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Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2011

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Résumé

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty.. an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possible depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice.

Dates et versions

hal-00632260 , version 1 (13-10-2011)

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Omer Biran, Francoise Forges. Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values. Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 73 (1), pp.52-64. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.009⟩. ⟨hal-00632260⟩
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