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Article Dans Une Revue International Game Theory Review Année : 2008

Multistage communication with and without verifiable types

Résumé

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.

Dates et versions

hal-00360739 , version 1 (11-02-2009)

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Frédéric Koessler, Francoise Forges. Multistage communication with and without verifiable types. International Game Theory Review, 2008, 10, pp.145-164. ⟨10.1142/S0219198908001844⟩. ⟨hal-00360739⟩
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