Unilateral Dominance and Social Discounting - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2024

Unilateral Dominance and Social Discounting

Abstract

This paper addresses the intricate challenge of establishing social discount rates across far-reaching generations, particularly in the face of divergent social viewpoints. We propose a principle of future-improved unilateral dominance to characterize social discount rates. Despite its divergence from traditional principles, our principle prioritizes the welfare of distant generations, resonating with a minority concern within society. Our findings indicate that society adhering to this principle exhibit greater patience and future-oriented concern than any individual. TThis approach, contingent upon the preferences of current generations, offers theoretical pathways to enhance considerations for the welfare of the distant future in the context of long-term environmental projects or activities.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
main.pdf (152.41 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-04487520 , version 1 (04-03-2024)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-04487520 , version 1

Cite

Xiangyu Qu, Bach Dong Xuan. Unilateral Dominance and Social Discounting. 2024. ⟨hal-04487520⟩
66 View
56 Download

Share

More