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Article Dans Une Revue Economics Bulletin Année : 2009

Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games

Résumé

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
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Dates et versions

hal-00490152 , version 1 (22-11-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00490152 , version 1

Citer

Douadia D. Bougherara, Sandrine S. Costa, Gilles G. Grolleau, Lisette L. Ibanez. Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games. Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (4), pp.3194-3202. ⟨hal-00490152⟩
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