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Article Dans Une Revue Regional Science and Urban Economics Année : 2011

On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game

Résumé

In this methodological paper, we prove that the famous tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988) in which the capital is completely owned by foreigners possesses a Nash equilibrium even when the assumption of symmetric jurisdictions is dropped. The normality of both private and public goods is all that is needed concerning restrictions on preferences when a peculiar regime of taxation is ruled out. Moreover, we show that conditions about technology allowing for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are satisfied by most of the widely-used production functions.
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Dates et versions

hal-00618727 , version 1 (02-09-2011)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00618727 , version 1

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Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, Abderrahmane Ziad. On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2011, 41, pp.439-445. ⟨hal-00618727⟩
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