Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-Poor Microfinance Institutions - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Development Economics Year : 2009

Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-Poor Microfinance Institutions

Not file

Dates and versions

hal-00382221 , version 1 (07-05-2009)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00382221 , version 1

Cite

Cécile Aubert, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de Janvry. Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-Poor Microfinance Institutions. Journal of Development Economics, 2009, 90 (1), pp.153-162. ⟨hal-00382221⟩

Collections

CNRS GRETHA
47 View
0 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More