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Article Dans Une Revue Economics Letters Année : 2008

Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests

Résumé

This paper analyses jump bidding in ascending auctions in the case of takeover contests. The free riding condition explains that some jumps can occur driven by the own bidders free-rider condition. We also show that ascending auction can be inefficient.

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Dates et versions

hal-00448000 , version 1 (18-01-2010)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00448000 , version 1

Citer

Christian At, Pierre-Henri Morand. Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests. Economics Letters, 2008, 99 (3), pp.458-460. ⟨hal-00448000⟩

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