Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists versus Engineers. - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics Année : 2008

Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists versus Engineers.

E. Grifell-Tatje
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hal-00280784 , version 1 (19-05-2008)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00280784 , version 1

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E. Grifell-Tatje, K. Kerstens. Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists versus Engineers.. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2008, 79 (2), pp.227-248. ⟨hal-00280784⟩

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