Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2021

An Interactive Prover for Protocol Verification in the Computational Model

Résumé

Given the central importance of designing secure protocols, providing solid mathematical foundations and computer-assisted methods to attest for their correctness is becoming crucial. Here, we elaborate on the formal approach introduced by Bana and Comon in [10], [11], which was originally designed to analyze protocols for a fixed number of sessions and which more importantly lacks support for proof mechanization. In this paper, we present a framework and an interactive prover allowing to mechanize proofs of security protocol for an arbitrary number of sessions in the computational model. More specifically, we develop a meta-logic as well as a proof system for deriving security properties. Proofs in our system only deal with high-level, symbolic representations of protocol executions, similar to proofs in the symbolic model, but providing security guarantees at the computational level. We have implemented our approach within a new interactive prover, the SQUIRREL prover, taking as input protocols specified in the applied pi-calculus, and we have performed a number of case studies covering a variety of primitives (hashes, encryption, signatures, Diffie-Hellman exponentiation) and security properties (authentication, strong secrecy, unlinkability).

Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
longversion.pdf (554.14 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
licence

Dates et versions

hal-03172119 , version 1 (17-03-2021)

Licence

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03172119 , version 1

Citer

David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, Charlie Jacomme, Adrien Koutsos, Solène Moreau. An Interactive Prover for Protocol Verification in the Computational Model. SP 2021 - 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2021, San Fransisco / Virtual, United States. ⟨hal-03172119⟩
2432 Consultations
1705 Téléchargements

Partager

  • More