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Article Dans Une Revue International Review of Law and Economics Année : 2010

Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking

Résumé

This paper develops a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized “race to the bottom” of asylum law. Neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonization are found to be in the interest of both host countries. Especially the most popular destinations like EU border countries would suffer from losing discretion. However, minimum standards would benefit refugees and less popular destinations.
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Dates et versions

hal-00447157 , version 1 (14-01-2010)

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Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer, Marie Obidzinski. Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking. International Review of Law and Economics, 2010, 30 (1), pp.86-97. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2009.09.004⟩. ⟨hal-00447157⟩

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