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Article Dans Une Revue Applied Economics Letters Année : 2010

Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment

Résumé

Traditional models of belief formation in repeated games assume adaptive players who do not take strategic interactions into account. We find that these approaches are limited in the sense that people think more strategically and realize that, in contrast with the classical view, their own actions are likely to influence their opponents' behaviour.

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hal-00607238 , version 1 (13-07-2011)

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Kyle Hyndman, Antoine Terracol, Jonathan Vaksmann. Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment. Applied Economics Letters, 2010, 17 (17), pp.1681-1685. ⟨10.1080/13504850903120691⟩. ⟨hal-00607238⟩
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