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Article Dans Une Revue The BE Journals in Theoretical Economics Année : 2006

Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information

Résumé

We extend a simple version of the citizen candidacy model (developed by Osborne-Slivinski (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist only two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to 3. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low.
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Dates et versions

hal-00173956 , version 1 (21-09-2007)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00173956 , version 1

Citer

Wilfried Sand-Zantman, Georges Casamatta. Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information. The BE Journals in Theoretical Economics, 2006, 5 (1), pp.Article 3. ⟨hal-00173956⟩
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