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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2011

Intrafim Bargaining, Worker Flows, and Employment Protection

Résumé

This paper provides a rationale for employment protection based on the interaction between the firm's decision on firing and the wage bargaining process with its workers. We develop a matching and intrafirm bargaining model where large firms hire workers on a frictional labor market and decide to destroy low productivity jobworker matches. The coexistence of entry and exit worker flows gives rise to a specific interaction between the firing decision and the wage bargaining process. This interaction causes inefficient decisions for hiring and firing and numerical simulations show that a combination of firing taxes and severance payments leads to an efficient labor market.
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Dates et versions

hal-00566168 , version 1 (15-02-2011)
hal-00566168 , version 2 (13-07-2012)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00566168 , version 1

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Tristan-Pierre Maury, Fabien Tripier. Intrafim Bargaining, Worker Flows, and Employment Protection. 2011. ⟨hal-00566168v1⟩
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