French CEOs' Compensations: What is the Cost of a Mandatory Upper Limit? - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue CESifo Economic Studies Année : 2010

French CEOs' Compensations: What is the Cost of a Mandatory Upper Limit?

Résumé

n the middle of the 90s, the sharp increase in globalization and the last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to what extent such a model can reproduce the observed chief executive officer (CEO) compensations. The size elasticity of CEOs' compensations in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensations. To moderate these compensations, a wage cap is often called for not only by opinion and the European Left but also, more surprisingly, by representatives of shareholders. The cost of this policy is evaluated in this job assignement model and the lobbying of shareholders is investigated and explained above some thresholds.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-00497583 , version 1 (05-07-2010)

Identifiants

Citer

Fabienne Llense. French CEOs' Compensations: What is the Cost of a Mandatory Upper Limit?. CESifo Economic Studies, 2010, 56 (2), pp.165-191. ⟨10.1093/cesifo/ifq002⟩. ⟨hal-00497583⟩
60 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More