On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2010

On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening

Abstract

A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents), which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the question whether using undesirable goods is profitable to the seller. We prove that in general this may be the case, depending on the correlation between agents types and aversion. This is due to screening effects that outperform this aversion. We analyze, in a continuous framework, both 1D and multidimensional cases.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
ALFS.pdf (189.64 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-00488417 , version 1 (01-06-2010)

Identifiers

Cite

Aimé Lachapelle, Filippo Santambrogio. On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening. 2010. ⟨hal-00488417⟩
177 View
59 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More