



**HAL**  
open science

# The Relationship between Public Authorities & Third Sector Organisations in Changing Welfare States: The Case of Asylum Reception Services in France and in Italy

Giorgia Trasciani

► **To cite this version:**

Giorgia Trasciani. The Relationship between Public Authorities & Third Sector Organisations in Changing Welfare States: The Case of Asylum Reception Services in France and in Italy. Economics and Finance. Aix-Marseille Université (AMU); Università di Napoli "l'Orientale", 2020. English. NNT: . tel-03508502

**HAL Id: tel-03508502**

**<https://hal.science/tel-03508502>**

Submitted on 9 Jun 2023

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI NAPOLI  
“L'ORIENTALE”  
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE UMANE E SOCIALI  
DOTTORATO IN STUDI INTERNAZIONALI  
XXXII CICLO

And

AIX-MARSEILLE UNIVERSITÉ  
FACULTÉ D'ÉCONOMIE ET GESTION (FEG)  
ÉCOLE DOCTORALE DE SCIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES ET DE GESTION D'AIX-MARSEILLE (ED 372)  
LABORATOIRE D'ÉCONOMIE ET DE SOCIOLOGIE DU TRAVAIL-CNRS (UMR 7317)

**« The Relationship between Public Authorities & Third Sector  
Organisations in Changing Welfare States:  
The Case of Asylum Reception Services in France and in Italy »**

**Candidate:** Giorgia Trasciani

**Tutor:** Dr. Giuseppe Lucio Gaeta

**Tutor:** Prof. Francesca Petrella

**Coordinator:** Prof. Luigi Mascilli Migliorini

**Coordinator:** Prof. Pierre-Xavier Meschi

ACADEMIC YEAR 2018-2019

SECS-P/03 Scienza delle Finanze

Sciences économiques

*The responsibility for the views expressed herein rests solely with their author. These views do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Universities. The University of Aix Marseille and the University of Naples, L'Orientale do not endorse nor disapprove any of the opinions expressed in this thesis.*

Vorrei ringraziare tutti coloro che mi hanno pazientemente accompagnata in questo percorso.

Senza tutti Voi, questo lavoro non avrebbe visto luce.

I miei professori, Francesca Petrella e Giuseppe Lucio Gaeta. Oltre che per insegnamenti teorici, letture consigliate, seminari, e conferenze, in particolare vorrei ringraziare per l'insistenza di Giuseppe nel tirar fuori qualcosa da illeggibili dati ISTAT, e perché per primo ha scommesso in questo percorso; Francesca per il suo sostegno accademico e morale, per le infinite ore trascorse a discutere di un terzo settore migliore, e delle sue contraddizioni, per il sorriso, la pazienza che sempre mi hanno sostenuta, e il suo modo di guidarmi senza mai sostituirsi alle mie scelte.

Vorrei ringraziare coloro che mi hanno concesso il loro tempo, e le loro preziose parole, durante le interviste. L'accoglienza è un diritto, e sostenere anche solo una persona in arrivo, può salvare l'umanità.

Inoltre ringrazio Giulia Galera, Bernard Enjolras, Philippe Eynaud e Marco Musella per aver letto questo lavoro: grazie ai loro commenti, ho cercato e cercherò, di renderlo migliore. Ringrazio anche Nadine Richez-Battesti e Delphine Mercier per avermi permesso di confrontarmi con loro durante il percorso e che hanno fatto parte del mio comité de suivi a AMU.

La mia Famiglia. Mamma, che ha cercato di trasmettermi la sua tenacia e combattività, Papà, che mi ha insegnato che l'Eroe è ogni uomo libero e che rivendica tale libertà, Ieia e Dario, le mie stelle, per cui tutto vale la pena.

Senza di loro, io non sarei, io non sono.

Le mie amiche, quelle di sempre, che nonostante la distanza, nonostante la difficoltà di capire in che città mi trovassi esattamente in ogni periodo dell'anno, non mi hanno mai, mai lasciata in questi ultimi 23 anni e sempre hanno aspettato il mio ritorno in quartiere – *“amiche da na vita, amiche pe' la vita”*.

I miei innumerevoli coinquilini, amici, pezzetti di cuore sparsi per il mondo. Un giorno o un anno insieme mi avete comunque cambiata (Valeria, Daniela, Benedetta – indispensabile fonte nel mio terreno a Marsiglia - Francesco & Martino, Diana, Leo, Adriano, Guillaume, Francesco, Ada & Emiliano, Garance, Alberta, Olivia & Yoan, Joana, Maxime, Sofia & Marta, Matteo, Paolo, Carlos, Piera, e infine tutti i topi che hanno condiviso gli immobili che ho abitato). I miei colleghi, con cui certo non posso dire di condividere solo un ufficio, ma soprattutto tutto il resto (Benni, Franci, Mauro, Marzia, Lorenz, Totore, Laura, Antonella, Todor, Rosita, Federica, Giulia, Pauline, Lisa, Enrico – con cui ho condiviso gli ultimi momenti pre-consegna con foto, video-chiamate e messaggi per lo più di scarso senso -, Francesca, Laura, Camille, Michela, Tomaso e tutti gli altri). Grazie a tutto il network EMES, per gli scambi, gli inputs, le conferenze, e i momenti piacevoli condivisi.

Infine un ringraziamento speciale va a Giovanni, il mio compagno. Al mio fianco in ognuna delle imprese in cui ho deciso di gettarmi. La voglia di scoprire, capire e lottare, che lo caratterizzano, sono state da esempio e da stimolo. Le lunghe discussioni su Foucault, Pettigrew, Harari, e gli altri, hanno scandito questi anni. L'unico a sostenere il ritmo di viaggi, spostamenti, cellulari persi, scatoloni lasciati in giro per l'Europa, conferenze e ripetuti traslochi internazionali. I viaggi in regionale. L'unico con cui condivido i miei libri. L'unico con cui mi sento sempre a casa.

E' stato magnifico, ogni passo fatto.

Da migrante fortunata,  
dedico la mia tesi a tutti coloro  
che hanno un passaporto meno fortunato del mio.

*“From up here the Earth is beautiful,  
without borders or boundaries”.*  
*Yuri Gagarin (1961)*

# Table of Contents

<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Chapter 1 Third Sector Organizations: Definition, Scope and Size .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>1.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>1.2. Definition.....</b>	<b>21</b>
1.2.1. An Historical Prospective .....	22
1.2.2. Alternative Definitions: Social Economy, Social Enterprise, and Social Entrepreneurship .....	24
<b>1.3 The Different Legal Forms .....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>1.4 The Number of the TSOs in the EU.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>1.5 The Economic Theories .....</b>	<b>32</b>
1.5.1. The Theory of Social Efficiency.....	32
1.5.2. The Organizational Economics Theories .....	33
1.5.3. The Theories of Demand .....	33
The Supply-Side Theory .....	35
<b>1.6 The Relationship with the State in the EU Public Policies .....</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>1.7 The TSOs in Italy: Legal Aspects.....</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>1.8 The TSOs in France: Legal Aspects .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>CH.1 What to remember?.....</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Chapter 2 The Literature Review : the Evolutions of TSOs in Changing Welfare Systems.....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>2.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>2.2 An Historical Perspective of the Transformation of the Welfare State in Europe ....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>2.3 The Emergency of the Welfare Mix .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>2.4 The Market Instruments Implementation .....</b>	<b>46</b>
2.4.1. The Quasi-Market .....	48
2.4.2. The Performance Control .....	49
<b>2.5 The Interaction Between Public Authorities and TSOs .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>2.6. The Internal Configuration of the TSOs and the Business like Evolution.....</b>	<b>55</b>
2.6.1 Marketization.....	57
2.6.2 The Value for Money .....	58
2.6.3 Corporatisation .....	58
2.6.4 Professionalisation.....	59
<b>2.7 Are There Any Alternative to Isomorphism? .....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>CH. 2 What to Remember? .....</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>Chapter 3 The Analytical Framework and the Methodology .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>PART 1 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>3.1.1 A Multilevel and Processual Analysis based on an Institutional Perspective.....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>3.1.2 The Macro Level of Analysis: Evolutions of the Third Sector .....</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>3.1.3 The Meso level Analysis – an Intra -Organizational Perspectives.....</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>3.1.4 The Micro level – an Intra-Organizational Perspective .....</b>	<b>74</b>
Isomorphism.....	76
Institutional Logics .....	81
Resource dependence .....	87
<b>3.1.5 What to Remember? .....</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>PART 2 THE METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>3.2.1 Introduction.....</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>3.2.2 The Mixed Methods Research Design .....</b>	<b>92</b>
<b>3.2.3 The Quantitative Methodology .....</b>	<b>95</b>

The Data.....	95
The Analysis .....	95
<b>3.2.4 The Qualitative Data .....</b>	<b>96</b>
3.2.4.1 Multiple Embedded Case Studies.....	96
3.2.4.2 The Selection of the Cases.....	100
<b>CH. 3 What to Remember? .....</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>Chapter 4 The Macro Level - The Third Sector Organizations in Numbers .....</b>	<b>111</b>
<b>Part 1 ITALIAN THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN NUMBER.....</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>4.1.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>4.1.2 Data.....</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>4.1.3 Third Sector in Italy: facts and figures.....</b>	<b>116</b>
4.1.3.1 Number of organisations and human resource employed .....	116
4.1.3.2 Territorial Distribution .....	118
4.1.3.3 Fields of Intervention.....	125
4.1.3.4 Legal Forms.....	129
<b>4.1.4 The Determinants of TSOs Distribution across Italy: an Empirical Investigation</b> .....	<b>134</b>
4.1.4.1 Incidence of TSOs in Italian Provinces.....	136
4.1.4.2 Determinants of TSOs' Density Heterogeneity among Italian Provinces.....	139
4.1.4.3 Results.....	143
<b>4.1.5 Investigating the business-like evolution of Italian TSOs .....</b>	<b>148</b>
4.1.5.1 TSOs' Professionalization in Italy: an Analysis of Provincial Data .....	151
<b>PART 2 FRENCH THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN NUMBER.....</b>	<b>157</b>
<b>4.2.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>157</b>
<b>4.2.2 The Data .....</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>4.2.3 The Incidence of the TSOs .....</b>	<b>159</b>
4.2.3.1 Organizations .....	159
4.2.3.2 HR.....	161
4.2.3.3 Territorial Distribution .....	165
4.2.3.4 Sectors of Activity .....	166
4.2.3.5 Legal Forms .....	168
<b>4.2.4 Business Like Evolution: Focus on Associations .....</b>	<b>170</b>
4.2.4.1 Concentration of the Budget.....	170
4.2.4.2 The Associations' Economic Resources .....	174
4.2.4.3 The Size .....	176
<b>CH 4 What to Remember? .....</b>	<b>179</b>
<b>Chapter 5 The Meso Level – The Analysis of the Organizational Field.....</b>	<b>181</b>
<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>5.1 The Role of the EU Regulation .....</b>	<b>183</b>
5.1.1 The Beneficiaries of Protection .....	183
5.1.2 Reinforcing Boundaries and Centralizing Governance .....	184
5.1.3 Crisis and Accountability in the EU Migration Regime.....	187
5.1.4 The Fragmentation of the Instruments of Reception.....	189
<b>5.2 The French Case Study .....</b>	<b>191</b>
5.2.1 The Elements of the Field in France .....	191
5.2.2 The Evolution of the Organizational Field .....	207
5.2.3 Considerations on the French Case .....	224
<b>5.3 The Italian Case Study.....</b>	<b>229</b>
5.3.1 The Elements of the Field in Italy .....	229
5.3.2 The Evolution of the Organizational Field .....	243
5.3.4 Considerations on the Italian Case.....	251
<b>5.4 Considerations on the Reception Service in Italy and France .....</b>	<b>256</b>
<b>CH.5 What to Remember? .....</b>	<b>259</b>

<b>Chapter 6 The Micro Level – An Intra-Organizational Analysis</b> .....	<b>262</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>263</b>
<b>6.1. The French Case Studies in Marseille</b> .....	<b>264</b>
<b>6.1.1 Case Study 1 ALAN</b> .....	<b>266</b>
Main Organizational Steps .....	266
Isomorphic Process .....	271
Institutional Logics .....	273
Resource Dependence Perspective .....	275
<b>6.1.2 Case Study 2 SAJIDA Association</b> .....	<b>279</b>
Main Organizational Steps .....	279
Isomorphic Process .....	286
Institutional Logics .....	288
Resource Dependence Perspective .....	293
<b>6.1.3 Case Study 3 FOFANA</b> .....	<b>297</b>
Main Organizational Steps .....	297
Isomorphic Process .....	304
Institutional Logics .....	306
Resource Dependence Perspective .....	308
<b>6.1.4 Transversal Analysis</b> .....	<b>310</b>
<b>6.2. The Italian Case Studies in Naples</b> .....	<b>313</b>
<b>6.2.1 Case Study 1: DERMAN Cooperative</b> .....	<b>316</b>
The Organizational Main Steps.....	316
Isomorphism.....	320
Institutional logics.....	322
The Resource Dependence Perspective.....	325
<b>6.2.2 Case Study 2 BEUTY Association</b> .....	<b>328</b>
The organizational main steps.....	328
Isomorphic Process .....	332
Institutional Logics .....	333
The Resource Dependence Perspective .....	336
<b>6.2.3 Case Study 3: DESTINY Social Cooperative</b> .....	<b>338</b>
The organizational main steps.....	338
The Isomorphic process .....	340
Institutional Logics .....	341
The Resource Dependence Perspective.....	344
<b>6.2.4 Transversal Analysis</b> .....	<b>346</b>
<b>CH.6 What to Remember?</b> .....	<b>350</b>
<b>Chapter 7 The Discussion of the Findings</b> .....	<b>352</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>353</b>
<b>PART 1</b> .....	<b>354</b>
<b>7.1.1 The Macro Level</b> .....	<b>354</b>
<b>7.1.2 The Meso Level</b> .....	<b>356</b>
7.1.2.1 The Elements of the Field: Regulations, Actors, and Financial Instruments.....	356
7.1.2.2 The Evolution of the Organizational Field .....	359
<b>7.1.3 The Micro Level</b> .....	<b>363</b>
<b>PART 2</b> .....	<b>366</b>
<b>7.2. General Discussion</b> .....	<b>366</b>
7.2.1 Marketization.....	366
7.2.2 Corporatization.....	369
7.2.3 Professionalization.....	370
7.2.4 The Performance.....	371
7.2.5 Different responses to the institutional pressures .....	372
<b>CH. 7 What to Remember?</b> .....	<b>376</b>



<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>377</b>
<b>List of Tables .....</b>	<b>382</b>
<b>List of Figures.....</b>	<b>384</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>386</b>
<b>Annex 1 The Interview Guidelines.....</b>	<b>408</b>
<b>Annex 2 The Case Studies Conflicting Institutional Logics.....</b>	<b>412</b>

## List of Acronyms

ANAEM	Agence nationale de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrants
ADA	Aide Demandeur d'Asile
ASGI	Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici Italiana
CADA	Centre d'accueil pour demandeurs d'asile
CAO	Centre d'Accueil et Orientation
CARA	Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo
CAES	Centre d'Accueil et d'examen de la situation
CAS	Centro Accoglienza Straordinaria
CARDA	Centre d'assignation à résidence de demandeurs d'asile (Hébergement Dublinés Ile de France)
CNDA	Cour Nationale du Droit d'Asile
CFDA	Coordination Financière Droit d'Asile
CHRS	Centre d'hébergement et de réinsertion sociale
CHUM	Centre d'hébergement et d'accompagnement pour migrants
CPA	Centre de Premier Accueil
CPH	Centres Provisoires d'Hébergement
CPO	Centre de pré-orientation
CPR	Centri di Permanenza per il Rimpatrio
DDCS	Direction départementale de la Cohésion sociale
DPM	Direction de la Population et des Migrants
DPAR	Dispositif Préparatoire au Retour
DPCM	Decreto Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
EU	European Union
FTE	Full time equivalent
HATSA	Accueil temporaire service d'asile
HPST	Hôpital, patients, santé et territoire
HUDA	Hébergement d'Urgence pour Demandeurs d'Asile
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration and Policy Development
INSEE	Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques
IOM	International Organization of Migration
ISTAT	Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
OFPRA	Office Français des Réfugiés et des Apatrides
PACA	Région Sud Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
PADA	Plateforme d'accueil pour demandeurs d'asile
PRAHDA	Programme d'Accueil et d'Hébergement des Demandeurs d'Asile
RMI	Revenue Minimum d'Insertion
SPRAR	Sistema per rifugiati e richiedenti asilo – system for refugees and asylum seekers
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency

## Introduction

“The Third sector is confronted nowadays with the deepest crisis of confidence never seen before”. With these dramatic words the President of the *Federsolidarietà*, Stefano Granata opened his speech less than one year ago, at the conference “*Territori accoglienti. Terzo settore e enti locali: dalle pratiche alle sfide future*”, in Trento. His message to the audience made of social workers and employees of the Italian third sector organizations (TSOs) active in the sector of reception for asylum seekers and refugees was clear. He pointed out the transformation of the TSOs, which are losing their peculiarities and their alternative organizational identity compared to the for-profit organizations.

Despite the denounced crisis, the Third sector (TS) continues to grow all across Europe, registering over 29 millions FTE workers in Europe, volunteers and paid workers included (Enjolras et al., 2018). The TS confirms being a heterogeneous group of organizations, joined together because independent of government, and value driven - instead of motivated solely by profit as the for-profit enterprises. They distinguish themselves from the other organizations on the market, because they are motivated by the desire to achieve social goals, they reinvest a part of their surplus generated in the pursuit of their social goals, and are characterised by a participatory governance. Incorporating elements from multiple economic sectors, today, TSOs are considered as hybrid organizations by nature, since they combine both social and economic objectives and are influenced by different institutional logics, sometimes contradictory (Skelcher & Smith, 2015).

However, in the last decades a process of transformation of the TS has been observed by a number of scholars. The TSOs are becoming more similar to for-profit organizations, in a number of terms (Maier et al., 2016), making the differences between traditional categories more blurred. Brennan and colleagues (Brennan et al., 2012) observed a trend of application of market instruments to the relations with other actors. In particular, the introduction of market instruments implied the transformation of public funding systems, the creation of quasi market and an increased competition across the sector (Le Grand, 2011a). A trend of transformation of the structure of the organization, which became bigger, due to merges and acquisitions (Eynaud, 2019), led to an internal reorganization in departments and more structured organizational charts (Horwitz, 1987). Finally volunteers, although they still represent a large part of the persons involved in the sector, are flanked by professionals and experts (Gadrey, 1994).

This isomorphic transformation process, has been defined as a “**business like evolution**” of the TSOs, (Baines, 2010; Hvenmark, 2013b; Maier et al., 2016), and its understanding in the case of reception services for asylum seekers is the heart of this research.

The transformation of the TS cannot be understood, unless it is contextualised in a broader transformation of our society and in particular of the welfare system. Starting from the early 1970s, a radical transformation of the structures and ideological foundations of the welfare state has taken place in most European countries. In a context of budget constraints for social policy and New Public Management (NPM) reforms, based on the belief that the public sector would work better if it takes on private sector management as an organizing principle (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, Esposito et al. 2017). That context has led, in the 1980s, to the configuration of a new discursive order, which has redefined the modalities and structures of state intervention. Public governance radically changed (La Spina and Majone, 2000, Majone 1997). Indeed, a structural shift happened from an interventionist or positive State to a

“Regulatory State”. No longer a direct economic actor, the State becomes a regulator, ensuring the smooth functioning of free markets, through regulation, with the aim to correct market failures (Gilardi, 2009, Majone 1997). This evolution, among others, marks the shift from “government to governance” (Seidman and Gilmore, 1986; Grabosky, 1995; Scott, 2000). Welfare States changed differently across Europe, of course. However, still some similarities emerge, in particular the introduction of market mechanisms to allocate public funds and the introduction of quantitative indicators of performance with the aim to reduce public expenditures and improve policies efficiency.

So although we retain that the TSOs are by nature hybrid organizations, however, due to intense institutional pressures, different processes of isomorphism can encourage the spread of entrepreneurial logics and competition, which could transform intimately the organizational internal configurations and the relationship with the other actors on the market.

Based on this complex framework, the heart of **our research focus** can be expressed by the following question:

Under strong institutional pressures, how are TSOs dealing with asylum seekers reception services able to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other organisational forms?

### *An institutional approach to study the TS*

In order to study this complex process of change, and contextualise it appropriately, we decided to apply an institutional approach based on both an economic and an organizational perspective. On the one hand, from an economic perspective we will apply **the New Institutional Economics (NIE) analytical framework** (Williamson, 2000). The NIE analytical framework based on four levels of analysis -embeddedness, institutional, governance and resources - proposes a holistic approach in order to study the economic dynamics, taking into account the institutional pressures, which explain the raise of the organizations. Based on this framework actors’ behavior is not the merely result of internal characteristics, but instead is attributed to its context or to “higher-order factors” (Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006), as the “economic organizations’ behaviors are shaped by the organizational industries, fields or national policies” (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006 p.195). Thus this approach considers contextual elements as highly relevant to understand organizational dynamics providing neo-classical theory of a considerable level of realism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).

Despite the effort to overcome the rationalistic approach and introduce the impact of the institutional framework, the NIE analytical framework does not enough capture the internal dynamics of the organizational change, and it results as unable neither to open the “black box” of the organization nor to answer the complex question concerning the organizational diversification (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005). This is why we complement our analysis with an “organizational institutional approach”. The organizational approach will allow us to study first the interaction among – meso analysis – and then within – micro level – the organizations on the field. Explaining the business like evolution as a process – using a

processual analysis - implies to understand the interactions among the external and internal dynamics, and place them into a specific context. This is why we focus on a specific sector of activity the social service sector of the reception for asylum seekers and in a particular city, Naples in Italy and, Marseille, in France.

Furthermore this work will not only describe a process of isomorphism and the consequent homogenization of the TSOs, which embrace the business like evolution. It will also examine the differences that persist among the organizations. Although apparently they react to external pressures almost in a similar way, and start, in order to survive, to “play the new role of the game” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) at the organizational field, they still enact specific strategies and combine in different ways competing institutional logics. Thanks to an analysis carried out through the lenses of Isomorphism, Institutional Logics approaches and Resource Dependence Theory, we will analyse the various organizational responses to the external constraints.

### *The Sector of Reception for Asylum Seekers*

As above mentioned this research focuses on the reception services for asylum seekers. In the last two decades, we assisted to a sharp increase of Third Sector Organizations (TSOs) dealing with assistance for asylum seekers and refugees. In terms of legitimacy, Third Sector Organisations have been recognised particularly suitable to fill the space left empty by the public sector, because they are values-based organisations (Tortia & Caroli, 2017) (Galera, 2016). Furthermore, the so-called “migration crisis” has demanded a huge effort to the third sector in the field (Jose Luis Monzón & Chaves, 2017)

The reception services for asylum seekers, as well as other social service sectors, have been under the pressure of market instruments to compress the budgets, and of performance indicators in order maintain high quality standards while reducing prices. The sector is characterised by a huge number of reforms, some of them aimed at privatization and marketization- introduced through approaches influenced by New Public Management (NPM). Indeed, quasi-markets have been established with the aim of encouraging providers to compete in providing the best-quality services at the lowest cost (Le Grand, 1991) (S Dan & Andrews, 2016).

But these kinds of reform concerning the market regulation do not represent the only type of pressure experimented by the TSOs involved in this sector. The reception service is a crosscutting service. It responds, on the one hand, to the dynamics of social policies and assistance of disadvantaged people, no matter their nationality, and to logics of securitization on the other. In the last 20 years, the matter concerning migration gained importance in the political agendas of all the EU Member States (EUMS). Concerning the migration policies, at the EU level, these policies changed based on two processes. On the one hand, the Schengen process, the creation of a free area of movement for European citizens, which also implied the Dublin Regulation, led to a strengthening of external boundaries. On the other hand, at the end of the 90s beginning of 2000s, the “managerial approach” gained consensus among the international organizations (Aguillon, 2016).

This work aims to analyse the market-oriented evolution of the asylum seekers reception sector, and the business like of the TSOs involved in it, through a comparative case study in France and Italy. In both countries, the reception system is characterised by multi-level governance, a growing number of actors, as well as a growing number of facilities’ models,

including temporary and emergency structures. The multi-level governance, composed by European Institutions, International organisations, national governments and agencies, as well as NGOs, TSOs and private enterprises, has not been always clear and easy to apply.

In this increasingly crowded field, it is quite hard to observe a system of co-construction between public authorities and TSOs in the production of these services; instead the dominant model seems to be the introduction of market mechanisms and quantitative indicators of performance, in order to control the action implemented by the management bodies. Indeed, very often the TSOs responding to public tenders, sign very detailed contracts, where their freedom of action is limited to a list of tasks to be funded. Meanwhile, a phenomenon of multiplication of reception facilities has been observed both in France and Italy. The new reception facilities are generally less expensive and their very short-term contracts permit to adjust very fast the services' conditions.

### *A multi- level analysis*

In order to study such a process, taking into account the complexity of both the external and internal contexts, we will carry out an analysis at different levels, which enable us to consider the institutional pressures on the one hand, and the internal organizational characteristics and strategic responses on the other, passing through the processes of their iterations. In line with the literature, we decided to analyse the business-like evolution, based on three main processes, which we will observe from different perspectives: the marketization, the corporatization and the professionalization.

The institutional analytical framework will enable us to apply a **multi-level approach** based on a threefold level of analysis, macro, meso and micro level.

At the **macro** level, we will study the Third sector, observing the main trends of transformation at the national level, in Italy and in France. We will analyse how the sector has evolved in terms of number of employees, volunteers and paid workers, in terms of size of the organizations, sector of activities and territorial distribution. Finally, for the Italian case, we will analyse the impact of the surrounding contextual framework on their patterns of development. In other words, we will study the factors that stimulate or limit the TSOs development at the provincial level.

At the **meso** level we will study the interactions among the different actors involved in the field of reception services. We will analyse the interactions between the TSOs themselves and between TSOs and public authorities. A detailed analysis of the organizational field evolution will be carried out in order to explain the impact of the market instruments application to the sector and more generally, of the reforms in the sector. We will explain then the strategic choices and the role played by the most relevant actors in the field and their positions in the context of the organizational field. The interactions between actors are then heavily influenced by the strategic choices undertaken by TSOs, in terms of collaboration and conflict, both among TSOs and between TSOs and public authorities.

At the **micro** level we will explore the internal dynamics of the organizations and their transformations both in terms of organizational configuration and characteristics - the employees, the size and the governance - and the multiple logics moving the organizations

and defining their identity. We will analyse both the process of isomorphism and the strategic choices, which at the opposite highlight the agency of the organizations, and their ability to actively respond to external pressures.

So the main objectives of our research are:

- At the macro level: To understand the nature and the evolution of the Third Sector in a complex and changing environment;
- At the meso level: To identify the nature of the interactions - among TSOs and with other actors in particular with public authorities - characterizing the organizational field and understand the on-going changes;
- At the micro level: To study the TSOs organizational configurations:
  - ❖ The nature of the isomorphic processes towards the business like evolution;
  - ❖ The institutional logics characterizing internally the organizations that may be competing and create internal tensions;
  - ❖ The various strategies adopted, going from “conformity” to “resistance”.

### *The research design*

This research is conducted through a mixed method design, combining quantitative and qualitative methods, where the qualitative part is dominant. As shown in the picture 1, while the macro level will be analysed through a quantitative analysis, a qualitative methodology will be applied to both meso and micro levels. The contextual constraints and the institutional pressures at the macro level will be analysed through the lens of the NIE perspective while an analysis of the organization field will be carried out at the meso level. The micro level will focus on the internal dynamics of the organizations.

The quantitative analysis will permit to better define the TS both in Italy in France and to observe the broad picture of the TSOs, main trends and the evolution characterizing the last decade. With the aim of checking whether the business-like evolution of the TS has been observed in Italy and in France, we will analyse this trend based on two different lenses, building upon the available data in both countries. For the Italian case, we will focus on its presumed professionalization. For the French case, we will focus on the distribution of public and private funds and on concentration of the market. Furthermore for the Italian data, in order to study the factors that stimulate or limit the TSOs development in the Italian provinces, we will rely on a cross-sectional regression analysis based on provincial data. In this analysis the territorial incidence of TSOs is used as the dependent variable and a wide set of covariates is considered as potential determinants on the basis of the existing literature. This literature explains TSOs proliferation by considering supply side factors – such as stakeholders who have an interest in the production of TSOs services, e.g. social

entrepreneurs, workers, etc – and demand side factors – such as potential consumers, beneficiaries and users (Nyssens, 2008).

Concerning the qualitative analysis, in order to connect the different levels of analysis, we will apply three approaches: the New Institutional Theory, and in particular institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), Institutional Logics (Thornton and Ocasio 1999) and the Resource Dependence Theory (Selznick 1949). In order to show the process of homogenization of the TSOs, which in this case it is mostly represented by the business like evolution, we will apply the concept of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This process of homogenization could be faced very differently from the organizations, and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) show three main process of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. We will refer to the Institutional logics approach to identify the internal interpretations of the TSOs' members, in order to analyse their position respect to the external context. The Resource Dependence will be the lens to analyse the different strategies adopted by TSOs to cope with external constraints, beyond isomorphic processes. The data used in this part are collected at sectorial and organizational levels. A total of six case studies have been analysed, three in Naples (Italy) and three in Marseille (France), collecting different types of information, through the triangulation of data such as interviews, documents and observation. The TSOs are based on the same geographical area so that they face the same institutional pressures from their environment.

Table 1 resumes our mixed method design, applied to the multi-level analysis.






Table 1. Mixed Method Design Applied to a Multi-level Analysis

### *The dissertation structure*

The PhD dissertation is organized in seven chapters. The work starts with the literature review and the explanation of main concepts on which our thesis relies upon. It then presents our analytical framework and research methodology. The **chapter 1** presents the literature review on the **TSOs** to better understand the characteristics of these organizations and the related issues that are at the heart of today research work. It includes the definition, which will be applied during all the work. In the **chapter 2** we will focus on the changing welfare systems, which are nowadays rather configured as a welfare mix, and on the New Public Management reforms, in order to explain the evolution of the public intervention in particular in social and health services. These main transformations have an impact on the relationship between the public authorities and the TSOs, which is always more mediated by market instruments. Furthermore they also have an impact on the internal configuration of the TSOs. We will then expose the concept of the business-like evolution. The **chapter 3** is divided in two parts: the analytical framework and the methodology. In the first part we explain how we use mobilize different theoretical supports, the NIE at the macro level, the organizational field and the processual analysis for the meso level and the three theoretical approaches to go deeper into the organizations at the micro level (institutional isomorphism, institutional logics and resource dependence) while in the second part we will expose the mixed method applied to this research and the data used. We then introduce our research question:

Under strong institutional pressures, how are TSOs dealing with asylum seekers reception services able to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other organisational forms?

How is configured the evolution of the relationship between public authorities and TSOs and between TSOs themselves?

How does this evolving relationship impact on the internal configuration, identity and sense of actions of value-based organisations? Is there any room for resistance to the diffusion of new practices and logics due to the external context?

Which kind of strategies the organizations put in place in order to cope with external pressures?

Once set all the basic elements in these three initial chapters, the second part will be dedicated to the empirical analysis and to the presentation of the results. **Chapter 4** presents our quantitative analysis based on data concerning TSOs in Italy and in France. Firstly we will analyse the sector and its main features, then we will focus on the numbers, which could confirm the business like evolution of the sector. In addition, in Italy we will study the impact of the contextual framework through a cross-sectional regression analysis, due to the access to available data. In the **chapter 5** we will analyse the organizational field of reception services. A very detailed time-line will be explained and the main events, which had an impact on the evolution of the sector is explained in details, with a major attention dedicated to the market instruments implementation and evolution and the legal framework will introduce the analysis of the organizational interactions. In this way we will offer a detailed analysis of the reception service for asylum seekers in France and Italy within a multi-level analysis, taking into account the European, national and local dimensions of the migration

and reception policies on the organizational field. The **chapter 6** presents the case studies. Six organizations, three in Naples (Italy) and three in Marseille (France) are presented in details. We will then show the isomorphic processes they have embarked on, the logics interactions and the strategies implemented characterizing each of the case studies. Finally in **chapter 7** we will present our comparative analysis of the two cases (Naples and Marseille) and highlight our main results within a general discussion.






Table 2. The PhD Dissertation Structure

# Chapter 1 Third Sector Organizations: Definition, Scope and Size

**CH1: The Third Sector Organizations - TSOs**

Definition(s)  
 The different legal forms  
 The Number of the TSOs in the EU  
 The Economic Theories  
 The Relationship with the State in the EU Public Policies  
 The TSOs in Italy: Legal Aspects  
 The TSOs in France: Legal Aspects



## 1.1 Introduction

To find a proper definition of the concepts “Third Sector” (TS) and “Third Sector Organisations” (TSOs) is still nowadays very complex, despite the large number of studies and the quantity of literature dedicated to the subject at European and international levels. This is due to the enormous diversity of entities potentially embraced (Enjolras et al., 2018). The local characteristics - stratified at multiple institutional levels: legal, historical, and political – has favoured the creation and development of very different forms of organizations, commonly characterized by not being public, neither classical capitalistic enterprises, but still very different among them and across countries. Due to all this complexity, and diversity at European level, but also worldwide, in this work we decided to adopt the term TSO as an umbrella term, embracing a large number of different organisations, as we will show later in the section dedicated to the definition.

Actually, because of the very local specificities, Salamon and Sokolowski highlight proliferation of different terms to indicate the range of non-market, non-state, and non-household initiatives in Europe (L. M. Salamon & Sokolowski, 2015).

In the UK and Anglo-Saxon region the concept more used are: “third sector”, “civil society”, “voluntary and community sector”, “volunteering”, “social enterprise” and “social economy”, but actually, the only legally recognised is “public charity”, which has its legal basis in the Charities Act of 2011. In Northern Europe, such as in Germany and Austria a broader conceptualization prevails, which is based on the concept of “Non-profit Institutions” (NPIs), characterised by an absolute prohibition on distribution of profits to members. However concepts such as “civil society”, “TS”, and “NPO” are often used as synonymous. In Nordic countries nine different kinds of legal forms (voluntary associations, ideal organizations, idea-based organizations, self-owning institutions, foundations, social enterprises, cooperatives, mutual insurance companies and banks, and housing cooperatives) constitute what is referred as TS. In Central and Eastern Europe the most common term used to refer to this kind of phenomenon is “civil society”, even if recently, a very broad and inclusive conception of “TS” widespread. In Southern Europe, and France and Belgium as well, the concept of “social economy” is very used, gaining political and legal recognition very often. Being important the presence of cooperatives, the boundaries between market and non-market are not totally well defined. Then, departing from end of 90s another concept spread across both the rivers of Atlantic, the concept of “social enterprise”.

Different definitions are also based in opposing ideological, cultural and political views (Chandhoke, 2001; Defourny, Develtere, & Fonteneau, 1999; Fowler, 2002). If at the origin during XIX century, the working class associationism is the starting glimmer, with the utopists such as: Robert Owen, Saint-Simone, Fourier and Proudhon. But then, different schools of thoughts and traditions, inspired by from left wing social movements, and socialist associationism, to social Catholicism and liberal approach, developed. Finally, in the most recent period, the debate across the two rivers of the Atlantic specific focused on the definition of TS (A. Evers & Laville, 2005). Actually the US definition focuses more on an economic approach that explained the so-called “non-profit” organizations as a result of market and state failures, and where clear frontiers are established between the three sectors, private business, public service and non-profit. At the opposite, the European academic interest in the TS is more oriented by sociological and political science approach, focusing on the role of TSOs in the framework of an evolving welfare system and on (democratic) governance systems (A. Evers & Laville, 2005).

This first chapter will permit to prove the complexity of the phenomenon, and to highlight the difficulty to make an international definition under which to categorize the phenomenon. In order to use the widely acceptable definition, we choose to use the latest definition of TSOs created by Salamon and Sokolowski (2015) in the context of the European project Third Sector Impact (TSI). The definition, which is one of the most updated, is the result of the joint efforts of a number of academics and experts on TSOs at international level, from all over Europe.

Once introduced the definition, included the legal forms which are part of the sector, we will offer an overview, with the data available from the TSI project at the European level. Then, we will show from an economic point of view, the different theories that try to explain the existence of TSOs. Those theories are analytically divided into two main macro-areas, the first one relatives to the supply side – stakeholders which have some kinds of interest in the production of TSOs services, such as social entrepreneurs, workers, etc. – and the second, concerning the demand side – consumers, beneficiaries and users (Nyssens, 2008). Finally we will give an overview of the TSOs in the two countries since they constitute the heart of our analysis Italy and France.

## 1.2. Definition

The definition of the TS used in this work is the last definition offered by Salamon and colleagues, as result of four-year project of research, including 11 research institutes, and funded by the European Commission, named “Third Sector Impact –TSI”. The European project Third Sector Impact - TSI tried to cope with this lack of definition. Actually, the project joined together an extraordinary number of institutions and researchers in a consortium partnership, with expertise on European TS realities, with the aim of formulating a consensus conceptualization of the sector. (Enjolras et al., 2018)

According to the conceptualization that emerged from their collaboration TS consists “*in private associations and foundations; non-commercial cooperatives, mutuals, and social enterprises; and individual activities undertaken without pay or compulsion primarily to benefit society or persons outside of one’s household or next of kin*” (L. M. Salamon & Sokolowski, 2015, p. 2).

Following the TSI definition (L. M. Salamon & Sokolowski, 2015), the TS embraces both institutional and individual components.

In-scope institutional components of the TS are:

- Organizations, i.e., involve groups of people whether legally constituted or not, who interact according to some understood procedures and pursue one or more common purposes for a meaningfully extended period;
- Private, i.e. institutionally separate from government and able to dissolve themselves on their own authority;
- Self-governing, i.e., in control of their basic mission and purpose formulated through their own internal governance procedures;
- Non-compulsory, i.e., engaging people without compulsion or coercion on the basis of free choice; and
- Totally or significantly limited from distributing any profits or surplus they may earn, i.e., either completely barred from distribution profits or under some legal or contractual obligation requiring them to limit this distribution in at least four of the following five ways:
  - o By adhering to an explicit social mission that frees them from the obligation to

- maximize profits;
- By limiting any distribution of profit to 50% of any surplus earned;
- By adhering to a “capital lock” on any retained assets;
- By employing or serving a significant share (e.g., at least 30%) of persons with special needs; and
- By adhering to a prohibition on the distribution of surplus on the basis of capital invested or fees paid.

In-scope individual activity components of the TS are:

- Be undertaken without compulsion, i.e., on the basis of free will;
- Be unpaid, i.e., without compensation except for reimbursement of costs;
- Produce benefits for others or for society, and not primarily for the person doing them or for the members of that person’s household or their next kin;
- Be carried on for a meaningful period of time, usually defined as at least an hour in a particular reference period.

This new collective definition goes in the direction of recognizing a broader role of TSOs than just economic one. TSOs can potentially play a role in society, not just in terms of economic and social action. Their distinctive function is as actors of the civil sphere, which is in line also with Etzioni’s definition, the third sector characterized by value-driven action and commitment from individuals operating within it (Etzioni, 1973), and Lewis’ group of people joined together because shared values and idealism (D. Lewis, 2003).

Furthermore, following Phillips and Smith, we recognise three area of intervention of the TSOs (Phillips & Smith, 2011): democracy and participation, public policies and service delivering. Actually, being organisations democratically managed, they enable citizens to enhance their participation, being part of collective action and increase human capital and reciprocal supports among people and territorial cohesion (Putnam, 2000). Secondly, as grounded –based and managed by citizens, TSOs are key partners of public authorities and very often among the most important stakeholders into the participatory decision making process. Finally they offer services and they can do this in very different way, as partners of public authorities (A. Evers, 2005; L. M. Salamon, 1999) or independently.

### 1.2.1. An Historical Prospective

The European Institutions since the end of ’80<sup>1</sup> are trying to formulate an appropriate definition of TS, with both the aim of creating a positive economic environment where different economic organisational forms could compete fairly, and on the other hand create an appropriate European regulatory framework. At the same time also the European academic community was trying to conceptualise a valid and applicable definition of TS. Actually, although strongly influenced by the US definition, however European academics shift the attention principally to the role of the TSOs within the welfare mixed, the relationship with the public authorities and their role in society in broader terms.

The two approaches are marked by different roots, which in turn had a strong impact on the actual configuration. Actually in US, already in the constitution is highlighted the non-

---

<sup>1</sup> The Communication “Business in the social economy sector: Europe’s frontier-free market” (1989)



distribution constraint for no-profit supposed to be the instruments for individuals to enable social change, through volunteering actions. Already Tocqueville during his staying in US, beginning of XIX century highlights the role of the NPOs in the US, as a space of freedom for citizens in contraposition to the State hierarchy (De Tocqueville, 1835). In Europe the roots of the TS are based on cooperatives as instrument for collective movement to change the quality of their and their community life. At the beginning of XIX century the first (workers and consumers) cooperatives and mutual companies started to grow in different European countries, under the pressure of the workers' movement. Workers get together, although sometimes such kinds of organisations are banned, to improve their living standards, and to support and show each other solidarity. So workers cooperatives on the sector of construction, textile and clockwork, consumer cooperatives to purchase bread and foods and basic commodities, but also mutual-aid organization formed voluntarily by individuals to protect members against income insecurity started to arise (Jacques Defourny & Nyssens, 2017a; José Luis Monzón & Chaves-Ávila, 2008). Following Desroche (Desroche, 1987) a number of different traditions are behind the workers movement throughout XIX century: Socialism, Christian-social, liberal and Solidarity movements. These different approaches varied in importance, according to time and geographical space. So it is not surprising that while in Europe cooperatives mutual societies, and associations dominate the TS, in the US foundations play a central role.

Concerning more recent periods, Defourny and Nyssens say that a strong impact on the development of the TS in the two sides of the Atlantic is due to the source of found of the organisations (Jacques Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). On the one hand in the US, where the role of the public sector in the economic sphere, dramatically decreased after 70s, we see that the share of public support in many subsectors decreased, while the share of commercial income increased significantly (Kerlin, 2006). On the other hand in the EU although considering a high variability across the countries, however the relations with the public sectors changed more in shape than in quantity. Very often the public authorities and TSOs, in order to offer welfare services, create partnerships, and if before 90s the former founded the latter through direct grants, nowadays the quasi-market and competitive tenders are the most currently used method.

Nowadays, in the framework of the North-American context, the concept of TS is a synonymous of non-profit. This means that the organisations have to show a characteristic of non-distribution constraint, which is quite strict. The "non-distribution constraint", used as well by the Johns Hopkins approach, basically says that no surplus is to be distributed among members (in order to prevent a for-profit-orientation). This is a compulsory characteristic required to the non-profit organisations in the US to take advantage of tax deduction. This definition is also applied in some other European countries, in order to identify the non-lucrative associations. But in the case of the US only the organisations characterised by non-distribution constraint could be part of the TS, in this way all the cooperatives and mutual societies, which redistribute a part of their profit to members are excluded. Being very restrictive characteristics, it does not include a large number of organisations, which are instead very numerous in the European traditions.

In conclusion where in the US, the no-profit organisations are synonymous of TSOs, because their high presence and the constitutional law imposing non-distribution constrain, in the EU, where the presence of cooperatives, mutualistic societies and associations is more important, the TS includes a more variegated types of organisations. These differences, based on different tradition, and different impact of public authorities on the development of the sector

are still evident nowadays, and put the basis for different approach of study and interpret the phenomenon. So if in the US approach there is an evident interest in the distribution constraints, in the EU approach there is still a lot of interest in the thematic related to democratic governance and the relation with public authorities and the welfare system, which is considered as the truly innovative factor in the view of the EMES network stream of research. As asserted by Enjolras and colleagues:

“Relaxing the nonprofit distribution constraint to include organizations that can distribute some surpluses generated by their activities, but by law or custom are “significantly limited” in the extent of this distribution, can thus provide a suitable proxy for the concept of public purpose that is central to our philosophical concept of the third sector and hence offers the operational basis for differentiation between in-scope and out-of-scope cooperatives, mutuals, and social enterprises that we are seeking” (Enjolras et al., 2018, p. 33).

### **1.2.2. Alternative Definitions: Social Economy, Social Enterprise, and Social Entrepreneurship**

As already mentioned, based on different cultural tradition different terms have been used across Europe to refer to a sector, which is not private neither public. Actually, in France already at the end of XIX century the term social economy started to be used. Actually in 1830 Charles Dunoyer published the “*traité d'économie sociale*”. The term social and solidarity economy is still nowadays the most used, and in 2014 recognised by law. The law includes in the social and solidarity economy the organizations, which have a different objective than the profit redistribution. In particular the attention is paid to the governance, which is required to be democratic and has to foster the participation and information of members, workers, and stakeholders. Actually, cooperatives and mutual companies are assumed satisfied automatically these requirements. As heritage of the workers collective struggles of the XIX century, the social and solidarity economy balance a general and a mutual benefit. The Italian economist Gui (Gui, 1991) distinguishes the two categories based on beneficiaries. Gui sustains that there are basically two groups in all the organisations. There is a group of persons who control the organisation, taking the most important decisions, and holding the power, which is called the “dominant category”. Then, a second group that is defined “beneficiary category”, which identifies beneficiaries, such as workers, consumers, users, and investors, who have the residual decision-making power, especially as to the allocation of the “residual surplus” (profit). In the mutual benefit organizations the beneficiary category and the dominant category are the same group of stakeholders. They are so created to provide services for the benefit of the persons who control or finance them, including members or associates. Mutual benefit organizations include all traditional types of mutual and cooperative organizations (consumer coops, worker coops, producer coops, credit and savings coops) as well as voluntary associations driven by the interest of their members (such as sport clubs, professional associations, etc) (Defourny & Nyssens, 2017) The other category general or public benefit organizations, they are created for charitable, philanthropic or welfare reasons to provide goods or services to other persons. The beneficiary category is different from the dominant category: they are voluntary organizations oriented to serving other people (beneficiaries) than their members, who control the organization; more generally, they include all philanthropic and charitable organizations.

In the last decades, another concept spread the concept of social enterprises. Depending on the school of thought to which reference is made, we can recognize a multiplicity of definitions, which Dees and Anderson (Dees & Anderson, 2006) have distinguished into two major categories. Firstly and most spread the “earned income” school of thought which use

the term to indicate the use of commercial activities by non-profit organizations as alternative funding strategies to support of their mission. Secondly, the “social innovation” school of thought, which confides a crucial role to the social entrepreneur, identified as a change-maker (Dees, 1998), able to find innovative solution to societal problems. So an entrepreneur but is motivated by a social mission. At the European level, the most accepted and spread is the EMES definition (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). This definition is based on a list of indicators, based on both economic and social characteristics.

Four criteria reflect the economic and entrepreneurial dimensions of social enterprises:

- A continuous activity producing goods and/or selling services;
- A high degree of autonomy;
- A significant level of economic risk;
- A minimum amount of paid work.

Five other indicators encapsulate the social dimensions of such enterprises:

- An explicit aim to benefit the community;
- An initiative launched by a group of citizens;
- A decision-making power not based on capital ownership;
- A participatory nature, which involves various parties affected by the activity;
- A limited profit distribution.

Finally another emerging concept, very linked to the previous one and very used across Europe, as well as on the other side of the Atlantic rivers, is the concept of social entrepreneurship. The concept emerged around ‘80s and gained popularity since the 1990s. Mair and Marti define social entrepreneurship as “a process consisting of the innovative use and combination of resources to explore and exploit opportunities, that aims at catalysing social change by catering to basic human needs in a sustainable manner” (Mair & Marti, 2006, p. 3). Austin and colleagues define social entrepreneurship as an “innovative, social value creating activity that can occur within or across the non-profit, business, or government sectors” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 2), which is in line with the definition used by Petrella and Richez-Battesti, as the two authors qualify “all the entrepreneurial initiatives that serve a social and/or environmental mission and that reinvest a large part of their surpluses in support of their mission” as social entrepreneurship (Petrella & Richez-Battesti, 2014, p. 143). The two authors framed the spread of this term in a context of economic recession and of great uncertainty about the future of Welfare States. Actually they explained that the concept is strongly linked to another concept “social innovation” used to indicate all the innovative solution to the societal needs, where the previous solutions are not anymore applicable due to the contest of the public budget constrains, but also emergence of new needs (Petrella & Richez-Battesti, 2014).

### 1.3 The Different Legal Forms

From their collective bottom-up review process, Salamon and colleagues recognized 4 clusters of entities: NPOs, mutual societies, cooperatives, social enterprises and human actions, such as volunteering and social movements.

As shown in picture 1, the categories could overlap with government, for-profit businesses and household activities, as the TS could result by an interaction among these three poles. This representation also shows that the TS rather being interpreted as an intermediary sphere, or an independent sector, it is actually, totally dependent by the framework, and it represents a kind of plural public space, where different values coexist (A. Evers & Laville, 2005). In these terms as show by Pestoff (Pestoff, 2012), TS seems to be an open and intermediary space where there is always the presence and impact of the other spheres such as State, with a

redistributive logic, Market with a business and commercial logic, and Community (family, local network etc.), with a reciprocity logic. This is why the organizations part of the TS, are represented as occupying the circular area in the middle, where a kind of hybridization among different logic exists.

Defining a perimeter of TS consists in identifying also the legal and institutional forms, which are part of the sector. If there is a certain consensus on the principles that govern TSOs, national differences appear evident at national level, where not always the concept of social economy is clearly mentioned. It is also true that, the same organisational forms could have different legal definition based on the single national legal framework.

We will mention in this paragraph, only a short list of the organisations part of the movement, upon which there is a kind of shared agreement and without entering in more specific details, as we will do for the paragraph about France and Italy.

### **1. Cooperatives**

As already mentioned the cooperatives family, under the ICA umbrella, gathers cooperatives active in very different fields. At the origin of the movement there are the Rochdale Pioneers, who founded in 1844 the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, an early consumer co-operative, forming the basis for the modern co-operative movement. Nowadays, there are more than the 3 million of cooperatives around the world (ICA, 2018)<sup>2</sup>: agricultural cooperatives, banking cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, housing cooperatives, insurance cooperatives, workers cooperatives, social cooperatives, and others. 100 million people around the world are employed by co-operatives, whilst 800 million are members.

### **2. Mutual Societies**

Depending on their principal activity and the type of risk they insure, mutual societies are divided into two large classes or categories. One group comprises mutual provident societies. Their main activity is covering the health and social welfare risks of individuals. The second group is mutual insurance societies. Their principal activity usually centres on insuring goods (vehicles, fire, third party insurance, etc.), although they can also cover areas related to life insurance (José Luis Monzón & Chaves-Ávila, 2008).

The mutual societies are worldwide followed a process of institutionalisation and in a number of industrialised countries they become part of the social security system, guaranteeing plurality of the offer (particularly in Belgium and France). The Mutual companies are active also in other sectors however, such as mutual insurance (Defourny & Nyssens, 2017).

### **3. Associations**

The no profit organizations are differently legally defined in the EU countries. They operate in all the sector of activities included social services, health, education, culture and sport, advocacy, volunteers promotion, labour union, trade and employment associations. They could be funded by public source or by members' subscription. Associations, differently by social enterprises and cooperatives, respect more often strictest rules concerning the non-redistribution of profit among members, such as in France (*loi 1901*) and in Belgium the *associations sans but lucrative* asbl.

---

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.ica.coop/en>


#### 4. Foundations

The foundations are a category of TSOs that will typically provide funding and support for other charitable organizations through grants, but may engage directly in charitable activities.

#### 5. Social Enterprises

The term, nowadays very discussed in the academic debated has been started to spread around 90s on both sides of the Atlantic (Jacques Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). However the concept remains quite opens to different interpretations. Salamon and Sokolowsky define social enterprises as enterprises that use market-type activities to serve social purposes (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2015). Defourny and the EMES research network instead, use the term in a more broad way, defining social enterprises as a set of organisations whose mission is to benefit either their members or a larger community rather than to generate profits for investors (Defourny, 2001). The EMES concept is then an open concept, able to gather different types of TSOs.

Figure 1.1 The TS Graphic Representation




Source: Salamon and Sokolowski 2015.

#### 1.4 The Number of the TSOs in the EU

For all the reasons already specified until now, the data concerning the TSOs in Europe are difficult to be collected. This is due to the different definition used across Europe, and so the difficulty to categorize under the same umbrella terms organizations operating in different context and differently defined at national level. Actually just concerning the definition we can see that in different areas the terminology changes.

Although the difficulties and the contradictions however, the researchers of the TSI project, based on the previously shown definition, tried to present a picture of the situation. Salamon and colleagues, based on previous studies (Salamon, Sokolowski, & Associates, 2004) identified the following five dimensions as the most relevant in order to show the magnitude of the TS: Workforce size, Workforce composition, TSOs sector of activities, TSOs Sector revenue sources, TSOs sector institutional composition. In the following pictures are resumed the results of their study.

**Figure 1.2 Size of the TS workforce compared to other sector of activities in the EU**




Source: Salamon and Sokolowski, 2018.

The picture 2 shows, the number of FTE - full time employees - in the TS at the European level. There are over 29 million FTE workers in the TS in Europe, volunteers and paid workers included. This makes the sector among the most vibrant and populated, after manufacturing and trade, and before construction, transportation and accommodation and food.

Out of the more of 29 million of FTE 45% are paid employees and the others are volunteers, as shown in picture 3. Actually the TS is the only sector, differently than private and public one, that can count on volunteers.


Figure 1.3 Composition of the TS workforce in the EU



Source: Salamon and Sokolowski, 2018.

In picture 4 are shows activities in which the TS in Europe is involved. Unfortunately, there are not more disaggregated data, so the researchers divided the activities into 3 main macro-areas; services, and expressive function and other. The service function includes activities in education, social services, health care and housing and community development, and direct volunteer action. The expressive function involves activities in culture and recreation, membership organizations— such as labour unions—business and professional organizations, environmental organizations and religious congregations. Finally, the other function includes activities of charitable foundations, international organizations, as well as activities not elsewhere classified. Picture 4 shows that more than 70% of activities are services. This confirms that in the EU the TS continue to be one of the main actors in the offer of welfare services.


Figure 1.4 European TS activities



Source: Salamon and Sokolowski, 2018.

In figure 1.5 the sources of the revenue are shown. They are gathered together in three groups: Private fees and sales; government: public grant or contract by tenders; and private philanthropy. As shown in the cake the most important piece is private fees and sales, which cover 54% of the total revenues. The picture shows than that the market activity of the TSOs in Europe is quite developed. Furthermore, under the categories government, there are not only the direct grant, but also the public contracts, obtained by tender. This means that the service produced by TSOs and sailed to the public authorities are included in this area are in fact purely sales activity.

**Figure 1.5 European TS Revenue Structure**



Source: Salamon and Sokolowski, 2018.

Based on the kind of revenues the organizations based their economic revenues, following Chaves and Monzón, we can recognised two macro-categories: a) the market or business subsector – cooperatives, social enterprises, mutual insurance and others - and b) the nonmarket producers’ subsector – associations and foundations and others (see the table 1 “TSOs market and non-market subsectors”).

TSOs could be market producers, which means that their output is mainly intended for sale on the market at economically significant prices, while the distribution of profit, which is generally limited is in any case proportional to the capital or to the fees contributed by the members but in accordance with the member's transactions with the organisation (José Luis Monzón & Chaves-Ávila, 2008).

Concerning the non-market sector, they are basically no-profit organization, applying the non-distribution principle. Monzon and Chaves described the category as follows: “they are private, formally-organised entities with autonomy of decision and freedom of membership that produce non-market services for families and whose surpluses, if any, cannot be appropriated by the economic agents that create, control or finance them” (2008:28).



**Table 1.1 TSOs Market and non-market subsectors**

TSOs	
Market Subsector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cooperatives (workers, agrifood, consumers, education, transport, housing, healthcare, social etc.)</li> <li>• Social enterprises</li> <li>• Other association-based enterprises</li> <li>• Other private market producers (some associations and other legal persons)</li> <li>• Non-profit institutions serving social economy nonfinancial organizations</li> <li>• Non-financial corporations controlled by the SE</li> <li>• Credit cooperatives</li> <li>• Mutual insurance companies and mutual provident societies</li> <li>• Insurance cooperatives</li> <li>• Non-profit institutions serving social economy nonfinancial organisations</li> </ul>
Non Market Subsector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social action associations</li> <li>• Social action foundations</li> <li>• Other non-profit organizations serving households (cultural, sports, etc.)</li> </ul>


Source: Chaves and Monzòn, 2016

However this differentiation is becoming less and less relevant, as many non-profit organizations have to sell goods and services on the market to survive. Actually, with the spread of the contractual relation above mentioned, among the public authorities and the TSOs, and the definition of tenders in orders to distribute public funds, make TSOs compete among them and in some sectors with other organizations. We will discuss more in details this process in the next chapter, when we will explore the change of the welfare system and the introduction of the market instruments to manage the relationship among public actors and TSOs.

Finally, the last figure, the figure 6 shows the different legal forms composing the TS in Europe. Actually, the 59% is composed by No-profit organisations, the 31% by direct volunteering, the 9% by cooperatives and mutual and 1% by social enterprises.

In the next paragraph we will briefly present the differences among these legal forms.

Figure 1.6 The European TSOs legal forms



Source: Salamon and Sokolowski, 2018.

## 1.5 The Economic Theories

A number of economists dedicated their research to the theories, which tried to explain the emergence of the TSOs from an economic perspective (Anheier & Ben-Ner, 2002; Ben-Ner & Gui, 2002; Nyssens, 2008, 2017). As shown by Nyssens (2008, 2017) at the beginning some theories reflect a neoclassical approach and based on the theory of the social efficiency. Then other theories, so called economic theories of organisations, based on the institutional economics, included transaction cost theory, principal agent theory and contract theory, tried to find alternative reasons, aimed at opening the black box of the organisations, although maintaining the assumption of rational choice of subjects in the sense of an optimal choice according to the criteria of neo-classical economics<sup>3</sup>. All these theories are not in contraposition but instead very often mobilize similar arguments. They could be analytically divided into theories of demand - the theory of trust; the theory of imperfect information; the theory of public goods; Voluntary failure theory; and theory of supply – the entrepreneurship theories. The following paragraphs follow the works of Nyssens (2008, 2017) and Anheier and Ben-Ner (2002), in order to schematise the different economic theories, which try to explain the emergence and evolution of the TSOs.

### 1.5.1. The Theory of Social Efficiency

The theory of social efficiency is based on the assumption that there is an optimal distribution of resources in society operated by the market, composed by consumers and enterprises maximizing their profit. Social efficiency is closely related to the concept of Pareto efficiency – A point where it is impossible to make anyone better off without making someone worse off. Specific conditions are required in order to market allocates resources efficiently,

<sup>3</sup> Even if, among them some such as the transaction costs theory, calls into question the principle of full rationality, moving instead the concept of limited rationality (Simon 1951).

included full satisfaction of the conditions for perfect competition, and purely private goods<sup>4</sup>. When these conditions are not filled the market's resources allocation is not anymore Pareto efficient. This situation is known as market failure. The market failure is one of the explication for the public intervention in the economic sphere, and for the existence of TSOs as well.

### 1.5.2. The Organizational Economics Theories

The theories of organizational economics behind differences, share two elements the transaction costs and the concept of efficiency (Nyssens, 2017). Concerning the first point, Williamson highlights the conditions making particularly expensive the transaction on the market (Williamson, 1975). He says basically that that hierarchies and markets are alternative governance structures to organizing economic activity and that economic actors choose the governance structure that minimizes the cost associated with transaction. The transaction costs could be, costs of coordination and costs of motivation (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), where the first refers to measurement costs and input coordination, the latter to the opportunistic behaviour of actors and agency theory. So in condition of information asymmetry these costs are related to agent's control.

### 1.5.3. The Theories of Demand

Historically, their reason was to explain the emergence of NPOs but we can enlarge these approaches to TSOs with a limited non distribution constraint. The theories of demand include the theory of trust (Hansmann, 1980), based on the market failure, the theory of public goods (Weisbrod, 1977), based on public sector failure, and the theory of State-TSOs interdependency (Salamon, 1987) based on the no-profit failure.

#### *The Theories based on Market Failure*

Market failure provides TSOs an opportunity for being considered by demand stakeholders more suitable than for profit capitalistic enterprises (Ben-Ner & Gui, 2003). In the neo-classical paradigm the condition of perfect information is one of the conditions *sine qua non* of the equilibrium in the optical of Pareto optimality. When an actor detains more information than another in a transaction, which is the situation of information asymmetry, the market could not provide anymore an efficient allocation of resources. On the other hand, sometimes, in particular in uncertain environments, excessively complicated contracts would be required, in order to forecast all the possible scenarios. However, even complex contracts, in uncertain environments and imperfect information, will be incomplete. In this context of incomplete contracts and asymmetric information, actors detaining more information could behave opportunistically.

Two models are then developed: adverse selection and moral hazard. In adverse selection models, the ignorant party lacks information while negotiating a contract, which could be related to the lack of information concerning the quality of the good, whereas in moral hazard the ignorant party lacks information about performance of the agreed-upon transaction or lacks the ability to recoup the losses for a breach of the agreement.

---

<sup>4</sup> Goods that are fully rival and without any externalities.

Concerning the first point there are services, which could be evaluated in quality only once realised, *ex post* and not before or during. Some examples are related to the kind of services such as relational services, education, healthcare, nursery services etc., but also in the case of the choice of the providers in a public tender. While the users invest in the relation, they became also dependent on suppliers. In these cases using the price as unique indicator may prove to be unsatisfactory to detect the good provider. Actually, if the market price is too low the good providers could decide to leave the market, as they would retain that their efforts would not be repaid adequately and they won't be able to produce their services maintaining the same level of quality. On the other hand raising the price, the risk is to excessively remunerate bad providers. In order to overcome the problem and prevent opportunistic behaviour different solutions could be experimented. Firstly, defining other signals, in addition to market price, such as the qualification of the workforce, based on the idea that qualified workers could offer a higher quality service. Another solution could be the reputation based on past performance. Actually, when transactions are repeated over time, then the beneficiary became informed. The reputation is in these terms a way to gain the confidence. Principal could also count on independent monitoring agencies, such as audit agencies and consultants. Obviously, these kinds of solution could be applied both by capitalistic for profit enterprises, and TSOs, but this latter category also can implement the so-called "non-profit correcting devices" (Ben-Ner & Gui, 2003).

Firstly in the "trust hypothesis" Hansmann (Hansmann, 1980), suggested that non-profit legal forms, imposing a the non-distribution (or at least limited) constraint could preclude undesirable behaviours. Secondly, TSOs can count on the implication of volunteers. Furthermore members, often not only select workforce based on qualification, but also on the implication on the project and motivational aspects. Finally, members can implicate demand stakeholders as well for securing better performance also in activities different than management control.

The second case is the moral hazard. In this situation an opportunistic behaviour could result from different causes. Firstly, when the principal is not in place during the implementation of the work such as in the case of a parent who leaves child at the nursery, or a public authorities contracting out a service to another economic actor. Second when during the implementation of the service, the situation changes, such as in the case of health deterioration of a sick person. Finally in the case exceeding demand facing a limited supply. Actually when starting a service required high investment and public subvention are limited, so the number of providers is limited, then they can exercise a market power, while the users (or the public authority funding the service) have no incentive to leave, as not sure to find better.

In this case again principal can apply to both for profit and TS organizations a number of corrective devices, such as contracts based on performance, contracts based on result or efficiency wages contracts. In any case, the principal need to indicate a number of indicators in order to evaluate the agent's performance.

Furthermore in the case of TSOs the organisation could count on motivated workers, which behind remuneration are firstly driven by values and principles (Benz, 2005). Finally as raised up by Queinnec in some sectors, profit-maximising producers might not have an incentive to enter into the market, from an economic point of view (Queinnec, 2012), as they don't have profit margins. But as differently motivated, or publicly funded, the TSOs will offer the service.

### ***The Theories based on Government Failure***

The government failure theory developed initially by Weisbrod (1975) is based on the assumption of heterogeneity of the demand. According to this theory, government provision of quasi-public goods is quite homogeneous as based on the preferences of median voters, therefore, hardly able to meet the needs of all the users. So if the problem of the equity is solved, however, public sector is not able to answer specific needs. On the other hand the capitalistic enterprises would not be able to produce public goods, such as not rival goods, neither such kinds of private goods that are the result of externalities, which are not adjustable through market price mechanism.

Instead, the TSOs are community-based and able to grasp more specific needs, which remain unanswered by public sector organizations, and to focus on specific sector of population. Otherwise, as often happens, for example in the health care sector, TSOs can develop complementary services (Nyssens 2017). Weisbrod's theory is particularly suitable to explain the TSOs intervention, when they are not publicly funded and when they answer to particular needs.

### **The Theory of Non-Profit Failure**

The theory developed by Salamon (Salamon, 1987) places TSOs at the core, where the two previous approaches rely them a residual role, compensating the State and market deficiencies (Nyssens, 2017). Actually Salamon sustains that TSOs in some sector even precedes the public intervention, detecting the issue earlier than the public authority. At this stage the TSOs mostly rely on members subscriptions or selling the services. Once the public authorities recognised a societal need, and institutionalised the action in a specific sector, instead of directly intervene, to capitalize the TSOs experience on the field, the public authority can decide to fund them. Actually public funding is needed due to the voluntary failures. The TSOs could have limits in the ability of producing large quantity of service, and so doing to remain focus on a limited sector of population. The public –TSOs partnership can solve this problem. The Salamon's approach overcome the competing relation among the two actors, focusing on the case of collaboration

### **The Supply-Side Theory**

Concerning the supply theories, they try to explain the motivations, which prompt social entrepreneurs to found TSOs. Rose Ackerman (Rose-Ackerman, 1997) suggested that ideology and altruism could be central factors in the actions of the TS entrepreneurs, while Young (Young, 1983) defines a number of social entrepreneurs profiles – artists, professionals, power seekers etc. - motivated not only by profit, but also by creativity, autonomy, or a different way to produce products and services. In these terms they would pursue objectives others than the monetary remuneration. Finally, specular to the market failure Hansmann (Hansmann, 1987) sustains that in order to reduce asymmetric information, demand-stakeholders could take part to the activities of TSOs (Ben-Ner & VanHoomissen, 1991) or take the ownership (Hansmann, 1996). Finally, as explained by Borzaga and Mittone (Borzaga & Mittone, 1997). Becoming part of the organisation, the different stakeholders can collectively control the activities of the organisation. The diversity of stakeholders implicated on democratic governance is a core subject of research for the European school of thought (Petrella, 2003).

In the table 1.2, presented by Nyssens (2017), all the different theoretical approaches are resumed, included of strengths and weakness

Table 1.2 The Economic Theories of TSOs

	Theories	Key-concepts	+	-
Demand – Side Theories	Market Failure	Imperfect information; trust based on the non-distribution constraint	The comparison between capitalistic for profit enterprises and TSOs based on the nature of the good/service	The non-distribution constraint is not a so strong argument; not attention paid on governance aspects
	Government Failure	Heterogeneity of the demand, median voters; based-rooted organisations able to grasp differentiated societal needs	Civil Society and Collective goods	As the State and TSOs are competitors there is no explanation for the public-TSOs partnership
	Voluntary Failure	The TS could be unable to reach all the population, limited offer; TSOs-State partnership	Collaboration instead of competition among the welfare services' suppliers	The role of the State is not enough explored
Supply –Side Theories	Theory of ideology and altruism	Social objective	Link to the heterogeneity of the demand	Simplistic vision of values
	If not for profit for what? Theory	Ideal –types of entrepreneurs	Multiple motivations beyond the profit	Simplistic definition of motivation
	Theory of Stakeholders participation	Imperfect information and implication of different stakeholders	Collective entrepreneurship and multiple of governance's models	There is a strong accent on trust and too small on the figure of entrepreneur

Source: Nyssens 2017.

## 1.6 The Relationship with the State in the EU Public Policies

As shown in the previous paragraphs, the role of the TSOs across the Welfare State could be described as in relation of partnership or as an alternative to public sector. This relation highly depends on the context (Williamson, 1991) or on the kind of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985). Actually, through the concept of embeddedness, the authors highlight that the kind of relation existing between the two actors, public sector and TSOs, causing effects on both sides, and changing considerably over time, is nestled in a specific historical moment.

While the components of the third sector cannot be understood without conducting an analysis of the public regulations governing them, at the same time the forms they take cannot be entirely attributed to the policies of state authorities.

Laville and Evers (2015) sustain that the TS in Europe is associated with the nature and expansion of public intervention. The authors identify three types of relationships between associations and public authorities.

- The first type is the universal or social–democratic system of Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Denmark. In this context, associations raise the voice of people, creating a contact among demand, the citizens and offer the public sector. Their function is not then to offer the service directly, but to act as a connector.
- The second type covers liberal and dual systems. The systems are characterized by the weakness of non-market services regulated by public authorities, and a public sector often based on monetary transfers (such as for Italy), resulting in a low level of social services' offer. In these systems TSOs often struggle to emerge as services producers, as they lack of economic resources or because in competition with private sector.
- The third type of association–state relationship is the corporatist regime. In the corporatist regime the TSOs gain a fundamental role, as they are considered as fundamental actors of the social policies and are often funded by public funds.

Moreover, as affirmed by Pape and colleagues (Pape et al., 2016) the economic recession strongly impacted directly and indirectly the configuration of TSOs and the interaction with public authorities. Economic downturn and related austerity policies after crisis, have not only affected the availability of public and private funding for TSOs, but also altered the modes of their cooperation with the state (Salamon, 1995). On the one hand the austerity policies aggravated the challenges TSOs are confronted with, on the other hand the expectation on TSOs have changed. Actually, consequently to the downsize of the public expenditures, TSOs regain a central role of welfare prevision and coping with labour exclusion, in order to fulfil welfare services not anymore covered by the State (Pape et al., 2016).

## 1.7 The TSOs in Italy: Legal Aspects

In Italy, during the last three decades the TS underwent an impressive change (Borzaga, 2004). Actually from the end of 90s when the sector's workforce counted around 300 thousands units (Borzaga, 1991) to nowadays, which counts almost 800 thousands paid workers and 5.5 millions of volunteers (ISTAT, 2018).

For long the TS has not caught the attention of the legislator. Actually, the different legal forms, which could be gathered under the umbrella definition of TS, have been regulated through a fragmented legislation. Associations and foundations, already appeared on the Civil Code approved in 1942, under the fascist dictatorship. As the fascism put the authoritarian State at the centre of welfare system, the TS have been confined to a residual role (Borzaga, 2004). The Constitutional chart seemed to mark a change, but more in theory than in the practice. Borzaga (2004) sustains that a quite particularistic and clientelistic welfare system has been instituted, leaving small room for TSOs. Furthermore, as the most part of the Mediterranean model the Italian welfare was mostly based on cash benefits.

At the end of the 1960s, the Italian welfare model began to show signs of crisis, which associated with economic crisis of '70s and changing societal needs included elderly population expanded, long term unemployment, drug abuse, homelessness, a demand for new solutions augmented. In this context a new wave of voluntarism canalized the generalized dissatisfaction. So if at the beginning the associations and voluntary organizations have been created, but these organizational forms did not allow for paid workers. For this reason, at some point to overcome the problem, the first social cooperatives have been funded, in order to implement a service of working integration of disadvantage people. Only in 1991 the social cooperatives have been legally recognized through the law 381/1991. Actually, Following Borzaga there are two main legal measures, which changed the landscape of the TS in Italy. The first one is the legal recognition of social cooperatives, which not only defined a more concrete opportunity to citizens to organize collectively themselves, but also marked a growing political interest for different forms other the public sector to provide social services. Another important turn point has been the reform of the public administration. The Law 241/1990 authorized the municipalities and the provincial and regional administrations to grant subsidies and economic aid to public and private bodies engaged in the delivery of services of benefit to the community. Ten years later the Reform of social policies (the Social Care Reform Act), demonstrated that the role of TSOs was changed, and so the including this kind of organizations both on the planning and management of social services (Borzaga, 2004).

The practice of TSOs-public authorities collaboration and particularly the contracting out spread up rapidly, but without a clear legal framework very often contracts were designed solely (or largely) to minimize the cost of the service, leaving no space to the innovative practices, quality of the services and nature of the organisations involved. Finally in the last years the practice of contracting out also brings to cases of illegality and corruption. The shocking story of *Mafia Capitale*, is the most impressive example of corrupted politicians and managers of social cooperatives doing illegal business and rigging public tenders. In any case the perception of people has changed again, and the TS is passing a huge silent identity crisis.

From a legal point of view in 2006 the legislative decree 155/06 defines the social enterprise. Then in 2017 the Code of Third Sector, has been approved. It represents a turning point for the TS in Italy. The Code of the Third Sector (Legislative Decree No. 117 of 3 July 2017) aims at reducing the normative fragmentation affecting the various third sector players by introducing a common definition for associations, foundations, social enterprises, philanthropic entities, and voluntary organisations, which are now all considered as “Entities of the Third Sector” (EVPA, 2018). The reform represents from both civil and fiscal law a very innovative perspective. Throughout article 104, the decree tries to reduce the normative fragmentation traditionally affecting the various entities of the Italian TS, by gathering most of them (i.e. associations, foundations, social enterprises, philanthropic entities, voluntary organisations etc.), below the common status of “Entities of the Third Sector”. The decree



also includes a definition of the activities of common interest<sup>5</sup>, which the entities of TS must (primarily or exclusively perform) in order to be admitted to the national register of the TS. Once admitted in the national register the organisations will be entitled to receive fiscal incentives. Finally, the Decree 12/2017 intervenes on the discipline of the social enterprise, abolishing the previous legislative decree 155/06 and giving greater flexibility to the this kind of organization. Social enterprise can be considered as a “qualification”, which can be chosen and assumed by any private legal entity, regardless of their incorporation as not for profit entities or for-profit companies, subject to their full compliance with the requirements of scope, performed activities and governance set by the new decree (esela 2018)<sup>6</sup>.

## 1.8 The TSOs in France: Legal Aspects

In France, the third sector constitutes an important economic force and is defined as social and solidarity economy (SSE) organizations (Pape et al., 2016). The term "Social Economy" firstly appeared in France during the first third of the XIX century (Defourny & Develtere, 2009). At the end of 1960s the term regains relevance thanks to cooperatives' and mutual societies' movement (Defourny & Nyssens, 2017). A charter of social economy is adopted in 1980 in order to define the specific features of the SSE organisations (SSEOs). Just one year later in '81, a decree created the inter-ministerial delegation for the social economy. The organizations included are both market and non- market organisations, associations, cooperatives and mutual societies, which deal with health care, culture, management bodies of catholic education, associations in charge of popular education, working integration enterprises. As observed by (Archambault, 2009), the definition qualifies the SSEOs as “*gestionnaires*”, managing institutions, not taking into consideration the role of advocacy played by these kinds of organizations. During the 2000s in France, the sector experienced a significant impact of the economic crisis. Even if the working force employed in the sector has globally grown, with a total increase of 0.8% between 2008 and 2013 (CNCRESS, 2014) however we observed a slightly decrease in the crisis years of 2011 and 2012 (Pape et al., 2016). Although the public fund cut, however the SSEOs gain momentum after crisis, and in 2014 a new law in Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) has been approved.

The French law n. 2014-856 on the Social and Solidarity Economy entered into force on 31 July 2014 (“SSE Law”). The SSE law revolutionized French SSE landscape in order to better sustain traditional SSE organisations and open the field to new social enterprises. According to article 1 of the SSE law, a “Social and Solidarity Economy Enterprise” (“ESS Enterprise”), including all the different legal forms have to fill a number of conditions, among them: must have a democratic governance, must pursue a purpose other than sharing profits, and must devote the majority of their profits to the objective of maintaining or developing the enterprise's social mission.

The traditional SSEOs, associations, cooperatives, foundations, and mutual societies are assumed to satisfy by default these characteristics, while other legal forms, included commercial enterprises, pursuing an explicit and primary social aim that benefits society, applying the conditions could be included within the SSE. Actually, this law intends to be the first “inclusive” law based on common values and characteristics, shared among SSEOs, regardless of their legal form (OECD/European Union, 2017). Indeed, the Law also includes

---

<sup>5</sup> Such as humanitarian assistance, health care, social assistance, scientific research, cooperation, development, etc.

<sup>6</sup> <https://esela.eu/news/landmark-reform-third-sector-italy>

in its purview a number of commercial enterprises, provided they respect specific principles, such as conducting a social utility purpose activity or directing profits towards this activity. The ministry of economy highlights that the law not only recognised the presence of SSEOs in all the sector of activity, but also put the base to define the social economy as a mode of entrepreneurship. A model to follow to conjugate economic efficiency, social utility, and democratic governance (Ministère de l'économie, de l'industrie et du numérique, 2015). Actually, the law pursues the following declared objectives: consolidating the network of SSE actors to reinforce their legitimacy in the public debate; facilitating their access to financing and public procurement; facilitating employees' takeover of their companies to preserve jobs modernising the status of co-operatives; enhance local sustainable development policies, particularly to incentivise the creation of jobs that cannot be outsourced (OECD/European Union, 2017). Furthermore the law highlights an on-going transformation such as the social entrepreneurship is gaining importance. Actually in 2011 the "*Mouvement des entrepreneurs sociaux*" – the social entrepreneurs movement has been created by a group of entrepreneurs lead by Mr. Rossi, the President of FOFANA one of the biggest group of associations and social enterprises of France.

## CH.1 What to remember?


TS is still highly diversified sector at the international level, as result of the convergence of plurality of movements, organizations, notions theories aimed at explaining the emergence of the phenomenon. Having a clear definition it would be important from different point of view, such as to increase its visibility. Furthermore the misrecognition, caused by limited institutional recognition, or conflicting legal framework, causes shortage of adequate policies. Particularly, in Europe, TS is an evident source of heterogeneity across the market and among economic and social organizations. It not only represents a sector "other" than the public and the private one, but it is also a different instrument for citizens, to express themselves through a bottom-up process, and to cope to unanswered needs, or just to complement the public actions.

In the next chapter we will show how the external context could be a relevant impact on the development of the TSOs. In particular, in line with what sustained in the first chapter, we will show how the application of certain policies to the welfare state, notably the state withdrawal, the privatization and the NPM reforms, had in turn consequences on the relation between public authorities and TSOs. We will also show how the application of certain market instruments to this relation had in the end changed the internal configuration of the TSOs.

## Chapter 2 The Literature Review : the Evolutions of TSOs in Changing Welfare Systems

### CH2: The Literature Review

- 2.1. Introduction
  - 2.2. An Historical Perspective of the Transformation of the Welfare State in Europe
  - 2.3. The Emergency of the Welfare Mix
  - 2.4. The Market Instruments Implementation
  - 2.5. The Interaction between Public Authorities and TSOs
  - 2.6. The Internal Configuration of the TSOs and the Business like Evolution
  - 2.7. Are there any alternatives to Isomorphism?
- CH 2 What to remember?



## 2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the relationship between TS and public authorities, and its impact on the internal configuration of organizations. In line with the European approach, many scholars argue that the TS configuration is strongly influenced by the Welfare State system, in which it is framed (A. Evers & Laville, 2005; Laville & Nyssens, 2001). As a matter of fact, the relationship between public authorities and TSOs have been researched for decades, particularly since the '80s, when the direct involvement of the State in the production of services has been questioned, and the outsourcing and the contracting have become the *modus operandi* for the offer of public services (Carmel & Harlock, 2008; J. Lewis, 2005; Rees, 2014).

Therefore, in order to understand the nature of the relationship between the two actors we consider it essential to mention the way in which the Welfare State and the public intervention on the definition and supply of public services have changed, after the '70s, which is the moment retained by scholars as the maximum expansion (Clayton & Pontusson, 1998). Nowadays, in the context of the welfare mix, the involvement of TSOs and collaboration with public authorities in the provision of social services is quite common (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; A. G. Bovaird & Löffler, 2009; Brandsen et al., 2017; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). The idea that the State could govern but not row (D. Osborne & Gaebler, 1993) slowly made its way, in public and political debate, on the basis of new economic theories, such as the new institutional economy (Williamson, 1979) and the transactional cost theory (Coase, 1988). But only when economic conditions changed, the Keynesian production model was abandoned for a more entrepreneurial approach.

In the same direction, during the '80s and '90s we observed the implementation of a series of reforms, under the name of New Public Management (NPM), aimed at reformulating the state intervention and finally other private players in the market (Esposito et al., 2018). This new paradigm has had a strong impact on the relationship between public authorities and TSOs providing public services (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Rees, 2014). In fact, the NPM reforms promote the application of market-based instruments in order to regulate the interaction between the two players. These tools include quasi-market implementation, contract management and quantitative indicators to assess the performance of the management bodies, including TSOs.

This massive transformation of the Welfare State has had a double impact on the development and therefore the persistence of TS. As a matter of facts, the TSOs, which as already mentioned in the previous chapter pre-exist the expansion of State intervention, gained momentum from the downsizing of the State. In fact, a number of services have been out-sourced and new players, both private and TSOs, have entered new markets, previously monopolised by the public actor (COCOPS, 2013).

On the other hand, the implementation of the NPM reforms has led to a new transformation of the relationship between public authorities and TSOs, as well as the internal configuration of TSOs. Dekker (2005) argues that the public authorities are urging competition and market instruments, directly influenced by TSOs, which are engaged in an isomorphic transformation process.

Indeed, number of scholars observed that the NPM reforms, and in particular the mechanism for awarding funding based on tenders, have amplified an on-going TSOs transformation process, in way similar to business (Maier, Meyer, and Steinbereithner 2016; Rees 2014b) (L.

M. Salamon, 1993) Business as the evolution of TSOs is described as the adoption of approaches and values - such as, among others, the generation of trade revenue, contractual competition, the influence of new and emerging donors, recruitment of paid workers and social entrepreneurship - all attributable to the categories of values and practices of the private market (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Weisbrod, 1977).

This chapter is organised as follows. First, we will briefly describe the evolution of the Welfare State in recent decades, and the role of public actors in the definition and provision of social services. We will therefore focus on the literature describing the NPM reforms and the application of entrepreneurial principles to the public actor. Therefore, we will analyse the implications for TSOs, relations with public authorities in a welfare state characterised by marketing processes and internal configurations for organisations, paying great attention to the phenomenon of corporatization and professionalization. Finally, we will define the use of literature to analyse the responses of TSOs, conceptualised in this work not only as the subject of reforms but as active agents, able to implement a strategy of resistance.

## 2.2 An Historical Perspective of the Transformation of the Welfare State in Europe

The term “welfare state” gained international popularity during the second half of the XX century (Titmuss, 1968). The roots of the welfare state are long-standing and complex. Over the last century, State activity has grown in all industrial countries, although the roots and extension have changed considerably in all countries. Initially, in particular during the gradual taxation of the ‘30s-‘40s, the expansion of education, the improvement of pensions, the maintenance of income, health care and work protection were the main outcomes (G. Esping-Andersen et al., 2001). Fundamentally, governments through the welfare state have addressed two major classic goals to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. In the last half of the twentieth century, the direct intervention of the State in the pursuit of these objectives varies greatly depending on the different national models implemented. At European level, Esping-Andersen and colleagues have developed the most recognised benchmarking of the evolution of the welfare state. The Scandinavian countries have opted for an inclusive, general, flat-rate, revenue-financed ‘peoples’ model. The Scandinavian model is recognised as one of the most resilient in the direct provision of services (Clayton & Pontusson, 1998). Continental Europe has a contributory insurance policy, which is firmly linked to the employment contract. Britain, in tandem with other Anglo-Saxon countries, began with universalism, but eventually came to favour selective assistance to the poor along with an emphasis on private welfare (G. Esping-Andersen et al., 2001; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999).

The expansion of public spending began at the beginning of the XX century, although nowadays it may seem a very small figure. For a long time, following regulatory theory, the only intervention accepted was due to market failure (Pigou 1924, Bator 1960). However, after the First World War, the expansion of the government’s role in the market economy became popular. On the one hand, the greater complexity of society, which due to the industrial revolution and urbanization has changed radically, has imposed the creation of specific programs (Wagner). On the other, despite the more conservative resistance, also the idea that only with an adequate level of public investments would it be possible to maintain full employment in order to generate adequate aggregate demand (Keynes) makes its way. At the same time, we can observe an increase in public expenditure due to the progressive broadening of the responsibility of public actors in the sector, including pensions, health

services, education, social services and assistance, public housing and support for disadvantaged people (Tanzi 2011). Therefore, at a certain point, public expenditure was not dedicated exclusively to responding to the market failure, but actually to explicitly redistributing income among citizens. “Governments had begun to be considered potential promoters of social reforms by the changed social forces who were gaining much more political power” (Tanzi 2011, p. 305). During the ‘60s, the expansion of public spending became a popular economic solution and the so-called “Keynesian revolution” was very popular.

Not only the needs, but also the theoretical perception of the role of the State and other actors in the economy have changed. At the end of the ‘50s, the first theoretical contribution to public sector management appeared and the idea that public action was less efficient than private sector management became widespread, as the lack of competition and adequate incentives spread. Economists such as Buchanan and Niskanen highlighted that in reality, in public action, policy-makers have an incentive to promote the interests of selected groups, while costs may also be higher due to bureaucratic and political corruption (Tanzi 2011). The change was thus supported by the development of theoretical approaches such as public choice. The public choice, signed by the application of the “economic methodology” to the processes of defining and implementing political decisions, is based on the assumption of selfish agents, including voters, politicians and bureaucrats. On the other hand, the New Institutional Economics (NIE), and in particular in the form of Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) (Coase, 1960), has promoted the assumption that “social institutions have been shaped by considerations of efficiency rather than as a result of social political actions” (Ferlie et al., 1996, p. 70). From a theoretical perspective in the literature of public economy emerged the concept of government (Coase, 1960), which echoed the notion of market failure. The doctrine criticized the government’s intervention on the assumption that the only legitimate state intervention was intervention due to market failure. The new theories argued that government interventions in the markets were expensive and tended to fail and that a proxy problem could arise. Coase used the TCT to explain the preference for hierarchical coordination between enterprises rather than the State (Acocella, 2005), basing itself on the idea that behind the choice of the actor there is always rationality, even if limited.

These theories are not immediately successful, until the late ‘70s, when economic conditions changed. During this period, the economy was characterized by stagflation (a phenomenon consisting in a combination of long-term unemployment and inflation). Both the development of new economic doctrines and the critical economic situation, were the starting point for a rethinking of the development led by the State (Esposito et al., 2018).

Therefore, the end of the ‘70s was a turning point. Keynesian policies had been challenged and liberal views have spread to both Western Europe and North America. In addition, since then, new social challenges have emerged as a result of the change in social and economic conditions (Whiteford, 2006), including high unemployment, increased life expectancy, the feminization of work which required new solutions and support tools. First in the UK and the US, and then in the rest of Western Europe, in the 80s we observed the implementation of reforms promoting a new vision of the public sector, supporting the primacy of market institutions over State. These reforms called for the restoration of bureaucratic coordination in the forecasting of public services (Ferlie et al., 1996), instead promoting public sector management and the use of market instruments. The modernisation of public bureaucracy is one of the main objectives of the NPM reforms. The concept of management refers to the dissemination of management tools from the private sector (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, 2004).

## 2.3 The Emergency of the Welfare Mix

In this context, despite the budgetary constraints, the State continued to address social issues, seeking to respond to the needs of society in a different way than direct intervention. In the new mix of welfare, there are different types of agreements to continue to meet the needs of society. In addition to the traditional mode based on the activities undertaken directly by the public authorities, there are several other configurations such as the distribution of vouchers directly to the beneficiaries in order to purchase the necessary service; the privatization tout-court; private actors with no relation to public sector funding; and contracting; private actors hired by public authorities to provide a service. Particularly with regard to social needs, an incremental privatisation of services and a delegation to private and social private actors were found to be the solution to a number of new objectives, including price ratio and quality-price assurance, increased quality of services, but also the participation of beneficiaries to the definition of services. This allows citizens to choose the best provider on the market, defining services as more “citizens” or “consumer- centric” (Le Grand, 1991).

The new model of intervention is no longer focused on the State, which defines and implements public and social policies. Instead, a model based on the concept of “steering and not rowing” (D. Osborne & Gaebler, 1993), defined a new role for the public actor, based on a clear separation between the level of definition of needs and production of services, and the promotion of a multiplicity of actors. In fact, the de-monopolization of the State operated on two levels. On the one hand, a process of modernization of the public sector has been implemented. It included a multiplication of the level of government (the central state, the regional or departmental, the very local and the European level). The multiplication of levels of governance has also been instrumental in re-creating a sort of competition between the different actors, as well as a diversification of the responsibility between them. Moreover, from an economic perspective, it has been argued that a federal model can improve the efficiency of the system by exploiting the different degrees of competitiveness of good and services (Acocella, 2005). On the other hand, the new model of welfare mix has promoted a renewal interaction with private actors, including private companies, together with household, are becoming increasingly more involved in planning and providing social care services, together with TSOs (Johansson et al., 2015). In fact, the TSOs, as already shown in the previous chapter pre-exist public intervention, and as mentioned by Zamagni and Zamagni (Zamagni & Zamagni, 2010) began to intervene on a large scale as early as the beginning of the XIX century. In fact, citizens of different countries, collectively or not, had spontaneously developed significant social programmes in order to provide assistance to people and families in difficulty in order to improve their daily life together with others in the same situation. However, the configuration of the welfare mix models, in place of the Welfare state, has left room for new interactions between actors and new role to play. By doing so, this new configuration did not spare social and the so defined sensitive sectors (La Spina, Majone, 2000). However, health care, childcare, education, social housing and others have changed dramatically according to new regulatory frameworks with the clear aim of introducing new players either private capitalist enterprises or TSOs (Laville & Nyssens, 2001). La Spina and Majone define this change in public governance (La Spina and Majone, 2000) as a shift from an interventionist or positive State (based on the Keynesian Model) to a “Regulatory State”.

Under pressure from the NPM reforms, this relationship between public authorities and other economic actors was based on market regulation instrument. The national configuration of public management agreements, initially based on a direct financing system, has moved to

performance management and the emphasis on production control. In this interaction the role of the two actors could vary considerably. Some authors observed a clear form of control exercised through contractual and quasi-market mechanisms (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Challis et al., 1994; Harlock, 2014) and payment through performance mechanisms (Rees, 2014) Conversely, others highlight the potential for co-construction of public policies and the TSOs most important commitment to the definition of the services (Boyle & Harris, 2009; Evers & Lakomski, 2012; Osborne, 2006).

## 2.4 The Market Instruments Implementation

The use of markets and market mechanisms to provide assistance has been defined as one of the most significant and controversial ways in which social states have been transformed (Gilbert, 2002). The instrument of the quasi market has been widely and intensely used, although several different implications at the national level, based on the idea that the government “steer but does not row” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). Already in the middle of the ‘90s Taylor and Hoggett (Taylor & Hoggett, 1994) assumed that over time the social welfare market could be dominated by new non-profit and even profit-making organisations settled by former employees (Ferlie et al., 1996).

Scholars observed that the application of market-type mechanisms - procurement (outsourcing), quasi-markets, liberalisation, privatisation and user choice mechanisms, used as a tool to promote the improvement of public service (Dan and Andrews, 2015) - resulted in a growing involvement of TSOs in certain sectors, in particular social services (Frahm & Martin, 2009; Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993; L. M. Salamon, 1993; Skelcher & Smith, 2015; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). On the other hand, an organisational impact was observed (Dart, 2004; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Hvenmark, 2013a; Maier et al., 2016; L. M. Salamon, 1993; Shoham et al., 2006) and defined as a process of business-like evolution.

During the ‘80s a similar process of restructuring a large number of public service settings (Ferlie et al. 1996) and countries (Larbi, 1999; OECD, 1993) followed, labelled as “New Public Management” - NPM – reforms. Although such reforms have been implemented worldwide, they have shown different local and sectoral characteristics. A number of related initiatives recognized as characterizing the NPM reforms, such as the large-scale privatization program (Aishburner et al. 1994), the emphasis of “doing more with less” (OECD, 1998), a management of cultural change in the public sector human resources (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Hood, 1991), a separation between purchaser and provider function (Pollitt, 1994), mechanisms to foster competition (Borins, 1994) (Commonwealth, 1996), and the creation of quasi market within the public sector (Ferlie, 1992; Ferlie et al., 1996). The quasi market makes it possible to maintain public funding, but also to establish a new ideological paradigm, based on competition, justified by an important choice for citizens-consumers and personalised tailor-made service, as well as efficiency, which implies cutting costs, a reduction in the bureaucratisation of local authorities, but also an increase of flexibility linked to the increase/decrease in demand, which is not possible in highly bureaucratic organisations, such as public branches.

Eyraud (2013) recognised a number of common features of NPM reforms in its study focused on the French education system. The split between the decision-maker (public authorities) and the supplier (private actor); the market orientation of the public action; remote management, in particular by objectives; the application of the principle of quality



relationship price considering; economy, efficiency, effectiveness; decentralisation and administrative decentralisation and the consumer or citizen orientation. Finally, Eyraud highlights the instrumental use of quantitative indicators. In the case of French higher education reforms, the application of selected quantitative indicators, such as the performance indicators, activity and inputs instead of others resulted in the legitimization of this type of reforms (Eyraud 2013).

However, after more than thirty years of studies on the concept, there is not an unanimous definition of NPM reforms. This is for different reasons, including the apparent contradiction between reforms introduced by governments and characterised by shift away from traditional public administration models, but in different ways and with different results. This is due to what Hood defines the “chameleon” character of the NPM reforms and the different application at sectoral and national time levels.

Ferlie et al. (1996), based on a vast review of literature, define four models or ideal types (in the weberian sense) of NPM. Model 1 of NPM is represented by the attempt to make the public sector more similar to business. Once the public sector was defined as excessively bureaucratic and inefficient, revenue to improve it included: greater attention to financial control, a strong concern for the quality-ratio price and efficiency gain; audit extension; hierarchical management, target setting and performance monitoring; increased use of protocols; increased role of non-public sector suppliers; the definition of a market-type experiment for the allocation of resources, which are almost not markets yet, but not even the direct production of goods; more entrepreneurial management; new forms of corporate governance and deregulation of market-like experiments (Ferlie, 1986; Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1991; Steward & Walsh, 1992). This first model was observed during Thatcherism and in the early ‘80s mainly in UK. Although some kind of privatization and outsourcing has already been observed, it is on the second Model, the so-called “Downsizing and Decentralisation”, that quasi-market and market instruments have been assessed more. A process of strong decentralisation and contraction has been implemented in the search for greater flexibility and competition between the actors involved. With a clear division between the public foundation and provision of the independent sector, contract management entailed the introduction of elaborated types of quasi-market-based allocation of public services. Moreover the introduction of specific quantitative performance indicators and a performance-based fund (Clegg, 1990; Hoggett, 1996), implied increasingly detailed contracts. As regards the third Model “in search for excellence”, the role of values, culture and symbols, as well as change and innovation are particularly emphasized (Deal & Kennedy, 1981; Meek, 1988), characterizing a public sector in search of cultural changes, based on a new imagination and identity. Finally, the 4<sup>th</sup> Model “Public Service Orientation” is a mix of management ideas of the private and public sector, focusing as well on securing the accountability of services (Osborne and Gaebler 1993) (Hodge and Thompson 1994, Walker et al. 2011). Concern for the user/consumer voice also implies new organisational models and inclusion in the decision making process of new actors and stakeholders, making the organisation itself more user-oriented. Basically, the idea is to define a collaborative mechanism between public authorities and TSOs at the local level, assuming that this institutional level is better able to meet the needs of society.

Reforms on the NPM have also been strongly encouraged by a number of international organisations such as the OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In the PUMA report (OECD, 1998), the OECD openly supported NPM reforms and their implementation with the aim of increasing the efficiency, the economy and the effectiveness of the national public administrations.

At the EU level, EU institutions, in particular the European Commission, also played a role. As demonstrated by the large number of communications and recommendations, the modernization of public sector organizations has long been a priority area of EU economic policy. As part of the paradigm of structural reforms, the NPM has intensified strongly in the 90s due to the intensification of market integration and liberalization processes (Bauby, 2008; Boggetti & Obermann, 2008; COCOPS, 2013; Sorin Dan & Pollitt, 2015). In particular and with the aim of creating a single European market, the regulation on public procurement has strongly influenced the apparatus of national public administration and its size. Departing from the European Commission's 1985 "White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market", public procurement policy and practice have been identified as tools to increase competition and to create the single market, avoiding distortion.

The debate on the state of health of these types of reform is beginning. Scholars are divided among those who still observe the persistence of NPM reforms style (Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016; Hyndman & Liguori, 2016; Jacobs, 2012, 2016; Rees, 2014) and others who suggest that the NPM era is in the past (Dunleavy 2005; Jones 2002; Levy 2010; Osborne 2006, 2010) and that new form of interaction characterise the relationship between the State and TSOs. In particular, Osborne talks about the post-NPM era characterised by governance of the network and collaboration between different actors, including public authorities, which are part of a "pluralist state" (Osborne 2006). Either the relationship with public authorities is interpreted as top-down, contract-based management, as in the NPM model, or as a network, as in the New Public Governance (NPG), following the new institutional theory, the external context has an impact on the internal configuration of organisations.

#### 2.4.1. The Quasi-Market

Welfare State changed differently across Europe, of course. However, some similarities still emerge. For instance, with regard to the provision of local public services, except in the case of the UK, liberalisation is not exactly characterised by a brutal downsizing of the State from the social sphere (such as in US) but rather by a change in the foundation mechanisms (Laville & Nyssens, 2001). The idea of introducing competition also for previous public services, now conferred to "independent sector", both TSOs and private companies for profit, leads the regulatory State to define a situation of "quasi-market", with the aim of imposing the logical market, where it was absent until then. Le Grand and Bartlett define the quasi-market as markets where the provision of a service is performed by competitive suppliers as in pure markets, but where the purchasers of the service are financed from resources provided by the State rather than from their own private resources (Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993).

The ideological change, in line with the NPM rhetoric, highlights the value of competition. In fact, through competition, it is possible to offer a wide choice for citizens-consumers, and a tailor-made efficient individual service, which implies a cut in costs or at least a reduction in the bureaucratisation of local authorities. It is also supposed to increase the flexibility linked to the increase /decrease in demand, which is not possible in highly bureaucratic organisations, such as public branches.

Furthermore the implementation of the quasi-market is based on the idea that the market will bring two types of benefits (Blank, 2000; Greener, 2008). Firstly, giving purchasing power to users of services (or their agents) should allow users to exercise consumer sovereignty. Secondly, the quality of the service will be improved and the price reduced due to the effect of competition between suppliers (Brennan et al., 2012). Following Brennan and colleagues, user choice and competition are also the basis of the two ethical considerations; libertarian

and utilitarian. The libertarian is based on the argument of complex pluralism moved by Claasen (2009) and drawn from the notion of Sen. Claasen argues that the availability of informal, market and non-market forms to provide public services, all coexisting at the same time. The choice within each form of supply will encourage people to develop their own agency skills and, in turn to develop their own capabilities. Claasen does not include quasi-markets in his list of possible elements in the complex pluralism, but there appears to be few reasons why this form of provision should not form part of that list. Indeed, there is a positive reason to include quasi-markets in the list, as they effectively encourage the exercise of choice (Brennan et al. 2012). Although the libertarian argument in favour of competition, the strongest arguments are essentially utilitarian. Competition would not only ensure higher quality at a lower price, but would also allow the monopoly of the public authority to move to another supplier in case of dissatisfaction with the service. In these terms, all suppliers have an incentive to be efficient; to generate as much quality as possible from a given level of resources, using resources efficiently - public money – or losing the business.

Glennerster and Le Grand moved some moved some critics to the quasi-market instrument (Glennerster & Le Grand, 1995). In fact, in their view, the promotion of quasi-markets in social services is part of a wider range of changes in relations between state and society, than stated as a way of reducing cost. In fact, they found that although the final stated objective, namely to reduce public expenditure, the quasi-market represents a different instrument for allocating resources, instead of a way of reducing the total amount of public expenditure. Separating finance and productive functions does not contribute itself to reducing public expenditure. They take the example of waste collection in the UK. Outsourcing at a certain point reduced the price of the service, but also workers' rights and cleanliness of agreements with trade unions. Moreover, in that particular case private, private companies were ready to enter the market, which is not always the case for social services. In sector such as social support for disadvantaged people, there is no competition so high as to bring the benefits to which it relates. Furthermore, where public authority is monopsonium, the tide of benefits decreases. Finally, the conclusion and management of contracts based on quantitative indicators could be very expensive. Contracts, prices and purchases could be very expensive to manage.

#### **2.4.2. The Performance Control**

Jany-Catrice defines performance as “a quantified comparison between a result and a targeted in a context of responsibility” (Jany-Catrice, 2012, p. 11). Many public services have introduced performance–monitoring systems. Jany-Catrice (2012) sustains that the “total performance system” has emerged as the result of a combination of four variables. Firstly, the transition from a production economy to a service economy, which makes the results less verifiable and certain; secondly the rationalization of public actions; thirdly, the individualization of working relationship and finally quantification. She defines the quantification as the process of excessive use of quantitative indicators in order to dehumanise and depoliticize evaluation mechanisms and tools. In reality, the author has strongly criticised the ideology, which defines these instruments as neutral. This neutrality is based on the idea that through quantitative indicators it is possible to measure the objective qualities of services. This is in line with a general trend towards the quantification of different social issues (Beaud & Prévost, 2000). As stated by Désrosières, performance is no longer seen as the evaluation of the differences between objectives and goals, but between the

measure of the differences between numerical targets and numerical goals (Desrosières, 1993).

Another problem is linked to the nature of the product. Services differ from goods as they are hard to quantify, and the “volume of production” is clearly a concept which is transposed from an industrial reality (Gadrey, 1994), but does not necessarily fit with services. Particularly, relational services and care could experience negative consequences in the framework of performance measurements, based on the outputs quantity (Gadrey, 1996). In fact, these kinds of instruments push the actors to produce faster and in a larger quantity in order to increase the volume. However, since it is not measured, the quality of the services could be neglected and in turn, decrease. The nature of the evaluation completely leaves aside the way of doing services, focusing on the quantity or the volume of the result (Jany-Catrice, 2012).

Quantification also allows comparison between nations, enterprises and products (Bruno, 2008). In this period, performance measurement became a tool to compete with organizations and evaluates them. It is for this reason that Barberis highlights the risk that performance will become the ultimate goal and ideology (Barberis, 2009).

As in the case of public sector organizations, the application of private sector management techniques allows greater control from one organization to another, such as TSOs. As already mentioned, it occurs when the separation between function of the purchaser and supplier is necessary a control function.

The “performance contract” (Mallon, 1994; Islam, 1993) facilitates the assessment of the benefit on the bases of results rather than compliance with or in addition to bureaucratic rules and regulations. The monitoring of performance contracts is the means by which public authorities can clearly identify and communicate to TSOs what they expected from them in terms of results/outcomes and performance. The agencies responsible for monitoring, are therefore in charge of checking and verifying the compliance with these contracts.

Performance control does not directly involve control over the quality of service, but is more oriented towards controlling the economic responsibility of the organisation. In fact, it depends on the type of indicators mentioned in the contract, and whether public authorities combine double control over efficiency and quality. Monitoring also requires independent audits by qualified management and accounting experts, normally delegated to external private expertise. Promotion cost savings, together with the definition of projects - which are not always primarily related to the specific mission of TSOs - could be survival strategies.

## **2.5 The Interaction Between Public Authorities and TSOs**

The relationship between the public sector and Third Sector Organisations (TSOs) in the design and implementation of public services has been widely discussed in recent decades. As the welfare mixed changed over time, this relationship has evolved from the classic Public Administrative model (PA) and has changed in terms of dynamics and roles, particularly since the ‘80s, as a result of the publication of reforms specifically inspired by managerialism. While there is a part of the literature that states that New Public Management (NPM) reforms belong to the past and a new era of New Public Governance (NPG) has begun (Casady et al., 2019; Dunleavy, 2005; Jones, 2002; Levy, 2010; S. P. Osborne, 2006b) others observe the drive towards intensified NPM (Caffrey et al., 2019; Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016; Rees, 2014).

At the beginning of 2000, governments began to engage with a number of private agents in often complex and contractually sophisticated network relationships (Casady et al., 2019; Hodge & Greve, 2018). Some scholars have interpreted it as a shift from the traditional hierarchical forms of organization and competition, characterizing NPM model in favour of an increasing application of collaboration arrangements (Bryson et al., 2014; Levy, 2010; S. P. Osborne, 2006a; Pestoff, 2012). They describe this change as evidence of the new emerging paradigm, namely New Public Governance (NPG). As a result of the NPG, the network structure that characterizes the market, defines relationships more socially integrated and less distant among actors (Osborne, Radnor, & Nasi, 2013). This network is characterised by inter-organizational relationships, collaborative partnerships and other forms of multi-actor relationships (Wu, Ramesh and Howlett, 2015). The traditional hierarchy, in which public authorities take decisions and TSOs implement policy, is replaced by a co-responsibility relationship in the design and implementation of public policies. The emergence of more pluralist models of governance and provision of welfare services is observed as well. Such models are often described as being based on public-private networks, where citizens and TSOs play a role as co-producers of public services (Pestoff, 2012). The direct participation of beneficiaries and civic stakeholders is highlighted as one of the main features that make the difference with the past, in particular with the NPM model.

Some authors, without reference to NPG, have interpreted the new network environment differently, focusing more on the increasing influence of “project-based work”, also known as “projectification of society” (Midler, 1995; Lundin & Söderholm, 1998; Jessen, 2002; Sydow & Staber, 2002, Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006).

As with the logic of the quasi-market to move away from the public monopoly and to include more players, differ in their ability to directly include stakeholders in the service definition process. Project-based management has become a tool to improve the participation of more interdependent actors contributing to the provision of public services. Making different actors different part of the decision making process, the role of public authorities, suppliers and users changes. Although there remains a separation between the timing of the decision and the execution, the actors involved in a project, nominally, have a more transversal role, also taking part in the decision-making process (Garel, 2011). The project is the container of a network (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999), a temporary device that allows many actors to collaborate and co-create services and goods (Garel, 2011). Based on a network structure, the project is defined by a horizontal structure and governance, in which each actor is characterized by different properties and technical skills, which make themselves compatible with each other. The project is a connector of actors, more or less flexible, in which the actors remain separate entities, therefore it does not involve the fusion and the union of the organization. However, they can define the term of collaborations. For this reason, although organisations remain completely separate, since they share objectives and goals, they also share a system of values and what Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) define as a “*grammaire*”. Following the theory of Justification (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991, Boltanski and Chiapello 1999), a grammar “at same time, it empirically describes the rules that people effectively follow when using a language and, on the other hand, proposes some normative generalizations in order to make those effective uses more coherent” (Jacquemain, 2008 p.8). Through this new system of values and objectives, the actors involved in the project have defined themselves: they create the perimeter through the network to define the actors involved; they share a vision and define procedures and operating modes. On the other hand, criticism has been shifted to this model of public service organisation. Actors must always be involved in a project to maintain the connections and be able to re-create them in a kind of

dependency. As already mentioned, a project is temporary in this, since it has a definite beginning and an end in time. A project-based financing strategy creates instability and uncertainty, which is caused by money flow discontinuity (Geyer, 2001; Whitley, 2006). Therefore, in order to maintain economic sustainability, actors must remain active in the network and create new projects. In order to do so, they always try to reach and maintain a good position avoiding remaining too marginal. This implies an on-going work on the creation and maintenance of formal and informal contacts.

In recent years, authors have strongly supported the resilience of the NPM paradigm (Caffrey et al., 2019; Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016). Caffrey and colleagues (2018) focus on the unwanted consequences of the NPM model, and in particular on performance management, which create perverse incentives and, in turn, encourage organizations to reach the target and miss the point (Bevan, 2006, p. 521). Hyndman and Lapsy argue that not only NPM reforms are still being implemented, but that the global financial crisis has intensified the NPM's drive in the UK (2016). Concerning other countries, De Vries and Nemeč suggest that, although some countries have decided to apply alternative paradigms, however, changes are modest and some countries still apply NPM instruments such as contract and outsourcing, unbundling and competition within the public sector, emphasis on quality of service delivery, use of the e-government tools of the performance measurement, emphasis on output and controls on the achievement of objectives (performance audit and control) (De Vries and Nemeč 2013).

In line with Ferlie, Lynn and Pollit “each country makes its own translation or adaptation” (Ferlie et al., 2005, p. 721), the authors who support the continuity of NPM models, have recognised that the current configuration of public management is the result of the evolution or sedimentation of different model (Sorrentino et al., 2018), and a combination of different traditions (Kickert, 2008).

Many scholars have begun to wonder what the impact of this relationship is, regardless of the configuration of public management at the organizational level (Bevan, 2006; Kendall & Knapp, 1996; J. Lewis, 2005; Rees, 2014; Suarez, 2011).

On the one hand, with regard to the NPM model, it is noted that hierarchical relationship, control and performance measurement systems create distortion not only in the mission of the organisation (Kendall and Knapp, 1996 Lewis, 2005) and autonomy (Brandsen et al., 2017) but also on internal and organizational configuration (Rees, 2014) Martikke and Moxham 2010). On the other hand, being part of a network, joining projects and staying active in them, has required by the NPG model, also requires resources and time and can create types of organisational distortion (Suarez 2011).

In the following section, we will analyse the main organizational consequences that this type of pressure could have at the organizational level. The justification for the involvement of TSOs in public services is the alleged distinctive character of these forms of organisations (Bubb and Michell, 2009; Buckingham, 2009; Macmillan, 2010, 2013). For this reason, academics call for further research on the impact of public management reforms on TSOs, resulting in change (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Rees, 2014). Knowing that market-inspired governance favours hybrid forms (Evers, 2005), we will analyse the many features and different articulation of what literature defines as “the evolution of TSOs”.

From a theoretical point of view, according to the NPM perspective, the relationship between public authorities and TSOs is conceptualized as defining a principal agent relationship (Arrow, 1971; Mirrlees, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974; Jensen, Meckling, 1976). Following the principal agent approach, an actor employs other agents to carry out an activity. In the present

case, the principal, the State, relies on the agent, the TSOs, for the provision of a number of services. In NPM reforms this split between decision makers and the actor implementing the services, has the aim to reduce costs and enhance efficiency (Eyraud, 2013; Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Problems may arise when there is information asymmetry between the two sides though, namely when the principal has incomplete information and the agent a complete one (Sloman, 2003). Thus, the agent knows more than the principal, which could be one the reasons at the basis of their relationship. However, this situation leaves room for a strategic behaviour, where the agent may pursue a different interest instead of those of the principal, and consequently acting to maximise its own interest. This situation is known as the agency problem. The agency problem could be solved through a system of incentives, which must push the agents to behave in the principal's interest. The control on the agents' action could be deployed through different kinds of market instruments, based on contracts.

The report shall be formalised by means of contract and, in this case, contracts, public procurement. Public procurement is not only a legal instrument, but also an economic one (Chrisidu-Budnik & Przedańska, 2017). Because of complete contracts, namely contracts that specify the legal consequences of any possible state of the world, are almost impossible, different solutions could be applied to overcome opportunistic behaviour or simply to control the performance of organisations and improve them when necessary, through sanctions.

Some scholars have observed the spread of the payment by results system (Sturgess et al 2011). This system implies that payments depend on the verification of results. Introduced to improve efficiency, increase value for money, facilitate choice and enable service innovation and quality improvements (Fitzpatrick, 2014), it also implies the introduction of quantitative indicators in order to calculate performance. In fact, performance management is defined as the core of public management control strategies (Van Doreen, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015). Therefore, in order to monitor the performance and economic accountability of organizations, internal and external audits are also common practices (Croxon, Hanney, and Buxton 2001). Although price mechanisms and contractual relationship may vary a lot depending on national characteristics and the particular variant of NPM applied (Bode & Brandsen, 2014), however the agreement is based on the quality-price ratio (Edward 2009).

On the top of this, with the aim of introducing competition, quasi markets are put in place (Ferlie et al., 1996; Le Grand, 2011b; Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993). The objective was that to impose market logic where absent. The promotion of markets in social services is part of a broader series of changes in state–society relations, justified through the potential positive impact on users and citizens. The idea to introduce competition even for the former public services, now conferred to an “independent sector” (TSOs, as well as for profit enterprises), led the regulatory State to define the situation of quasi-market. Le Grand and Bartlett (Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993) define quasi-market as a type of market where competitive providers undertake the provision of services - as in pure markets - with the purchasers financed by resources provided by public authorities instead of their own private resources. In these terms, the introduction of competition and market logic has been justified through two main arguments (Brennan, et al 2012). On the one hand a major choice for citizens-consumers, and an individual tailored service. Purchasing power should empower users by enabling them to exercise consumer sovereignty, with in turn an impact on the quality and the prices of services (Blank, 2000; Greener, 2008). On the other hand, competition for business should force providers to improve the quality of services and reduce costs to purchasers. In this way, markets also serve the public interest providing goods and services for citizens that are efficiently produced at prices that imply a saving for public authorities (Cleveland, 2008). Although the definition of quasi markets is justified as an instrument to reduce public

expenditure, some authors (Glennerster & Le Grand, 1995) argue that they do not imply a decrease in costs *per se*. Indeed, the instrument essentially redefines how to allocate money but not the quantity. It means that to split the function of dispensing money and providing service, it must be accompanied by a strong and vigorous competition for the public procurement among different private potential providers.

Finally, a number of authors define the relationship between public authority and TSOs as particularly focused on control (Caffrey et al., 2019; Challis et al., 1994; Hood, 1991) and emphasis on output controls (Hood, 1991, Caffrey et al. 2018). The configuration of public management is seen as a top-down interaction, based on asymmetric power between actors (Zeckhauser and Pratt, 1985, Caffrey et al. 2018). The contract establishing an incentive mechanism linking performance compensation and results in turn could also have perverse results. Scholars highlight that increasing the level of monitoring on the agent to improve information may have negative effects such as reducing work effort (Chang & Lai, 1999; Dickinson & Villeval, 2008; Frey, 1993). Others, pointed out that contractual requirements and monitoring could result in a threat to independence, distortion of objectives and drift of mission (Kendall & Knapp, 1996; Lewis, 2005).

Conversely, NPG is based on organizational sociology and network theory (Casady et al., 2019; Osborne, 2006a). For this reason, NPG focuses in particular on inter-organizational relationships and governance processes (Osborne 2006a). Inter-organizational relationships are based on trust, relational capital and relational contracts (Bovaird, 2006). In this regards, a number of academics recognized a shift from the traditional principal-agent relationship, based on contractual mechanisms to regulate the potential opportunistic behaviour of agents, new approaches to procurement (Birch, 2001; Dror & Hamel, 1998; Kanter, 1994; Lorange & Ross, 1992). For instance, Bovaird recognized three types of collaborative relationships: relational contract, partnership acquisition and distributed commissioning (2006). These new and innovative approaches are based on the concept of “collaborative advantage” (Kanter, 1994) where each party expects to benefit from joint work, which is believed to be more successful (Lorange & Roos 1992; Dror & Hamel 1998).

The NPG model conceived the market as a network (Caffrey et al., 2019; Casady et al., 2019). Due to the rapid fragmentation of public service into a larger number of organisations and actors, the interaction between commissioners and suppliers has become increasingly challenging (Byatt, 2002). The concept of relationship embedded networks (Hite, 2005) designs well the new configuration in which different actors need each other to run the service. Such models are often based on public-private networks, where citizens and third-sector organisations play a role as ‘co-producers’ of public services (Pestoff & Brandsen, 2008). In this network, stakeholder, the public sector, TSOs and citizens co-produce the public service (Pestoff, 2012) The actors are involved in the different stages of the decision-making process, from problem identification to the policy formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation (Pestoff et al., 2006). In addition, the actors are authorised and entitled to contribute at different stages of the trial (Osborne, 2006a).

The logic of competition is replaced by the logic of co-production and collaboration (Evans & Sapeha, 2015) where the final products result from actors working together. Such processes, for the most part, involve a rebalancing of the responsibilities and dynamics of power between the state, TSOs and citizens (Alcock, 2012). For these reasons, the NPG is often described as an tool to develop more inclusive practices rooted in the idea that public TSOs, citizens or beneficiaries are interdependent (Phillips and Smith 2011). The dynamics



of interdependence replace the power relationship and the interaction based on negotiation and persuasion, rather than control (Phillips and Smith 2011:4-5).

**Table 2.1 NPM and NPG characteristics**

	NPM	NPG
Theoretical Framework	Neo-classical Economics	Organizational Theory
Value -based	Competition Performance Information Asymmetry	Neo-Corporatism Share of responsibility Co-production
Instruments	Quasi-Market Tender Contract	Partnership Project Other instruments of collaboration
Based of the Arrangement	Principal - Agent	Network
Approach	Top-Down Control	Horizontal Exchange

Table Resuming the two Public Authorities – TSOs models.

## 2.6. The Internal Configuration of the TSOs and the Business like Evolution

TSOs are constantly increasing in number, creating more competition for scarce resources. On the other hand, another phenomenon has also been observed; companies are becoming more involved in traditional non-profit service areas (Boris and Steuerle 2006; Ryan 1999). Since the '90s, a number of scholars have observed a process defined as “business-like evolution”. The business as the evolution of TSOs is described as the adoption of approaches and values - such as, among others, the generation of trade revenue, contractual competition, the influence of new and emerging donors, recruitment of paid workers and social entrepreneurship - all ascribable to private market values and practices (Weisbrod 1998; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). Embracing new values means leading TSOs to a series of changes in organisational behaviour, making them more market-like in their action, structure, composition and philosophy (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004).

Different reasons were discussed as potential business-like evolution, such as reduced public funding, market tools, performance measurement systems and project trend. A number of scholars argue that the decrease in public funding and the change in the way it is provided are among the main causes of the business-like trend (Maier, et al. 2016, Salamon 1993, Rees 2014). Reduced funding has encouraged TSOs to actively engage in the search for multiple sources of funding based on competition in public procurement and partnership in multi-stakeholders projects concerned. Not only the impact is a marketization of the report (Salamon 1993), but also a growing entrepreneurial attitude. In fact, in a highly disaggregated

welfare mix, TSOs seek for different sources of funding in order to accumulate resources but also to differentiate risk.

Some authors specifically focus on market instruments such as contracting out, quasi-markets, liberalization, privatization and user-choice mechanisms. They claimed that although the implementation of market type instruments which were supposed to improve public services (Dan and Andrews, 2015) resulted in a greater involvement of TSOs in certain sectors, particularly social services (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993, Skelcher and Smith 2015, Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Salamon, 1995; Frahm and Martin, 2009), it also encouraged a business-like evolution (among others Maier, et al. 2016, Salamon 1993, Dart, 2004, Hvemark, 2013, Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004, Shoham and Ruvio 2006). Lewis (1993) argues that contracts and quasi-market systems may have perverse impacts on the organizational behaviour of those organizations, such as TSOs, which traditionally provided care. Particularly, the formalization of relations through the contracting process can induce organizations to renounce innovative and challenging forms of organisation and internal governance, leading to a mission distortion focused on the contract's output (Bevan and Hood 2006, Lewis 2005, Kendall and Knapp 1996).

With regard to performance measurement systems, Bevan argues that measurement systems are rarely discreet and on the contrary, they often influence behaviour (Bevan 2006). New instruments, aimed at quantifying performance and calculating results, are often imposed or simply introduced voluntarily by TSOs to comply with the new financing instruments. Marival et al. analyse "*devices*" (idea) of management and control used to include the associations in institutional systems (Marival, Petrella, and Richez-Battesti 2015). These could have an impact on the internal organizational configuration, the corporatization, the recruitment of human resources, the professionalization, the use of resources and the calculation of the budget, economization. Quantitative indicators are used to evaluate organisations on the basis of explicit standards and performance measures and often result in standardisation of practices and homogenisation of services among organizations. As mentioned by Larbi (Larbi 1999) definition of specific results, objectives and success indicators, preferably expressed in quantitative terms and to which managers would be required to work, are often justified by liability. In this vision, responsibility requires a clear statement of objectives and strong emphasis on production controls. Resource allocation and rewards or the cut of punishment of funding became thus related to measured performance. In this way it is possible to underline the results rather than the procedures. New evaluation tools introduced by government or public authorities with performance-based measures.

Ferlie and Adresani (Ferlie and Andresani 2006) claim that the governance of the network is not even close to self-organising agreements of stakeholders based on participation and inclusion, but rather the opposite. As already mentioned, Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) claimed the same, in particular in relation to the trend of "projection". Not only does the network create a kind of stakeholders dependency, but also the project-based financing strategy creates instability and uncertainty caused by money flow gap (Geyer 2001; Whitley 2006) which makes the exits even more complicated.

Battilana and Dorado argue that TSOs could be strongly influenced by the implementation of the market-based tools, to the point that their activities could be subject to a change of mission. In this case, the TSO stops responding to the social mission, how to respond with specific social intervention when interventions are detected on the ground, but instead a standardized response to a need identified by the administration, to get the found (Battilana and Dorado 2010). The application of market-based tools and the internalisation of new market logics could also represent other challenges or TSOs such as internal tensions, weakening democratic governance, overcome by management logic with important

consequences for the organisation in terms of legitimacy, identity and sense of action (Curchod et al., 2015).

Finally, Ashworthy argues that in an era of “high-performance management” changes in organizational characteristics are pursued for both technical and political reasons, seeking substantial results as well as formal legitimacy.

In the following lines we will go more in detail of some concepts that characterize the specific characteristic of the business-like evolution. Based on the extensive systematic review of the literature of Maier, Meyer and Steinbereithner (2016), we have selected the organizational structures and processes that describe the evolution of becoming business-like. In particular, Maier and colleagues recognised the following as one of the concepts that highlight particular aspects of business-like organizations such as marketization, corporatisation, becoming more entrepreneurial and more professional.

### 2.6.1 Marketization

As a result of the literature, marketization refers to the increasingly TSO type of market relationships with stakeholders or, from a macro perspective, market-type relationships that gradually penetrate the country’s welfare system (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004)(Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004; Salamon, 1993, Weisbrod, 1998).

The marketing of reports may, but should not, lead to the introduction of monetary exchanges. Sometimes this process is associated with an increase in tariffs for users, which is the phenomenon observed by Salamon (1993), although it is not always so. Brennan et al. use the term marketization to refer to “government measures that authorize, support or impose the introduction of markets, the creation of relationships between buyers and sellers and the use of market mechanisms” to allocate services. (p. 379). Other forms of marketization are observed in the literature, such as enhancing users to purchase services in the market (vouchers), providing supply to private suppliers (Brennan 2012), and the growing attitude of TSOs to seek a private source of foundation, compared to a public one.

Salamon observed (1993) in the early 90s the emergence of commissions and sales as the main sources of profit-free growth in American Welfare. This is not prerogative of the US welfare system. In France, Tchernonog (2012) observed the same path of evolution for associations. Tchernonog analysed the foundation’s evolutionary path, observing data in 2015 and in 2011. From these it has emerged that the private foundations in particular are increasing - passing from 49% to 51% in 6 years - and public one in decrease – passing of 51% to 49%. Tchernonog also analysed several instruments for public foundation, with particular attention to the distinction between “*public grant*” – grant or direct founding and “*public command*” and public procurement. It has defined the first instrument most compatible with the freedom of choice of the association regarding the type of activities and actions to be carried out. Instead, public procurement is based on an action already defined by the public authority, which leaves associations little choice in term of inventiveness, innovation and differentiation. Although both could be defined as market-based instruments, however the second is stricter and also requires the introduction of elements of competition to subcontract the service. By 2005 to 2011 it has been registered a decline in the use of grants and direct evidence for public procurement, three times more in 2011 than in 2005<sup>7</sup>. Finally, some scholars (Brennan et al. 2012, Brandson and Pape 2018) argue that marketization could

---

<sup>7</sup> Source of data Enquete CNRS- Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne “Le paysage associatif français” 2011-2012

very very often lead to encouraging the entry of for-profit suppliers into sectors previously reserved or dominated by TSOs.

### 2.6.2 The Value for Money

The strong concern for price-quality and efficiency justified greater discipline and the idea that it is need to “do more with less”. The marketization of the reports has also made the organisations budget-oriented and particularly attentive to the use of their resources. The definition for TSOs is increasingly driven by monetary concerns is economization (Hoffmann, 2011; Jäger & Beyes, 2010). The discussion on the market and efficiency has become a commonplace as well as other new practices aimed at efficiency (Suàrez, 2011). It has been observed that, while some TSOs have developed a rather entrepreneurial spirit, others in reaction to funding cuts, respond to request projects in sector other than their sector of activity, or move from one sector to another, looking for more operation stability in current policies at the top of the agenda. In fact, the project-based foundation system, creating particularly unstable and uncertain situations, caused money flow to break down (Whitley 2006) (Geyer 2001) which drives organisations to jump into project of different nature, sometimes even not very close to the mission of the organisation.

Under the umbrella of economization there are two concepts: commercialization and conversion. The term commercialization captures the growing dependence of TSOs’ on revenue from sales of goods and services (Salamon 1993), whereas conversion refers to an organization that changes its legal status, such as TSOs for profit. The change could be also from one legal form to another, which allows a different degree of freedom in terms of dividends redistribution (from associations to social enterprise for instance). It also describes the shift control of assets or responsibility for liabilities from one sector to another (Goddeeris & Weisbrod, 1998).

A number of scholars (Helm and Andersson, 2010, Davis, Marino, Aaron, & Tolbert, 2011) observed the increasing uptake by TSOs’ of entrepreneurial behaviour such as high levels of innovation, risk-taking and competition with other firms. A number of authors have noted that often TSOs, under pressure from multiple sources to become more efficient and responsible, have become more professional (Smith and Lipsky, 1994, Hwang and Powell, 2012). They often depend on private funds, but even when their resources are public, they have to compete, with private companies as well, to obtain funds. They must also achieve a certain level of performance required to continue to be found.

### 2.6.3 Corporatisation

The areas of change, under the pressure of market instruments, performance assessment and indicators, are management and governance (Suàrez, 2011). Higher levels of procedural formalities and more centralised decision-making process, in contrast with the idea of the European approach to the social economy based on high membership participation rates and democratic decision-making.

Corporatisation focuses on changes in the organisation’s governance structure. It refers to the reshaping of governance of a single organization in line with the business model (Alexander & Weiner, 1998), or to the integration of several organizations into a holding corporation (Horwitz, 1988). As described above, TSOs can implement different strategies to address budgetary constraints, and some of them opt for restructuring (Tchernonog 2013).

Another element associated with corporatization is the internal re-organisation and corporate restructuring. A trend often associated with specialisation and professionalization, is the creation of a department with a specific function. Particularly in large organisations,

specialisation makes it possible to standardize procedures. The creation of a complex and well-defined department and organogram allows management to divide the work and assign specific tasks (Gadrey 1994). For instance, the search for funding has particularly affected the reconfiguration of the internal structure. Indeed it involved the creation of departments specifically dedicated to definition of a fundraising strategy, projects development, applications management in response to a call for proposals or a tendering procedure, selection and definition of a partnership.

The interaction of professionalisation and corporatisation is particularly evident when looking at the phenomenon of standardisation of practices and the definition of routine, which Gadrey defines as industrial rationalisation (Gadrey 2011). Based on a strong specialisation of workers and the application of quite detailed programs, developed by a “*technostructure*”, the organisation seek for a wide standardisation of procedures, with the aim of increasing the productivity ratio as students out of educators, patients out of doctors, disadvantage people out of social workers.

The rationalization of the structure, namely corporatisation, has an impact on the organization of the division of labour and, in turn, on the work itself. This could lead to rationalisation of working time, planning and fragmentation of work.

#### 2.6.4 Professionalisation

In recent years, greater professionalism has been observed, namely the increase in full-time paid careers, often retaining competence with credentials, to the detriment of volunteers, motivated and values-driven, but without a high degree of competence. TSOs, increasingly focused on efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability, have contributed to professionalisation and corporatisation (Hwang and Powell 2009). Due to the pressure on the continuous search for funding, the informal model based on volunteers become obsolete and no longer viable (Salamon 1993; Smith and Lipsky 1993).

As mentioned by Powell and Hwang (2010) TSOs differ by private and public sector because they can rely on two categories of workers: volunteers and paid-workers, or a combination of both. Jenkins (1998) defines professionalisation as the creation of a permanent position, and Staggenborg (1988) observing the same phenomenon defines it as a bureaucratic tendency.

Pollak and Blackwood (2007), analysing TSOs in the US, observe that TSOs have evolved from informal, doing good, values-driven to rather formal organisations, well structure in terms of corporate structure and paid employees. On the one hand the reasons for professionalisation could be attributed to responsibility and, on the other hand, to efficiency. Therefore, professionalisation could be interpreted as a strategy for obtaining funds. Suárez (2011) argue that organisations rely on paid-staff to implement the service and that standard management strategies to achieve the mission have become increasingly relevant for obtaining grants and contracts public.

Organisations with paid workers are more likely to impose formalised roles and rules. On the one hand this is intuitive and based on the size of organisations. Edward (1994:317) comparing large and small associations dealing with sponsorship, found that larger organizations “have higher levels of procedural formalities and a more centralized financial decision-making.” On the contrary, smaller organizations were “more likely to have high rates of member participation... and make decisions by consensus.” With regard to democracy, Grant also agrees on this point (2003) observing that professionalised organisations, resulting from the transition from a member to a staff-led governance model, show a democratic deficit.

Concerning the impact of professionalization and the increase in paid workers, and the consequent criticism of volunteers as unskilled professional authors argue that this category of workers can have an impact on the organisation and trigger a rationalisation process – namely the introductions of specific rules and roles, which redefine the internal configuration, mission and organisational identity (Minkoff and Powell, 2006).

Gadrey (1994) observes that professionalisation is characterized by workers with a high level of knowledge in specific terms, resulting in the institutionalisation of shelter in the labour market. He describes the modernisation of professional services as a twofold trend: on the one hand, “industrial rationalisation”, and on the other “professional rationalisation”. Both components aim at arranging actions, thus reducing the number of managers and increasing the top-down control, thanks to specific procedures defined as guidelines for workers. These trends are in line with the industrialization of social services, a new way of producing, based on the tertiary nature of the system, focused on the concentration of resources and workforce and the creation of a “divisionalised organization” (Mitzberg, 1990), and an high level of specialization. Industrialization in the context of social services, rather than focusing on the industrial model of production, refers to performance management and measurement methods often linked to the priority of organisations such as enhance productivity and reducing costs. In this context guidelines, knowledge and formalised methods are fundamental. Gadrey recognized a second level of rationalization, besides the industrial one already mentioned, called professional rationalization. In addition to the standardization of specific tasks, professional rationalisation aims at defining a more systematic typing of cases and solutions. Thus the detailed procedures are explicitly defined, for the different figures. Through this second level of rationalization a specialized worker, facing a case responds following guidelines. The direct consequence of this trend is a reduction in autonomy of the worker, who operates with standardized tasks – industrial rationalization - and standardized responses to cases – professional rationalization. The use of formalized tools and routine is defined as rationalization by a number of scholars such as Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson (2000), Drori, Meyer, and Hwang (2006) and Suarez (2011). Hwang and Powell recognise two types of professionals: professional and managerial organisation (2009). The growth of managerial professionals represents a profound institutional change. Especially when they have consolidated experience in profit-making organizations or have been educated in business school. It could involve the integration of professional practices such as strategic planning, independent financial audits, quantitative program evaluation, and consultants, and a new business-oriented culture (Hwang and Powell 2009).

## 2.7 Are There Any Alternative to Isomorphism?

Early research on Institutional theory strongly emphasise the impact of the external context on the organisation’s behaviour and configuration (Hwang and Powell 2009).

As previously mentioned, a competitive environment, the need for accountability in order to obtain funds and the imposition of market instruments could be at the origin of TSOs business-like evolution. Following the approach of institutional theory, influenced by the powerful isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) organizations are induced to reproduce the contextual institutional model. In fact, as remarked by Oliver (1991), institutional theory tends to emphasize the tendency of organizations to homogeneity and focuses on institutional compliance and passive adaption to the rules of the external environment. Based on this logic, the organizational reaction to external institutional pressures is in conformity with the environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer &

Rowan, 1977). As mentioned by Oliver (Oliver 1991) several authors emphasize this tendency of organizations to focus on institutional compliance and passive adaptation to the rules of the external environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer, Scott, and Deal 1981). In fact, the institutional perspective shows how “behaviours without can occur and persist, through the exercise of habit, convention, convenience, expediency or social obligation” (Oliver, 1991: p.151). In particular, this is true in case of a framework of rules taken for granted.

The logical institutional approach challenges this conceptualization by introducing the concept of hybridity (Battilana, Dorado, 2010). Following this theoretical framework, organizations are exposed to more logical competitors (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), which in turn are incorporated (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). In reality, institutional logics are supra-organizational and abstract, but they shape the individual and organizational identity, becoming visible in the reinterpretation and manipulation managed by the actors (Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Greenwood et al. 2010,) (Skelcher and Smith 2015). As stated by Skelcher and Smith (2015 p.437) the logical institutional approach “developed within the wider field of institutional theory, is a way of explaining the interactions between normative social structures, organizational forms and individual behaviour”. In complex environment could co-exist more logical (Pache and Santos 2013). In this context characterised by the complexity and multiplicity of logics, hybrids are likely to emerge (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008).

The literature describing the internalisation of TSOs of conflicting logical elements recognises a multiplicity of configuration. Pache and Santos say that responding to social needs, but remaining private organizations in need of financial sustainability, TSOs could incorporate the logic of social welfare on the one hand and commercial on the other one (Pache and Santos 2013). Logics correspond to specific characteristics in terms of objectives, organizational form, governance mechanisms and professional legitimacy. Battilana and Dorado (2010) have recognised the interaction of different logics characterising two microfinance organizations in the Bolivian context, namely Banking, Development, and Emerging Commercial Microfinance Logics, based on the combination of objectives, target population and management principles. If the two examples are based on an inductive case study-based analysis, Skelcher and Rathgeb Smith (2015) propose to apply the seven institutional orders, adapted by Thornton et al. (2012), namely the Family Community, Religion, State, Market, Profession, and Corporation. So instead of looking at the characteristic of specific organisations, they propose a more theoretical approach. The reaction to hybridization may differ considerably. While decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and compromise (Oliver, 1991) are parts of the traditional institutional theory, a new stream of literature shows that a broader repertoire of behaviours is possible, based on the combination of logics (Greenwood et al. 2011) or even deviance in order to gain discretion (Taesdale and Day, 2019).

Furthermore, also resource dependency, by introducing strategy elements, also included the interaction among organizations that tries to explain how organizations attempt to reduce interdependence and uncertainty (Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009) through active behaviour, implementing strategies with the aim of minimising environmental dependences. Among the different alternatives, organisations can implement collaborative strategies and other inter-organisational relationships (mergers, Joint Ventures, board of directors, political actions, executive succession) (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) in response to external threats, seeking for sustained institutional recognition. Organisations are immersed in their

environment and cannot be addressed without reference to the context. At the same time, the inverse is true: organisations are open system (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) influenced by external factors, including other organisations. So the second element, after environmental uncertainty, that organisations attempt to reduce is the power of others over them, or in other words addiction (Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009; Ulrich and Barney 1984). The Resource Dependence Theory focuses on the need for organizations to adapt to environmental uncertainty, through an active response that leads to defining strategies: included different types of networks, where appropriate.

## CH. 2 What to Remember?

In this chapter we analysed the literature describing TSOs as integrated in their context made up of other private sector organisations, non-profit and profit, and public authorities. These latter, under years of NPM reforms, show a considerable change, defined as managerialism (Ferlie, et al. 1996). Since the 80s, liberalization and privatization have opened up the market to a large number of private players. Moreover, the cultural context, influenced by the new economic approach, the New Institutional economics and TCE, has favoured market trade rather than the provision of social services by the public sector.

Concerning the relationship between TSOs and public authorities, while public funds have decreased, they have nevertheless remained the main source of funding for several social public policies. However the way in which public funds are allocated has changed dramatically. The imposition of market-based instruments, such as contracts, performance-based remuneration and projection, has establish a regime of competition with the aim of improving the quality of public services and reducing prices. Furthermore, while some literature continues to argue that this relationship is still configured as the principal agent hierarchical configuration, as a result of the NPM reforms, others have described the actors as part of a network where exchanges are based on horizontal relationship and interaction among equals – so called NPG. No matter what the case is, the interaction between public authorities and TSOs remains a very complex dynamic and this change in the way funds are distributed has to a large extent influenced TSOs.

We have therefore described the business-like evolution of TSOs, as a trend observed since from 90s, resulting from the cultural context and the implementation of market instruments. We have also tried to understand how to describe this transformation, not only as an isomorphic evolution, but rather as a coexistent of different elements belonging to more institutional logics. Based on the logical institutional approach, we have described TSOs as hybrid organizations, characterised by conflicting elements and including market logic. This conceptualisation not only explains the internalization of contextual pressures, but also explain the differences in responses that embedded organisations in the same context could undertake.

This fairly wide literature review responds to the need to analyse a complex phenomenon, the evolution of TSOs dealing with social public services in the context of mixed welfare systems. This work is based on the idea that it is impossible to de-contextualise a phenomenon, which is instead always the result of external context pressure internalization, and internal reaction to these pressures. For this reason the literature presented in this chapter belongs to different levels of analysis. At the beginning the analysis focus on the institutional level and the evolution of the Welfare state. The reforms applied to the public sector are then



analysed in order to understand the changing role of the public authorities and their interaction with TSOs in the provision of public social services. Once explored the literature describing the intra-organizational process, which exist between the two actors, we then analysed the characteristics at the organizational level, characterised by a business-like evolution. Gradually we have stratified the analysis, which will be addressed through a multi-level analytical framework, widely presented in the next chapter.

The heart of my research is focused on the following question: under strong institutional pressure, how TSOs, which deal with the reception service for asylum seekers, are able to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other forms of organisation?

How is the relationship between public authorities and TSOs evolving?

How this evolving relationship impacts on the internal configuration, identity and meaning of value-based organisations' actions? Is there any room to resist to the spread of new practices and logics due to the external context?

What kind of strategies do organizations put in place in order to cope with external pressures?

# Chapter 3 The Analytical Framework and the Methodology


## CH3: Analytical Framework and Methodology

### PART 1 The Analytical Framework

A Multilevel and Processual Analysis based on an institutional perspective  
 The Macro level of analysis: Evolutions of the Third sector  
 The Meso and the Micro levels – an organizational perspective  
 The Meso level  
 The Micro level  
 Isomorphism  
 Institutional Logics  
 Resource dependence

### PART 2 THE METHODOLOGY

The Mixed Methods Research Design  
 The Quantitative methodology  
 The Data  
 The Analysis  
 The Qualitative Data  
 A multiple embedded case studies  
 The selection of the cases  
 The Data  
 The Analysis



*“There is the problem of perspective. Where we sit not only influences where we stand, but also what we see”  
Pettigrew 1987, p. 649*

## Introduction

The purpose of this work is to analyse the evolving role and configuration of TSOs in the context of changing welfare systems. As shown in chapter two, an important part of the literature argues that, in recent years, contextualised in a deep relationship with public authorities, TSOs have become more business-like. In order to analyse the phenomenon of the TSOs business-like evolution, our research question will be the following: how TSOs, which deal with the reception service for asylum seekers, are able to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other forms of organisation? To answer to this question, we will carry out a multilevel and processual analysis based on an institutional perspective. While the macro level will be analysed through a new institutional economic lens, the meso and micro levels will be tackled through an organizational perspective. Finally, this multilevel and processual analysis will be pursued using a mix methods approach.

First, at the macro level, we will analyse the TS at the aggregate level, through a quantitative methodology. We will identify the determinants of TS at national level and the main characteristics, such as marketization and professionalization, resulting from the contextual pressures. To do so, we will rely on the new institutional economy (NIE) perspective.

Second, we will develop the analysis at the meso level that will focus on the interaction among organizations, dropped into a specific context, the case of the reception for asylum seekers social service. Applying a qualitative approach, we will describe the evolution of the institutional frameworks both for France and Italy. We will particularly focus on the inter-organizational dynamics at the local level, both for the case of France and Italy. The study of the organizational relationships, developed as a longitudinal study, will describe the evolution of the organizational field. The interactions among organisations are framed in an evolving market governance, managed shaped as a quasi-market, increasingly characterised by the application of market instruments and performance indicators, but also from an increasingly rigorous regulatory environment.

Finally, we will conclude the empirical analysis focusing on the micro level, examining internal organizational configurations. An intra-organizational analysis finalised to definitely open the black box and show that although the external environment has an impact on the organizations, these latter continue to have rooms of autonomy. In this regard we will apply a threefold interpretation. We will analyse the different organizational responses to the contextual pressures. Firstly, we will observe the tensions behind the conforming tendency to collective norms and beliefs, defined as isomorphism, undertaken by the different organisations. Secondly, in order to complement this interpretation of the organizational behaviour, we will mobilize the framework of the institutional logics. It will permit to better characterise the specificities of each organization, highlighting the tension between the effects of conformism, on the one hand, and the differences, that remain within the

organization, on the other. Finally, we will apply the lens of the resource dependence in order to study the strategies that characterize the organizational behaviour.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part describes the analytical design of this research, characterized by a multilevel and processual analysis. We then present in the second part, the methodology implemented to collect and analyse empirical data.

## **PART 1 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **3.1.1 A Multilevel and Processual Analysis based on an Institutional Perspective**

In order to properly explore the subject of this research, combining different institutional approaches, we decided to carry out a multi level analysis, macro, meso and micro, based on a mixed method. Scholars developing multilevel analysis agree that organizations must be understood as multilevel systems, meaning that adopting a multilevel perspective is fundamental to understand real-world phenomena (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Costa1, Graça, Marques-Quinteiro, Marques Santos, Caetano, and Passos 2013). Furthermore as suggested by Rousseau (2011), who defines “embeddedness,” as a multilevel concept, the complexity of some issues requires using different lenses in order to make them accessible. This is confirmed by Kozlowski and Klein (2000), which define as fundamental, the recognition that, micro phenomena are embedded in macro contexts and that macro phenomena often emerge through the interaction and dynamics of lower-level elements.

In this research once defined the different levels of analysis, we will analyse the internal dynamics characterizing each level, and then the interaction among them. As the understanding and description of internal dynamics is essential in order to carry out a more integrated approach (House et al., 1995), we will structure the analysis in different blocks inherent to the different levels. The definition of the unit of the analysis, in our case, while all the analysis will be based on an institutional perspective, the macro level will be studied through an economic approach, and the meso and micro through an organizational one. Using different theories and approaches is relevant for a multilevel analysis, due to the traditional different interests across disciplines. For instance, while the macro level has historically interested economists, able to engage in high level of generalization using aggregated data - group of organizations, entire sectors of activity - the meso and the micro levels focus on concepts more adapted to the organizational approach, basing the reflection on direct observation. This of course could create some difficulties, because as highlighted by some scholars, many of the controversies and problems associated with multilevel research are based on misspecifications or misalignments among the theoretical levels of constructs (Hannan 1991, Rousseau 1985). On the other hand, the interaction among the levels permits to conceptualise the organizational behaviour, in our case the TSOs business like evolution, as the combined result of contextual and individual levels.

Considering the interaction between the different levels is necessary to take into account the different aspects and give a full perception of the phenomenon. As emphasized by some scholars supporting the multilevel analysis, the main contribution of this kind of analysis is represented by the specification of how the phenomena are linked at different levels (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). This relationship among levels could be conceptualized as top-down rather than bottom-up. In the top-down level analysis, an organizational system is embedded or included in a higher-level context. Thus as individuals are embedded within


groups, groups are within organizations, organizations within sector of activity, and so on. Basically, top-down processes describe the influence of higher-level contextual factors on lower levels of the system. This is actually totally in line with the institutional approach proposed in this research, where human activities are not conceptualized as fixed and permanent objects, but instead are constantly evolving in relation to the contexts in which they are found.

On the other hand the bottom –up approach describes how individuals contribute to organizational effectiveness and to institutional changes. The bottom-up approach gives centrality to the actors, without necessarily decontextualizing them. For instance, as also mentioned by Kozlowski and Klein (2000) a good example is the construct of organizational culture. The organizational culture is represented by the sum of the collective characteristics, behaviours, and values of an organization's members. Organizational cultures differ insofar as the characteristics, behaviours, and values of organizational members differ. In these terms the organizational behaviour is the result of lowest level's attributes, which influence the highest levels, such as the interactions among organizations and the shape of the sector as a whole.

As mentioned above the first important step in order to craft a multilevel study is to define, justify, and explain the level of each focal construct that constitutes the entire system (Kozlowski and Klein 2000). At the macro level, we will explore the TS as a whole. We will observe the macro trends, and the evolution the TS as a whole embraced in the last years, in terms of increase in size and characteristics of the evolution, focusing in particular to the business-like evolution. The concept is particularly complex, which explains why the analysis hasn't stopped at a first level. We will then explore the phenomenon, at the lowest levels - meso and the micro - but from a different perspective. On the other, contextualising at the meso level we will observe the same phenomenon from a different perspective, bringing to light aspects that would be impossible to deal with at a macro level of analysis. The study at this level will be carried out on the dynamics of the organizational field the reception for asylum seekers and refugees. Those two levels will be tackled through an organizational institutional perspective since the NIE does not permit to go deep enough into the meso and micro levels. For this purpose, the analysis at the meso level is contextualised, both from the point of view of the sector of activity - the reception for asylum seekers - and geographically - the municipal areas of Marseille, in France, and Naples, in Italy. In fact, framed in this two respective contexts, TSOs could have very different roles in the definition and thus in the implementation of the service. Depending on the public administrative arrangements that are framed, on the institutional national, regional and local environments, but also on the internal dynamics dominating the organization. The sector is actually, the result of complex multilevel governance, resulting from the commixture of social and security policies, composed of a large number of actors at various governance levels (from the international one to the local one). The micro level of the analysis will show that, although those pressures highly influence the organizational behaviours, the broad trends, observed at the macro and meso levels (the marketization, the professionalization and corporatization), are differently interiorised by the organizations, which maintain their peculiarities, namely different strategies and logics of action. In order to show this, we decided to apply three different organizational approaches. We will show that the case studies selected, although embedded in the same context and reacting at the first glance similarly embracing the business-like evolution (isomorphism), however codify the external realities mobilizing different logics (Institutional logics), and react through various strategies (Resource Dependence Theory).


The above described multi level analysis aims at clearly showing the interactions between agent and structure, focusing both on the external pressures and the internal configuration of the organizations. Focusing on the impact of the external pressures on the TSOs, and in particular on the business like evolution due to those pressures, we will try to explain the phenomenon both through a top down (the pressure of the structure on the lower units) and a bottom up (uncovering the agency of the actors involved in the action) approach. This will be possible through the construction of a mixed determinants model (Klein et al., 1994), which will permits to describe the determinants of the observed phenomenon at the different levels. Both the complexity of the issue and the high theoretical pluralism, characterizing this work, explains the use of a mixed methods research. Complex phenomenon requires to be studied from different perspectives, which will bring to the lights different aspects, concerning the same object of research. If the macro level analysis will explain the magnitude of the phenomenon, and whether ascribable at one country or more, nothing would however be observed about the ways it will show up in different contexts. At the meso and micro levels instead, although not able to generalise the phenomenon, we will be able to grasp the differences among cases, and the nuances across contexts. Aware of the incompatibility in some respects, of the answers instead of hierarchize them, we will develop twofold analysis - from an economic and an organizational perspective – for the purpose of giving a clearer picture, while recomposing the complex puzzle of the external and internal dynamics characterizing the business like evolution of the TSOs.

**Figure 3.1 Macro Meso and Micro Analysis**



Source: Author , 2020

**Figure 3.2 the mixed method applied to a multilevel analysis**



### 3.1.2 The Macro Level of Analysis: Evolutions of the Third Sector

To analyse the macro level, and give a broad picture of the change characterizing the TS, we will use an economic perspective, based on the New Institutional Economics. The data and methodology, which will be explained more in detail later in this chapter and in the following chapter, demonstrate an impressive growth of TS in recent decades in both France and in Italy. This growth has been characterised by a strong heterogeneity both in terms of legal forms and services provided. Based on North's definition of institutions, North (1991, p. 97) defined as "the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction, we will examine the contextual determinants of the current TS configuration. Actually the NIE perspective is the first one to highlight the importance of the context in order to understand the development of the economic organizations (Williamson, 2000). Measuring the presence of TSOs in both countries, in Italy and France, will give us a clear picture of what the sector is today and what are the main trends in terms of legal forms, territorial distribution and employment. Moreover, the business-like evolution of the sector is explored using detailed descriptive statistics. Furthermore, in order to prove the impact of the context on the economic organizations development, we will also explore the factors that stimulate or limit the development of TS in the Italian provinces, through a standard econometric analysis. This will permit to test different economic theories explaining the spread and kind of development of the TSOs face to the different institutional characteristics. Finally, the macro-level analysis will aim at point out the transformation of the sector as a whole, also with respect to the private and the public sectors, and the role the sector plays nowadays in the contemporary welfare systems.

As stated by Powell and DiMaggio, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides the neo-classical theory with a considerable level of realism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). In fact, Williamson's framework proposes a holistic approach in order to study economic dynamics, taking into account institutional pressures (see table 3.1), which explain the growth of organizations. The main contributions are on the one hand as a result of Coase, attempts to overcome the neoclassical approach, which defines the company just as an operator aimed at maximizing profits. On the other hand, the behavior of the actors is not simply the result of internal characteristics, but is instead attributed to its context or to "higher order factors" (Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006), as the behavior of economic organizations is shaped by the organizational industries, sectors or national policies" (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006 p. 195). Thus, the NIE takes into account elements that are not considered by the neo-classical basic model such as incomplete information, cognitive limitation and difficulties in enforcing and monitoring agreements, uncertainty (Slater & Spencer, 2000).

Based on economic efficiency considerations, the key element of the analysis is the transaction cost, described as the cost of participation and exchange on the market (Coase, 1959). As stated by Williamson "The new institutional economics is concerned about the origins, incidence and ramifications of transaction costs" (Williamson, 1979, p. 233), and institutions should reduce uncertainty and provide the positive environment for economic exchanges (D. C. North, 1994). They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of



conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)". While individuals, represented in a manner consistent with their ordering of preferences and the rationality of maximizing utility (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), have the need to create the interaction of the most efficient actor, in terms of output, institutions are the elements that arise and persist when they confer benefits for actors.

With regard to the NIE, economic actors are characterized by bounded rationality and are aware that the complex contracts under which transactions are settled are inevitably incomplete. Actors must choose whether to produce internally - hierarchy - outsource - market - or use a hybrid institutional arrangement. In order to understand what the scenario is, the different appropriate levels of analysis are considered. Williamson recognizes four levels of analysis: embeddedness, institutional environment, governance and resource allocation and employment (see Table 3.1). The higher level imposes constraints at the lower level. The first level – Social embeddedness - concerns culture, customs and traditions. It is not subject of study for the economist, because taken as given by most institutional economists. Furthermore, change at this level is very slow and difficult to observe.

The second level refers to the institutional environment – formal rules, constitutions, laws, particularly related to contracts laws and enforcement of property (North 1991). This level describes the distribution of power across different levels of government and instruments such as executive, legislative and bureaucratic functions. At this level, change is normally the consequence of a shock, such as war, financial crisis or perceived threat. This level of analysis is particularly important for the maintenance of property rights. In fact, a private-enterprise system can properly function when property rights are defined and respected (Coase, 1959). The legal system defining ownership is functional to arbitrate disputes, and sets prices for resources, so that, if someone wants to use it has to pay the owner.

The third level represents the governance of contractual relations and the reorganisation of transactions. Governance institutions aim at defining order, mitigating conflict and bringing mutual benefits. This is why contracts are defined. As mentioned by Williamson, "once established the rules of the game, property, the contract represents the game" (2000, p. 599). While the rule of the game concerns the second level, the "play of the game" is treated in the third level. This is where the formal rules have an impact and where the parties through private ordering deal among them. As in the NIE approach any problem could be reformulated as a contractual issue and then examined in terms of economizing transaction cost (Coase, 1960), at this level, the governance of the contractual relations becomes the focus of the analysis.

Finally, the fourth level concerns resource allocation and employment. Here, economic organisations are described as production functions (Williamson, 2000). They basically remain a black box. In considering the choice of governance structures, from hierarchy to market, the NIE shall take into account the purpose and economic effects, but remains silent on the different motivations that stimulate the attitudes and activities of organisations, while described as a production function.

**Table 3.1 NIE's Level of Analysis**

<b>Level</b>		<b>Description</b>
L1	Social embeddedness	Culture, customs, traditions, informal institutions
L2	Institutional environment	Formal rule of the game and division of power - polity, judiciary, bureaucracy
L3	Governance	Play of the game - Contracts
L4	Resource allocation and employment	Prices, quantities, incentives alignments

Source: Williamson, 2000

So we can assert that the NIE theory recognises the importance of institutions (Matthews, 1986), and that it represents a real advance in the knowledge of the impact of institutions, a "silent revolution" (Demsetz, 1997, p. 426) that reformulates the neoclassical economic issues, which until then dealt with the allocation of resources and the degree of utilization, regardless of context (Williamson 2000). The formal specification of the institutional environment, which arise when conferring benefit to the economic actors (North 1998), are described as laws, polity, judiciary and bureaucracy (North and Weingast, 1989). Examining the institutional environment, and understanding its arrangement would permit as well to understand many issues included the proliferation of a specific organizational form, such as the TSO. The NIE approach appears to be a particularly suitable analytical framework for the macro level analysis, allowing for understanding why institutions, defined as positive factors enable transactions and the development of the economic organizations (North, 1988).

Our analysis follows this perspective, by specifically investigating whether the heterogeneity of TSOs presence in Italian regions is correlated with economic, socio-demographic and institutional contextual factors. As shown in the table above, the NIE approach claims that the institutions contribute to define the "rule of the game" (North, 1992; Williamson, 2000), represented by L2 in the table 3.1 just above, by reducing uncertainty and by providing an efficient framework for economic exchange (North, 1991). In the NIE's framework, the institutions - formal rules and informal constraints - affect economic performance by determining the cost of transaction and production as well as by providing incentives and disincentives for business activity (North, 1992). So once detected the contextual determinants of TSOs incidence, we will check whether the institutional environment determines any effect of the development of TS, our analysis includes a set of variables that are commonly used to measure quality of institutions in Italian provinces. The source of these variables is the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) developed by Nifo and Vecchione (2014).

### 3.1.3 The Meso level Analysis – an Intra -Organizational Perspectives

As asserted by Costa<sup>1</sup>, Graça, Marques-Quinteiro, Marques Santos, Caetano, and Passos 2013, p.8) “Once we start assuming that companies and organizational systems are complex systems, constantly changing and interacting with outside systems (e.g., the market) and inside systems (e.g., departments), it becomes clear that a useful way for us to research in a multilevel scenario is to think and to do *meso*”. Following these authors we integrated the *meso* level into our analysis through the study of the field of the reception service for asylum seekers both in France and Italy. The second part of this work seeks to understand the mix of reasons that motivate actors to operate in specific contexts. We will then carry out an analysis of the inter –organizational interactions, which will aim not at defining the most efficient configuration, but instead at exploring *how* the considered inter-organizational configurations shape the interactions among organizations, in the organizational field.

This part of the work will explore the interactions among actors through the formal tools put in place, such as contracts and performance indicators, which have an impact on the structure of the exchanges and also on the organizations. The institutions here are not interpreted as elements that reduce uncertainty and provide an efficient framework for economic exchange as in the NIE (North 1992), but instead are considered as potentially constraining organizational rationality (Nee, 2005). By shaping the culture and organizational beliefs, they can give new explications for organizational and individual behavior, and being the causes for unreflective activities. Based on the main difference between the NIE and the organizational new institutional theory, Powell and DiMaggio (1991) argue that institutions are not human designs, but rather evolve out of the particularities of a given historical and cultural context. Later, Scott (2007) gives us a less deterministic interpretation of institutions, focusing more on inter-subjectivity and individual interpretations rather than larger social processes, although remaining quite distant from the North (1991) assertion which wants institutions as human consciously designed to help people efficiently meet their goals.

Di Maggio and Powell defined the organizational field as “those organizations, which, on the whole, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (Di Maggio and Powell 1983 p. 148). They are actors such as key suppliers, consumers of resources and products, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce services or similar products. This unit of analysis is a novelty introduced by the new institutional theory, which allows us to take into consideration not only the organizations in competition (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), but all the relevant actors. Once the organizational field has been established, powerful isomorphic pressures influence organisations, which in turn are induced to reproduce the contextual institutional model (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983).

The studies over organizational field for long time have mostly focused on isomorphism and stability, and only recently the attention has been turned to change (Reay and Hinings 2005, Glynn 2014). The organizational (and inter-organizational) field has become the place of investigation for the institutional change, which is articulated as the process of deinstitutionalization and re-institutionalization of new practices (Zucker 1988). Practices – which includes a number of specific actions within the organizational field, such as the exchange practices, involving financing, production of services etc (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King, 1991) – can be

defined as institutionalised once became standard practices (Radcliffe-Brwon, 1986). However actors can at any time choose not to embrace them, and instead choosing alternative actions, included not acting. Actually, as Di Maggio highlights an organizational field could be a well “an arena of strategy and conflict” (1983, p. 149), where change happens.

Furthermore, as clarified by Bidart and Mendez (Bidart & Mendez, 2016) social phenomena are processes and “take time”. Although it may seem obvious, however, the dynamic aspects of phenomena are not always taken seriously in the social sciences. Instead the purpose of the process is to glorify the concept of “time matters” (Abbott, 1988). For this reason, the observed variable is never isolated and discreet, but instead the result of the interaction between time and the changing events observed at different levels. Processual studies, based on multiple sources, enable researchers to link the present with the past and the future. Actually, the change is not explained as progressive and incremental, but instead characterized by periods of variable length. These periods are characterized by a revolutionary moment of dramatic change, which marks the transition from one to another. This analysis allows to understand the origins, development and implementation of organizational change, taking into account the environment, enabling and binding forces, the role of key people or organizations in this field (Pettigrew 1987 p 657). Furthermore process-oriented analysis is supposed to be based on the identification of the main actors involved and how their actions and objectives shape the dynamics of change. The identification of the key actors (or stakeholders) passes through the collection of data about their actions and perceptions in relationship to changes within the organizational field (Reay and Hinings 2005).

Such analysis is designed to consider the process in a narrative perspective, (Bidart & Mendez 2016) integrating the different elements, rather than measuring the occurrences of events and variables. In fact, the processual analysis, which traces the specific, but evolves over time, configures the different elements of the internal and external context, aims not to explain “why”, but instead “how”, the change happens. Processual analyses help to answer the question "how does this phenomenon occur? " but also "how do certain variables or phenomena change over time? "(Mohr, 1982). The change analysed in this work is the evolving dynamics of the TSOs, contextualised in the specific service of the reception system for asylum seekers and refugees, in Marseille, and Naples, during the period of the last three decades. We will focus on the changing practices over time, characterising the field, as the result of a number of different influences, which could not be hierarchized. As asserted by Leblebici and colleagues (1991), the configuration of the field is not permanent but contingent. So exploring the new practices, we will also explore how they have been introduced and through which mechanisms, whether actors adapted in order to remain in the industry – the service of the reception for asylum seekers - or at opposite, if they try to figure out mechanisms of resistance. The processual analysis will also characterise the micro level of analysis.

### **3.1.4 The Micro level – an Intra-Organizational Perspective**

Once detected the actors composing the field, we will focus on their internal organizational dynamics, and their behaviour in response to material and cultural

pressures. The study has the objective of identifying from an external and internal perspective the causes of the TSOs business- like evolution in a complex and evolving institutional environment. To do this, we will focus on the evolution of human resources, the increase in number of social workers, the acquisition of skills and the new roles played in the organizations. We will study the organizational evolution in terms of strategies. The strategies observed at the sector level could be quite different, although certain ways of coping with the external environments have been observed as a common path.

As above mentioned, to carry out the organizational analysis we will apply an institutional perspective and a resource dependence perspective.

The organizational approach of the Institutional theory will permit to define how rules, culture and institutions, orient actors' actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The early organizational institutional approach focuses on institutional environment, which limits the organizational choice (Powell 1988), and in turn organisations behave as they are expected to behave and how they expect other organisations will behave (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Actions are based on a shared system of rules, which bind actors, and on the other hand privilege and insure others, through a system of rewards and sanctions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Based on a system of coercive, regulatory and mimetic mechanisms, organizations comply with institutionalised rules and practices, through a process of greater homogeneity among organizations defined as isomorphism (Powell and Di Maggio 1991). Emphasis in particular has been put on legitimacy, has the main explanation for organizational behaviour and structure, while a rejection of rationality has marked the definitive detachment from other organizational theories (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). The isomorphism is so described as that process of incorporation of the external pressures, conforming to the environment, in order to survive (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

Since these first approaches, later institutionalism approach, trying to get out of determinism imposed by the early institutionalists, did no longer focus on isomorphism, but on the effects of differentiated institutional logics on organizations (and individuals) (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). The institutional logics – defined by Thornton and Ocasio (1999) as the material practices, values, beliefs, and rules socially constructed, which provide meaning to social reality- provides the link between individual agency and socially constructed institutional practices. The institutional logics so described represent the instruments to understand the organizational behaviour as socially and institutionally contextualised, providing ultimately room of change. For instance the institutional logics approach has the ambition to put back in the centre of the analysis the actors. In particular authors explain that different logics can continue to co-exist, and different kinds of hybridization can be observed (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). We will try to address a major challenge to analyse and conceptualise how organizational actors influence change, while being integrated into the institutional fabric of their organisational context (Burns & Nielsen, 2006). Institutional logics provide symbolic and material elements that structure the organizational legitimacy and identities of the actor (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). In the context of our research for instance, there are some TSOs that, while maintaining links with civil society, can still grasp and respond effectively to new social needs. At the opposite others have lost sight of the need of the community and are subject to increasingly heavy isomorphic pressures and who

sometimes take opportunistic behaviour. The recognition of multiple competing logics, allows to encompass the structural determinism putting greater emphasis on the process of agency, conflict and contingency (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005).

In addition, following the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), we will explore the active choice behaviour of the organization coping with interdependencies and scarce resources. The RDT, differently than the institutional approach, focuses on the material contextual constraints. The organizational behaviour is moved by the aim of reducing the uncertainty, in order to adapt to the external context and find a viable way to manage the scarce resources. So in this case the “loci of external power” are the organizations that control resources (Oliver 1991), and the organizational responses are aimed at coping with problematic interdependencies and controlling resource flows (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Applying this approach, our analysis takes into account the different organizational responses to the pressures towards homogenization of the organizational field. To describe them, we will analyze which strategies have been put in place by organizations to address external constraints. These strategic choices define the role played by actors, and their positions in the context of the organizational field. The interactions between actors are then strongly influenced by the strategic choices undertaken by TSOs, in terms of cooperation and conflict, both among TSOs and between TSOs and public authorities. The organizational interaction will be influenced by the strategies implemented and the logics behind them.

With the articulation of these three approaches, we will be able to answer the main question of this research, which is twofold: how do TSOs dealing with reception services face strong institutional pressures that drives them towards a business-like evolution and, within this context, how do the interactions between these organizations and public authorities change. We will analyse also if there is still room for manoeuvre to resist the isomorphic trend, and what are the strategic actions put in place in this sense if any. Finally we will give the voice to the organizations, analysing the institutional logics, which characterise their identity and see how they respond to tensions between competing logics that may have been exacerbated by institutional pressures.

## Isomorphism

As stated by Powell and DiMaggio (1991) the institutional approach in different disciplines included economics, political science and organizational theory. The different institutions, which assumed the same principle as institutional arrangements and the social process, developed very different interpretations. For instance, the new institutional economics interprets the institutions as enabler or constraint of transactions. They are created by rational human actions in order to reduce uncertainty by providing an efficient framework for economic trade (North 1991). Two main strains have been developed in political studies: positive theory and regime theory. The first describes how political institutions shape political outcomes (Shepsle 1986) focusing in particular on the concept of stability and trying to find the reasons behind it (Moe 1987). The second flow concerns international studies and institutions, which promote cooperation between actors (Krasner 1983, Young 1986). Concerning the organizational approach, although distinct differences exist between

old and new institutional theories, however both show scepticism toward models of rational organizations of actors. However, the New Institutional theory marks the rejection of the rational actor model, which is at the basis of the new institutional economics and in particular transaction costs approach<sup>8</sup>, recognizing sources of constraints concepts such as stability, legitimacy (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) power (Fligstein, 2001) and control (Coleman, 1990). This part of the work relies on the New Institutional Theory, and in particular to one of the most important concepts developed within theory in order to explain the homogeneity, in a specific organizational field, the concept of isomorphism.

As stated by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), one of the main questions to which the new institutional theory seeks to answer is the process of homogenization in a specific organizational field. The tendency of organizations to homogeneity is so explained as institutional compliance and adjustment to the rules of the external environment (Oliver 1991). Isomorphism is the concept, which better explains this process of compliance with the environment, as organizational reaction to external institutional pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Hawley (Hawley, 1968) describes isomorphism as “a binding process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units facing the same set of environmental conditions”. In reality, this means that organizations, becoming more similar to others on the field, change in order to become more compatible with the contextual environment, which does not necessarily mean becoming more efficient (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In this context, if the first adopters introduce certain practices with the aim of improving productivity, the reproduction of other actors is mostly based on legitimacy and in order to avoid normative sanction (John W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Meyer (1979) and Fennell (1980), have recognised two isomorphic processes, the competitive and the institutional. The competitive relies on efficiency and competitive motivation, the second on power and legitimacy, assuming that organizations seek legitimacy by conforming to the environment (Thornton, 2011). Following Di Maggio and Powell (1983) institutional isomorphic change takes place through three mechanisms, coercive, mimetic and normative, while two types of predictors are identified at the organizational and field level. This is also show on the table 3.2. Finally following Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge (2007) different types of organizational characteristics could incur in isomorphism.

In order to analyse the process of marketization and professionalization shown by the organizations we will mobilize the concept of isomorphism and we will answer to the following question:

*Do organizations become more similar under institutional pressures? If so, how?  
Which are the organizational characteristics that reinforce or hinder the process of organizational homogeneity?*

### Coercive Process

The coercive process occurs when external agencies impose changes on organisations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This is particularly true when organizations rely on

---

<sup>8</sup> Even if rationality is defined as bounded, in contrast with the neo-classical model (Williamson 2000).

external funds, such as donors or public funding to ensure organizational survival and sustainability (Claeyé & Jackson, 2012). In fact, when one organization depends on another, one might observe mechanisms of informal pressure exerted on the former by the latter. This results in coercive isomorphism. An example could be the fact that organizational change is a direct response to government mandate (John Wilfred Meyer et al., 1981). It has been pointed out that certain behaviours, even if ceremonially performed, could however have an impact on the organizations themselves. For instance, new professionals could support their positions or the imposition of new tasks, such as the creation of new organizational controls to honour the legal commitment under a complex contract (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983). Weber recognised the instruments imposed by specific public authorities, which could have the same effect, such as the vicissitudes of the budgetary cycle, the ubiquity of certain fiscal years, annual reports and financial reporting requirements ensuring eligibility for federal contracts or funds (Weber, 1952).

### Mimetic Process

Uncertainty could be the cause of isomorphism as well (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Following Thornton (2011) this is the most studied case of isomorphic change. Ambiguous objectives, unstable environments, high variability in the legal framework and sectorial changes, could encourage organizations to imitate the successful ones (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Organizations tend to model themselves on similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. Actors sometimes copy innovations, once they become minimal threshold, even without any clear evidence of enhancing their performance, but in order to improve their legitimacy (Ashworth et al., 2007). Modelled organizations may be aware but also unaware of their role and they do not necessarily impose their model, but they could naturally become leader (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).

### Normative Process

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that the regulatory process of isomorphism is associated with professionalism. Professionalization is defined by Larson (1977) and Collins (1979) as the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work. Following Ashworth and colleagues “organizations are expected to comply with professional standards and to adopt systems and techniques considered legitimate by the relevant professional groups” (2007 p. 167).

### Core-Periphery Characteristics and Isomorphism

Hannan & Freeman (1984) affirm that isomorphism could alter the organizational “periphery” leaving the core intact. Ashworth and colleagues (2007) sustain that organizational attributes could be more or less resistant or protected from isomorphic pressures. They defined the strategy and culture “core” characteristics, while structures and processes represent “peripheral” characteristics, and could be more easily influenced by institutional pressures. Instead, core characteristics are associated with values and identity (Hannan & Freeman 1984), so they are supposed to be more resistant as embodying the essence of organizations. Against the expectation that isomorphism would be shown more strongly in the peripheral attributes of structures and processes than the core, their empirical studies have suggested the opposite and



stronger evidence of isomorphism has been measured in organizational culture. Finally, following Ashworth and colleagues (2007), the mimetic isomorphism in organization theory concerns more the tendency of an organization to imitate the structure of another organization– peripheral characteristics - because of the belief that the structure of the latter organization is advantageous. On the contrary, McNulty and Ferlie (2004) suggested that traditional professional values and at least some working practices last in healthcare.

### Predictors

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) recognised two orders of predictors, organizational-level predictors and field-level predictors.

As regards the organizational level, the two authors state:

- The similarity of one organization with another is directly related to its dependency on it;
- Organizations receiving all the resources from the same source tend to change isomorphically in order to become more similar to their source of resource;
- The similarity is directly correlated to uncertainty in terms of means – ends relation;
- Organizations with more uncertain objectives tend to model sub-organizations perceived as legitimated;
- Organizations with graduated employees will have to support isomorphism faster due to the high level of internalization of dominant organizational rules and models, already experienced by workers with an academic background;

As far as field level predictors are concerned:

- The dependence of an organizational field on a single source of resources is directly related to the level of isomorphism. This hypothesis is particularly true if the organizations in a field depend on the State or public authority;
- The fewer alternative organizational models visible in a field, the faster the rate of isomorphism in that field;
- Isomorphism increases where the level of uncertainty of the technologies is greater

Core-Periphery Characteristics and Isomorphism;

- Isomorphism is directly related to professionalism in an organizational field;
- Isomorphism is higher when the field is structured.

**Table 3.2 Institutional Pressures Characteristics and Predictors**

Institutional Pressures	Characteristics	Predictors	
		Organizational Level	Field Level
COERCIVE	Coercive forces are the external pressures exerted by agencies government, regulatory actors to adopt the structures or systems that they favour. These pressures are often associated with legal requirements, health and safety regulations, and so on, but may also stem from contractual obligations with other actors, which constrain organizational variety.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Similarity of one organization to another based on dependency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Market Instruments: accreditation, evaluation criteria etc.</li> <li>- Stringent legal Framework, such as in the “emergency management”</li> <li>- Organizational field dependent by the State</li> </ul>
MIMETIC	Mimetic forces are pressures to copy or emulate other organizations’ activities, systems, or structures. These mimetic pressures sometimes are not justified as an improve of efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Innovations that are deemed to enhance legitimacy are seen as desirable, especially under conditions of uncertainty</li> <li>- Similarity of one organization with other related by economic dependency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uncertainty of the field</li> <li>- Often changing legislation</li> <li>- Limited economic resources</li> <li>- Similarity of one organization with others related by economic dependency particularly when there is one source financing</li> <li>- Few Alternatives</li> </ul>
NORMATIVE	Normative forces describe the effect of professional standards and the influence of professional communities on organizational characteristics. They capture the ways in which organizations are expected to conform to standards of professionalism and to adopt systems and techniques considered to be legitimate by relevant professional groupings.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Professionalization</li> <li>- Use of quality management systems</li> <li>- Graduates support faster isomorphism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Professionalization</li> </ul>

Source: Author, 2020

## Institutional Logics

While early institutional scholars, such as DiMaggio and Powell, Zucker and others, focused on isomorphism, in society or organizational fields, a number of scholars have been increasingly interested in differentiation among organizations. Among them, Friedland and Alford (1985) started to describe the contradictory practices and beliefs characterizing the western society as institutional logics. They further developed the concept, looking for a solution between the individualistic rational choice, and macro structural perspective. They particularly focused on what they call “institutional orders”. The institutional orders, namely capitalist market, state bureaucracy, families, religion and democracy, are moved by their own central logics, which provide for identity the social actors involved. Although they represent constraints for individuals in terms of means and ends, they also provide for agency. Based on these assumptions Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) provided for a more accomplished definition. They defined the institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules, by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality”.

The individual and organizational behaviours are the result of “an interplay between individual agency and institutional structure” (Thornton, Ocasio p.103) and they could be understood only if located in a social and institutional context, which on the one hand regularize, creating constraints, and on the other leave space for agency and change to actors. This definition makes the institutional logics a perspective different from both the NIE – which sees behaviours anchored to rational choice – and early new institutional theory – which enhances the role of the structure on the actors. Furthermore it gives room to the concept of “embedded agency” (Battilana 2006), which highlights the partial autonomy of the individuals and organizations acting in society. However, society is described as resulting from different institutional systems, and each system represents a different set of expectation for human and organizational behaviour, which limits the variety of action.

The interplay of different logics makes the concept of hybridity in the foreground. Skelcher and Smith (2015) argue that hybridization arises from a plurality of rationalities, which could be referred at the institutional logics as suggested by Pache and Santos (2013). In this sense we follow the above mentioned authors interpretation of the hybridization as “the process in which plural logics and thus actor identities are in play within an organization, leading to a number of possible organizational outcomes” (Skelcher and Smith 2015 p. 434). However as asserted in chapter 2, the competitive environments could be source of hybridizations among different logics in TSOs. This is confirmed by the study of Jager and Schroer (2014), who applied the logic’s categorization, to highlight the business like trend characterizing the TSOs. So doing they explained that, on the one hand and despite the market- oriented environment and increasing competition, TSOs continue their activity maintaining their focus on social or environmental issues. On the other hand, they also observed that a number of non-profit start to behave integrating market concepts, such as selling their services for a market price, and reshaping their image in order to better present themselves to funding and volunteering markets.

Based on the process of institutional logics' definition used by of Pache and Santos (2013) we firstly defined two major logics: the social welfare logic and the logic of the market (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Jäger & Schröer, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013). The social welfare logic is defined as based on the goal of making services and products available to address the social needs, while the market logic is structured around the idea to reward efficiency and rationalised costs. Furthermore, as noticed by different academics, hybrid organisations also incorporate specific logics from the field of activity. Reay and Hinings (2009) recognized that plural logic co-exist in the Alberta health care field, Powell and Sandholtz (2012) the science and market logics in the biotechnological companies, and Dunn and Jones (Dunn & Jones, 2010) both health care and academic logic within the Faculty of Medicine, Purdy and Gray (2009) the condition of co-existent of judicial and bureaucratic logics in the field of alternative dispute resolution. In the next paragraph we espouse the use of this approach as well in order to identify the specific field competing logics.

In order to understand which institutional logics are shown, and how they co-exist in each organization studied, we will answer to the following question:

*How do hybrid organizations manage competing institutional logics that are exacerbated by pressures from the environment?*

### **Definition and Construction of the Dominant Logics**

For the definition of the institutional logics we took inspiration from the Pache and Santos work (Pache and Santos, 2013), but of course readapting it to our case studies and our research focus, the business-like evolution, from a micro perspective. The organizational elements, where organized in 10 items, representing as well the correspondent nodes in NVIVO software. Finally, we mapped them back to the four characteristics of the logics, as defined by the field-level data:

- HR;
- Size of the Organization;
- Organization Chart;
- Resources;
- Relationship with other associations;
- Relationship with public authorities;
- Funding;
- Reception services offered;
- Strategies;
- Values;

As shown in the table 3.3. we regrouped them into 4 different main themes: goal, performance and funds, organizational form, professionalism

1. If TSOs mission is concerned with the creation of social value, delivering a service to a community and achieving a broader target of well-being, different visions are however in place to meet this important objective.

The endorsement of the founders, mostly from the public authorities, is important to secure the resources. The founding system strongly changed in the last decades, and on the other hands the kinds of services funded as well, as shown by the different *appel à projets*, and *circulaires* issued by the social policies ministry before and interior ministry then. The public authorities asked for more compliance with the governmental migration policy and adherence to the securitarian political agenda.

What is the role of the association in the sector of reception for migrants?

2. Due to the reforms on the public sector and in particular concerning founding for TSOs, one of the main questions raised by the key actors in the field concerns performance. Is it still true that one of the main differences between capitalistic firms and TSOs concerns the performance objectives, in the light of the public competitive tenders, and the marketization of the sector?

What are the impacts of evaluation and performance indicators and competitive tenders?

3. In the last decades we observed an increase in size of the TSOs. Different dynamics are linked to the size, HR, and in general internal structures of organizations.

Which kind of organizational structures show the associations involved in the sectors?

4. In the entire social sector, we observed the change of the kind of people involved. Not only in terms of the shift from volunteers to paid workers, but also in terms of the kind of professional involved and how they interact among them. Actually, the sector of the reception, in the past, was characterised by voluntarism. At the end of 80s and at the beginning of 90s, specific figures and professionalised workers such as social assistants and social workers have been introduced. This has been also in line with the creation of different categories and different program related to their specific difficulties (the so-called “differentiation of poverty”). Then, the increasing complexity of the asylum procedures on the one hand and of the funding and accountability system on the other made it necessary to develop a greater competency on legal and business issues. Although the presence for these kinds of figures is important in all the organisations, however the interaction among them and their specific competencies highly varies in the different organisations.

How is defined the professional legitimacy?

These four items paved the way for defining our four logics of actions as following in table 3.3. and 3.4.

Below you will find the description of the four logics. Often, the tension between social and entrepreneurial logics are mentioned as characterizing the TSOs under process of business like evolution, as the result of integration of market concepts into their management and practices (Jager and Schroer 2014 Austin et al. 2006). Two

other logics based on the field's characteristics, play an important role in the business-like evolution, which in the particular case of the social services under professionalization. These two logics could be polarised into two categories: technical rationality logic on the one hand and militant logic on the other.

**Social Logic** – It is based on the values of support for the beneficiaries of the services, which is the principle mission of a non-profit social service. This kind of logic is based on the principle values exposed to describe the non-profit, a horizontal participative organization, based on the idea that the quality of the service is always a priority compared to the profit. The performance indicators, as well as the public tenders are seen as innovative instruments, but that can jeopardize the social mission if the search for efficiency predominates on solidarity values.

**Entrepreneurial Logic** – It is based on the so-called “Value for Money”. The competition as well as the contractualization of the relationship among actors is seen as a positive factor of innovation and of increasing the productivity of the social service's structures. The organizations become bigger in order to benefit from economies of scale and quite specialised. The internal organization is based on division of role, with a clear definition of the different tasks, the governance is quite pyramidal and particularly articulated in different departments with a number of liaison officers at regional level for the local branches. This kind of structure is finalised to reduce the cost and mutualised the service in order to cut duplication.

**Technical Rationality Logics** – It is based on professionalism and specialised competencies. This logic is based on the idea that as social policies, and in particular those related to migration and reception have become in time more and more complex, only highly specialised figures can deal with out. This is true also for the management of the structure such as the TSO, which are supposed not only to deal with complex issues, but also to interact with the other stakeholders through complex instruments, such as public tenders, contracts, and multi-actor projects. On the base of this vision of the external context, the organizations are supposed being internally well organised, and the social workers are called to deal with their specific tasks, based on their academic and professional background.

**Militant Logic** – It is based on the values of solidarity and militancy. The members first and foremost are supposed to adhere to the organizational values and identity, which in turn define the mission of the organization. The organizations are thought being small and horizontally managed, where all the members are ready to do everything and to deal with every kind of task in order to answer the need of the beneficiaries and in general the people in need. There is an ideological rejection of the performance indicators compliance and the members' subscription is the preferred source of funding, as it leaves the organization totally independent from other actors' control (included public authorities). The quality of the actions is the most important thing, bringing the organization even to enact extreme strategies of opposition such as to quit the service.

**Table 3.3 Analytical Grid for Drafting Institutional Logics**

Logics	Questions	Items	Field –level Data
	What is the role of the association in the sector of reception for migrants?	GOAL	Relationship with other associations; Relationship with public authorities;
Social Logic Entrepreneurial Logic Militant Logic	How is the organizational structure of the associations involved in the sectors?	ORGANIZATIONAL FORM	Size of the Organization; Organization Chart; Resources; HR
Technical Rationality Logic	How is defined the professional legitimacy?	PROFESSIONALISM	Strategies
	What is the impact of evaluation and performance indicators?	PERFORMANCE AND FUND	Values Reception services offered;

Source: the Author, 2020 (based on the work Pache and Santons 2013)

**Table 3.4 Institutional Logics Main Characteristics**

	Social Logic	Entrepreneurial Logic	Militant Logic	Technical Rationality Logic
<b>Values</b>	Assistance and support	Value for Money	Solidarity and militancy	Professionalism and competencies
<b>HR</b>	Able to support the beneficiary from different aspects without any hierarchy among the social and psychological aspect and the legal and administrative one	Specialised and division of role, clear definition of the different tasks	Adherence to the organizational values and identity	Specialised
<b>Size of the Organization</b>	“ <i>Small is beautiful</i> ”	Big in order to benefit from the economies of scale	Small and horizontal	Big and with clearly defined tasks
<b>Organization Chart</b>	Horizontal and participatory	Pyramidal and particularly articulated in different departments with a number of <i>liaison</i> officer at regional level	Horizontal and participatory	Pyramidal and characterised by strict division of roles based on competencies
<b>Resources</b>	Difficult acceptance of the performance indicators	Internal mutualisation of resources and cut of costs; economies of scales	Rejection of the performance indicators compliance	Internal mutualisation of resources and cut of costs
<b>Relationship with other associations</b>	Cooperation	Competition	Selected cooperation based on shared values	Selected cooperation based on competences
<b>Relationship with public authorities</b>	Mediated by intermediary actors	Thanks to the large size the relationship is direct	Independent and conflicting	Relationship based on expertise
<b>Funding</b>	Public grants (based on the social services provided)	Public and Private market Resources	Membership fees	Public resources
<b>Reception services</b>	Selected instruments of reception, based on the quality of reception	All if efficient and competitive	Selected instruments of reception, based on quality	All if relevant competencies
<b>Strategies</b>	Diversification and radicalization in the action	Acquisition of other social centres dismissed and scaling-up	Exit and radicalization in the opposition	Division of work

Source: Author, 2020



## Resource dependence

Resource Dependence Theory stresses the need for organisations to adapt to environmental uncertainty to face with the problem of interdependency and actively manage or control resource flows (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that in order to understand organisational behaviour, instead of focusing on internal dynamics, such as decisions, values and beliefs of leadership, it is important to focus on where the actions are carried out. Actually, the two authors shift their attention to the situations, pressures and constraints resulted from the environment. So as well as the New Institutional Theory, Resource Dependence explains the organizational choice as constrained by multiple external pressures. But while the new institutional theory focuses on the isomorphic trend, Resource Dependence tries to find an explanation for active choice behaviour and in particular those which concerns any kinds of interactions with the other actors from the field (Oliver 1991). In fact, as Oliver pointed out, Resource dependence theory focuses on “a wide range of active choice behaviours that organizations can exercise to manipulate external dependencies or exert influence over the allocation or source of critical resources” (1991:148). Focusing on, different possibilities of adaptation to external forces, alteration of the environment and organizational decisions, the Resource Dependence Theory shows large room for strategic choice (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).\_Uncertainty and the need for resources drive the action of organisations. But if organizational survival depends on the acquisition of the necessary resources from the environment, however it is not always easy to acquire them, particularly in case of scarcity of resources (J. A. Alexander & Morrissey, 1989). For this reason, although organisations share a strong preference for remaining independent and self-sufficient (Cook et al., 1983), in particular when they do control resources, they often seek affiliation with other actors to cope with this issue (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In this context, the organizations enact strategic choices (Child, 1972), in order to interact with the other actors in the sector and to face interdependencies. In this sense situations and environment both represent constraints and opportunities.

As in other organizational theories, the motivation behind organizational behaviour is stability and legitimacy, which could be achieved through the exercise of power (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). External power is held by those who control scarce resources (Oliver 1991), and there is an unbalance of power among the different actors interacting on the field. On the interdependence could be controlled and negotiated, through strategies. For instance, large organizations have held enormous concentrated power. Powell and DiMaggio (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) recognize power, a distinct element that separates Resource Dependence and transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1979), which is rather based on economic efficiency. Power explains both the intra-organizational dynamics, and the inter- shaping the field and the creation of an iterative dynamic with context, which relies on the ability of organizations to influence external pressures (at the opposite than in the New Institutional theory) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

The authors recognised a number of different organizational efforts to manage environmental constraints. First, the organization can avoid dependence by maintaining alternative resources (Froelich 1999) or, more directly, by diversifying its

effective resources. Unfortunately this is not always possible and other actions are possible, such as alliances, acquisition and mergers, but also political engagement. Alliances strongly depend on the type of interactions between partners and on their position in social network (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Knowing that organizations do not prefer to give up their independency (Cook et al., 1983), this solution is less rigorous than others such as merging and acquisition, which implies that two or more organizations join in a permanent relationship. Thus, mergers and acquisitions appear to be more formalized interactions between actors, generally characterised by a combination of staff, facilities and board of directors. Furthermore, Alexander and Morrissey (1989) show that in the healthcare sector, multi-hospital systems behave differently, in terms of decision-making considerations, compared to single hospital.

The intervention in public policies and political process, is another action in which organizations could engage, particularly when related to direct or indirect public intervention that affect the action on the market and designed to provide some kinds of advantages (Schuler et al., 2002).

In order to understand the different strategies put in place by each organisation to actively respond to the external pressures, we will answer to the following question:

*How do TSOs dealing with reception services for asylum seekers face the environmental uncertainty? What types of strategies do they implement to cope with external constraints and pressures?*

In the table 3.5. we show the categories of analysis concerning the resource dependence. Resource dependence theory has implications regarding the optimal divisional structure of organizations, recruitment of board members and employees, production strategies, contract structure, external organizational links, and many other aspects of organizational strategy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

Based on Hilman, Withers and Collins (2009) review of Resource dependence approach to study the organizational behaviour, we will examine the following actions, which organizations can put in place to cope with external factors:

1. Mergers (integration and acquisition)
2. Joint venture or other inter-organizational relationship included projects
3. Board of directors (size and composition) and Executive Succession
4. Political Actions

**Table 3.5 RDT Actions Description and Specificities**

Actions	Description	How these actions could be undertaken
<b>Mergers</b>	The RDT offers an external focus on why organizations acquire other organizations (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, Davision, 2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reduce competition by absorbing important competitor(s);</li> <li>- Manage interdependence with either sources of inputs or purchasers of output by absorbing them;</li> <li>- Diversify operations and thereby lessen dependence on the present organizations with which it exchanges</li> </ul>
<b>Joint Venture and other forms of inter-organisations relationships</b>	RDT focuses on how the joint venture and other inter-organizational relationships, more informal compared to mergers, could reduce uncertainty.	<p>In the sector of reception for asylum seekers the most relevant inter-organizations relationships are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Network based on shared information</li> <li>- Network based on shared resources</li> <li>- Network based on projects</li> </ul>
<b>Board of Directors and Membership</b>	The composition of BoD but in the case of TSOs also of the membership in general, could have an impact on the different vital aspects, thanks to the ability of matching resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Relationship with government could differ based on the composition of the BoD;</li> <li>- Relationship with other organizations in the field could differ, particularly if based on ideology (political actions) or technical skills</li> </ul>
<b>Political Actions</b>	The organization, through political mechanisms, attempts to create for itself an environment that is better for its interest	<p>TSOs could express their political positioning differently:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Selective collaboration based on ideological posture</li> <li>- Refuse to collaborate with public authorities expressed through different channels of funds (member fees, etc)</li> </ul>

Source: Author 2020

### 3.1.5 What to Remember?

In conclusion, in order to study the process of business like evolution of the TSOs, and taking into account the complexity of this phenomenon, we will carry out an analysis at different levels, which enable us to consider on the one hand institutional pressures and on the other the internal organization characteristics and strategic responses, going through the processes of their iterations. Actually, to define our analytical framework, we call for concepts within different approaches. First, we have mobilised the analytical framework of the New Institutional Economics – NIE, which will allow for a macro level analysis. With the aim of releasing from the rationalistic trap and opening the black box of the organization, to analyse the internal configuration that goes beyond an analysis based on resources and employment, we introduce the processual approach at the meso and micro level. Furthermore institutional and resource dependence theory at the micro level are used as lens to analyse the organisational behaviour.

This analytical framework will enable us to answer to our research questions:

Under strong institutional pressures driving TSOs towards a business-like evolution, how are TSOs, dealing with asylum seekers reception services able to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other organisational forms?

How is the evolution of the relationship between public authorities and TSOs and between TSOs themselves configured?

What kind of strategies the organizations put in place in order to cope with external pressures?

And finally, how does this evolving relationship impact on the internal configuration, identity and sense of actions of TSOs? Is there any room for resistance to the diffusion of new practices and logics due to the external context?

## PART 2 THE METHODOLOGY

### 3.2.1 Introduction

In the second part of this chapter we will describe the methodology applied to the research. For this study, a mixed method design, combining quantitative and qualitative methods, has been implemented in order to respond in the most comprehensive way to our research question. As mentioned above, this research integrates a multilevel and processual analysis, which relies on multiple data's sources, methods of collection and of analysis of the data.

The mixed methods research results being very useful in the analysis of complex phenomena, in social sciences, generating new results compared to the traditional methodologies (Pascal, Aldebert and Rouzies, 2018). A number of different strengths have been recognised to this new way to organize and develop research, which has become particularly popular during the last two decades. In particular the mixed methods research offers the opportunity to triangulate data, in order to confirm or corroborate explications, to enrich complementarity of data differently collected and analysed, finally to use the results obtained through the first sequence of analysis, in order to develop the second part, consequentially this offers the opportunity to broadly articulate the research (Greene et al. 1989).

Firstly, using quantitative methods, our analysis will focus on the macro level, where we will interpret descriptive statistics, in order to describe the evolution of the TS both in France and in Italy. We will particularly focus on those statistics, which outline the business-like evolution of the sector. Furthermore, for the Italian data, in order to study the factors that stimulate or limit the TSOs development in the Italian provinces, we will rely on a cross-sectional regression analysis based on provincial data. This quantitative approach will be developed in chapter 4.

Secondly, the methodology used to study the evolution of the organizations and their environment - the meso and the micro levels analysis - is developed based on a qualitative approach. The purpose of the qualitative methodology is to describe situations and in particular practices, instead of measuring the entity. By contrast with chapter 4, where we try to test the hypothesis based on the literature through a quantitative approach, chapters 6 and 7 are based on a qualitative approach with the aim to both describe phenomena and consider the different perspectives of reality expressed from the actors questioned.

We will then show how these two approaches are combined in order to obtain greater confidence since “findings [which are] corroborated across different approaches then greater confidence can be held in the singular conclusion” (Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2013 p. 19). Among the different possible configurations, characterizing the mixed methods research, we have chosen to adopt an explanatory sequential mixed methods design characterised by a dominance of the qualitative component, which has been developed sequentially to the quantitative part. This has been done intentionally, as both the status and the time ordering of the two phases are relevant dimensions according to Morgan (1998) and Morse (1991).

Data collected for the qualitative study are detailed exploratory data. They come from a small sample of selected individuals, who are questioned in their natural environment, which is very important, due to the institutionalist framework used. Social phenomena are actually

interpreted in this work as context-bound and not understandable outside their context. This is why particularly attention is paid to the elements characterizing the two contexts as shown also in the part describing the analysis. The context became an integral part of this research, both concerning a part of the quantitative analysis (in particular the econometric analysis) and an unavoidable aspect to understand the multiple embedded case studies, concerning the qualitative part (Yin, 2019). In the rest of this chapter, we will first present our mixed methods research design and then the choice of our case studies which will be described in more details in chapters 6 and 7.

### 3.2.2 The Mixed Methods Research Design

By the early 1990s, mixed methods turned toward the systematic integration of quantitative and qualitative data, and the idea of ways to combine the data through different types of research designs emerged (Creswell and Creswell 2018). From the beginning the mixed methods research has been developed with the aim to encompass the limits of both the quantitative and qualitative research (Jick, 1979). In the last decades, the mixed methods research gained momentum (Burke Johnson Onwuergbuzie and Turner, 2013). The mixed methods research has the ambitious to draw from the strengths of the two single research paradigms, while minimizing their weaknesses (Burke Johnson and Onwuergbuzie, Turner, 2013), and overcoming the distinct philosophical positions they are based on. Actually, several authors recognized that a point of convergence is possible and represented by the mixed methods, which not only allows for broadening and deepening the research, describing and analysing a phenomenon from different perspectives, but also, answering to a broader and more complete range of research questions (Johnson, Turner, 2003). This is due to the possibility to complement the numbers (quantitative approaches) with words and narratives (qualitative approaches), and, vice versa, to add precision to words and narratives through numbers. Finally, as the research could be mixed at different stages, it leaves open to different solutions based on what it is required to provide the stronger evidence for conclusion, based on corroboration of findings (Burke Johnson and Onwuergbuzie 2013).

Through a multi level-analysis, this study will address the TSOs organizational behavior under strong institutional pressures. An explanatory sequential mixed methods design will be used, and it will involve collecting quantitative data first and then explaining the quantitative results with in-depth qualitative data. Explanatory sequential mixed methods is one in which the researcher first conducts quantitative research, analyzes the results and then builds on the results to explain them in more detail with qualitative research. It is considered explanatory because the initial quantitative data results are explained further with the qualitative data. It is considered sequential because the initial quantitative phase is followed by the qualitative phase. This type of design is popular in fields with a strong quantitative orientation (hence the project begins with quantitative research), but it presents challenges of identifying the quantitative results to further explore and the unequal sample sizes for each phase of the study (Creswell and Creswell 2018).

In the first quantitative phase of the study, through descriptive statistics we will show the evolution of the TSOs, while through an econometric analysis we will also test the impact of the institutional context on the top of the TSOs. We will then test, using a new institutional economics perspective, different TS economic theories (demand offer and public authorities partnership). Doing so we will be able to assess whether TSOs diffusion relates to contextual


variables, intercepted through literature and the Vecchioni's indicators. One of the main strengths of this approach applied to our case has been the opportunity to test the hypothesis that a specific transformation has been observed with aggregate data on the Italian, as well as the French third sector. So following the literature, we test the hypothesis that the transformation could be defined as a business like evolution. In the case of the Italian data we also go further and try to identify the impact of the different institutional variables on the development of the TSOs locally.

The second qualitative phase will be conducted as a follow up to the quantitative results to help explain the quantitative results describing the business like evolution of the TS. The plan is to explore the organizational behavioral reaction of the TSOs, contextualize in the sector of the reception for asylum seekers and refugees in the metropolitan areas of Marseille and Naples. The qualitative data permits to explore the processes of the organizational transformation. As we will explain in the next section, we selected six cases studies, in the specific sector of the reception for asylum seekers, in order to understand the dynamics characterizing the organizational change from the point of view of the practitioners and the other actors involved. We analyze the strategies enacted in order to answer the contextual pressures, and how they will try to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other organisational forms. In these terms, we engaged in the efforts to come out from a positivistic approach, which could characterize the quantitative analysis, to embrace an ontological relativistic claim, and describing a single phenomenon – the business like evolution - as a complex phenomenon, composed by multiple and contradictory “realities” (the different actors' perspectives).

Finally, converging and corroborating findings, we can conclude integrating the findings during a two steps interpretation of data, before separately and then integrated, as shown in the figure. In our perspective this results in a triangulation of data collected and analysed following different approaches. The two approaches clarify each other's results, integrating information and informing each other's findings.

In the following sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 we will show the quantitative and qualitative design methods, their collection methodology and the analysis we carried out.

**Table 3.6 The Mized Method Analysis**





### 3.2.3 The Quantitative Methodology

#### The Data

Although the quantitative data and method will be described more in depth in the next chapter, this section gives an overview of the nature of data used and their collection process. The quantitative analysis concerns two cases, the Italian and the French TSOs. Both cases are analysed at the national level. However the level of data aggregation used to carry out the analysis changes according to the needs. Furthermore, the analysis covers the multiplicity of areas of activity of the TSOs. The aggregation is based on different categories: territorial units (national regional, provincial), legal forms (social cooperatives, foundations, associations, etc.), activity fields (health care, education, social services, others), size (the number of employees), types of “employees” (the total, the paid workers, the volunteers) and sources of funds the organizations rely on (public, private, contracts, grants, etc.).

Different analyses have been carried out in France and in Italy. The part dedicated to Italy relies on data collected in three years: 1999, 2011 and 2015. The 2011 and 2015 data TSOs data are available on I.stat, the data warehouse by the Italian national Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). More specifically, these data are available under the website area entitled “2011-2015 Industry and Services Census”. The database have been downloaded from the Istat web site and then properly organised in a data set, which enables the author to use them. The data have been collected at the most territorial disaggregated level, the provincial one, for each category of variables, for the years 1999 and 2011.

For France, the data used in this chapter are extracted from two different sources. We first refer to the data used in the “*Atlas de l’économie sociale et solidaire*” for the editions 2014 and 2017. The publication results from the collaboration of different institutes: the INSEE – *Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques*, National institute of statistic and economic studies; the *CNCRESS*; the *DIESS – Délégation interministérielle à l’économie sociale et solidaire* the social and solidarity economy inter-ministerial delegation and the research centre *LEST* (The Institute of Labour Economics and Industrial Sociology). We also build our analysis on the publication “*le paysage associatif français*” on associations. Data are a combination of data sets collected by *RNA repertoire national des associations* - National Directory of Associations; *repertoire SIRENE système informatique pour le répertoire d’entreprises et des établissements* – informatics system for the Directory of enterprises and facilities. The latest survey has been realised in 2017 and follows the collection of data 2011 and 2005.

#### The Analysis

Concerning both the Italian and the French cases, the first step has been represented by the analysis of descriptive statistics. In both cases, the primary objective has been to describe the TS at national, regional and provincial/ local levels, following different categories (legal definition, funding system, size of the organizations, field of activity, employment, etc.). As much as possible, the organization of the data has been finalised to describe the evolution of the sector, which has been done more in depth for Italy. Particular attention has been paid to those data highlighting the business like evolution. Based on the nature of the data at our disposal, the analysis has focused on different aspects in the two countries. In Italy, the

analysis focused particularly on the professionalization. This has been due to the availability of data concerning the years 1999 and 2011, disaggregated at territorial, organizational and sectorial levels, both for volunteers and paid workers; In the case of French data we focused on the marketization, and corporatization as data organised by source of funding and size were available and usable.

The level of disaggregation of Italian quantitative data also allowed us to go a step further in the analysis. With the aim of inspecting the contextual determinants of TSOs incidence in Italian provinces, we collected data at the province level. This exercise has been carried out for the number of the TSOs, but also for the variables that according to the literature might be considered as drivers of the TSOs development at the provincial level. These variables are listed and described in the table 4.14, and are based on the literature (Lu, 2017, Weisbrod, 1975, Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, 1991 Marcuello, 1998; Matsunaga & Yamauchi, 2002). Since our analysis aimed to test if the institutional environment determines any effect on the development of TS, the analysis also included a set of variables commonly used to measure the quality of institutions in Italian provinces. The source of these variables is the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) developed by Nifo and Vecchione (2014). Finally, with the aim of examining the connection between the contextual variables presented above and the development of the TSOs across the Italian provinces, a cross-sectional regression analysis has been done. We first considered the TS as a whole, we then differentiated the analysis based on the 9 sectors of activities mentioned by the ISTAT.

### **3.2.4 The Qualitative Data**

#### **3.2.4.1 Multiple Embedded Case Studies**


The choice to use case studies as strategy of research for the qualitative part, instead of other valid options such as experiments, surveys or others, is intrinsically due to the relevance has been assigned to the external contexts, in our research. Yinn explains that “a case study is an empirically inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real –life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2014 p.13). The (embedded) case study method permits to enhance the contextual conditions highly pertinent to the phenomenon studied more than other strategies, even in those cases, as our, where it is hard to exactly trace the boundaries between the first and the latter. Furthermore, due to multi- unit nature of the dynamics taken into account defining the contextual conditions, we use an embedded case study design. The embedded, in contrast with the holistic one, does not consider only the “global nature”, but instead conceives the phenomena as embedded across multiple sub-unit of analysis. Multiple case studies also results as a particularly appropriated strategy in order to both show that, on the one hand, the cases, as predicted thanks to the quantitative analysis, will show similar results, illustrating that the business like evolution is severally experimented across the organizations, but also, on the other hand, following the literature, that each case will produce contrasting results (although under the same pressures the organizations will re-interpreted the phenomenon, based on their particular experience) but for predictable reasons.

We have chosen to observe a number of different organizations (six), in two European countries, France and Italy. Our data collection was designed on the basis of the multiple integrated case studies (Yin, 2014). Actually, the three cases selected in Marseille, France,

differ in size, while they are based on the same geographical area, they develop the same kind of service, the reception for asylum seekers, and they respond to the same system of funding. The same can be said concerning the three cases based in Naples, Italy. Furthermore all the cases are under the European legislation, which as we will show in the empirical part, gained relevance over time.

We have represented our embedded case studies in the figure 4.3, which is based on the elaboration of the Yin's model (Yin, 2014). The different levels of actors interplaying are nested. The blue area represents the European unit of analysis. Being both France and Italy part of the European Union, they have to respect the European legal framework, which implies also the interaction with a number of different political and technical-bureaucratic actors. The national unit of analysis is also represented by a quite large number of governmental and not governmental actors. Furthermore at this level we also observe that still there is a kind of autonomy face of the EU institutions, which is marked by the white space overcoming the blue area. Finally there is our unit of analysis, the organizations, which are locally based. In both cases, however, large associations also operate at national level as well, having different branches across the national territory. This is represented by the CS1 green area, which goes over the local area. This is why in figure we show them as still embedded at local level, although not in the same way as the other two cases studies, which have no other branches.

**Figure 3.3 Multiple embedded case studies**



Source: Author elaboration based on the Yin's model, 2019

### ***The European Level***

Over the past 20 years, the issue of migration has gained importance in the political agendas of all EUMSs leaders. Both policies have changed strongly. On the one hand, social policies, particularly during the 90s, have moved from an attitude of “welfarism” or “assistance culture” to more active policies. In fact, at the basis of this radical change, the idea that making the beneficiaries responsible for their own destiny in particular as regards active labour and revenue policies, the action would have been more fruitful. Concerning migration policies, these policies have changed at the EU level on the basis of two processes. On the

one hand, the Schengen process, the creation of an area of free movement for European citizens, including the Dublin Regulation, has led to a strengthening of the external boundaries. On the other hand, at the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s, the “managerial approach” gained consensus among international organizations (Aguillon, 2016), which is concretely shown at European level in the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and in the Rabat process (2006) also known as the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, both aimed at implementing a migration management plan and promoting controlled mobility (ICMPD, 2015). Border control and the security approach, managed basically through the Dublin regulation, started to become increasingly important until it became a real priority, due to the increase number of people leaving their countries and crossing the sea and then the EU borders. Although this brief overview, still at the European level we found a broad number of different actors, the European commission, the European Parliament, the EASO agency as well as the international non-governmental organizations such as the IOM, often struggling among them and internally in order to sustain or contrast a more securitarian position.

### *The National Level*

The increase number of actors in the field of the so-called “migration industry” produces an increasing confusion and difficulties with the attribution of responsibility and accountability, but also deeper struggles concerning the effectiveness of the different actions (border control, rescue and save activities, reception, integration etc.), which are always more interrelated. However particularly during these last times the European national governments have claimed their full authority and autonomy on the matter. Considering the Italian and French cases, the systems are characterised by multilevel governance, an increasing number of actors, as well as an increasing number of structures, including temporary and emergency structures. Multilevel governance, characterised by European Institutions, International Organisations, National governments and agencies, as well as NGOs, TSOs and private enterprises, has been always been clear and easy to implement. The immigration decision-making process has been marked by the continuing struggle between national governments and the European Union (EU) over the amount of discretion that states have in interpreting EU directives. As regards integration, even more complex relations have emerged between local, regional, national and EU institutions (Scholten and Penninx, 2016). The number of levels increases, as well as the number of actors in charge for responding to the situation. In this increasingly crowded field, we observe that all across Europe the interior ministry gained authority in a matter, migration, traditionally managed by the ministry of foreign affairs, concerning the VISA, and ministry of social affairs concerning the policies of integration. Finally, we also observe that TSOs in order to respond to public tenders very often sign very detailed contracts, in which their freedom of action is rather limited to a list of tasks, representing the financed services. On the other hand, a multiplication of reception facilities has spread in both France and Italy. New reception facilities are generally less expensive and their very short-term contracts make it possible to adapt service conditions very quickly. The relationship between State and TSOs, which is characterized in both national cases by contractual relationships, but which define different configurations and tools will be analysed in detail. On the other hand, we will analyse the interactions between TSOs within a more competitive environment. The process has an impact on the internal context, in particular on organizational configuration (size, HR, resources and organogram). We focus in particular, not only on the different system of contracting out of the services, which are characterised by the application of different market-instruments, but also on the interaction process that the

specific instruments described triggered between the different actors and especially between public authorities and TSOs.

This complex frame involves an impressive number of actors who should theoretically coordinate their action, included the ministries of foreign affairs, the ministries of interior (and their different departments), the ministries of social affairs, the prefectures, the territorial commissions, different bodies of the judiciary power, among others.

### *The Local Level*

The local level under analysis refers to the urban areas of Marseille in France and Naples in Italy. As we will show in the following chapter, the two cities shows a number of similarities in terms of size, and socio-economic conditions experienced by the residents. Both the cities overlook the Mediterranean Sea, and probably also because port cities, both are defined in each other's national contexts as "welcoming cities".

We choose to analyse the cases at municipal level, as this choice permits to maintain certain homogeneity of the context. Concerning the study of migration and integration phenomena, the attention to the local level, and the city for instance, is more recent, but in rapid consolidation (Alexander 2007) (Caponio & Borkert, 2010) (Penninx et al., 2004). Following Scholten and Penninx (2016) while our understanding of how policies develop at various levels has increased, however there is still much work to do in the field of reception and integration policies concerning asylum seekers. Actually, the most of the work has been done at national level. This is due to the redistribution of competencies among the institutions. Actually, the regulation of international migration has traditionally been a competence of the nation state, with the voluntary transfer of competencies in the EU being only a recent exception to this rule (Scholten & Penninx, 2016). Bommès (Bommès, 2010) adds that this level of analysis also allows the generalization and the application of the historical-institutionalism to ideal models, in order to compare them and grasp differences and similitudes.

The attention to the local dimension of the phenomenon of migration and integration phenomenon is due to different reasons, including the distribution of power among actors, the discretionary power of certain actors individual as well as organizations, and the role of the city and urbanism in the new societal challenges. Scholten and Penninx (2016) state that "the local dimension of migrant integration policies" (Alexander 2007) is linked to the principle of subsidiarity. In other words, the distribution of power among public authorities follows a principle of proximity, which in turns allows the creation of a series of policies directly at local level. It is also important to consider that when policies are outsourced and the decision-makers are different from the actor implementing the action, there is nevertheless an impact of the action, which to some extent has an impact the final outcome of the policy itself.

Concerning the urban dimension of the phenomenon, Sassen (2008) sustains that the city is strategic place to understand the new trans-national, trans-local societal trends, including globalization, the application of new technologies, inter-culturality and migration. The process of urbanization has already made the city an interesting object of study (Castells, 1977), (Harvey, 1982), (Satler, 2006), but in Sassen's view the new urban era puts the city in a very central role. Actually, she highlights that, regardless the interaction among national regional and local authorities level, the city, is the very place where a complex structure of

articulated interactions is defined (Sassen, 2008). From an analytical point of view, this means for the author that it is possible to establish a direct link between the global and urban dimensions of the societal phenomena, which does not necessarily need to go through a national dimension.

### *The Organizational level*

The TSOs, which manage the reception service for asylum seekers in Marseille (France) and Naples (Italy), will be the principal unit of the analysis at the micro level, and in particular in the context of service of the reception for asylum seekers (see the different levels of analysis in the section multilevel analysis). The so called “refugees emergency” has required a huge effort from the third sector active on the field. Moreover, in some cases, the mechanisms for selecting “management bodies” have given life to a real “business of the assistance”. Some TSOs are increasing their revenue, training employees differently and making their activities increasingly specialised. The integration of new indicators also responds to new forms of financing. The internal context explored in this research is composed of both material characteristics of organizations and cultural aspects. Concerning the material characteristics of the studies, we will focus on the evolution of HR, the increase in number, the acquisition of skills and the new roles played in organizations. We will study the organizational evolution in terms of strategies. The strategies observed on the sector could be quite different, although certain ways to cope with the external environments have been observed as a common path. For instance, merging is one of the most implemented strategies, as well as the professionalisation of social workers and corporatisation. The organizations in both France and Italy were also analysed in terms of internal institutional logics. While there are some TSOs that, although maintaining links with civil society, can still grasp and respond effectively to new social needs, there are some who have lost sight of the need of the community and are subject to increasingly heavy isomorphic pressure and who sometimes adopt an opportunistic behavior.

#### **3.2.4.2 The Selection of the Cases**

Case selection is a crucial point (Eisenhardt, 1989). This selection does not necessarily have to respect statistical representativeness, but the terms have been selected sufficiently homogeneously to permit meaningful comparison whilst being sufficiently heterogeneous to support theoretical generalization. Basically, a controlled variation sampling of six organisations was selected. We selected three TSOs in France and three in Italy, from the same city in both countries. All the organisations are active in the sector of asylum seekers reception but they differ in size, age and government positions’ alignments. Although the description of the selected organizations is given in chapter 6 for the French organizations and in chapter 7 for the Italian organizations, in the following lines we will explain how the cases have been selected.

Concerning the three cases located in Marseille, France, we realised exploratory interviews with contextual actors (particularly FNARS, IFRI, and CIMADE) in order to help choosing relevant cases. From these initial interviews, we have identified two main points: all the actors agreed that the “*appel à projets*” as a turn point for the evolution of the sector; the size of the associations matter. For these reasons, one of the determinant criteria in the choice of the organizations was the size. Actually, during all the other interviews this point has been confirmed. In fact, small and local associations, which traditionally characterise the French

landscape, are being replaced by national organisations (4 of them), which today detain more than half of the markets. Their size and internal mechanisms (normally they have a central headquarters in Paris and local branches – from 10 to 60 - spread across national territory) reduce costs and define a different relationship with the central governmental level. Nevertheless, the local associations are trying to resist and to react to this concentration of the market, engaging different strategies (merged, regional confederation for example). Finally other actors get into the sector: *collectifs* and organised civil society. Since 2015 local groups of organised citizens have decided to react to political reforms, but also to react to the weaknesses of associations. *Collectifs* strongly criticise the actions of national associations and also organise themselves to offer a parallel informal service, to help people arriving in city (offering accommodation, juridical, psychological and human support).

**Table 3.7 Case Studies in Marseille, France**

	Name	Size
FRENCH CASE STUDY 1	ALAN Association	Small Local Association
FRENCH CASE STUDY 2	SAJIDA Association	Medium Local Association
FRENCH CASE STUDY 3	FOFANA Association	National Association

Source: Author, 2019

In the case of the TSOs based in Naples, Italy, we applied a different procedure to select the cases. For one of them, the TSO involved in the SPRAR system, it is the only one in the city to be involved in this network. The SPRAR is supposed to represent the ordinary reception, which is why we decided to include the case among our cases, despite the different process of management body selection. Despite this crucial difference, we observe that the organization continues to implement several similar practices. Concerning the other two cases, selection was hampered by the fact that against the French context, in Naples, there was no intermediate body, which could help and inform about the sector. We therefore directly contacted the organizations by email (see chapter 5 on the context for more information on the TSOs dealing with the service of reception). Furthermore we selected two organizations different in size, one operating at national level and the other one very local and small, with only 10 workers.

**Table 3.8 Cases Studies in Naples, Italy**

	Name	Size
ITALIAN CASE STUDY 1	DESTINY Association	Small Local Association

---

Source: Author, 2019

### *The Data*

In order to triangulate information (Yin, 2014), data was collected from different sources. Our main source consists of interviews supplemented by my participation in focus groups and several meetings. The analysis was also based on a wide variety of documents gathered during our research (see below).

#### *a. The Interviews*

A number of 56 semi-structured interviews were conducted in France (27), Italy (18) and Belgium (9) (for the European level), as detailed in the tables below (3.9, 3.10, 3.11). The interviews have been realised in the period between November 2017 and February 2019. The interviews were stored and recorded (excepted for the EU level since the politicians preferred not to be recorded and the transcription results from the notes taken during the semi-structured interviews. They were collected in Brussels the 06 and 07 of March 2018. All the other were recorded and transcribed.

The interviewees were selected as key-actors in the field, namely the European migration regime, at different levels. The interviews are semi-structured, and they are structured starting with more general open-ended questions, moving towards more detailed information. The interview grid, which is They focus on experience, with the aim of understanding in depth the different characteristics of organisations and their evolution in a complex environment. Furthermore, questions and opinions were asked with the aim of understanding the positioning of events and interpretation of organisational changes, have been asked. Finally, actors have been asked to express their feelings concerning specific events or statement. This was done to understand the actors' ideal solution to complex problems such as the reception for asylum seekers.

#### *b. The Focus Groups*

A focus group is generally understood to be a group of a number of participants, with an interviewer, or moderator, asking questions about a particular topic (Smithson, 2007) or more generally speaking an informal discussion among selected individuals about specific topics (Beck et al.1986). One of the strengths of this method of collection of information is that the data obtained do not result by constrained interviews with a set of questions. Although it could be not considered as a natural conversation, actors guided by a moderator cover a large number of topics in a quite constructive discussion modality.

<sup>1st</sup> Focus group, Marseille, France. I took part to a meeting organised by the FNARS named “*Commission Asile Régionale PACA*”, during which the actors involved were a number of reception centres dislocated on the metropolitan area of Marseille. The meeting was



structured as an interactive session with a small group of around 20 participants. This allowed all participants to express themselves. At the same time, the number was large enough to provide a diversity of opinions. The main purpose of the meeting was the discussion concerning asylum reforms, the analysis of the current situation and how to strengthen the role of FNARS to better represent the members.

2<sup>nd</sup> Focus group, Naples, Italy. The focus group, composed of 5 reception centres and a local administrator, was part of a larger event bringing together organizations supporting asylum seekers from different parts of Italy. A moderator has guided the interaction, and the questions have been previously co- decided with a group of scholars, which took part at the event.

### *c. Meetings*

I have also participated in several meetings in Marseille including:

In Marseille:

- Manba weekly General Assembly. Field notes from observation of activities: the activities have been observed for the most part and only in a case (the interaction with the Manba collective) I have observed with participation during the period from October 2017 to September 2018.
- CIMADE monthly meetings in Aix-en Provence, France.
- Regional Meetings of a number of *Collectifs* such as : RESF, Réseau Hospitalité, soutienmigrantes13, Le collectif FLE sud-est, réseau Mineur non Accompagné, Observatoire Migrants, etc.; Obs. Enfermement: colloque Rennes 25/11 Les nouvelles formes de contrôle des personnes étrangères.

In Ventimiglia :

- June 2018 - 2 days protest open borders

In Brussels:

- 9 November 2017: European Forum Social and Solidarity Economy European Parliament in Brussels.
- 16 November 2017 Social Innovation for Refugee Inclusion: Maintaining momentum and creating lasting change. European Economic Social Committee. Brussels.

In Italy:

- 22 November 2018: Conference “Territori Accoglienti: workshop sulle buone pratiche diffuse in Italia: Tetto settore e enti locali: dalle pratiche alle sfide future”. More than 100 TSOs met in order to discuss the migration law reforms “decreto sicurezza”.
- 24 November 2018: Conference “Territori Accoglienti” with DANIELA DI CAPUA General Director Sprar, Gianfranco SCHIAVONE President ASGI; MATTEO BIFFONI ANCI spokesperson for migrations policies; Anna FASANO Vicepresidente Banca Etica; Cosimo PALAZZO Direttore Area Emergenze Sociali Comune Di Milano; Giusto DELLA VALLE Church of Como; Stefano GRANATA

President Federsolidarietà; FLAVIANO ZANDONAI (EURICSE). Moderator CARLO BORZAGA EURICSE

- 28 November 2018: Seminar “Il Diritto Di Asilo In Italia Procedure E Accoglienza” Moderator ADELE DEL GUERCIO - Università degli Studi di Napoli L’orientale, speakers Coordinator I.A.R.A. - Servizi integrati di accoglienza ed integrazione per i rifugiati, richiedenti asilo e titolari di protezione umanitaria (SPRAR), DERMAN impresa; the legal expert DERMAN impresa sociale; STELLA ARENA – Lawyer and activists PAP;
- Le mobilità e le migrazioni: per una interpretazione critica Seminar moderator Prof F.Amato
- 19 June 2018 Open Arms press conference in Naples. Speakers: the member of Italian Parliament Fratoianni, the Naples municipality representative of the social policies.

#### d. Documents

The documents include:

- Institutional documents produced at EU level (in particular the Dublin system evolution)
- Institutional documents produced at the governmental level;
- Official documents produced by the organisations;
- News articles and newspapers;
- Documents release prepared by field-level actors (particularly public authorities) has been collected and analysed. In particularly reports and evaluation, at national level.
- For France the OFPRA documents from 2005 to nowadays; call for projects; tenders; projects; *cahier de charges*; communications sent by national authorities to lower levels of public servants for a total of 30 documents.
- For Italy the SPRAR reports from the beginning 2001 year of the creation to nowadays.

**Table 3.9 List of Interviews at EU level**

<b>EU LEVEL</b>	<b>INTERVIEWS</b>
European Parliament	Sylvie Guillaume, S&D, MEP, France
European Parliament	Josef Weidenholzer, S&D, MEP, Austria
European Parliament	Jure Tanko, Advisor to S&D, MEP Tania Fajon, Slovenia
European Parliament	Juan Jose L. Gomez Advisor of Elena Valenciano, S&D, MEP, Spain
European Parliament	Ton Beumer, Head of Unit, S&D Group

Expert	Olenka Delanghe, Policy Advisor Migration Policies, PES
Expert	Hedwig Giusto, Senior Policy Advisor in Migration, FEPS
IOM International Organisation of Migration	P. Quesada, Post-crisis specialist
European Commission	Giulio Di Blasi, Member of the cabinet of HR/VP Federica European Commission Mogherini.

**Table 3.10 List of Interviews France**

ORGANIZATION	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	INTERVIEW	TIME	PAGES
MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR		<i>Directeure de l'asile au Ministère de l'intérieur</i>	00:35:00	7
	2	<i>Cheffe de département de l'accueil des demandeurs d'asile</i>	01:00:47	12
OFII	1	<i>Directeur Asile OFII Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration</i>	00: 52:00	10
IFRI - Institut Français des Relations Internationales	1	Researcher and Policy Expert on Migration	00:55:00	11
FRANCE TERRE D'ASILE		Director of the Administrative Secretariat	01:14:00	15
	3		00:26:00	6
			00:55:00	11
		Director of a CADA FTDA		
CIMADE PACA	1	Regional representative	1:00:00 1 Internal meeting 1 voluteers training day	12

3 Events

FNARS PACA Fédération des Acteurs de la Solidarité	2	Migration and social services Policy officer	00:39:00 01:36:00	8 19
PADA DE MARSEILLE	1	Director	00:53:00	11
COLLECTIF MANBA	1	Activist	01:22:15 1 Weekly meeting	16
CASE STUDY 2 ALAN Association	4	President Director Social Worker Social worker	01:33:31 02:36:07 01:07:49 00:28:30	18 26 12 6
CASE STUDY 1 SAJIDA Association	6	President Director Deputy Director Social worker Legal expert Legal expert	01:00:00 01:12:00 01:14:00 01:30:00 02:13:00 01:19:00	12 14 15 16 21 14
CASE STUDY 3 FOFANA Association	4	Director Social Worker Social worker Social worker	01:20:16 00:56:36 00:53:00 00:48:10	14 12 11 10
DEFIE -SECIP REGION PACA	1	Policy Officer	00:48:00	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>27</b>		<b>31:37:00</b>	

Table 3.11 List of Interviews Italy

ITALY	NUMBER OF INTERIEWS	INTERVIEW	TIME	PAGES
MINISTERO DE L'INTERNO	1	Prefetto	00:27:23	6
MIN POL SOCIALI	1	Ex Ministro politiche sociali	00:49:19	9
ASGI	1		01:01:00	12

COMUNE DI NAPOLI	1	Assessora cittadinanza	01:00:20	12
SPRAR	1	General Director Central office	01:01:20	12
DEDALUS	1	President	00:39:08	8
Movimento PAP	3 Focus groups	Activitists		
CASE STUDY 1 DERMAN Social Enterprise	5	President Director Legal expert Social worker Project Developer	01:13:00 01:13:45 00:44:30 00:18:02 00:48:02	14 14 9 4 9
CASE STUDY 2 Beuty Onlus	4	President Director Social worker Social worker	00:46:02 01:00:00 00:42:43 00:40:48	9 12 8 8
CASE STUDY 3 DESTINY Social Cooperative	3	President Director Social worker	01:00:00 00:29:08 01:30:00	12 6 16
TOTAL	18		17:40:00	

---

Source: the Author 2019

## *The Analysis*

Qualitative data analysis is based on the process of transformation of the collected data - interviews, discussion groups' transcripts, internal documents, and newspapers – into some forms of explanation and interpretation of the phenomenon investigated.

The approach used is an explanatory one. In fact, guided by literature and quantitative analysis, we have formulated the question used to explain how the organizations have been changing over time. Indeed, through the qualitative analysis we have tried to describe more in detail the phenomena of organizational change, defined as business like in the literature and already observed for different fields of activities but never for the sector of the reception for asylum seekers, as specific object of research. Furthermore, through the case studies we also try to explain that although the weight of the macro trends differences are still observed among organizations, and that the interaction between the external context, and the organizational identity is the source of these differences.

Once familiarised with the data, particularly interviews, collected, recorded and transcribed in their original languages, the observation analysis strategy was the following. First, we divided the data into four main categories: The institutional environments, the organizational field, the organizational aspects, the service offered. A chronological reconstruction of the stories for the different categories is carried out and the key events highlighted in order to describe the major events, at the contextual and organizational levels, and start to link the different events. Actually, because of the processual analysis we will emphasise the historical elements in order to draft the interactions among them.


In terms of code used to analyse the different texts, we have developed an analysis starting from more general themes, to then code them more in detail. We have started analysing the interviews, based on the following categorization that integrates the institutional approach, emphasizing contextual elements, but also inter and intra organizational ones.

- The institutional environments: categorizing the elements concerning the legal, economic and social environment;
- The organizational field: Inter-organizational exchanges in particular the relationship between State-TSOs and TSOs and TSOs, and the instruments used (contracts, alliances, partnerships, etc.);
- The organizational aspects: HR, size, resources, organizational chart, institutional logics.
- The service offered: reception services for asylum seekers.

To do so, we have used NVIVO, software for storing, organising, categorizing, analysing and finally visualising qualitative data. This allows for encoding the text. A code is an abstract representation of an object or phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 2008 p 66), or a way of identifying themes in a text (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). The objective of coding is to order chaos (Patton, 2002, 463). Fracturing the text allows to give different interpretations to the same piece of text. Different types of codes could be recognised: descriptive, interpretative or defining themes. Multiple codes are applied to the same text.

Codes are categorized and classified through nodes. A node is a collection of references on a specific theme. Nodes are essential for understanding and working with NVivo. They allow related materials to be gathered in the same place, allowing them to search for models and emerging patterns and ideas.

The first version of the codes is resumed in the following table. The nodes during the analysis have been sub-divided again. For each of the codes it has been established a t and t1, respectively the characteristics which defines nowadays the organizations, and the characteristics which used to define the organizations in the past.



Source: author, 2019

### CH. 3 What to Remember?

In this chapter, we have presented our analytical framework and the methodology that will be applied in our work in order to answer the main research questions. These questions have been declined following the literature.

Under strong institutional pressures that drives TSOs towards a business-like evolution, as stated in the literature, how are TSOs, dealing with asylum seekers reception services, able to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other organisational forms?

How is the evolution of the relationship between public authorities and TSOs and between TSOs themselves configured?

How does this evolving relationship impact on the internal configuration, identity and sense of actions of TSOs? Although the main tendency seems to be isomorphism, is there any room for resistance to the diffusion of new practices and institutional logics due to the external context?

What kind of strategies the organizations put in place in order to cope with external pressures?

This work is based on an institutional approach, using a multi level and processual analysis, based on a mixed methods research. Departing from the Williamson's framework, new institutional economics, the first part of the empirical section will be dedicated to a quantitative analysis, which, in line with the NIE approach, will attempt to answer the question concerning how economic organizations arise. From an NIE perspective we will analyse the evolution of the TS due to external pressures, in the business-like sense, and marketization, in terms of the number of organizations, legal forms, funds and human resources involved.

While at the macro level we use an economic approach, for the meso and micro level, we move toward an organizational approach, applying a qualitative methodology to allow going deeper inside the organizational field and inside the organizations. At the meso level, the objective of the study is to analyse the interaction among TSOs and among TSOs and public authorities. At the micro level we will mobilise three approaches: isomorphism, institutional logics and the resource dependence theory in order to study both the cultural and material external context's constraints and strategic responses from the organizations.

This research therefore proposes a multilevel and processual analysis, from a macro, meso and micro perspective, analysed through a mixed methods design. The application of this type of methodology allows for the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods "for the purposes of an in-depth understanding and corroboration" (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 123). In the next chapter, we will show and discuss the results of the quantitative approach, while in chapters 6 and 7 we will present the results of the qualitative one.



## Chapter 4 The Macro Level - The Third Sector Organizations in Numbers

### CH4: The Macro Level

#### Part 1 ITALIAN THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN NUMBER

##### Data Description

Number, Territorial Distribution, Fields of intervention, Legal Forms

The determinants of TSOs distribution across Italy: an empirical investigation

Investigating the business-like evolution of Italian TSOs

TSOs' professionalization in Italy: an analysis of provincial data

#### PART 2 FRENCH THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN NUMBER


Numbers, Territorial distribution, Sectors of Activity, Legal Forms

Business Like Evolution focus on associations

Concentration of the budget

The Associations' economic resources

The Size



This chapter is divided into two parts: the part 1 focuses on the data concerning the TSOs in Italy, and the part 2 on data concerning France.

## **Part 1 ITALIAN THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN NUMBER**

### **4.1.1 Introduction**

This chapter aims at measuring Third Sector Organizations (TSOs) presence in Italy and its evolution over recent years. More in details, the analysis focuses on four topics: first, the dimension of the TS in the country, in terms of number of organizations and of people employed; second, the heterogeneity of TSOs in terms of legal forms, sector of activities and territorial distribution; third, the distribution of TSOs among Italian provinces; four, the business like evolution of TSOs, which is analysed by specifically looking at its professionalization.

The analysis is based on data gathered from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) for three years: 1999, 2011 and 2015. Such repeated cross-sections allow to investigate the TS over recent time and to track its changes.

The analysis provided by this chapter will firstly focus on the dimension of the TS in Italy (section 4.3a). As our elaborations will demonstrate, over last 15 years the TS reported an impressive growth in this country. Over the time-span considered, the TS increased both in terms of registered organisations, and in terms of employees. Nowadays more than 336 thousand of organizations exist (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Rees, 2014). Compared with the 1999 data, this means a TS growth rate of 51.9%. The total amount of workers in the sector (volunteers and paid workers included) increased by 72% between end of '90s and 2015, when they approximately reached 6.6 million of people. This numbers are consistent with the idea that over recent years the TS has become increasingly important for the entire Italian economy (Fondazione Symbola, Unioncamere, & Fondazione Edison, 2015), registering a total turnover of approximately 64 billion of euros in 2015, that represents almost the 3.5% of the Italian conational GDP.

The TS recent growth has been accompanied by the TS diversification. As a matter of fact, TSOs are nowadays characterised by a high level of heterogeneity both in terms of legal form and in terms of services provided (L. M. Salamon & Anheier, 1997b). Sections 4.3b and 4.3c of this chapter are specifically devoted to the analysis of this issue. Allows to classify the existing TSOs by considering the following legal forms: associations, social cooperatives, committees, foundations, not recognised associations, mutual aid societies, ecclesiastical body. Our analysis will investigate the incidence of these legal forms over time. Furthermore, looking at the services that TSOs provide, ISTAT classifies the existing organizations into 11 macro-areas: Culture, sports and recreation; Education and research; Health; Social services and emergency prevention; Environment; Development and housing; Law, advocacy and politics; Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion; International co-operation; Religion; Business and professional associations, unions. These 11 categories are based on the International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations (ICNPO) elaborated by the Johns Hopkins University (US, Baltimora) in the framework of a research project started during the '90s. Section 4.3c will provide a clear overview about TSOs heterogeneity in terms of services provided.

The TSOs heterogeneity also concerns their territorial distribution in the country. Differences between the Northern and the Southern regions of Italy in terms of incidence of the TS have been highlighted by the literature (Costa & Carini, 2016)(Picciotti, Bernardoni, & Cossignani, 2014) These differences concern both the number of existing organizations and the number of people employed. Section 4.4 of this chapter aims to deal with such a heterogeneous territorial distribution by analysing its determinants. This is carried out by having in mind that organizations, TSOs included, are surrounded by a contextual framework, which has a decisive impact on their patterns of development (Hannan & Freeman, 1987; Twombly, 2003). In order to study the factors that stimulate or limit the TSOs development in the Italian provinces, we will rely on a cross-sectional regression analysis based on provincial data. In this analysis the territorial incidence of TSOs is used as the dependent variable and a wide set of covariates is considered as potential determinants on the basis of the existing literature. This literature explains TSOs proliferation by considering supply side factors – such as stakeholders who have interest in the production of TSOs services, e.g. social entrepreneurs, workers, etc – and demand side factors – such as potential consumers, beneficiaries and users (Nyssens, 2008).

Consistently with the work carried out in this thesis, the final part of the chapter (section 4.5) focuses on the so-called business-like evolution of the Italian TS. As already mentioned in chapter two, starting from '90s a number of scholars claim that the TS has been increasingly characterized by the adoption of approaches and values which are ascribable to private market practice (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; B. Weisbrod, 1998) With the aim of checking whether such a business-like evolution of the TS has been actually observed in Italy, we analyse the Italian TS and specifically focus on its presumed professionalization. Consistently with the existing literature, in our analysis professionalization is defined as the increase of paid, full-time employees working in TSOs with the simultaneous decrease of volunteers (Hwang & Powell, 2009). If a business-like evolution of the TS has been actually carried out over recent years, then a professionalization trend should be highlighted by the data. Having this in mind, we propose a detailed analysis of Italian TS data that aims to support or deny the thesis about its business-like evolution.

This chapter is structured as follows. In section two we describe the data analysed on the chapter, show how they have been collected and organized, and define the variables built with the aim of carrying out the analysis. In section three we provide a detailed examination of the data concerning the TSOs activity in Italy. Descriptive data about TSOs incidence, legal form, type of activity and territorial distribution will be presented. In section four we carry out a deeper analysis in order to understand the contextual determinants of the TS' rootedness in Italy. Through a standard econometric analysis, we will explore the factors that stimulate or limit the development of the TS in the Italian context. Finally, in section five, we analyse the business-like evolution of the TS. We focus on the professionalization phenomenon and investigate the evolution over time of the presence of volunteers and paid workers in the sector.

#### **4.1.2 Data**

In this section data used in the analyses is described. The section presents the sources of data, the time-span the data cover and the variables that were calculated on the basis of the original data in order to carry out part of the investigation.

The analyses illustrated in this chapter rely on data that observe three years: 1999, 2011 and 2015. The 2011 and 2015 TSOs data were gathered through I.stat, a data warehouse by ISTAT. More specifically, these data are available under the website area entitled “2011-2015 Industry and Services Census”. The “industry and service census” data warehouse disseminate the information collected through the 2011 and 2015 ISTAT census that involved non-profit organizations as well as public institutions, and private enterprises. The data warehouse is accessible through the ISTAT official home page [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it) and through the dedicated website <http://censimentoindustriaservizi.istat.it>. Instead, data related to 1999 are not accessible on-line; therefore, they were requested through the ISTAT website at the beginning of 2017.

The 1999, 2011 and 2015 data collected through these sources allow to observe (i) the absolute number of TSOs existing in Italy, (ii) the absolute number of paid workers and of (iii) volunteers employed in these organizations. These numbers were available by legal form of the existing organizations and by field of intervention. The considered legal forms and fields of intervention are illustrated in section 3.1.

The descriptive elaborations presented in section 4.3 use data from all the three mentioned years. When data were not available for one specific year (this is the case of the information about TSOs sector of activity which is not available for 1999), then the time-span examined was reduced.

While data were collected at different territorial levels, i.e. national, regional and provincial, the descriptive analysis carried out in section 4.3 is mainly carried out at the regional and macro-regional level. The reason for this choice is that we wanted to include into the analysis observations from all the considered years and, unfortunately, provincial-level data are not available for 2015.

The elaborations presented in sections 4.4 and 4.5, instead, use data at province-level. As a consequence, they only rely on the 1999-2011 time-span.

In order to use the 1999-2011 province-level data some operations had to be completed to make data collected in these two years comparable. As a matter of fact, between 1999 and 2011 Italy carried out a significant territorial re-composition of its provinces. Due to the territorial configuration designed by the 2004 reform<sup>9</sup>, we had to drop out from the analysis a number of provinces. For example, the 1999 data for the Milan province is not comparable with the 2011 Milan province data since in 2004 the Monza Brianza province was created by splitting the Milan area. As a consequence, both Milan and Monza Brianza had to be excluded from our analysis. We did the same for some provinces in the Puglia region, where we had to remove Bari, Foggia, and Barletta Andria; in the Sardinia region we removed Nuoro, Sassari, Olbia, Ogliastra, Cagliari and Medio Campidano. Finally, in the Marche region we had to remove Fermo and Ascoli<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>9</sup> National law 147/2004.

<sup>10</sup> The provinces considered in the analysis are 96: Agrigento, Alessandria, Ancona, Aosta, Arezzo, Asti, Avellino, Belluno, Benevento, Bergamo, Biella, Bologna, Bolzano/Bozen, Brescia, Brindisi Caltanissetta, Campobasso, Caserta, Catania, Catanzaro, Chieti, Como, Cosenza Cremona Crotona, Cuneo, Enna, Ferrara, Firenze, Forlì, Frosinone, Genova, Gorizia, Grosseto Imperia Isernia La Spezia, Aquila, Latina, Lecce, Lecco, Livorno, Lodi, Lucca, Macerata, Mantova, Massa Carrara, Matera, Messina, Modena, Napoli, Novara, Oristano, Padova, Palermo, Parma, Pavia Perugia Pesaro Urbino,

Such an operation allowed to build a panel province-level dataset that observes variables (i) – (iii) in 1999 and 2011.

For the purposes of the analyses carried out in sections 4.4 and 4.5, three variables were created by elaborating the original data.

The first variable (labelled *Density*) is defined as follows:

$$Density_{itx} = \left( \frac{workers_{itx}}{pop_{it}} \right) * 10,000 \quad [1]$$

where the subscript *i* indicates the *i*-th considered province and *x* indicates the *x*-th TSOs' sector of activity<sup>11</sup> and *t* is the considered year (1999 or 2011); *workers* indicates the total number of people working in TSOs (paid workers+ volunteers) and *pop* indicates the total population resident in the area (absolute values – data extracted from ISTAT).

As it is clear, this variable observes the total number of people employed in the TS (paid workers + volunteers) in each province out of the total population reported by the same province in the same year. This variable aims to describe the incidence of TSOs in each province. As a matter of fact, the number of people engaged in TSOs (paid workers + volunteers) allow to observe the size of TS (Matsunaga, Yamauchi, & Okuyama, 2010; Salamon, 2003) and dividing this number by total provincial population allows to take into account the different scale of the Italian provinces.

A second variable (labelled *Professionalization*) measures the ratio of paid workers out of the total number of people employed in the TS. Such a variable is defined as follows:

$$Professionalization_{itx} = paidworkers_{itx} / (paidworkers_{itx} + volunteers_{itx}) \quad [2]$$

where the subscript *i* indicates the *i*-th considered province, *x* indicates the *x*-th TSOs' sector of activity and *t* is the considered year (1999 or 2011); *paidworkers* indicates the total number of paid people working in TSOs and *volunteers* indicates the total number of volunteers. This variable allows to analyse the relative importance of paid workers in TSOs for each province and sector of activity. The choice to focus the analysis on this variable follows other studies that observe the relationship between volunteers and paid-workers to capture the degree of TSOs' professionalization (Hwang & Powell, 2009; Suarez, 2011).

---

Pescara, Piacenza, Pisa, Pistoia Pordenone, Potenza, Prato, Ragusa, Ravenna Reggio Calabria Reggio Emilia, Rieti, Rimini, Roma, Rovigo, Salerno, Savona, Siena, Siracusa, Sondrio, Taranto, Teramo Terni Torino Trapani Trento Treviso Trieste Udine Varese Venezia Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, Vercelli, Verona, Vibo Valentia, Vicenza, Viterbo. According to their geographic location in the country, these provinces were grouped into 5 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) 1 macro-areas: North- West, North-East, Centre, South and Islands.

<sup>11</sup> As reported in a previous chapter of the thesis, The considered fields of intervention are the following: culture sport and recreation (which is labelled *csr*), education and research (*istr*), health (*health*), development and housing (*sveeco*), social services and emergency prevention (*assoc*), philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion (*fil*), religion (*rel*), law advocacy and politics (*pol*), environment (*amb*), international cooperation (*sollnt*), business and professional associations, Unions (*Sind*), other fields of activity (*other*).

### 4.1.3 Third Sector in Italy: facts and figures

#### 4.1.3.1 Number of organisations and human resource employed

According to the ISTAT data, the TS has been characterised since the '90s by a remarkable growth which is evident when looking at total number of organisations and at people employed.

As reported in table 4.1, the 1999 ISTAT census registered 221,412 TSOs existing in Italy - all sectors of activity and legal forms included - which became 301,191 units in 2011, when the second census has been performed. The latest ISTAT TSOs survey, dated 2015, confirms such a positive and dynamic picture by recording 336.275 TSOs working in the country. This means that over the 1999-2015 period, TSOs increased by approximately 52%.

Table 4.1: Third Sector Organizations (TSOs) in Italy (199, 2011 and 2015. Absolute values, percentage values and 1999-2015 growth rate

	<b>1999</b>	<b>%1999</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>%2011</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>%2015</b>	<b>% of change 1999-2015</b>
<b>TSOs</b>	221,412	100,0	301,191	100,0	336,275	100,0	51.9

\* mutual aid societies, ecclesiastical body and committees.

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Unlike the business or government sector, TSOs extensively rely on both volunteering and paid employment. Figures about people working in these organizations (both volunteers and paid workers) are of course consistent with the growth observed when looking at the total number of organizations. In 2015 (see Table 4.2) the ISTAT census counts 5,528,760 volunteers (83.3% of total workers) and 1,081,992 paid workers (employees and outworkers included).

Data reported in Table 4.2 show that the number of volunteers remarkably increased over the time-span examined by moving from 3.3 million in 1999 to 4.7 million in 2011, and approximately 5 million in 2015. The number of paid workers followed the same trend; they almost doubled over the time-span under investigation, moving from approximately half a million at the end of the 90s, to more than 1 million nowadays (2015).

Apart from those already mentioned, also other different typologies of human resources are implicated in the TS. First, this is the case of outworkers who are approximately 290,000 in 2015. Following the ISTAT definition (ISTAT website), the outworkers, or external workers, are not included among the employees, due to the specific contract they own. Actually, they represent a particular typology of employees including those people who are not classified as real employees or as self-employees, but still participate to the productive process of the

organization. This typology includes: i) administrators that are not members (shareholders) of the firm, ii) workers under contract for a project, iii) other external workers like occasional worker, voucher, associated in participation when registered as “*gestione separata*” at the Italian national Social Security Service. The outworkers (*ex interinale*), are often not directly employed by the TS but, instead, work for an employment agency which is charge of providing workers to the TS for a limited amount of time.

Other forms of human resources working in the TS are: secondees, religious people and young people performing National Civil Service. ISTAT recognises under the main categories of “employees” different type of human resources included: directors, managers, workers, seasonal workers, fixed-term contracts, trainees, associates, religious person, and insertion contracts.

Between 1999 and 2011 volunteers increased by 43.5% against a 55.5% registered by workers. As shown by the data summarized in table 2, during the same period the outworkers contractual form is in tremendous expansion, moving from approximately 70,000 to approximately 270,000. As a matter of fact, over the 1999-2011 years the most significant variation is the one reported by outworkers (238.7%) and by temporary workers (48.1%). The significant growth of both the two categories represents an alarm bell, in terms of job insecurity of the labour, in a sector, which has always been attentive to the stable employment. After the severe increase during the above-mentioned period, we observe a rapid decline in terms of outworkers for the period 2011-2015. This is mainly due to the Italian reform of labour market<sup>12</sup>, and the abrogation (with very few and specific exceptions) of the continuous and coordinated contractual relationships based on project (co.co.co.).

A remarkable dynamism is shown by the paid workers category. Actually, as reported by Figure 4.1, volunteers represent the largest part of the people implicated in TS, representing the 83.3% of the total amount of people involved in the TS in 2015. In absolute values, in 2015 the category registered an increase of more than 66.8% compared to 1999 (Table 4.2). However the last column of Table 4.2, where are displayed the rate of growth between 1999 and 2015 for the different working figures, shows that the paid workers is the most dynamic category. Indeed, the total amount of paid workers (workers employed by the organisations and outworkers), which registers an increase rate of 76.8%, is growing more than volunteers (66.8%). This observation is totally in line with the hypothesis of professionalization of the sector. In the third section of this chapter, we will show a more in-depth analysis, based on disaggregated data for province, showing the different degrees of professionalization in the specific sector of activities.

Table 4.2: Number of TSOs, and HR, 2015, 2011, 1999. Absolute Values and Percentage of change.


	1999	2011	2015	1999-2011% change	2011-2015% change	1999-2015% change
<b>Third Sector Institutions</b>	221,412	301,191	336,275	36	11.6	51.9
<b>Volunteers</b>	3,315,327	4,758,622	5,528,760	43.5	16.1	66.8

<sup>12</sup> Law No. 92 of 28 June 2012 (*Fornero Reform*).

<b>Total Paid Workers (a,b,c)</b>	611,866	951,580	1,081,992	55.5	13.7	76.8
– a. Workers	531,926	680,811	788,126	27.9	15.8	48.2
– b. Out of which Temporary Workers	3,743	5,544	n.a.	48.1		
– c. Outworkers	79,940	270,769	293,866	238.7	8.5	267.6
<b>Total people involved</b>	<b>3,927,193</b>	<b>5,710,202</b>	<b>6,610,752</b>	<b>45.4</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>68.3</b>

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Figure 4.1 Human Resources distribution in the TSOs



Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

#### 4.1.3.2 Territorial Distribution

TSOs are not homogeneously distributed on the Italian territory.

According to the ISTAT 2015 data, TSOs are more entrenched in Northern regions where more than 50% of them - all sectors and legal forms considered - is based (ISTAT 2015). Data reported in Table 4.3 and 4.4 highlights that the area registering the highest presence in absolute values is Northwest (more than 90 thousand of units) followed by Northeast (78 thousand) and Centre (75 thousand). Southern regions report a definitely lower number of TSOs (approximately 57 thousand). According to these figures, almost the 28% of the TSO existing in Italy are based, in the Northwest which is followed in terms of TSOs presence by the Northeast (23.3%) the Centre (22.5%) Southern regions (17.1%) and the Islands (9.3%).

Such a territorial distribution is similar to the one observed by the 2011 census data. Nevertheless, when comparing the two years, it is possible to notice that in the Centre and in the South the TS grew at a highest rate than in the other areas. This might be appreciated in Table 4.3, where data are reported by macro-areas as well as in Table 4.4 where more detailed by region data are shown.



Looking at the regional data reported in Table 4.4, the Lombardy region registers the highest presence of TSOs in 2015, with 52,667 organizations, and a percentage of increase of 14.1% over the 2011-2015 time-span. Second region in terms of numbers is Lazio, with more than 30 thousand of TSOs. Actually, the Region experienced a massive growth in the most recent period under analysis (2011 -2015), overtaking Regions such as Piedmont, Veneto and Trentino, which in 2011 recorded higher absolute values. Regional data also reveal that the TSOs growth registered in the South is not homogenous. Although quite far from Northern regions in terms of absolute values, Campania reports a high rate of growth in the period examined (33%). Nevertheless, Molise reports a negative score, which means a decrease in number of TSOs (-2.0), but also Region Basilicata registers a quite low increase rate (3.0%).


The last column of Table 4.4 presents for each Italian region and macro-region the number of TSOs calculated per ten thousand of inhabitants. When looking at data calculated in this way, the picture described so far definitely changes. The North West area is overtaken by the North East, which registers the highest presence (67.4), followed by the Centre (62.8). Indeed, the regions showing the highest incidence of TSOs per inhabitant are Trentino Alto Adige (107.1) and Valle D'Aosta (105.1). Slightly detached Friuli Venezia Giulia (83.8), Umbria (76.1), Marche (74.4) and Tuscany (71.0). The lowest values are instead recorded in Campania, where only 32.9 non-profit institutions per 10,000 inhabitants are observed, in Sicily (40.8) and in Puglia (41.3). Numbers reported in Table 3 are graphically represented in Figure 2.

Table 4.3: TSOs distribution by Italian macro-areas.

NUTS 1 region	%	%	%	Growth rate 1999-2011	Growth rate 2011 - 2015
	Distribution 1999	Distribution 2011	Distribution 2015		
North West	26.4	27.5	27.6	41.7	12,2
North East	24.6	24.6	23.3	43.4	5.5
Centre	21.2	21.4	22.5	61.3	17.1
South	16.6	16.5	17.1	35.2	15.6
Islands	11.0	9.8	9.3	20.8	6.9
<b>Italy</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	36.0	11.7

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Figure 4.2 TSOs Distribution by Italian macro-areas



Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Table 4.4: TSOs per Region (absolute values).

Regions	Absolute Number of TSOs			% Growth rate	TSOs per 10.000 inhabitants
	1999	2011	2015	2011- 2015	2015
Piedmont	18,700	25,962	28,527	9.9	64.8
Valle d'Aosta	833	1,319	1,339	1.5	105.1
Liguria	7,841	9,461	10,454	10.5	52.6
Lombardy	31,119	46,141	52,667	14.1	66.5
<b>North West</b>	58,493	82,883	92,987	12,2	57.7
Trentino Alto Adige	8,308	10,298	11,342	10.1	107.1
Veneto	21,092	28,898	29,871	3.4	60.8
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	6,119	10,002	10,235	2.3	83.8
Emilia-Romagna	19,160	25,116	26,984	7.4	60.7
<b>North East</b>	54,679	74,314	78,432	5.5	67.4
Tuscany	18,020	23,899	26,588	11.2	71.0
Umbria	4,347	6,249	6,781	8.5	76.1
Marche	7,476	10,676	11,487	7.6	74.4
Lazio	17,122	23,853	30,894	29.5	52.5
<b>Centre</b>	46,965	64,677	75,751	17.1	62.8
Abruzzi	5,841	7,261	7,835	7.9	59.1
Molise	1,021	1,816	1,779	-2.0	57.0
Campania	11,411	14,472	19,252	33.0	32.9
Puglia	12,036	15,105	16,823	11.4	41.3
Basilicata	1,271	3,238	3,334	3.0	58.1
Calabria	5,301	7,963	8,593	7.9	53.6
<b>South</b>	36,881	49,855	57,615	15.6	40.8
Sicily	16,526	19,846	20,699	4.3	40.8
Sardine	7,870	9,616	10,790	12.2	65.1
<b>Islands</b>	24,396	29,462	31,490	6.9	46.8
<b>Italy</b>	<b>221,414</b>	<b>301,191</b>	<b>336,275</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>55.4</b>

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Table 4.5 shows the regional distribution of paid workers and volunteers in the years 1999, 2011 and 2015. Data suggest that paid workers are prevalently concentrated in the Northern regions. Actually, one third of the total amount of paid workers is in the Northwest area, where more than 350 thousand of them are observed. Regions in the Northeast follow with approximately 263 thousand of units; the Centre area is not very far in terms of absolute values, and approximately records 261 thousand of paid workers. Southern regions are definitely far behind with 127 thousand of paid workers employed in TS.

Looking at these data from a longitudinal 1999-2015 perspective, it is worth noting that the evolution of the number of paid workers has been characterized by a remarkable increase. Nevertheless, such an increase has been highly heterogeneous across macro-regions and across regions. In the time period under examination, the Centre area experienced a considerable growth of paid workers: +321%. More in detail, the Lazio region, has been a driver of the remarkable macro-regional growth, since it moved from 14,447 units in 1999 to 122,683 in 2011 and 157,019 in 2015, thus becoming the second region in terms of absolute number of paid workers in Italy after Lombardy (229,539 in 2015). A positive and remarkable trend is also reported by the Northeast (+129%) of the country where it is mainly driven by the performance of Emilia Romagna (+178%). Also Southern regions have experienced a substantial growth of paid workers over the time-span examined: +124%. Campania and Basilicata show to be the main drivers of this growth; an increase by +182% is registered in Campania while + 195% is reported for Basilicata. In some southern regions such as Calabria, Sicily and Molise the number of TS paid workers ha even decreased over recent years (2011-2015).

Finally, the increase observed in the Northwest has been significant (+73%) but not impressive as it has been observed elsewhere in the country.

Concerning volunteers, they are more than 5 million in total. More than 3 million are in the Northern area of the country with a slight prevalence of the Northwest. Lombardy, which is within this latter area, shows the highest number of volunteers (more than 1 million) in Italy, which is by far the best score, considering that Veneto follows with 500 thousand, and Lazio and Tuscany are even lower with less than 350 thousand units.

Looking at the volunteers' figures from a longitudinal perspective, a positive trend is observed in Southern regions and in the Islands, where a notable increase is registered between 2011 and 2015, making the number of volunteers higher 1 million (Islands and South included). Nevertheless, significant heterogeneity among regions is observed. Indeed, while volunteers increased by +50,1% in Campania and +22.8% Basilicata, they decreased in Sicily where the number of volunteers (as well as of paid workers) is lower than what is observed in 2011.

Table 4.5 Regional distribution of TSOs' human resources (absolute values).

Region	Paid Workers			Volunteers		
	1999	2011	2015	1999	2011	2015
Piedmont	41,610	79,360	90,323	268,007	416,962	439,893
Valle d'Aosta	1,415	2,711	2,620	8,150	18,692	25,935
Liguria	20,336	24,860	30,422	95,359	156,865	186,554
Lombardy	140,140	219,595	229,539	636,229	813,896	1,009,795
<b>North West</b>	<b>203,501</b>	<b>326,526</b>	<b>352,904</b>	<b>1,007,745</b>	<b>1,406,415</b>	<b>1,662,178</b>
Trentino Alto Adige	12,772	25,005	27,633	161,238	255,033	274,874
Veneto	51,825	87,513	102,013	305,043	466,172	505,239
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	11,899	23,428	26,155	128,403	161,845	168,916
Emilia-Romagna	38,548	87,508	107,337	350,150	428,550	473,060
<b>North East</b>	<b>115,004</b>	<b>223,454</b>	<b>263,138</b>	<b>944,834</b>	<b>1,311,600</b>	<b>1,422,089</b>
Tuscany	30,206	58,746	66,847	305,403	432,185	469,495
Umbria	6,556	13,063	13,658	58,195	106,962	133,042
Marche	10,905	20,923	23,881	94,966	159,855	177,966
Lazio	14,447	122,683	157,019	207,903	391,248	485,958
<b>Centre</b>	<b>62,114</b>	<b>215,415</b>	<b>261,404</b>	<b>644,467</b>	<b>1,090,250</b>	<b>1,266,461</b>
Abruzzi	6,798	12,722	13,922	55,071	88,608	129,354
Molise	1,895	3,802	3,601	10,148	22,217	25,255
Campania	16,750	32,898	47,258	117,927	159,091	238,858
Puglia	22,009	38,532	43,854	121,952	178,262	218,695
Basilicata	2,514	5,571	7,410	13,687	47,663	58,527
Calabria	7,712	13,343	13,217	61,890	89,123	97,717
<b>South</b>	<b>57,678</b>	<b>106,868</b>	<b>129,262</b>	<b>380,675</b>	<b>584,964</b>	<b>768,406</b>
Sicily	37,688	54,207	48,255	111,283	224,669	216,534
Sardine	15,841	25,110	27,030	110,181	140,724	193,091
<b>Islands</b>	<b>53,509</b>	<b>79,317</b>	<b>75,284</b>	<b>221,446</b>	<b>365,393</b>	<b>409,625</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>611,866</b>	<b>951,580</b>	<b>1,081,992</b>	<b>3,221,185</b>	<b>4,758,622</b>	<b>5,528,760</b>

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

In order to ease comparisons among regions and macro-regions, the data presented so far were rescaled by considering population living in the area under analysis. Table 4.6 presents for each region the number of paid workers and volunteers per 10,000 inhabitants.

When relying on these data, in 2015 the North East largely exceeds the other macro-areas, being followed by the North West and the Centre. Southern regions are definitely far from the other areas of the country. Concerning paid workers, Lazio (266) and Trentino Alto-Adige (261) show the highest values, followed by Emilia-Romagna (241) and Lombardy (229). Molise, Calabria and Sicily show the lowest values, even if it is worth noting that in Molise the population decreased between 2011 and 2015 (while in Calabria it increased, even if only slightly). Concerning volunteers, the 2015 data per inhabitant reveals that Trentino and Valle d'Aosta are the only Italian regions registering more than 2 thousand of volunteers out of 10 thousand inhabitants. Umbria (1,486.90) and Friuli-Venezia Giulia (1,376.52) follow. Again, a clear divide between Northern regions and Southern ones appears to be evident.

Table 4.6 TSOs' human resources (per 10,000 inhabitants).

Region	PW1999 *10,000	PW2011 *10,000	PW2015 *10,000	VOL1999 *10,000	VOL2011 *10,000	VOL2015 *10,000
Piedmont	98.31	181.86	204.14	633.22	955.48	994.23
Valle d'Aosta	119.28	213.79	204.21	687.02	1,474.06	2,021.47
Liguria	127.27	158.27	192.15	596.77	998.70	1,178.29
Lombardy	156.68	226.29	229.48	711.30	838.71	1,009.53
<b>North West</b>	<b>136.64</b>	<b>207.11</b>	<b>218.67</b>	<b>676.63</b>	<b>892.08</b>	<b>1,029.94</b>
Trentino Alto Adige	138.39	242.89	261.69	1747.11	2477.31	2,603.14
Veneto	116.09	180.17	207.02	683.30	959.75	1,025.33
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	101.09	192.19	213.14	1,090.88	1,327.70	1,376.52
Emilia-Romagna	98.16	201.53	241.18	891.63	986.96	1,062.93
<b>North East</b>	<b>109.62</b>	<b>195.19</b>	<b>225.65</b>	<b>900.59</b>	<b>1,145.72</b>	<b>1,219.51</b>
Tuscany	86.54	159.97	178.13	874.97	1,176.91	1,251.10
Umbria	80.07	147.73	152.64	710.79	1,209.61	1,486.90
Marche	75.09	135.75	153.99	653.93	1,037.13	1,147.58
Lazio	28.20	222.94	266.48	405.75	710.99	824.72
<b>Centre</b>	<b>57.06</b>	<b>185.69</b>	<b>216.20</b>	<b>592.05</b>	<b>939.82</b>	<b>1,047.47</b>
Abruzzi	53.93	97.31	104.55	436.90	677.79	971.44
Molise	58.47	121.21	114.92	313.09	708.31	805.97
Campania	29.27	57.05	80.62	206.08	275.87	407.50
Puglia	54.45	95.08	107.22	301.71	439.87	534.69
Basilicata	41.65	96.38	128.51	226.78	824.57	1,015.00
Calabria	37.79	68.11	66.87	303.24	454.93	494.36
<b>South</b>	<b>41.22</b>	<b>76.46</b>	<b>91.35</b>	<b>272.04</b>	<b>418.51</b>	<b>543.05</b>
Sicily	75.32	108.35	94.76	222.41	449.08	425.24
Sardine	96.48	153.17	162.51	671.05	858.41	1,160.90
<b>Islands</b>	<b>80.52</b>	<b>119.41</b>	<b>111.44</b>	<b>333.23</b>	<b>550.10</b>	<b>606.37</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>107.52</b>	<b>160.11</b>	<b>177.97</b>	<b>566.02</b>	<b>800.66</b>	<b>909.40</b>

Note: PW stands for Paid Workers; VOL stands for Volunteers

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

#### 4.1.3.3 Fields of Intervention

Data concerning the TSOs sectors of activity, which are available only for 2015 and 2011, provide a complete picture about the kinds of interventions TSOs deal with.

In 2015, 64.9% of TSOs (more than 218 thousand of organizations) carry out their actions in the sector of culture, sports and recreation. Such a percentage rose up by 11.5% from 2011. Social services and emergency prevention follow as the second sector of most frequent intervention (approximately 9%) while business and professional associations, unions is the third more frequent sector (6.1%).

The latter two sectors of interventions are those who grew more over recent years. As a matter of fact, comparing 2011 and 2015, the business and professional associations and unions sector increased by 25.6%, while social services and emergency prevention grew up by 23.4%. Based on the ISTAT report (2012), TSOs represent an important part of the field of Social service, counting 361 non-profit institutions for every 100 enterprises, and they represent a veritable driver for all the Italian economy (ISTAT, 2011).

Even if the total amount of TSOs increased by 2011, this trend has not been experienced by all the sectors of intervention. The most intense decrease is shown by the sector of law and advocacy (- 23.1%) and by the environment sector (approximately -19%). Education and research drop approximately by -11%, with a loss of almost 2 thousand of organisations. This trend is specifically observed in the Centre area where the decrease is -20% in the 2011-2015 period. Finally, the philanthropic (-22%) and development (-10%) sectors of intervention experienced a remarkable drop in number of institutions over the period investigated.

Looking at the sector of activity data from the perspective of territorial distribution, the Northern areas seems those reporting the highest number of TSOs in all the sectors of intervention with few exceptions. One is represented by the fact that the South counts the highest number of organisations in the sector of development (1,775 units) and seems very competitive in the sector of business and professional associations, unions (4,724 units). TSOs in the South grew up in number in the sector of social services, showing an increase by 34.3%.

Large disparities among the sectors are observed in terms of human resources (Table 4.7 and Table 4.8). Culture, sport and recreation is the first sector in terms of volunteers. Actually, more than a half of total volunteers active in TS in Italy (3 million) is concentrated in this sector. The sectors social services, health and environment follow. Social services registered an increase of the number of volunteers by 48% between 2011 and 2015, followed by environment with 28% and by health (+27%). Instead, a decrease is registered in the number of volunteers active in the sector of Education (- 8.9%). Actually, the sector, experienced also a drop of paid workers (employees and outworkers) by -11.2%. These data are not surprising, but totally in line with what shown in Table 6, the decrease in number of organisations. Finally, a decrease of volunteers is registered also in other sectors such as development, advocacy, and philanthropy.

Concerning paid workers, over the 2011-2015 time period the culture, sport and recreation sector reports an increase by 39%, followed by the development sector (+30%), Social services (+15%) and Health (+11.5%). Instead, a drastic reduction is observed in the number

of paid workers working in the sector of Environment (-55%), advocacy (-30%) and philanthropy (-34%).

Table 4.7: Distribution of Italian TSOs by field of intervention and by territorial repartition. 2011 and 2015 data (absolute values).

Field of intervention	Year	Italy	North West	North East	Centre	South	Islands
Culture, sports and recreation	2011	195,841	52,969	50,563	42,252	31,437	18,620
	2015	218,281	59,995	53,449	49,360	36,113	19,364
Education and research	2011	15,519	4,645	3,769	3,252	2,452	1,401
	2015	13,481	4,084	3,177	2,603	2,322	1,295
Health	2011	10,969	3,448	2,166	2,388	1,768	1,199
	2015	11,590	3,239	2,301	2,524	1,877	1,650
Social services and emergency prevention	2011	25,044	7,438	5,705	4,595	4,461	2,845
	2015	30,877	8,709	6,196	6,693	5,990	3,290
Environment	2011	6,293	1,651	1,754	1,270	979	639
	2015	5,105	1,415	1,328	1,175	701	486
Development and housing	2011	7,458	1,995	1,518	1,775	1,417	753
	2015	6,838	1,549	1,035	1,556	1,775	923
Law, advocacy and politics	2011	6,822	1,805	1,463	1,862	1,153	539
	2015	5,249	1,581	1,187	1,451	679	351
Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion	2011	4,847	1,672	1,289	852	666	368
	2015	3,782	1,206	802	779	577	417
International co-operation	2011	3,565	1,305	1,014	850	248	148
	2015	4,332	1,679	1,121	977	389	166
Religion	2011	6,782	1,606	1,217	1,482	1,660	817
	2015	14,380	4,527	3,374	3,322	2,187	970
Business and professional associations, unions	2011	16,414	3,632	3,520	3,784	3,459	2,019
	2015	20,614	4,593	4,091	4,788	4,724	2,418
Other activities	2011	1,637	717	336	315	155	114
	2015	1,746	411	371	522	282	161
<b>Total</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>301,191</b>	<b>82,883</b>	<b>74,314</b>	<b>64,677</b>	<b>49,855</b>	<b>29,462</b>
	<b>2015</b>	<b>336,275</b>	<b>92,987</b>	<b>78,432</b>	<b>75,751</b>	<b>57,615</b>	<b>31,490</b>

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.



Table 4.8: TSOs' human resources by field of intervention. 2011 and 2015 data (absolute values).

Field of intervention	Paid Workers		Volunteers	
	2011	2015	2011	2015
Culture, sports and recreation	178,940	248,931	2,815,390	3,128,701
Education and research	168,552	149,716	176,701	161,028
Health	171,482	191,227	337,699	428,755
Social services and emergency prevention	266,153	306,258	598,952	888,080
Environment	6,602	2,964	140,165	179,726
Development and housing	81,339	100,779	57,737	45,566
Law, advocacy and politics	8,084	5,600	157,670	128,057
Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion	4,831	3,146	120,301	116,942
International co-operation	4,805	6,625	78,901	106,659
Religion	3,665	7,566	154,670	170,046
Business and professional associations, unions	50,975	51,909	112,560	165,164
Other activities	4,152	6,271	7,876	10,068
<b>Total</b>	<b>951,580</b>	<b>1,081,992</b>	<b>4,758,622</b>	<b>5,528,760</b>

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Table 4.9 shows 2011 data about TSOs revenue and distinguishes between public and private sources of revenue. Public sources include grants and contribution from national and international public bodies and contracts with national or international public bodies from contracts and / or agreements with institutions. Private sources, instead, include annual members subscription, sales to users of good and services, donation and contribution, resources from financial management.

The data show that TSOs are highly heterogeneous in the extent to which they look at the public sector as their most important source of income. Part of this heterogeneity depends on sector of activity. Indeed, entry subsidies and contributions free of charge from national or international institutions and / or public bodies represents an important share (21.8%) for the sector of Law, advocacy and politics, but among the other sectors this percentage does not exceed 10%. Instead, contracts with public authorities make up more than 50% of total revenue in Healthcare (65.5%) and in Social services sector (52.4%). The annual contributions of the members, instead, represent the majority of incomes in the sectors of business professional associations, and unions (70.5%), other activities (67.0%), economic development and social cohesion (37.3%), Culture, sport and recreation (31.0%) and Law, advocacy and politics (25.7%). in the areas of Environment and Culture, sports and recreation the highest share high revenue is the sale of goods and services (respectively 30.8% and 30.2%).

Finally, in the fields of International Cooperation and Solidarity and Religion, more than half of the revenue (53.8% and 51.3%) comes from contributions, offers and donations, and in the Philanthropy sector, 64% of revenue derives from income from financial management.

Table 4.9: Share of TSOs by type of funding and by sector of intervention. 2011 data.

Field of intervention	Public Funds		Private Funds				
	Grants and contribution from national and international public bodies	Contracts with national or international public bodies	Annual members subscription	sales to users of good and services	donation and contribution	resources from financial management	other
Culture, sports and recreation	9.5	9.2	31.0	30.2	9.2	2.5	8.2
Education and research	10.9	30.9	12.4	28.4	6.8	3.4	7.2
Health	2.8	65.5	3.3	20.1	3.5	1.4	3.4
Social services and emergency prevention	4.1	52.4	7.5	22.8	6.6	2.7	4.0
Environment	10.1	22.4	19.4	30.8	9.1	1.4	6.7
Development and housing	1.9	27.9	37.3	19.6	3.1	4.0	6.2
Law, advocacy and politics	21.8	23.3	25.7	3.7	11.9	2.5	11.1
Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion	1.8	2.1	7.6	1.9	6.7	64.0	15.9
International co-operation	4.7	23.1	3.6	3.6	53.8	1.2	10.1
Religion	1.7	3.9	11.8	12.7	51.3	12.1	6.5
Business and professional associations, unions	3.6	5.6	70.5	8.3	4.6	1.8	5.6
Other activities	0.2	0.9	67.0	2.5	0.8	17.7	10.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>6.8</b>

Source: Own elaboration on 2011 ISTAT data.

#### 4.1.3.4 Legal Forms

The Italian TS includes different organizations' legal forms as it is discussed by the literature (Busso, 2018). Actually, the existence of such a heterogeneity of legal forms definitely reflects the heterogeneity of the TS.

On the one hand, consistently with the longstanding tradition of the Italian charities and volunteer organizations (Borzaga & Santuari, 2001; Ianes, 2016), the association legal form and the foundation legal form do exist since the adoption of the Italian civil code<sup>13</sup> in the middle of XX century. On the other hand, during the '70s the social cooperative organizational form emerged (Borzaga, Fazzi, & Galera, 2016; Ianes, 2016) whose legal formalization was carried out only at the beginning of the '90s through the national law 381/1991<sup>14</sup>. A part from these three legal forms, other typologies include committees or ecclesiastical bodies, or mutual aid societies.

While some legal forms appear to be more voluntary and non-profit oriented (associations and foundations), others definitely show a more evident business-like orientation (Jacques Defourny & Nyssens, 2017b). For instance, social cooperatives' productivity, average turnover, as well as their dynamic and innovative behaviour, make them particularly entrepreneurially-oriented compared with other forms of TSOs (Borzaga et al., 2016).

Table 4.10 shows that associations represent the biggest slice of the TS. They count 286,942 units in 2015, all the sector of activity aggregated, which means 85.3% of the total amount of organizations. Over the 1999-2015 time-span associations reported a sharp increase (42%) which is observed when moving from 1999 to 2011 as well as when moving from 2011 to 2015.

The longitudinal inspection of data through Table 4.10 and Figure 4.3 reveals that the social cooperative legal form is the most dynamic one. As a matter of fact, when comparing the 1999 and the 2015 data, social cooperatives report a growth rate of 246.7%, moving from 4,651 units to 16,125. Such an increase is observed between 1999 and 2011 but also between 2011 and 2015. As a matter of fact, the data reveal that the share of social cooperatives out of the total TSOs steadily increased over the last 15 years, being equal to 2.1% in 1999, 3.7% in 2011, and 4.8% nowadays.

Looking at the whole period under investigation, also foundations report a significant growth. However, they grew up steadily between 1999 and 2011 and then remained almost stable in total number. Nowadays they represent 1.9% of the total amount of TSOs.

Under the category "other" we aggregated all the TSOs legal forms different from those mentioned before (e.g. mutual aid societies, ecclesiastical body and committees). This category counts 26,756 units (8.0% of existing TSOs) in 2015 and reported a remarkable increase of units especially over very recent years (2011-2015).

---

<sup>13</sup> Association (ndr. Associazione riconosciuta) art. 12 e artt. 14-35 c.c.; Not recognized association (Associazione non riconosciuta) artt. 36-42 c.c.; Foundation art. 12 e artt. 14-35 c.c.; Committee artt. 36-42 c.c.

<sup>14</sup> Social cooperative law n° 38, 8 November 1991.

Table 4.11 allows to observe the number of TSOs active in Italy by legal form and by the Italian NUTS 1 macro-areas. The 1999, 2011 and 2015 data are reported. Figures highlight that associations have always been, starting from the '90s, the most widespread organisations. Their presence is particularly concentrated in the Northern regions of the country where more than 50% of them is located in 2015.

Looking at social cooperatives, their national distribution varies over the considered years. In 1999 they were more concentrated in the Northern regions of the country while in 2011 and in 2015 such a legal form seems to be significantly widespread also in the Centre as well as in the South. Actually, over the time-span examined the social cooperatives increase rate is largely higher in Southern regions than what is observed in the Northern ones, which allowed to determine a more homogenous distribution of social cooperatives along the Italian territory (see Table 4.11). An impressive growth of social cooperatives has been observed in Southern regions where over the period 2011 – 2015 they grew up by 1,563 units (from 2,843 to 4,406, see Table 4.11).

As we will see in a while, the main sector of activity for social cooperatives is labour integration of disadvantaged people, and their main mission is the creation of new jobs. Therefore, it is quite significant that this kind of organisations finds room in the Southern regions of the country, where a high level of unemployment as well as a low rate of business activity are observed.

Table 4.12 relies on 2011 and 2015 data to show Italian TSOs by legal form and by field of intervention. Adding to the analysis based on Table 4.10, the data reported in Table 4.12 reveal that in 2011, the most widespread legal form is “not recognized association” (200 thousand units) which covers more than 2/3 of the total organisations. The “recognized associations” (68,349 units) and social cooperatives (11,264) follow. 2/3 of not recognized associations work in the field of culture, sport and recreation. With the only exception of the development and housing sector - where the most frequent legal form is social cooperatives - all the investigated fields of activity reveal a sharp majority of not recognised associations. Social cooperatives, instead, are particularly developed in the sector of social services and emergency prevention, where 1/3 of them are active, namely 4,452 units. The development and housing sector (3,654 organisations) and the health sector (1,192) follow. Foundations are very developed in the sector of culture, health and social services, and in the education and research sector.

Comparing 2011 and 2015 we notice that the increase in the total number of TSOs is particularly due to the increase of the number of associations. Associations increased in all the sectors, and more evidently in the sector of social services and in education and research. Actually, in this sector the decrease of the number of TSOs in this sector is particularly due to a drop of associations. Actually, for the census 2015, all the associations - recognised and not - are categorised under the same voice, counting 6,533 units. Summing up the data, in 2011 we can count more than 10 thousand of units. The number of social cooperatives and foundations increased for the same period, but not enough to balance the loss. On the other hand, the number of social cooperatives strongly decreased in the sector of Environment, passing by 128 to 2 units and it decreased as well in the sectors of Law, advocacy and politics, Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion, and International co-operation.


Table 4.10: TSOs in Italy by legal form: absolute values, share on the total number of TSOs and 1999-2015 growth rate.

Legal form	1999	% 1999	2011	% 2011	2015	% 2015	% of change 1999-2015
Association	202,061	91.3	269,353	89.4	286,942	85.3	42.0
Social Cooperative	4,651	2.1	11,264	3.7	16,125	4.8	246.7
Foundation	3,008	1.4	6,220	2.1	6,451	1.9	114.5
Other*	11,692	5.3	14,354	4.8	26,756	7.9	128.9
Third Sector Institutions	221,412	100,0	301,191	100,0	336,275	100,0	51.9

\* mutual aid societies, ecclesiastical body and committees.

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Figure 4.3 TSOs by legal form, share values (1999, 2011, 2015)



Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Table 4.11 Distribution of TSOs by legal form and by macro-area (absolute values). 1999, 2011 and 2015 data.

NUTS 1 region	Social cooperatives			Foundation			Associations			Others*			Total		
	1999	2011	2015	1999	2011	2015	1999	2011	2015	1999	2011	2015	1999	2011	2015
North West	1,339	2,692	3,577	1071	2,590	2,654	52,727	73,252	78,192	3,356	4,349	8,564	58,492	82,883	92,987
North East	947	1,863	2,359	685	1,300	1,247	50,142	67,305	67,879	2,923	3,846	6,947	54,680	74,314	78,432
Centre	789	2,117	3,102	698	1,338	1,493	42,800	58,379	64,937	2,676	2,843	6,218	46,964	64,677	75,751
South	838	2,843	4,406	421	725	770	33,810	44,092	48,911	1,809	2,195	3,528	36,883	49,855	57,615
Islands	732	1,749	2,681	150	267	287	22,582	26,325	27,023	930	1,121	1,499	24,396	29,462	31,490
<b>Italy</b>	<b>4,645</b>	<b>11,264</b>	<b>16,125</b>	<b>3,025</b>	<b>6,220</b>	<b>6,451</b>	<b>202,681</b>	<b>269,353</b>	<b>286,942</b>	<b>11,694</b>	<b>14,354</b>	<b>26,756</b>	<b>221,414</b>	<b>301,191</b>	<b>336,275</b>

\* Committees or Ecclesiastical bodies, or Mutual Aid Societies.

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999, 2011 and 2015.

Table 4.12: TSOs' human resources by field of intervention and by legal forms (absolute values). 2011 and 2015 data.

Field of intervention	2011									2015				
	Social Coop	Recognised associations	Foundations	Ecclesiastical body	Mutual aid societies	Not recognised associations	Committees	Others	Total	Social cooperatives	Foundations	Associations	Others	Total
Culture, sports and recreation	747	44,987	1,524	809	564	143,469	2,319	1,422	195,841	777	1,667	207,424	8,413	218,281
Education and research	899	3,016	1,708	2,154	7	7,103	97	535	15,519	1,489	1,780	6,533	3,679	13,481
Health	1,192	4,054	493	174	61	4,886	38	71	10,969	1,092	358	9,879	261	11,590
Social services and emergency prevention	4,452	6,120	1,188	933	201	11,749	204	197	25,044	6,466	1529	21,891	992	30,877
Environment	128	1,852	74	-	3	3,844	164	228	6293	2	57	4,909	137	5,105
Development and housing	3,654	876	151	3	71	2,484	101	118	7,458	5,889	36	762	151	6,838
Law, advocacy and politics	19	1,567	51	-	5	4,889	221	70	6,822	1	66	5,060	121	5,249
Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion	9	1,107	478	25	6	3,146	58	18	4,847	-	296	3,418	68	3,782
International co-operation	24	1,025	134	42	-	2,250	76	14	3,565	-	286	3,757	289	4,332
Religion	-	994	353	2,422	12	2,966	18	17	6,782	-	262	1,938	12,181	14,380
Business and professional associations, unions	14	2,518	29	-	14	13,575	133	131	16,414	-	49	20,416	149	20,614
Other activities	126	233	37	21	52	643	3	522	1,637	410	67	955	314	1,746
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11,264</b>	<b>68,349</b>	<b>6,220</b>	<b>6,583</b>	<b>996</b>	<b>201,004</b>	<b>3,432</b>	<b>3,343</b>	<b>301,191</b>	<b>16,125</b>	<b>6,451</b>	<b>286,942</b>	<b>26,756</b>	<b>336,275</b>

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT 2011 and 2015 data.

#### 4.1.4 The Determinants of TSOs Distribution across Italy: an Empirical Investigation

As shown in the previous sections, over the past decades the TS in Italy has significantly grown in size, playing an increasingly crucial role in the framework of the national mixed welfare system. Furthermore, the analysis suggested that the TS responds nowadays to a great diversity of needs: recreation, social, education, health, environment and political advocacy, and economic development. Finally, the analysis demonstrated that the presence of TSOs is highly heterogeneous among the Italian regions.

A number of studies have been dedicated to understand, why and how the TSOs developed in specific areas (Matsunaga et al., 2010). Despite this, there is still divergence on the interpretation of factors that explain the territorial distribution of TS activities. The multiplicity of theories might be ideally divided into two main areas: demand-side theories and supply-side theories (Nyssens, 2008) (Van Puyvelde & Brown, 2016). Both are based on the analysis of actors who are interested in the TSOs production (Freeman, 1984).

On the one hand, some theories recognize the existence of TSOs as the answer to stakeholders' (individuals, organizations, or public bodies) needs (Ben-Ner & VanHoomissen, 1990). Among these theories we can place the theory of market failures (Ben-Ner & VanHoomissen, 1990) as well as the government failure theory (Weisbrod, 1975) and the theory of State- TS interdependence (Salamon, 1999; Salamon & Anheier, 1997a).

On the other hand, theories suggested that TSOs basically respond to need expressed by supply-side stakeholders, such as managers, workers, suppliers, funders, and social entrepreneurs, which are in charge the provision of goods and services to consumers and clients.

The market failure theory basically explains the existence of TSOs looking at trust problems. As a matter of fact, being characterized by strict limits on the appropriation of surplus in the form of monetary gain, TSOs are supposed to be less likely to behave opportunistically. In this perspective, they reduce transaction costs, particularly in such cases where the quality of the service is difficult to be evaluated (Laville & Nyssens, 2001). This, in turn, fosters users' confidence (Ben-Ner & Gui, 2003; Nyssens, 2008).

The government failure theory (Weisbrod, 1975) is based on the assumption of heterogeneity of the demand. According to this theory, government provision of quasi-public goods is quite homogeneous and based on preferences expressed by the median voter. In this perspective, such a provision faces significant difficulties in meeting the needs of all the users. Instead, TSOs are community-based organizations more able to grasp specific needs, which remain unanswered by public sector organizations.

In the framework of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP), Salamon and colleagues found that TS grows in proportion to the level of government



support of TS activities (Salamon, 1993, 1995). This has been explained by the State – third sector interdependence theory, which basically claims complementary between these organizations. As a matter of fact, Salamon observes that very often, public authorities and TSOs work together, creating different configurations of partnership (Salamon, 1993). This is also partly due to the fact that public funds are crucial to sustain services provided by TSOs, representing a non-negligible share of the total funds available for TSOs activities.

Differently from demand-side theories, supply-side theories focus their analysis on motivations that prompt social entrepreneurs to found TSOs. Rose Ackerman (1997) suggested that ideology and altruism could be central factors in explaining the actions of the TS entrepreneurs, while Young (Young, 1983) defines a number of social entrepreneurs profiles, who are motivated not only by profit but also by creativity, autonomy, by the willingness to achieve a different way to produce products/services and to pursue objectives not assimilable to monetary remuneration. Finally, Hansmann (Hansmann, 1987) suggests that in order to reduce asymmetric information, demand-side-stakeholders might take part into TSOs. In order to collectively control the production of goods and services through democratic governance.

Alongside the demand-side and the supply-side approach, the existing literature (Pennings, 1982) also highlighted that factors in the institutional, social, and economic environment could explain the evolution of TSOs organizational patterns. Our analysis follows this perspective by specifically investigating whether the heterogeneity of TSOs presence in Italian regions is correlated with economic, socio-demographic and institutional contextual factors.

On the one hand, consistently with the demand-side literature, regional economic and socio-demographic factors might shape regional demand for TSOs.

On the other hand, the New Institutional economics (NIE) approach claims that the institutions contribute to define the “rule of the game” (North, 1992; Williamson, 2000), by reducing uncertainty and by providing an efficient framework for economic exchange (North, 1991). More in detail, in the NIE’s theoretical framework, formal rules and informal constraints, which are defined as institutions, affect economic performance by determining the cost of transaction and production as well as by providing incentives and disincentives for business activity (North, 1992). Does this also work for TSOs?

Based on the demand-side literature and on the NIE literature, this section tries to identify the socio-demographic and institutional factors, which are correlated with the development of TSOs in the Italian provinces.

This aim is pursued by carrying out a cross-section regression analysis that is based on 2011 data that allow to observe the incidence of TSOs in the Italian provinces by distinguishing their sector of activity and their organizational form.

Such a study echo prior ones on TSOs density (Marcuello, 1998; Matsunaga et al., 2010; Saxton & Benson, 2005). To the best of our knowledge this is the first study of this type carried out in Italy.

#### 4.1.4.1 Incidence of TSOs in Italian Provinces

The *Density* variable described in section 4.2 is used to observe how much TSOs are present in Italian provinces. As it has been already described, for each province this variable is calculated as the ratio between the total number of people engaged in the TS (volunteers + paid workers) on total provincial population (\*10.000). Such a variable allows to get a glimpse of the TS's incidence in each province and, according to the literature (Ben-Ner & VanHoomissen, 1992; Matsunaga et al., 2010; Salamon, 1999), is an appropriate to measure the size of the TS in each province.

As highlighted in the equation [1] presented in section 4.2, the *Density* variable is calculated by TSOs sector of activity. As a result, for each province 13 alternative versions of the *Density* variable were calculated as follows:

- (i) *Density\_tot* was calculated by looking at the entire number of TSOs active in each province;
- (ii) *Density\_Csr* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of culture sport and recreation;
- (iii) *Density\_Edu* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of education and research;
- (iv) *Density\_Health* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of health;
- (v) *Density\_Ecodev* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of development and housing;
- (vi) *Density\_Socserv* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the social services and emergency prevention;
- (vii) *Density\_Phil* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion;
- (viii) *Density\_Rel* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of religion;
- (ix) *Density\_Pol* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of law advocacy and politics;
- (x) *Density\_Envi* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of environment;
- (xi) *Density\_Intcoop* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of international cooperation;
- (xii) *Density\_Unions* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in the field of business and professional associations, unions;
- (xiii) *Density\_Others* was calculated by restricting the analysis to TSOs working in fields different from those listed above.

Table 4.13 reports mean and standard deviation calculated for each of the 13 *Density* variables. Since data used in the analysis were extracted at provincial level, the mean should be interpreted as the average incidence of TSOs in the Italian provinces as given by the total number of people working in TSOs per 10 thousand of provincial inhabitants. The standard deviation, instead, measures data variability.

The table clearly highlights three main points. First, the average number of people employed in TSOs (all fields of intervention) per province is quite remarkable.

Consistently with figures described in previous sections of this chapter, such a number is particularly remarkable for sectors *Crs* and *Socserv*. Second, the average number of people employed in TSOs (all fields of intervention) per province remarkably increases between 1999 and 2011. This increase is particularly relevant for the sectors *Crs*, *Socserv* and *health*.

Table 4.13 Density by field of intervantion, 1999 and 2011


	1999		2011	
	mean	sd	mean	sd
<i>Density_Tot</i>	704.58	428.2	1053.63	444.24
<i>Density_Csr</i>	373.78	285.87	597.85	271.94
<i>Density_Edu</i>	24.57	19.16	41.27	27.27
<i>Density_Health</i>	74.67	58.36	87.81	51.6
<i>Density_Ecodev</i>	12.75	22.29	24.52	12.68
<i>Density_Socserv</i>	121.08	159.01	147.73	70.79
<i>Density_Phil</i>	3.96	3.82	25.9	37.5
<i>Density_Rel</i>	25.35	18.47	30.92	41.12
<i>Density_Pol</i>	20.14	21.15	27.95	24.95
<i>Density_Envi</i>	15.82	18.86	27.15	22.51
<i>Density_Intcoop</i>	5.38	8.32	12.56	11.56
<i>Density_Unions</i>	22.08	13.88	27.91	20.28
<i>Density_Others</i>	5.01	9.57	2.05	5.3
Observations	96		96	

Source: own elaboration on ISTAT 1999 and 2011 data.

Figures 4.4 and 4.5 allow to visualize the *Density\_tot* values reported by each Italian province in year 1999 (figure 4.4) and in year 2011 (figure 4.5). The highest values, represented by dark blue, are clealy concentrated in the Northern part of the country, which means that more people are engaged in TS in these areas. Nevertheless, also among the Northern provinces a high level of heterogeneity is observed with provinces in the extreme northeast of the country - such as Bolzano, Trento, Belluno, Udine – showing the highest values.


If we compare figure 4.4, based on 1999 data, with figure 4.5, based on data 2011, the picture only suggests very feew changes. As a matter of fact, although data show a generalised increase in the Centre and South area, with the South reporting the highest rate of growth (+39.6%) the gap between Northern provinces and the others remains quite evident. Comparing the two pictures, Northeast remains the area reporting the highest concentration of TSOs. Nevertheless it is worth noting that the Northwest registered an higher rate of growth (+35,6%) between the two considered years.

Figure 4.4 Density\_tot values in Italian provinces (1999).



Source: Own elaborations on ISTAT 1999 data. Density\_tot is calculated as the ratio between the number of paid workers in TS and the total number of people working in TS (paid workers+ volunteers)

Figure 4.5 Density\_tot values in Italian provinces (2011).



Source: Own elaborations on ISTAT 1999 data. Density\_tot is calculated as the ratio between the number of paid workers in TS and the total number of people working in TS (paid workers+ volunteers)

#### 4.1.4.2 Determinants of TSOs' Density Heterogeneity among Italian Provinces

With the aim of inspecting the contextual determinants of TSOs incidence in Italian provinces, we firstly collect data on province-level variables that according to the literature might be considered as drivers of the TSOs development at provincial level.

These variables are listed in Table 4.14 where their label, full description and data source is shown.

As highlighted by Lu (Lu, 2017) a number of existing studies on the relationship between population characteristics and third sector size. They are based on the Weisbrod's demand heterogeneity hypothesis, which suggests that the TS size is positively related to population heterogeneity (Weisbrod, 1975). Sources of population heterogeneity could be age, degree of education, economic condition, and ethnicity. The theory of the heterogeneous demand suggests that, being the public provision highly homogeneous, the demand for public goods remain unsatisfied in case of countries with heterogeneous demand. In this situation the presence of TSOs increase (Anheier & Ben-Ner, 1997).

Having this in mind, a first group of variables looks at the characteristics of the provincial population which might be considered as potential drivers of demand for TS services and, therefore, as potential drivers of TS development in the province.

*POP14* and *POP65* observe the share of population under 14 over 65 in each province. These two groups of citizens (the youngest and the oldest ones) have specific needs that TSOs might satisfy, such as education for the youngest and welfare and health for the oldest.

*GDP* is the provincial GDP per capita; such a variable allows to measure the level of wealth of each province. The literature claims that wealth is positively associated with the presence of TSOs (Ben-Ner & VanHoomissen, 1991). Actually, high level of income implies more heterogeneity preferences, but also different ability to buy TSO's products and services.

*Illiterate* observes the share of provincial population without education while *Unemployment* observes the share of unemployed in each province. Both these variables were already used in a number of previous studies on drivers of TS development since they foster demand for welfare services (Marcuello, 1998; Matsunaga & Yamauchi, 2002). *Foreigners* measures the share of foreigners on total provincial population. Social integration of foreigners might imply the intervention of TSOs, this is why the inclusion of this variables makes sense.

Since, following the existing literature, our analysis aims to check whether the institutional environment determines any effect of the development of TS, our analysis includes a set of variables that are commonly used to measure quality of institutions in Italian provinces. The source of these variables is the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) developed by Nifo and Vecchione (2014).

Table 4.14: Description of Variables

<b>Label</b>	<b>Variable description</b>	<b>Data source</b>
<i>POP14</i>	Population under 14	ISTAT
<i>POP65</i>	Population over 65	ISTAT
<i>GDP</i>	GDP pro capita	ISTAT
<i>Illiterate</i>	Percentage of Illiterate population	ISTAT
<i>Unemployed</i>	Percentage of unemployment population	ISTAT
<i>Foreigners</i>	Percentage of foreign population	ISTAT
<i>IQI Corruption</i>	This variable summarizes data on a crimes committed against the Public Administration (PA), the number of local administrations overruled by the federal authorities and the Golden-Picci Index, measuring the corruption level on the basis of “the difference between the amounts of physically existing public infrastructure (...) and the amounts of money cumulatively allocated by government to create these public works” (Golden and Picci, 2005, p. 37). The index is built so that it takes higher values for lower levels of corruption.	Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
<i>IQI Government</i>	This variable measures government effectiveness as given by the endowment of social and economic structures in Italian provinces and the administrative capability of provincial and regional governments in terms of health policies, waste management and environment.	Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
<i>IQI Reg Qual</i>	This variable concerns the degree of openness of the economy, indicators of business environment, business density and the rate of firms mortality.	Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
<i>IQI RoL</i>	This variable summarises data on crime against persons or property, magistrate productivity, trial times, tax evasion and shadow economy.	Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
<i>Civicness</i>	N. of non-sport daily newspapers sold/1,000 people	Nannicini et al (2013)

The IQI is a composite indicator built to measure Institutional Quality in Italy. IQI is based on five groups of elementary indexes (in turn connected to measures of corruption, governance, regulation, law enforcement and social participation). The items of IQI concern major dimensions of institutional quality: the degree of social participation (Voice and Accountability), the quality of public service and of the policies formulated and implemented by the local government (Government Effectiveness- *IQI Government*), the ability of government to promote and formulate effective regulatory interventions (Regulatory Quality – *IQI Reg Qual*), the perception concerning law enforcement both in terms of contract fulfilment, property rights, police forces, activities of the magistracy and crime levels (Rule of Law - *IQI RoL*), the degree of corruption of those performing public functions both in terms of illegal gains and private proceeds acquired to the detriment of society (Control and Corruption – *IQI Corruption*<sup>15</sup>) (Nifo and Vecchione, 2015)<sup>16</sup>. The IQI dataset provides with a sub-index for each of these dimensions. The following four sub-indices were used in the analysis: *IQI Government*, *IQI Reg Qual*, *IQI RoL*, *IQI Corruption*. The latter sub-index (Voice and accountability) was excluded because its calculation is based on some indicators that measure the number of social cooperatives active in the Italian provinces. As a consequence, including this sub-index into our analysis would have translated into biasing the results because of social cooperatives' incidence being both on the left and on the right side of the estimated equation.

Finally, the last variable used in the analysis is *Civiness* that measures citizens' civiness, which is proxied by relying on data about newspapers sold at provincial level (per 1,000 inhabitants).

With the aim of inspecting the connection between the contextual variables presented above and the *Density* variable, a cross-sectional regression analysis that estimates the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Density_{ix} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 POP14_i + \beta_2 POP65_i + \beta_3 GDP_i + \beta_4 IlliteratePOP_i + \\
 & \beta_5 UNEMPLOYMENT_i + \beta_6 FOREIGNERS_i + \beta_7 IQICORRUPTION_i + \\
 & \beta_8 IQIGOVERNMENT_i + \beta_9 IQIREGQUAL_i + \\
 & + \beta_{10} IQIRoL_i + \beta_{11} CIVICNESS_i + \varepsilon_i
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{3}$$

Where  $i$  indicates the  $i$ -th province,  $x$  indicates the  $x$ -th field of activity,  $\beta_0 - \beta_{10}$  are the parameters to be estimated. Models were run by relying on OLS. Restricted data availability for some of the variables presented above implied using only the 2011 data in the regression analyses. Therefore, all the variables presented in equation [3] were measured in 2011. The cross-sectional nature of the resulting analysis does not

---

<sup>15</sup> It is worth noting that this variable is built in a way that higher values mean lower levels of corruption.

<sup>16</sup> Nifo and Vecchione(2015), Appendix, 1 Website  
<https://sites.google.com/site/institutionalqualityindex/dataset>

allow to identify causal links. As a consequence, our estimates have to be intended as robust *ceteris paribus* correlations.



#### 4.1.4.3 Results

Estimates are presented in Tables 4.15- 4.16. Each column in the table reports the results obtained through one specification. All the specifications reported rely on the same set of control variables but differ in terms of the dependent variable. As a matter of fact, each column considers a different version of the *Density* variable; the first column considers *Density* calculated by looking at the TS as a whole while in the other columns *Density* by field of intervention is examined.

On the whole, the estimates suggest two main results.

First, most of the contextual determinants considered by the analysis turn out to be correlated with the incidence of TS in the Italian provinces. When TS as a whole is considered (column 1), the coefficients of *POP65* and *POP14* turn out to be positive and statistically significant. This suggests that incidence of young (<14) and old (>56) people on total population has a positive impact on the development of the TS sector. The coefficients of the variables *GDP* and *Illiterate* are positive and statistically significant. These results are in line with the theoretical approach of the heterogeneity of the demand. Concerning the variables characterizing institutions, the coefficient of the variables *IQI Corruption*, *IQI Government* and *IQI ROL* are positive and statistically significant. It is worth noting that *IQI Corruption* measures provinces' effectiveness in controlling corruption; *IQI Government* measures the efficiency of public institutions, and the administrative capability of provincial governments; *IQI ROL*, instead, measures the ability of government to promote and formulate effective regulatory interventions. Results obtained for these variables are definitely in line with the theory of the interdependency (Salamon, 1999). Actually, when the administrative capability of provincial institutions works properly (higher values for the *IQI Government* variable), lower values of corruptions are observed (higher values of the *IQI Corruption* variable), and effective formal and informal justice of institutions is ensured (higher values for the *IQI Rule of Law* variable), then partnerships with TSOs are most suitable and TS proliferates more. The *Civiness* variable, instead, measures citizens' attitude towards expressing their preferences. Such a variable reports a positive and significant coefficient. According to this result, if social participation is higher, demand for TS services is more easily detected and this stimulates the creation of the TSOs. As it is argued by Douglas (Douglas, 1997), a healthy third sector is characteristic of democracies.

A second remarkable result of the analysis is that the effect of contextual determinants on TS provincial development is highly heterogeneous across TS fields of intervention. This is mainly because of the specific characteristics of services provided by TSOs in each field of intervention. While the results reported in the tables provide a comprehensive overview of differences of results among our regression models, we do think that the focus of this thesis on social services provided to migrants makes it appropriate to focus our analysis of the regression results on those that concern some of the inspected fields of TSOs intervention, e.g. culture (*CSR*), education (*Edu*), health (*Health*), social services (*Socserv*).

Table 4.15: OLS estimates Coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable considered in each model is reported at the top of the column.

	(1) Density_Tot	(2) Density_Csr	(3) Density_Edu	(4) Density_Health
<i>POP14</i>	13811.7* (1.94)	6282.0 (1.53)	298.2 (0.70)	638.5 (0.79)
<i>POP65</i>	8166.4*** (2.76)	4154.9** (2.26)	-48.06 (-0.26)	831.3** (2.06)
<i>GDP</i>	0.0334*** (2.96)	0.0127* (1.81)	0.00452*** (5.30)	0.00248* (1.73)
<i>Illiterate</i>	8158.5* (1.98)	6062.5** (2.35)	-293.3 (-1.10)	101.0 (0.14)
<i>Unemployment</i>	435.3 (0.11)	-675.3 (-0.25)	646.3* (1.92)	-113.0 (-0.20)
<i>Foreigner</i>	-2644.8 (-1.07)	-1049.4 (-0.68)	-61.56 (-0.55)	-283.7 (-0.96)
<i>IQI Corruption</i>	591.7*** (3.09)	341.9** (2.36)	-9.564 (-0.43)	18.40 (0.56)
<i>IQI Government</i>	432.9** (2.18)	356.1** (2.56)	-1.755 (-0.11)	-26.34 (-0.62)
<i>IQI Reg Qual</i>	66.19 (0.34)	83.56 (0.60)	-12.19 (-0.89)	45.97 (1.34)
<i>IQI RoL</i>	407.2** (2.24)	295.6*** (2.77)	-17.06 (-1.63)	19.27 (0.72)
<i>Civicness</i>	16392.5*** (5.03)	11495.8*** (5.51)	55.00 (0.18)	701.0 (1.34)
<i>Constant</i>	-4917.3*** (-2.84)	-2574.0** (-2.54)	-72.90 (-0.70)	-259.6 (-1.40)
Observations	102	102	102	102
$R^2$	0.716	0.664	0.694	0.347

Source: own elaboration on data from various sources (see tab. 12 for details). \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 4.16: OLS estimates Coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable considered in each model is reported at the top of the column.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Density_EcoDev	Density_SocServ	Density_Phil	Density_Rel
<i>POP14</i>	317.4*	1841.1	132.4	1375.2**
	(1.87)	(1.31)	(0.38)	(2.34)
<i>POP65</i>	141.5	503.9	305.8	831.7**
	(1.54)	(0.88)	(1.10)	(2.60)
<i>GDP</i>	0.000369	0.00628**	-0.000439	0.00137
	(1.34)	(2.51)	(-0.54)	(1.65)
<i>Illiterate</i>	-35.79	985.1	171.1	287.8
	(-0.24)	(1.18)	(0.59)	(0.70)
<i>Unemployment</i>	172.1	1087.6	-939.4	-56.88
	(1.26)	(1.39)	(-1.29)	(-0.16)
<i>Foreigners</i>	-17.18	-20.02	88.58	-239.7
	(-0.29)	(-0.04)	(0.72)	(-1.30)
<i>IQI Corruption</i>	19.20***	94.73**	14.10	27.49*
	(2.75)	(2.33)	(0.88)	(1.71)
<i>IQI Government</i>	18.29**	83.51**	-9.749	-49.03
	(2.53)	(2.20)	(-0.59)	(-1.59)
<i>IQI Reg Qual</i>	3.444	-18.55	-28.49	-16.51
	(0.53)	(-0.58)	(-0.95)	(-0.89)
<i>IQI RoL</i>	2.750	28.77	12.17	23.30*
	(0.54)	(0.84)	(0.77)	(1.92)
<i>Civicness</i>	286.8***	2105.8***	-92.89	677.3**
	(2.65)	(2.92)	(-0.32)	(2.20)
<i>Constant</i>	-89.20*	-618.0*	-30.90	-381.8**
	(-1.97)	(-1.86)	(-0.37)	(-2.62)
<i>Observations</i>	102	102	102	102
<i>R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.507	0.626	0.128	0.130

Source: own elaboration on data from various sources (see tab. 12 for details). \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 4.17: OLS estimates Coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable considered in each model is reported at the top of the column.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Density_Pol	Density_Envi	Density_Intcoop	Density_Unions	Density_Other
<i>POP14</i>	973.2*	331.1	449.8*	852.6	320.3*
	(1.75)	(0.74)	(1.78)	(1.30)	(1.96)
<i>POP65</i>	658.1***	133.8	169.4*	380.0*	104.1**
	(2.70)	(0.74)	(1.94)	(1.92)	(2.06)
<i>GDP</i>	0.00153*	0.00166**	0.000949***	0.00170	0.000284
	(1.99)	(2.03)	(3.23)	(1.60)	(1.30)
<i>Illiterate</i>	264.0	453.1*	21.30	127.5	14.11
	(0.69)	(1.79)	(0.15)	(0.47)	(0.23)
<i>Unemployment</i>	327.2	-116.4	318.6*	-125.5	-89.92
	(1.01)	(-0.40)	(1.74)	(-0.38)	(-1.09)
<i>Foreigners</i>	-212.3	-278.1*	-41.37	-420.6*	-109.3**
	(-1.30)	(-1.69)	(-0.75)	(-1.82)	(-1.99)
<i>IQI Corruption</i>	24.42	28.72**	16.41***	11.88	4.033
	(1.15)	(2.23)	(2.68)	(0.75)	(1.25)
<i>IQI Government</i>	34.53**	19.10	8.091	2.589	-2.461
	(2.02)	(1.33)	(1.23)	(0.19)	(-1.01)
<i>IQI Reg Qual</i>	-2.321	-7.186	1.014	11.66	5.801*
	(-0.15)	(-0.31)	(0.15)	(1.31)	(1.77)
<i>IQI RoL</i>	1.423	22.05*	6.278	8.971	3.652
	(0.08)	(1.98)	(1.36)	(0.72)	(1.29)
<i>Civicness</i>	-208.3	618.4**	273.4	361.1	119.1*
	(-0.84)	(2.17)	(1.32)	(1.29)	(1.73)
<i>Constant</i>	-323.2**	-146.2	-140.7**	-211.4	-69.35*
	(-2.28)	(-1.43)	(-2.10)	(-1.42)	(-1.91)
Observations	102	102	102	102	102
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.280	0.305	0.481	0.294	0.353

Source: own elaboration on data from various sources (see tab. 12 for details). \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

When the analysis uses *Density\_CSR* as the dependent variable – and therefore focuses on provincial development of TSOs active in the field of culture, sports and recreation - the results are mostly in line with the general ones presented above. As a matter of fact, results suggest that the incidence of CSR TSOs in Italian provinces is positively driven by factors that foster demand for CSR such as economic wealth (positive correlation with *GDP*), an older population (positive correlation with *POP65*), a more illiterate population (positive correlation with *Illiterate*) as well as by institutional factors such as those measured by *IQI Corruption*, *IQI Government* and *IQI RoL* and citizens' *Civiness*. Compared with previous results, the only remarkable difference is that *POP14* is not statistically significant in explaining the development of CSR TS which might be due to the fact that people in the very young age class are not highly involved in the cultural activities included in the CSR sector.

Looking at the results obtained when looking at TSOs working in the education sector, their incidence seems to be positively driven only by two variables that shape demand for educational services: *GDP* and *Unemployment*. The positive sign found for *GDP* is consistent with the idea that richer contexts reveal a higher willingness to pay for educational services provided by non-public organizations. The positive coefficient found for the *Unemployment* variable, instead, suggests that unemployment stimulates the demand for TSOs implicated in this sector which seems consistent with the idea that vocational training and adult education are tools commonly used to stimulate activation of unemployed people. This means, for example, that the institutional setting does not make the difference in explaining the heterogeneity of Italian provinces in terms of development of TS in the field of education.

A similar result is observed when looking at TSOs working in the health sector. In this case *POP65* and *GDP* are the only two variables showing statistically significant and positive results. This is consistent with expectations since the presence of elder population increases the need for healthcare services and a higher willingness to pay is also clearly positively correlated with demand for health services not subsidized by public authorities, such as paramedical services, or complementary to the services offered by public sector. Again, also for this field of intervention institutional quality seems not to make the difference.

Finally, when looking at social services and emergency prevention, we found that the TSOs are more developed in provinces where: (i) *Civiness* is higher. This means that where citizens are more able to express their needs (i.e. a higher social participation is observed) demand for TS social services is higher and, therefore, there is a higher number of TSOs dealing with social issues. In a different perspective, the *Civiness* variable might also be interpreted as a measure of citizens' cohesion, which might be interpreted as a proxy for higher degree of sensitivity for social issues. (ii) *GDP* shows a positive coefficient, which suggests that more attention for social services is devoted in wealthier provinces. (iii) a lower corruption is observed. This suggests that where control of corruption is more effective, then social services by TS are more demanded for, maybe because of higher citizens' confidence in TS organizations. (iv) government regulatory quality is higher. This supports the idea of TSOs seen as complementary to the public sector.

#### 4.1.5 Investigating the business-like evolution of Italian TSOs

This section deals with the issue of the business-like evolution of the Italian TS. According to the literature briefly recalled in the introductory section of this chapter, starting from the '90s the TS has experienced a notable transformation which is mainly characterized by the adoption of private businesses' behaviours and organizational forms (Zimmer & Pahl, 2016).

An important feature of the TS business-like evolution is professionalization, i.e. the increase of paid workers employed. More in detail, in order to deal with highly competitive environments, TSOs rely on professional employees and often replace their volunteers with such paid workers. The aim behind such a choice is to engage more performing people to cope with the increased demand for accountability (Salamon, 2003). As a consequence, an increasing presence of specialized expertise is observed in TS organizations that tend to shift from volunteers to paid staff (Abbott, 1988; Brint, 1994).

With the aim of checking whether such a professionalization phenomenon we provide an empirical analysis of data that allow to investigate the evolution over time (1999-2011) of the relative weight of paid workers employed in TSOs.

Professionalization of TS is an internationally well-recognised phenomenon, explored by a massive literature that investigate it from various perspectives. The existing studies mainly focus on Anglo-Saxon countries (McKay, Moro, Teasdale, & Clifford, 2011), on US (Salamon, 2014) and on France (Audebrand & Michaud, 2015). Instead, the literature specifically focused on the Italian case is definitely underdeveloped; although there is some evidence that in Italy volunteering is increasing or that it still remains at high levels in a number of sectors, some contributions observe a trend towards professionalization also in this country (Busso, 2018) (Battilani & Zamagni, 2012).

A number of factors stimulate and/or limit the presence of paid workers or volunteers in TSOs such as the legal framework (Battilani & Zamagni, 2012) and more specifically the nature of TS funding sources (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Also the establishment of sector-specific training schools, (Wilensky, 1964) has been suggested to play a role.

Looking at the Italian case, the existence of a link between TS professionalization, TSOs' field of intervention and TSOs' legal forms seems evident.

For example, a number of Italian national laws - in particular the Law 4/1993 (Ronchey Law) and the article 112 of the 2004 *Codice dei Beni culturali e del paesaggio* (Code of Cultural Heritage and Landscape) - encourage the presence of volunteers in TSOs working in Culture. Current legislation enables museums, archives and public libraries to integrate their employees with volunteers by stipulating agreements with TS associations. As a matter of fact, associations are organisations aimed at bounding people together voluntarily in order to reach common purposes, which are different from profit. As a consequence of such legal provisions, in Italy voluntary associations are the main interlocutors of public bodies

working in the field of cultural heritage<sup>17</sup>. According to this, over recent years TS working in the field of culture should have retained a significant number of volunteers.

In other fields of TS intervention, different trends are observed. For example, the education and health sectors, have recently undergone a process of specialization and professionalization. Looking at the health sector, it is worth noting that in Italy the process of nursing specialization is relatively recent and has undergone relevant changes since the end of the '90s. Starting from that moment, nursing moved from being a simple health occupation lacking a well-defined and homogeneous qualification or specificity, to being a real profession with specific and technical knowledge, a university training path, specific roles and competences, a formal code of ethics and a set of legal and institutional acknowledgements (Rocco & Stievano, 2011). Beyond nursing also other non-medical health occupations have undergone a process of specialization, due to some health system reforms, to consumerism, to educational reforms, and due to the hyper-specialization and division of the medical profession into different roles (Sena, 2017). As a consequence of these transformations, TS working in the health field should have experienced a significant professionalization over recent years.


Concerning the social services sector, it includes a large range of activities such as emergency and relief, income support and maintenance, refugees and asylum seekers support, and other social services. Support to people has changed over time and the idea of reactivation and reintegration of disadvantaged people has gained ground (Lewis 2004). For this reason, specific educational profiles for social workers have been created, defining highly specialised figures. Such a strong emphasis on formal educational credentials alongside the other phenomena briefly recalled, should have translated into a professionalization trend in the field (Stevenson & Lundström, 2001).

Beyond sectorial peculiarities, another reason that could be behind TS professionalization, is the size of available public funds (Hwang & Powell, 2009; Salamon, 2003). As a matter of fact, scholars suggest that where public funds are more easily available, a professionalization's trend is more likely to be observed (Suarez, 2011). The reason is that when TSOs have to secure public grants, they need to show a certain degree of accountability and professionals increase TSOs' accountability, not only thanks to their skills, but also thanks to their contracts which demonstrate stability and full-time engagement in the TSO's project (Suarez, 2011). Another reason can be tracked in the high competition among TSOs to obtain public grants. Actually, as shown by ISTAT data, nowadays the majority of public funds in Italy designed to TSOs, are allocated through competitive tenders (Figure 4.6). This encourages TSOs to engage employees who have an adequate background even before obtaining grants, in order to show their ability to carry out activities. Furthermore, very often tendering imposes a certain number of professionals in the TSOs team as compulsory requirement to get the grant.

---

<sup>17</sup> An open debate exists about the impact of this legislation. Actually, some argue that it enhances complementarity between paid workers and volunteers, which is positive since it increases quality of the final product/service; others, instead, are more critical, because highlight that such a legislation simply promotes substitution of paid workers through volunteers.

Figure 4.6. Sources of TSOs funds in Italy 2011.



Source: Istat, 2011



#### 4.1.5.1 TSOs' Professionalization in Italy: an Analysis of Provincial Data

In order to examine professionalization among Italian TSOs, we rely on the data presented in section 4.2. More specifically, we use province-level data concerning the number of paid workers and volunteers employed in TSOs and calculated one variable (*Professionalization*) that is the ratio of paid workers on the total number of people working in the TS (see section 4.2 for details). As already highlighted, this variable allows to observe the relative weight of paid workers in TSOs.

The analysis takes two years into account, 1999 and 2011, with the aim of investigating the evolution of TSOs' *Professionalization* over time. The analysis is based on descriptive investigation of the data and aims to observe differences in Professionalization among TS fields of intervention and among the Italian Macro-regions.

Table 4.18 shows the average values of the *Professionalization* variable calculated by using province-level data. The average value is calculated by looking at TS as a whole and by restricting the analysis to the 12 fields of intervention considered so far.

A quick look at this table clearly reveals that *Professionalization* is highly heterogeneous across fields of intervention.

Looking at the 2011 data, the *Professionalization* variable show high average values for the TS major sectors of activity (excluded Culture), namely Education (0.49), Health (0.28) and Social Services (0.31). The highest value is reported by the Economic Development field of intervention (0.56). Instead, Professionalization is not remarkable in field of Culture and Sport and Recreation. In this field, the high number of volunteers involved compared to paid workers, generates final average *Professionalization* values definitely low.

Comparing the 2011 data with those registered in 1999, it seems evident that TSOs operating in the major sector in terms of number of institutions - namely Culture and Research, Health and Social services - observed a remarkable increase of *Professionalization* average values. Education is an exception since it observes a decrease. More specifically, a tremendous increase of volunteers employed in this sector totally overcome the more moderate increase of paid workers. This resulted in the observed low average Professionalization values. The sector Economic Social and Community Development registers particularly high values which seems to increase over time. It is worth noting that this field of intervention shares one feature in common with the Social Services sector: it is dominated by the social cooperative legal form (ISTAT, 2016). As already mentioned, this kind of organisations particularly promotes employability, compared to others.

The *Professionalization* average values only decrease in the following sectors: Education, Law, Advocacy and Politics, Business and Professional Associations, and Unions. Actually, these decreasing trends are differently justified. In the sector of Law, advocacy and politics and the sector of Business and professional associations, Unions, the reason behind the decrease of *Professionalization* is the drop of paid workers. Instead, in the case of TSOs dealing with Education and Research - which

includes activities such as teaching classes, working in after-school programs for children, but also research, and tutoring for adults - an increase in both paid workers and volunteers is registered, but the predominance of the volunteers' increase maintains the value of the *Professionalization* average values quite low compared to what is observed in other sectors. The sector of Education and Research has been subject to very severe cutbacks in public funds during 90s, and then beginning of 2000s, which could explain the observed reduction of average *Professionalization*.

Table 4.18: *Professionalization* average values by year and TS field of intervention (all the fields of intervention are included).

	1999		2011	
	mean	sd	mean	sd
Professionalization_Tot	0.14	0.08	0.14	0.04
Professionalization_Csr	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.02
Professionalization_Edu	0.55	0.2	0.49	0.14
Professionalization_Health	0.19	0.18	0.28	0.16
Professionalization_Socserv	0.25	0.14	0.31	0.1
Professionalization_Envi	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.06
Professionalization_Ecodev	0.44	0.23	0.56	0.14
Professionalization_Pol	0.09	0.12	0.05	0.05
Professionalization_Phil	0.05	0.12	0.04	0.04
Professionalization_Intcoop	0.04	0.1	0.03	0.05
Professionalization_Rel	0.06	0.09	0.02	0.02
Professionalization_Unions	0.43	0.16	0.33	0.13
Professionalization_Other	0.56	0.3	0.36	0.3

*Note: the analysis is based on province-level data.*

*Source: own elaboration on ISTAT data 1999 and 2011.*

Once analysed the phenomenon at national level, we focus on heterogeneity among the Italian NUTS 1 Macro-regions.

The Northwest is the area which registers the highest average *Professionalization* values, after the Islands. As shown by Table 18, the number of paid workers out of the total people employee in TS has grown up from 1999, all the sectors aggregated. Regarding the sectors Culture, Health, Social Assistance, Economic Development, and Philanthropy, they all actually registered an increase. The value of the *Professionalization* variable grew up in 2011 for the Health sector, registering the highest value, compared to the other areas. At the opposite, In line with the national value of the variable, Education and Research decreases, together with Environment and Advocacy and Politic and International Solidarity. Concerning Education, even if the value remains relatively high and although totally in line with the national trend of decrease, we observe that a more sever drop (passing from 63% to 53%) is registered, compared to other areas.

Table 4.19 *Professionalization* average values by year and TS field of intervention (North West data).

	1999		2011	
	mean	Sd	mean	sd
Professionalization_Tot	0.15	0.07	0.15	0.04
Professionalization_Csr	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02
Professionalization_Edu	0.64	0.17	0.53	0.12
Professionalization_Health	0.17	0.18	0.36	0.19
Professionalization_Socserv	0.24	0.13	0.29	0.09
Professionalization_Envi	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.02
Professionalization_Ecodev	0.4	0.19	0.57	0.11
Professionalization_Pol	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.02
Professionalization_Phil	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
Professionalization_Intcoop	0.05	0.1	0.03	0.02
Professionalization_Rel	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.03
Professionalization_Unions	0.48	0.17	0.34	0.11
Professionalization_Other	0.59	0.25	0.21	0.19

Table 4.20: *Professionalization* average values by year and TS field of intervention (North East data).

	1999		2011	
	mean	Sd	mean	sd
Professionalization_Tot	0.11	0.04	0.15	0.04
Professionalization_Csr	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.02
Professionalization_Edu	0.54	0.16	0.5	0.11
Professionalization_Health	0.16	0.11	0.25	0.13
Professionalization_Socserv	0.22	0.1	0.31	0.12
Professionalization_Envi	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.1
Professionalization_Ecodev	0.45	0.19	0.56	0.12
Professionalization_Pol	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
Professionalization_Phil	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05
Professionalization_Intcoop	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.03
Professionalization_Rel	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.02
Professionalization_Unions	0.47	0.18	0.43	0.16
Professionalization_Other	0.57	0.28	0.3	0.25

Table 4.21: *Professionalization* average values by year and TS field of intervention (Centre data).

	1999		2011	
	mean	Sd	mean	sd
Professionalization_Tot	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.04
Professionalization_Csr	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03
Professionalization_Edu	0.39	0.18	0.34	0.1
Professionalization_Health	0.12	0.17	0.18	0.16
Professionalization_Socserv	0.3	0.16	0.32	0.08
Professionalization_Envi	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03
Professionalization_Ecodev	0.45	0.22	0.61	0.13
Professionalization_Pol	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.04
Professionalization_Phil	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.04
Professionalization_Intcoop	0.06	0.17	0.04	0.08
Professionalization_Rel	0.05	0.11	0.02	0.02
Professionalization_Unions	0.4	0.14	0.3	0.1
Professionalization_Other	0.49	0.32	0.42	0.3

Table 4.22: *Professionalization* average values by year and TS field of intervention (South data).

	1999		2011	
	mean	Sd	mean	sd
Professionalization_Tot	0.12	0.06	0.14	0.03
Professionalization_Csr	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.03
Professionalization_Edu	0.51	0.16	0.51	0.1
Professionalization_Health	0.21	0.17	0.29	0.17
Professionalization_Socserv	0.19	0.1	0.28	0.09
Professionalization_Envi	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.06
Professionalization_Ecodev	0.34	0.25	0.51	0.13
Professionalization_Pol	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.05
Professionalization_Phil	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05
Professionalization_Intcoop	0	0.01	0.01	0.02
Professionalization_Rel	0.07	0.11	0.01	0.01
Professionalization_Unions	0.39	0.11	0.27	0.08
Professionalization_Other	0.59	0.32	0.56	0.36

Table 4.23: *Professionalization* average values by year and TS field of intervention (Islands data).

	1999		2011	
	mean	Sd	mean	sd
Professionalization_Tot	0.25	0.09	0.17	0.06
Professionalization_Csr	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.03
Professionalization_Edu	0.74	0.16	0.66	0.12
Professionalization_Health	0.34	0.25	0.32	0.07
Professionalization_Socserv	0.41	0.14	0.36	0.1
Professionalization_Envi	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.06
Professionalization_Ecodev	0.66	0.25	0.52	0.21
Professionalization_Pol	0.27	0.22	0.11	0.1
Professionalization_Phil	0.15	0.33	0.03	0.05
Professionalization_Intcoop	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.06
Professionalization_Rel	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.03
Professionalization_Unions	0.39	0.14	0.22	0.07
Professionalization_Other	0.58	0.42	0.35	0.28

The North- East (see Table 4.20) registers in total, all the sectors aggregated, the most relevant increase in terms of *Professionalization*. Such a growth is driven by the sector of Economic Development, Social Assistant and Health. Excluded the four sectors of Education, Law, advocacy and politics, and Business, Professional associations, and Unions, and Religion, all the sectors registered an increase.

In the Centre (see Table 4.21) the *Professionalization* average values are slightly lower than those reported in other macroareas, both in 1999 and in 2011, even if an increase between these two years is observed. Compared to 1999 in 2011 the value for Social Assistance sectors are more homogenous, and the regional differences are narrowed. Quite impressive the growth registered in the sector Economic Development, where the value observed in 1999 is very similar to the national level and to other regions, but then increased faster than elsewhere, which means that the number of paid workers employees on the sector in the Centre area are increasing more than on the other part of Italy. The values registered for Education lower than the national level and than the other areas are. As already shown, the value is decreasing across all the national territory, but in the centre area register the smallest value for 2011 (although the same was for the 1999 also). Finally, a significant change has been registered for the sector Economic Development, which drastically increases.

The Southern area (Table 4.22) registers, all the sector aggregated, a net increase in the value of *Professionalization*. Actually, except for the sector Business and Professional associations and Unions, Religion and the sector Law, Advocacy and Politics, all the sectors registers an increase, while Education remains stable. Particularly important the rise into the sector Economic Development, which compared to the other regions in 1999 registered a very low level, in 2011 reaches the other regions value. The decrease of Law, advocacy and politics, even if in line with the trend characterising the other regions, however it is very impressive.

The Islands macro-region (Table 4.23) is the only one registering a significant decline of the *Professionalization* variable (moving from 0.24 to 0.17). Basically, all the TS sectors, excluded Environment, registered a decrease. Despite such a decrease, the most professionalized sectors - such as Health, Education and Social Services – show average values that remain comparable with those reported by other areas of the country. This is partly explained by a particular high level of *Professionalization* registered during the 90s. In particular, at the time of the first census, 1999, the score registered all sectors aggregated (0.24) as well as for specific sector such as Education (0.72), Health (0.34), social assistant (0.38) and Economic Development (0.64) are impressively higher than the same, at the national level. One of the reasons behind the decrease is the total stagnation of the number of paid workers in the TS, which remained basically the same from 1999 to 2011 in face of a mild increase of volunteers.

Overall, the descriptive investigation of our data suggests that the Italian TS is only partially characterised by a professionalization trend. As a matter of fact, the incidence of the professionalization process is highly heterogeneous across sectors, and across geographical areas.

Some sectors clearly show an increase in the level of professionalization between the 1999-2011 period. This is the case of Health, Education, Social Assistant and Economic Development. Other fields of TS intervention, such as Education, show an opposite trend, particularly characterised by an increase of volunteers, which totally overcome the very modest increment of paid workers.

Differences also emerge among different parts of the country. The “duality” of the TS (Costa & Carini, 2016) i.e. differences between North and South and Islands, is confirmed by our data with professionalization being definitely more evident in sortnern part of the country. In particular we noticed that in the Islands the process of professionalization has even reversed over time with the *Professionalization* variable reporting higher values in 1999 compared with 2011.

## PART 2 FRENCH THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN NUMBER

### 4.2.1 Introduction

This second part of the chapter 4 is dedicated to the analysis of the data describing the evolution of the TSOs in France. We consider as TSOs all the organizations included in the *Economie sociale et solidaire* (ESS), as explained below. The analysis and comments developed in this part are based on the data collected by the Observatoire National de l'ESS – CNCRESS and published in the “*Atlas de l'économie sociale et solidaire*” for the edition 2014 and 2017, and on the data Tchernonog and Prouteau have collected for the third edition of the “*Paysage associatif français, 2018*”. Once shown the main features describing the extension of the phenomenon at national level, we will focus on the heterogeneity of the phenomenon. The different legal forms, the human resources engaged, the different sector of activities, and the territorial distribution. Finally, in tune with the rest of this work, we will describe the business-like evolution of the sector. In particular, in order to analyse the trend of the marketization – the penetration of market type relationship into the social welfare arena (L. M. Salamon, 1993), we will focus on a specific legal form, the association, which represents more than the three-quarters of the entire TS.

In 2014, the year of the last survey the TSOs represented the 8.8% of the total number of the enterprises in France, and 10,5% of the paid workers. The number of TSOs registered in 2014 is actually 164,077 and the number of the paid workers is around 2,3 millions. Although the highly constrained environment, and a slight decline in number of employees during 2011 and 2012, the French TS shows a high resilience after crisis. The continuously increasing number of employees and organizations witnesses the growing relevance of the sector.

The TS in France is characterised by a number of different legal forms, namely associations, cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations. In 2014 the new law on social and solidarity economy “*Loi ESS*” has been approved. The law applies an inclusive definition for the sector and regroups different kinds of organizations, which adopt certain practices and principles. In these terms the social and solidarity economy is defined as a way of pursuing the economic development in line with principles, such as: a democratic governance, a different purpose than the redistribution of economic benefits, and a management in accordance with the principles of reinvesting the most part of the economic benefits, the institution's minimum reserves could not be distributed. With this new law, in addition to the above-mentioned organizations, are also included commercial companies, which show a social utility and fulfil the principle of the social and solidarity economy. The law particularly highlights the spirit of co-operation and collective identity of this kind of enterprises, consistent with the French tradition of the social and solidarity economy. For this reason, the Observatoire National de l'ESS includes all the

cooperatives among the TSOs: agricultural cooperatives, artisan cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, production cooperatives (scop), cooperatives of collective interest (Scic), cooperative of activity and work (CAE).

Concerning the sectors of activities they are organised following the definition of the NAF rev.2 – *Nomenclature d'activités française*, French economic general classification, which has been reformed in 2008.

The sectors are categorized as follows: social action; sport and recreation; financial activities, banking, and insurance; art and spectacles; education; health; information and communications; food industry; accommodation and catering; business support; construction and others.

Concerning the human resources involved in the sector, they include both volunteers and paid workers. The paid workers represent the 10.5% of the total employees in France, and the 13.9% of the private sector, for a total number of 3,372,812 paid worker. Between 2008 and 2014 while the number of the paid workers in the TS has increased, the number of public sector workers decreased, which could support what sustained by some authors, such as Hély, that the TS basically takes the place of the withdrawn public sector (Hély, 2017). Unfortunately, the Observatoire National de l'ESS does not provide for data concerning the number of volunteers. Actually, a work of collection of this data would be very important in order to understand the level of participation, during the general assembly, or on the daily activities of the TSOs. However some figures are provided by the last report “la France Bénévole” (Bazin & Malet 2019), and we will show them.

The regional distribution of TSOs is quite heterogeneous. The French republic is divided into 18 regions: 13 located in metropolitan France (the European continent): Hauts-de-France, Normandy, ile-de-France, Grand Est, Brittany, Pays de la Loire, Centre – Val de Loire, Bourgogne- Franche-Comté, Nouvelle –Aquitaine, Auvergne – Rhone –Alpes, Occitanie, Provence Alpes-Cote d'Azur; the other 5 are overseas regions: Mayotte, Réunion, French Guiana, Martinique, Guadelupe. The Region Brittany and Pays de la Loire are the Regions where it is registered the highest presence of the TSOs, both in terms of number of institutions and employees.

Finally, in order to describe the phenomenon of the business like evolution of the organizations, we will focus on one specific legal form, the associations. On the one hand we will describe the transformation of the public funds. In 2012, the difference between private and public sources is quite modest, registering 49% of the budget for the public and 51% for the private sources. In 2017 the percentage of public funds is around 45%, while the private is 55%. The data shows an evident privatization of the TS source during the last decade, in particular due to the sales of services. On the other hand the way to distribute the public funds as well, underwent to a radical transformation. While the direct grants and subventions constantly decreased, the contracts with national and international public bodies increased. Very often these contracts are the result of open tenders, which force the organizations to enter in competition each other and with other kinds of private organizations. This in turn has several consequences, in terms of size, and internal strategies, such as for example the decision to merge. The TS is confronted to challenges such as the stagnation of public funds, the increased competition due to the new instruments of redistribution, and an



increase in private resources, which are transforming the structure of the sector. A clear trend of marketization has been observed in the TS in the last years.

The chapter is organised as follows. After having briefly described the data used in the chapter, we will show the most recent statistics concerning the number of organisations, the human resources involved, the sector of activity and the territorial redistribution. Finally data showing the business-like evolution of associations, particularly concerning the marketization will be described and commented.

## 4.2.2 The Data

Since the 2008 the *Observatoire national de l'ESS – CNCRESS* collects the data on the TSOs in France. The data used in this chapter refers to the data appeared in the “*Atlas de l'économie sociale et solidaire*” for the edition 2014 and 2017. The publication results from the collaboration of different institutes: the INSEE – *Institute Nationale de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques*, National institute of statistic and economic studies; the *CNCRESS*; and the *DIESS – Délégation interministérielle à l'économie sociale et solidaire* the social and solidarity economy inter-ministerial delegation. Although the “*Loi ESS*” in 2014, proposed an inclusive definition opening to new legal forms, these new members of the sector are still not observable. For this reason, data concerns 4 legal forms, associations, foundations, mutual companies and foundations.

With regards to the data exposed in the publication “*le paysage associative français*” on associations, they are the combination of data-set collected by *RNA repertoire national des associations* - National Directory of Associations; *repertoire SIRENE système informatique pour le répertoire d'entreprises et des établissements* – informatics system for the Directory of enterprises and facilities. The latest survey has been realised in 2017 and follows the collection of data 2011 and 2005.

## 4.2.3 The Incidence of the TSOs

### 4.2.3.1 Organizations

Representing the 8.8% of the total French enterprises and employing the 10.5% of the paid workers in the country, the French TS confirms being a solid and growing sector. Over the period 2008-2014 both the total number of TSOs, and the number of employees increased, although a slowdown observed in 2013, particularly due to the number of associations, which sensible decreased (see table 4.24). The associations are an important slice of the French TS, representing a percentage of 93.9% of the organizations in 2014, which corresponds to a large share of the workers employed in the sector (83.5%).

The growth of the sector during the period 2008 and 2014 corresponds to an increase on organizational heterogeneity. Although the associations confirm being the most numerous organizations, we can observe an increase in the number of other legal forms. For instance, the foundations, although considerably less copious, experienced a continue growth, even during the period 2011-2014, when all the other TSOs registered an evolution in the opposite side (See table 4.24).

Despite a steady decline of the two sectors - the public and private for-profit ones - in the period 2008 – 2014, the TS represents an exception, registering a positive average growth rate, both in number of facilities and in number of workers. Concerning the number of buildings while private and particularly public sector show negative values respectively – 0.2% and – 1.5%, the TS confirms being particular resilient after crisis, registering a positive value of + 0.4% (see figure 4.27).

Table 4.24 Number of TSOs. Absolute Values, Percentage Values, Percentage of Change

Legal form	2008	% 2008	2011	% 2011	2014	% 2014
<b>Association</b>	156,926	95%	157,077	94.3%	154,095	93.9%
<b>Cooperative</b>	n.d.	n.d.	8,016	4.8%	8,714	5.3%
<b>Mutual Society</b>	n.d.	n.d.	913	0.5%	792	0.5%
<b>Foundation</b>	169	0.1%	436	0.2%	476	0.3%
<b>TSO</b>	165,113	100,0	166,442	100,0	164,077	100,0

Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

\*Average annual rate of change from 2008 to 2014


Table 4.25 Distribution of organizations among TS, private and public sector

Legal form	2008	2011	% of change* 2008- 2011	2014	% of change* 2008-2014
<b>TSOs</b>					
Organizations	163,421	166,442	+0.8%	164,077	+1%
Facilities	203,370	222,869	+1.2%	221,136	+3%
Workers	2,259,656	2,327,175	+1%	2,372,812	+5.0%
<b>Private Sector</b>					
Organizations	n.a.	1,642,464	-0.2%	635,023	- 1.1%
Facilities	n.a.	1,947,129	-0.1%	1,931,436	-1.1%
Workers	14,723,663	14,505,299	-0.5%	14,622,540	-0.7%
<b>Public Sector</b>					
Organizations	n.a.	75,237	-0.6%	72,137	-5.9%
Facilities	n.a.	175,289	-1.0%	162,390	-10.0%
Workers	5,815,777	5,789,619	-0.1%	5,672,041	-2.5%

Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

\* average rate for the period.

Figure 4.7 Average Growth Rate 2008-2014 Facilities and Workers TS, Private, Public Sector




Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

#### 4.2.3.2 HR

As already mentioned, the *Observatoire National de l'ESS – CNCRESS* collects data concerning only paid workers. In 2014 the TS represents the 10.5% of the employees in France, corresponding to of 3,372,812 of workers. In the period 2008 – 2014, although the private sector remained the prevalent sector of employment, accounting for the 64.5% of all the employees, the number of workers employed in the TS increased, while the percentage of workers employed in the public sector decreased, passing from 25.5% to 25% (see figure 4.8).

**Figure 4.8 Distribution of labour force within TS, public and private sector**




Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

Despite a slight decrease in 2011 and 2012, TS continues to grow in terms of workers employed (See figure 4.9). In contrast with the number registered for public and private sectors however, the average rate of growth for the period 2008-2014, remains positive, registering a score of +5.0% (See table 4.25). As shown on the top of the figure 3 - purple line - the number of workers in the private sector was 14.7 million in 2008. The number of private sector employees has been fluctuating, after a dramatic decrease registered in 2009. With regard to the public sector – blue line – it registered positive values of growth rate only for the year 2013 and 2014. The TS at the opposite - green line - maintained a positive growth rate for almost all the period.

Cottin-Marx, Hély, Jeannot and Simonet sustain that this trend could be interpreted as a process of “replacement” due to a progressive disinvestment of the State in social action (Cottin-Marx, Hély, Jeannot, & Simonet, 2017). Actually the reforms during the 2000s, dramatically transformed the public interventions. Cottin – Marx and colleagues assert that two are the main drivers of this transformation. On the one hand, the process of decentralization and agencification of the public authorities. Public action has been delegated to the TS particularly at the local level. As a matter of fact, the municipalities delegate more and more frequently the management of certain services to the population to quasi-public entities (Petrella & Richez-Battesti, 2012). On the other hand the transformation of the public funding system strongly impacted the relationship between public authorities and TSOs. As Tchernogog and Prouteau repeatedly showed (Tchernogog, 2013; Tchernogog & Prouteau, 2019) public authorities’ economic commitments vis-à-vis the associations strongly changed, though not necessarily in quantity, but definitely in the way to allocate public money.

The most remarkable transformation is the gradual shift from the direct subsidy to the public market, competitive tenders and users fees. We will show more in details this aspect in the dedicated section.


**Figure 4.9 Evolution of the Labour Force in the TS, Public and Private Sector**



Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

Considering the legal forms the associations remain the first employer of the French TS in 2014, registering a percentage of 78%, followed by cooperatives 13%. Although still relative modest, the percentage of workers employed in mutual societies and foundations are growing, counting respectively 5.8% and 3.5% of the total TS' employees (figure 4.10).

**Figure 4.10 Distribution of Labour Force par Legal Form**



Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

The table 4.26 shows that cooperatives experienced a contraction on number of resources between 2008 and 2010, while it remained stable in 2011, to finally increase again in 2014. Since the employees of the other legal forms continued to increase, at the aggregated level this inflection is not perceptible. Instead, the contraction experienced by the TS in 2011 is due to the decrease of employees in associations. While in 2010 1,840,864 associations' employees have been registered, in 2011 the number of resources sensibly decreased to 1,818,728. In 2014 the value increased until overcoming the values registered for 2008 and even 2010.

**Table 4.26 TS Labour Force distributed for legal forms**


Legal form	2008	2010	2011	2014
Association				
Workers	1,768,168	1,840,864	1,818,728	1,844,547

Facilities	181,732	183,660	187,939	184,560
<b>Cooperative</b>				
Workers	308,493	306,424	306,040	308,532
Facilities	25,413	25,871	26,111	26,760
<b>Mutual Society</b>				
Workers	119,816	126,125	131,107	136,723
Facilities	6,672	6,964	7,442	8,298
<b>Foundation</b>				
Workers	63,179	67,933	71,300	83,010
Facilities	1,177	1,267	1,376	1,518
<b>TSOs</b>				
Workers	2,259,656	2,341,346	2,327,175	2,372,812
Facilities	203,370	217,762	222,869	221,136

Source: (Observatoire National de l'ESS – CNCRESS, 2014, 2017)

As already mentioned the *Observatoire National de l'ESS* does not provide for data concerning the presence of the volunteers. However, the publication *France Bénévole 2019* (Bazin & Malet, 2019) reports some of them. The total number of volunteers in France is around 19million people. The Figure 4.11 shows that In three years (2016-2019), the proportion of French people volunteering during their free time has generally declined slightly (25% to 24%). The group of volunteers has feminised, due to the increase of number of women volunteering and decrease of men until reach a strict parity in 2019.

**Figure 4.11 The increase rate of volunteers in France**




Source: France Bénévole, 2019

### 4.2.3.3 Territorial Distribution


The TS are not homogeneously distributed at national level as shown in figure 4.12 concerning the employees. The percentage of workers engaged in the TS out of the total employees registered is attested between the 7% and the 14%. Brittany and Pays de la Loire register the highest rate respectively 12.6% and 14.3%, while the particularly low percentage in Ile de France (9%) is due to the high number of institutional representation based on the region, where, as consequence, the number of employees is modest.

**Figure 4.12 Regional Distribution of the HR implicate in the TS 2014**



Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS- CNCRESS, 2017

**Figure 4.13 Regional distribution of the TS facilities 2014**



Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

#### 4.2.3.4 Sectors of Activity

The labour force is heterogeneously distributed in the different sectors of activities (table 4.28). The TS is particularly relevant in 4 sectors, social action (60.9%), sport and recreation (56.9%), financial activities (30%) and arts and entertainment (26.3%). The social action includes services, such as the support and home help for children, elderly and disable people. The relevance of the TS and the public sector decreased on the sector between the two last measurements (2011-2014), while augmented for the private sector. Actually, this could be due to the fact that, the “purchase of service contracts” opens the competition to different kinds of actors. So, while the retrenchment of the public sector in the active intervention is a full-blown, however this does not automatically mean a resuming of the service by the TS. As sustained by Salamon, the availability of public funding, which are nowadays assigned by tenders, and dispensed by contracts, could result on attracting for profit private providers into the field (L. M. Salamon, 1993). Concerning sport and recreation, both in the private and the public sector the number of employees decreased, while in the TS increased. The private sector is particular relevant in the sector of trade, accommodation and catering and the industries. The public sector registers a general decrease in almost all the sectors, but art and entertainment, construction, and education.

**Table 4.27 Distribution of labour force par sector. TS, private and public sector**

	Relevance of the TSOs 2011	Relevance of the TSOs 2014	Relevance of the Private 2011	Relevance of the Private 2014	Relevance of the Public 2011	Relevance of the Public 2014
Social action	61.9%	60.8%	9.8%	11.6%	28.2%	27.5%




Financial activities banking, and insurance	30.1%	30.1%	67.3%	67.4%	2.6%	2.5%
Agriculture	4.5%	4.4%	91.0%	91.7%	4.4%	4.0%
Art and entertainment	27.2%	26.3%	37.0%	36.0%	35.8	37.7%
Trade	1.9%	1.9%	98.0%	98.0%	0.1%	0.1%
Construction	0.8%	0.7%	98.9%	98.0%	0.3%	1.4%
Education	19.0%	18.6%	5.4%	5.2%	75.6%	76.2%
Accommodation and catering	2.9%	2.9%	95.3%	95.3%	1.8%	1.9%
Food Industry	4.5%	4.4%	95.3%	95.4%	0.2%	0.2%
Information and communications	1.2%	1.3%	98.2%	98.2%	0.6%	0.1%
Health	11.5%	11.6%	23.2%	23.4%	65.3%	65%
Business support	5.2%	5.6%	90.1%	89.8%	4.7%	4.1%
Sport and recreation	54.6%	56.9%	38.8%	37.5%	6.7%	5.6%
Other Services	0.4%	0.6%	17.6%	40.8%	81.9%	58.6%
Not Classified	99.7%	94.3%	0.2%	5.6%	0.1%	0.1%

Source: (Observatoire National de l'ESS – CNCRESS, 2014, 2017)

In 2014, the most part of the workers of the TS have been engaged on the social action (41%), education (15%), financial activities, and health (7.6%), which together account for the 80% of the total employees in the TS.

**Figure 4.14 Relevance of the TS on the sectors 2011,2014**



Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

#### 4.2.3.5 Legal Forms

As already shown in the figure 4.10, the most part of the employment is occupied in the associations. As shown in table 4.29, the percentage of employees in associations compared to the other TS legal forms, is quite high for all the sectors of activities. The few exceptions are represented by the two sectors of Trade and Construction and other sectors of production. By contrast in the others, the percentage are elevated such as for the sector of sport and recreation (99%), Education (97%), social action (93.7%), art and entrainment. Cooperatives are particularly relevant in the sector of trade (90.4%) and construction and other sectors of production (81.2%).

In table 4.15 we can observe the size of the organizations, categorised in four groups: the small organizations with less than 10 employees, the medium 10-59 employees, the medium large, a vast category including the organizations which have from 60 to 249, and the biggest ones which overcomes the 250 employees. The TS at a whole is basically divided in two kinds of organizations the medium and small, which together register 50.5% and the big ones, which represent the other half of the total. Although the common thinking, the associations show heterogeneity in terms of size, and more than half of the population is composed by small or medium size organizations. As we will show later, the idea that associations are mainly big organizations is based on the redistribution of the budget, which is quite concentrated and mostly detained by big associations (see paragraph 3). Cooperatives show the most important portion of small organizations, 24.5%, but to the detriment of the medium ones, so at the end they show the same proportion than the associations between the large 46.5% and the medium and small organizations. Regarding the foundations, 40% of the population shows a size between 50 and 249 employees, while the percentage of organizations registering more than 250 employees is the most extensive, among the TSOs, registering 36.4%.


**Table 4.28 TS Legal Forms' distribution 2014**

	Cooperatives	Mutual Societies	Associations	Foundations	Total
Social action	0.2%	2.2%	93.7%	3.9%	100.0
Financial activities banking, and insurance	65.5%	33.9%	SS	SS	100.0
Agriculture	58.7%	SS	SS	SS	100.0
Art and entertainment	2.4%	SS	95.6%	2%	100.0
Trade	90.4%	7.7%	1.9%	1.9%	100.0
Construction & other sectors of production	81.2%	SS	17.7%	17.7%	100.0
Education	SS	SS	97.0%	2.4%	100.0
Accommodation and catering	3.8%	0.4%	93.3%	2.5%	100.0
Food Industry	SS	SS	SS	SS	100.0
Information and communications	23.3%	SS	76.7%	0.3%	100.0

Health	0.2%	12.2%	72.6%	15%	100.0
Business support	12.5%	1.0%	81%	4.6%	100.0
Sport and recreation	SS	SS	99.7%	SS	100.0
Other Activities	35.2%	0.9%	63.6%	0.2%	100.0

Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017


Figure 4.15 Size of the TSOs' distribution



Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

Although the association remains by far the employer the most important on the TS, however, compared to the other organizations, it is not growing and in the last year excepted for the 2013, registered negative growth rate particularly in 2011 (-1.2%) and in 2014 (-0.3%). The cooperatives after an increased of the growth rate in 2012 (+0.2%) and 2013 (+0.7%) in 2014 again registered negative values (-0,3%). Mutual societies experienced an important growth in 2011, followed by a drastic decreased the following year (-0.3%). It represents the worst score since 2009. The growth rate of foundations after a fluctuating period has steadily increased since 2012.

**Figure 4.16 Evolution of the labour force's growth rate 2008-2014**



Source: Observatoire National de l'ESS-CNCRESS, 2017

#### 4.2.4 Business Like Evolution: Focus on Associations

Once described the main characteristics of the TS in France, we will focus on one specific legal form, the associations, which, as already mentioned, represents more than the 78% of the TSOs. As well as the rest of the TSOs, in the last decades this form of organization underwent through main transformations in response to challenging contextual pressures. In particular the public expenditure dedicated to TS' activities has decreased since 2011, with a consequential increased of competition in order to obtain the necessary funds to survive and continue to carry out activities. We can then observe a privatization of resources, and a concentration of public budget in the hands of few large associations, which cope more easily with stringent public requirements to obtain the funds.

##### 4.2.4.1 Concentration of the Budget

The associations are among the legal forms, the most characterised by the presence of volunteers, and the associations could be categorised for the presence of the absence of the paid workers. As shown in the table 8, it clearly appears a numerically predominance of the former out of the second latter. Actually the organizations without paid workers represent the 89.4%, against 10.6% associations with paid workers. However if we now cast a glance at the budget distribution, we could notice that the latter detains the most part of the budget, the 88.2% against the 11.8% of the budget detains by the associations without paid workers. So basically 159,000 associations detained more than the three quarters of the total budget.

**Table 4.29 Budget of the associations with and without paid workers**

Total number of Associations	Budget	Associations without paid workers	Budget	Associations with workers	Budget

2005	1,100,000		928,000		172,000	
2011	1,300,000		1,117,100		162,300	
2017	1,500,000	113,28 Bil.	1,341,000	13,343 Bil. €	159,000	99,94 Bil.
	(100%)	€	(89.4%)	(11.8%)	(10.6%)	€
		(100%)				(88.2%)


Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associative français” 2019

The budget is very concentrated also concerning the sector of activities. The 88.2% of the total budget is realised by the associations with paid workers. The humanitarian, social action and health sector achieves 50.9% of the budget, of which 49.3% by the associations with paid workers. Among the other sector, the education and training and the sport sector are the only two that overcome the 10%. These numbers show a sign of professionalization of associations in social action and health sector.

In the figure 4.16 the two columns show the budget concentration based on sector of activities on the left and on the right the number of organizations par sector of activities. The figure clearly shows that the budget is particularly concentrated in the sector “humanitarian social action and health”, which in terms of number of associations represents the 14%. The second sector in terms of budget, the “education and training” sector represents the 13% of the total budget, corresponds to the 3% of the number of organizations. The sector “sport”, which shows the highest percentage in number of organizations 24%, realizes the 12%.

Finally the budget is highly concentrated also based on the size of the organizations. The biggest organizations, detaining a budget larger than 500 k of euros, although representing only the 1.3% of the total number of organizations, produce the 71.7% of the budget. At the opposite, the largest share, 49%, is represented by the associations with a budget between 1 to 10k euros, produces only the 3.8%. This group together with the associations producing less than 1k of euros represent the 75% of the associations in terms of number, but only the 4% of the total budget.

Figure 4.17 Budget Concentration par Sector




Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

**Table 4.30 Budget of the associations based on sector of activity**

	Associations without paid workers		Associations with paid workers		Total	
	Bil. €	%	Bil. €	%	Bil. €	%
Humanitarian, social, health	1.8	1.6%	55.874	49.3%	57.716	50.9%
Advocacy	0.998	0.9%	5.377	4.7%	6.375	5.6%
Education, Training	0.332	0.3%	14.011	12.4%	14.343	12.7%
Sport	4.621	4.1%	8.486	7.5%	113.106	11.6%
Culture	2.647	2.3%	8.363	7.4%	11.010	9.7%
Recreation	2,550	2.3%	3.954	3.5%	6.505	5.7%
Local development and economic services	0.353	0.3%	3.875	3.4%	4.228	3.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.343</b>	<b>11.8%</b>	<b>99.940</b>	<b>82.3%</b>	<b>113.283</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

**Figure 4.18 Distribution of Organizations par Size**



Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

#### 4.2.4.2 The Associations' Economic Resources


The associations could have different kinds of resources, namely contributions, donation and patronage, revenue from the sale of their activities, grant and public subsidies. While the public subsidies represent the 20.2% out of the total, we can notice that the most consistent source of revenue is represented by the sale of services, which represent the 65.9% of the total resources in 2017 (table 10).

**Table 4.31 Economic Resources of the associations 2017**

Resource	Associations without paid workers	Associations with paid workers	Associations	Budget Mil. Euros
Contributions	25.5%	7.2%	9.3%	10.554 Bil. €
Donation and Patronage	7.2%	4.2%	4.6%	5.195 Bil. €
Revenue from sales of services	52.1%	67.7%	65.9%	75.643 Bil. €
Grant and subsidy	15.2%	20.9%	20.2%	22.891 Bil. €
Total	100%	100%	100%	113.283 Bil. €
Total	13,343	99,940	113,283	

Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

**Figure 4.19 Evolution of the Resources for the Associations 2005-2017**




Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019



The change on government spending, both in quantity and modality of delivery, has produced a significant modification on the funding structure of associations. In the last decade the sales of services both to public authorities and private actors, confirmed being the principle source for the associations (figure 10). The percentage continued increased since 2005, when it represented the 49% of the total sources. It increased then to 61% in 2011, to reach the 66% in 2017, which in euros means € 75.643 billion. On the other hand the percentage represented by grants and public subsidies has continued to decrease. In 2005 it represented the 34%, while in 2017 the 20%. Donation and Patronage remained constantly around 5%, and the contributions slightly decreased.

If we look closer to the number registered in 2017, we can observe on the one hand that the associations with paid workers have recourse more than the associations without paid workers to the sale of services in order to fund the their activities.

**Figure 4.20 Resources Distribution, Associations, with and without Paid Workers**




Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

On the other, if we focus on the specific sectors of activity we can remark that almost in all the sectors the associations’ major sources are the contracts with private or

public authorities to sell services (fig 4.19). The most extensive used is observed in the sector “humanitarian, social and health”, with a percentage of 81%, followed by “education and training” and “recreation”. These are the activities traditionally considered as provided within a “European welfare partnership” (L. M. Salamon, 2003), are nowadays undergoing to a trend of marketization.

Sport, local development and advocacy are the sectors, which more rely on contributions, while culture is the sector the most directly -subsidised by the public authorities, followed by local development and advocacy.

**Figure 4.21 Distribution of resources par sector of activities**



Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

#### 4.2.4.3 The Size

As shown in figure 4.17, in number the organizations with highest budget (more than 500k of Euros) represent only the 1.3% of the total associations. Although they are not very numerous, they gained a large share of the total budget for the associations (table 4.33). In 2017, the budget has been particularly concentrated in this segment, representing the 71.2% of the total budget. The 10% of the biggest organizations, in 2017 produced almost the 90% of the total budget among associations. On the opposite side of the *spectrum*, the associations gaining less than 1k euros per year, the 25.6% in terms of number of the entire organizational population, represent only the 0.2% of the total budget.

Concerning the evolution as shown in table 4.34 and figure 4.22, between the 2011 and 2017 the growth rate of the number of organisations has been positive for almost all the categories in terms of budget size, excluded the medium size budget organizations. Actually, the organizations with a budget of 50 to 200 k euros, and them raising a budget between 200 to 500 k euros experienced a negative growth rate for both the number of organizations and the budget. At the opposite the organizations with less than 1 k euros budget, and the organizations with more than 500 k euros registered the most consistent increased in terms of number of organizations. Their

increased is due to different reasons. Actually, the small budget organizations are the newly created associations, which are still small and base their activities on volunteers and small budget. On the other hand, the increase of the biggest budget associations results by the merge of the medium ones. Actually in order to respond tenders and sell their services to the public authorities, the organizations have to confront to a number of requirements included quantitative performance indicators. The big associations are able to answer more easily thanks to their ability of implement the economies of scale. So concerning this segment, while the number of the organizations increased because of mergers, the budget increased for the ability to obtain the public funding.

**Table 4.32 Evolution of the budget based on size of the associations**

size in terms of budget	Budget 2011	Number of associations 2011	Budget 2017	Number of associations 2017
< 1k €	0.2%	22%	0.2%	25.6%
1 to 10 k €	3.2%	49%	3.8%	49%
10 to 50 k €	7.1%	19%	8.4%	18.9%
50 to 200 k €	9.2%	6%	7.6%	3.9%
200 to 500 k €	10.1%	2%	8.9%	1.3%
> 500 k €	70.2%	2%	71.2%	1.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

**Table 4.33 Annual Evolution Number and Budget of the Associations based on the Size 2011-2017**


size in terms of budget	Budget	Number of associations
< 1k €	0,20%	4,60%
1 to 10 k €	4,70%	2,20%
10 to 50 k €	4,40%	2,50%
50 to 200 k €	-1,60%	-4,10%
200 to 500 k €	-0,60%	-3,00%
> 500 k €	1,60%	2,40%
Total	1,60%	2,40%

Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

Finally concerning the size, it has been registered that almost 39,000 associations experienced a merge during the period 2011-2017 (Eynaud, 2019). The numerous merges and grouping among organizations result in an increased size of the organizations, confirming a general trend of the TS, where one organization out of five registers more than 50 paid workers 19.7% (Observatoire National de l’ESS –

CNCRESS, 2017). Furthermore, the survey carried out by the research lab “*Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne*”, Paris, collected more information not only about the merges which have taken place in the last five years, but also on the intentions of the organizations for the next five years. Based on the results of the survey it emerges that the associations with elevated annual resources are more inclined to merge, registering a percentage of merging in the last five years of 8.1%, against a percentage of 1.8% registered by associations with a budget lower than 1 K of euros. This trend is confirmed also when we look to the project of merge in the next two years. The associations with a budget higher than 500k of euros answered positively in the 9.5% of the cases, and 8.3% of that with a budget between 200 and 500 k of euros, against a 5.1% registered by associations with less of 1k of euros budget, or 3.1% of them between 1 and 10 k of euros budget.

**Figure 4.22 Annual Evaluation Number and Budget of the Associations Based on the Size 2011-2017**



Source: CES report Centre de Recherche sur les associations “le paysage associatif français” 2019

## CH 4 What to Remember?

The first part of this chapter 4 describes the evolution in the last 15 decades of the TSOs in Italy. The Italian data show an impressive growth of the sector, both registered in terms of number of organizations and number of employees. The sector is characterised by a strong heterogeneity in terms of legal forms, territorial distribution, sector of activities and human resources employed.

We observed in particular that, although the number of volunteers remains very high and represent the most part of the people involved in the sector, however, the increase rate of the number of paid workers is more elevated. Actually between 1999 and 2015 the paid workers are growing more, and in particular the outworkers. This is a first sign of professionalization. We then investigated more in detail this phenomenon, using desegregated data collected at provincial level for the years 1999 and 2011. The results show that, although the general trend, strong heterogeneity is based on sector of activity and territorial areas. For instance the sectors showing the highest values are the social services, the health, and economic development. . Other fields of TS intervention, such as Education, show an opposite trend, particularly characterised by an increase of volunteers, which totally overcome the very modest increment of paid workers. Differences also emerge among different parts of the country. The “duality” of the TS (Costa & Carini, 2016) i.e. differences between North and South and Islands, is confirmed by our data with professionalization being definitely more evident in southern part of the country. In particular we noticed that in the Islands the process of professionalization has even reversed over time with the *Professionalization* variable reporting higher values in 1999 compared with 2011.

As shown by ISTAT data, nowadays the majority of public funds in Italy designed to TSOs, are allocated through competitive tenders. This encourages TSOs to engage employees who have an adequate background even before obtaining grants, in order to show their ability to carry out activities (Suarez, 2011). Furthermore, very often tendering imposes a certain number of professionals in the TSOs team as compulsory requirement to get the grant.

Finally we carried out a cross-sectional regression analysis based on provincial data. Our analysis aimed to check whether the institutional environment determines any effect of the development of TS. So we firstly collect data on province-level variables that according to the literature might be considered as drivers of the TSOs development, and then we added in the analysis a set of variables that are commonly used to measure quality of institutions in Italian provinces. The source of these variables is the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) developed by Nifo and Vecchione (2014). Results show that most of the contextual determinants considered by the analysis turn out to be correlated with the incidence of TS in the Italian provinces. Furthermore, concerning the variables characterizing institutions, the coefficient of the variables *IQI Corruption*, *IQI Government* and *IQI ROL* are positive and statistically significant, which confirm the theory of the interdependency (L. M. Salamon, 1999). So when institutions work properly partnerships with TSOs are most suitable and TS proliferates more. We also observed that the effect of contextual determinants on TS provincial development is highly heterogeneous across TS sectors.



The French TSOs, excepted for a couple of years (2011-2012), is increasingly growing since 2008. Despite the large proportion of associations, more than the 75% fo the TS, the sector is inclined to increase in heterogeneity, particularly due to the new law on “ESS” adopted in 2014, which opens up to a number of new organizations.

Based on the analysis on the most representative organizations form, the associations, data show that, under strong institutional pressures the conformation of the sector is changing. Firstly, the budget is particularly concentrated among the big associations, with a high budget, engaged in the humanitarian, social and health sector.

The change on government spending, both in quantity and modality of delivery, has produced a significant modification on the funding structure of associations. In percentage, the decrease of the direct distribution of subsidies and grants resulted in an increase of the contracts both with private and public authorities. The competition to obtain funding, together with the increasing difficulties to obtain them encourage the associations to increase in size. Actually we observe that the increased number of associations realising more than 500 k of euros, corresponds to a decrease of medium size budget associations. This suggests that, while the increase of the small associations result by the creation of the new ones, for the associations with big budget, the explication could be the merge of medium size organizations. The data show a trend both in marketization, with the increase share of funds collected through market instruments, and corporatization, with the increase in size and the merge of the big size associations.

We also observed that the number of the paid workers is high and particularly concentrated in certain sector, which are also the sector where the most part of the budget is registered, namely the social services. This is in line with what sustained by the literature (Suarez, 2011) the professionalization could represent a sign of accountability for the TSOs, and in competitive tendering procedures they can appear more reliable than other competitors, which based their activities on the participation of volunteers. On the other hand, the increase of the budget also permits to remunerate professionals

# Chapter 5 The Meso Level – The Analysis of the Organizational Field



## Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of the meso level. The study of the organizational field of the reception for asylum seekers has been carried out during the first eight months of the 2018 for France, while the last months of the year and the beginning of 2019 were dedicated to the Italian case.

The actors involved in both the systems of reception for asylum seekers go over different levels, European, national and local. Firstly, we will present the complex system of migration management defined by the EU, which obviously includes also the reception. We will then pass to the national level, and we will describe, the beneficiaries and the instruments of reception put in place nowadays, before for the French and then for the Italian case. Finally we will analyze through a processual analysis the evolution of the organizational fields for both the cases.

Our analyses will shed light on the process of marketization and the increasingly important application of market instruments, the tightening of the rules concerning migrants. The evolution of social policies will be show in order to adequately prepare the ground for the analysis of the organizational field. Firstly, we will detect, based on our institutionalist analysis grid, the contextual challenges in the case of the Italian framework. DiMaggio (1988) attributes change to exogenous forces, so before introducing endogenous elements of change (explored in the micro analysis) we will detect the relevant external elements explaining for change.

We will analyse the evolution of organizational field of the reception service for asylum seekers and refugees, which represents the core of the meso level analysis. However to do it, we will before presents the elements characterizing the fields, namely the actors, and the instruments to interact across the field, such as for example the regulation, the contracts, among others. Firstly, we will map the relevant actors, in order to understand the role they play across the field and over time. We will see that their roles change considerably through time and that different agents gain relevance, while others become less central. In order to analyse the nature of the interactions among organizations, we will review the different instruments put in place to handle the inter-organizations relationships. Secondly we will present the different steps of the evolution of the organizational field. We will show that the establishment of a specific instrument, resulting in the institutionalisation of new practices, in turn will redefine the relationship among actors. Following Zucker (1988), we will explain the process of deinstitutionalization of certain practices, which decay, substituted by the new ones. Both cases are resumed at the end of the paragraph by an exhaustive time line, which graphically summarizes the salient steps.

While some similarities will be captured, many differences will also be observed between the countries under exam. France has a long tradition of reception and hosting of refugees, and migrants. The system has been from the beginning organised and managed by the TSOs, and in particular by associations, funded by public money. Even if funds remain still today largely public, the public procurement procedure dramatically changed the field, as well as the nature of the dynamics among actors involved in the sector. At the opposite the Italian system, partly due to the lack of



experience compared to other EU member states in terms of responsiveness to important flows of migrants, got caught unprepared to this new circumstance. Initially, national public authorities did not take any systemic solution and did not put in place, neither funded, any services, in answer to the growing social needs expressed by the newcomers as well as by the local authorities, which end up facing with a situation already in progress. For this reason, private individuals and the small and local associations have, for a long period, intervened autonomously, taking in charge the situation in a voluntarily way. This is how the Italian reception system was born; through a very bottom up approach, which has been institutionalized and subsidized by public authorities, only from the middle of 2000s. However in both cases the institutionalization of market instruments albeit differently had a crucial impact, determining the relationships among actors and determining new patterns of interaction.

## 5.1 The Role of the EU Regulation

### 5.1.1 The Beneficiaries of Protection

What is nowadays the reception service for asylum seekers and refugees? The definition of refugees, as used nowadays, has been created at the end of the Second World War. The status of the refugee, as it has been determined in the UN Convention of 1951 : “*A person who has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries*” includes persons who are “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin” on the grounds of “being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”. The convention’s provisions have to be applied “without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin”. Moreover, the convention states that “refugees should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay”. For a long time and particularly during 70s, for the citizens of those European countries, which experienced immigration, as France among others, the refugee’s status has been linked to a political connotation, firstly experienced with the arrival of people from the Chile of Pinochet, and then dissidents from the URSS. These people have been regularised, welcomed and supported, in the destination countries. Then during 2000s the number of arriving people augmented and the migration policies, which where before almost totally incorporated in the external affairs and social policies, became a matter of security and control, while a different feeling has been being experienced by the European citizens.

In this chapter, we will show what is nowadays the reception system for asylum seekers in the EU, and especially, in the countries where our cases study are based, namely France and Italy. Although reception remains a prerogative of national states, however we observed particularly during 2000s, an Europeanization of the policy, in an effort, never accomplished, to share the burden among the EU member states. The construction of a single area of movement for EU citizens, also lead to a strengthening of control on the external borders, and a dedicated regulation. So we observed a twin and parallel tendency. On the one hand, in the last decades we observed all across Europe, a strong politicization of reception and integration policies for asylum seekers and refugees from some national political parties (Scholten & Penninx, 2016), which

in turn arouses mix feelings among EU citizens. Actually, the perception of people, which always more often describe the situation as an invasion or a crisis (Geddes, 2016), is quite negative, which is also due to the media description of the situation (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM, 2018). On the other hand we observe a continuous effort, at the EU institutions level, to define as “neutral” the instruments to implements a good migration management.

Concerning the reception, although a EU directive<sup>18</sup> tried to push towards an homogenization of the quality of reception and integration service, at national level different models of reception have been established. They resulted from the very national specific needs and from an unbalanced EU system of asylum due to the number and category of migrants hosted, as well as the administrative configuration where the system of reception has been designed.

### 5.1.2 Reinforcing Boundaries and Centralizing Governance

The Article 3(2) Treaty of the European Union (TEU) reads as follows: *“The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”*.

As well as for all the area of the free exchange, the principle on which the European Union is based is trust among members, who on the one hand remove internal boundaries, and on the other ensure an intensified control on the external borders. This is why the EU implemented a number of policies in order to control the access of third countries nationalities: the asylum policies, the immigration policies and the management of border controls. Actually, the asylum policy is based on Articles 67(2), 78 and 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is set in order to “offer appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection in one of the Member States and ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. To this end, the Union is striving to develop a “Common European Asylum System”<sup>19</sup> (European Parliament web-site, 2019).

The immigration policy, based on Articles 79 and 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), aimed at “laying down the conditions governing entry into and legal residence in a MS, including for the purposes of family reunification, for third-country nationals. MSs retain the right to determine volumes of admission for people coming from third countries to seek work”. Nevertheless, the EU also works in order to prevent and reduce irregular immigration, in particular by means of an effective return policy, in a manner consistent with fundamental rights (European Parliament web-site, 2019)<sup>20</sup>.

---

<sup>18</sup> EU Directive 9/2003/CE, EU Directive 2013/33/EU

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/151/asylum-policy>

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-policy>

On the basis of Article 3.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Articles 67 and 77 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) the EU also pursues the objective of common policy on external border management. With the aim of controlling the borders the EU created the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), which is a combination of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA — Frontex) and the national authorities. The regulation extends the scope of the activities of Frontex to include enhanced support for MSs in the field of migration management, the fight against cross-border crime, and search and rescue operations. As openly declared the migration management is the guiding logic of the EU migration policies. For this reasons a number of instruments exists, an agenda, directives, regulation, in order to make migration “safe orderly and regular” as stated by the Global compact for migration, the inter-governmentally agreement prepared by the International Organization of migration – IOM, and strongly supported by the EU institutions, presented in 2017 and signed by almost all the EU member states (excepted Italy, Austria, Bulgaria among others).

In 2015 the European Commission published the European Agenda on Migration. The agenda set a number of objectives such as: reducing incentives for irregular immigration; border management — saving lives and securing external borders; developing a stronger common asylum policy; and establishing a new policy on regular immigration, modernising and revising the ‘blue card’ system, setting fresh priorities for integration policies, and optimising the benefits of migration policy for the individuals concerned and for countries of origin. The Agenda also launched the idea of setting up EU-wide relocation and resettlement schemes and it announced the “Hotspot” approach (the centres for identifying, registering and fingerprinting incoming migrants, at the frontline MSs such as Italy and Greece), and proposed a possible common security and defence policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle smuggling networks and combat trafficking in persons (which was launched soon afterwards as EUNAVFOR MED — Operation Sophia)<sup>21</sup>.

Concerning the external policies, finalised to contain international flows to Europe, already at the beginning of 2000s we can observe a strategy of “good governance of migration” based on bilateral agreements and development aids. For instance, the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, also known as Rabat Process, brought together the European and African countries from North, West and Central Africa, as well as the European Commission (EC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and for the first time introduced readmission clauses for irregular migrants in the framework of an instrument of economic cooperation. Since then, several countries have launched projects at bilateral or national levels, with the aim of make development aids contingent upon migration flows control and in particular readmission clauses in order to coordinate arrival and departure countries in the effort against the irregular migration. Actually, making returns more effective became clearly one of the main priorities of the EU agenda, as shown by the clauses of the mobility partnerships and

At the national level, the distinction among the instruments implemented is based on

---

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-policy>

the cause of the migration. The third countries nationals arriving because of human reasons could apply for the asylum in order to receive the appropriate sustain. In the other cases a number of directives have been set up, based on sectorial legislation approach. Actually, due to the difficulties encountered in adopting a general provision covering all labour immigration into the EU, the current approach consists of adopting sectoral legislation, by category of workers, in order to establish a regular immigration policy at EU level<sup>22</sup>. Concerning Asylum a number of directive and regulations are applied. The Qualification Directive, the Eurodac Regulation; the Dublin III Regulation, the Reception Conditions Directive, and the Asylum Procedures Directive, in order to develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to all third-country nationals who need international protection, but also to clarify the EUMSs in charge of the procedure<sup>23</sup>.

Finally, in order to maintain the borders control it was implemented the hotspot strategy in 2015 (more in the Italian section). The hotspots are the centers of first identification, aimed at qualifying immediately the migrants who are or are not in the condition of asking for asylum, and register the fingerprints in the Eurodac database, in order to recognize migrants in all the EUMSs. Actually, the hotspot strategy was supposed to be followed by a redistribution agreement among EUMSs, as result of a Dublin Regulation's reform, which never happened.

All these instruments – which cover almost all the different aspects of migration policy namely admission, integration, asylum, the labor market, international cooperation, human rights, development, etc. - define the complex strategy of the EU to improve migration management. Some authors sustain that the EU - as well as

---

<sup>22</sup> The Blue Directive (2009/50/EC EU); the Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU); the Season workers Directive (2014/36/EU); the intra-corporate workers Directive (2014/66/EU); the Research, Studies, training, voluntary service Directive (2016/801/EU).

<sup>23</sup> The 2011/95/EU directive or Qualification directive on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted;

- The No 603/2013 REGULATION (EU) Eurodac Regulation on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast);

- The No 604/2013 REGULATION (EU) or Dublin III establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast);

- The DIRECTIVE 2013/33/EU Reception Conditions laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast);

- The DIRECTIVE 2013/32/EU Asylum Procedures Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast).

other international organizations - migration regime is based on a “managerial approach” or “*approche gestionnaire*” (Aguillon, 2016) (Munck, 2008) (Geiger & Pécoud, 2014). Such a managerial approach, relies on the claim that it would be possible to solve migration issues through instruments, that transcends political dilemmas and diverging interests, but that are just technically and economically effective (Geiger & Pécoud, 2014). Through the managerial logic, the de-politicization of the migration policy is covered by “the cloak of neutrality” represented by the promotion of unquestionably “good” objectives - development, good governance, cooperation, protection of migrants and refugees, among others - and the claim to benefit all parties (Shore & Wright, 1997). So basically, the application of the EU instruments, which appears as neutral and technical, actually defines the member states legislations, procedures and activities.

### 5.1.3 Crisis and Accountability in the EU Migration Regime

As shown in the previous paragraph the EU migration regime covers numerous aspects such as the different aspects of migration policy namely admission, integration, asylum, the labour market, international cooperation, human rights, development, etc. These aspects are highly inter-related, for how the system is conceived.

The table 5.1 shows the number of irregular entries divided by destination and origin. The increase of arrivals in 2015 is particularly concentrated on the Eastern Mediterranean route, but the migration crisis has been declared all across Europe. Concerning the decrease in arrivals through the same route, we observe an important decrease the following year 2016. This is due to the EU-Turkey agreement, which includes a payment for Turkey in order to maintain facilities for refugees in national territory. Concerning the fall in arrivals via the Central Mediterranean route in 2017, it came about after the implementation during the summer of the Italy- Libya Memorandum of Understanding (MEDAM 2018). This agreement follows the failed attempt to reform the asylum and in particular the Dublin regulation, and to better balance the burden among the EU member states.

The national authorities claim that the effectiveness of asylum procedures varies by country, according to surges in caseloads. Actually, because the most part of people who cross the Mediterranean go to Italy and Greece, the two countries complain to be overloaded and for this reason, both the speed of procedures and the quality of the services offers are affected.

But who is accountable for, in this contemporary Europe multi-level governance, characterizing migration management? Actually, this is a rapidly changing context.

On the one hand there is an increasing involvement of non-state actors, due to marketization of the system. On the other, the state, which has never been a single, monolithic entity, it is accompanied by an increasing number of actors involved from the EU, to the national and very local level. Such transformations have the ability to further diffuse and alienate a policy-focused core from the implementing units, ‘hollowing out’ institutions (Rhodes, 1994), which in turn creates a deficit of accountability (Trasciani, Mavin, Borrelli, & Alomar, 2019).

On the top of that - as shown in the table 5.1 - at the beginning of 2010s the number of arrivals stably increased, until 2015, the peak year, when almost 2 million of

people tried to cross the EU borders, without any scheme of compulsory relocation, and with a massive pressure on South borders particularly, Italy, Greece, Spain and Bulgaria. In parallel, we observed a strong politicisation, since the EU policy makers started to refer to this situation as the European Migrant Crisis (Geddes, 2016). Speed and urgency became the dominant framework, based on the established logic of threat and rising panic, rather than building upon a culture of need (Vollmer 2016). Following Agamben (Agamben, 2005), in this context, the use of “crisis” could be associated to the “state of exception”. In the current political context, McAdam (2014) sustains that the use of crisis constantly characterized the state of affairs, making prevail short-term solution instead of structural long-term policies. McAdam highlights that to some extent, the current discourse of crisis, it is not a genuine state of emergency, but rather ought to be interpreted as a discursive mechanism, which serves to explain current events and justifies European states’ lack of adequate response by sustaining the idea that states are struggling to maintain the status quo (Trasciani et al., 2019).

Instead of searching for a common EU approach, the crisis rhetoric became the justification for a number of decisions, included administrative retentions of irregular migrants, or the international agreements with Turkey<sup>25</sup> before and then with Libya, in order to stop the flux of migrants and externalize the EU boundaries, the periodical suspensions of the Schengen arrangement and the closing of borders in France as well as in other EU countries or, last but not least, and the deaths of thousands of people at Europe’s external borders (Pauly, Bank, Blöser, Arne Niemann, & Zaun, 2016). As we will explain later more in details, at the national level, the instrumentalisation of crisis made room for implementation of rapid reforms. Not only the legislation concerning procedures of request of international protection changed, but also the reception system. The number of emergency accommodation centres increased, based on public tenders lacking of transparency and often through direct procurement. (ATTI PARLAMENTARI XVII LEGISLATURA, 2017).

**Table 5.1 Irregular Entries into the EU by main routes, 2014 -2017**

Route	2014	2015	2016	2017
Central Mediterranean Destination: Italy, Malta Origin: Eritrea, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia	170,760	153,946	181,126	118,962
Eastern Mediterranean Destination: Greece Origin: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Syria	50,830	885,386	182,534	42,319
Western Mediterranean Destination: Spain Origin: Sub-Saharan, West Africa	7,840	7,164	10,113	23,113

---

Western Balkans Destination: Hungary,  
(Germany, Austria...) Origin: Albania,  
Kosovo, plus arrival from the Eastern  
Mediterranean route 43,360 764,038 122,779 12,179

---

Source: 2018 MEDAM, Assessment Report

#### 5.1.4 The Fragmentation of the Instruments of Reception

During the process of application for asylum of a third-country national, the MS in charge of the application provides reception. The Directive 2003/9/EC fixes minimum standards, but each MS can organise the system in totally autonomous way. Actually, the accommodation centres could be managed directly by public authorities or instead be externalised, through public contracts, to private or TSOs, which is very often the case. The TSOs, and in some cases for-profit organisations as well, respond to a public tender, in order to obtain the fund to carry out the service of reception. Even if minimum standards are fixed by the Directive, the MSs are free to organise the service very differently.

For instance in the case of France and Italy, the geographic position is particularly relevant in order to understand the kind of service developed. Italy, in the middle of the Mediterranean, has been, during the last four years - and although the last governments made more and more difficult to reach the country, particularly with the latest "zero landing policy" - a region suitable for first arrival. Nowadays around 200.000 asylum seekers are located in the country, under the public system of reception, but figures are blurred concerning the number of people, which are out of the system, due to the new migration reforms<sup>24</sup>. Very often migrants autonomously try to cross the French borders, passing by the mountains, in Ventimiglia and Mentone. Once in France, they often pass through Marseille to then move to North towards Calais and finally reach the UK. Sometimes migrants want to stop in France. This is particularly true for French speakers. Some people in fact leave their countries with the specific aim of reaching France, because of cultural proximity and family. Very often migrants have relatives and family, which arrived decades before, as France is, from the beginning of 70s, a land of immigration from North Africa and former colonies. Nowadays in France there are something like 80.000 asylum seekers (OFPRA, 2017), under the public system of reception, but is calculated that the need is slightly higher, and around 40.000 extra places would be needed. Finally, even if the infamous Calais Jungle, the camp used by migrants around Calais, who attempted to enter the UK via the Port of Calais or the Channel Tunnel by stowing away on lorries, ferries, cars, or trains travelling to the UK, has been dismantled, people still try to pass by this way the Channel.

To achieve this objective is not easy however. As many as 50,000 people have been arrested by French authorities at the border in 2017, of whom 98% have been pushed back to Italy. According to a report of the Senate, from January to mid October 2017 this included approximately 8,000 people with authorisation to stay in Italy and 15,000 undocumented persons (AIDA, 2017). Actually, because of the Dublin

---

<sup>24</sup> Decreto sicurezza, 2018, 2018

System, the first country of arrival, apart for few rare exceptional cases, is the country in charge of the asylum procedure, so very often Italy, Greece and Spain.

Because of their geographical position, their arrival /transit attributes, but also their welfare systems and their administrative configuration, MSs put in place very different systems of reception. In the following sections, we will therefore describe the reception system in both France and Italy, which are quite different, although some similarities can be observed.



## 5.2 The French Case Study

### 5.2.1 The Elements of the Field in France

For a global understanding of how the field of reception services for asylum seekers is organized, we need to analyse three major elements of the French context: the funding system for the TSOs in social services and in particular the national legislation concerning the migration industry (which includes the service of the reception and integration), the market of the reception for asylum seekers, and the redefinition of the social policies.

#### 5.2.1.1 Migration Regulatory Framework

Concerning the migration policies, at the EU level these policies changed in accordance with two main sequences of events. On the one hand, the Schengen process, the creation of a free area of movement for European citizens, which also implied the Dublin Regulation, a strengthening of the external boundaries. On the other hand at the end of 90s beginning of 2000s, the “managerial approach” gains consensus among the international organizations (Aguillon, 2016), which at the EU level concretely is shown in the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and the Rabat process (2006). The Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, also known as Rabat Process, aimed at implementing a plan of migration management and promoting controlled mobility (ICMPD, 2015). Control of the borders and the securitarian approach started to become more and more important until when, during 2010s, became a true priority, because of the increased number of people leaving their countries and crossing the sea and then the EU borders. Furthermore, accompanying the expansion of the so-termed “migration industry” (Andersson, 2014), we can detect increasing confusion and difficulties with the ascription of responsibility and accountability, but also more deep-seated struggles concerning the effectiveness and failings of bureaucratic restructuring and managerial approaches (Christensen & Læg Reid, 2007). As we will show the EU policies had a significant impact at national level.

Concerning the French migration regulatory framework, this has rapidly changed in the last 10 years. Briefly glancing at the competence’s distribution on regular immigration, the EU is competent to lay down the conditions governing entry into and legal residence in a Member State, including for the purposes of family reunification, for third-country nationals. Concerning combating irregular immigration, the EU is required to prevent and reduce irregular immigration, in particular by means of an effective return policy, in a manner consistent with fundamental rights. The EU is competent to conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to their country of origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry into, or presence or residence in, a Member State. Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) strengthened the EBCG Agency’s capacity to carry out rapid border interventions. DG HOME continues to implement operational measures to enhance protection of external borders and roll out hotspots. To modernise the external borders management, the Commission adopted a Smart Borders Package in April 2016 with proposals among others the Schengen Borders Code to expand systematic checks and increase security in the Schengen area.

(European Commission, 2016). Within the EU, the implementation and broadening of the Schengen agreement during the 1990s made migration within and between EU member states significantly easier. But at the opposite made even more difficult the migration from outside (Lahav, 1998). Most part of EU countries have converged towards more restrictive policies and reform to control immigration, and informed by the recommendations of European Commission, they drifted towards a tightening of channels for legal migration and tightening of asylum recognition (European Commission 2016, p 39). Furthermore, at the EU level, internally, we recognise different actors' position. European Parliament, which would like to reform Dublin system before next election, trying to mitigate the criteria for entering in Europe (the Common European Asylum System Draft); European Commission, which trying to implement the most efficient system of control; and European Council, basically member states, which internally again, maintain very different positions. As well known, the Dublin system's main purpose has been to assign responsibility for processing an asylum application to a single Member State. The Dublin III Regulation identifies the EU country responsible for examining an asylum application, by using a hierarchy of criteria such as family unity, possession of residence documents or visas, irregular entry or stay, and visa-waived entry. In practice, however, the most frequently applied criterion is the irregular entry, meaning that the Member State through which the asylum-seeker first entered in the EU is responsible to examine his/her asylum claim. (European Parliament, 2018). The Dublin system was never designed to achieve solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility. One of the main points raised by the new text is the concept of solidarity, based on a fairness mechanism to address and alleviate that pressure in Member States (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2017). Dublin Regulation also known as Dublin III, and the EURODAC Regulation, which establishes a Europe-wide fingerprinting database for unauthorised entrants to the EU, define the cornerstone of the Dublin System. As already mentioned, its main purpose from the very beginning was to assign responsibility for processing an asylum application to a single Member State and provides for the transfer of an asylum seeker to that Member State. Usually, the responsible Member State will be the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU. If on the one hand the logic behind is to prevent an applicant from submitting applications in multiple Member States, on the other hand it implies an internal reorganisation to move people from one European country to another, when recognised as not eligible for seeking asylum on the first one.

Even if member states remain in charge of the reception and integration policy however we can ascertain the impact of the above mention Dublin system in terms of number of asylum seekers and kinds of services implemented in the different member states. In case of France and Italy it plays totally different impact. Italy is a country of transit, where people often arrive from extra European area. In Italy, the creation of Hotspot, in 2015 answer exactly to control better who arrives for the first time in Europe. The Hotspot approach is based on a single place where processing asylum applications, enforcing return decisions and prosecuting smuggling organisations. Ideally, people are not supposed to remain there for long-time, just the time for the pre-identification, registration, photograph and fingerprinting operations. But NGOs including ASGI (*Associazione Studi Giuridici Italiani*) and Amnesty International observed differently. People are detained without any court order, forced to be fingerprinted, and classified as asylum seekers or economic migrants depending on a summary assessment, mainly carried out either by using questionnaires filled in by migrants at disembarkation. As sustained by the UNHCR, the system totally fails in

providing fair, efficient and effective protection. In the same year, in France has been created (through a “*marché public*” and without any legal base) the PRAHDA (*Programme d’Accueil et d’Hébergement des Demandeurs d’Asile*). These structures have been put in place for the first time in 2016. They are managed by the ADOMA, a mixed organization, to accommodate isolated people, who have applied for asylum and are categorized under Dublin procedure (the so called *Dublinés*). Actually even if not created explicitly for this reason, they host for the most, asylum seekers under Dublin procedure, which are then, following the regulation and excepted for specific cases, supposed to return to Italy. Without dwelling on the questionable conditions on the structure, defined by some actors on the field as instrumental to avoid the so call “*appel d’air*”, which is based on the idea that a generous reception policy has an attractive effect on migrants, however it is significant for the analysis on the impact of the EU regulation, the creation of new structures responding to the national roles defined by the regulation.

At the national level the migration governance is basically founded on controlling borders and security, defining who is accepted in, and who will be left out.

France has a long tradition of offering asylum to foreign refugees, and the right of asylum has constitutional value under French law. French asylum law is heavily based on international and European law, but is largely codified in the *Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile* (CESEDA, Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right of Asylum). Particularly important are obviously, the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; and the European Union (EU) Regulation of June 26, 2013 (referred to as the “Dublin Regulation”) In practice, however, French asylum law has mostly been codified in the “*Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile*” (CESEDA, Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right of Asylum), including the application of the aforementioned international and European norms in French domestic law. There are two types of asylum protection in France: Refugee protection, and Subsidiary protection. Subsidiary protection is given to any person who does not fulfil the conditions to be recognized as a refugee, but for whom there are serious and known reasons to believe that he/she is in real danger of suffering the following violations in his/her country: (a) execution, (b) torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, or (c) if the person is a civilian, a serious and individual threat to his/her life or person by reasons of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.

The governmental agency involved in the process are, OFPRA - *Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides* (OFPRA, French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons), which is the principal government body in charge of processing and evaluating asylum applications; the OFII - *The Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration* (OFII, French Office for Immigration and Assimilation), which is the office in charge of answering to the material needs of asylum seekers; the CNDA - *The Cour nationale du droit d’asile* (CNDA, National Court on Asylum Law), which is the administrative court in charge of dealing with recourse.

The Beneficiaries of the Reception Humanitarian Protection in France

The asylum seekers in France could experience three different situations: the normal procedure, the accelerated procedure and the Dublin procedure. The CADA (*centre d'accueil pour les demandeurs d'asile*), which remains, until now, the most used instrument to accommodate asylum seekers, it is a completely dedicated instrument of accommodation for asylum seekers in normal and accelerated procedures. The only exceptions concern refugees and applicants for asylum whose demands have been rejected: They can stay in a CADA only for a very limited period of time, which cannot exceed 6 months for refugees, and 3 months for applicants for asylum who were rejected.




French asylum law is heavily based on international and European law, but is largely codified in the *Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile* (CESEDA, Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right of Asylum). Particularly important are the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; and the European Union (EU) Regulation of June 26, 2013 (referred to as the “Dublin Regulation”).

In order to lodge an asylum application in France, a person first has to be registered as asylum seeker by the French authority responsible for the right of residence: the Prefecture. The registration of asylum claims in France has been deeply reorganised with the reform of the law on asylum, fully applicable as of 1 November 2015. A “single desk” (*guichet unique de demande d'asile*, GUDA) has been introduced in order to register both the asylum claim and the need for material reception conditions. There are 34 “single desks” across France. In order to obtain an appointment at the “single desk”, asylum seekers must present themselves to orientation platforms (*Plateformes d'accueil de demandeurs d'asile*, PADA). Local organisations are responsible for this pre-reception phase and make appointments at the Prefecture for the asylum seekers. According to the law, the appointment has to take place within 3 working days.

Once registered at the GUDA the applicant receives an asylum claim certification and an application form in French is send to the OFPRA (*Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides*, French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons), the only administration competent to examine asylum applications. The OFPRA is the principal government body in charge of processing and evaluating asylum applications,

**Figure 5.1 Asylum Request Process in France**

1. PADA - *Platform d'Accueil pour Demandeur d'Asile* - Orientation Platform for Asylum Seekers.  
 - Information concerning the Asylum procedure;  
 - Appointments to asylum seekers to the "single desk"; Photos



4. PADA - *Platform d'Accueil des Demandeurs d'Asile*  
 Reception Platform for Asylum Seekers

3. Domiciliation

4. Orientation towards an emergency centres of reception

5. Information and sustain in order to acquire the rights such as healthcare, bank account, schooling enrolment

6. Sustain for drafting the OFPRA dossier and transcription of bio

1. Regular Procedure:

A time limit of 6 months is set for OFPRA to take a decision

1. Accelerated Procedure:

A time limit of 15 days months is set before convocation

3. Dublin Procedure:

- A document is provided each 4 months until the transfer
- Once the MS in charge issues a decision of transfer the asylum seeker has 15 days for appeals to an Administrative court
- The transfer is due into 6 months. Expired this limit, without transfer, France becomes responsible for the procedure, and the application can submit a new request for asylum at the prefecture.

5. OFPRA *Office Français des Réfugiés et des Apatrides* – French Office for refugees and Stateless examines the asylum procedures + in charge of the individual interviews

1. Accepted: status refugees 10 years/ Subsidiary protection 1 year, right to work and family reunification
2. Rejected: Delay of 15 days to appeal to the CNDA

6. CNDA Cour National du Droit d'Asile

- Appeal for the OFPRA decisions (normal procedure after 5 months, accelerated 5 weeks)

which is under the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Interior since November 2007. Statistics for 2017 refer to an average processing time of 114 days, 183 in 2016 and 216 days in 2015 (OFPRA, 2017).

Under the regular procedure, the OFPRA has a time limit of 6 months, extendible an additional 9 month-period and, under exceptional circumstances, it can even be extended for 3 more months if necessary, to take a decision (Article R.723-2 Ceseda). For 2017, an average processing time of 114 days has been referred (aida, 2018, ofpra 2018)<sup>25</sup>. During this period the OFPRA is in charge of the process, which is composed of three main steps: interview, investigation and decision.

Following the rejection of their asylum application by the Director General of OFPRA, the applicant may challenge the decision to the National Court of Asylum (CNDA). The CNDA is an administrative court specialised in asylum.

The reasons for channelling an asylum seeker into an accelerated procedure are outlined in Article L.723-2 Ceseda, which lists different grounds.

The accelerated procedure is automatically applied where:

- The applicant originates from a safe country of origin; or
- The applicant's subsequent application is not inadmissible.

The asylum applicant will be channelled under the accelerated procedure, where the Prefecture has reported that:

- The asylum seeker refuses to be fingerprinted; When registering his or her claim, the asylum seeker has presented falsified identity;
- The claim has not been registered within 120 days after the foreign national has entered the French territory;
- The claim has only been made to prevent a notified or imminent removal order;
- The presence of the foreign national in France constitutes a serious threat to public order, public safety or national security.
- The asylum seeker has supported his or her claim only with irrelevant questions regarding his or her claim;
- The asylum seeker has given manifestly contradictory and incoherent or manifestly wrong or less likely statements that are contradictory to country of origin information.


The OFPRA office does not examine the case of asylum seekers under the Dublin procedure. These are formally informed through the notification of readmission order letter delivered to them once the decision to “take charge” or “take back” has been made from the MS in charge of the procedures. The French authorities are in charge of notifying the transfer and in turn of 6 months it must be accomplished, and the asylum seekers re located to the country of first arrival. Once expired the deadline, the person can present a new request of asylum, wherever in a MS across Europe, included France, which would become responsible for the procedure.

---

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/france/asylum-procedure/procedures/regular-procedure>

All during the procedure - basically from the first visit to the PADA until the final decision of Interior Ministry - the asylum seekers have the right to be hosted in a dedicated centre (the CADA, HUT-SA, CAO, PRAHDA, etc).

Figure 5.2 Asylum Application Process



Source: l'âge de faire 2017

### The Structures of Reception for Asylum Seekers in France

Public policies concerning asylum in France have always been closely linked to the activity of various associations (based on the law 1901), indeed the centres are managed by different kinds of TSOs such as associations and social enterprises or organisations of mixed economy (ADOMA). Almost 1,500 associations contribute to the territories in implementing the reception and integration policy for first-time foreigners (Ministry of Interior). The ministry of Interior coordinates the procurement procedures of operating entities by 2007. Different procedures are put in place, depending on the kind of structures such as the call for projects (*appel à projet*), or public tenders (*marché public*).

In these last years, we observed a multiplication of structures finalised to accommodate, asylum seekers, and migrants. As shown in tables 5.2, and 5.3, they are more than ten different types and they are differently distributed at national level. These kinds of structures, differently than the CADA, can host all people under all the kinds of procedures. If the CADA is expressly created for asylum seekers under normal and accelerated procedures, the others host as well the *Dublinés* – people under the procedure of Dublin. All the different types of accommodation are funded

and coordinated by the Ministry of Interior, including emergency accommodation, briefly described below.

The emergency has been used as an explication for this double system. Actually, given the lack of places in regular reception centres for asylum seekers, the State authorities have developed emergency schemes. The emergency system could be either regulated at national level, such as for the case of the Temporary Reception – Asylum Office - *accueil temporaire – service de l’asile* - AT-SA, or a decentralised emergency reception scheme, such as for the Emergency Accommodation for Asylum Seekers - *hébergement d’urgence dédié aux demandeurs d’asile* - (HUDA).

The management of these reception centres is subcontracted to the semi-public company Adoma or to NGOs that have been selected through a public call for tenders, such as Forum réfugiés – Cosi, France terre d’asile, l’Ordre de Malte, Coallia, French Red Cross etc. These centres fall under the French social initiatives (“*action sociale*”) and are funded by the State. Their financial management is entrusted to the Prefect of the *Département*. These centres fall under the French social initiatives (“*action sociale*”) and are funded by the State. Their financial management is entrusted to the Prefect of the *Département*. Forum Réfugiés also manages the PADA *Platform d’Accueil de Demandeur d’Asile* – Platform for Asylum Seekers, which is the first place visited by the asylum seekers in order to deposit their asylum request.

Another remarkable instrument of emergency reception is the PRAHDA. The Prahda, *Programme d’Accueil et d’Hébergement des Demandeurs d’Asile* - Reception and Accommodation Program for Asylum Seekers, would be officially an evolution of the CAO, *centre d’accueil et d’orientation* - another reception device for asylum seekers - and theoretically "*dispositif d’hébergement d’urgence*". Since number of people under the Dublin procedure has grown fast and dramatically in the last three years<sup>26</sup>, this is why the specific structures (such as the Prahda) have been created to host these people waiting for the notification of transfer. Normally they remain under the Dublin Procedure around 4 -5 months. In 2016 there are 62 Prahda set up in France, for a total of 5351 places (Cimade, 2016). Associations and activists already observed an alarming situation. The living conditions in these places, mostly old Formula 1 Hotel, are very bad. This new structure seriously undermines the rights of asylum seekers, particularly in legal matters. Furthermore they are far from cities, difficult to reach, almost not visible to the rest of citizenship. The Prahda officially addresses CADA’s non-eligible audiences, although they also host sometimes asylum seekers in "normal" and “accelerated” proceedings. People under the Dublin Procedure are not allowed to be host in CADA. The officers in French Prefectures are requested to take fingerprints for each and every asylum seeker above 14 years old and they have a duty to check these fingerprints in the Eurodac database. If the Prefecture finds that the person is already registered in another country, France is not anymore in charge of the above mentioned asylum procedure and the person has to be readmitted to the country in charge. After notification there are three transfer modalities, voluntary, enforced transfer and transfer under escort. The asylum seeker after 2 refusals to go to the Prefecture for the transfer is considered as absconding.

---

<sup>26</sup> After the implementation of the Hotspot Strategy (2015), namely the creation of specific spot in Italy, Spain and Greece to collect fingerprints from migrants arriving by the Mediterranean route.



**Table 5.2 The reception centre for asylum seekers**

<b>Structure</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Number of Hosted Asylum Seekers</b>
CADA	<i>Centre d'accueil demandeur d'asile</i>	39,000
AT-SA	<i>Accueil Temporaire Service d'asile</i>	6,000
HUDA	<i>Hébergement d'urgence demandeurs d'asile</i>	15,000
CPH	<i>Centre Provisoire Hébergement</i>	2,300
CAO	<i>Centre Accueil et Orientation</i>	10,700
CARDA	<i>Hébergement Dublinés - Ile de France</i>	-
PRAHDA	<i>Programme d'Accueil et d'hébergement demandeur d'asile</i>	5,351
CAES	<i>C. det d'Examen de Situation Administrative</i>	-
DPAR	<i>Dispositif Préparatoire au Retour</i>	10,000

Source: Cimade, 2017 Different forms of asylum seekers reception in France

As shown in the table 5.2 the centres are very different, for legal framework, in price per day, and in number of places. For instance the CPH, the CHUM and the CADA are regulated by the CASF – *Code de l'Action Sociale et de Famille* – Code of Social Action and Family. The others such as the CAO, CAES, HUDA are defined by the CESEDA, *Code de l'Entrée et de Séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile*, Code of Entry and Foreigners Stay, and asylum rights. Others finally, are neither formalised by law, but just by *circulaire*, such as in the case of DPAR.

The prices are highly different, the structured named CPO and CAES show the highest price, with 25 euros, while the HUDA costs 17 euros, and the Prahda 15 euros. The structures are funded through the public fund *Le Programme 303 « Immigration et Asile »* - program 303 immigration and asylum. The fund is organised in 4 different actions, circulation of migrants and visas politics, guarantee of asylum right, fighting irregular immigration, and support.

Figure 5.3 French Reception Centres' characteristics



**Typologie des dispositifs d' « hébergements » des personnes migrantes-accueil /transit/contrôle/expulsion : comment s'y retrouver ?**

janvier-2018

Dispositif	Acronyme	Signification	Description, public concerné	Cadres légaux (et infra légaux)	Nombre de places / localisation / principaux opérateurs	Financement / Prix de journée par personne et par jour
Dispositif de tri de migrants	CAES	centre d'accueil et d'examen de situation administrative	Dispositif combiné : hébergement et examen administratif. Puis orientation rapide vers un centre adapté à la situation administrative	Article L 744-3-3 CESEDA <a href="#">Circulaire du 4 décembre 2017 relative à l'évolution du parc d'hébergement</a>	415 places : 3 centres dans les Hauts de France: généralisation ave 2 200 PLACES en 2018	BOP 303 prix de journée : 25€ c
	CPO	centre de pré-orientation	Idem CAES, mais spécificité francilienne		250 places Espérer 95 (Patinoire de Cergy)-	
	CPA	centre de premier accueil	Personnes arrivant à Paris (sauf Débutées) Examen de situation administrative obligatoire trois jours après au CESA (devenu GUDA bis)	CPA : art L 345-2 2CASF + convention tripartite Mairie de Paris, Etat, Emmaüs	800 places hommes et 400 femmes, Emmaüs solidarité (Paris, La Chapelle et Ivry)-	DRHIL (BOP 177) + Mairie de Paris+ ( prix de journée : non connu
Hébergement de transit	CAO	Centre d'accueil et d'orientation	Créer pour l'évacuation des migrants du Calais et utilisé désormais pour les évacuations de campements parisiens	L 744-3 2°CESEDA <a href="#">Charte de fonctionnement</a> -juillet 2016	10 000 places environ hors IDF, (en voie de transformation en CAES pour 2 000 places)	BOP 303 prix de journée : 24 euros
	CHUM	Centre d'hébergement d'urgence pour migrants	Spécificité francilienne Migrants évacués des campements parisiens et orientation via les CPA	L 345-2-2 CASF <a href="#">Vade-mecum</a> - septembre 2016	10 000 places environ en IDF EMMAUS, AURORE, France Horizon...	DRHIL—BOP 177 Prix de journée : 30 à 60€
Dispositifs d'accueil pour personnes en demande d'asile ou réfugiées	CADA	Centre d'accueil pour demandeurs d'asile	Hébergement et accompagnement des demandeurs d'asile en cours de procédure normale.	L 744-3-1 CESEDA et L 348-1 du CASF	40 450 places ADOMA : 7 106 s ; COALLIA, 5 713 ; FTDA : 4 679 ; Forum réfugiés : 1288 ; CRF : 177 ; Groupe SOS : 1084, ...	BOP 303 Prix de journée 19,50€
	HUDA	Hébergement d'urgence pour demandeur d'asile	Hébergement et accompagnement des demandeurs d'asile. <i>Public prioritaire : procédures accélérées</i>	Article L 744-3 2° du CESEDA <a href="#">Circulaire du 4 décembre 2017</a>	21 000 places (dont 7 000 stables) ADOMA, Coallia et autres structures	BOP 303 Prix de journée 17€
	AT-SA	Accueil temporaire service de l'asile	Hébergement et accompagnement des demandeurs d'asile. <i>Public prioritaire : procédures accélérées</i>	Article L 744-3 2° du CESEDA <a href="#">Appel à projets</a> – 29 juillet 2015	5776 places: ADOMA et autres structures	BOP 303 Prix de journée 15,65€
	CPH	Centre provisoire d'hébergement	Accueil et accompagnement de personnes réfugiées et de bénéficiaires de la protection subsidiaire	<a href="#">Article 349-1 et suivant du Code de l'action sociale et des familles</a>	2279 places COALLIA 439 ; FTDA 309DPHRS : 400; Forum réfugiés 173 ...	BOP 104 intégration Prix de journée 25€
	PRAHDA	Programme d'accueil et d'hébergement des demandeurs d'asile	Accueil et accompagnement mélangé de demandeurs d'asile en attente d'enregistrement, en cours de procédure+ dublinés assignés à résidence	L 744-3 2° du CESEDA <a href="#">Marché public</a> du ministère de l'intérieur, sept 2016	5351 places : situées souvent dans d'anciens hôtels formule 1. ADOMA opérateur unique	BOP 303 prix de journée : 15€
Dispositif de surveillance à visée d'expulsion	DPAR et centre assignation Dublinés	Dispositif de « préparation au retour »	Surveillance et expulsion des personnes assignées à résidence sous OQTF ou décisions de transfert Dublin	<a href="#">circulaire du 17 juillet 2015</a> «	Actuellement au nombre de 7 (557 places): Moselle, Rhône, Paris, Seine –Saint-Denis, Bouche du Rhône. Adoma, Rose des Vents, accueil sans frontière 67, ADRIM. Généralisation prévue dans chaque région en 2018	BOP 303 Prix de journée 24€

## The CADA Centre d'Accueil pour Demandeur d'Asile in France

In our work, we have decided to focus on the management of the CADA since it is the major regular type of reception centres in France, hosting more than 40 000 asylum seekers. The Article L-348-1 *Code de l'action sociale et des familles* – Code of social action and families – legally frames the CADA. The article says that “people who registered their asylum request (...) have the right to benefit of an accommodation, in a reception centres for asylum seekers”. The article 348-2 in the same code also pinpoints that the mission of these centres is “ensure the reception, accommodation, but also the social and administrative support of people who have submitted their asylum demand, and all during the processing period of the demand”.


In 1991, the new Asylum Law is a true turnaround: on the one hand it introduces the interdiction of working for asylum seekers, on the other it establishes of the CADA new special temporary housing facilities called “*centres d'accueil pour demandeurs d'asile*” - centres for the reception of asylum seekers - while waiting for the decision concerning their asylum application (Law 19 December 1991). The creation of a specific centre for a targeted population, and with a specific function of hosting exclusively asylum seekers, it is a something new in 1991, when excepted for the CPH the migrants are hosted in the ordinary structures (Kobelinsky, 2005). In fact until this reform they were hosted in the standard national system of sustain for people in need and with low income. As main consequence, this reform implied a remarkable reduction in economic independency of asylum seekers, and on the other hand, the growth of illegal work. The number of CADA increased rapidly. Nowadays there are more than 350 CADA in France, and the structures are located across all the national territory. They are characterised by very different living conditions for beneficiaries, services offered and size and they include both collective reception centres and scattered housing in apartments (private housing). The most part of the CADA are managed by associations, which report the service after having competed through the “*appel à projet*” – a competitive tender. The funding is ensured by a “*dotation global de financement*” general operating allocation, which results from a consultation between the service in charge of the pricing and the centres' management bodies, which is asked to explain all the costs.

As shown in figure 5.4, the market is quite concentrated in favour of few large national or regional operators. They are Adoma, Coallia, Forum Réfugiés, France Terre d'Asile. Adoma, which runs 59 CADA with a total capacity of 3437 places Adoma has become the first public operator in this field. This large para public (or mixed economy) company was involved in “households Sonacotra” – Algerian single migrant workers. But this population was decreasing and non renewing, so the company decided to move to another market. AFTAM, which became Coallia, is the second largest manager with 41 CADA; France Terre d' Asile (FTDA) manages 37 CADA and a total capacity of more than 4,522 places (data for 2016, Cimade).

If Adoma and Coallia are traditionally “immigrant home managers” and they have just repositioned themselves on the market, changing basically their beneficiaries, but not the service offered, both France Terre d' Asile, and Forum Réfugiés are associations, initially strongly militant. Then, during the last years they changed their business model, becoming more and more involved in the management of CADA.

As already mentioned, the governmental body in charge of national hosting system is the OFII. The OFII is a public institution. It implements policies in the field of integration and monitoring of foreigners living in France. It was under the supervision of the Ministry of Immigration, of Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development - *Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité Nationale et du Développement Solidaire* - before, and then the Ministry of Interior. It is in charge of the first reception of asylum seekers, and it manages the national hosting system (included accommodation in CADA).

**Figure 5.4 CADA distribution at national level**




Source: Cimade web site 2017

**Table 5.3 Number of places in CADA Evolution**

YEAR	2001	2005	2008	2010	2012	2018
N° of Places in CADA	5.283	15.470	20.410	21.330	21.410	40.428

Source: Cimade, OFII, 2017, 2018

**Figure 5.5 CADA Number of places and structures**



Source: Ri-elaboration of data from the web-site of “Cimade”, 2017

### *5.2.1.2 Public Tenders Legislation and Funding System of TSOs*

Concerning the first point, as already mentioned in chapter 2 starting from the early 1970s, a radical transformation of the structures and ideological foundations of the welfare state has taken place in European countries. Two elements characterize this evolution: budget constraints for social policy and New Public Management (NPM) reforms, based on the belief that the public sector would work better if it takes on private sector management as an organizing principle (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, Esposito et al. 2017). This context mutation has led, in the 1980s, to the configuration of a radically new discursive order, which has redefined the modalities and structures of state intervention.

Public governance radically changed (La Spina and Majone, 2000, Majone 1997). Actually, a structural shift happened, moving from an interventionist or positive State (based on the Keynesian Model), to a “Regulatory State”. The “de-monopolization” of the State in some sectors has had as consequences to include civil society in the management of public affairs, with the idea of stimulating citizens’ participation in the definition of new solutions to social problems, and implement co- construction of social policies and services. This ideological change, in line with the NPM rhetoric, highlights concepts such as competition, which is justified through an increase in choice for the citizens-consumers, individual tailored service, and efficiency, which implies a cut of costs or at least a reduction in local authorities bureaucratisation . It is also supposed to increase flexibility related to the increment /decrease of demand, which is not possible in highly bureaucratized organisations, as the public branch has contributed to cut civil services, dismantle state-owned enterprises, downsize public administration and reduce public expenditure.

Concerning the legal framework of public procurements, the regulation differs in EU member states, but one of the main drivers to modify and implement last years reforms has been the creation of the Single Market. Departing from the European Commission's 1985 “White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market” MSs public procurement policy and practice have been identify as instruments to increase competition and to create the single market, avoiding distortion. Directive 88/295 amended all previous public supplies directives. Open tendering procedures became the norm and negotiated procedures were allowed only in exceptional circumstances (Bovis, 2007). In 90’s one of the most important changes followed: the adoption of the first Utilities Directive, Directive 90/531. Public utilities’ markets – energy, telecommunications, transport and water sectors – were until that moment characterised by very different national legislation and representing a big business. It has been only after the achievement of the European single market in 1992, that EU institutions started to care about services. The Directive 92/50 so called “service directive” attempted to contribute to the liberalisation of public sector services. To make the legal framework more homogenous in 1993 the supplies, works and utilities directives were adopted (93/36, 93/37 and 93/38). Almost 10 years later in 2004 the procurement legislation has been reformed following the principles of simplification and modernization. On the one hand the dichotomy between utilities and the rest of public sector has been firmly established, and on the other a new procurement procedures introduced, the “competitive dialogue” in case of very sensible contracts (2004/18/EC). The directive on Public Procurement in force is the 2014/EC. The

reform, setting common rules, aiming to homogenize the legislation on public procurements across the EUMSs, enables the public authorities to benefit from a greater flexibility in using the most appropriate instruments, aimed at satisfying the specific local and circumstantial requirements and needs (Alberti, 2015). Put in place the single market, public procurements became instruments for a more efficient use of public resources (Gisondi, 2015) (Gisondi, 2015). For this reason, a particular attention has been drawn to expenditure to results ratio, trying to avoid inefficiencies due to excessive rigidity of procedures and to anti-competitive practices, which are related to improper conducts and inappropriate economic actors behaviours.

Finally, the reform of 2014 takes into account the unforeseen events. In case of extreme urgency, exceptional situations and urgent needs, the public procurement directive foresees several possibilities to meet these kinds of extreme events, notwithstanding the provisions normally applicable, or awarding the contract without prior publication of contracts notice. For example, with regard to the current asylum crisis, the Commission has published a Communication to offer an overview of the public procurement possibilities for national authorities under the existing EU rules. Notably, the current Public Procurement Directive allows for an "accelerated restricted procedure" in cases of urgency and a negotiated procedure without prior publication in exceptional cases of extreme urgency. Moreover, the new Public Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU also provides for an "accelerated open procedure". All these existing provisions make it possible to award contracts quickly to address asylum seekers' urgent needs (EC, 2015)<sup>27</sup>. Based on the European legislation both in Italy and France the in application of the EU regulation, the system of public tenders has been reformed in 2016.

### **5.2.1.3 Welfare State and Social Policy**

While already at the beginning of XX century we can observe the first seeds of a French social security and then creation social insurances, however it is only after the Second World War, that we assisted to the birth and development of a social protection with a universalistic approach (Gacoin 2009).

Since its creation on October 4, 1945, Social Security administrations have had the objective of gradually extending social protection to all residents of the French territory. Each member of the national community has now the right to benefit a minimum standard of living, whether exercising a profession and regardless of the ability to contribute.

At the beginning of the second half of the century, the social policies not only experienced a large expansion in terms of people, who benefit from them, but also started to be treated on a sectorial basis. During 50s, although the most marginalised are not a priority yet, there is a kind of institutionalisation of the "*foyer*", the places where the necessary assistance is provided to the most deprived (Brigeon 2009). This marks however the beginning of the hosting policies for some categories of people, particularly in need.

---

<sup>27</sup> European Commission - Fact Sheet Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action - Questions and answers Strasbourg, 9 September 2015. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-15-5597\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5597_en.htm)

From 1980s a process of decentralization started, thereby a number of functions have been transferred from the ministries towards lower levels of government (regional, departmental and municipal authorities) In the same period, an increase of the rate of the poor population has been registered. Unemployment increased, while the differences among the richer and the poorer augmented. Finally after a massive mobilisation led by the TSOs among others social actors, in 1988 the minimum income was created (Jami, Pillant, Segura, 2015).

The 90s have been characterised by the increased use of market instruments under the logic of the New Public Management reforms. This trend has been confirmed by the reforms in 2000s. In 2002, Social Action Reform (*Réforme de l'Action Sociale*) reformed the social and social-health sector. The *Loi 2002-2* sustains a number of managerial practices included the implementation of the *Appel à Projet* as instrument to entrust the service; the evaluation of the facility's management instead of the service; evaluation and self-evaluation imperative; new system of pricing definition. The Act of 2 January 2002 renewing social and medico-social action defines a set of measures and interventions aimed to promote, in an interdepartmental framework, the autonomy of the citizenship, to prevent social exclusion and to promote social cohesion. It reaffirms the predominant place of users, intends to promote autonomy, the protection of persons and the exercise of their citizenship.

The reform is also based on a continuous assessment of the needs and expectations of the users, such as persons with disabilities, vulnerable individuals and families, elderly people, persons and families in precarious situations, and children.

In line with this reform the law 2002 the law 2005 as well bring the citizen in the middle of an approach aimed at activating him instead of supporting or taking him in charge. This approach of "empowerment" included a process whereby groups considered at risk of exclusion or in a precarious situation, learn and acquire the instruments to increase their capacity to face the difficulties and recover from the situation (Castel, 2011).



### 5.2.2 The Evolution of the Organizational Field

Today as never before, migration and integration policies have become a top political priority in the most part of European Member States' political agenda. France has a long tradition of offering asylum to foreign, even before the definition of the refugee status, in 1951 through the Genève convention and the right of asylum has constitutional value under French law. Public policies concerning asylum in France have always been closely linked to the activity of associations (based on the law 1901), and social and solidarity economy organisations. The associations from the beginning used to manage before the situation of migrants and then, after 1951, when through the Genève convention was established the status, refugees, that reached the country.

Departing from the beginning of 70s when the first structures for refugees have been created, the CPH "*Centres Provisoires d'Hébergement*" – Temporary Centre of Reception, the State took in charge the cost of the service, meanwhile the associations managed the service. At the beginning in line with the French associative tradition and with the law of 1975 on "Institutions Sociales et Médico-sociales", the task repartition has been characterised by a clear logic, the associations would have allowed to maintain a plurality of visions and values, thanks to an project construction. The State represented the guarantor of the general interest. In this way it has been possible to send the information from the bottom, local level, to higher level, regional and then governmental level. The sector is particularly interesting, because we can observe a very rapid change, at the institutional, market governance and organisational level.

At the beginning of 90s the legislative framework changed and the new law did not permit anymore to asylum seekers to work. Consequently they were not anymore able to provide for themselves. For this reason, the State, created a new specific structure for this audience, the CADA, reception centre for asylum seekers, breaking with the past and making a first, clear differentiation among migrants and nationals. The very rapid legislative evolution on migration policies, at national as well as European level strongly impacted the evolution of the structures finalised to the reception of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in general. In particular at international level we can observe a shift in competence among different public actors, with a clear shift of competencies from the ministry of social affairs to the ministry of interior.

Departing from 90s a global trend triggers a series of changes in the public sector, the application the New Public Management – NPM – reforms. In the current welfare mix the traditional governmental functions have evolved leaving the room for enhanced private sector involvement in the delivery of public social services whether TSOs, or for profit enterprise (Hood, 1991, Rhodes, 1996, Ferlie et al. 1996, Casady, Eriksson, Levitt and Scott, 2019). After centuries of Public Administration (PA) configuration of public management, the reorganization trend of the public sector defined the intervention of new actors and new institutional arrangements (Pollitt, Hood, Pettigrew, Ferlie). As already mentioned the PA model, characterised by high degree of hierarchical and bureaucratic control, formal procedures and direct State's intervention, is not questioned until the beginning of '70s. The reform of PA aimed at applying private values to public sector, in order to increase the efficiency and enhance the performance. Based on the idea of "steering but not rowing" (Osborne

and Gaebler, 1992), the NPM reforms advocate the adoption of managerial tools and market instruments (Ferlie, Ashburner, Pettigrew, & Fitzgerald, 1996; Hood, 1991, 1995; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, Sorrentino et al. 2018). Private actors offer the outsourced social services, and the public authorities–TSOs relationship is characterised by the move from management by hierarchy to management by contract. At national level we observed a redefinition in quantity and of public expenditure, impacting the market governance. The definition of a quasi-market through the implementation of specific funding instruments, before the “*appel à projet*” – call for project – and then “*appel d’offre*” – tenders – created a strong competition among organisations involved on the sector.

The contract-based relationship not only changed the kind of interaction among actors, but also the way of defining the quantity, and the way of delivering resources that associations needed for developing the services. So if during 90s, the ascending project, based on the bottom-up approach left room to associations to define their services and bargain the quantity of resources, the contract based funding system enacted a top down dynamic. Very punctual criteria set in calls for tender and progressive introduction of quantitative indicators have reduced the degree of choice for associations. Nowadays associations are funded for the implementation of specific tasks, which are clearly defined in the book of specifications (*cahier de charges*) and with extreme difficulties to find time and resources to implement activities out of the list.

These three levels of analysis could offer a picture of the main changes on the reception system for asylum seekers in the last decades in France. Analysing how they changed, we will first trace the changes that happened in the organizational field and in particular the evolution of number and kind of actors involved. We will also explore the inter-organization relationship and the evolution of the sector, which constantly grew up for in numbers reaching in 2017 a total of among 80,000 accommodations for almost 400 structures involved.

**Table 5.4 The Number of CADA, Accommodation places, and Demands for Asylum 1997-2017**

Years	Number of CADA	Number of accommodation	Number of demands for asylum first registration
1997	58	3,470	21,416
1998	61	3,588	22,463
1999	63	3,781	30,807
2000	73	4,756	38,747
2001	83	5,282	47,291
2002	151	10,317	50,730
2003	181	12,480	52,172
2004	222	15,460	50,514
2005	245	17,689	42, 267
2006	268	19,424	35 520
2007	274	19,410	35,520*
2008	271	20,410	42,599*
2009	271	20,410	47,689*
2010	279	21,330	52,762*
2011	270	21,410	57,377*
2012	270	21,410	61,468*
2013	264	23,393	66,251
2014	265	24,411	64,811
2015	257	28,104	80,075
2016	326	37,300	85,700
2017	384	39,697	100,142°

Source: if not differently mentioned the OFPRA, \* ofii, ° Cimade.

In the following sections we will describe the main steps of to the inter-organisational dynamics of the reception system in France. Three main sequences will be described: the first one from 70s to 90s, the foundation of the system of reception; the second one from beginning of 90s to middle of 2000s the definition of the “market”, and finally the third, from 2000s to 2017, the increase of competition.

In order to develop this analysis we used a number different sources, included interviews, reports delivered by the public authorities and associations involved in the sector of the reception and other services delivered to asylum seekers and refugees, such as the CIMADE association newspapers’ articles and official data published by the OFPRA. The retrospective interviews have been collected during the period 11/2017 – 08/2018. The 36 interviews collected concerning the French field are mainly face-to-face interviews, excepted for the French administration, based in Paris. The interviewed include: EU experts (Members of European Parliament, migration policy advisor of think tank and international organisations based in Brussels); French representatives from public administration from ministry of interior and OFII;

French national experts; social workers and directors of different associations based in Marseille, France. These interviews, for an average duration of 1h, are all transcribed and registered when it has been possible.

Finally in order to trace the institutional evolution, we also analysed the most important *circulaires*, selected with the help of the key actors in the sector, and the text of the public tenders - *appel à projet* - with in annex the text of the *cahier de charge*. A complete list of official documents consulted has been provided in chapter 3.

### *The First Period from 70s - 90s: Laying the Foundations*

After the Second World War, in 1951 the Geneva Convention has been signed, relating to the Status of Refugees. The convention defines the term ‘refugee’ and outlines the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obligations of States to protect them. During 70s the first migration flows towards France have been experienced, particularly from the countries such as Chile, where Pinochet established a military dictatorship, and from the former French colonies, and departments from North Africa, and the “boat-people” fled Vietnam. During the 50s the reception and accommodation of migrants as well as other people in economic distress has been managed by charitable organizations (Bregeon, 2009). Actually, these kinds of structures were involved in the sustain of marginalised people, who were not only poor but also not integrated, socially and into the labour market (Castel, 1995). This slice of population did not represent a priority for the public and social policies of the time and all during 50s, the charitable organizations, mostly religious organizations, operated an intervention aimed at receiving homeless, and vagabonds. There were not a truly project of social rehabilitation, but instead a social sustain, without a long-term project for the person in need.

In 1974, the CHRS “*Centre Hébergement Readaptation Sociale*”,<sup>28</sup> namely a hosting centre for social redeployment has been established by law. The law imposes just one criterion for having access to the service: being an “*individu à la marge*”, a marginalised person or family without sufficient revenues. Without any distinction based on nationality or kind of need expressed, the centres could host any person with very serious economic difficulties. The local associations increasingly started to ask for recognition as CHRS, in order to deliver this kind of service of reception.

In the same period, due to the increasing flows of people arriving from the South America, it has been created an “exceptional” structure, specialised in this particular category, was the “*Centres Provisoires de Hébergement*” (CPH) – temporary centres of reception - created as experimentation for Chilean Refugees<sup>29</sup>. The centres were aimed at receiving only this category of migrants, namely people who were already covered by protection, the refugees. A committee of three associations, the Cimade, Secours Catholique, France Terre d’Asile, coordinated the reception of refugees. The creation of the CPH, in the Paris area, although implemented as temporary solution, marked however the formal taking-over by the French State of the refugees based on

---

<sup>28</sup> *Loi n°74-955 CASF*. Code de la famille et de l'aide sociale. 19 -11- 1974

<sup>29</sup> Articles 185 CASF Code de la famille et de l'aide sociale.

the social assistance, and created a key milestone for the institutionalisation of a national reception system. Actually, in the 1975, the public authorities entrusted the management of CPH to the France Terre d'Asile Association – FTDA, (Dufour, 2006), stipulating an economic agreement and enlarging the audience to other nationalities. More than 30 CPH have been created, across the national territory. The DNA – *Dispositive National d'Accueil*, the national system of reception, was set up, under the supervision of the “*direction de la population et des migrations*“ Population and Migration Department (DPM), ministry of social affairs

In 1974, France also closed its borders, significantly altering migration dynamics. This decision was aimed at discouraging immigration for the purpose of labour, while more migrants already in the national territories sought to bring their families in France. But irregular migration did not stop instantaneously and to prevent the entrance of migrants into the national territory from the port of Marseille, where the boats used to arrive, a first centre of administrative detention was created in a hangar, managed by the association ADRIM, where sanitary conditions and standards of hygiene were wretchedly poor (Fischer, 2017). In parallel, the State took in charge the situation of the regular migrant workers arriving from the North Africa. Actually the Ministry of the Interior created a singular housing company, the SANACOTRA, nowadays ADOMA a mixed society, with the specific goal to build and administer accommodation for unmarried guest workers living in France (Bernardot, 1999). This choice was due to prevent the poor and degraded suburbs, which were growing up around Paris, Lyon and Marseille.

During '80s the number of asylum seekers augmented, even more than the number of refugees (Masse, 1996). In this period the French State entrusted humanitarian and social assistance for asylum seekers and refugees to an organisation active in the defence of rights of foreigners: La Cimade. From 1984 (and until 2009), thanks to an agreement with the Ministry of Social Affairs, La Cimade was the only association present in the administrative detention centres (CRA) in the metropolitan area across all the country. Created with the aim of offering material support, the mission quickly evolved into legal assistance for people being deported to the border and to supervise on the conditions of detention (Arbogast, 2016).

From an institutional prospective, the policies concerning the migrants have been managed for almost 40 years, from the second world war, by three different ministries: the ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs. To have access to the national territory migrants needed a visa, which was an exclusive competence of the Ministry of External affairs, in Paris as well as through the network of consulates abroad, to develop the contacts with the origin countries. The ministry of social affairs was in charge of the material needs for the regular migrants. In particular, the department of population and migration, DPM, dealt with the social protection of migrants. Finally the ministry of Interior, and the network of the *Prefectures*, was in charge of delivering all the residence permits, ensuring the first contact at the French borders, and finally controlling and fighting the illegal migration.

Meanwhile at the European level, the process of unification continued. The Schengen Agreement is a treaty, discussed during the late 80s and finally signed in 1985, which led to the creation of Europe's Schengen Area, in which internal border checks have

largely been abolished. Meanwhile the borders across Europe became easier to cross for European Citizens, the opposite was for people coming from outside Europe, because of the Dublin convention. Within the EU, the implementation and broadening of the Schengen agreement during the 1990s made migration within and between EU member states significantly easier. But at the opposite made even more difficult the migration from outside (Lahav, 1998; more). Most part of EU countries have converged towards more restrictive policies and reform to control immigration, and informed by the recommendations of European Commission, they drifted towards a tightening of channels for legal migration and tightening of asylum recognition (European Commission 2016, p 39).

In 1991, a true turnaround is based on two main points, firstly in September 1991 the interdiction of working for asylum seekers was introduced, during the period of the application for protection. As main consequence, this reform implied a remarkable reduction in economic independence of asylum seekers, and on the other hand, the growth of illegal work (Kobelinsky, 2015). Secondly the *circulaire* n°91-22<sup>30</sup> established the CADA – reception centres for asylum seekers. Asylum seekers may reside in special temporary housing facilities called “*centres d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile*”, while their asylum applications being processed. The CADAs created a further breakdown in the context of the social policies, after the creation of the CPH. As above-mentioned, until the reform, asylum seekers, when needed, were hosted in the standard national system of sustain for people in economic distress, the CHRS, while the refugees in the CPH.

From an organizational point of view while FTDA and CIMADE are two organisations born with the mission of assistance and take care of migrants, the organisations managing the CHRS were mostly local associations, with a background on social affairs, and created to answer to local needs. The classic dynamics among the ministry of social affairs and CHRS was the project had been defined by the association and then submitted for the founding process. It was a bottom up process, defined by the participation of different actors, and included associations, from the grassroots, at the most local level, which actively offer the service. Depending on the local context, the bottom-up approach makes issues like social cohesion, concertation and decision-making transparency, very relevant. At very local level cooperation among different organisations was based in sharing of resources and employees, sharing of working spaces, and coordinating answer to social needs.

The cooperation was also at the base of the new born reception for refugees sector, during ‘70s, when the Refugees Coordination, a confederal platform of the five associations - Cimade, French Red Cross, FTDA, SSAE and Secours catholique – was created. All of them differently participated in the management of the national reception system. In collaboration with the State, they shared the reception tasks: FTDA coordinated the national system in order to manage the entry into the centres; the Red Cross took care of the reception of the exiles at the borders; SSAE and Secours Catholique welcomed those who do not have a place in the centres; finally the Cimade provided trainings, particularly for the social workers but also outside the centres of reception.

---

<sup>30</sup> The *circulaire* n° 91-22 19 -12- 1991

Concerning the resources, if until the 70s the charitable organizations were basically independent by the public funds, then the situation changed. During the decades, particularly following the campaign organised in the 80s by the associations in order to highlight the need for sustain social categories in extreme poverty, the State enlarged its intervention on social policies. The CHRS as well as the CPH and the CADA have been funded by the State from the beginning. Under the law 1975<sup>31</sup>, social institutions and social health the project has supposed to be defined as ascendant. Actually, the freedom of the association or the actor in charge of the service remains very important, and determinates the conceptualization of the law, which is actually based on the distinction between the associations – managing body - and the activities implemented. Only these latter are subjected to public control, which is under the legislation are denominated the "establishments" then, later, the "services". The management bodies, the associations remain free from the public authorities control both in term of condition of its foundation and operations. In principle, this construction guarantees both the respect of the fundamental legal framework constituted by on the one hand the freedom of the association, and on the other the exercise of the public control on enactment of the social policies. Coherently it maintains both a upward logic in line of the associations' freedom, but also a downward logic necessary for the public supervision. In this period we observed consolidation and enlargement of social hosting as kind of social aid, and the institutionalisation of a practice not anymore informal but professionalised. In the following decades the number of associations involved in the sector grew rapidly (Bregeon, 2009).

**Table 5.5 The Organizational Field 1970s - 1990s**

<b>Level of Analysis</b>	<b>Description</b>
Institutional Level	3 Different Ministry in Charge: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Social Affairs (DPM) and DDSS</li> <li>- Ministry of Interior</li> <li>- Ministry of Foreign Affairs</li> </ul>
Governance	The service of reception for asylum seekers, received in generalist structures for people without an adequate income, is set up by associations, re-funded by the public authorities (local or regional) based on the cost incurred and on the bargaining procedures.
Resources	Based on the needs of the organizations a total budget is defined to finance the service

<sup>31</sup> Loi Institutions Social et Medico-Social, 30 -06 -1975

### *Second period 2000s: Definition of the sector and creation of a market*

Departing from 90s in Europe we assisted to an acceleration of reforms aimed at privatization and marketization- introduced through approaches influenced by New Public Management (NPM). The social policies have not been immune, including the policies of reception for asylum seekers. At the root of these reforms was the imposition of market logic where it was absent until then, hoping to benefit from the competitive pressures exerted through marketization, and in turn making more efficient the public service. Pollitt and Dan (2011) state that the concepts of economy, efficiency and effectiveness have played a central role in the rhetoric of NPM reformers who have advocated them by pursuing specific goals. NPM reformers have argued that the reduction or lowering of inputs – in a word cost reduction (Economy), and or output increase for the same inputs or outputs steady for inputs decreasing (Efficiency) were crucial values to manage public sector as well as effectiveness (to reach the objectives). In the sector of reception, the application of these reforms went parallel to the institutionalization of the sector, which before was blurred among different policies. During the 2000s, the migration reception market came to the light progressively, based on different legal and organizational changes of the field. In particular, the reform of the DNA, national system of reception, the reform of the Social Law, which among others severely reformed the way of funding the structures which provide social services and the creation of a number of reception structures alternative to the CADA.

**Table 5.6 Number of CADA 1997-2001**

YEAR	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
N° OF CADA	58	61	63	83	151
N° ACCOMODATION	3,470	3,588	3,781	5,282	10,317
N° ASYLUM SEEKERS	21,416	22,463	30,807		38,747

Source: if not differently mentioned the OFPRA, \* ofii, ° Cimade.

Firstly, in order to make more homogenous the ordinary instrument of reception, the CADA, has been reformed in 2000<sup>32</sup>. In order to homogenise the service, but also to cut the costs (as specified in the *circulaire*<sup>33</sup>) the public authority listed four missions: the reception and hosting of asylum seekers, the social medical and administrative support, the schooling of children and the support to rejected asylum seekers while leaving the centre. The public authorities although indicating a suitable ratio social workers / beneficiaries (ETP) one to ten, also indicated that, considered the delicate tasks the association in charge of the service is called to answer, an accurate evaluation of the number of the team members and of their skills is necessary. A number of asylum seekers' needs are covered, such as the travel to the OFPRA

<sup>32</sup> Circulaire MES/DPM n° 2000-170 du 29 mars 2000

<sup>33</sup> Circulaire MES/DPM n° 2000-170 du 29 mars 2000 “*relative aux missions des centres d'accueil des demandeurs d'asile (CADA)*”



interviews or school's materials. The other resources are calculated based on the kind of reception delivered and in particular on the kind of catering service, individual or collective.

Furthermore, the decree in 2001 defined the CADA, as a specialised of CHRS<sup>34</sup>, managed under the *Code de l'Action Sociale et de Famille*, while its work governed by *circulaires* issued by the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity. It is financed by the State under the social assistance, an association or a company manages it, while the budget control is provided by the DDASS - *Directeur Départemental des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales*. (Van Erkelens, 2005).

Since the law n° 2003-1176 of December 10th, 2003, the CADA are under the supervision of the OFII, French officer for immigration and integration. Then Law No. 2006-911 of 24 July 2006 on immigration and integration has largely reformed the reception system for asylum seekers, making the CADA a category of establishment in its own right (paragraph 13 of Article L312-1 of the CASF).

The problem of reducing the cost for social expenses was at the core of the political debate. As declared by the parliamentary acts in 2000 concerning the budget for health and social affairs, despite the efforts to contain the costs, and because of the modality of funding the service, public authorities could prevent with difficulty extra-expenses. The *commission des finances* wrote:

*“In the area of population and migration, the initial budget estimates for the two years 1999 and 2000, were overwhelmed by the need for social care of displaced persons from Kosovo (nearly 8,000 Kosovars have been received in France from April 1999, among them 6,500 were accommodated in centres of reception, and about 3,800 were still receiving social support during the year 2000: 1,720 in the shelters and 2,110 received other kinds of services). These last years also registered a sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers: 30,900 in 1999 against 17,400 in 1996”.* (Parliamentary Acts 2001).

In a context of budget restrictions for social policies, the instrument of the subsidy<sup>35</sup> - namely a financial contribution dispensed by a public authority to a management body for the development of a service of general interest - had been reputed not anymore suitable, in order to exercise a descendent control on the public expenses (Cour des Comptes 2004). Furthermore, a number of detailed indicators would be requested in order to comply with the LOLF - *loi de finances* - of 2001, which has the objective to improve the relation between cost and efficiency in the frame of public policies. In reality, the migration and reception policies did not comply with these requirements particularly in terms of budget control.

In 2002 after a long discussion the law 2002 has been approved. The CADA, as well as other social structures, are concerned by the obligations contained in the law n° 2002-2.

---

<sup>34</sup> based on the Decree 3 - 07- 2001.

<sup>35</sup> The CADA benefits from a “*dotation globale de financement*”, regulated in the framework of the decree n° 88-279, 24 -03- 1988, which concerns the structure of the budget and accounting of social structures, funded with public money.

According to this logic, the “*appel à projet*” - call for projects - has been introduced as an authorization practice and funding system, changing rapidly the dynamics of the sector. As already mentioned, before, the project was defined by the association and then submitted to a funding process. It was a bottom-up process, characterised by the participation. The introduction of the “*appel à projet*” totally changed the mechanisms. The definition of a market, where a number of associations are supposed to compete to gain the market, also created a different relationship among actors at very local level. Where cooperation and alliances on specific thematic were the dominant strategies of small associations, nowadays competition arises. In this way, even if the legislative and regulatory framework places the CADA outside the scope of the public procurement code, they do not however receive direct grants, but instead associations are called to take part to competitive tenders in order to become the provider of the service.

**Table 5.7 Number of CADA 2001-2006**

YEAR	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
N° OF CADA	151	181	222	245	258
N° ACCOMODATION	10,317	12,480	15,460	17,689	19,424*
N° ASYLUM SEEKS	50,730	52,172	50,514	42,267	35,520

Source: if not differently mentioned the OFPRA, \* ofii, ° Cimade.

Another kind of competition is based on the multiplication of structures. The increase in number of arrivals (even if not yet call emergency), motivated the public actors to reorganise the system of reception. So new structures different than the CADA were created. These new structures AT-SA, HUDA, and others, were still managed by associations and funded by public authorities but under different conditions than those used for the CADA. Firstly, the contracts are short term (2-3 years compared to 15 for the CADA), and the missions less focused on social support and more on administrative one. Furthermore the price is significantly lower compared to the one in a CADA, which was at the time around 25 euros. Finally, the population accepted includes the *Dublinés* in contrast with the CADA. The asylum seekers under Dublin procedures start to increase, due to the Eurodac regulation<sup>36</sup>, even if it is after the implementation of the Hotspot strategy that the number climbed up more significantly. The most part of the associations already in charge of a CADA, started to open also these different kinds of reception centres.

Concerning the institutional framework, in 2007 the government Sarkozy created the Ministry for Immigration (*Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire*).

The idea behind was to merge all the procedures related to asylum seeking in one public office, to end the 40 years of split into three different ministries. In order to centralise the decisions a number of agency was reorganised. In 2007, the OFPRA the French office for the protection of refugees and stateless, which was under the control of the external affairs, was moved under the ministry of immigration, with the role to process the asylum requests. In the same period, 2005, the OFPRA drafted the first

<sup>36</sup> See external context and chapter 5

list of safe countries in order to make more restrictive the asylum policies. The other agency is the OFII<sup>37</sup>, a public institution under the supervision of the Ministry of Immigration as well, which deals with the issues related to integration and monitoring of foreigners living in France. In line with the centralization of decisions, in 2004, the State decided to internalise the management of the DNA, which had been managed since the creation by the association FTDA. The OFII, previously ANEM, was entrusted of the service and the redistribution of asylum seekers across the national territory, which became one of its most important services together with the assisted voluntary return programme. Finally in 2010, the office passed under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior.

**Table 5.8 Number of CADA 2007-2011**

YEAR	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
N° OF CADA	274*	271*	279	270	270*
N° ACCOMODATION	19,410*	20,410*	20,410*	21,330*	21,410*
N° ASYLUM SEEKS	35,520*	42,599*	47,689*	52,762*	57,337*

Source: if not differently mentioned the OFPRA, \* ofii, ° Cimade.

Concerning the inter-organizational dynamics, at the end of the 1990s, under the pressure of new associations, including *Forum Réfugiés*, which during the 90s experienced an increase in specialization and professionalization, as well as in size, the privileged role of the 4 associations part of the *Coordination Réfugiés* is questioned. These four associations, which had stipulated an agreement of distribution

<sup>37</sup> The OFII has been created under the name of ONI *Office national d'immigration* the national office of immigration. At the beginning of 50s was in charge of the recruitment of foreign workers under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (recruitment of workers) and the Ministry of Public Health and Population (medical examinations of foreigners). Foreigners, particularly Italian, played a crucial role in the reconstruction of the country after the war. But during 70s the scenario changed and the economic crisis pushed the public authorities to close the borders (1974). In this context the ONI changed its mission, starting to deal with particularly the family reconciliation, and the assisted voluntary return programme. During 80s the name changed to become OMI *office des migrations internationales* the office of international migration. During 90s the main task of the OMI became the integration of migrant workers, the most part arriving from Maghreb and Poland. At the beginning of 2000s another task is added to the mission of the office: the control of the CRA - *Centre retention administrative*- Administrative centre of detention for irregular migrants. Finally in 2003 starts to deal with the asylum, and in particular it has been in charge of the management of the DNA, which for almost 40 years had been managed by the association FTDA. Under the government Sarkozy, the OFII, still under the name of ANAEM, falls under the supervision of the newborn Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development (MIINDS). Finally in 2010 the OFII passed under the control of the Ministry of Interior.

of tasks during the 70s, had evolved very differently. For instance, if the association FTDA became very closed to the public authorities<sup>38</sup>, other such as the CIMADE association, became even more radical in criticising the policies and the operate of the public actors in the field of migration<sup>39</sup>. During 2000s, the number of asylum seekers continued to augment such as the number of places in CADA even if not enough to cover all the needs). The local associations at the very beginning of 2000s started to operate as CADA officially, due to the high presence of asylum seekers in their CHRS structures, which, even if they remained opened to these kinds of audience, did not cover the needs expressed by asylum seekers. As shown in table 5.8, and 5.9 the number of CADA rapidly evolved.

In addition, during 2000s the imposition of quasi market changed the inter-organizations relationships and the relations with the State, which trough the instruments such as the *cahier de charges* could impose a higher degree of control on the structures, and not only in terms of budget. The reform of the CADA in 2000 defining a list of tasks supposed to be developed by the association had been a first step in this direction. Actually in the following decades and through an increasing detailed cahier de charge only the listed activates could be developed reducing the margin of freedom of the associations in charge of the service. Finally, the competition imposed through tenders defined as well new dynamics, as the collaboration spirit left the place to the concurrence for always more scarce resources. However particularly at the local level, the new born CADA tried to create space of collaboration. In particular the new services asked them new and very specific competencies, particularly concerning the administrative and juridical aspects. Trainings were commonly organised, exchange of documents and information were experimented in order to answer to these kinds of exigencies<sup>40</sup>.

One of the main changes is the internalization of the DNA. For instance, the association FTDA until the early 2000s was in charge of coordinating the national reception system. In this role, the association, created in the 70s with the aim of receiving refugees from Chile in 70s, was in charge of establishing in each department a reception scheme, as well as for the creation of platforms of domiciliation, reception, information and orientation of the asylum seekers arriving. Once the OFII took the charge of the DNA, the FTDA lost one of the most important activities, and an internal reorganisation became essential<sup>41</sup>. In order to continue to operate and maintaining however a very closed link with the public authorities, FTDA, following the example of Adoma, increased the number of centres of reception under its control, rapidly becoming one of the most important management bodies. Concerning the organization Adoma, the transition to the new sector of activity continued, as the more traditional audience the single Algerian workers, continued to decrease as they were not anymore interested in this kind of housing solution but motivated to integrate themselves, together with their families.

---

<sup>38</sup> Interview FTDA1

<sup>39</sup> Interview CIMADE

<sup>40</sup> Interview association 1.1

<sup>41</sup> Interview FTDA1.

**Table 5.9 The Organizational Field during 2000s**

Level of Analysis	Description
Institutional Level	Ministry of Immigration, National Identity and Development (MIIINDS) The agency OFII and Ofpra, became more central and have been displaced under the supervision of the MIIINDS.
Governance	Under the social action law 2002 the associations are funded by competitive tender, the “ <i>appel à projet</i> ”, and managed through “ <i>cahier de charge</i> ”
Resources	Based on the price indicated in the public tenders, discussed in details each year during the phase budget control

Source: the Author, 2019

### ***The Third Period 2010s: Competition and Homogenization***


In 2010 the Ministry for Immigration has been suppressed and the competencies transferred to the Ministry of Interior, specifically from 2013 to the Foreigners General National Direction (*Direction générale des étrangers en France*). From the 1st of January 2010 the OFII - *The Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration* (OFII, French Office for Immigration and Assimilation) in charge to manage all the National Reception System, is moved to the Interior Ministry, in the *Direction générale des étrangers en France - DGEF*. Strong of the experience resulting from its seventy years of activity, the OFII in 2010s plays a leading role in the reception, accompaniment and integration of foreigners. While the time for recruiting foreign workers is over, the OFII is now turning to essential tasks. The OFII is primarily responsible for the reception and integration of immigrants who have obtained a first residence permit: they sign the Republican Integration Contract (CIR). The OFII also is in charge of assistance for the return and reintegration of foreigners who leave France voluntarily. The Ofpra remains in charge of the application process for asylum.

During this period the concerns regarding the growing expenses, pushed the Ministry of Interior together with the Ministry of work and employment, and the Ministry of finance, to entrust the *Inspection générale des finances*, the *Inspection générale des affaires sociales* and the *Inspection générale de l'Administration* to draft the report on “the reception and the undertaking of asylum seekers”. The report aimed at evaluating the services of reception, understanding the reasons behind the increase of expenses and finding a way to cut them where possible. Actually the report found three main

reasons: firstly an evident increase in the number of asylum seekers in arrive; secondly the complexity of procedures which makes them quite long, making the “fluidité de flux” – migration flows’ fluidity very slow; thirdly, the quantitative indicators of occupancy rate and undue presence were not in line with the expectations. The inspectors highlighted that, although the price of the service constantly decreased from 26.2 euros in 2010 to 24.4 in 2012 and 24 in 2013, a major effort in terms of management optimization of the structures is however required. One of the solutions has been found in the development of urgency centre of reception. This kind of centres are, as already mentioned, more flexible, thanks to short term contracts of 2-3 years, and less expensive, as the daily price par person is lower (15 euros for the Praha for example). There are also less complicated to set up, as the *cahier des charges* is less demanding in terms of tasks to be solved. The quality of the CADA, in average is evidently higher than in these kinds of centres, as recognised from the authorities in charge of the report. But one of the main objectives, clearly expressed, is to decrease the costs. If the resolution set in 2011, namely decreasing the price to 15 euros par day, it is not already achievable, a number of actions are required in order to cut cost and improve the efficiency to tend to this objective.

Started at the beginning of 2000s, the process of diversification of reception centres continued, and accelerated in the last 3 years, as shown in the picture. The system remains a binary one: on the one hand the CADA, the ordinary reception, and the other the exceptional conceived to cope with the so-called “refugees emergency”.

**Figure 5.6 The Evolution of French Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers**



Source: the Author, 2020.

Nowdays, the CADA are regulated under the Article L348-1 CASF and article L744-3 CESEDA. The CADA, which could be both collective reception centres and scattered housing in apartments (private housing), are finalised to accommodate asylum seekers having registered a claim, under normal or accelerated procedure. Asylum seekers under a Dublin procedure are excluded from these centres. If there is no place in a reception centre, the asylum seekers are placed on a waiting list, in the

meantime, they will be directed to other provisional accommodation solutions, when these are available. As shown by the different tables, the number of CADA increased constantly: in 2001 there were only 5,283 CADA accommodations across France. Today there are more than 40,400 accommodations for around 350 structures. The CADA are still nowadays assigned through “*appel à projet*”, even if frequently, particularly after 2015 and the last reform of public contracts, authorities discussed the application of the public market. The contract lasts 15 years and the daily price par person today is 19.50 euros.

All the other structures are defined emergency structure, to highlight their temporary character. This is the situation in 2017: The AT-SA *Accueil Temporaire Service d’asile* 6,000 places; HUDA “*Hébergement d’urgence demandeurs d’asile*” 15,000 places; CPH *Centre Provisoire Hébergement* 2,300; CAO *Centre Accueil et Orientation* 10,700 places; DPAR “*Dispositif Préparatoire au Retour*” 10,000 places; CHUM *Centre Hébergement Urgence Migrants*; CARDA; *Hébergement Dublinés* (Ile de France); CAES *Centre d’accueil et d’Examen de Situation Administrative*; CPO *Centre de pré-orientation*; PRAHDA *Programme d’Accueil et d’hébergement demandeur d’asile* 5,351.

The Prahda, *Programme d’Accueil et d’Hébergement des Demandeurs d’Asile* - Reception and Accommodation Program for Asylum Seekers, is officially an evolution of the CAO, the “*dispositif d’hébergement d’urgence*”, created to solve the Calais crisis. In 2017, There are in France a total of 62 Prahda for 5351places (Cimade, 2016) all managed by Adoma.

**Table 5.10 Number of CADA 2012 -2017**

YEARS	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
N° OF CADA	270*	264*	265*	257*	326*	384*
N° ACCOMODATION	21,410*	23,393°	24,411°	28,104°	37,300°	39,697°
N° ASYLUM SEEKS	61,468*	66,251	64,811	80,075	85,700	100,142

Source: if not differently mentioned the OFPRA, \* ofii, ° Cimade.

All during 2010s the CADA structure is reformed, and new instruments are implemented, aimed at improving the control of the cost on the one hand, and enhancing the performance of the structures, on the other. Already in 2011, the ministry Besson drafted a new law, imposing new quantitative indicators and detailed indications for the management bodies. For instance, a cost reference guide has been drawn up, which indicates the unit cost for certain services. This instrument appears to be particularly useful for the credit manager, the delegate of the prefecture, in charge of conducting the management dialogue with the association. The management dialogue, “*dialogue de gestion*”, can be defined as "the whole process of exchanges between two different hierarchical or managerial levels, concerning the resources and the objectives assigned and their ratio". Basically it is an instrument finalised at defining the objectives and the necessary means to achieve them ". Concretely, it leads to develop the budget. Conceived as an instrument to organise the different roles

in the framework of the public actions, it concerns different aspects: performance; programming of activities and means (Sanjuar & Lucas, 2006). The challenges of the management dialogue are mainly the optimization of management, the definition of the performance and the level of resources required to obtain it. After a verified analysis based mainly on quantitative elements, the dialogue makes possible to establish the link between the performance and the resources available. The way to achieve this result is a methodology and an organization. In terms of methodology, as conceived the management dialogue it makes clear an unavoidable link between the budget (means) and the performance (purposes). They retain that this budgetary instruments could result useful in order to consider potentially new solutions, allowing an efficiency gain (such as mergers and organizations' grouping) (IGF, IGAS, IGA, 2013).

Concerning the efforts of optimization, one of the most discussed instruments is the *taux d'indu*, the ratio of undue presence into the structure, basically the ratio of accepted or rejected demands out of the total number of people hosted. As the CADA is supposed to host only asylum seekers, all the population not under procedure, both because already accepted or rejected, has to leave the structure. While the refugees have 3 months (plus 3) to leave, in the case of rejected procedures the person has only one month. In 2011 the reform, not only reduce the ratio of undue people, which passes for refugees from max 8% to max 3% and in case of rejected demand to max 4%, but also introduced an economic sanction for the associations which do not comply with the rules. Sanctions could be the a reduction of the budget for the successive year. The law also increase the minimum rate of occupation, which passes from 95% minimum to 97% minimum.

In 2015 a very debated new law reformed the Asylum. The reform also impacted the CADA structures. Firstly the law established that the distribution of the ATA, the pocket money allocated to asylum seekers under procedure, was not anymore a task in charge of the associations, management bodies, but instead, managed by the OFII. In line with the previous provision, implemented in 2011, in 2016 the price for person / day decreased again to 19.50 euros. Furthermore a critical size of 85 persons par structure has been declared. The smaller associations have been forced to conform to the law, and in some occasion to increase in size.

The new *Cahier de charge* (particularly departing 2015) openly shows a preference towards the medium big associations. Some of them ask for not less than 60 asylum seekers received, so a minimum threefold has been fixed. Others simply show that large numbers imply higher fund par person and reduction of certain costs, due to possible. The big associations can reduce their price thanks to the economy of scale but also because in the most part of the case (Adoma for instance is a pioneer on it) they are owners of the structures where the service is offered. They have a comparative advantage to the small and local association, which are almost never the owner of their infrastructures, and cannot benefit from a reduction of the cost due the avoided rent. Some small associations reacted by merging, or specialising themselves into a very specific slice of audience.



Data for 2017 speaks quite clearly<sup>42</sup>: there are six big associations dominating the market of CADA, managing half of the market in term of structures. The “four big” and so called by practitioners “national associations” dominates the market. They are big associations, already present in the industry of the migration, but in a very specific area, and now developing a large spectrum of services, and answering to a large number of “*appel à projet*”. In 2017 there are a total of 332 CADA and almost 40,000 places (Data Cimade, 2017).

- 34 FTDA France Terre d'Asile
- 60 ADOMA
- 48 COALLIA
- 11 CRF
- 9 Group SOS
- 8 Forum Réfugiés

Gérard Noiriel (1991) points out that the associations, in France, when funded by public money, began gradually to be submitted to “bureaucratic standards” and became the privileged actors in charge of the social assistance, ensuring State’s control in this sphere. Not all the organizations decided to follow the new rule of the game. One of them for example the Cimade, decided to keep a militant identity. Actually, the contrasts between the Cimade and the public authorities, concerning the migration policies are long-standing, and in particular they concern the detention. Nowadays migrant detention centres fall into various categories: airport/port waiting areas where foreigners are intercepted at the border when they are not in possession of valid documents (up to 24 days); administrative detention centres (CRA) where undocumented workers present on French territory are held (up to 45 days); and police stations and administrative detention rooms (LRA) which can hold migrants for a short period (2 to 4 days). In 2016, there were 24 administrative detention centres, 67 waiting areas and 19 “administrative detention rooms” in France. According to data from the organisations working in the field of administrative detention, almost 50,000 individuals were detained in administrative detention centres and facilities in 2015 (Arbogast, 2016).

Since the 70s, when the DNA was created, and until 31 December 2009 thanks to an agreement with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Cimade was the only organisation working in the field of administrative detention in the metropolitan area across all the country. Created with the aim of offering material support, the mission quickly evolved into legal assistance for people being deported to the border and to supervise on the conditions of detention (Arbogast, 2016).

Since 2010, the Ministry of interior opens public tenders and four other TSOs have been mandated by the State to provide legal assistance to detained foreign nationals. Nothing in the call for tenders prevents private for-profit companies from submitting a bid in the future. This development results from the government policy of putting associations into competition to obtain the management contract. This particular situation made the Cimade even more conscious that it was necessary to change the strategy of funding in order to maintain a high degree of autonomy<sup>43</sup>. For this reason,

---

<sup>42</sup> See also chapter 5

<sup>43</sup> Interview CIMADE1

the association in the last years drastically reduced the percentage of public funds covering its expenses (around 5% in 2017<sup>44</sup>). To do so, the association progressively changed the composition of the team, reducing the number of paid workers - the most part are lawyers working in the central office of Paris - and relying on a majority of volunteers. They receive a number of training, pay the subscription at the beginning of the year, and help on the organization of events, protests, and daily support to asylum seekers in the centres or during the permanence. By contrast with other associations, the Cimade decided to apply a different strategy of funding, instead of changing the service, as others did before.

**Table 5.11 the Organizational Field 2010s**

Level of Analysis	Description
Institutional Level	Ministry of Interior
Governance	The public tenders create a strong competition; the quantitative indicators facilitates economies of scales
Resources	Price and quantity are imposed by public authorities; objectives-based funding system (quantitative indicators)

Source: Author 2019

### 5.2.3 Considerations on the French Case

The table 5.13 summarizes the evolution of the organizational field in France. The reception for asylum seekers has been for a long time under the supervision of the social policies ministers, and the structures created to manage the integration of the asylum seekers had been conceived as very similar to other kinds of structure aimed at helping other categories of people in need for support in reintegration. This was until the beginning of 2000s when, due to the international and European changes and pressures, the ministry in charge became first the ministry of immigration and then ministry of interior. This is due to the securization of the migration policies as shown in the previous paragraphs. In the meantime, the reception also changed due to the system of funding, not anymore based on grants for TSOs but on competitive public tenders and “appels à projet”. The marketization of the system and the imposition of quantitative performance indicators had an impact both on the activities and on the structure of the organizations. The observed trend of professionalization was led by contractual requests, competition but also by the always more technical character of the procedures for asylum requests. The small and local associations have been partly replaced by the big ones, while others, as shown in the next chapter in details, acquire a new organizational behaviour based on maximization of economies of scale.

<sup>44</sup> Interview CIMADE, interview FARS

Finally, public authorities, under the claim for homogenising the service at national level, on the one hand, decreased the price per day of the service, making always harder for small associations to remain in the sector and on the other, edited an always more detailed “*cahier des charges*”. As observed in the analysis, the list of tasks has changed over time and the number of the organizational tasks that could be funded was contracted. One example among others is French classes. Some organizations decided to carry them on, others decided to delegate them to volunteers, others just suppressed them.

**Table 5.12 The evolution of the Organizational Field and the (market) instruments applied with the aim to regulate the exchanges**

LEVEL	1970s-1990s	2000s	2010s
Institutional	<i>Ministère des affaires sociales</i>	<i>Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale</i>	<i>Ministère de l'intérieur</i>
Governance	Direct subventions	APPEL A' PROJETS Call for Projects	Evolution to Public Market under Discussion
Organisational	Small and Local Associations	Big Associations	Big Associations (50% of the Market)
	Collaboration	Collaboration local Competition national	Competition
	Low work-specialisation	High Work- Specialisation	
Resources	Price and Quantity discussed b/w associations and local authority	- Price / person Ratio: +/- 25euros/ person/ day	- Price / person: 18 E/p./j - Indicators and funds by objectives
			-Min Number of places imposed for each CADA
		- <i>Taux d'encadrement</i> 1/10 (max)	- <i>Taux d'encadrement</i> 1/15 (min)

Source: the Author, 2019

**Table 5.13 France Time-line**

United nation definition of Refugee	Creation of the <b>DPM</b> ( <i>Direction de la Population et des Migrations</i> ) Population and Migration Department. The DPM, had been created as a department of the Social Affairs Ministry, in order to cope with the migration phenomena characterizing the second post-war.	Creation of the <b>DNA</b> ( <i>Dispositif National d'Accueil</i> ) National System of Reception. Initially, funded by the DPM, with the aim of answer the material needs f asylum seekers and refugees in particular an accommodation. Special centres of reception have been created the CPH, under the administrative and financial control of the <i>directions départementales de l'action sanitaire et sociale</i> (DDASS).	Creation of the CRA <i>Centre de Retention Administrative</i>	Campaign “ <i>pauvreté – precarité</i> ”; French associations ask government to deal with the extreme poverty characterizing certain sector of population	Introduction of the <b>RMI</b> ( <i>Revenu Minimum d'Insertion</i> ). This law marks the acknowledge by politicians of the existence of extreme poverty's situations among French residents.	<b>Schengen Convention</b> proposed the complete abolition of systematic internal border controls and a common visa policy	<b>Circulaire n° 91-22</b> DPM: the national system of reception is reformed  Creation of the Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers <b>CADA</b> ( <i>Centre d'Accueil pour Demandeurs d'Asile</i> ) as a specific kind of CHRS  1990s Algerian War	LOI DEBRES		
<b>1951</b>	<b>1966</b>	<b>1967</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1981</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1988</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1996</b>
	New French Law concerning Refugee Status, which modifies: - <i>Loi n° 52-893</i> (1952) concerning the Asylum Right; - <i>Décret n° 53-377</i> (1953) concerning <i>l'Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides</i> and the appeals board for refugees.		French government ended up its labour migration programs, following the lead of other European counterparts  <i>Loi institutions social et medico social.</i> This law asks for implement bottom up project in the social sector			The <b>Schengen Agreement</b> led to the creation of Europe's Schengen Area, in which internal border checks have largely been abolished		<b>Dublin Convention</b> It is the (EU) law that determines which EU MS is responsible for the examination of an application for asylum, submitted by persons seeking international protection under the Geneva Convention, within the EU.	The Asylum seekers are not anymore allowed to work during the application process	

MES/DPM 99-399	MES/DPM 2000-170, the CADA is reformed.  Creation of other centre of reception defined "emergency centres" such as <b>HATSA HUDA</b> , less expensive, more flexible.	<b>Social Action Reform (Réforme de l'Action Sociale)</b>  Loi 2002-2  The laws sustain the implementation of the <i>Appel à Projet</i> as instrument to entrust the service; the evaluation on the facility's management instead of on the service; evaluation and self-evaluation imperative; new rules of pricing	<b>REORGANIZATION OFPRA</b> French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)  loi n°2003-1119 on the <i>immigration, au séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité</i> ”, <b>Loi Sarkozy</b>	The public authorities revoked the management and responsibility of the DNA to <b>FTDA</b> . Actually for long time (Since 70s) the association managed the DNA, and deal with the redistribution across the national territory of the asylum seekers and refugees. The public authority decided to internalise the service and to entrust it to the public agency <b>ANAEM</b> (which will become the oFII)	The CADA is an independent legal entity	The <b>DPM</b> ( <i>Direction de la Population et des Migrations</i> ) Population and Migration Department, has been absorbed by the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity	Loi <b>HPST</b> Or Bachelot, establishing the <i>Appel à Projet</i> as the main instrument of entrustment. The law also reforms this instrument. Suppression of the committee CROSMS	First Marché public for the entrustment of the service of control on CRA. Until then the only association dealing with this very sensitive service is the CIMADE (a very militant association) The government decided to open the market. This decision has been strongly criticised
----------------	---	--	---	--	---	--	--	--

2000s The appel à projet and competitive tenders become the normal instrument of entrustment of services such as the CADA, HUDA and the other centre of reception for asylum seekers

1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2009	2010
<b>CFDA</b> <i>Coordinament Français pour le Droit d'Asile</i> has been created in 2000, succeeding the Commission for the Protection of the Right of Asylum  Members: Most associations working, primarily to defend the right of asylum in France (CIMADE, GISTI, Médecins du Monde, MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples), secours Catholique (Caritas France) GAS		<b>DUBLIN II</b>  <b>EURODAC Regulation</b> establishes a Europe-wide fingerprinting database for unauthorised entrants to the EU  <b>Creation of FRONTEX</b>  <b>27/01/2003 European Directive</b> Concerning the reception of Asylum Seekers					Sarkozy creates the Ministère de l'Immigration et de l'Identité Nationale et du Developpment Solidaire. This Ministry takes charge of task previously managed by the DPM	The <b>RMI</b> is abolished	

<p><b>LOI Besson</b> Financial sanctions for the CADA hosting undue people (such as people which already received positive/negative answer concerning their asylum application).</p>	<p>EU PUBLIC MARKET REFORM &amp; FRENCH PUBLIC MARKET REFORM</p>	<p>Creation of other structures of reception <b>CHUM CAO</b></p> <p><b>LOI 2015-925</b> <i>Arrete</i> concerning <i>the CADA Cahier de Charge</i> – Contract Specification for the centres of reception for asylum seekers. The <b>ADA</b> managed until now by the CADA, is now managed directly by the OFII. The ADA is a money-pocket, which is distributed normally at the end of the month. This decision creates tensions and</p> <p>The budget day/person passes from 24.50 euros to 19.50 euros.</p> <p>The <i>Cahier de Charge</i> substantially changed (in terms of workers ratio, tasks to be accomplished etc)</p>	<p>Creation of the <b>PRAHDA</b></p> <p>A new instrument has been used to fund the public services such as the Prahda, the Social Impact bonds.</p> <p>New law on Migration. Particularly stringent legislation concerning – <i>Deboutés</i> rejected applications - assignation of a residence.</p>	<p>New <i>Circulaire</i> concerning the migration law, increasingly stringent conditions and more control on migrants received in the centres. The feelings concerning the law are mixed. The world of charitable associations is split</p>
<p><b>2011</b></p>	<p><b>2013</b></p> <p><b>DUBLIN III</b> The Dublin III Regulation (No. 604/2013) was approved in June 2013, replacing the Dublin II Regulation, and applies to all member states except Denmark. It came into force on 19 July 2013. It is based on the same principle as the previous two, i. e., that the first Member State where finger prints are stored or an asylum claim is lodged is responsible for a person's asylum claim</p>	<p><b>2015</b></p> <p>French government closed the <b>VENTIMIGLIA</b> borders. Migrants keep dying in their attempts to cross the border or get lost and hurt themselves in dangerous places.</p> <p>As reaction a number of “collectifs” movements of self-organised people started to support migrants not only at the borders, but also across the cities (El Manba, Projet FORESTA, yes we camp</p>	<p><b>2016</b></p>	<p><b>2017</b></p>

## 5.3 The Italian Case Study

### 5.3.1 The Elements of the Field in Italy

As well as for the French case, the three macro areas analysed for a major understanding of the context are 1) the national legislation concerning the migration industry (which includes the service of the reception and integration) 2) the system of funding for the TSOs in social services and in particular in the market of the reception for asylum seekers, and 3) the redefinition of the social policies. This introductory analysis is particularly important in order to highlight the introduction of new tools, shared knowledge, regulation, which enables actors to act across the field. These elements are summarized in the time line presented above.

#### 5.3.1.1 Migration Regulation

Italian legislation concerning migration is framed in the European regulation, included the Dublin system. Until the middle of 80s, the migration issues had not reputed particularly problematic for the Italian authorities, this is why any kind of additional legislation was developed, but only the Geneva Convention (1951) was received. Based on this convention the only request for asylum processed in Italy could be submitted from a population of European origin. However in the case of the political dissident coming from Chile an exception was made, and although very limited an economic support was provided. In the middle of '80s the first major amnesty was signed for more than 100,000 already present on the national territory. The Foschi Law (n. 943/1986) also provided for family reunification procedures, defined tourist stay and study visa, finally established full (formal) equality between Italian and foreign workers. This small attention to the issue was due to the idea that the peninsula was more a transit country and so the arrivals were not supposed to stay for long time across the national territory.

The first step aimed at making more consistent the legislation has been the Martelli Law, 39/1990 during the Andreotti Government. Among the measures imposed by law the most important and innovative ones have been: the imposition of a quota for economic immigrants inflow and the expulsion for the so defined “socially dangerous elements” and for illegal immigrants. The first provisions to promote the integration of immigrants have been set. In particular the ministry of interior is entrusted to provide, after having verified the actual need, a contribution of first help for a period no longer than 45 days. Finally a sanatorium has been created, in order to regularize the irregular migrants already present on the national territory.

In the meantime, at the beginning of 90s the arrival of the migrants from the ex Yugoslavia started to increase. The arrivals (28,000 the first day and after a couple of weeks 20,000 people more) caught the country unprepared. However the people arriving from Albany did not have the access to the asylum procedures, because they did not meet the required conditions to be recognised as refugees. The following years, with the outbreak of the war in ex-Yugoslavia and the civil war in Somalia, the number of new comers augmented. Already in the '95 a new law reformed the previous one. The region Puglia, where mostly arrived the so-called “boat-people”,

did lack any structure other than those made available by the Church and the volunteers. The new Law Puglia (d.lgs 451/1995 then law 563/1995) institutionalised the first CDA –*centri di accoglienza* – the reception centres. The centres opened along the Puglia coast during the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. However until now the solutions were always limited to specific intervention and a clear framework was still lacking.

Creating a clear reference framework is the objective of the law 40/1998, also called Turco- Napolitano from the name of the ministry for the social affairs, Turco, and the ministry of Interior Napolitano, under the government Prodi. The "*Testo Unico sull'immigrazione*" has the ambition to finally define a systematic and organic legal *corpus*, bringing together all the relevant laws concerning the migration and the reception services. The idea behind is to favour the regular immigration and discourage the illegal one. The regular immigrant can face the path of acquisition of citizenship configured by law, which also implies the right to vote, the family reunification, healthcare and education services. The law also established the CPT "*Centro Permanenza Temporanea*" or Temporary Permanence Centre, for all those "subjected to expulsion and / or refoulement measures, which cannot be immediately implementable". The first administrative detention centres for migrants were created.

At the beginning of 2000s with the second government Berlusconi, a new law that regulates the migration is established. The Law 182/2002 also called Bossi-Fini, amends the Turco-Napolitano law in a restrictive sense: the length of the residence permit is reduced from 3 to 2 years, the fingerprinting for all foreigners and the crime of clandestine state are introduced and the sponsorship system for the residence contract is abolished, making even more difficult for the non-EU citizens to come to work legally in Italy. The law also established the SPRAR system, which still nowadays is supposed to be the ordinary system of reception for asylum seekers and refugees. Finally it also provided for the largest European amnesty involving over 650,000 individuals.

Actually the Bossi-Fini law, which at that time has been hardly criticised for the logic based on criminalization of the migrant, tried to give an instrument of reception for the asylum seekers and refugees with the SPRAR system. The SPRAR was based on the best practices already put in place by the local authorities and by TSOs for several years. In continuity with the previous experiences at local level, the objective was the creation of a network of local actors, implicated in a number of projects aimed at facilitating the social and economic integration of the asylum seeker. With the aim to fund the SPRAR system, a special fund has been instituted at the Ministry of Interior (Law 39/1990) as well as a central service of information, promotion, monitoring, consulting and providing technical support to local administrations. In the following period the management of this structure would be entrusted to the ANCI – *associazione nazionale comuni italiani* – national association of Italian municipalities.

Departing from 2005 the Italian system of reception is in a constant evolution. The transposition of the EU Directive on reception 9/2003/CE passed through a number of decrees that redefined the different steps of reception, which is not anymore defined as a short term process of a couple of months as during 90s, but instead the period between the asylum application submission and the final decision of the territorial commission in charge. In 2004, the CARA (centre of reception for asylum seekers)



has been instituted, in order to identify the migrant and then displace him to the most adapted structure, based on the belonging “category”. Following the legislative Decree 140/2005, if the person is able to ask asylum, he will be redirected to a reception centre; otherwise he will wait for expulsion in a CPT. Eventually, in the case the reception centres would result overcrowded, the asylum seekers could be hosted in a CARA centre, waiting for the time strictly necessary to individuate an dedicated reception centre on the national territory.

In 2008, the Security package (No. 125/2008) introduces new types of crimes for illegal immigrants and severe sanctions for those who favour their illegal stay on the Italian territory, such as tightening of penalties for those who declare false generalities, clandestinely defined as aggravating factor in case of criminal offenses, expulsion for EU citizens or non-EU citizens affected by prison sentences of more than 2 years. In terms of reception the so-called CPT is renamed CIE – *centro di identificazione e espulsione* - identification and expulsion centre. Furthermore the Legislative Decree n. 160/2008 restricts the possibility of family reunification. In 2009, the Provisions on public security (No. 94/2009), bring up the maximum CIEs’ detention times to 6 months, institutionalises the crime of illegal entry and residence, and tightens the penalties for the crime of aiding and abetting illegal immigration.

In 2011 a new state of urgency is declared - after the so-called “Albanian invasion” - the Emergency North Africa – EMA. In this period we could observe a large use of the extraordinary legal instruments of “*Ordinanza della protezione civile*” to face the situation in the most rapid way. At the beginning the situation is quite chaotically managed. A number of private actors are called to intervene, such as hotels and private companies, in order to increment the number of shelters for asylum seekers. Control from public authority is quite low and the cases of mismanagement multiply. In 2014 new 20 Territorial Committees have been set in order to judge the asylum requests of asylum seekers on the national territory and, in 2015, the d.lgs 142/2015 reforms again the system of reception. The new directive 2013/32/EU and the directive 2013/33/EU continue in the same direction as the previous revision in 2003, aimed at making a more unified European system of reception. The reform has the main ambition of reforming the entire structure and defines three levels of reception for asylum seekers and refugees. The three levels are named the earliest reception, the first and the second one.

1. The earliest reception concerns first aid and identification, in specific centres called Hotspot. The migrants stay there as long as necessary: they receive the first medical care, they are photographed, and in case they have the required characteristics they can request international protection.

2. The first reception is composed of the Reception centres (CDA) and Reception centres for asylum seekers (CARA), they are defined as hub. The first aims at verifying the regularity of the permanence, the second at receiving the applicants for international protection to complete the procedures relating to the recognition, and then to distribute them on the national territory, where specific structures are dislocated.

3. Finally the second reception is done in the SPRAR. The "integrated" system of reception includes services to sustain asylum seekers through the integration: lodging them in specific structures, assistance and orientation measures, training and language classes.

The Art 11 also institutes the special centre for reception in case of unavailability in the ordinary ones. Although the CAS, extraordinary centre of reception, is not

supposed to be an instrument replacing the ordinary reception, however the number of this kind of structure rapidly increased (Sprar Report 2018). In 2017, 9,073 CAS were active and only 197 SPRAR centres, so the 80.70% of migrants is hosted in the CAS centres. In the same year, with the aim of stemming this phenomenon, an Interior Ministry directive concerning repartition of asylum seekers across the national territory through SPRAR system has been emanated, which included the activation of the safeguard clause for reception in the SPRAR. Actually following this rule, the municipalities, which adhere to the SPRAR network, would not be charge of added numbers of asylum seekers through CAS. 2017 is also the year of the "Minniti-Orlando" decree (converted Law No. 46/2017). This decree includes a number of reform to the system of asylum: the suppression of the second degree of appeal against a refusal of protection; videotaped interviews for asylum seekers; the transformation of the CIE structures (Identification and Expulsion Centres) into CPR (Permanence Centres for Repatriation). Several points of the decree have been accused of unconstitutionality.

The government instituted in 2018, after a large anti –migrant campaign, tried to reform the system again. The Security Decree No. 113/2018, also called the Salvini decree, from the name of the Interior ministry in charge, established: the cancellation of the 2-year residence permit with the introduction of special permits (for social protection, for health reasons, for natural disaster in the country of origin) of one year; the increase of the maximum time in which foreigners can be "withheld" in the CPR from 90 to 180 days; the extension of the list of crimes which causes the revoke of international protection; finally, the introduction of the possibility of revoking Italian citizenship for people who are considered a danger to the state. Concerning reception the SPRAR system is also reformed and limited to those who have seen their application for international protection accepted.

## Beneficiaries


According to the Italian legislation, there is no formal deadline for lodging an asylum request. Under the Procedure Decree, the asylum claim can be lodged either at the border police office, airports or more often at seaport or on the national territory in one of the Police stations *Questura*, where fingerprinting and photographing are carried out, this procedure is called *Foto segnalamento*. In any case, the police authorities cannot examine the merits of the asylum application. Before sending the application documents to the territorial commission in order to process the registration, the police verifies the fingerprints registration, in line with the Dublin III directive. The directive imposes the fingerprints' registration in the Eurodac database, in the first country of arrival. This process is aimed at defining the country in charge of the asylum demand process. Finally, the formal registration of the application (*verbalizzazione*) is conducted through the "C3" form (*Modello C3*), where the applicant declares his/her story, country of origin, reasons to flee, persecutions, etc.

The police authorities send the registration form and the documents concerning the asylum application to the "*Commissioni territoriali per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale, CTRPI*" - Territorial Commissions or Sub-commissions for International Protection - located within the national territory, which are the only authorities competent for the substantive asylum interview (AIDA, 2017).

There are three different types of procedures a regular one, a prioritized and an accelerated one (see figure 5.6). In the first case, within a maximum of 30 days following the registration, the territorial commission must fix an appointment and after three days takes a decision. When unable to take a decision in this time, the Territorial Commission can extend for a maximum of nine months the deadline and only in case of complex issues or having received too many requests of asylum simultaneously that it has not been possible to processes them. There are six possible outcomes to the regular procedure, following the Decree 113/2018. The Territorial Commission may decide to grant refugee status, to grant a subsidiary protection, to recommend to the *Questura* to issue a one-year “special protection” residence permit, to reject the asylum application as unfounded, to reject the application as manifestly unfounded and to reject the application on the basis that an internal protection alternative is available (AIDA, 2017). The table 32 shows the data for 2016 and 2017 concerning the case examined and, out of them, the number of refugees, subsidiary protection, humanitarian and the rejections, which in both years cover almost the 60% of the total examined cases.

Article 28-bis of the Procedure Decree (implemented by Law 132/2018) provides for different accelerated procedures that foresee different time limits following the immediate transmission of the file from the *Questura* to the Territorial Commission, depending on the applicable ground. For instance the applicant comes from a Safe Country of Origin, or when the applicant makes a Subsequent Application without presenting new elements. The accelerated procedure is also envisaged when the asylum applicant in question is detained in a CPR or in a hotspot or first reception centre or if the application is manifestly unfounded. In case of rejection, and Dublin procedure, the applicant can appeal until the second degree.

**Figure 5.7 Italian Procedure for Asylum Application**



Source: Authors re-adaptation AIDA report 2017

**Table 5.14 Types of Protection in Italy**

	2016	%	2017	%
Refugees	4.808	5%	6.827	8%
Subsidiary Protection	12.873	14%	6.880	8%
Humanitarian Protection	18.979	21%	20.166	25%
Rejection	54.254	60%	46.992	58%
Other **	188	0%	662	1%
<b>Total Examined cases</b>	<b>91.102</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>81.527</b>	<b>100%</b>


Source Ministry of Interior web-site 2017

#### The reception: the SPRAR Network and the CAS

Article 10 of Italian Constitution sets forth the right of political asylum, but when looking at the legal implementation, despite the numerous reforms, the legal framework remains blurry and contradictory particularly when come to describe the service of reception dedicated for asylum seekers. Very often the centres of reception have been created to answer the urgency, and this is why a superimposition of tasks and competencies seem to characterise them. Furthermore as the intervention of the State came quite late at the end of 90s, it has been based on the previous experiences, developed by TSOs and local administration. In 1999, for the first time a decentralized and networked reception experience, developed by associations and non-governmental organizations, has been tested. Then in 2001 the Ministry of the Interior (Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration), the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the implementation of a National Asylum Program. (PNA). Thus, the first public system for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees was born, spread throughout Italy, with the involvement of central and local institutions, according to a shared responsibility between the Ministry of the Interior and local authorities.

In the same period and for some years, the Italian Red Cross has been the main private organisation mandated to work in the Italian CIEs and in certain “reception” centres for asylum seekers. The charity provides a range of services, including catering, health, accommodation, psychosocial support, cultural and linguistic assistance and logistics. After a number of serious incidents (in particular fires and deaths in the centres) and while the Red Cross criticised the lack of human resources, the Italian government decided to bring more civil society organisations into migrant detention centres.

Figure 5.8 The reception system in Italy



Source: Author, 2019

Concerning the system of reception, nowadays the system is based on a differentiation among three different levels: first aid and assistance activities, and then first and second reception (LD 142/2015).

The European Agenda on Migration introduced the “hotspot approach” as the model of operational support to Member States faced with the so-called disproportionate migratory pressure. The implementation of the hotspots approach should be understood in relation to the broader reform of the CEAS, and to an overarching strategy to reduce migration flows to the EU. This is why in Italy and Greece from 2015 we can observe the creation, of these kinds of structures. Hotspots are designed with the aim to swiftly identify, register and process migrants. Reception conditions are inadequate and below standard. Furthermore, in Italy, the findings from a ECRE report in 2016 (ECRE, 2016) show that hastened provision of information when people have just stepped off the boat is not sufficient to properly make them aware of the possibility to apply for asylum. This, in turn, may undermine their effective access to the asylum procedure if not followed up by proper individual and group information and guidance as soon as conditions allow.

The first reception is based in **CARA** - *Centri Accoglienza Richiedenti Asilo* – reception centre for asylum seekers, and **CAS** - *Centri Accoglienza Speciale* – Special centre of reception. Across the national territory, Ministry of Interior declared a total of 13 CARA. The CARA are supposed to disappear to be replaced by regional hub.

The second level of Italian Reception System is split into two: the CAS structures and the SPRAR Network. In the system of assistance called SPRAR - *Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati* – Protection system for asylum seekers and refugees, local authorities, with the support of the third sector, guarantee interventions through integrated assistance approach: distribution of food and lodging, but also providing complementary information measures, accompaniment, assistance and guidance through the construction of individual pathways to socio-economic integration.

A multi-level governance approach based on the political responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, based on the voluntary participation of local authorities in the network of hospitality projects. The decentralization of the interventions of "integrated assistance" is based on the promotion of local network and involvement of a large number of stakeholders. TSOs represent the most part of the so called "management bodies" (*enti gestori*). SPRAR system is based on two concepts. "Integrated Management" and "Multilevel Governance". In addition to the institutional agencies provided for by the Italian ordinance (among them we should also mention the network of Italian Municipalities and their national association, ANCI, which is organically linked with the Ministry of Interior), other bodies are also involved in migration issues, both from the operative point of view and by carrying out researches and studies on migration issues.

The UNHCR branch office is operative in Italy since 1953 and its representatives participate both to the National Commission for Asylum Right and to the Territorial Committee for Immigration. In order to carry out its various operative programs, the Italian Government collaborates with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which operates in Italy since its establishment, in 1951.


Moreover, there is also a large network of NGOs and humanitarian associations, which deal with various aspects of the migration phenomenon. Some of them are responsible for both first reception (also in terms of legal and administrative assistance) and integration measures (social insertion, as well as socio-economic and socio-cultural cohesion). As the amount of organizations involved in these activities is very significant, we hereby mention only some of them: the Italian Council for Refugees (CIR), Caritas, Arci, Acli, Migrants Foundation and the Jesuit Centro Astalli Foundation, other ecclesiastical organizations, Trade Unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL and UGL) and Workers' Patronages (which the Ministry of Interior has charged with the task of providing assistance for the necessary practices for the granting or renewal of residence permits).

Finally there is a central service, which is based in Rome. The Central Service was established by the Ministry of the Interior Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration and entrusted to ANCI by agreement. ANCI, for the implementation of the activities, asked the support of the Cittalia foundation. The Central Service is responsible for monitoring the presence on the territory of beneficiaries of international protection creation; the maintenance and constant updating of a database of interventions carried out at local level in favour of beneficiaries of international protection; dissemination of information on the interventions carried out technical assistance to local authorities, also in the preparation of reception services support to information and guidance services implemented at government centres for beneficiaries of international protection; support the ANCI in the tasks related to the status of delegated authority for the European Refugee Fund (ERF) (SPRAR, SIPROIMI Web-site 2018). The Central Service covers its role of coordination and consultancy also with regard to special reception services, activated within the

Protection System and dedicated to people belonging to the so-called most vulnerable categories, such as unaccompanied minors, disabled or even temporary disabled persons who require assistance domiciliary, health , elderly and victims of torture and violence. The Central Service also takes care of the training and updating of the operators, and - in a logic of exchange between the centre and the periphery - operates so that the experiences of the territories become common heritage and the services offered guarantee quality standards.

The other form of reception is the CAS. They are imposed by the Prefecture to answer to the emergency (which is often the case when the municipality does not adhere to the SPRAR Network). They are managed by private actors (TSOs as well as for profit organisations). In 2015, the 70% of asylum seekers were hosted in CAS (70.910 Accommodations against 21.814 in SPRAR Network accommodations) and in 2016: 137.000 in CAS and 26.000 in SPRAR (15%) (data from the annual Rapporto SPRAR, 2016).

**Figure 5.9 Municipality adhering to the SPRAR**



Source: The Report of the Sprar System 2016

Table 5.15 The reception centres in Italy

"centri governativi" Government Centre	HUB	<b>CDA</b>	<i>(Centri di accoglienza)</i>	1995	<i>Legge Puglia</i> ; Established for the reception of immigrants for the period of their administrative status on the national territory;
		<b>CPSA</b>	<i>(Centri di Primo Soccorso e Accoglienza)</i>	2006	Only the centres of Lampedusa and Cagliari were established by <i>ministerial decree</i> : on 16.02.2006 and 17.09.2007. They are "transition centres" in which migrants are provided with first aid and reception, and then moved to other types of centres. The decree setting up them did not indicate terms and conditions of detention, merely stating that the stay in these structures must last as long as it is necessary to complete first aid and rescue operations.
		<b>CARA</b>	<i>(Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo)</i>	2004	<i>DPR 303/2004, then d.lgs. 25/2008, ex art. 20, comma 2, then d.lgs. 142/2015</i> . Based on the experience of CID, created with the aim to implement procedures of identification, first reception, and status recognition. Art 20, d.lgs. 25/2008 (maintained almost the same in the ex art. 10, comma 2, d.lgs. 142/2015) allows the right for the application of leaving the camp during the day, without any upon agreement.
		<b>CIE</b>	<i>(Centri di identificazione espulsione)</i>	2008	They have been set up with the aim of giving effect to coercive deportation measures, issued to foreigners without a residence permit, in cases they are not repatriated immediately. The reasons that may hinder the immediate execution of the expulsion are essentially two: the failure to identify the person or the absence of means of transport for repatriation. The internment of a foreign citizen in CIE involves the deprivation of personal freedom.
		<b>CIDs</b>		2002	Established through the <i>law Bossi-Fini l.189/2002</i> , with the aim to detain asylum seekers who arrived illegally in the country, or who, at the time of filing an asylum application, were irregular, or who were subject of an expulsion because of the rejection to their request for protection.
		<b>CPT → CIE → CPR</b>	<i>(Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza)</i>	1998- 2008	<i>Legge Turco-Napolitano</i> (d.lgs. 286/1998) than converted in CIE in Centri di identificazione ed Espulsione. The aim of this structure is the detention of illegal migrants, with the aim to repatriate them. Art 9 <i>decreto legge n. 92/2008 "Misure urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica"</i> , then converted in law (L. 125/2008), <i>Centri di permanenza temporanea</i> , and <i>Centri Di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza</i> , change their name in " <i>Centri Di Identificazione Ed Espulsione</i> ". Today through the <i>legge Minniti-Orlando (L 46/2017)</i> they are renamed <b>CPR</b> . At the beginning of 2017 there were 5 CIE, but the project is one per Region for a total of 1600 places
		<b>CAS</b>	<i>(Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria)</i>		Implemented by Prefectures in case of unavailability of in agreement with cooperatives, associations and hotel facilities, through public contracts, after consulting the local authorities
		<b>HOTSPOT</b>		2015	Lampedusa (AG), Trapani, Pozzallo (RA), Taranto. The European Agenda on Migration introduced the "hotspot approach" as the model of operational support to Member States faced with the so-called disproportionate migratory pressure

Source: the Author, 2019



## The Hotspot Approach

In 2003 the European Commission introduced the Eurodac. The Eurodac - European Dactyloscopy - is the European Union (EU) fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers and irregular border-crossers, and together with the Dublin Regulation, defines the cornerstone of the Dublin system.

The Eurodac database is supposed to help the EU member states understand the country of first arrival, as the person arriving irregularly is required to register the fingerprint. The country of first arrival is also the country in charge of the asylum process. So when the person registered in a country requests for asylum in a different one, she is sent back to the first country of arrival, where if not already done, could proceed introducing the demand for protection. The hotspot system helps the system to work properly, taking shape as a fundamental feature of the relocation procedures conducted from Italy and Greece in the framework of Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601 of 14 and 22 September 2015 respectively. Part of the European Commission's European Agenda on Migration, the “hotspot” approach, is generally described as providing “operational solutions for emergency situations”, through a single place to swiftly process asylum applications, enforce return decisions and prosecute smuggling organizations through a platform of cooperation among the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, Europol and Eurojust (Aida 2017). The EASO office processes the asylum claims and relocation procedure, the UNHCR monitor the centers while Frontex deals with identification, registration and fingerprinting of recently arrived people, enforcement of return decisions and collection of information on smuggling routes.

By the end of February 2018, five hotspots were operating in Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Trapani, Taranto and Messina, the latter starting operations on 30 September 2017 with a capacity of 250 places. As of 24 November 2017, the hotspots hosted a total of 624 persons, of whom 574 in Sicily and 50 in Taranto. Aida document reports that, at the beginning of 2018, a number of humanitarian organizations visited the centers. They reported degrading conditions of detention. As consequences the Lampedusa hotspot has been temporarily closed, but then opened again. Concerning the Taranto hotspot, it was also temporarily closed, after the National Anti-Corruption Authority detected procurement irregularities.

From the implementation of the hotspot system, the number of people under the Dublin procedures, in country such as France augmented (Cimade data 2017). These persons were supposed to be sent back to Italy, where they demand would be processed. During the last two years the countries where the hotspot are located, namely Italy and Greece, have complained about the lack of support in the implementation of relocation system, which is not compulsory, but founded on a voluntary basis. This created even more space for the emergency rhetoric based on the idea that the borders' countries are those who pay more the “migration crisis”. If, on the one hand, this situation moved some members of the European Parliament to start asking for a Dublin system revision, on the other hand; it also justified a number of international agreements, such as the one that Greece concluded with Turkey, or Italy with Libya, at least questionable.

### 5.3.1.2 Public Tenders and Funding System of TSOs

During the 90s the most used instrument of collaboration between public bodies and TSOs was the agreement based on refunding. Actually, public bodies established forms of collaboration with TSOs, using the instrument of the agreement, referred to in the Law 266/91. Following the law, priority should be given to restricted and negotiated award procedures, which allow for a definition of the elements, and the level of quality that the municipality intends to obtain from the contractor. So once agreed on the kind of the services, the project would be entirely developed by the association in charge. The preferred mechanism of public services' allocation was then based on a bottom up approach, instead of competitive tenders and contractual mechanisms imposing clear results.

In order to obtain public funds however some requirements were supposed to be respected (co. 2, art. 6, Law 266/91). The TSOs could establish agreements with public administrations (State, regions, autonomous provinces, local authorities and other public bodies) in order to contribute to the implementation of regional and local programs. The affiliated activity must consist of services, even supplementary to those provided by public services, but in any case in line with the public authorities programs. In choosing the organizations with which to stipulate the agreement, the public authorities are called to give priority to organizations in possession of the following requisites: a) the staff and volunteers' qualification in relation to the services to be provided, with particular attention to the attendance of professional training courses; b) the location of the headquarter of the organization which is required to be based on the territory under the supervision of the contracting public authority; c) significant presence of volunteers compared to employees, or external contractors, in relation to the type of activity provided (Article 7 of Law 266/91).

Bemi (2003) sustains that, from a quantitative point of view, the data shows that all during the 90's, TSOs have been prevalently funded through public money, and in particular the 70% of that revenue come from agreements based on refunding system. In parallel, the proportion of private funds, particularly coming from the sell of products and services, was growing, at that time representing around 1/3 of the total.

At the beginning of 2000s, the law 328/2000 *Legge quadro per la realizzazione del sistema integrato di interventi e servizi sociali* – framework law for the integrated system of social services interventions - entrusts the regions with the competence to decide how to decline the intervention of the TSOs services (paragraph 4, article 5). The law does not innovate much compared to previous law and again there is not a clear mechanism, which links quantities of service to price.

In entrusting the TSOs, the local authority must therefore provides in the agreement a method of expenses' reimbursement, consistent with the characteristics of gratuitousness and solidarity that characterize the organization. Finally, the national plan also mentions the option of voluntary contributions to TSOs, from the public authority (National Plan 2001-2003).

But at the middle of 2000s, the reform of the public contracts, based on EU legal framework reformulated the system of public procurements. Italy adopted a “Code of

public contracts of works, services and supplies in implementation of Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC. The “Code of Public contracts of works, services and supplies” introduced by Legislative Decree 12 April 2006 n. 163, then reformed in 2016, defined the new legal features of the public procurement system. The aim of the reform was then to align Italian legislation to the European legal framework, in order to ensure that businesses across the European single market could compete for public contracts and to design bidding contests above certain thresholds (European Commission 2018). The new set framework strengthened the already existing monitoring procedures, in line with the priority of making public spending more efficient. It also extended the mandate of the Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts, a public body in charge of controlling and supervising public contracts. Furthermore following Sargiacomo and colleagues (Sargiacomo, Ianni, D’Andreamatteo, & Servalli, 2015) *“on the surface, these new rules brought procurement activities in line with the anti-corruption best practices being advocated by international organizations such as the World Bank and Transparency International”* (p. 5). However they also mentioned that the government’s ability to use the power of ordinance in the planning and management of major events and to solve specific emergency issues allows for avoiding the stringent provisions of the existing rules. Based on the EU public procurement Directive 2014/24/EU, the legislative decree 50/2016 again modified the procurement code. In order to make easier the participation of small and medium enterprises in public procurement procedures, contracting authorities are encouraged to divide contracts into lots (European Commission, 2018). For award criteria, contracting authorities are encouraged to move from the ‘price-only’ criteria to the “MEAT” criteria (most economically advantageous tender). Finally the European Commission also expressly highlighted the importance to carry out market consultation to better prepare procurement procedures and inform economic operators of their needs, although the respect of open competition rules remains the priority. In brief, both the reforms are going in the same direction, towards more transparency and competition in order to make more efficient public expenditures.

### **5.3.1.3 Welfare State and Social Policy**

At the end of 90s, all across Europe the welfare state experienced dramatic changes. Italy is fully involved in this process of transformation, based on rescaling (Kazepov, 2013), retrenchment and recalibration (Hemerijck, 2013). Italy is engaged as well in this process of transformation as demonstrated by the 2000 welfare reform’s framework law (Ferrara, 2012). The law 328/2000 firstly has the objective to cut the distance between the definition of the actions and the actuation, giving more importance to the local authorities in the process of definition of policies, and shifting downwards the strategic and programmatic commitment. It also defines a system of social policies and services based on subsidiarity between the public and the private sectors (Ambrosi, 2018). As explained by Piga (Piga, 2012), the law entrusts the local authorities with the task of coordinating, integrating, and evaluating, leaving the more traditional role of the service provider to the private sector and TSOs. Furthermore the law leaves space to specific governance structures and specific form of coordination among actors, different by territories and sectors.

Concerning the social policy focused on reception for asylum seekers, by contrast with the French case the reception of asylum seekers in Italy has never been under the exclusively supervision of the ministry of social affairs. Actually, only in the case of the law Turco-Napolitano, there has been a timid attempt to conduct the issue under the umbrella of social policies. This is due, to the long delay characterising the starting point of the Italian system of reception. Actually as shown in the previous paragraphs, the state started very late to manage and fund this service, which has been treated for long time as a marginal need, left to be managed by volunteers and catholic organizations.

The massive use of the CAS service does not really help in this sense. In contrast with the SPRAR, which is managed by the local authorities in a sort of multi-stakeholders governance, the CAS is managed by the prefect, which can decide in terms of number of hosts. Then the service entrusted normally through competitive tender to an organization, which could be a TSO or a for-profit company.

Furthermore, the services are organised in different projects with a very uneven corpus of activities. Actually, this seems to be a characteristic of the social policies in general in Italy, based on a number of scholars' studies (Borzaga & Santuari, 2001) (Fazzi, 1996) (Picciotti, Bernardoni, Cossignani, & Ferrucci, 2014). These authors explained that already from 70s, some social policies were not managed by the State or by public authorities but by volunteers, catholic organizations or informal local network that started to deal with specific social issues in order to find solutions. This resulted in a number of very different practices at local level, and a high level of fragmentation, which have been during the time, often recognised and enhanced and often funded by local public authorities, such as in the case of the creation of the SPRAR system but also for sectors such as homecare and mental health services. These kinds of actors, such as TSOs, instituted then a quite spontaneous and direct way to interact with public authorities, which is at the base of interaction among actors, characterising the local welfare system in different Italian municipalities (Borzaga and Santuari 2001). It is also relevant to highlight that, at the beginning, this kind of relationship was characterised by strong cooperation between the TSO and the public authority. During 2000s and accentuated by the economic crisis, the system of contracting has been instituted, redefining the relationship among the actors. In fact, the contracting system introduced elements of control from the public authorities on the top of the TSOs, based on criteria of cost effectiveness (Picciotti 2014) and elements of competition among the TSOs (Borzaga & Fazzi, 2011).

### 5.3.2 The Evolution of the Organizational Field

#### *The First Period 1980s An Informal System of Reception for Asylum Seekers*

Unlike France, Italy has not a long tradition of immigration. Actually the XX century has been mostly a century of emigration for the country. Italians landing the native lands, emigrated to United States, Australia, South America, but also France, Germany and Belgium looking for a better future. Right after the IIWW Italy represented a transit country for more than 100.000 refugees, supported by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA, and the IRO, International Refugee Organization. During the period 1960-1970, the first migration started, the migrants arrived principally from the former colonies of Northern Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia), from the Yugoslavia to Friuli, which was badly affected from a earthquake, and reconstruction involved a large number of workers, and from Tunisia to Sicily, where particularly men were hired on fishing boats. Finally at the end of the 1970s, political dissidents and exiles fleeing Latin American dictatorships and wars in Iran and Iraq, started to ask for refugees status, directly to the UNHCR delegation based in Rome. During the waiting period, which could last more than two years, the new arrived could work and very often, particularly in the case of political dissidents, were positively received. In some cases, as for the 609 Chileans who found shelter in the Italian embassy in Santiago after the Pinochet's *golpe* in 1973, the asylum has been easily granted, and the family reunification often implemented. The reception is not organised as a public service, but by particulars, and by some associations, which started to take in charge the service in a quite informal way.

During 80s, international events strongly impacted the migration flows. In 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the new displacements from the East, increased the number of the new arrivals from Europe. But internally an episode in particular highlighted the increased number of arrivals and the need for new solutions, concerning migration issues. The murder of a young man, Jerry Masslo arrived from South Africa to escape from apartheid, shaped the souls of Italian politicians. After Italy has denied asylum to this young man, he was assassinated in Villa Literno, in Campania, while working as hired hand. This made people as well as decision makers understand that a need for a reception and integration service was needed. In fact, for long time the situation has been left apart from the institutions. The only organisations dealing with the issue were the volunteers and Church and the TSOs, without any support from the public institutions. Before the assignment of specific resources from the central public authority, not only TSOs but also some local administrations started temporary accommodation programmes (Ponzo 2005). The bottom up approach, characterizing a large part of social policies, included housing, defined the reception as well. Excluded for the centres of identification, the reception has indeed been very limited and in any case managed at very local level.

#### *The Second Period 1990s -2000s The Formalization of a System of Reception*

The Europeanization of asylum and immigration policies since the 1990's – *in primis* the Dublin Agreement- has strongly impacted the systems of reception all across

Europe. This is particularly true in Italy, where a high number of asylum seekers, arriving in Europe asking for protection, following the Dublin regulation, have been forced to ask for asylum directly in Italy, although preferring different countries, for various reasons such as the languages, family ties, others. As a consequence, on the one hand, this mechanism transformed Italy from a country of transit to a country of arrival. On the other hand, the newcomers not allowed to ask for protection, but categorised as economic migrants, although not having the right to work nor remain across the national territory, they could not leave it neither. For these reasons the Italian government created the CIE - centre of identification and expulsion, where migrants have been placed in administrative detention.

Concerning these centres for detention, for some years, the Italian Red Cross has been the principal organization responsible for monitoring the compliance with fundamental rights in those centres and for managing them as well as the centres for reception. The charity provides a range of services, including catering, health, accommodation, psychosocial support, cultural and linguistic assistance and logistics. After a number of serious incidents (in particular fires and deaths in the centres) and while the Red Cross criticised the lack of human resources, the Italian government decided to bring more civil society organisations into the sector, opening to competition with the aim of reducing costs and increasing the number of organisations involved.

Concerning the CARA, the governmental centre of reception activation and management of the centres for migrants, since the very beginning of their establishment, has been entrusted to the Prefectures (UTG – Unità Territoriale di Governo). The prefectures collaborate with local authorities, and other public or private organisations, which have the option of subcontracting certain services to cooperatives, associations and NGOs (art. 22 of the Presidential Decree 394/1999), in order to guarantee an efficient administration of the structures. Actually, in Italy, the large reception centres (CPSA, CDA, CARA, CIE) have been entrusted to a managing body, identified in an institution, an association, very often a social cooperative, selected through specific tenders for each type of structure.

The managing authority is in charge for the daily administration of the centre, reports, and any subcontracts, while the Prefecture is in charge of monitoring and control of the management and is supposed to verify the ways of providing services and their quality. The appointment of the reception centres to an association is managed through a specific tender (*capitolato di appalto per il funzionamento e la gestione dei centri di accoglienza per immigrati*), approved through ministerial decree in 2008.

For the emergency structures, contracts are normally short-term (3 months renewable). Short-term contracts could create instability for the structure and uncertainty about the future of the service.

Concerning the services of reception and integration, starting from the experiences of decentralized and networked reception, carried out between 1999 and 2000 by associations and non-governmental organizations, in 2001 the Ministry of the Interior Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration, the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed a memorandum of understanding for the realization of the PNA - National Asylum Program. Thus was born the first public system for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees, spread throughout the Italian territory, with the involvement of central and local institutions, according to a sharing of responsibilities

between the Ministry of the Interior and local authorities. Finally, in 2002, the SPRAR system has been created.

The SPRAR is still nowadays “the ordinary” Italian system of reception. It is based on multilevel governance to promote and develop local networks with the involvement of all actors and privileged interlocutors at very different levels. So, unlike the CARA, which are governmental centres, the organisations involved in the SPRAR system are local (municipalities, regions, and provinces). Furthermore the system works on a voluntary basis, so the local authority can adhere but they are not obliged. It means that municipalities, provinces and regions can also opt out of the network, and do not offer services of reception in their areas through the system.

As originally based on a quite informal network of local actors, administrative and political bodies as well as TSOs, the system highly relies on the specific abilities and skills of the adherent actors. Furthermore, since the beginning the relationship among local actors on the territory has determined the success of the projects, and where the cooperation with authorities had been positive, the results followed. In particular, as the SPRAR has been a structure from the beginning as “*an excellent example of the best practices*” (Interview\_SPRAR\_central\_office), it has very soon been designated as the service for the most vulnerable people. Unfortunately, due to the shortage of places, which at the beginning of 2000s reached approximately 2000 places, this logic has not always been applied and first the governmental centres, then the CAS, became the most used solution. In reality, “*the political investment on the SPRAR from the beginning has not been sufficient*” (Interview\_ASGI), and this is why very soon the “alternative” centres of reception collected the majority of the asylum seekers.

One of the SPRAR system’s distinguishing characteristics is the analytical accounting report. Basically, the system, which is judged even too stringent from some, is based on subsidy, which has to be reported. In this way there is no marge of gain for the economic actor, as the contribution does not provide the possibility for a profit margin. “*Therefore it is very far from the logic of the provision of services as a result of a contract, where the economic subject could show an economic interest in participating*” (Interview\_ASGI).

If on the one hand there is no forecast economic gain, on the other, the adhesion is on a volunteer basis. The actors, which have no interest in doing economic benefit, could however benefit differently from adhering to a SPRAR. Nevertheless, it represents always a remunerative activity for the public authorities and then for the actors involved, such as TSOs, which can bring an activity and a social service on, paying the workers, creating a network of activities, which could go beyond the support for asylum seekers and refugees but which could benefit the entire local population.

The SPRAR system has been set up one year before the EU Directive 9/2003/CE laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum, which in Italy has been transposed in 2005. There is from the beginning an inconsistency. On the one hand, the directive indeed provides for an obligation to host decently the asylum seekers under process of protection request, but on the other hand the system put in place in Italy is voluntary based and insufficient to cover the demand for the service. So the legislative decree 140/2005 established the State’s obligation to provide public services and reception. There has been a long political debate on the issue and on the definition of the SPRAR. Finally the legislator opted for maintaining the SPRAR

system as it was, without any additional political and economic investment, and creating a binary system, based on another type of reception, the governmental centres. The governmental centres, the CARA, are organised in a totally different way: they are based on contract, which are obtained through competitive tenders, and the services are internalised, creating a parallel system of services for asylum seekers and refugees. This is in a total opposition with the logic governing the SPRAR, which relies on a number of actors, which activate services available for the entire population in turn. The services, which are the services offered by the specific areas, are supposed to be executed out of the SPRAR structures, in order to put in contact the asylum seekers with the local inhabitants.

### *The third period: 2011 to 2017 From the North Africa Emergency to Nowadays*

During the ENA – Emergency North Africa, the CARA as well as other emergency structures have been set up. In particular in the South, included in Naples, the civil protection has directly assigned the service to “*federalberghi*”<sup>45</sup> and to hotels. The price of the service was quite high even if the contracts were not very often respected. The associations and the civil society organised an autonomous control and support service to migrants, in order to answer to the primary needs and provide information concerning the asylum request (Avallone 2018).

The contracts were quite advantageous for the management body with a price around 43 euros par person par day, including even a daily barber for the beneficiary, and generated a colossal business. Without any control, neither a reporting activity, the profit have been very high and the respect of the terms of the contracts very poor.

In 2012 the system of SPRAR was partially reformed and enlarged. At the beginning and during the first decade, the projects have been annually renewed. It implicated a huge administrative burden both for the TSOs involved, and for the central service based in Rome. “*The project were constantly renovated, you did not have time to finish the previous project, that you had to present all the documents for the new one. All over again! It was a mess!*” (Interview\_ASGI). In 2012 the project have been extended, becoming before two-year and then, subsequently, three-year long. In this period the SPRAR system received more funds and the projects grew up in number and extension, reaching more than 12.000 places in 2015. Also the central structure became bigger.

Following the current wave of arrivals- from 22,118 in 2013, to 186,530 in 2017 (Ministry of Interior Data) the situation however changed again.

The so-called “refugee emergency” has demanded a huge effort to TSOs which were active in the field, for the most part composed by cooperatives, but also associations and social enterprises. Although the increase registered in terms of number of places managed within the SPRAR system, the places were not sufficient to answer a constantly growing demand. This is why, as explained by the ASGI lawyer, once in 2015 the Italian government had the opportunity to abrogate the double services and implement just an ordinary one, the same for all and decided in favour of a new binary system again based on a totally different market governance. In 2015 the double system of reception, which emerged already from 2005, changed structures.

---

<sup>45</sup> *federalberghi* is a trade association representing the interests of hotel companies in Italy.



On the one hand an ordinary reception, the SPRAR network, based on a large number of actors, included local public authorities, and an emergency system, the CAS. The ordinary reception, the SPRAR system, created in 2002, is more sophisticatedly defined and is supposed to serve as the cornerstone of the Italian reception system. This network, including a large number of organizations, is characterised by multi-level governance, which is meant to leave a large space of action to the local administrative and political bodies. While the Ministry of Interior defines the entity of the resources then dispensed through the FNPSA – *Fondo Nazionale per le Politiche e i Servizi per l’Asilo* – National fund for Asylum policies and services, the distribution of the money is managed by the central SPRAR system, in Rome. One member of this structure, the ANCI, the Network of Italian Municipalities, represents the local bodies, which in a totally volunteer manner adheres to the network. Other bodies are also involved in the network. The UNHCR branch office has been operative in Italy since 1953 and its representatives participate both at the National Commission for Asylum Right and in the Territorial Committee for Immigration. In order to carry out its various programs, the Italian Government collaborates with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has operated in Italy since its establishment in 1951. Activities cover different areas of intervention, such as technical cooperation, counter-trafficking and assistance to victims, migration and development, labour and circular migration, assisted voluntary returns including reintegration in the countries of origin, facilitating family reunification. Moreover, there is also a large network of NGOs and humanitarian associations, MSF – Medici Senza Frontiere, Amnesty International, MEDU - Medici per i Diritti Umani, which deal with various aspects, particularly a function of control on the structures for respecting human rights.

The CAS are imposed by the Prefecture to respond to the perceived emergency (a situation which often arises when the municipality does not adhere to the SPRAR network). The Prefecture - *Prefettura* - represents the Ministry of Interior and is also in charge of reception and integration at the local level. In each Italian Prefecture there is a “territorial council for immigration” (Cti), responsible for monitoring the presence of immigrants and the capacity for the area to absorb migratory flows. The prefectures are supposed normally together with the mayors to define the number and modalities of accommodation provided at local level. Very often the mayors did not know much about the Prefecture’s operations. The authorities have tried to circumvent this problem, introducing the “safeguard clause”. Based on this clause, the local bodies involved in the SPRAR service, would not be charged with an additional number of asylum seekers.

The CAS as well as other structures of reception, which follow under the category of special or extraordinary or urgent reception, in order to differentiate by the ordinary one, the SPRAR, which is the baseline, have been conceived and created during the emergency situation, in response to the increased flow. All of these centres are managed by private actors- such as social cooperatives or associations, social enterprises as well as for-profit organisations, and small enterprises- particularly small hotels, which find more profitable to enter in this business instead of continuing their activities. There is very little control on this kind of structure and data and information are not available, as the documents have been classified as sensible and not accessible to the public.

Furthermore, selection mechanisms of “management bodies” have also given life to a real “business of the assistance” (Colucci, 2018) (Galera, 2016), where many TSOs are mainly increasing their revenue by improvising in this new area of activity

without equipping themselves such as for example training employees for the purpose. From an organisational point of view the impact has been dramatic, and the cooperatives were facing a number of challenges. The system of financing based on short-term projects, affected the organisation, in terms of liquidity as well as in the number of members and/ or employees they were able to maintain in force. The possibility to derive significant profits on the “assistance sector” has also favoured the setting up of ad hoc cooperatives, with doubtful competence and inexperienced. As argued by Borgaza et al. (2016), while there are TSOs that, by maintaining links with civil society, can still grab and respond effectively to new social needs, there are many who have lost sight of the community’s need, and are subject to increasingly heavy isomorphic pressure and that sometimes assume opportunistic behaviour. Finally, in recent years, centres all over Italy have been shut for fraud or misuse of public money, exposing insufficient government oversight and often corruption. Investigations have overwhelmed the sector. A system designed to ensure a cartel finalise to obtain lucrative contracts, to manage migrant reception centres. Just to mention one on all “*Mafia Capitale*” starting by 2015, exploited the growing refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, which resulted in vast system of corruption in the Rome city government.

**Table 5.16 Different processes of entrustment by region**


TABELLA 2		Riepilogo regionale delle procedure di affidamento in ordine decrescente rispetto alla percentuale degli affidamenti diretti							
REGIONE	01 - PROCEDURA NEGOZIATA PREVIA PUBBLICAZIONE DEL BANDO	02 - PROCEDURA NEGOZIATA SENZA PREVIA PUBBLICAZIONE DEL BANDO	03 - PROCEDURA APERTA	04 - PROCEDURA RISTRETTA	05 - AFFIDAMENTO DIRETTO	06 - CORRDOI UMANTARI Accordo 15 dicembre 2015	NON DISPONIBILE	TOTALE	% AFFIDAMENTO DIRETTO
Calabria Totale	20	1	46	0	75	0	10	152	49,34%
Molise Totale	0	0	44	0	34	0	0	78	43,59%
Sardegna Totale	39	0	53	1	55	0	1	149	36,91%
Puglia Totale	74	3	114	2	80	0	0	273	29,30%
Umbria Totale	0	0	224	0	82	0	0	306	26,80%
Veneto Totale	388	0	315	4	201	0	0	908	22,14%
Toscana Totale	5	37	604	0	182	2	0	830	21,93%
Sicilia Totale	11	1	90	0	26	0	1	129	20,16%
Friuli-Venezia Giulia Totale	105	1	184	0	66	0	2	358	18,44%
Lombardia Totale	351	98	785	2	259	0	12	1507	17,19%
Emilia-Romagna Totale	264	24	544	1	151	0	213	1197	12,61%
Piemonte Totale	86	11	783	1	114	0	36	1031	11,06%
Basilicata Totale	110	1	4	0	9	0	0	124	7,26%
Lazio Totale	273	35	335	0	47	0	0	690	6,81%
Campania Totale	43	130	196	0	21	2	1	393	5,34%
Liguria Totale	150	61	224	5	25	0	3	468	5,34%
Abruzzo Totale	4	0	115	0	1	0	0	120	0,83%
Marche Totale	234	2	184	0	2	0	0	422	0,47%
Trentino-Alto Adige Totale	0	0	0	0	0	0	199	199	0,00%
Valle d'Aosta Totale	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	0,00%
<b>TOTALE COMPLESSIVO</b>	<b>2157</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>4868</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1430</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>478</b>	<b>9358</b>	
<b>TOTALE PERCENTUALE</b>	<b>23,05%</b>	<b>4,33%</b>	<b>52,02%</b>	<b>0,17%</b>	<b>15,28%</b>	<b>0,04%</b>	<b>5,11%</b>	<b>100,00%</b>	

Source: the ANAC report 2017.

As already mentioned the normal system of reception, the SPRAR, is constituted by a network of local authorities, which entrust the integrated reception projects to associations and cooperatives from the third sector, which in turn may deal directly with the persons taken into protection, or offer integration and placement services in a social network that supports different entities, such as private homes, foster care, etc. Though, in recent years, the reception system in Italy has been characterised by an “exceptional situation” under the justification of growing number of arrivals. Even if the SPRAR system is shown as the rule, a very small part of the reception is based on

this virtuous system. Based on the data from the Ministry of Interior and ANCI, the CAS in 2015 answered 70% of the demand, offering 70.910 accommodations against 21.814 Sprar Network accommodations, growing in 2016: 137.000 CAS; and just 26.000 SPRAR (15%) (data from the annual Rapporto Sprar, 2016). As mentioned, the CAS is intended to function as an emergency solution, when other reception places are full to capacity. The extensive use of these provisions cast doubt on the functioning of the entire system, and raise questions about who is truly accountable for the management of asylum seekers in Italy.

**Figure 5.10 Asylum seekers par year**



Source: DEF 2018

The two systems are thought and then funded in a totally different way. The SPRAR system is funded by project. The idea is to bring together different actors, local entities, TSOs, employment officers, and other organizations, implanted in the territory. The project is funded, not the structure. Each partnership has to present a project in order to obtain funds, which must be characterised by a sufficient wide impact, but also demonstrate to be able to offer an individual approach on each beneficiary, making possible a real integration. The fund is always allocated to the public local entity, which could be the municipality as well as the province or the Region. The public actor can, but is not compulsory, externalise the service. In fact, in several cases, particularly when the municipalities are very small, the service is developed in-house, such as in the case of Chiesanova municipality near Turin or Santa Marina, near Salerno. Concerning the CAS the service is entrusted normally through a competitive tender. In 2017 we can observe crucial changes concerning the modalities of appointment through tender. First of all, the contract is subdivided into four batches: 1) the first batch concerns personal services, including cultural mediation, health, social and psychological assistance, meals and foodstuffs, cleaning and environmental hygiene services and supply of goods; 2) the second batch the traceability of services with the awarding of the contract to the most economically advantageous offer, identified according to the best quality / price ratio, discouraging excessive reductions; 3) the third batch the provision of a social clause aimed at promoting the stability of the personnel employed; 4) finally, the fourth one, the strengthening of the inspection and monitoring of the Ministry of Interior on the

quality standards of services rendered<sup>46</sup>.

The quality of the CAS services has been the subject of attention at national and international levels. At the international level, a number of sentences declared the system not sufficiently adequate to host and support asylum seekers. The 15 July 2012, for example, a judge based in Stuttgart (Germany) retained Italy incapable to guarantee the minimum standards of reception. For this reason the German judge refused to apply the system of Dublin to the case of an asylum seekers and to send him back to Italy, defying the treatment “*inhuman and humiliating*” (Romano, 2012). At the national level, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on “the accommodation system, identification and expulsion, and conditions of detention of migrants” has been entitled in 2014, to analyse the use of public resources by the organisations involved into the sector and with the aim of reporting to the chamber of deputy. The Commission declared that “*the management philosophy of the CAS is criticisable because of the frequent recourse to direct assignments, too often justified to face emergencies, as well as to the frequent occurrence of monopoly situations, favoured by the coincidence between the managing body and the figure of the owner of the structure*” (p.109, Atti Parlamentari XVII Legislatura Doc. XXII-bis N. 21).

The “Code of Public contracts of works, services and supplies” introduced by Legislative Decree 12 April 2006 n. 163, then reformed in 2016, defined the legal features of the public procurement system. The procurement contracts normally are awarded through the open procedure but the procedure allowing for direct purchasing in some circumstances is defined as exception, to maintain a good level of quality standards, and control over the structures and organisations would be appointed. Data from the Anti-corruption Authority shows that the recourse of the direct assignment is used in the 15.28% of the contracts on average, with very significant differences at the regional level. In Calabria and Molise Regions, respectively, the use of direct assignment is 49.34% and 43.59%. The same authority reports many cases of failure to apply the rules properly, because of the direct assignment. Finally, some evidences of illegal collaborations between the public and private sector have been identified, as the cases reported were not achievable without the necessary involvement of public officials responsible for the proceedings (ANAC, Deliberation n. 32, 20 January 2016).

Often the CAS are made to engage in activities for which they do not have the staff, skills, and competencies required, because as already mentioned, often they are reconverted businesses. On 26 September 2017, the Ministry of Interior published the National Integration Plan for beneficiaries of international protection which specifies that CAS must adjust their services and activities such as language training, work and services orientation to those offered in the SPRAR system, in order to offer greater chances of integration also to beneficiaries of international protection who have spent their entire asylum procedure in these centres. Unfortunately, very little space is left to associations and social cooperatives to create new or different programs for integration and social activities and unfortunately the reform into the decree of the 7th March 2017 continues in this direction. With this reform, the Ministry of Interior

---

<sup>46</sup><http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/documentazione/bandigar/a/fornitura-beni-e-servizi-relativi-alle-strutture-dei-centri-accoglienza>

adopted a tender specifications scheme (*capitolato*) for the supply of goods and services related to CAS (and CPR and CPSA as well), which only foresees a very basic level of services. Through the decree, the state severely limits the number and the contents of services eligible for funding. The same Decree also introduces another main change. The reform aims at overcoming the idea of a single operator and subdividing the contract into four batches: personal services, health, social and psychological assistance, meals and foodstuffs, cleaning services. Even if the idea is to avoid illegality and increase transparency, there is also a collateral effect of homogenization and uniformity of procedures, with a very strong specialisation of the work and very little comprehension of the situation as a whole. In this context, for TSOs in the sector, which are normally totally funded by national government, is very hard to intervene into the contents of projects. They are basically demanded to offer very specific services with a very high rate of specialisation consequently, which in turn determines a very limited role in the decision making process, and a classic dynamic of outsourcing of the service.

Following the adoption of the decree Minniti-Orlando in 2017, a movement animated by a network of reception operators took action. The objective was not only the specific challenge of the provision but also a work of awareness of the role (of protection and guarantee) of the operators, who expressed the fear of being transformed into *longa manus* of Ministry of the Interior and therefore into control bodies. Some cooperatives and networks of associations have always spoken in the sense of the progressive transformation of all the reception structures from CAS - emergencies - to SPRAR - voted at least on paper for integration, while others have not frowned upon the request to convert from one form to another.

Finally in 2018 a new reform took place. The Salvini Decree, legislative degree 4/10/2018, n. 113, converted in law 1/12/2018, n. 132, stated the end of the SPRAR, which is transformed in SIPROIMI - *Sistema di protezione per titolari di protezione internazionale e per i minori stranieri non accompagnati* – Protection system for beneficiaries of international protection, and foreign minors isolated. Based on this reform, the system of reception became exclusively dedicated to minors and refugees. Furthermore the law also reformed the system of protection abrogating the protection for humanitarian reasons. The decree also reduced the price per day to 17.50 euros per person. Despite the growing debate, which has followed the very stringent decree, the reform is still young to show the very results. It is estimated that more than 12,000 people (La Repubblica, 2018) would be left without any support and removed from the system during the year 2019, while in the next 2 years approximately 120,000 people are destined to slip into the irregularity, between non-renewed permits for humanitarian reasons (about 32,750), not released permits (27,300), and delays due to Territorial Commissions examination, according to the new legal provisions (70,000).

#### 5.3.4 Considerations on the Italian Case

The table 5.19 summarises the main changes happened across the organizational field in Italy. The TSOs until 90s were operating on a voluntarily basis, and relying more on quite spontaneous network of local authority and organizations. It is only at the beginning of 2000s, when the Italian government realised that Italy had become a country of arrival instead of departure, that ministry of interior (expected for the

periods of highest emergency as during the ENA) assumed the charge. Compared to France, Italian system totally lost a step passing directly to a market based interaction among actors. Although, some of the TSOs, which started to be funded for dealing with the migration-related issues, were already there, others have been attracted by public funds. Furthermore, due to the low control, and on the high demand for the quality of the service, a number of for profit organizations jumped on the market. Several cases of mismanagement of public money have been observed. The 2000s are also a crucial turn point for the reform of the administrative system and the new role assumed by the municipalities and local authorities. In this sense the SPRAR system represent a virtuous system of collaboration between the public authorities and the TSOs. But being on voluntary adhesion, it has proved insufficient to meet the needs. A Complementary system of reception, managed by the prefectures through contractual market instruments and public tenders, was created in order to compensate. This system however showed low level of quality.

**Table 5.17 Italy the Organizational Field**

	1990s	2000s	2010s
Institutional	- (Informal network of local actors)	Ministry of Interior	Ministry of Interior + Civil Protection (2011-2013)
	Collaboration and informal network	Network project-based	Network project-based Market Competition
Organisation	Small and Local Associations	Small and Big Associations	Small and Increasing in size Associations
	Work Specialisation Low		Work Specialisation High
Resources	Organizational Private Resources, Voluntarism		Price imposed by the public institutions

Source: Authors 2019

**Table 5.20 Italian Time-line**

United nation definiti on of Refugee	the migrants arrived principally from the former colonies of Northern Africa (Eritra, Ethiopia and Somalia), from the Yugoslavia to Friuli, which was badly affected from a earthquake, and reconstruction involved a large number of workers, and from Tunisia to Sicily, where particularly men was hired on fishing boats.	The murder of Jerry Masslo. Jerry Masslo arrived from South Africa to escape from apartheid. Italy denied asylum. He was assassinated in Villa Literno, in Campania, while working as hired hand.	The Schengen Agreement  The so called “ <i>invasione Albanese</i> ” Albanian invasion - when the Vlora boat arrived in Italy	L. 8 novembre 2000, n. 328 – Legge quadro per la realizzazione del sistema integrato di interventi e servizi sociali							
<b>1951</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1986</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2000</b>
			Following Pinochet’s golpe in 1973, the asylum has been easily granted to Chilean people in the Italian embassy and the family reunification often implemented.	Foschi Law (n. 943/1986): - guarantees family reunification - defines tourist stay and for study reasons - establishes full (formal) equality between Italian and foreign workers. The law was accompanied by a major amnesty involving over 100,000 immigrants	Law (n. 39/1990 Martelli (Andreotti Governme nt)	law 381/1991 Social cooperativ es regulation (then reformed with the law 190/2014)	Law Puglia d.lgs 451/1995 → 1.563/1995 creation of the CDA –centri di accoglienza – Opening of reception centres along the Puglia coast (1995, 1996 and 1997). It has been extended and still constitutes the foundation of the Italian first reception system.	d.lgs 281/1997 shared of Competence s between State and Regions and local authorities	40/1998 Turco Napolitano First law of a general and systematic nature, bringing together all the relevant laws in the unique text " <i>Testo Unico sull'immigrazione</i> ".It favors regular immigration and discourages illegal immigration: The regular immigrant can face the path of acquisition of citizenship configured by law. Path that guarantees the right to vote, family reunification, health treatment and education. Establishes the figure of the Temporary Permanence Center, for all foreigners "subjected to expulsion and / or refolement measures with a forced accompaniment to the border that cannot be immediately implemented"		

<p>EU Directive 9/2003/CE laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum</p>	<p>2008 Bengasi Treaty</p> <p>Treaty of cooperation "between Italy and Libya signed by Berlusconi and Gaddafi in which Libya is required to control migration towards Italy.</p>	<p>2011: Migration wave from North Africa following the Arab springs</p>				
<p><b>2002</b> 182/2002 <b>Bossi Fini</b> Law amends the Turco-Napolitano law in a restrictive sense:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The length of the residence permit is reduced from 3 to 2 years</li> <li>- Introduction of fingerprinting for all foreigners and the crime of clandestine state</li> <li>- The sponsorship system for the residence contract, that makes it more difficult for the non-EU citizen to come to work legally in Italy is abolished</li> <li>- Establishment of SPRAR system</li> </ul>	<p><b>2003</b> Law amends the</p> <p><b>2004</b> DPR 303/2004 establishment of CARA centre for asylum seekers, then modified by d.lgs 25/2008 and d.lgs 145/2015</p>	<p><b>2005</b> Decree of reception EU Directive 9/2003/CE, d.lgs 140/2005</p>	<p><b>2006</b> d.lgs. 163/2006 on public contracts, transposition EU regulation).</p>	<p><b>2008</b> Security package (No. 125/2008):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- introduces new types of crimes for illegal immigrants and those who favor their illegal stay on Italian territory,</li> <li>- aggravating clandestinity for criminal offenses,</li> <li>- the tightening of penalties for those who declare false generalities</li> <li>- expulsion for EU citizens or non-EU citizens affected by prison sentences of more than 2 years</li> <li>- new name of the so-called cpt which becomes "identification and expulsion center"</li> </ul> <p>Legislative Decree n. 160/2008: retracts the possibility of family reunification</p>	<p><b>2009</b> Provisions on public security (No. 94/2009):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Introduction of the crime of illegal entry and residence</li> <li>- The tightening of penalties for the crime of aiding and abetting illegal immigration</li> <li>- Extension of maximum detention times, up to 6 months, in CIEs</li> <li>- The introduction of new economic requirements for entry, and for family reunification and renewal of the residence permit, (integration agreement and points residence permit)</li> </ul>	<p><b>2011</b> The State of urgency is declared to face the new arrivals. The extraordinary legal instruments of "<i>Ordinanza della protezione civile</i>" is used (particularly to face the Emergency North Africa)</p>
<p>Accompanied by the largest European amnesty involving over 650,000 individuals</p>						



<p>Directive 2013/32 /UE Directive 2013/33/UE (previously directive 2005/85/EC)</p>	<p>Directive 2014/24/UE on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC</p>	<p>Hotspot Regulation EU 2016/1624</p>		
<p>On reception services and of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection</p>	<p>Directive 2014/23/UE on the award of concession contracts</p>			
<p>(mandatory creation of Regional HUB, created in 2015)</p>				
<p><b>2013</b></p>	<p><b>2014</b></p>	<p><b>2015</b></p>	<p><b>2016</b></p>	<p><b>2017</b></p>
<p>d.l.119/2014 → 1. 146/2014 creation of 20 Territorial Committees aimed judging the asylum requests of asylum seekers on the national territory</p> <p>L. 190/2014 Law concerning Pro- competition instruments for the confidence of the services</p>	<p>d.lgs 142/2015 <b>Reform of the reception system for asylum seekers and refugees:</b> 3 levels: the very first, first and second reception: 1. First aid and reception centers. The migrants stay there as long as necessary: they receive the first medical care, they are photographed, they can request international protection. They are thought to replace the CARA. 2. Reception centers (CDA) or Reception centers for asylum seekers (CARA), the first to verify the regularity of the permanence, the second to welcome the applicants for international protection to complete the procedures relating to the recognition. 3. SPRAR "integrated" welcome (board, lodging, training, assistance and orientation measures) Art 11 in case of unavailability in the ordinary reception the creation of CAS centre for reception in urgency</p>	<p>D. Lgs. 50/2016 Public Contract Code</p> <p>193/2016 Urgent fiscal provisions for financing of different needs could be not postponed</p> <p>10/08/2016 the system of funding for local public bodies is modified in order to make easier access to the National fund for services and policies concerning asylum (FNSPA)</p> <p>Interior Ministry directive concerning repartition of asylum seekers across the national territory through SPRAR system</p> <p>Activation of the safeguard clause for reception in the SPRAR</p>	<p>Minniti-Orlando" decree (converted Law No. 46/2017): 1 - For migrants who have appealed against a refusal the possibility of the second degree is suppressed, there is a degree of judgment of less 2 - Guarantors of the just execution of the law would be judges established ad hoc to deal with this issue 3 - Videotaped interviews 4 - Transition from the CIE (Identification and Expulsion Centers) to the CPR (Permanence Centers for Repatriation). The points of the decree have been accused of unconstitutionality.</p> <p>Law 205/2017 Code public contract</p> <p>Decree on tendering specification for public contracts concerning the reception centres for asylum seekers and refugees</p>	

## 5.4 Considerations on the Reception Service in Italy and France

The service has notably changed in the last two decades. Firstly, there is a multiplication of structures, which are divided into ordinary reception and emergency ones. The two parallel systems are quite different. In the ordinary system, although the quantitative indicators are applied, and economies of scale are supported, local acceptance of the structure is necessary. A number of stakeholders are involved in both the planning and the implementation of the reception service, particularly in Italy. In France too, the CADA still represents a structure integrated in the local social fabric. However, this is not the case for emergency services, which are in both cases managed by the Ministry of the Interior, and by the prefectures at the local level without needing any discussion with local authorities. However, the kind of the service strongly changed also in the ordinary reception, as shown by the text of the tenders. For example, in France, the integration function of these structures was evident in the past. This was due to the implementation of services such as learning of the French language, recreational activities such as travelling, or other activities functional to keeping in contact with the rest of the population. These services have disappeared, leaving room for the control function. In Italy, for example, organizations are obliged to put a curfew on beneficiaries.

Thus, although there are still exceptions, particularly in Italy, where the SPRAR system allows more autonomy for organizations, the sector of reception has radically changed. Pushed in the same direction by national and European legislations, the centres are becoming in several reported cases, “no-places”. As it is in the case of the Prahda in France, where the majority of the beneficiaries are dublineées, waiting to be sent back to Italy. The beneficiaries of these structures are waiting for their administrative procedures to be processed. The *cahier des charges* of the management bodies do not have any kind of support for the integration tasks, because in reality there is no desire to integrate the beneficiaries. In accordance with the Dublin Regulation, they are supposed to return to Italy, and repatriated when there are international agreements with the countries of their nationality. Both in France and in Italy, several cases of mismanagement have also been reported. Since the beginning of the emergency around 2013, the social movement replaced the public authorities in charge of quality control of services in the structures. Volunteers and civil society across Europe have begun to organise a solidarity network in order to support asylum seekers.

The system of reception could be considered in this term as a continuum among different countries. For instance in Libya, the centres of reception / detention funded by the EU already make a sort of selection by letting only a small portion of people leave the country. Once arrived in Italy, the beneficiaries are registered in the Hotspot where fingerprints are recorded in the European Eurodac database. Then, they are moved to the Regional HUB, where their identification sends them and they can introduce their demand for asylum. Subsequently, they are transferred to the CAS, waiting for a place in SPRAR, where they are more likely to receive social and administrative support. Very often, after months and sometimes years, they decide to leave the country and try to cross the borders. When this happens, they reach France, where they start again to submit their request for asylum. However, as they are already registered in Italy, this is not possible unless rare exceptions. They are

accommodated at the Prahda, where they wait for four months to receive their ticket to return to Italy. Without legal assistance, due to the very low rate of lawyers in the structure, they are alone in seeking to overturn the decision. Sometimes, they are intercepted by social movements, which offer their volunteer support for different services such as housing, French classes, administrative support, etc. If by chance the decision is effectively overturned they go to CADA where the acceptance rate of asylum requests is higher. Otherwise, they are sent back to Italy, where they often remain irregularly on the national territory.

**Table 5.18 The service in IT - FR**

	Italy		France	
		Naples		Marseille
	SPRAR	CAS	CADA	HUDA, UT-SA, CAO, PRAHDA, Etc.
Division decision-maker and providers	Not totally	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decentralisation of public Actors	Yes	No	No	No
Performance based Management	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Performance Control	High	Low	High (Dialogue de Gestion)	Low
Price	35 euros/day/person	35 euros/day/person	19 euros/day/person	15-20 euros/day/person
Funding Period	3 Years	1 Year	15 years	1-3 year
Market Instruments of funding	SPRAR is a multilevel project where the local authority is entirely implicated	Public Market	<i>Appel à Projet</i> (Call for Project) opened to the market	Public Market, or <i>Appel à Projet</i>
Min number of Asylum Seekers hosted in CADA	Defined by the local public authority	No	85	85
Co-funded by Local Public Authority	5%	No	No	No
Qualitative Control	Yes	No	No	No
Quantitative Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Well integrated at the local level	Yes	No	Yes	No
Workers/Migrants Ratio	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Taux d'Indu for Refugees	No	No	Yes	Yes
Taux d'Indu for rejected Asylum seekers	NO	NO	Yes	Yes
TSOs	Yes	Not Only	Yes	Not Only
Hotel Number of Structures in Town	No	Yes	No	No
Number of Hosted Asylum Seekers in the service in Town	1	19	10	Not reported
Number of Hosted Asylum Seekers in the service in Town	132	1.127	850	Not reported

Source: Author 2019

## CH.5 What to Remember?

This part of the work aims at describing the evolution, from an institutional perspective of the organizational field both in Italy and in France. We described the reconfiguration and the inter-organisational mechanisms, characterising the sector of the asylum seekers reception in the last 30 years, and their evolution. We used a processual analysis to detect the different periods and describe them as a sequence of a number of different factors of different nature, as resumed in table 5.14 For France, and figure 5.20 for Italy, where the main characteristics of the different periods, for each case, are described.

The French Ministry of Interior esteems that nowadays almost 1,500 associations contribute to the territories in implementing the reception and integration policy for first-time foreigners, while we do not have an official number for the Italian case. Using market instruments such as calls for projects and tenders, public authorities set very specific requirements in order to gain the contracts (top-down approach). And once the actor gain the competition, the public authorities put in place a system of indicators and binding contracts which impose specific daily tasks to organisations, and funding only listed services.

We observed in particular for the French case the following characteristics

- Optimisation and reduction of prices are prioritised as mentioned into the inter-ministerial document “[\*l'hébergement et la prise en charge financière des demandeurs d'asile\*](#)”, where the purpose of significant budgetary saving through homogenisation of practices in the different centres is clearly mentioned;
- Introduction of performance indicator, that are based on number of people on exit of reception centres, with budgetary penalties are applied if standards are not respected;
- The minimum ratio of staff to migrant imposed by contract 1:15, 1:20 depends on the structure in France);
- Clearly mentioned preference for large structure, able to answer to all the demand proposed by call, instead of a number of small centres;
- The economic pressure due to relative short-term contracts, the re-statement of the balance-sheet figures and the change of tariff even during the contract do not create much room to work.

While for the Italian case we observed that:

- There is a fast ovulation of the system which start to increase later compared to France and be institutionalised during a period of a big reforms (2000s) both at the institutional level (decentralization of the power) and concerning the legal framework for the tenders;
- The system of funding is based on projects, which increase the opportunity to collaborate, but o also increase the precariousness and uncertainty due to the short duration of funding;
- The transparency claimed by who advocates for the public tendering system and application of the market instruments is not observed, and a number of scandals challenge the credibility of the TS in Italy;

- Since profits are possible in the management of the CAS, and not being excluded by law, for profit enterprises entered the market. But they do not always act ethically nor promote a service of quality;

However some kinds of resistance against the systematic change have been put in place from a part of the organizations from this sector. The best example in France has been the reluctance expressed by associations to participate into the public market (*marché public*) for the appointment of the Prahda centers, in 2016.

The members of FNARS *Federation des Acteurs de la Solidarité*, refused to take part to the competition, because of the ways used from the State to allocate the funding and as well because of the services that have been required (*cahier de charge*) The public market was defined as “a breach of the partnership relationship between the State and the associations” (FNARS, 2016), for its innovation in the modality, it was in fact the first a public market opened to assign a social service; and for the price 16,5 euros par person. But also the function of control asked to the organization in charge of the structure, very different from the social nature of the organizations normally involved in the sector created some problems to traditional actors. They in fact saw on these Prahda centers, a mirror for the evolution of the migration policies in France, tending to control instead of reception. Finally they also argued that the public market was not appropriate for small associations. The constraints imposed by these markets lead to the exclusion of all the associations that did not have the size required to respond or that did not have sufficient and immediately available infrastructures capacity. Finally the members of the FNARS denounced a false competition and a concrete will, expressed by the public authority to discard the associations historically ensuring the missions of support people in difficulty to the benefit of operators controlled by the state and and for-profit organizations (FNARS, 2016).

The market-oriented evolution of the migration reception sector, and the resulting business like evolution of the TSOs involved in it, is quite functional to this change from structure of reception and integration to control, selection and expulsion. Through the introduction of public markets and tenders by tenders, the progressive transformation of the reception centers is becoming increasingly clear. Each tender is always more detailed, leaving very little room for manoeuvre to the organization appointed for managing the centers. The social workers are always less free to accompany and sustain people in a process of integration, since their work is more related to filling papers, bureaucratic tasks and control. The co-production process is not the dominant *modus operandi* in the majority of these structures.



The economic pressure due to relative short-term contracts, re-statement of the balance-sheet figures and the change of tariff even during the contract do not create much room to work. The competition is based on several aspects. A competition among organizations (associations or cooperatives) exists to win the public procurement contract, maintain the services already put in place and survive. But there is also a competition among different structures of receptions, where the multiplication of structures follows a specific reasoning. At the same time the competition mechanism makes difficult to collaborate and create networks of resistance against the new migration policies.

Finally, as we will see in the case studies, the market orientation of the migration sector reshaped the internal organizational mechanisms and dynamics as well. As

mentioned in this work, some actors try to resist but with extreme difficulty, and day-by-day their mission of reception is always more related to control and selection. Opening the market allowed greater control over structures and their goals, and the ability to implement very quickly a new migration policies paradigm. Through the implantation of market mechanism, it has been possible in a few years to change the reception policy into a policy of control and rejection.

Finally, as we will see in the case studies, the market orientation of the migration sector reshaped the internal organizational mechanisms and dynamics as well. As mentioned in this work, some actors try to resist but with extreme difficulty, and day-by-day their mission of reception is always more related to control and selection. Opening the market allowed greater control over structures and their goals, and the ability to implement very quickly a new migration policies paradigm. Through the implantation of market mechanism, it has been possible in a few years to change the reception policy into a policy of control and rejection.

## Chapter 6 The Micro Level – An Intra-Organizational Analysis





## Introduction

At the micro level, we propose a study based on three different organizational approaches. The theoretical approaches used in this research are the neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and the institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). These approaches help to highlight the interactions between the internal and external context, which are very relevant in order to understand the organization dynamics. Mobilizing three theoretical approaches will allow us to grasp different perspectives, in order to offer in the end a more detailed picture concerning the phenomenon under study.

We will first mobilize the concept of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in order to understand which kinds of pressures - normative, mimetic or coercive - determine it in the different cases. Thanks to the predictors showed in the methodology, we will show different isomorphic processes. While the concept of isomorphism will explain the propensity for the organizational homogeneity, and why the organizations participating in a field are similar or implement certain common practices, the concept of institutional logics will bring light on internal diversity. This leaves open the door for exploring what make them different. We will explore this internal logics and how the actions of organizations are characterized by these internal tensions of different projections of the external institutional pressures. Finally, through the lens of the resource dependence approach, we will analyze the strategies put in place by the organizations to face the external pressures and uncertainty.

In this chapter we have explored individually first the three French case studies based in Marseille and then the three Italian selected organizations from Naples. Each case study will be presented through a resuming table, showing the number of workers, volunteers, year of foundation and the main activities carried out. A short summary of the most relevant steps through the evolution of the organization will be also presented in order to make easier the comprehension of the results that will be showed in the following section. Then, the different approaches will be mobilized, in order to explore the different organizational behaviors. Finally a transversal analysis, including the three cases will be carried out, in order to draw some conclusion at the field level in each country.

## 6.1. The French Case Studies in Marseille

Nowadays in Marseille there are 10 CADA, with almost one thousands asylum seekers hosted. Until 2001 the Adrim was the only one presents on the area managed the only. Adrim is an historical actor in the sector of reception and “management” of migrants. Actually the organisation during 70s managed a hangar, based at the port of Marseille. The hangar was an unofficial centre of administrative detention, *ante litteram*, where the migrants arriving from the North African countries where lodged, as irregular migrant on the French territory<sup>47</sup>. The other associations, excluded the FOFANA, at that time were already in place, but they were involved with social services of other sort. The most part of them during the 80s took part to the campaign “fighting against poverty”, which had the objective to report to the authorities the extremely harsh conditions in which a part of the population used to live.

**Table 6.1 Reception centres in Marseille and number of places**

Name	N° of places
ALOTRA	80
ADOMA	144
ADRIIM	149
SAJ	136
IDA	51
AAJT	80
HOSPITALITE POUR LES FEMMES	30
ALAN	85
LA CARAVELLE	115
FOFANA	85
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>955</b>

Source: Cimade 2017<sup>48</sup>

Three cases have been selected in the metropolitan area of Marseille, ALAN, SAJIDA and FOFANA. While the first two organizations have been rooted in the territory of Marseille for decades, and they are among the historical actors active in the territory dealing with the different aspects of the social assistance, FOFANA represents the example of a new player in the area. FOFANA manages a new CADA in Marseille. FOFANA, which deals with a number of different services (mostly in the social and medico-social sector) started to offer services of reception for asylum seekers in 2015, when a large number of new calls for projects have been launched, in order to respond to the government's need to increase the “*parc d'hébergement*”, the number of the asylum seekers' reception centres. While studying the CADA in Marseille, we will also describe the institutional pressures, the logics, and strategies characterizing the group, which even if newly arrived, well represents certain trends characterizing the field.

<sup>47</sup> See chapter 6 for more on the subject.

<sup>48</sup> <https://www.lacimade.org/schemas-regionaux-daccueil-des-demandeurs-dasile-quel-etat-des-lieux/>

**Table 6.2 The Three Case Studies in Marseille**

<b>Name of the Organization</b>	<b>Legal form of TSO</b>	<b>Service</b>
<b>ALAN</b>	Association	CADA
<b>SAJIDA</b>	Association	CADA
<b>FOFANA</b>	Association part of a large group	CADA

### 6.1.1 Case Study 1 ALAN

#### Main Organizational Steps

##### 1919 – 1958: The beginning

ALAN is an association, which manages a small local CADA in Marseille founded in 1995. The association started its activities in support of migrants already during the period of the first after war. In 1919, the founder of the *Maison de Jeune Fille*, a protestant woman, carried out actions aimed at sustaining new girls arrived in town. She helped them, in order to prevent from ending up in the street and prostituting themselves.

After a couple of decades, in 1948 the founder's daughter, Ms ALAN, funded the *Centre d'Accueil ALAN*. One of the fundamental principles of the organisation has been from the beginning, and still today, the “unconditional reception”. The unconditional reception is based on the idea that the category to which a person belongs does not matter. If the person is in need, the organization will try to offer its support to make him/her an independent and socially integrated person again. Ms ALAN is also among the co-funders of the CIMADE association, still nowadays one of the most militant association dealing with the migration related issues in France (see previous analysis of the organizational field). In 1958 the hosting centre ALAN became formally a recognised association under the French law 1901.

##### 1958 – 1988: A “charitable organization of struggle”

During this second phase, the current Secretary General of the association (Interview\_ALAN\_4) is appointed. He totally embraces the pillar principles proclaimed by the funders, particularly solidarity and the principle of unconditional reception. During this period the association counts principally on volunteers, with basically just one paid worker. At that time, the work is developed in order to answer to urgency situation. The service is offered to local homeless people. The centre opens its doors to all person in need, who walk right up and knock.

In 1988, the RMI (*Revenue Minimum d'Insertion*) - is introduced. This marks an important step in the public authorities intervention against hard deprivation of a slice of the population. It actually indicates that finally the government was starting to take into account the new poverty, realizing that in France there were people without any kind of revenue. This also had an impact on the *foyer/centre's* funding system. If until that time, the ALAN was founded through small private sources, now founding related to the RMI start to be allocated by public authorities. The Association also takes part and strongly promotes the campaign “*pauvreté et précarité*” in name of a more substantial support to the people in need.

##### 1991 – 2008 The “Specialization”

Chapter 3 In 1991 the *circulaire* n° 91 - 22<sup>49</sup> concerning the creation of CADA centres of reception for asylum seekers, is in line with the process of the “categorization of the poverty” – namely the creation of different categories based on the kind of difficulties the beneficiaries of the sustain is called to confront - and the creation of specific *dispositive* (schemes) according to the kind of the audience. The reform not only creates a specific structure of reception for asylum seekers meant to host them during the asylum procedure, but also forbids asylum seekers to work during their first year of residence. During the following period the succeeding reforms created different kinds of structures, with the aim of segmenting the population received and creating specific services for the different beneficiaries.

Chapter 4 At the same time the social policies are centralised at regional or national level, and the centre does not host anymore as they used to do before, the beneficiary directly (the so-called “*accueil à la porte*”) but the reception became submitted to a national or regional redistribution. In the meantime, the functioning of the centres of reception is reformed, becoming more and more highly framed. Both the law on the CADA of 2000<sup>50</sup> and the reform of the “*loi de l’action sociale*” in 2002, social action law, go in this direction. The reforms impose more detailed definition of the tasks the managing bodies are in charge of and a more coherent and transparent account management.

Chapter 5 So until beginning of 2000s, ALAN receives the asylum seekers in the generalist structure CHRS, formally recognized as CHRS in 1998. With 30 places for reception of asylum seekers, the legal status recognition is followed by the decision to put in place a team of professionals. It is the beginning of the professionalization for the association. Following a kind of trend, characterizing a large number of associations based in Marseille, the ALAN opens up a CADA in 2005. Conscious of their relative short experience on the asylum matters, the six or seven small and local associations that took in charge the same kind of service at that period, decided to create “*espace*”, an organization able to support them, technically and practically. During that period the associations developed their activities based on a collaborative spirit, exchanging information, human resources and tips.

Chapter 6 During this period the ALAN also opened up other structures such as: the *lits halte*, the *LHSS – Soins Santé* in 2006, the *HUDA* in 2007, the *pension de famille OUSTAOU* in 2008. The association increased in size, with more specialised services and more specialised social workers. As far as allowed by the law, the association tried to remain true to its principle of “unconditional reception”, and maintain adherence to its fundamental principles.

#### 2008 – 2017 Back to the origins

In 2012 a new Director is appointed (ALAN\_Interview\_1) in the CADA, who soon becomes the FNARS delegate for the region PACA. During this period, first the “*loi Besson*”, aimed at imposing a sanction in case CADA persists in hosting people not allowed (because their asylum procedure has been denied or accepted), then the *décret 2011*<sup>51</sup> and finally the asylum reform 2015 put associations in a tough position. The reform not only imposes a new *taux d’encadrement*, ratio of workers to

---

<sup>49</sup> Circulaire n° 91 – 22 DPM: Réorganisation dispositif d’accueil National

<sup>50</sup> MES/DPM n° 2000-170 du 29 mars 2000

<sup>51</sup> the décret 2011 2011- 861 imposes a 50% of socio educational staff out of the total number of workers into a CADA.

asylum seekers, different passing from 1 to 10, to 1 to 15, but also redistributes a number of tasks among the public authorities and the other actors involved in the field, included the associations<sup>52</sup>.

The social workers and employees in the ALAN association started an internal discussion concerning the kind of services they were offering compared to what they wanted to do. Although they have always claimed the fundamental principles of solidarity and unconditional reception, however after several decades of activities, the feelings of members were mixed up. An organizational reflection was developed on the way social services have been developed lately and how they were changing. As the feeling of “going back to the roots” and continuing to offer high quality services, was shared, a collective internal discussion rose up. One of the main conclusions has been the decision to turn down the HUDA service, because conceived as not in line with the fundamental principles of solidarity and unconditional reception. The HUDA, which is an emergency accommodation for asylum seekers, works very differently from the CADA. Not only concerning the kind of beneficiaries, but also, because the daily price is sensible lower, reducing remarkably the number of tasks for the managing body and transforming the reception from a service of integration in a service where it is offered basic assistance, or just a place to stay, a bed where to sleep. The costs are cut minimizing or zeroing the legal support during the application for asylum, as well as for social and psychological assistant. The workers of the centre ALAN were convinced that this was not in line with the values supported by the organisation. And in 2016 they found a solution with the prefecture. Based on the new regulation, the CADA are requested to comply with a “minimum size”, defined as critical threshold of 85 hosts. The ALAN from the beginning never counted more than 30 asylum seekers hosted, and in the last period experienced some pressure from public authority in order to increase the size. The compromise has been then found in transforming the HUDA places (20), in CADA, accepting then to increase the size until reaching the critical size.

Still today the CADA ALAN is defined as one of the most militant CADA of Marseille, endorsing position sustained by the CIMADE and some social movements and taking part to protests. ALAN also animates often the FNARS, considering this platform as an instrument for being represented. The ALAN association actually as a small, local organization, finds in cooperation with the other actors rooted in the territory a strategy to resist to contextual pressures.

---

<sup>52</sup> The OFII takes in charge the *ADA Allocation pour demandeur d’asile* a pocket money for asylum seekers, until then managed directly through the associations. This implicated a change into the relation with the host, as now the social workers don’t know exactly the amount of money each of them has at disposal.

Table 6.3 ALAN Main Steps

Legal form	Association (law 1901)
YEAR of CADA constituency	1995
How it has been created	The association is the result of the merge of two organisations: the Association <i>Centre d'Accueil de ALAN</i> and the <i>Maison de Jeune Fille</i>
Number of workers	60 paid workers
Number of volunteers	0
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Centre d'Hébergement</i> (Accommodation Centre for homeless and destitute) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o CHRS ALAN</li> <li>o Claire Joie</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <i>Pensions de Famille</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o L'oustaou de Jane</li> <li>o Le Moulin</li> </ul> </li> <li>- CADA ALAN (the reception centre for asylum seekers)</li> </ul>
Very important Steps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>1919</b> Ernestine Schloesing funded the <i>Maison de Jeune Fille</i>, with the aim of helping the new girls arriving in town against the prostitution. She is a Protestant, very active in her community</li> <li>- <b>1948</b> ALAN (Ernestine Schloesing's daughter) funded the <i>Centre d'Accueil ALAN</i>. One of the most important principle of the organisation is the "unconditional reception", which is still nowadays the pillar of the organisation's actions. She is also among the co-funders of the CIMADE association (still nowadays one of the most militant association dealing with migration in France).</li> <li>- <b>1958</b> the hosting centre ALAN became a recognised association under the law 1901 (14 places for reception) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>1987</b> D. became the General Director of the association. He is still in charge, and he totally embraces the pillar principles proclaimed by the funders.</li> <li>- <b>1995</b> <i>Maison de Jeune Fille</i> + <i>Centre ALAN</i> merged</li> <li>- <b>1998</b> the association obtained the recognition as CHRS. At that time a team of professionals is put in place (30 places for reception) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2005</b> ALAN opened its first CADA (32 places for reception) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2006</b> creation LHSS (Lits Halte Soins Santé) (5 places) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2007</b> Opening of HUDA (emergency reception centre for asylum seekers). (20 places of reception) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2008</b> Opening of <i>Pension de Famille Oustaou de Jane</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li></ul>

	<p>(reception for young girls and social support)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2012</b> Christine Director of ALAN CADA (still in charge)</li> <li>- <b>2015</b> The association takes in charge the CHRS Claire Joie, (20 places of reception)</li> </ul> <p>Christine is elected as Delegate at the FNARS PACA (still in charge)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2016</b> Opening of Reception Centre Le Moulin (20 places for women with mental healthiness)</li> <li>- <b>06/07/2016</b> Fusion of CADA (32 places) and HUDA (20 places) → 85 places of CADA (to fit the critical size required from the Interior ministry)</li> </ul>
External Events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2001</b> decree 2001-576, 3 July 2001 Concerning the functioning et funding system of CHRS</li> <li>- <b>2002</b> <i>Loi de l'Action Sociale</i></li> <li>- <b>2007</b> Sarkozy created the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity</li> </ul> <p>The Government Sarkozy also applies the RGPP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2011</b> Loi Besson (Sarkozy Gouvernement) imposes a system of financial sanction for CADA registering high “taux d’indu”</li> <li>- <b>2011</b> Decree 2011-861, 20 July 2011 imposes 50% of social workers out of total employees in the CADA structure.</li> <li>- <b>2013</b> New Dublin Procedure</li> <li>- <b>2014</b> Asylum Law Reform</li> <li>- <b>2015</b> 2015-925 Law New “cahier de charge” <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o New ratio workers/ migrants</li> <li>o The OFII takes in charge the ADA allocation until then managed directly through the associations</li> <li>o (The role of social workers is changing)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <b>2016</b> Creation of the PRAHDA structure of reception (very low level of social assistant)</li> <li>- <b>2017</b> <b>Circulaire</b> demanding for CADA structures, economy of scale and concerning human resources 1ETP out of 15 asylum seekers.</li> </ul>

Source: Author, 2019



## Isomorphic Process

The three phases of the ALAN association highlights the evolutionary process undertaken by the organization. Particularly relevant for the isomorphic process are the second (58-88) and the third phases (91-08). During the second phase, we observe that the external environment is characterised by a number of reforms due to the public actors started considering as a crucial concern the situation of extreme poverty experienced by some people in France. The first funds are dispensed in order to sustain the associations dealing with social issues and are not particularly constraining in terms of requirements. They are based on the system of grants and the organization is reimbursed at the end of the action. The ALAN is one of the most active of the Marseille region and very well rooted at local level. During this period however, the associations started to formalise a number of actions always carried out in more informal way. Firstly, as result of the merge between the two centres “WAO” and “*centre d’Accueil ALAN*” the association *ASSOCIATION WAO – Centre ALAN – MARSEILLE* has been legally established under the law 1901, in 1958. The merge is described as a natural consequence of a shared story, a common approach to deal with social issues, in order to sustain people, without taking their place, but instead providing them with the appropriated instruments for emancipation (Interview\_ALAN\_1). Nevertheless, the formalization is a first act in order to be recognised by public authorities and gain the deserved legitimacy in the generalised field of social interventions (Interview\_ALAN\_4). However, the organization remains quite small and based on the activities led by volunteers relying on a philanthropic approach, while the public funds remain very limited, and the action very basic.

The 1975 Law defining the CHRS and the introduction of the RMI in 1988 changed the situation. The practice until that moment, had been to offer support to homeless and people in need, doing a very direct intervention in the neighbourhood and in the municipality, through a street-level intervention. By then the reception starts being managed through a regional platform, which selects the people responding to the criteria in order to be host in the centre and receive support. The allocation of the RMI marks the recognition of the poverty as a high point in the political agenda. Although the action remains very general, the law represents a first step towards a more formalised approach to deal with social issues, and to deal with the organizations always have been in charge of them. As mentioned by the social workers at the ALAN association, in 2000s “ *we started to categorize the poor people*” (interview\_ALAN\_4). The creation of the CADA before, and other structures afterwards, created a differentiation among the kinds of service based on the category of people received. If before the 90s in the PACA region the CHRS used to host all the people with a low income, then the different structures started to determine a specialization in the social action. The ALAN in this phase experimented a strong specialization opening a CHRS, a CADA and then, the HUDA, and other structures specialised in sustaining isolated young girls. Furthermore in 1998, the association, which until that moment was based on the activities of volunteers, set up a team of specialised social workers in order to manage the CHRS. They did not have the choice since it was required to receive the accreditation as CHRS. Moreover, since the size of the structure grew from 14 to 30 sleeping accommodations and in order to maintain continuity in the action, a stable group of paid workers proved to be necessary. We can observe both in the case of the legal recognition and in the case of professionalization two signs of isomorphic processes based on legal pressures. To

have access to fund the organization needs a legal recognition, and to respect the contract with the public authority the organization needs to engage a number of professionals, with a specific background.

Concerning in particular the reception of asylum seekers, until 2000s in the PACA region there were no centres for reception for asylum seekers, CADA, and the asylum seekers were hosted in the generalist centres the CHRS. However, the asylum application procedures became constantly more complicated, and required a higher degree of specialization, not only in terms of social workers involved, but also in terms of knowledge of the international and national laws. Furthermore, the social workers at some point started to recognise that the “*asylum seeker became a stigmatised category*” (Interview\_ALAN\_4). In this context, the professionalization played a double role, on the one hand it helped to implement more focused actions, in a more organic way. On the other hand, the members of the organizations started to feel that, due to this kind of transformation “*the functioning was taking over the meaning*” (Interview\_ALAN\_4), making the finalization of some practices more important than the values. Some of the members also started to particularly suffer the imposition from public authorities, feeling that the increasing size was jeopardizing the freedom of action “*became a huge and heavy machine. We were losing freedom of action*” (Interview\_ALAN\_4). During this phase, the strongly normative field clashed with the militant organization. A continuous reflection on how to change the direction of this process, in order to keep the organization’s heterogeneity compared to the other organizations, has been advanced.

Responding to the requirements imposed by the principal and unique funder namely the public authorities on the sector, became the only solution. As previously shown, the competitive environment, and the imposition of market instruments could be at the origin of the TSOs business like evolution. Starting from the middle of 2000s the competitive tenders became the system of allocation of funds in the sector of reception. The “*appel à projet*”, which is not strictly speaking a public market, however imposes a level of adherence with certain practices. The number of ETP - the fulltime equivalent workers involved in the service – out of the number of hosts, is formally defined in the text of the tender (nowadays 1/15). The public authorities also impose the price for person for day (19.50 euros) and finally in the last contracts they also impose the minimum size of the structure (85 hosts). The required skills for workers are mentioned in the cahier des charges, as well as the activities, which will be funded. As mentioned by the social workers of the associations, there is very limited room of creativity and alternative practices, in this situation, where the number of workers is not sufficient either to implement the required tasks, against the spread rhetoric of social innovation, which the public authorities promote (Interview\_ALAN\_1; Interview\_ALAN\_2; Interview\_ALAN\_3; Interview\_ALAN\_4).

Furthermore, in a sector where the rules are very strict, the punishment for not alignment is not only a financial sanction nor a reduction of the budget for the sequent year but also an element in the system of selection mechanism. Public authorities, represented by the ministry of interior, indeed look for reliable actors (IGF, IGAS, & IGA, 2013). And even if the market mechanism used to assign the service, the competitive tender, is strongly based on the best offer in terms of price, however “*we also take into account the nature of the actor, the ability to quickly respond to*

*emergency, and a certain positive attitude towards the public bodies, while respecting the democratic principles of pluralism” (Interview\_OFII\_1).*

The change towards legal recognition and professionalism is motivated by several factors, including the evolution of the public policies and in particular the way in which the funds are distributed. As mentioned by the institutional theory, in the sector where the funds come from only one actor, particularly in the case of public body, the level of isomorphism is higher (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Furthermore it is also mentioned that when the field is highly structured, there is more isomorphism. It means that the specific characteristics of the complex field have a direct impact on the organizations behaviour. Moreover, the organizational field is characterised by a very high degree of uncertainty. The legislation, in particular that which concerns migration and reception, changes very often, following the political cycle, at the national and the EU levels. So if the market depends on the number of asylum seekers arrivals, the kind of reception to put in place is also a political choice (Interview\_EU\_1).

Another important event to be highlighted is the entry of the big associations, which have been absent until late in the PACA region “*clearly toggles the field*” (interview\_ALAN\_4). The local associations had not the ability to react on time, and “*defend themselves*” (interview\_ALAN\_4), but instead “*they often follow the flow*” (interview\_ALAN\_4). The big associations not only had already internalised practices such as the corporatization and the professionalization, but also, as shown in the quantitative part of this work, used a number of strategies of surviving including merges and acquisition of competitors.

Following *Hannan and Freeman* (1984) if we analyse periphery and core characteristics, we observe that, in the case of ALAN, while the periphery - structures and processes – changed due to the institutional pressures, the core – values and culture – remains very attached to the founding principles. In the case of ALAN, the isomorphic transformation of practices does not coincide with a new logic of action. This is also confirmed by the constant need of maintaining the primordial values, always expressed by a President and a secretary general very attentive to the ideological positioning of the workers, and by a constant self-criticism compared to the lost of freedom and the increasing in size showing a low adherence to the logic imposed by public authorities although conforming in practices.

## **Institutional Logics**

The ALAN association shows a rooted militant logic, justified by its origins, namely the strongly engaged mother and daughter founders of the two primordial organizations. The social workers are selected based on their skills, but also based on their adherence to the project, and a certain adhesion to a way to look at the migration and reception policies, which is compatible with the organization’s values. The organization reclaims a clear ideological positioning in every action, partnership and activity. It organizes and takes part to protest in name of the organization; it creates very selected partnership and collaboration, mostly with the Cimade, and the daily activities are strongly based on the idea that the asylum seekers need to acquire

autonomy, self-esteem, and need to be accompanied through a holistic support. For this reason, the social worker accompanies the beneficiaries but never replaces them. The militantism is also reclaimed against the authorities, the prefecture and the ministry of interior, which actually has not a good reputation among the ALAN's social workers. Some of them feel a high level of frustration against the securization of reception policies. In particular, the evolution from social affairs ministry to migration and national identity first and then to the interior ministry are hardly criticised. For them, it is not a matter of rationalisation of public offices neither of contraction of costs, it is in fact a different way to define and draft the policies related to the reception.

The *appel à projet*, the public contracts, and the quantitative indicators, which are at the core of the entrepreneurial logic, and which affect the organizational *modus operandi* are strongly criticised as well as instruments of budgetary control and are not interiorised as accepted practices. Indeed, the members of the organizations commenting them highlight that “*we are not there to cut costs*” (Interview\_J-P\_1) “*this is not my job to decrease the expenses*” (Interview\_J-P\_4) as well as activity control, they are however respected with reluctance. Some strategies as we show are however put in place to contrast to the public authority. Firstly being part of the FNARS as “*The FNARS is a tool of resistance*” (Interview\_ALAN\_1). The association is strongly engaged in the federation and tries to enhance the role of the FNARS against public authority and big associations. Also ALAN enacted an “exit strategy” from the services, which are not compatible with the values expressed by the association, such as the HUDA. Both strategies resulted from internal discussions and shared values. Finally the organization strongly sustain that “*Small is beautiful*” (Interview\_ALAN\_4). They consider that there is no reason to increase in size, and they already feel the actual size as an imposition, by the public authority, which is not really based on an organizational choice.

The size of the organization increased, both as result of the merger and the increase of public funding, the professionalization departing from the middle of 90s became a dominant feature, and the respect of quantitative indicators a daily practice. However, the strategy implemented in doing so is very peculiar, particularly in the second part of 2010s. Increasing in size, which is totally in line with the strategy requested by the public authority to maintain low the costs<sup>53</sup>, gave in reality the association some space of freedom. In 2017, the association realised that managing a HUDA, urgency centre for asylum seekers, was not anymore in line with the values expressed by the association. The price for the service was low, and the ratio ETP worst than for the CADA, between 1/15 and 1/20<sup>54</sup>, and the “*cahier des charges*”, less demanding in terms of sustain and integration. If the association accepted to manage a HUDA, during the past, it was because they interpreted as a tool against the selection (“*triage*”) of asylum seekers. Over time, it revealed to be an instrument not appropriated for accompanying the beneficiaries along their path of integration. The means only permitted to offer a shelter, while waiting for the asylum procedure. “*An easy job*” compared to the tasks asked for a CADA (Interview\_ALAN\_2). In 2017,

---

<sup>53</sup> See the report “*l'hébergement et la prise en charge financière des demandeurs d'asile*”, (IGF, IGAS, and IGA 2013).

<sup>54</sup> The ratio ETP represents the number of Workers out of the beneficiaries for a service. It is indicated in terms of hours.

the association under the pressure of the public authority accepted to reach the critical size indicated by the prefecture of 85 places, but in return obtained to transform the places HUDA (20) in places CADA. Furthermore through a specific specialization on assistance for people with disabilities, the association obtained a different ETP ratio and a higher price per day than other associations managing CADA in the area. This example shows actually that even if an evident isomorphic transformation, based on coercive process, has operated against the association, however the values remain rooted, as well as the ability to criticize the public authority, which is also the sole source of funding.

### Resource Dependence Perspective

The Resource Dependence perspective says that the organizations try to adapt to environment uncertainty coping with the problem of interdependency and actively managing or controlling resource flow, in order to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The organizations apply different strategies to cope with external pressures, over time, but with a constant reflection on values and coherence face to the basic principles set up by founders.

In 1995 the legal recognised association results from a merge. The merge is a quite formalised organizational strategy, aimed at increasing the size, in order to have an increased power on the top of the other actors on the field, but also, when possible, to implement certain economies of scale, reducing the prices. Actually, a merge compared to partnership or to other kinds of collaboration implies the creation of a unique team and the share of the resources and is therefore a more invasive process. It also true that the two associations, funded by the mother and the daughter from the beginning are strictly linked, their activities very similar, as well as they board very close. So the merge has not been traumatic, neither interpreted as very invasive in the daily life of the people involved in the structures.

The true change of this period came with the recruitment of a professional team of paid social workers, engaged full time in the service and not anymore volunteers, who dedicated their free time to people in needs. The creation of a stable team, permitted to give much more stability to the association's action. The engagement of professional paid workers also increased the confidence of the funding public body, which could rely on an association able to maintain the commitment made, as it is mentioned in the *cahier des charges*. Indeed the kind of skills required and the percentage of the different professionals which are required in order to be eligible as management body are also indicated. If the professionalization is a remarkable trend characterizing the organization, both the President and the Secretary General however always cared about the commitment the ALAN workers embodies. So even if it is true that during the selection the skills of candidates are evaluated, the priority remains the adherence to the basic organizational values: "*In our structure the social worker is committed!*" (Interview\_ALAN\_2). Finally, concerning the board of directors' composition and membership in general, the President is described by the other members of the team as very attached to the founding principles of universal assistance and care of the others. Furthermore the activities not anymore mentioned in the *cahier des charges*, such as the travel to the OFPRA, the service of support and

accompanying to the prefecture or the materials for the beginning of the school year, are often managed by social workers, therefore solely acting in a personal capacity. So in their free time they accompany asylum seekers for example to the public offices. Such as in the case of a social workers, who paid their travel and their stay in Paris, autonomously, in order to be there, and supporting the asylum seekers in the very stressing moment of the interview with the OFPRA (field notes, 2018). They organise campaign to collect school materials, and pick-nick and other recreation activities with volunteers and other supporting “*collectifs*” in order to cover the cut of budget dedicated to these kinds of activities.

Then, all during 2000s the strategy has been to take in charge different kinds of services, growing in size and kinds of actions. The differentiation of activities instead of passing through a process of merging as described by resource dependence scholars, in this case also passes through participation to different calls for projects. At the end of the 90s, the creation of the CHRS (30 places) has been followed by the opening of the CADA in 2005 (32 places). In 2007 another structure specialised in reception of asylum seekers was set up, the HUDA, with 20 places. In 2008 the association took in charge a new service, the “*pension de famille*”, which is a structure dealing with isolated young girls. In 2015 and 2016, the association still continued to increase in size with first the merge of the CHRS Claire Joie, 20 places for women, and then the opening of a new structure, the “*Residence d’Accueil Le Moulin*”, a reception service for girls with issues of mental health. Finally, as explained in the previous section, the transformation of the HUDA and the increase in size of the CADA also contributed to the increase in size. During all these years however the President did not change. A president remained very linked to the roots, and in particular to the always-expressed idea of a universal sustain for all the people, at the basis of the organizational activities. As a consequence, it has been possible to maintain certain continuity and a reflection on organizational change has been always carried in parallel. Such as for instance the reflection on how to remain autonomous, in the way the actions are carried out, with regard to the public authorities, concern which grew up in parallel with the increase of the size and the increase of competition on the market.

In 2017, the increase of the number of beneficiaries in the CADA, imposed by the prefecture, has been strategically used to find some room of autonomy. Thanks to a very specialized service provide to a specific audience asylum seekers with disabilities, the organization has been able to create a market *niche*, and the association gained autonomy. Firstly the budget is higher for this kind of structure, secondly the ETP ration 1/10 more favourable than for other CADA. Furthermore an additional resource, a nurse, is also provided following the exceptional *cahier des charges*. Finally, being one of the few establishments designed for receiving this kind of population, they also gain a certain bargaining power, particularly during the *dialogue de gestion*. The same tactic has been adopted concerning the CHRS, which is nowadays specialised in supporting women victims of trafficking. There is of course an investment in the kind of training followed by the social workers, and on the infrastructures, which must be equipped in accordance with law, but it pays back. Even if the price to pay has been an increase in number of places, however the organization remains strongly convinced that “*small is beautiful*” (Interview\_ALAN\_4), and that that it represents an exceptional situation, but they

consider that the time for growing is over and they don't want to do it anymore. Compared to other structures, it remains a small one.

Concerning the inter-organizational relationship, the Secretary General of ALAN has been one of the most engaged developers of the association ARCA - *Association Regionale Coordination Asile* – regional association of asylum coordination. The ARCA, is an association, created at the beginning of 2000s in order to sustain the associations that in PACA regions started during those years some new CADA (among others La Caravelle, ALAN, SAJIDA). The association was conceived as a space of exchange of information, resources and collaboration. Actually, the first *appel à projet* presented in the area PACA has been responded in a collective manner, through an agreement among different associations in terms of assignments and roles based on the fact that “*we knew each others, we used to work together*” (Interview\_ALAN\_2). “*The appel à projet destroyed the inter-organizational collaboration spirit*” (Interview\_ALAN\_2). According to the ALAN members' statements, the market instrument, implementing an increasingly aggressive competition on the market and for the market, had a negative impact on the field actors' interaction, the competition replacing collaboration. Furthermore the arrival of the “national big associations” (Adoma, FTDA, FR) also created some difficulties, as mentioned in the interview ALAN\_2: “*when the big social enterprises entered into the market, the organizational landscape totally changed*”. They operate through a different logic and they are not really integrated in the territory, but they mostly report to the HQ in Paris or Lyon. So, when in the middle of 2000s, the collaboration leaves the place to the competition, ALAN remained however strictly linked to the actors the most akin organizations, such as the CIMADE, with whom there is a long story of collaboration and interaction, as explained later. So cooperation with other organizations, although very selected ones, represented for ALAN a true strategy to cope with the difficulties of being a small size organization in a sector where almost all the organizations were increasing in size.

Finally all the members of the organization agreed on the need to find new material space of collaboration among organizations, in particular the local and small ones, which present different needs from the big and national ones. The ALAN association is for a long time engaged in the sustain and development of the FNARS – *Fédération nationale des associations d'accueil et de réadaptation sociale* – from which the ALAN CADA's director is the regional delegate. In this role she is also very engaged in a work of lobby against the public authorities, particularly the ministry of Interior. During these last years, a lot of initiatives has been set up together with the PACA regional spokesperson of the FNARS, including the annual regional committee on asylum and migration<sup>55</sup>. “*The FNARS is a tool of resistance*” (Interview\_ALAN\_1), composed by more than 800 associations at national level. Among the members, there is mutual respect and even if internal democratic discussions are very open and animated, the FNARS is in charge of sustaining and defending the associations. The federation represents actually the association, in front of the public authorities, bringing the voice of a number of associations at once. For a long time it has been a useful and powerful instrument of representation, in contraposition to the “big 4” associations. But now, some of them joined the federation – nowadays called

---

<sup>55</sup> One of them has been held in Marseille, in March 2018, and it is part of the observation. It joined all the CADA located in the PACA area, in order to discuss the reform of law and express some considerations on the evolution of the sector.

federation of social actors, in order to be more adapted to other kind of actors such as social enterprises or for profit organizations – as members, limiting the space of representation for the small and local associations. So in the last couple of years, the FNARS work has been undermined. The main problem the FNARS according to the ALAN members is that “*some big associations don’t have a militant spirit and in the long run, this strategy [ndr. To include them among members] is not a winning one!*” (interview\_ALAN\_2). The big associations even taking part in the federation, use different channels to address to the public authority, but their presence as internal members weakens it as a lobby body, and as a platform for finding a common position.

Another strategy mentioned by the resource dependence approach, which can be observed in the ALAN organizational behaviour is the political action. The political position taken along the years is characterised by a strong coherence. Firstly, a committed president has been in charge for a long time, secondly the selection of social workers has not only been based on competencies but also on militant values, This makes the association different from the other actors on the field. The members themselves claim having a different political aptitude compared to other structures on the sector of reception for asylum seekers: “*Which is nowadays the social workers’ prospective?! They gain the same salary [ndr. Compared to the past] but they do not complain! Actually there is not political mobilization!*” (Interview\_ALAN\_2). This is also observed when talking about the multiplication of centre of reception in particular the CAO. Regarding this point, the organisation recognises the CADA, as the only kind of structure enabling associations to implement a true process of integration. The ALAN members do not recognise the other service as valid alternative, because the daily budget per hosted person is too little to carry out an integrated (social, psychological and economic) process of integration. This is why they criticised the organizations, which for economic benefit decided to take in charge this kind of services. This militant engagement brings the organization to collaborate only with selected actors, which adhere to the same principles. The closer collaboration is set up with the Cimade, which is among the most militant and “*resistant*”<sup>56</sup> (Interview\_ALAN\_1) organizations of the field, as recognized also by the Interior ministry. The link between the organizations is a long time old, as Mme ALAN funded both the organizations in the 40s. This collaboration is very important for the association and it represents in itself a political statement, a clear positioning in the organizational field, “*just that mere mention of it makes clear who we are*” (Interview\_ALAN\_1).

Finally the ALAN remains one of the few organizations, which take part to the protest on the streets in the name of the association, and not as individual people. This is important to be highlighted, because it supports the fact that, once again, the legitimacy of the organisation is sought elsewhere in a militant network.

---

<sup>56</sup> Resistant is used to indicate that the organization is part of the resistance. The resistance against the change towards a marketized sector.



## 6.1.2 Case Study 2 SAJIDA Association

### Main Organizational Steps

#### 1986 – 1995 Creation of the two local and small associations

The SAJIDA association is the result of a merge between two local associations based in Marseille, the association SAJ and the association IDA. The SAJ association has been founded in 1986 as a branch of *Secours Catholique*, which is itself a branch of Caritas in France. The main aim of the association at the beginning was the reception of people in need of psychological and economical support to help them for being reinserted in society. In 1988 the State created the RMI, Minimal revenue of reinsertion, a new instrument to support people with low revenues. This revenue is managed at departmental level, but some associations are called in charge for the distribution to the final beneficiaries, among them the association SAJ. Although at this stage a group of volunteers was still in charge of managing the service, the mother organisation, the *Secours Catholique*, started to doubt concerning the nature of the activity developed by the organization and asked for an audit. The audit decreed that the association was involved into an activity of *Action Sociale* - social action - instead of *Aide Sociale* - social help. While created in order to deal with this second task, the nature of organization had changed, and *Secours Catholique* decided for a separation and stop funding an activity, which was different from what was asked at the beginning. So, in 1996 a small group of people, around 10, decided to resume the association and to continue offer the service. In the same year, the association gained its first *appel à projet*, for a service of emergency shelter, contracted out by the municipality of Marseille. Once got the contract, the association decided to create a second branch named “GHU” - *Gestion Hébergement d’Urgence* - in order to maintain separated the different activities.

At the beginning of 90s the association IDA was funded, but under the name of ASL – *Association Solidaire Logement*. The association resulted from the collaboration among 10 different associations active in the area of Marseille, in the sector of reception and sustain for people economically and socially disadvantaged. The association in 1991 started to manage an urgency shelter for people in need. During the 90s, the activity of emergency reception for families, in partnership with the municipality of Marseille and the *Conseil Départemental des Bouches-du-Rhône*, together with other associations such as Habitat Marseille and Abbé Pierre Foundation, became the first structure receiving families, instead of individuals with the aim to avoid to separate them.

#### 1995 – Formalization of the organizational structures: two different paths

During the second half of the 90s, the organization SAJ-GHU expanded rapidly. More than 100 workers have been employed and 300 places of urgency have been created. The same structure was also in charge of managing the 115 emergency telephone number for the department Les Bouches- du-Rhône. The workers carried out their activities in both associations, but the organisations remained separated as the GHU started to manage an important amount of money continuing to gain public contracts, and SAJ continued to remain a small association. The large number of paid workers

implicated a professionalization and a certain level of specialization. The association continued to expand its activities and size during this period. Other services were put in place, such as the CADA in 2001 with 136 places, Maison Relais, CHRS, HUDA, SHAS and other structures. Until then, the association had been funded only through departmental funds. Not only the services were different but also the source of funds because, although public, they came from different levels of government, and from the national one in particular.

IDA, even remaining a small association – never more than 23 paid workers - started to diversify its activity, although being always engaged in the fight against poverty. In 2004, after several years of reception of asylum seekers' families, the association was appointed as CADA. In this period, the CADA structures in the area were crowded and the association decided after a period of reception in urgency to engage in this service. In 2006, in order to accomplish new tasks, it changed the status.

#### 2009 – 2016 The Merge and increase in size

In this period the association SAJ and GHU, which formally remained separated from the foundation merged. In 2012 SAJ-GHU and IDA formalised a process of approaching which was already there informally. The same president was nominated for both associations. In 2015 a new general director of SAJ-GHU was appointed, he had been already the general director of IDA for long. Finally, at the end of 2016 the merge is formalised. The association is nowadays counting 130 paid workers. In the meantime, IDA got the *appel à projet* for the CAO service. The workers are highly specialised. The people in charge of the administrative and legal dossier of asylum seekers mostly have a degree in international law.

After the merge between the two organizations the association, renamed SAJIDA, became an organization of medium-large size at the local level (but still a small one compared to other competitors at the national level), and acquired even more credibility in the eyes of public authorities. Establishing a good relationship with them also permitted to establish itself as a reference point. This is particularly true when during some cases of emergency the public authorities directly contacted the association. This has been the case in 2018 during the eviction of a crumbling building, where several families of migrants used to live. The public authorities asked the direct intervention of the organizations retaining that the team would be able to take in charge the migrants' needs and the organizations had the appropriated instrument to manage the critical situation. *"The DDCS asked the SAJIDA association, calling me, because I'm in constant contact with the DDCS officers, if I could support them in order to accompanying the displaced persons. We have been called to evaluate their administrative situations, and to do a 5-day orientation."* (Sajida\_Interview\_3).

Table 6.4 SAJIDA Main Steps

Legal form	Association (law 1901)
YEAR of constituency	01/01/2017
How it has been created	SAJIDA association is the result of the merge of two association SAJ and IDA
Number of workers	130 workers
Number of volunteers	
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pole Asile <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o CADA (Centre d’Accueil de Demandeur d’Asile)</li> <li>o CAO (Centre d’Accueil et d’Orientation)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Pole Accueil et Insertion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o ACCUEIL DE JOUR</li> <li>o 115</li> <li>o RSA (<i>Revenue de Solidarité Active</i>)</li> <li>o CHRS</li> <li>o CHRS URGENCE</li> <li>o PENSION DE FAMILLE</li> <li>o ASELL (Accompagnement Socio-Educatif Lié au Logement)</li> <li>o SIAO (Service Intégré d’Accueil et d’Orientation)</li> <li>o SANTE PRAPS</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Pole Resources</li> </ul>
Very important Steps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>1986</b> SAJ has been founded</li> <li>- <b>1996</b> SAJ became independent from the “Secours Catholique. Caritas France”</li> <li>- <b>1988</b> A group of volunteers created IDA</li> <li>- <b>2002</b> new law for social services in France “Loi sur l’action sociale”</li> <li>- <b>2000s</b> (beginning) increasing arrivals of migrants</li> <li>- <b>2012</b> One President for the two associations</li> <li>- <b>2015</b> New General Director in SAJ (he has been chosen by the new President and previously was the director of IDA)</li> <li>- <b>2016</b> Merge</li> </ul>
SAJ Legal Form	Association
SAJ Year	1986 – 12/ 2016 created by the local branch of “ <i>Secours catholique</i> ” Caritas France.
SAJ Workers	110 (12/2016) → MIDDLE – BIG SIZE
SAJ Volunteers	4 (12/2016)
Story in short	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1986 Creation of SAJ Service of reception and professional redeployment.</li> </ul> <p>Created by the local branch of <i>Secours Catholique</i>, Caritas France,</p>

with the aim of sustaining disadvantaged groups, which face social challenges such as poverty, exclusion and precariousness. One of the first services delivered has been the “ateliers d’expressions”.

- 1988 As first stable service, SARA engaged in the sustain to the RMI *revenu minimum d’insertion* (nowadays RSA), which became the most important and principal service of the association (until the 1997). At this time volunteers dealt with the services.
- 1995 At this time the most part of people involved were still volunteers but with a small amount of paid workers as well. The association is involved in a number of different activities.

After an audit, which concluded that SAJ is not any more engaged in social assistant but in social action, the central branch of *Secours Catholique* (Paris) decided to interrupt its sustain to the SAJ local service and to operate a scission with the association.

- 1996 A small group of people decided to resume the association and to continue offer the service. Secour Catholique decided to leave an amount of money to them. At this time not more than 10 people composed the association.
- 1996 The municipality of Marseille decided to contract out the service of Emergency shelter, and opened the market, by a tender (appel à projet). SAJ association got the contract and it resulted in the creation of a new association “GHU” (Gestion Hébergement d’Urgence).

More than 100 workers have been employed and 300 places of urgency have been created. The same structure manages as well the 115 emergency number for the area Bouche de Rhone). The workers carried out their activities in both the association, but the organisations remained separated as the GHU started to manage important amount of money continuing to gain public contracts, and SARA continued to remain a small association.

- 2001 Until then, the association had been funded 100% by the *Conseil Departimental*. This could become risky. For this reason, the association starts to differentiate the funding through new services funded at national (and not departmental) level.
  - o 2001 CADA (totally funded for 15 years, at national level, by the Ministry of Interior)
  - o 2003 Creation of “*maison relais*” and other temporary residency. They are funded by Central Public fund (State) and CAF (Caisse d’allocation familial).
  - o 2003 CHRS (totally funded at national level).
  - o 2014 *Dispositif D’urgence+* (totally funded at national level by the ministry of interior)
  - o 2004-2009 HUDA (Emergency reception centre for migrants, totally funded at national level by the Ministry of Interior)
  - o 2016 CAO (reception centre for migrants, previously

	<p>camped in Calais camp. Totally funded at national level by the Ministry of Interior.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2009 SAJ merges with GHU association, giving rise to SARA-GHU.</li> <li>- 2012 Conscious of economic troubles, the SAJ association starts to get closer to Logisol. The two associations starting from 2012 have the same President.</li> <li>- 2015 A new General Director has been appointed. He has been for more than 20 years director at Logisol. He was as well the President of the FNARS PACA Corse, and very conscious of the dynamic which were established by the so-called national associations (namely Forum Réfugiés, France Terre d'Asile, ADOMA). He has always been firmly convinced that the size counts and to make their voices heard, the local associations absolutely needed to increase in size.</li> <li>- 2016 the merge</li> </ul>
External events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reduction of funding for the service “<i>Atelier d' Expression</i>” during 2000s</li> <li>- Beginning 2000s the arrival from the North Africa and other third countries increased. For this reasons the number of CADA increased rapidly (in the year 2001 they doubled the number of slipping place passing from 5,283 to 10,317 in 2002)</li> <li>- Law 02 january 2002: loi de l'action sociale et le projet d'établissement</li> <li>- Before with the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development of France <i>Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire</i> in 2007 then suppressed and replaced by the Ministry of Interior there is a process of centralization of the reception service for asylum seekers.</li> <li>- 2015 the reform of asylum law. The ADA is not anymore managed by the CADA but it is the OFII in charge for it.</li> </ul>
IDA	Association under the law 1901
IDA YEAR	1988
IDA WORKERS	20 workers (12/2016) → SMALL SIZE
IDA Volunteers	4 volunteers (12/2016)
IDA Story in short	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1988 Following the national demonstration against “poverty and precariousness” in '85 a group of associations in '88 decided to unite in their fight: Armé du Salut, Entraide Protestante, Emmaüs Pointe Rouge, Saint Vincent de Paul, les Petits Frères des Peuvres, la Caravelle, la CASIM, la Draille, SOS Femme, and ATD quart monde. On the basis of this experience a group of volunteers decided to join forces and to create a new association Solidarité Logement.</li> </ul>

<p>SAJ + IDA SAJIDA</p>	<p>The main goals of the association were: to offer a safe space for families in need, to denounce the dysfunctions of social policies and of society in general.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- During 90s the activity of Emergency reception for families, in partnership with the municipality of Marseille and the Conseil Departmental Bouche de Rhone, together with other associations such as habitat Marseille and Abbé-Pierre Foundation, became the first structure receiving families with the aim to avoid to separate them.</li> <li>- In 2004 a CADA is created. Actually in this period the other CADA structures in the area were crowded, and the association was receiving families of asylum seekers, even if not appointed for this task. The emergency became a stable service and in 2004 the CADA has been established.</li> <li>- In 2006 the 14 administrators, and the members decided to rewrite the associative project to reiterate some points such as the fight to the extreme poverty and the objective of solidarity and sustain to people in needs. A sustain resulting in a global social sustain, but at the same time leaving the space of autonomy to people, to develop their own solutions and becoming protagonist of their own lives. Making in clear the main points and goals of the association the people involved in the project also wanted to reaffirm the founding values to pass a clear message to the professional workers part of the team.</li> <li>- Between 2006 and 2016 the association has been characterised by a process of diversification of activities (CADA, CHRS, Emergency reception, ASELL – Socio-educational activities of support) and increasing of paid workers (passing from 5 to 23 in 2016).</li> <li>- In 2010 the association change the name in Logisol.</li> </ul> <p>Association</p>
<p>Services</p>	<p>The association organised the activity in three departments: migration department, reception and social inclusion and finally Human resources and services.</p> <p>Nowadays the associations count 678 accommodations in 19 structures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pole Asile (Migration Department): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o CADA SARA (Centre d’Accueil de Demandeur d’Asile) (136 accommodations)</li> <li>o CADA LOGISOL (51 accommodations)</li> <li>o CAO VENTO MAI (Centre d’Accueil et d’Orientation) (50 accommodations)</li> <li>o CAO St Jérôme (30 accommodations)</li> <li>o CAO Fonscolombes (36 accommodations)</li> <li>o Hébergement Réfugiés (75 accomodations)</li> <li>o HUDA (65 accomodations)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pole Accueil et Insertion: (Reception and Social Inclusion) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Lieu d'Accueil RSA (<i>Revenue de Solidarité Active</i>) (1200 people assisted)</li> <li>o CHRS SHAS (40 accommodations)</li> <li>o CHRS Unité Familles (45 accommodations)</li> <li>o CHRS Logement d'Insertion (54 accommodations)</li> <li>o CHRS MECS Hotel de la famille (40 accommodations)</li> <li>o CHRS URGENCE+ (35 accommodations)</li> <li>o PRAPS Equipe mobile</li> <li>o PENSION DE FAMILLE (21 Accommodations)</li> <li>o ASELL (Accompagnement Socio-Educatif Lié au Logement)</li> <li>o 115</li> <li>o Accueil de Jour Crimee</li> <li>o G.E.M.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Santé (Healthcare)</li> </ul>
Motivation behind the merge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The management was convinced that in order to be heard they needed to increase the size.</li> <li>- Shared values such as the refuse of poverty. Poverty is conceptualised in both the association not as a fatality but as a condition which could be changed.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2018 SAJIDA association at local level is a big association and a point of reference. Nowadays, in case of emergency the public authorities directly contact the association. This has been the case in 2018 during the eviction of a crumbling building, where several families of migrants used to live.  <i>“La DDCS.a demandé à l'association SAJIDA ASSOCIATION, à travers de SAMIR, car je suis en contact avec la DDCS, si je pouvais le soutenir pour accompagner la sortie, pour évaluer des situation administratives de personnes, et pour faire une orientation sur 5 jours.”</i></li> </ul>

Source : the Author, 2019

## Isomorphic Process

For the case of SAJIDA we observed that different kinds of forces drove towards an isomorphic process. Firstly a coercive process of isomorphism is observed. The very constraining normative framework, concerning both the funding system and the practices of reception for asylum seekers, had an evident impact on the structure, management and activities of the organization. As mentioned by the secretary general of the association, the law of 2002 marked the turning point: *“The turning point is 2002. Everything changed after the reform. Actually, the associations became management bodies, and their actions based on transparency and efficiency. The change has been in the culture and in the practices, based on control, pricing, and culture of evaluation”*. (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1). This new role of the associations in the relationship with public authorities, which was bottom –up before and became top down now is quite accepted. *“In the [reception] sector is the State in charge of the service. But once signed the agreement the association became the management body. We are in delegation of the public service”* (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3).

Also due to the legal framework and the new way of entrusting the services, through public tenders, SAJIDA has undertaken a process of professionalization. Departing from 90s, with a formal and stable team of paid workers, which in the case of SAJ grew up fast and in the case of IDA remained however contained. Furthermore, the professionalization also generated specialization. Indeed the social workers and the other professional figures, involved in the team, are highly qualified *“One of the advantage of being a medium association is that I can pay my workers correctly. Because when a worker is qualified, he is more expensive”* (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3). The internal division of the work also follow this specialization. By contrast with the big association where the division of labour is quite strict, in the case of SAJIDA it is more or less informally defined. So except for the organizational chart, which defines the role and the department affiliation of each worker, the decision concerning the team organization is left to their members. Only when it comes to manage the answer to the *“appel à projet”*, a specific pool is created, composed by the director, the quality manager and the head of resources’ department. They are in charge of organising the answer to public tenders in general, in this way, it does not weight down to the specific department (asylum, reception, urgency, etc.). Even if *“it would be much better to have a specific professional figure in charge”* (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1), for the moment the available resources are not sufficient. Within the specific services, such as for example the reception centres, it is mostly the workers who organize their work. However, preferably the division of the labour is quite developed. For instance in the CAO, there is a net division of tasks, where some of the team only works on the juridical and administrative aspects, others deal with the so-called *“integration to the French culture”*, in order to help people develop a certain independency and autonomy, in terms of daily live in France. This kind of organization of the labour is common within the big associations, which are structured in complex organizational chart and organise the labour in different specific tasks assigned to different professional profiles. In any case, it strongly differs from the origin of the two associations, when a group of volunteers offered to deliver a number of services to people in need.



We also observed a mimetic process of isomorphism. In the sector of social policies, uncertainty is very high and the organizations from the field are mostly dependent from the State or from other public authorities. SAJIDA's social workers describe the reception service for asylum seekers as a very unstable and in continuous evolution sector, which undergone a massive transformation. The super – power of the big associations, “*the asylum mammoths*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_4), transformed the logic of the sector, which is not anymore based on social dimension (see the part on dominant institutional logics). Furthermore the laws concerning the reception services, the reception centres and the asylum process, repeatedly changed, as well as the *cahier des charges* and the prices of the service.

This is why SAJIDA replicated the organizational behaviour of the biggest associations in the sector, although still operating at local level. For example the mutualisation of costs in order to benefit from economies of scale is a clear illustration. The new *cahier des charges* asks for an ETP ration 1/15 instead of 1/10 as before, which means that the number of social workers out of the total number of beneficiaries decreased. SAJIDA decided then to increase the number of beneficiaries hosted. Thanks to the creation of the department in charge of the accounting and the administration, the association can reallocate ETP and engage more social workers in direct contact with the beneficiaries, compared to a small association not able to do the same. The economies of scale in terms of human resources are possible even in a medium association at local level, organizing the service of reception for asylum seekers in scattered residences. Furthermore, always following the example of the “big associations”, material resources could also be object of costs cut and economies of scale. Very often the big organizations – such as Adoma - also used collective residence. This is another way to reduce the costs, using a unique housing solution for a large number of people instead of separate them into smaller apartments. By the way, Adoma having available substantial capital, invested in the acquisition of the buildings, which in turns makes fix costs lower, not having a rent to pay. This is not possible for small and medium organizations, which very often suffer poor liquidity.

This imitation strategy of the big associations is somehow justified realizing that no other options were available. As mentioned by Powell and Di Maggio (1991), in the organizational fields where only few alternative models are perceived as applicable, the trend towards isomorphism is more likely. This imitation strategy of the big associations is somehow justified realizing that no options were available.

Finally, the big associations also represent an example in terms of relationship with the public bodies. The workers in SAJIDA feel that the weight of the big associations on the sector is totally different: “*We could not have an impact on the Ministry in Paris. But if you manage 300 centres of reception you could!*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3). Big associations have a direct contact with public authorities, without passing through intermediary bodies, such as the FNARS. The direct connection with the public bodies characterised actually the interactions between the so-called “four big” and the public authorities such as the government or the ministry of interior. Some of them are advantaged for geographical reasons, having their headquarters in Paris, where the national authorities are installed. But the number of organizations that they manage is important as well. For this reason, small associations are destined to disappear. Interview\_SAJIDA\_3 “*the institution found the*

*interaction with the dispersive galaxy of the small associations hard to manage. They want a unique and reliable interlocutor. 4-5 providers with whom to discuss is enough*". This is why SAJIDA as well, in line with the example of the four big, experienced a narrower collaboration. At the beginning of 2018 the prefecture decided to evacuate a building mostly occupied by migrants. The association has been directly called from the departmental authorities in order to manage the situation, namely helping the authorities to handle the expulsion from the building, and make a juridical evaluation of each case, in order to understand to which categories people belonged, and which kind of social support each case required, finally where addressing these persons. With a very short notice, the mission has been set, after three days of very intensive work. Although the authorities gave them *carte blanche*, it has been a very hard work, days and nights, and more than 90 cases have been exanimated, in a very short time.

In this case, we observe that there is an introjection of the dominant discourse - "*the big associations are setting up in the local landscape and they will replace the small ones*" (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1) - which even if not shared, it is however accepted and therefore guides the actions of the organization. "*We merged to save ourselves [...]. The subvention will disappear. The small associations are destined to disappear!*" (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1). The idea that in order to continue being part of the field it is important to follow the unwritten law of the market, concerning the size of the organization, the internal organization and the relationship with public bodies is becoming more and more rooted. "*We must increase the size, we must take over the market. We must show to do very well our job. No rapprochement. And we must merge!*" (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3). The transformation is perceived not only in practice but also more deeply at the cultural level. "*We started to talk about 'market', people became 'clients', the competition became something 'virtuous'. It is the new cultural approach*" (Interview\_SAJIDA\_5). However, values, concerning the care of people, the way to work the reception, the attention to dedicate to each case from a juridical point of view or the importance quality of the service, still remain. Yet, in terms of actions, some "conformity" is required in order to survive: "*If I accept the money [from the public body] you can't contest. This is not a coherent position. If I don't agree, I just close the contract with the State*" (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3).

To sum up, a process of isomorphism is observed in the case of SAJIDA organization, according to the following criteria. On the one hand, in line with a coercive process of isomorphism, the association has integrated a number of practices, such as for instance the respect of the imposed budget and the application of the quantitative indicators. For this reason, the activities not explicitly mentioned in the *cahier des charges* were suppressed and professionalization became a dominant trend. On the other hand, following the mimetic process of isomorphism, SAJIDA replicates the organizational behaviour of the "big four" in order to develop economies of scale and have more direct contacts with the public authorities, without passing through collective representative platforms such as FNARS.

### **Institutional Logics**

SAJIDA shows a mix of institutional logics, interacting among them in order to offer a understanding of organizational processes.

Firstly the process of professionalization increased the relevance of the Technical Rationality Logic. Being a good and professionalised worker is an important and shared value across the organization. The members of the association do not only think that it is a requirement in order to obtain the “*appel à projet*”, but also that it is a sign of excellence of the organization. The social workers are well-trained, some of them have a degree in management of human resources, others in international law, depending on their tasks in the association. They are convinced that doing correctly their job is the most important thing, which for them means following the rule imposed by the public authorities through the *appel à projet* and the signed contract. Their knowledge of the sector is highly technical and based on their studies and their previous experiences, and the strict repartition of the tasks and the division of labour among workers is interpreted as a way to use in the best way the knowledge of each of them.

Professionalization and an excellent background are of high values for the organization. The head of the office are mostly graduated, in international law, management or human resources. The Director highlights that, “*if it is possible to save money applying a careful and economic management, however, this is not the case concerning the qualification of the team*” (Interview\_SAJIDA). If division of labor by task is a way to save money, the specialization is also a guarantee. Specialized and qualified workers, are not only more efficient but they potentially could also guarantee a greater quality of the services, knowing that no indicator is dedicated to this point, and that the beneficiary’s feedback is not taken into account at all. So, “*In a context where not all the structure could afford skilled and trained workers, I know that my employees have a degree and a background, which enable them to sustain all during the process of asylum request, the person. This criterion reassures me*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_2). Finally, the workers themselves very often prefer to remain focused on their specific task, instead of starting dealing with issues of different nature: “*you can gather experience and become very good at what you do*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3).

While for the previous case, the association ALAN, the reception of asylum seekers is just one among other social activities, for the members of the organization SAJIDA, it is conceived as very different from them. This difference is based on the kind of beneficiaries, the law in application in the sector and the relationship with the public body. This is why it requires a different kind of competencies highly specialised, while the solidarity and the will to help others are not sufficient to solve the problem of an asylum seeker dealing with the complex bureaucracy of the request for protection (Interview\_SAJIDA\_4).

This is in contrast with the social logic expressed as characterizing the first period of the activity of the organization. The President of the organization explained that if nowadays SAJIDA is one of the most important organizations across the region dealing with the service for asylum seekers, it is because at the origin there was a true vocation for this job and for helping all the people in need, without any distinction. “*Our association, and this is the case of many associations that today deal with helping asylum seekers, migrants and refugees, entered into this activity because their vocation was not to help migrants but to accompany and help people in distress in great precariousness and vulnerable people*”. (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1). However still

nowadays, the association defines the “social bond” as one of the priorities for the organization, which although bigger than others from the sector, remains quite small compared to the “4 big”: “*But after all, all our structures must establish the « social bond » as an essential character. That's a little bit of who we are. Of course we are a slightly larger association compared to other structures that manage disability or other social service, but however compared to, for example, FOFANA, we are still very small nowadays*”. (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1).

Concerning the militant logic, it is not particularly noticeable. The members of the association recognise that all the services to migrants are highly manipulated by governments in order to move consensus, such as reported in one of the interview, it is defined as “*a very political sector*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1). Nevertheless, they do not feel being part of that, and so they do not think that, because of their role and their job, they could be able to change the rules of the games “*I don't do politics. I just do my job*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3). However they also think that, becoming similar to the other big associations would make them able to have a chance to interact directly with whom takes decisions, namely the Ministry of Interior. So they express the idea that being a medium-big association, doing correctly the job and following the rules imposed by public authority is the only way to count in the sector.

However, a part of the workers criticise the new dominant culture, as “*the neo-liberal culture changed the dynamics in the social sector*” (interview\_SAJIDA\_1), and not for good. Furthermore, the market instruments are often passively accepted, such as for the imposition of quantitative indicators “*this is the rule! You can't do differently*” (Interview\_S-L\_2). They consider that the national authority prefers to interact just with a restricted number of actors instead of a myriad of small local associations. Being a big association is recognised being a source of legitimacy, as it represents the ability to move resources easily, in case of need: “*take the example of ADOMA who has 400 CADA in France. You discuss with the general director of ADOMA, you tell him to do something you know that you have 400 CADA*”. (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3). This is why the association recognises that increasing in size could represent a survival strategy, and a way to be more competitive in order to gain the *appel à projet* and obtain the contract. On the other hand, SAJIDA wants to remain medium-big association, and not becoming a very big one. SAJIDA members want to keep the legitimacy and recognition at the regional level, while they are not interested on acquiring legitimacy at the national one.

We observed that the organization is characterised by a quite evident entrepreneurial logic, shown by the high level of acceptance of the marketization across the sector. Even if firmly convinced that the “*appel à projet represents a problem, which drives the associations to reject the collaboration and wage a war one against the other, a war of prices*”, actually, the association integrated the idea that being big is an asset, in the view of competing on the market. “*We got to be strong in order to gain the appel à projet and the market, this is why we joined forces. We decrease the costs, costs of structure*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_4).

Contrary to ALAN association where “small is beautiful”, for SAJIDA the generalised increase of organizations' size (trend that it is also confirmed in the quantitative study), and consequentially becoming a medium-big association, does not


represent *per se* something negative. Instead it could be source of inspiration. Firstly, these organizations have very valid teams, they engaged professionals highly qualified, having the resources to do so and they are continuously trained. The punctual division of the labour enables the different professionals to remain totally focused on their activity, which in turn will improve their skills. In this sense, they are interpreted as a good example and a distinction is made among the associations. Furthermore, a net distinction is made among those which, even if nowadays big, are traditionally operating in the asylum, such as FTDA, or FR, and those organizations, which are new in the sector. This distinction is based on the different experience and the different approach they use to deal with the service. As shown by the organizational chart there is also a trend to the corporatization (fig.

The entrepreneurial logic is also expressed in the way the organization represents its relationship with the other organizations “competitors” in the sector, defined as a “market”. The only way to survive is to gain the market, through merge and through a good relationship with the public authorities based on the reliability. The reliability for the organization is acquired respecting the quantitative indicators.

*“The survival strategy is to dominate the market. You have to take a market’s share. Number 1 you have to get big, number 2 you must be irreproachable, that means that your rates, of 3% of 97% must show that your work is done more than well. In this context you can say... do you see? I do what you ask me, and actually I do it very well! There is no reason for me to close. The third strategy is to merge. This is what we have done here. The two associations merged together result in a medium size association. Two medium size associations when they merge, result in a big one. We did it at SAJIDA ASSOCIATION. And indeed when it comes to discuss with the local public authorities, not national one yet, they finally hear us”* (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3).

In the association SAJIDA, while the militant logic is not very embraced, the entrepreneurial and the technical rationality logics prevail. However also the social logic remains present and very strongly expressed by a number of workers, included the Director, who has been for long time very active in the FNARS These two latter are quite compatible, and result from the process of professionalization and corporatization of the organization, as well as the strong marketization shown by the sector of the reception for asylum seekers.

Figure 6.1 SAJIDA organizational chart



## Resource Dependence Perspective

A number of strategies are implemented to deal with the challenging environment and with a very restraining public authority as the sole source of funds. Following the resource dependence approach, we will focus on the merge, which empowered the organization. SAJIDA increased in size, enacting economies of scale and differentiated its services, both described as strategies to reduce the power of competitors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). We will also highlight how the organization used to apply a collaborative approach against the other organizations in the past, while nowadays it prefers to internalize some services and to establish a direct relationship between the board of directors and the local public authorities.

In order to ensure the public funds, SAJIDA enacts a strategy, which is mostly drawn over the example shown by the “4 big”. Although SAJIDA reproduces this organizational behaviour at the local level, we recognise a common path, particularly concerning the merge strategy. On the one hand, through merging, it increases in size, in order to exploit the economies of scale and on the other, the multiplication of services and activities, permits a differentiation of the actions.

Firstly, the two associations SAJ and IDA decided to merge in 2017. This choice presented different advantages. The size of the organization makes it less vulnerable to the environmental changes, particularly concerning the continuous changes characterizing the price of the service and the number of social workers per beneficiaries, as expressed in the “*cahier des charges*”. Indeed, the price for the CADA service strongly decreased in the last years, first in 2015 when the management and distribution of the ADA passed to the OFII and the price per day person became 19.50 euros. Then it decreased again to 19 euros in 2017. For small organizations, this kind of changes could be very difficult to deal with, and often it is impossible to promptly respond appropriately. This could easily generate problems of liquidity, which can lead to the failure of the associations as demonstrated by a number of associations dismissed in the last years. For example in Marseille, the associations, which used to manage the PADA, encounter this kind problem, and finally declared failure, leaving the service open for a public market, which was reported by one of the “4 big. The size prevents from this high uncertainty characterizing the sector in the last years of continuous reforms. As we showed in the evolution of the organizational field, new *circulaires* have often been published in recent decades, with more or less revolutionary effects for the organizations operating in the sector.

Merging, and the consequent increasing in size, enabled cost cutting thanks to the economies of scale. The mutualization of resources such as the managers and all the employees working in activities of desk-office such as secretary, accountability, and reporting work, led to reduce the costs. Mutualization strategy could be both an internal as well as an inter-organizational process. In SAJIDA’s experience, we see an evolution in this sense. During a long period, this work of mutualization of resources had been done collaborating with other local organizations. Through informal or formal collaboration, such as sharing human resources between two different structures (and therefore sharing the cost) or the exchange of information, through the creation of an association, the ARCA, the knowledge and the know-how has been for

a long time put in common (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1). But then, when the *appel à projet* and the other market instruments started to appear, the landscape changed, and SAJIDA readapted to the environment preferring internalizing some services and cutting co-operative relationships with other associations. “*We have merged, both the associations Sara and IDA, in order to be able to answer to the appel à projet*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_1); “*in order to offer the price the State requires*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_4).

The size also increases the visibility, in terms of action at local level, and in turn legitimacy. Actually, the *prefecture* asked for the intervention of SAJIDA, in the evacuation at the beginning of 2018, and not another actor, because it knew that the organizations had enough resources to operate in this case of urgency. Furthermore being an organization of medium size, big at the local level but still small at the national one compared to other organizations in the sector – is also functional to implement a more direct relationship with authorities. “*Actually, our size is functional in order to discuss with the local public authorities. We are unavoidable!*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_3). The public bodies not only can rely on a reliable actor, but also can feel free to directly address some requests to them, in particular case of urgency and receive a positive answer.

The merge has been managed carefully and slowly, taking all the time needed for adaptation, maintaining both names of the two native organizations. In order to make easier the transition, an organizational restructuring has been operated. A specific department of human resources has been set up, responsible for monitoring the transition phase. The merge has been accepted quite easily from a majority of the workers involved. It implicated obviously a massive reorganization, in particular concerning the management level. A new and more complex organization chart has been put in place (see figure 6.2) in order to respond to this need of maintaining in pivotal roles the person who was already in charge. So unlike the big associations, such as FOFANA, which has absorbed four centres of reception in the PACA area, and has still its headquarter in Paris, where the dialogue with the central public bodies, such as the ministry of the Interior, could be direct, the SAJIDA association operated a very gentle and slow transition, paying all the attention needed to maintain a balanced relationship between the two organizations and the social workers implicated. Despite this careful attention, some workers have preferred to leave the organization after the merge, being not in line with the new organizational chart and strategy.

Another strategy used in order to manage interdependency is the diversification of the services. Although always in the framework of the fight against poverty and support towards people in need, the number of activities increased and so did the contracts with the public authorities. Indeed, particularly during the first decade of 2000s, the organization SARA spread its activity over a number of services.

The increase of the number of sectors of activities permits to differentiate the funds. Actually, particularly SAJ, even before the merge, realised that the dependency on solely departmental funds could be risky. It was particularly true at the beginning of 2000s when the social sector law changed drastically the way of distributing public funds. This is why the organizations started to take part to a number of different *appels à projet*, which basically continued to be the strategy followed even after the merge. The CAO’s service entrustment is an example. The CAO are strongly



criticised structures, as mentioned also during the asylum and migration committee organised by FNARS, in March 2018, and where all the CADA of the area joined to discuss the situation of the new asylum policies and new structures of reception. Actually, without any turn of phrase, the FNARS defined this centre as an instrument totally lacking from an objective of integration of people, but as dormitories for migrants. SAJIDA defended itself, as other associations in charge of the service, saying that however, it depends on the way that the social workers interprets its role, and how the organizations management body, interprets the *cahier des charges*.

In 1996 the association, already involved in services such as accompanying programs, access to healthcare and social services, domiciliation, decided to engage in the externalisation of the service previously managed by the municipality, the urgency accommodation unit (*unite d'hébergement d'urgence*). The service was funded by the DDASS, the departmental funds. In the same period, the association was entrusted by the departmental service the emergency number 115. Then, among others, they had to manage the departmental medical unit, and in 2003 the *Accueil de Jour de la Maison du Partage à Aubagne* – the daily service of accommodation. Although these services are of various natures, they are all funded through department funds. This creates, in a period of budget constraints, instability and incertitude. In the meantime, new societal challenges were growing up. The number of arrivals from abroad was increasing and the pressure on the centre for asylum seekers was rising up. The associations in charge of certain social services such as the reception of destitute people, were asked to participate to the effort. The decision to expand the activity to the reception of asylum seekers is therefore based on two different considerations. Firstly, the changing society and the natural transformation of an association inclines to understand and grasp the local needs. Secondly, the activity enlargement was justified by the need of expanding the source of funding. Although still of public origin, funding concerning the asylum and the reception is granted by the national level, and managed first by the ministry of social affairs, then by the ministry migration and national identity and finally by the ministry of interior. An increased centralization of power through the creation of the national agency of the OFPRA - for administrative issues - and the OFII – dealing with the material needs, including accommodation - displaced all the decision making process at the national level and not anymore at the local one. The OFII spokesperson confirms that even if the local prefecture is in charge of the selection of the management bodies, everything is however analysed and validated at the national level: “*the prefect controls and authorize contracts. Obviously once I agreed with his decision. Every prefect takes his decision autonomously, then of course the decision gets up to my office, and I give my consent. Normally, I do, normally I agree with the prefect’s decision [...] actually until when they follow my directives, everything goes in the right direction...and the OFII is able to organise the asylum seekers properly in the appropriate structures*” (OFII spokesperson).

Although the different strategies put in place, the competition generated by the national association that landed in the region, created some difficulties. A kind of “*individualization in finding new solution takes form, taking over collaboration*” (Interview\_SAJIDA\_2). The national associations are more inclined to collaborate with their headquarters, or with the other branches of the same association. For instance, FTDA, FR and FOFANA have their training programs in Paris (accessible

to all the social workers not only to the members of the association). They have their legal affairs and their accountability departments. Their resources are evidentially different and they do not need to create partnership with others, and even if they would like to build partnership, it would not be that easy. They arrive in a new area, they do not know the local partners, the other associations, neither the social capital which is already based in the area. The local associations instead can exploit their network. They are able and used to collaborate with others associations or local based volunteers. For instance, SAJIDA, although not the owner of any building, does not pay the rent for some of the structures. Thanks to the agreement with private people, or with other associations in the area, they can avoid the cost of paying a rent, which is quite important. In this way, they are able to ask for a contained price in order to being more competitive at local level in the *appel à projet*.

### 6.1.3 Case Study 3 FOFANA

#### Main Organizational Steps

##### 1984-1995 – The Foundation

The association has been founded in 1984 as *SOS Drogue Internationale*, in order to answer the new societal urgency, the widespread abuse of drugs. The funder Mr Rossi, at the age of 19, started his career as educator for young people in need. He then became an expert in the fight against addictions, and has been recruited from the Inter-ministerial mission against drugs created by the Pierre Mauroy government. At the same time, he also embraced the "classical" entrepreneurship and took the lead of a group of SMEs for a period of 10 years. After the failure of this business, in 1997, Mr Rossi became the President of the group *SOS Drogue Internationale* and decided to totally devote himself to this project and make it its principal activity. At this time, the organization has already evolved. In 1985, he also created the *SOS Habitat et Soins* with the aim of sustaining people affected by HIV and AIDS. The evolution of the disease and treatments had led to diversify the association's actions. The association started then to offer many solutions for accommodation and housing. In 1994 conscious of how hard it would be for the beneficiaries to reintegrate in society - find a job or a place where to stay in autonomy – Mr. Rossi also funded *SOS Insertion et Alternatives*. These three associations worked very close, in order to fight exclusion and sustain most disadvantaged people.

##### 1995-2010s – The New Spirit: development and diversification

Since its founding in 1984, the FOFANA has always been driven by the ambition to demonstrate that economic performance can be put at the service of the general interest. This strong conviction on "social entrepreneurship" has always been applied to the organization's actions, which always have been based on viable economic models, with the aim of maximizing the social, societal and environmental impact, in the most economically and efficient way. In order to pursue these values, in 1995, the three mother-organizations merged and, thanks to the collaboration of the *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignation* and the Public Authority, the three associations together created both the cooperative *Alterna* and *Groupement d'Intérêt économique Alliance Gestion* (GIE). The cooperative has been created to respond to the associations' needs in terms of real estate and contribute to the implementation of an innovative social housing policy. The associations also decided to pool a number of functions (accounting, legal, finance, HR, etc.) within an economic interest group (*Alliance Gestion*) - thus professionalizing the management, the advice and the internal control of their activities, and generating significant economies of scale. In 1995, the group is really constituted and called FOFANA.

From the 2000s, the FOFANA considerably accelerated the diversification of its services, either by creating innovative devices, integrating organizations in difficulty or just looking for growth. Among the new sectors of activity, are included fair trade (2001), early childcare services (2005), sustainable development consulting (2005), hospitals and healthcare (2008), solidarity finance (2010) and asylum seekers reception (2011).

### 2011-2018 – The Reorganization

Then, the group has continued to grow up developing a larger number of services. Due to the increase in size and activities, a corporate reorganization became essential. The group's rate of growth is around 25% by year, counting 11,000 employees at the beginning of 2011, 15.000 in 2015 and 18.000 in 2018. In 2011 a structure called *Directoire* has been created, which includes the President, the General Directors and the members (which are also the chief of each area of activities) under which 4 associations are created: FOFANA Jeunesse, FOFANA Solidarité, FOFANA Santé, FOFANA Seniors.

For instance, among other services, the sector solidarities deal also with the reception for asylum seekers. The organization started this service during the Calais crisis, in 2015. In this period the so-called Calais Jungle was declared national emergency and new solution was put in place. Actually, the government decided, in order to reduce the tensions exclusively in this geographical area, to redistribute the asylum seekers, at the national scale. The new centres have been created to respond to this purpose, the CAO. The CAO were centres aimed at analysed the administrative situation and the displacement of people until 2015 living in the Calais Jungle. A number of calls for tenders had been organized and the FOFANA gained some of them. Between 2016 and 2017 the number of structures managed by the group in the migration sector increased impressively. Some of them result from acquisition, particularly some CADA, in displaced areas, and others from as answer to the *appel à projet*. Nowadays the group counts something like: 6 CHUM, 3 CAO, 14 CADA, 2 CHUR, 6 SAAR, 3 CPH and 3 reception centres for minors.

Nowadays the group, still under an associative legal form, is organised as follows (fig 6.2): a General Assembly, the Board of Directors, a *Directoire*, the regional delegates, the GIE and the cooperative Alterna. The *Directoire* represents the FOFANA national executive body and implements the decisions and orientations defined by the Boards of Directors. It is composed by the head of each sector of activity, who has been appointed by the General Assembly. The Executive Board of the FOFANA is actually composed of: Jean-Marc Rossi, Chairman of the Management Board; the Director of the Real Estate and International service; the Director of Synergy & Performance, Ecological Transition service; the director of the Digital Transition and Accelerator of Innovation service; the director of the Corporate Communication and Culture service; the director of Finance and Participation Management service; the Director of Health and Seniors service; the Director of the Youth service; the Director of the HR and Employment Policy service; the Director of the Solidarities service; the Director of Territories service. A number of regional delegates are in charge of making the connection with the local level.

The GIE (*Alliance Gestion*) is in charge of the optimization of the performance, making possible to optimize the management and the means of action by providing advises and control in the various fields of competences, namely, finances, accounting, human resources, communication, legal, etc. Hierarchically independent, the GIE is accountable only to the boards of directors.

Finally, Alterna coordinates the group's asset management and supports the development of its real estate activities. In this respect, Alterna manages a diversified

real estate portfolio, intervenes in project management projects in construction or rehabilitation and provides consulting services to associations and companies in the group.




Figure 6.2 FOFANA Organizational Chart

**Table 6.5 FOFANA Main Steps**

Legal form	Association (law 1901)
What is today	FOFANA is a French organization, specialized in social entrepreneurship that brings together companies and associations. In 2018, it employs 18,000 employees, counts 550 institutions, and generates 950 million euros, mainly through public subsidies.
YEAR of constituency	1984
How it has been created	The association results from the merge of three parent organisations: International fight against drugs(1984), House and care international (1985) and Find a job international (1994) + the collaboration of the <i>Caisse des Dépôts et Consignation</i> and the Public Authority → The three associations together created both the cooperative Alterna and <i>Groupement d'Intérêt économique Alliance Gestion</i> (GIE). Then, the group has continued to grow up developing a large number of services.
Number of workers	18,000 paid workers all across France  Concerning the CADA in Marseille: 6 people: 1 director, 2 social workers, 1 maintenance worker, 1 administrative worker
Number of volunteers	Concerning the CADA in Marseille 18
Number of Beneficiaries	1.7 million people
Services	The organisations is conceived a <i>directoire</i> divided in 8 sector of activities (see the picture below): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Jeunesse (Youth) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Petite enfance;</li> <li>o Protection de la jeunesse;</li> <li>o Parrainage et actions éducatives;</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Seniors et Santé (Health and Seniors) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o EHPAD;</li> <li>o Filière gériatrique;</li> <li>o Hôpitaux</li> <li>o Soins à domicile</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Emploi (Employment): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Commerce et services: Entreprises d'insertion et de développement durable</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Culture: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Ingénierie et accompagnement</li> <li>o Médias</li> <li>o Patrimoine</li> <li>o Cinéma</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Solidarité (Solidarity) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Addictions;</li> <li>o Handicap;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Habitat solidaire et action sociale;</li> <li>○ VIH/sida;</li> <li>- International (International Actions) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Appui au développement;</li> <li>○ Incubateurs et entrepreneuriat;</li> <li>○ Volontariat;</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Transition Ecologique (Ecological Transaction) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Agriculture et Alimentation durable;</li> <li>○ Préserver et valoriser le capital naturel;</li> <li>○ Financement Participatif;</li> <li>○ Conseil en Transition;</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Thee other bodies are in place: the above mentioned GIE, which is the body in charge of manage the accounting, public funds and transparency; and the Cabinet, where we can find the General Secretary, the Members of the Directoire (which also are the Director of the different area of activities) and the President Mr Rossi, gather together.</p> <p>All the activities are as well supervised by the Regional delegated (7 macro areas are defined)</p> <p>Each sector is again subdivided into sub-sections.</p> <p>“Asylum and Integration” follows under the category Solidarity and includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 14 CADA; number of available places 1283;</li> <li>- 6 CHUM: 655;</li> <li>- 3 CAO: 123;</li> <li>- 2 CHUR: 177;</li> <li>- 6 SAAR 294;</li> <li>- 3 CPH: 160;</li> <li>- 3 MNA (reception for minors) number of places 94</li> </ul>
Very important Steps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>1984</b> Mr Rossi funded the association SOS Drogue International</li> <li>- <b>1985</b> SOS Habitat has been founded</li> <li>- <b>1994</b> SOS insertion et alternatives has been funded</li> <li>- <b>1995</b> the 3 associations merge in two bodies: cooperative Alterna and GIE (Groupe Alliance Gestion). Together they form the FOFANA.</li> <li>- <b>1997</b> FOFANA becomes Rossi full time activity</li> <li>- <b>2001</b> A new activity: Fair Trade, furthermore a number of health and social facilities have been resumed. Rossi affirmed that most of all he feels to be particularly good in acquisition.</li> <li>- <b>2003</b> Acquisition of JCLT the biggest actor providing minors support services in France.</li> <li>- In the meanwhile new sector of activities are incorporated;</li> <li>- <b>2008</b> Director General Mr Duclos (still nowadays)</li> <li>- <b>2010</b> FOFANA created the “<i>comptoir de l’innovation</i>” with the aim to sustain social entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurs. A fund for the purpose has been allocated.</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2011</b> Sector health and elderly have been included among the core sectors of the FOFANA.</li> <li>- Due to the increase in size and activities a <b>corporate reorganization</b> became essential. Actually the association counts 11,000 employees. A <i>Directoire</i> has been created, which includes the President, the General Directors and the members (which are also the chief of each area of activities) under which 4 associations are created. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o FOFANA Jeunesse</li> <li>o FOFANA Solidarité</li> <li>o FOFANA Santé</li> <li>o FOFANA Seniors</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <b>2015</b> The FOFANA starts to deal with migration and reception services for migrants as well. Firstly the organisation engaged itself in the CAO (dedicated structures aimed at thinning the displacement of migrants from the Calais Jungle). Very soon other structures are opened: CADA, CHUM, CHUR, SAAR, CPH. In less than 3 years more than 3000 places into different kind of reception facilities are put in place.</li> <li>- <b>2016</b> FOFANA opened a CADA in Marseille</li> </ul>
External Events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>80s</b> Mr Rossi meets a young woman older of three restaurants, and a disco, who asked him to manage them. Rossi accepted and undercover his passion for the entrepreneurship;</li> <li>- <b>Beginning of 90s</b> a scandal overwhelms Mr Rossi business: one of the dance club he used to manage is founded to be a drug dealing place. He decided to move further and to devote himself exclusively to FOFANA;</li> <li>- <b>2010</b> Rossi is the funder of MOUVES - <i>Mouvement des entrepreneurs sociaux</i>;</li> <li>- <b>2013</b> Parliamentary debate on Social Economy Law;</li> <li>- <b>2013</b> European Directive 2013/33/UE reforming the reception for asylum seekers;</li> <li>- <b>2015</b> French Asylum Reform (based on the European Directive); <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2015</b> 2015-925 Law New “cahier de charge” <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o New ratio workers/ migrants</li> <li>o The OFII takes in charge the ADA allocation until then managed directly through the associations;</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <b>2015</b> <u>the government announced that it will find a solution for the Jungle of Calais.</u></li> <li>- <b>2016</b> Macron nominated Rossi one out of nine national delegate of the “En Marche” Movement, formally recognised a decennial friendship.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- The new cahier de charge asks for “economies of scale” <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>2017</b> <i>Circulaire</i> demanding for more police control on the reception centres. During the meeting in Paris, where the Ministry of Interior Colomb (Macron Government) was explaining the consequences of the new dispositions, the most part of the associations left the room included the</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

### Isomorphic Process

After a first period of isomorphic change, based on the idea that in order to be more efficient the TSOs have to adequate to the market, the organization became a point of reference for the other actors implicated in the social services. As mentioned by Hanson (2001) in his studies concerning isomorphic process across schools, legitimization process of replication begins when actors look for guidance and start to act and look like highly regarded schools. FOFANA is clearly part of the group of organizations “highly regarded”. This is so true that at some point the board of director decided to create a movement, to help other organizations convert their business model and became more similar to FOFANA. This movement is based on the idea that the social entrepreneurship could become the model, which integrate both entrepreneurial and social aspects. Actually, FOFANA, which presents itself as very innovative in terms of organizational chart, practices, and carrier of social innovation (FOFANA, 2018), became absolutely a reference for the emerging and fast-growing movement of social entrepreneurship.

Following the literature in institutional theory we observed an isomorphic transformation based on normative pressures, led by professionalised operators of the social services as well as the new managerial figures started to populate the sector. The President of the Group, Mr Rossi, is a great supporter of this transformation, which places economic logic at the service of the general interest, not only at organizational level, but also at a systemic one. He is the funder of the French network of social entrepreneurs, and he also among the co-founders of a special master aimed at training the new managers of the social sector. The FOFANA strongly bases his organizational culture on an entrepreneurial spirit expressed through the idea that “*the economic performance could be at the service of the general interest*” (FOFANA, Website<sup>57</sup>). As already mentioned, at the beginning of 2010, the charismatic President Mr. Rossi, funded the social entrepreneurs movement “*Mouves*”. The movement promotes the social entrepreneurial spirit, and the idea that, no matter under which legal forms the organization is registered, it is always possible to embrace a social and/or environmental aim in order to improve the society. Actually, the FOFANA is exactly based, and grew up, on this approach, as demonstrated by the complex organizational structures and by its *modus operandi*. Core concepts are efficiency and innovation. In these terms the economic performance gains centrality in the organizational project, as it represents a mean and not the final purpose, which is instead the social impact. Indeed, the principle of economic efficiency is fundamental as directly linked to the social and environmental purposes. This is why it figures as the first organizational principle of the FOFANA. Indeed, the first principle states: “*through the efficiency of our actions our Project materializes, our beneficiaries and customers, whether local authorities, businesses or individuals, can trust us*” (FOFANA website). The FOFANA is a viable economic model, continuously growing up, in terms of income, members and employees. Born as a local association created in order to fight the drug addiction, since 2000s it

---

<sup>57</sup> <http://www.FOFANA association.org/512/notre-projet>

became a “colossus” of the social services, thanks to the diversified activities such as elder care, reception and housing, but also fair trade and health care services, and the “*the specialization in the acquisition of structures in loss*” (Libération 2013). And if until the middle of 90s it is composed by just 3 associations, in 2009, the group counts 10 associations, 11 enterprises and around 2,200 employees, which became nowadays around 18,000 in almost 500 organizations spread across the national territory and beyond. This way of working and organizing internally the structure is also presented as a true mission. On the one hand, acquisition and merge are the main strategy applied to grow, finalised to increase the size and the turnover of the group, reinforcing its economic and political position across the organizational field. On the other hand, mutual support among members is one of the principles of the *Mouves*. The social entrepreneurship movement, led by FOFANA, aims at build a network of people involved in businesses, which have any sort of social impact, helping the structures, which adhere to the basic principles, to improve their activities. Through networking, sharing of expertise and good practices, the entrepreneurs develop their skills, enlarge their network of contacts and in turn improve their business. So because of acquisition or through mutual support and counselling, the mission is to make the network grow, the members contributing collectively to the development of social entrepreneurship on the territory. Among the different TSOs and enterprises that are part of the group, there is also the “*UP Movement*”. *UP Movement* hosts entrance-free events, such as the UP Conferences, UP Café, UP Pro, UP Conferences students and the UP Fest, with over 130,000 members, open to everyone ready to share information and best practices across the community. It is conceived as a network among peers and it represents a very important moment of socialization. Networking is definitely part of those activities, which make the isomorphic process moving faster. As sustained by the literature (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004) the participation to these activities could have an effect on the cultural paradigm in which field’s actors operate.

In the same line, the Paris-Dauphine University new university curriculum, which FOFANA developed in collaboration with others, aimed at training the future entrepreneurs and managers of social enterprises had also a large impact. The course, which is an executive master in business management, is open to current or future entrepreneurs, managers, and executives already involved in a project framed in the Social and Solidarity Economy (ESS) but also to all those, from public functions or the traditional private company - who work in the field of CSR or not - who intend to orient their career towards elements of social innovation, territorial innovation and a participatory governance. The principle axes of this course are finalised to enhance the economic analysis, the understanding of the social and institutional environment, the ability to initiate projects that respond to societal challenges, but also to valorise the teams and define clear strategy to increase the performance.

Within FOFANA, given the high number of employees, the level of qualification highly varies. However, members from the *Directoire* (see the organizational chart) and the regional delegates are mostly graduated in management, public administration and political science, from well-known university, such as HEC, Science Po, Paris Dauphine, or from different *Ecoles Supérieures du Commerce*. A large part of them also take part as member of educational team of the programme sponsored by the FOFANA.

Finally, among the principles at the core of the organization, one is dedicated to the enhancement of Human Capital. On the one hand, the know-how and the skills of the employees are presented as guarantees of quality of the organization's actions. This is why *"it is therefore essential to ensure that we have the right profiles at the right time, in the right place, and that all the necessary development of their potential is implemented."* (FOFANA web-site 2019)

On the other hand, much importance is also given to the employees' adherence to the Group Project and to that of their institution, as well as to team cohesion. A sustainable career development and quality of life at work are part of the attracting and retaining talent policy enacted by the organization. Furthermore, an excellent level of management at all levels, combined with strategic business skills, up to date and in line with the organization needs, is made compatible with individualized evolution and mobility paths.

### Institutional Logics

The logics expressed by the organization are quite contrasting between the central and the local level. At the high level, particularly expressed by the President and the members of the *Directoire*, the rhetoric of the social entrepreneurship, social impact and social innovation as solution to the societal challenges, are quite rooted and express the dominance of the entrepreneurial logic:

*"By placing social innovation at the core of its practices, the group shows that it is possible to build a solid organisation, capable of creating and sustaining its economic activities, while maintaining a strong social impact"* (FOFANA, 2018).

The social impact refers to the impact of the group's activities on the whole of society. The group, when implementing actions, always takes into consideration the economic and social realities of the territories in which actions are set up. The group also passes the message that everyone can contribute to the transformation of society. This is the purpose of the "UP Movement", which, through its various media, is responsible for publicizing all projects that offer solutions in response to the major challenges of society.

Furthermore, *"by highlighting unnecessary costs, FOFANA is able to show how certain expenses can allow significant savings to be made and in turn transformed into societal investments"* (FOFANA website<sup>58</sup>). The FOFANA expresses the idea that through social entrepreneurship and particularly implementing innovative solution it is possible to respond to social issues whilst allowing the community to make significant savings.

Not by chance, the first principle of the group is the economic performance, which although put at the service of social and environmental aims, remains a priority. This approach is also represented through the daily life and activities of the organizations and its internal structure. *"Maintaining an excellent level of management consistently with the principle defined by the group"* is a priority (FOFANA, 2018), as well as to attract and make growing internally the talents. Furthermore, professionalism and a coherent organizational structure are ensured through a specific department of human resources.

---

<sup>58</sup> <http://www.FOFANA association.org/en/385/about-us>

The economic pressures are not experienced at the very local level, although the importance of growing in size is perceived. The budget and accounts are managed by the specific department – the GIE – which is in charge of this service for all the structures members of the FOFANA group. The director of the CADA is in charge of filling the documents and sending the reporting tables to the account officers. Except for the evident gain that would represent the increase of the number of beneficiaries in terms of economies of scale, and this is why the local association that we have studied, under the recommendation of the central level, decided to take part to the *appel à projet* launched to increase the number of places in the region, financial pressures are not experienced by local associations. Indeed, concerning the quantitative indicators, the local association follows the rules. Obviously they are not totally comfortable with this role of controlling the beneficiaries and reporting the information to the police, or expel those beneficiaries, who do not respect the rules, as expressed by one of the interviews “*we are not the police*” (Interview\_G-S\_4). However the social workers, including the director of the local association, feel that they can’t do differently.

However, particularly at the local level, they express a sort of malaise from living the contradiction between an entrepreneurial logic and the social and the militant one. The social workers in the CADA of Marseille perceive the pressure of being part of a big association. “*I feel the weight of being part of a multinational company*”<sup>59</sup>. This has an impact on their daily activities, particularly when concerning the relationship with the other TSOs. Actually, the CADA’s employees feel not totally accepted from the other social workers, as colleagues, working in the same sector and with the same kind of objectives. At the opposite, some of them embrace the idea that their job is not just “business as usual” but that they are fighting to obtain more rights for migrants as well as the other associations on the sector.

*"We're not too well received by the other organizations in Marseille. For me it's going well, but we're seen as the organisation that comes and eats everything. But that's not the whole point. The goal is to fight to welcome better!"*

(Interview\_FOFANA\_1)

There is however a common vision concerning professionalism, which is mainly expressed through the Technical Rationality Logic. In this case, the local association and the central level agree and find a common ground.

The logic is expressed through concepts such as excellence, human resource development, entrepreneurship and competencies development: “*The excellence of the services offered to our beneficiaries and clients relies above all on the know-how and interpersonal skills of our employees*” (FOFANA web site 2018). However at the local level, in the case of the CADA in Marseille, receiving training and having the opportunity to grow from a professional perspective is seen in a positive way by social workers, and judged as one of the strengths of the organization.

---

<sup>59</sup> The FOFANA is often defined as the “multinational of the social sector” due to its large size and its subsidiaries dislocated abroad as well.

## Resource Dependence Perspective

FOFANA organizational structure is based on a very particular model, which includes, associations, cooperatives, and for-profit companies for a total of 144 organizations in 2017. The organization operates in 44 countries in different sectors such as health, voluntary work, education and training, as well as reception services for asylum seekers. Based on high specialization of employees and continuing expansion in terms of turnover and number of members, the group is defined as the biggest social enterprise in Europe. Following the resource dependency theory the most evident strategies put in place by FOFANA are the followings. Firstly, merges and acquisitions, the size and the multi-structure system of the FOFANA bring with them new practices, such as the working specialization and the division of the work, the creation of transversal departments working for different structures. As a consequence, costs are cut because of internal mutualisation of services and massive economies of scale. Secondly, the political action, with the creation of a French movement for social entrepreneurs, represents a clear political statement, which places the group at the centre of a movement, which calls for a systemic change based on the social impact of responsible entrepreneurship. Thirdly, the composition of the Board of Directors, which on the one hand is very valuable in this context of changes characterizing the environment (the marketization in particular), being composed by a number of “business experts”, “specialists” etc. (Hillman, Cannella and Patzold 2000). On the other, the Board also secures a good relationship with the government at the central level, which, as mentioned by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in turn implies a number of benefits such as information flows, preferential access to resource, advice and legitimacy.

Concerning the scaling up strategy, the FOFANA bases its growth primarily on economies of scale and diversification. As also mentioned by Hollingsworth (2014) for the case of FOFANA, “*a holding company—an umbrella body that can act at scale for smaller operating subsidiaries—can give social enterprises the opportunity to operate as David and Goliath simultaneously*”. The shared services provide more flexibility and lower incremental costs. Instead of each organization hiring its own full-time accountant, a holding company can recruit them centrally and share them across the group at a lower overall cost.

Furthermore the FOFANA has adopted a knowledge-sharing program and standardizing a number of processes and defining blueprint-helping organizations to follow the model. The President Mr Rossi, during an interview (*Liberation* 2013), declared to be a specialist in merge of enterprises. Actually, one of the main strategies enacted by the FOFANA is integrating new entities that can benefit from centralized support. FOFANA has acquired numerous organizations over the years. They have all developed synergies, professionalized their activities and pooled their expenses, which in turns enable small organizations to invest more money in innovation and other kinds of activities, and big ones to survive. With the aim of spreading best practices concerning social innovation, in 2009 the “*comptoir de l’innovation*” has been created, and thanks to it, the FOFANA sustains innovative social entrepreneurs who lack resources and/or skills, but also creates a space of exchange for a community of “change-makers”.

In order to maintain group coherence, the organization is based on standardised model

of work. The president Mr Rossi is the first to say that it is important to homogenise and standardize practices. Rossi says: “*What was done through totally spontaneous human behaviors needs to be institutionalized via management tools so that the structure maintains its values and quality standards throughout the organization*” (Liberation 2018). The FOFANA in this particular characteristic strongly differentiates from other organizations working in the social sector. He actually recognized that “*The social sector believes that “small is beautiful”, and that everything should be tailor-made, carefully crafted for the individual situations of each beneficiary, rather than planned and rationalized, or even industrialized, for growth*” (Liberation 2018).

This creates, on the one hand, cuts of cost and, on the other, certainty about the organization’ *modus operandi*. Among the reiterated practices for example, the launch of a new project is of particular interest. The organization discusses the ideas with relevant authorities before doing a pilot. Once defined the advantages for both parties, the team sets up the pilot, including an evaluation of savings realized for the public sector compared to the *status quo*. These numbers very often help the organizations to convince politicians to implement certain projects, to obtain funds or even to change regulations.

Concerning specifically the case study, the FOFANA CADA located in Marseille for instance, which opened in 2017, results from an *appel à projet*. The internal organization is based on specific labour division. The team is quite small, as the size of the structure for the moment is limited to 85 places, which means 5 employees: the director of the structure, 2 social workers following the administrative and juridical aspects and one in charge of all the daily activities and the “social integration”, and one administrative. Concerning the budgetary, fiscal and accounting part, there are all managed at the central level. The director reports to the headquarters and the specific department treats all the issues concerning the budgetary situation of the structures.

Finally, the size, and the financial stability, not only makes it an example to follow for some of the other organizations, but also make the group very credible to public authorities. The FOFANA with more than 500 structures is a solid organization, present not only in France, but also abroad. The organization for these characteristics does not need to be represented to public authorities, but instead has internally, structures and resources to do it. Furthermore with headquarters located in Paris, the territorial proximity makes simpler the contacts and the communication. Mr Rossi is as well co-founder of “*En Marche*” the party led by Mr. Macron, who won the last Presidential election. President Macron has also been personally a student of Mr Rossi at Sciences Po Paris. For all these reasons, often the other actors involved in the various sectors of social services have reasons to think that some exchanges with very high public authorities could pass as well through informal channels. Although the FOFANA does not need any intercession passing by the FNARS, in some cases the local subsidiaries and single structures adhere to. This is often due to a previous subscription, before being incorporated into the group. In Marseille actually, after not having found an agreement on different issues, the FOFANA decided to leave the FNARS.

#### 6.1.4 Transversal Analysis

The three cases show that pursuing multiple goals is particularly difficult in ecosystems that are characterised by tensions and that each of the cases finds its own strategy of resolution. For decades, organizational theorists have underscored the risk of organizations abandoning their social goals in their quest for survival and efficiency (Weber, 1904). Actually, the so defined “cult of efficiency” (Selznick, 1957) could be a factor of mission drift (Jones, 2007) particularly when the organizations are not economically independent and the public authorities put in place increasing pressing remote management control. Moreover, if organizations do not follow the requirements imposed by the public body, which is eventually the unique funder, such as in our cases, it is not easy to resist the market. However, in our cases we show that some strategies still could be implemented, in order to maintain independence of action and adherence to the mission. For instance we showed the case of ALAN, which decided for an “exit strategy” leaving a specific service, the management of the HUDA centre. This service after being judged too far from the organizational values and principles, has been abandoned and reconverted to a service more appropriate from the ALAN members’ point of view. We also show the example of SAJIDA, which in line with the associative approach, the collaboration and the anchorage in the local community, since it doesn’t have to pay rent for some structures, can charge lower prices.

Although all the selected organizations are nowadays active in the sector of migration, they did not enter at the same time and they are not in the market/sector (depends on the organization’s definition of the field of activity as we saw through the analysis of the institutional logics) for the same reasons. At the beginning of XX century, when no public authority used to deal with the issue, ALAN association has been created with the mission to support the new arrived in town, particularly female migrants, while SAJIDA in the late 90s started to host migrants, and then, has been among the first in the PACA region to operate in support of this specific population, opening a CADA already at the beginning of the 2000s. By contrast, the FOFANA has not been active in the sector until middle of 2010s, when the authorities have declared the new crisis of refugees and have allocated substantial resources to stem the phenomenon. Thanks to a very developed programme of recruitment and talents’ attraction FOFANA could quickly catch up. Even if in terms of technical skills, the FOFANA team has proven to be highly qualified, however the other two organizations, objects of this research, show a different attachment, approach and interpretation of the issues related to the asylum. They express a different interpretation of the sector, framed in the social policies instead of embracing the securitarian approach proposed by public authorities and led by the Interior ministry.

ALAN and SAJIDA are strongly rooted in the area. Both organizations not only are part of the informal network of organizations active in the area, but they also adhere, although with different spirit, to the FNARS, which constituted for long time a place of exchange and support. So, as shown in the case, they can count on the local support of the other associations and for profit enterprises (see the case of SAJIDA). Some differences remain between the two organizations concerning the way to manage the relationship with public authorities. ALAN, which prefers to maintain a small size and already complains being too large as result of an imposition from the public authorities, remains a militant, without any ambition of scaling up nor having a closer



relationship with the authorities. At the opposite, SAJIDA appreciates the new role of direct interlocutor with local public authorities, resulting by its increase in size.

Concerning the size, while ALAN shows a total refuse in scaling up, SAJIDA enjoys some of the positive aspects of being a medium size organization (economies of scale, cut of duplication of costs, stability and legitimacy) without pretending to become a national one. SAJIDA wants to remain well rooted in the area, understanding the importance of direct links with the other actors of the social sector. However it has also internalised the rhetoric linked to the good management, the economies of scale and the reduction of costs and looks at the “big four” as positive examples. Even so, we can still observe several differences with FOFANA, which is an example of national organization, which increased by 25% its turnover in the last decades. Its evolution from the small and local level to a national one started at the end of ‘90s and never reverted. The organization totally embraced an entrepreneurial spirit, and not only applies the quantitative indicators imposed by the public authority in order to obtain the funds, but also implements practices to improve the organization’s performance, the processes’ efficiency and the economies of scale.

Although the professionalization is a point in common among the three organizations, they however strongly differ in the way of implementing it. Concerning the FOFANA, the organization openly expresses its entrepreneurial spirit. The FOFANA as well as other big associations (see FTDA), have in their team people graduated in management, *Ecoles de commerce* etc. they also often worked for private organizations, before landing to FOFANA. By contrast, in the smaller and local associations of our study, the workers come from the social sector, are mostly graduated, detaining a degree related to specific social issues. But often they continue to study obtaining degrees in international law, such as the case of the director of ALAN, in order to better understand the migration dynamics. Compared to the other cases, ALAN shows that, even if specific competencies are required (including languages and knowledge of the cultural background of the countries of origin and transit of beneficiaries), the adherence to the values and principles is still the most important condition to be taken into consideration during the selection of the new members of the team.

In line with the literature (Lee and Battilana 2018), our case studies also show that in case of founders or directors, who had worked in both business and social sectors, the organizations are more inclined to show the hybrid combination of market and social logics. However contrasting of visions are quite visible, as well as a process of decoupling, which is enacted in the case of FOFANA. This strategy is exacerbated by its large size and the fact there is no direct contact between the directors, defining the strategy of the organization even at the local level. This is line again with the literature (Bromley and Powell 2012), as in the FOFANA we observed that the normative structures are separated from the operational ones.

The case of ALAN, the “militant CADA of Marseille” is totally different. The association implements rules prescribed by public authorities, but the members in principle totally disagree with them. They do not accept the new role, which public authorities delegate to associations of budget controlling and cost reduction. Although strongly criticised, the most part of the quantitative indicators are respected, as the association wants to continue to represent an alternative model to the dominant actors. In the case of SAJIDA the strategy applied is compromising. Through compromising,

the organization tries to reconcile competing demands, crafting an acceptable balance between the conflicting expectations (Oliver 1991). The organization, to some extent embraces the economic and efficiency logic imposed by governmental authorities while remaining local and maintaining the social logic values of good quality of reception.

Finally, based on our analysis, we define the positioning of the three organizations in the field as following: FOFANA as leader, SAJIDA as follower and ALAN as alternative.

The FOFANA is close to the government position and public authority vision concerning the role of the TSOs also expressed in the IGF, IGAS and IGA publication (2013) and therefore in line with the law 2002. The organization respects the imposed quantitative indicators, shows an attitude of increasing in size to cut the cost and implement economies of scale and shows a high degree of managerialization and professionalization.

SAJIDA association, to some extent, tries to follow this trend. The organization results from the merge of two local ones, it has a medium size, quite large compared to the other local associations in the Marseille area, and in the last period cultivates good relations with the local public authorities. However, the organization does not pretend to have the same role than a national association and does not want to become one of them.

Finally the ALAN association not only constitutes an alternative in terms of strategy, not using the acquisition or the contraction of costs through the increase of size but also through an over specialization in a very determinate slice of the market, the people with disabilities. In this way, the organization is able to maintain its militant character, which distinguishes itself from others, and to continue to operate totally in line with the organizational values.

	ALAN	SAJIDA	FOFANA
Sector	Social	Social	Mix
Migration	1919	1990s	2015
Size	Small	Medium	Large /International
Workers' selection base	Engagement	Professionalism	Professionalism and Entrepreneurship
Strategies	- Militantism - Value based - Selected Partnership	- Professionalism - Scaling up - Territorial embedded	- Entrepreneurship - Scaling up - Acquisition - Economies of scale
Ideal-type	Alternative	Follower	Leader

Source: Author, 2019

## 6.2. The Italian Case Studies in Naples

As reported by Avallone and colleagues during the 2011 the authorities called for the so-defined Emergency North Africa -ENA. In order to answer to the ENA a number of urgency provisions have been deployed. The O.P.C.M. (*L'Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri* – the Order of the President of the Council of Ministers) n°3933 emanated in April 2011, allocated 300 million euros and nominated the head of the civil protection department – Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Commissioner delegate for the implementation of the emergency management' actions. In the same line, a coordination committee has been created, head by the general director of the migration and civil freedom (part of the Public security department), and composed by the spokesperson of the regions conference, an ANCI spokesperson and a UPI spokesperson. Within the framework of this committee the general director was in charge of define the reception solutions, which realised through legal emergency procedures, passing by direct award. The Red Cross as well was engaged in the effort, with an economic gain of around 650.000 euros (Avallone 2018). In this context the department of civil protection together with the spokesperson of the Region centralised a consistent decision making power. The management of the reception centres has been entrusted to the *Federalbergatori*<sup>60</sup> for a price of 43 euros par day par person. The manager of the hotels signed a contract, which implies minimum standards reception quality and social services to be guaranteed to the beneficiaries. This contract was never respected, no public tenders were announced, and consequently no transparency, neither control.

While this period was supposed to finish soon, it was quite long more than 2 years, and with serious consequences in Naples. Actually a number of activists, but also associations (such as Garibaldi 101) and TSOs, included the management body of the local SPRAR, started to denounce illegal acts, included embezzlement and abuses, which the beneficiaries suffered. Actually, the beneficiaries did not receive medical care very often, neither legal assistant. As mentioned by Avallone and colleagues “*the machine of reception, since then lacerated and continue to lacerate migrants on order to make money, untroubled*” (Avallone 2018, p.24). In the most part of the cases the quality of the reception was very low, and the asylum seekers did not received the necessary information, nor a decent shelter, neither any reporting concerning their request's outcome. As result the most part of the asylum seekers saw their requests not accepted, however in the 80% of the cases the appeal reversed the territorial commission's decisions. When finally the protection has been accorded, it has been only after two years of abuse and malfeasance.

In this context, the first and unique SPRAR in Naples has been created in 2004, and from the beginning managed by the same organization. The municipality fixed the number of places at 100 and reached 132 nowadays.

After the very bad management of the ENA, in 2015 the new law provided for the creation of the CAS. Very often cases of mismanaged has been registered again. This time not the civil protection, but the ministry of Interior was in charge of the control and selection of actors. One of the clauses has been the experience of the actors in the management of the structures. The civil society again started to organise an autonomous control, visiting the CAS, also the most isolated and remote, to check the conditions of the hosted people.

---

<sup>60</sup> It is a trade association that represents the interests of hotel companies in Italy.

Very often the communication between the prefecture and the municipality has not been very fluid and the municipality lamented a certain opacity in the prefecture 'way of operating both in terms of practices and number.

During this period a number of associations and citizens self-organised in social movements, denounced this kind of management and the very inadequate and lacking control from the prefecture and the civil service, which was in charge all during the so called emergency period from 2011 to 2015.

During 2017 the *questura* of Naples only allowed asylum applications on Monday morning for a limited number of applicants. ASGI sent a letter to the Questura on 27 September 2017, urging it to refrain from preventing access to asylum seekers and their lawyers.<sup>76</sup> Although it has not responded to that letter, the Questura has introduced an online appointment procedure since January 2018, which is only available once a week and allows around 40-45 people to apply; this means that within a few minutes access to the procedure through that system is closed (Aida 2018). In Naples, as well as in the rest of Italy, as already mentioned we found a double system of reception: the Sprar and CAS. there is only one Sprar project managed by the Association LEES Onlus Social enterprise.

**Table 6.6 the reception centre for asylum seekers in Naples**

<b>DERMAN Onlus - Impresa Sociale</b>	<b>132</b>
<b>Organizations Managing CAS</b>	
Associazione AICS - OSTELLO DI MERGELLINA	118
AGAPE S.r.l. - Hotel DEI MILLE	69
BEUTY Onlus - Residence ROKIA	21
Croce Rossa (Comitato Prov. Napoli) - Hotel SAN GIORGIO	95
DESTINY Cooperativa Sociale	17
FISIOMEDICAL CONSULTING	78
FISIOMEDICAL CONSULTING - Ponticelli	21
FISIOMEDICAL CONSULTING - S. Giovanni a Teduccio	64
IL PIOPPO Onlus - NELSON MANDELA	45
IL PIOPPO Onlus - CASA SOFIA	7
DERMAN . Onlus - Impresa Sociale	44
LTM	25
RTI PAN /DAFNE - IL CASTAGNO	46
SAMIRA Cooperativa Sociale	79
Cooperativa SAN MARTINO	20
RTI San GIUSEPPE GESTIONI S.r.l. / SAMIRA Coop. Soc.	189
VIRTUS ITALIA Onlus - Impresa Sociale	80
VIRTUS ITALIA Onlus - Impresa Sociale	45
VIRTUS ITALIA Onlus - Impresa Sociale	64
<b>TOTALE</b>	<b>1,127</b>

Source: Interior Ministry 2018<sup>61</sup>

<sup>61</sup> [http://www.prefettura.it/napoli/contenuti/Presenze\\_rifugiati\\_nei\\_cas-6643835.htm](http://www.prefettura.it/napoli/contenuti/Presenze_rifugiati_nei_cas-6643835.htm)

The three cases have been chosen among the tens of organizations managing reception centres for asylum seekers in Naples. Actually, the first one DERMAN, has been selected as the only SPRAR in Naples. As already shown above, the SPRAR system is totally different in terms of market and organizational arrangement, compared to the other types of centres. It is actually based on co-production of the service, together with the local public authority, which is accountable of the service and received the funds. The SPRAR system is based on a “network” governance, where different partners are included in the implementation of different services dedicated to asylum seekers, but not only. The idea is also to integrate this kind of service with the local welfare, avoiding system duplication, and trying to include the most as possible the beneficiaries in the ordinary system of social services. Furthermore, this case is particular interesting as from the beginning of the so-called “migration emergency” at the end of 90s, the organization is active. Actually, the organization, which strongly claims a political commitment and defines itself as antifascist value based, dedicated most of its activities denouncing crimes perpetrated by entrepreneurs without any scrupulous, who took advantage of the chaotic situation, which in Naples has been managed through procedures of emergency.

The other two selected cases are two associations managing CAS. The first one, BEUTY, is a national organization based in different regions. It manages a multiplicity of services included reception centres for asylum seekers. The last one, DESTINY, was a small social cooperative, born to answer to local neighbourhood needs. Actually, the members of the cooperative, already used to collaborate, have been informally engaged for long, organising activities in the neighbourhood, which is one the poorest and most popular across city. The unpredictability of the external context and in particular a funding system based on the number of persons received put the organization in a serious condition, until when finally after a couple of years of formal activity, closed its doors. The group of members however, still continue to collaborate and bring on activities dedicated both to local population and migrants.

Name of the Organization	Legal form of TSO	Service
<b>DERMAN</b>	Association → Social Enterprise → Cooperative	SPRAR
<b>BEUTY</b>	Onlus	CAS
<b>DESTINY</b>	Social Cooperative	CAS

Source: the Author, 2020.

## 6.2.1 Case Study 1: DERMAN Cooperative

### The Organizational Main Steps

#### 1999 – 2004 Foundation and First Informal Activities

The organization has been founded in 1999. The founders are composed by anti-racist activists, which are also members of the Neapolitan antifascist network. The political engagement is very important, as it defined the mission of the organization and the values, which guided the organization action from the beginning. The association has been founded in 1999, although the members were already active and involved in a number of activities. The organization started dealing with:

- A legal helpdesk for asylum seekers,
- An information desk for migrants and homeless, which is still active.

Furthermore a number of projects started to be developed in the context of intercultural awareness campaign, empowerment of isolated people. At that time 10 workers composed the team.

#### 2004 – 2014 Activities of Reception, the SPRAR in Naples

In 2004, the Naples municipality decided to adhere to the SPRAR and individuated in the LESS association the appropriate management body. Since 2004 LESS has been the managing body of the IARA Project - Integration and welcome for refugees and Asylum seekers – from the city of Naples. This project is for the protection and security of migrants entered into the national grid of the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees set up by the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration of the Ministry Interior. The SPRAR has two main objectives: to provide measures of assistance and protection to the beneficiaries; secondly to facilitate the integration process by acquiring a newfound autonomy. In order to achieve these objectives in the framework of the SPRAR system the municipality of Naples, together with the organization DERMAN set up the IARA project. The IARA project is based on the concept of empowerment and strengthening the autonomy of the beneficiary, defined as an individual and complex process through which individuals can re-build their capacity for choice and re-acquire the perception of self-esteem, potential and opportunities.

The structure at the beginning started receiving a very restricted number of people, 19. Then in time the number of places increased first to 25 and then until 2016 to 60 asylum seekers and refugees. In the meantime, other activities continued to be developed. The association as well as others in town started to take part to competitive tenders and call for projects in order to develop more services, such as the ELICA project (see below) developed through a FAMI (Fund of asylum migration and integration) fund. The tenders became in time more complex and required always more clauses for the organizations. This is why on the one hand the organization decided to create a specific team in charge of answering call or projects and managing collection of funds. On the other hand the members decided to transform the legal status of the association into a social enterprise, gaining more freedom in the management of economic resources.

DERMAN's members continued also their path as activists and they have been particularly active during the ENA – North Africa Emergency between 2011 and

2013. During this period, while the Civil protection handled the situation from an institutional point of view, the management of the services had been entrusted to a number of hotels around the train station, Garibaldi square area. The DERMAN association together with other associations, social movement and civil society, started a work of controlling and denouncing the management bodies, which not only did not honour the contracts, but also perpetrated abuse and violence against the beneficiaries. This kind of activity was totally voluntary based and without any kind of remuneration from the public authorities.

#### 2014 – 2017 The Social Enterprise

The team, which is composed nowadays by 40 persons, continued to grow up. The SPRAR project, named IARA, increased in size in 2016, when it had more than doubled the number of beneficiaries, which are nowadays 132.

The service is organised as follows: 19 places in a reception centres, 27 places in apartments for adult men, 8 places for adult men in the apartment in semi – autonomy, 12 places for adult women potential victims of trafficking in a reception centre, 6 places for adult women in an apartment in semi – autonomy.

The association also carries out a number of services finalised to the integration such as: the Italian language teaching (A0 - A1 - A2 levels); orientation activities for training and / or retraining; placement projects supported by a number of grants to pay the asylum seekers' working time; a service to facilitate the meeting between demand and supply of labour in companies and employment agencies; a support service with the aim of finding housing solutions for autonomy.

The other support services are: information, awareness and counselling on asylum and the recognition of international protection procedures; support in all phases of the hearing preparation in Territorial Commission for the Recognition of International Protection; social secretariat to all greeted about the rights, benefits, social resources of the territory and the method of access to various services (release of residency card, health insurance card, etc.); interface with police headquarters, Prefecture, Commissions and accompaniment for solving problems related to the recognition of international protection and to the issuing of residence permits; support the psycho-social health and practices for the coroner certification of torture outcomes.

Meanwhile, the organization became a social enterprise in 2014, in order to better manage the growing number of projects and funds. Beside the IARA project the organization is also implicated in different international and national partnerships:

1) ELICA - Empowerment Labour Integration Community and Autonomy: this project aims at building a regional network with the objective of implementing integration services. ELICA project is implemented in partnership by DERMAN Social enterprise, ASMENET, CLAOR- *Centro Linguistico di Ateneo Università L'Orientale* – Linguistic Centre of the University of Naples, L'Orientale, Municipality of Naples, CONSVIP and Project Ahead. The project is funded by the FAMI – Fund of asylum migration and integration (FAMI PROG. 82). The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) has been set up for the period 2014-20, with a total of EUR 3.137 billion for the seven years, by the European Commission. The project ELICA is based on four strategic intervention axes: inter-institutionalism, multi-disciplinary, innovative, and impact on the territory. The objective is to contribute to the construction of an experimental Regional Plan of socio-economic interventions, coordinated by a multiplicity of actors included institutional actors, TSOs, and for profit organizations. These actors are moved by the same objective,

namely sustain the autonomy and empowerment of the holders of international protection, which are host in the reception centres located in Campania.

2) *We Care*: this project is carried out by the ASL – azienda sanitaria locale – local health centre, Napoli 2 Nord, Less Social Enterprise, Dedalus social cooperative, and funded with the FAMI fund for 2014-2020. The objective of the project is to contribute to the construction of an integrated and synergistic regional system of health monitoring for the applicants and holders of international protection in conditions of psychological vulnerability. The project is based on a strong cooperation between the system of reception and protection of migrants, the public service, and the for profit organizations. The partners work to raise the qualitative standard of regional social and health services in terms of protecting the health of applicants and holders of international protection in conditions with psychological vulnerability.

3) *Mani in Pasta* is a project developed in Dakar for young people, which want to learn the profession of the bakery. The project is funded by the IOM in partnership with a local association.

4) *Crediti senza confine project*: is a project of literacy teaching in Calabria Region. The project particularly focuses on men and women abused, or victims of exploitation. The project targets particularly women, who in some context remain quite isolated, and experience several difficulties to socialise and then learn the language. This makes even harder the social inclusion. The project helps them, through the language learning to find their place.

In 2014, the organization also took in charge the management of a CAS. Even if this choice has been criticised from certain, the social enterprise explained that the idea was to demonstrate that it was possible to correctly manage this kind of structure and that actually it would have been regrettable not doing it and leaving this opportunity to other less motivated and genuine organizations.



**Table 6.7 DERMAN time-line**

Martelli Law	<p>182/2002 <b>Bossi Fini</b> Law amends the Turco-Napolitano law in a restrictive sense:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The length of the residence permit is reduced from 3 to 2 years</li> <li>- Introduction of fingerprinting for all foreigners and the crime of clandestine state</li> <li>- The sponsorship system for the residence contract, that makes it more difficult for the non-EU citizen to come to work legally in Italy is abolished</li> <li>- Establishment of SPRAR system</li> </ul>	<p>d.lgs 163/2006 on public tenders in order of receiving the EU legislation</p> <p>The call becomes more stringent and detailed</p>	<p>Provisions on public security (No. 94/2009):</p> <p>worsening of the requirements for asking protection in Italy</p>	<p>The State of urgency is declared to face the new arrivals.</p> <p>The extraordinary legal instruments of “<i>Ordinanza della protezione civile</i>” is used</p>	<p>At the end of this dark humanitarian protection has been provided through a large amnesty together with 500 euros per person as reparation</p>	<p>New extraordinary system of reception, managed by the Interior Ministry and called CAS – <i>Centri Accoglienza Straordinari</i></p>	<p>The SPRAR system reduced from 20% to 5% the co-funding for the local public authority;</p> <p>CAS system of accounting changed in order to become more similar to the sprar system</p>	<p>The number of people received in CAS passed from 4,400 to 3,300</p>		
	<p>Accompanied by the largest European amnesty involving over 650,000 individuals</p>			<p>ENA EMERGENCY</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The authority in charge is the Civil Protection</li> <li>2. The Federalberghi coordinates the hotels in charge of the emergency service of reception</li> </ol>			<p>Decrease of the Mediterranean landing and Ministry of interior circular which blocks the new arrival in town</p>			
<p>Increase of funding for the reception services for asylum seekers and refugees.</p>										
<b>1999</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>
<p>A group of anti-racist and anti-fascist activists funded the association LESS</p>	<p>The LESS association carries out services “on the street”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Information desk for migrants;</li> <li>-Legal helpdesk for asylum seekers.</li> </ul>	<p>The municipality of Naples adheres to the SPRAR system and the DERMAN association is entrusted to developed services of reception.</p> <p>The service starts with 19 places</p>	<p>The number of reception’s places increase reaching 25</p>		<p>Activities of monitoring and claim against the management bodies of p.zza Garibaldi, which are mostly hotels coordinated by federalberghi.</p> <p>Strict collaboration with local activists and social movements</p>	<p>LESS changed its legal denomination into a social enterprise</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-The sprar increases in size</li> <li>-New projects are developed;</li> <li>-The turnover continue to increase as well as the number of social workers</li> </ul> <p>The prefecture entrusts the social enterprises for a CAS;</p>		<p>DERMAN created the 2 cooperatives Partenop and Autobilling</p>	<p>DERMAN becomes a social cooperative</p>	

Source: Author, 2019

## Isomorphism

The organization DERMAN encountered a clear change in terms of practices and of organizational structures from the year of foundation 1999 to nowadays. Firstly, the structure progressively became more formalised and stable and legally recognised; secondly we observe a trend of professionalization and corporatization. Although a clear trend of isomorphism is observed, however through the lens of the institutional logics, we can observe that nowadays the hybrid configuration continues to show a dominance of the militant logics, which is melt with the new regime encouraged by the external pressures, and pushing towards a “performance culture”, developed in order to maintain grants and continue to operate.

Since the beginning of ‘90s, a stable group of members, who later became the founders of the organization, used to carry on some actions at the local level in order to sustain the most disadvantaged people. However at the beginning, they were not formally organised in a legally recognised structure. Their actions were based on the shared values of anti-fascism and anti-racism. They also often used to collaborate in several of those actions with other actors implicated in the Napolitan social context and other groups of activists, sharing the same ideas. At the beginning of 2000s the group of the founders, not more than 10 people, decided to formalise these activities, creating the association DERMAN. The association for some years developed services on the street with a very direct contact with the neighbourhood and the people living the area particularly with the homeless and disadvantaged people. Indeed, the first services developed have been the helpdesk for asylum seekers, offering in particular a legal support to them, and an information desk for migrants and homeless. Being legally formalised opened a number of funding opportunities, small and medium projects started to be carried out.

Once the municipality of Naples adhered to the SPRAR system in 2004 (which, as already mentioned, was established based on the article n° 32 law 189/2002, by the Interior Ministry, in collaboration with the ANCI and the UNHCR) DERMAN has been selected as co-producer of the service. IARA project has been the first and unique SPRAR project in Naples, managed in partnership with the municipality. This has represented the first big project, where the organization has been engaged, in terms of funding, resources and commitment.

The organization, through the acquisition of a recognised legal status, acquired stability. Being part of a big project, in collaboration with a number of public authorities also provided it for legitimacy. The organization, which was already strongly rooted in the territory, while becoming an actor of the SPRAR expanded its network of stakeholders. The IARA project resulted as a catalyst. DERMAN started to be involved in a number of projects, with local as well as international actors. Moreover, in 2014, in addition to the SPRAR project, the organization also started two other projects, ELICA and WeCare, as described above. Both the projects were funded through EU funding. At a certain point the activities augmented, and consequentially turnover increased. The association then decided to change the legal status, which had been evaluated by members, not anymore entirely compatible with

the large plethora of activities put in place. So the association became a social enterprise in 2014 and a social cooperative in 2018. This new legal status is due to the new reform of the third sector, which will invest all the TSOs in Italy.

The organization also increased in size and underwent a number of internal reorganization, due to the successions of the projects. Nowadays there are a number of social workers directly implicated in the front service and then 4 different transversal areas, which operate across the different projects and structures: the legal area, the psychological area, the working integration and the healthcare. Beside it, project coordinators and a team dedicated to raise and manage funds have been created. On the other hand still at the end of 2010s a number of non remunerative activities were carried out such as the popular control of the emergency reception centres in collaboration with the social movements, activists and the civil society.

Finally, the organization to cope with the uncertainty of funds has experimented a certain degree of corporatization and managerial professionalization. The department dedicated to the fundraising and planning of national and international projects turned to be an important point of reference in order to maintain a suitable level of entries to pay the members and workers. Furthermore, when the organization started its activities, the members were 10, while there are nowadays almost 40. This implies a new internal organization structure, highly formalized or departmentalized.

As mentioned by a DERMAN member (Interview\_DERMAN\_4): *“There is the board of directors which is made up of the cooperative's members. Each member of the board manages a department, so there is the “job and integration” department, “human resources” department, “budget and accounting” department, the “administration” department, “reception and protection”, and “logistics”. So, beside these six departments there is the direction of the national and international volunteering, which is another activity on development at DERMAN. On the top of all of that there is the general direction, and a general manager who defines let’s say what are the general lines of development of the organization. Below the directions there are the coordinators of of the reception projects. The “reception and protection” management defines the organizational guidelines for the reception and protection projects that we carry out. Therefore, both the residential and non-residential services interface with the various project coordinators, the coordinator of the SPRAR IARA project in Naples, the coordinator of the AIDA project, the ELICA project coordinator etc. etc.”.*

In the case of DERMAN, we can observe both a coercive and a normative kind of institutional pressures. On the one hand, the coercive pressure is particularly expressed through the legal status acquired by the organization in order to respond to the requirements to take part to the projects, and to fund the services. Moreover, the organization is bound to respect the regulation concerning the management of the centres, which has a clear impact not only on the structure of the organization but also on the kind of the service offered. For example, there is an attempt to continue a “street service”, however the service financed is the reception for the asylum seekers, which therefore becomes the most important service. In addition, the service must be done in compliance with the regulations. So, for example, only asylum applicants and not irregular can be received, and they can be guided on integration program and,

despite the will of the members, the service could not be universal and offered without taking into consideration the legal status of the migrants.

On the other hand, we can observe that the organization experiences also a normative process of isomorphism. The funding system in the social sector, including for reception centres is strongly based on projects, because of the above mentioned law 189/2002. It means that the funds are normally quite short, and very often not renovated, or in any case very depending on political will of the public authorities, so little continuity is ensured to the activities put in place. To cope with this problem, the organization reorganised internally. It created a number of teams implicated in the specific projects, and then transversal areas, which are then co-funded by multiple sources. Across time the team in charge of fundraising became very fundamental. This team plays a crucial role, assuring stability and continuity of activities, to the organization, as taking part to new projects and new partnership, which is not only a way to expand but a truly strategy of surviving. In fact, the funding system of TSOs is characterised by precariousness and the very short duration of the projects, does not provide a sure entry, this is why the associations prefer to adhere to multiplicity of them, at the same time. Furthermore, the increased in size also permits a certain specialization. As already mentioned, this is particularly true for certain figures, such as psychologist and the fundraising's team. Finally the evolution is also confirmed by the legal definition, which passes from association to social enterprise, makes the organization less informal.

### Institutional logics

The organization shows a clear transformation both in size and in the way to organize internally the team, while maintaining a militant (expressed through the antifascism) logic characterising it, from the beginning.

The anti-fascism and the activism characterised the past and the present of a large number of DERMAN members' personal journey, and the organization's members still nowadays defined themselves as "*the technical rib of a political movement*" (Interview\_DERMAN\_1). The political background of the board of directors and of most part of the members is often highlighted as one of the most important characteristic of the organization: "*the most part among us, and including myself, even if not among the funders of the association, we have a political background, that distinguish us from others. This political background is related to the anti-racism and anti-fascism, and to the left-wing movement in the city of Naples*" (Interview\_DERMAN\_1).

And also the marketization of the sector and the securitarian perspective the public authorities embraced is highly criticised and contested.

*"And therefore we absolutely, contest this emergency-style management of reception. In particularly we contest the system of public contract awarded"* (Interview\_DERMAN\_1).

For instance, even some choices are explained in terms of militant logics, such as for example the creation of a legally recognised TSO. The creation of an economic organization is also a choice dictated by the high rate of unemployment in the area. Founding DERMAN has represented for the members the opportunity to implement the same activity already carried out before, but paid. Particularly at the beginning, when the main activity was the help and information desks in the street, members act

on a totally voluntary basis and quite informally. Over time, the basic activity remained and the members also implemented new activities still not remunerated by any contracts.

One of the activities that members are most proud is the popular control of the reception shelter for asylum seekers and refugees during the North African Emergency period. During this period, scandals were a daily common place but a bunch of organizations, including DERMAN, fought to denounce the management bodies, which were not correctly implementing their role.

*“And at that time we very much contested this emergency management of reception. Therefore these organizations emerged out of nowhere, devoid of adequate competencies, and requirements. The public bodies [ndr. Civil protection] have entrusted them, without monitoring the competencies neither the actions of these actors! This has been a political choice, in order to rapidly solve the so-called emergency, without taking into accounts the long-term consequences. But this approach actually, continues to be implemented. The new law decree is a proof. The choice to continue funding the emergency reception instead of doing a serious and concrete investment on the ordinary one, the SPRAR, which actually will be weakened”* (interview\_DERMAN\_1)

The militancy also inspires the way to carry out the service, with a particular attention to the multi-culturalism, education, and awareness raising. Even if a certain expertise is developed over time and a number of specialised profiles are hired, marking a clear specialization and professionalization, the importance given to the ideological perspective of the workers, remains however a priority.

Even some choices, which could be differently interpreted, such as the choice to change the legal status, however reflect the strong duality based on the co-existent of two very different logics the militant and the market logic. However, the choice of becoming a social enterprise is also justified as an opportunity of having more flexibility in terms of economic resources, while offering the chance to create jobs for local engaged people. The organization, in 2014, was rapidly growing, as new services were developed, a CAS, two new cooperatives for working integration, catering and cleaning company. The form of association was not any more suitable for the members. The same members however also expressed the need for a different kind of participation to the decision-making process, and after only 4 years the enterprise became a social cooperative. The members mentioned that the shared decision of becoming a cooperative has been due to ensure a more horizontal and participatory governance. Once again, the transformation of the association was due on the one hand to economic reasons and on the other to implement mechanisms more favourable to democratic and participatory governance.

Nevertheless, the organization follows the market logic participating to calls for projects and respecting the quantitative indicators and the budget defined by project. The hybridization observed in the DERMAN is based on a predominance of militant logic, which is melt with other institutional logics. As shown in the table below, the militant logic is based on the way the organizations select the workers, the criticism against some management bodies, which have made illegal profits on migrants. Furthermore, the interviewed members often have felt the need to emphasize the origins of the organization, the values on which its constitution is based. Members

claim for a “clear ideological distinctiveness” compared to the other operators of the sector, in particular from those who used to operate during the ENA-North African Emergency.

Members also refer to their sector of activity as a “*market*” (Interview\_DERMAN\_1), and to their activity as an answer to the demand for specific social services, which grew up in the last years. The members are very conscious of the economic challenges the association had to face in the past, and then the social enterprise and now the social cooperative. The creation of a network, became a priority both for public and for-profit organizations: “*creating a network, industrial scouting activities, put in place and upgrade training activities of working insertion*” (Interview\_DERMAN\_4).

Concerning the technical professional logic is shown when describing the organization and highlighting the fact that there is a repartition of roles based on the skills and capacity of the social workers “*The division of roles, is based as least as possible on a principle of hierarchy in an organization like ours, dealing with a service which is based on the principle of an integrated service of reception, and a full cooperation among members of the teams. In our organization, everyone has his own role and responsibility and choice to be done, but in a shared way, we can take all the decisions that there are to be taken in a shared and cooperative way*”

(Interview\_DERMAN\_4).

Also the capacity to establish networks is interpreted as the result of some members’ skills. The ability to understand the environment, and to highlight the technical capabilities of the organisation

“*The most experimented activities, on which DERMAN has a much stronger expertise, are the reception projects, in particular the IARA-SPRAR project of the Municipality of Naples. Thanks to the IARA project, a whole series of relationships have been developed on the territory not only with organizations that also deal with reception and integration for migrants, but also with bodies private and public, that carry out similar activities but for other audience, and which expressed somehow an interest in being active in the sector the reception and immigration sector*”.

(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)

The members of DERMAN, although conscious of the normative isomorphism spreading on the sector, expressed the feeling of having found a good balance among the different logics, which interact harmoniously, looking for maintaining in any case the social mission of the organization.

## The Resource Dependence Perspective

The organization engaged a number of strategies in order to avoid becoming totally dependent from a unique source of funding. As already mentioned, the organisation developed a number of projects and chose to answer to different calls to get fund to provide a diversity of services. This strategy was possible, among others, thanks to the increase in size of the organization, started with 10 members to become a team of 40. The organization can rely on multiple persons able to plan a project. Working by project required a number of skills, which the organization DERMAN seems to possess.

Firstly we observe that the relationship with the public authority compared to the other organisations across the area is very different. Derman, concerning its core activity, the reception, deals mostly with the municipality, instead of the prefecture as for the CAS system. While the prefecture is bureaucratic and representative of the ministry of Interior, the municipality is a political body. Furthermore in the specific case of Naples, in these last years, the municipality has always taken a stance in favour of migrants, in contrast with the Ministry of the Interior, which is more inclined to manage and reduce inflows.

As already mentioned the market arrangement of the SPRAR is quite particular, and permits the TSO involved to be part of the decision making process concerning the system and modalities of the reception and integration. Even if *de facto* the service is externalised to another organization, the public authorities in charge, which obtained the grant, remains the one responsible for the project. The actors involved define this very peculiar governance as “*a collaboration between the actors characterised by the co-production, the co-management and partnership*” (Interview\_DERMAN\_1). “*I like to use the term co-production because we work really together in the implementation of the SPRAR project in the case of Naples*” (Interview\_Naples\_Municipality). As the DERMAN director explained “*in order to take part to this kind of partnership we needed to prove being a stable organisation, and owning the necessary means to implement complex projects*”. This is why the organization decided first to take a legal status of association and then in 2014 a social enterprise status. The choice was based “*on the need to managed more efficiently a large amount of different grant and funds*” (Interview\_DERMAN\_2).

As mentioned by the Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the organization in order to reduce environmental uncertainty engages in specific actions. The external context in the area of Naples pushes the organizations to engage in projects, as it is the case for most TSOs across the national territory. Projects permit organizations to survive. As mentioned by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), the project is basically what defines the boundaries of an organizational network, carrying out a specific activity. In our specific case the I.A.R.A. project, as based on the concept of collaboration and co-creation with the municipality, enables the organization to be in the middle of this network of the reception and in general of the social policies in the metropolitan area of Naples. The organization has then certain legitimacy, as the major referent for the municipality in the framework of the only project implemented for ordinary reception. Thanks to the gain in legitimacy, we can observe that the association entertains a large

number of collaborations with different actors, such as the universities (L'Orientale and Federico II), other associations in the frame of a number of projects carried out in partnership across the local and national territory as well as with social movements. The organization has been able to maintain a militant character, while starting to answer to new and complex challenges, taking part to new international projects, in collaboration with actors such as the United Nations, such as for example the project developed in Senegal with the IOM, the UN agency for the migration.

The board of directors has a strong direct and well consolidated connection with some representatives of the municipality, due to a past of militancy in social movements adhering to the same political area, and therefore having already shared struggles for the improvement of social policies and services in the area. This results in a good relationship with the municipality and a good coordination in setting the activities for the I.A.R.A project.

The political actions are also implemented by the organization. Furthermore, the organization gained legitimacy as part of the militant groups' network, based in Naples. The city in the last years is very active concerning the migration related issues and the anti-racist movement gathers different actors actively engaged in the promotion of decent life and defence of asylum seekers, refugees and other categories of migrants. The association DERMAN is engaged in this activity for a long time. Particularly, during the ENA –Emergency North Africa, the organization took part of the team, which organized control over the hotel in charge of managing the emergency reception centres in Piazza Garibaldi. The association has also been a promoter of actions in sustaining of migrants denouncing physical abuse, mistreatments, and poor conditions. The organization together with other associations such as Garibaldi 101, denounced situations where minors were lodged with adults and risking abuse, children, and adults sick for days without any assistance. Some migrants also denounced physical and verbal attacks by the managers of the facilities, discrimination, or just totally absence of the services due to contracts.

Differently to other organizations, DERMAN did not experience a particular diversification of activities, although in 2015 it showed expansion, covering new sectors of activities. Even if some projects could target specific groups of population, such as people with mental distress, unemployment etc., the common denominator is that these projects are dedicated to migrants. The association, born with services on the street, such as help and information desks, shows a formalization of the activities, developing more complex projects such as the reception of international partnership with important collaboration such as the IOM.






Figure 6.3 Derman Projects and Network

## 6.2.2 Case Study 2 BEUTY Association

### The organizational main steps

1987- 1999

The organization has been funded in 1987, in the Region Umbria, in order to manage international project of development. The association also takes in charge very soon a number of services of information and communication concerning the migration phenomenon. Conferences and public manifestations are organised across the region. During the 90s the association starts organizing labs for school-age children aimed at raising awareness on the migration related issues and on diversity.

2000-2015

At the beginning of 2000s one of the services, which was growing the most is the training for social workers. The service grew up rapidly, becoming a service targeting as well public sector workers, implicated in services such as education, health, and administrative procedures. During the 2000s the organization diversified its activities, in addition to services of communication and sensitization projects of reception, multi-cultural mediation, orientation and training are put in place. In 2006, the first SPRAR is taken in charge in Perugia (Umbria), followed by activities such as help desk and information desk for migrants. The organization also opened new branches in other southern regions of Italy including Lazio, Campania and Calabria, where nowadays it is in charge of 6 SPRAR.

Also the organization differentiated more the source of funding, taking part to FAMI projects, which are European project funds.

The organization went through an organizational restructuring. As the organizations increased in size, a rationalization of the organization was put in place. The headquarters is located in Rome, and it is the representative office. In Umbria, in Perugia more precisely, are based the department tackling with projects and the department dealing with control and accounting. In this office the quality control is centralised and managed in order to benefit from economies of scales. All the structures and projects, which are based across the country, are processing complex procedures in a systematic way.

The organization also became certified body under the UNI EN ISO 9001:2008 standards. The ISO 9001 of quality management systems (QMS) standards is designed to help organizations ensure that they meet the needs of customers and other stakeholders while meeting statutory and regulatory requirements related to a product or service. The organization obtaining the certification prove to adhere to the seven quality management principles, that are: QMP 1 – Customer focus; QMP 2 – Leadership; QMP 3 – Engagement of people; QMP 4 – Process approach; QMP 5 – Improvement; QMP 6 – Evidence-based decision making; QMP 7 – Relationship management. So basically the organization has to demonstrate its ability to regularly supply a product that meets the customer's requirements and the applicable mandatory requirements, wishes to increase customer satisfaction through effective application of the system, including processes to continuously improve the system and ensure compliance with customer requirements and applicable mandatory ones. All the

requirements are of a general nature and foreseen to be applicable to all organizations, regardless of type, size and product supplied.

2015 - 2018

The organization is now quite large and embarks to new challenges and projects “*as we found a call, we define a project and we send the proposition*” (Interview\_BEUTY\_1).

In 2015, BEUTY takes part to the public tenders for the CAS service. These new structures, which are meant to substitute the CARA and the hotels as emergency reception services, rapidly grew up in number all across the country. This kind of experience differs from the others, as the Prefecture entrusts the service to the organization, which became the only in charge. Particularly at the beginning, the control is quite low and due to the large number of arrivals compared to the structures available, the public body embarked questionable actors. In this sense it has not observed a discontinuity with the previous phase, when the hotels, which showed being not trustable management bodies.

#### The BEUTY CAS in Naples

From 2015 to 2018 the BEUTY nonprofit has been entrusted to manage a CAS, with a capacity of 32 persons in Naples. BEUTY decided to take in charge the service in the Campania region and opened up two CAS one in Naples and one in Caserta. The centre in Naples has been active during three years. Despite the organization's willingness to innovate and to manage the CAS following the SPRAR standards, the workers experienced several difficulties. By contrast with the SPRAR, the public body of reference is the prefecture. Furthermore, particularly at the beginning, a slight preference has been shown for organizations proposing large numbers of places, 100 or more. This represented a disadvantage for BEUTY. Due to the increasing demand however, also the other smaller structures have been finally selected. In the case of CAS, the price made up of auction was of 35 euros par person par day. The price could be slightly lower when the other participants to the market propose a different one, which was in average between 32 and 35 euros. The authority control has been judged quite arbitrary: some structures were strictly controlled, other definitely less.

Through the prefectural circulars the control over the population was very high and also impacted the daily life in the structure and the relationship between the social worker and the beneficiaries. For instance two moments have been experienced as very sensitive: the curfew and the distribution of the pocket money. At the end of 2016, a very strict curfew has been imposed. The curfew was fixed around 9, which was quite early and sometimes very hard to respect, particularly when for example beneficiaries had relatives in other centres in the same region but in different cities, or for those who were working. Concerning the distribution of the pocket money, the distribution could be done only in presence of the officials from the prefecture. This coordination could create some delays, which in the case of very low income as for asylum seekers could create discontents and tensions between beneficiaries and social workers. Actually very often the beneficiaries with great difficulties distinguish them from public authorities representatives: because they apply the rules, they are also exchanged for those who created them.

Finally the contract with the prefecture is annually based. It means that each year a new project, even if very similar to the previous one, has to be sent to the prefecture in order to participate to the competitive tenders. It also could happen that – and it is one of the reasons why BEUTY did not take part to the new call - the same activities carried out the previous years, were asked to be carried out at a new lower price.

Finished the contract in 2018 the BEUTY nonprofit decided not to take part again to the new tender. The number of asylum seekers in town decreased the price offered from the other organizations as well. The organization found impossible to maintain certain standards without a sufficient amount of money and decided to move forward and focus on other services. As already mentioned by Interviewer\_BEUTY\_1 *“Having centres spread across the national territory helps us having a broader picture of the situation. But it is also true that the local specificities make the difference sometimes. I want to show you just an example over all. In Naples in order to cope with our vision about migration and integration, we made a deontological choice to close the CAS. In Foligno instead, we decided for a different solution. Actually there, the municipality together with ARCI association, and CARITAS Foligno and BEUTY onlus decided to take over a SPRAR project. These associations all joined into an “associazione temporanea di imprese”, a temporary association of enterprises. The experiment is still working very well and the organization is learning a lot from this partnership.*

# BEUTY 30 YEARS OF ACTIVITIES

**ANNI 80** Cidis Onlus si occupa di programmi di Cooperazione internazionale e Educazione allo sviluppo. In un periodo di grande fermento culturale organizza convegni, seminari e dibattiti, e conduce i primi laboratori nelle scuole sull'approccio alla diversità culturale.

Cidis Onlus nasce in Umbria nella metà degli anni '80, da un gruppo multietnico di studenti e volontari riuniti intorno ad una macchina da scrivere presa in prestito.



**ANNI 90** L'Italia si trasforma da terra di emigranti a Paese di immigrazione e il decennio si apre con l'approvazione della prima legge sull'immigrazione. Cidis Onlus apre sedi in Campania e nel Lazio. Oltre ai progetti di cooperazione e di aiuto umanitario in emergenza, vengono elaborate proposte di Educazione Interculturale per la Scuola, nasce il primo centro di Mediazione culturale e si struttura il primo nucleo di insegnanti di italiano L2 in contesto migratorio. In tutti i territori in cui opera l'associazione avvia e rafforza l'attività di numerosi sportelli di informazione e orientamento per migranti.



**ANNI 2000** L'immigrazione è una dimensione strutturale della società italiana. Cidis Onlus apre una sede in Calabria. A scuola i bambini stranieri sono sempre più numerosi e nel mondo del lavoro gli immigrati diventano parte imprescindibile del sistema economico e produttivo italiano. Cidis Onlus struttura campagne di insegnamento dell'italiano L2 in contesti migratori, promozione della cittadinanza attiva, sostegno alla genitorialità a scuola. Gli sportelli informativi sono sempre più specializzati e Cidis Onlus rafforza e intensifica il suo impegno nella formazione e aggiornamento degli operatori dei servizi pubblici in ambiti chiave (scolastico, socio sanitario, penitenziario, amministrativo); sviluppa programmi specifici per le donne immigrate; compie i primi passi perché la mediazione culturale diventi mediazione di sistema e continua la sua azione sul fronte del inserimento lavorativo con la formazione professionale.



**ANNI 2010** È il decennio delle Seconde Generazioni e della questione della riforma della legge sulla cittadinanza. La formazione civico linguistica della popolazione immigrata va di pari passo con il lavoro per la costruzione di una coesione sociale basata su identità fluide e meticce. Cidis Onlus prosegue il lavoro sul fronte della mediazione culturale e sulla riorganizzazione in chiave interculturale dei servizi.



## ACCOGLIENZA

Nuovi flussi migratori, che coinvolgono in via prioritaria rifugiati in fuga da guerre e povertà. Lì dove è presente Cidis Onlus rafforza l'impegno nel settore della prima e seconda accoglienza dei richiedenti asilo e titolari di Protezione internazionale con strutture SPRAR, strutture di accoglienza per minori non accompagnati e strutture per l'accoglienza straordinaria.



Figure 6.4 The BEUTY' project since 80s

## Isomorphic Process

Both the sternness and the instability of the rules incremented the isomorphic process embarked by the organization. On the one hand, this is conformed to the coercitive process of isomorphism. The sector is highly regulated both in terms of funding and in terms of kind of activities to carry out (even if from this second point of view it strongly depends on arbitrary judgement of the prefecture). Also the projectification, which strongly characterised the relationship between the public authorities and the TSOs in Italy, and experienced by BEUTY could be ascribable to this kind of process. The organization follows the public authorities rules but also the so-called “rules of the market”, participating to the tenders and taking part to partnership and different kinds of projects, but not really as a conscious and consensual response to uncertainty, but rather as a reproduction of reiterated practices, which have been dropped from a central level to the local branch. Finally, we observe normative pressures of isomorphism based on professionalism and in turn corporatization. Tasks are very well separated, and being a rather big organization at national level, the creation of different departments in order to deal with the different aspects of local branches activities, has been considered as the most suitable solution in order to also cut the costs of duplication of professionals.

Although the analysis concerns the CAS, it can be applied, to a certain extent, to the organization as a whole. The organization increased in size and a number of transformation occurred, which also impacted the local branch, included the CAS centre of Naples. First of all, the organization was born in order to deal with the international development projects, mostly carried out abroad in particular in a number of African countries. Then, in part thanks to the expertise acquired in migration notions and concepts, but also because a consistent part of public funds shift towards the sector of the reception and integration of migrants, the organization started shifting activities. At the beginning, it was more a supporting service to public authorities, schools and hospitals in order to sustain the social workers in the relationship with people coming from different countries and cultures (Multi-cultural aspects). Then the organization also started to deal with the service of reception. BEUTY started to participate to public tenders for the entrustment of services of reception, such as the CAS and the SPRAR, in different regions of Italy, thanks to the quite ramified network of actors. In particular, at the middle of 2010s when the migration became high in the Italian political agenda, a number of tenders have been opened in order to create new structures of reception, which pushed a large number of TSOs, and not only, to enter into the sector (for more information about, see the Italian context below in the same chapter).

As already shown, the combination of the very instrumentalized and politicised of the “migration industry” and the system of public funds based on the number of people received, increased the instability of the revenue for the organizations involved. This became obvious when the Italian government openly took securitarian position - before with the Minniti’s and then with the Salvini’s decrees –closed the borders and made some deals with the Libyan government. The number of asylum seekers decreed suddenly at national level. Furthermore, concerning the situation in Naples, in the period of 2017-2018, the prefecture decided to block the number of arrivals in town, estimating that the situation was already over control and too difficult to be managed. These decisions impacted on the structures, which actually were expecting

to host a certain number of people and which finally received fewer beneficiaries than expected. In this way, some of the management bodies did not or struggled to cover the effective costs. This was not the case for BEUTY, the organization however continued to carry out the activities until the end of the contract, by contrast with other organizations in town, as we will see later in the last case study from Naples.

In addition, a number of characteristics indicate that there are clear evidence of corporatization and elevated specialization. The size of the organization, which rapidly increased from the beginning of 2000s as a consequence of the differentiation of activities, permits certain economies of scale. For instance, more technical tasks such as the answer to the projects calls and the accounting or the control of quality are centralized and carried out by a department, which is based in Perugia. The headquarters, which work as representative siege, are based in Rome and used to deploy institutional activities. The team based in Foligno dealing with the project and quality control is highly specialised and even if the local branch collaborates in the drafting of the projects, in the apposite office, the team deals with the more technical details. Furthermore they also are in charge of revising the accountability in order to check that the financial statements are in order.

Furthermore a system of standardization of practices finalised to certificate the good management of the organization has also been institutionalised. Indeed, the organization is also certified under the UNI EN ISO 9001:2008 standards. The ISO 9001 of quality management systems (QMS) standards is designed to help organizations ensure that they meet the needs of customers and other stakeholders while meeting statutory and regulatory requirements related to a product or service. So the aspects link to the efficiency and good management of the structures are actually taken into high consideration.

### Institutional Logics

The logics characterizing the hybrid identity of the organization are multiple. The organization BEUTY and its workers show a clear awareness of the market logics as for example expressed by an interviewee through the sentence:

*“The small structures are anti-economic”* (Interview\_BEUTY\_2).

The interviewees argue that the sector of reception for asylum seekers is a highly-controlled sector, where a number of behavioural choice and position are more the result of external factors than a decision maturated internally. Indeed, being on the market imposes a certain organizational behaviour, which is more due to elements such as the imposition of the price by competitive mechanisms: *“this is a tender. The price is done by the participants!”* (Interview\_BEUTY\_1). The public authority has also the power to impose certain criteria on how to develop the service. In the case of the CAS, the Interior ministry, represented locally by the prefecture, imposes the number of people to be host, the number of social workers, the list of services, which are paid and, at some point, even a curfew. The hosting structures are supposed to notify the authorities in good time of the absence of a guest, and sanctions are foreseen for migrants who do not comply with rules and timetables. The presence of the prefectural officers often raised tensions in the structure, and even if certain tasks they asked to perform are not related to a service of reception and integration, such as more control on the displacement of beneficiaries among others, the management

body could not escape from performing them. Again, this is the case for the imposition of the curfew and the distribution of the pocket money on the days chosen by the prefecture without taking into account the needs of the beneficiaries.

However, market logic is not totally internalised, which is one of the reasons why, at a certain point, BEUTY decided to quit the market. In this term the social and militant logics come up, in order to justify this decision. Reading the new call for the assignation of the CAS in the following year, the feeling was very bad: *“it seemed really a jail! The increased restrictions concerning freedom of entry and going out, an increased control on the people”*. The increased control is also read as an increase of tasks and engagement, for the same or even smaller compensation, as almost certainly the price would decrease due to the exacerbated competition: *“there was an increase of services, such as the medical control to check against drug abuse, etc... with a very small budget... then economically does not worth... so we could not manage to carry out the service in this way... we would have eliminated a number of services, which are developed by BEUTY since a long time, and enable the person being autonomous and independent”* (Interview\_BEUTY\_3).

Concerning the projectification the feeling is very mixed: on the one hand, the multiplication of the activities permits a certain freedom: *“we are not an organization which bases its activity on the reception. It is just one of the services we offer, but as association we cover very different services on the sector of sustain to migrants”* (Interview\_BEUTY\_2). The diversification is the result of the capacity to participate to a number of projects at the same time. The specialization and the expertise of a dedicated department is a positive advantage for the organization. On the other hand, the *“project very often works well only after the second or third year of activity. But then maybe this is exactly the moment when they finish!”* (Interview\_BEUTY\_2). When a project finishes and there are not resources to bring on the activity obviously the new skills and the expertise acquired are lost, which is of course a great pity for an organization dealing with social services. In terms of cost in writing the projects, this is not a very experienced issue. The projects are developed at central level in the department of quality control in Perugia. Local branches are only included in the final step of the revision process to make the project more suitable to the local specificities.

Finally, concerning the Technical Rationality Logic the organization is particularly proud of being certified body under the UNI EN ISO 9001:2008 standards. This is the expression of both an entrepreneurial logic, as the efficiency of the management, the introduction of a number of practices to implement transparency and reduce the cost are saw as important positive innovation *“ For each purchase, three different budgets are realised before choosing where to buy the products”* (Interview\_BEUTY\_2). This is not experienced as a problem, but at the opposite, it is shown as a proof of accountability, so it is also relevant from a technical rational logic's point of view. It is undeniable that, in the specific context, where embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds are very common and widespread, being able to show signal of differentiation and proof of accountability is important, and it also represents a sign of ability to work well and correctly. The BEUTY members are very aware of this kind of reality and highlight the fact that this is a *“a parallel story, nothing to share with us, the association and TSOs which traditionally operated in the sector. Those realities [ndr. Hotels which took in charge the services of reception during the ENA] have been created especially, from the local criminal groups in order to make money”*



(Interview\_BEUTY\_2). The social workers engaged by BEUTY are not just professional, but also people who really feel important their job and who retain the perception of working in a social sector and with human beings: “*We assess situation by situation, because we are dealing with human beings*” (Interview\_BEUTY\_3).

Definitely the organization shows a certain ability to cope with different logics. There is strong social logics expressed by the workers “*we take in consideration each single case, because in this sector we deal with human lives*” (Interview\_BEUTY\_3). This is also confirmed by the feeling that they would have not be able to continue to carry out the services lowering their quality, for a more convenient price. This logic blends well with the entrepreneurial and the technical rational one, which is as well highly embraced. The transparency is actually an important value and it is very highlighted and shown as proof of difference with those kinds of reality, which actually contaminated the sector, raising scandals and alimending the right parties rhetoric. It seems that the organization and the members are able to accept the rules of the game,

## The Resource Dependence Perspective

The instability of the external environment is very high and has hard consequences both on the CAS and on the association as a whole. The organization enacted different strategies in order to maintain a certain independence from the environment. First of all the increase in size was a strategy finalised to acquire financial and economic stability. Instead of merging and absorbing important competitors, the organization decided to take part to a large number of public tenders and expand its activity of reception all across the country. The number of projects developed multiplied in order to maintain a suitable level of income or in any case sufficient to pay the workers. The increase in size also enabled the organization to cut cost eliminating the duplication of activities.

The factor “size” is interpreted as a resource for the local team working into the CAS. The size helps to enter in the right network, and also gives the opportunity to choose with whom to collaborate and in what. In order to be able to refuse certain projects and undergo for others, the organization is required to have the material resources and to be able to survive. This is in fact the case for BEUTY and the workers know it well: *“Remaining entrapped in the wrong network is something that could happen, particularly to the small organizations. In this case they have no choice but accept whatever it happens. Fortunately, BEUTY is present on the territory since long time. Then, we have a network, which increases and decreases depending on the kind of project we deal with. As all the sector after a while you know each others, and how they work”* (Interview\_BEUTY\_2). The size permits the organization to make a selection of the partners, but also of the activities.

The multiplication of the projects is the main strategy used by the organization to cope with uncertainty of resources. Even when an activity is funded such as the reception in the CAS, they could experience difficulties. For instance, in the case of BEUTY, even if they recognized that the price was quite adequate, they struggled. Firstly, as the organization decided to deal with this service using the same quality of standards of the SPRAR, the difficulties arose as not the same services were forecasted on the two contracts. Furthermore as the CAS is thought as a provisional short-term solution even the services included are normally only for the first three or four months (such as the psychological support or the first medical services). BEUTY however decided to support the beneficiaries of the CAS as they were in the SPRAR. This followed a clear logic, of avoiding making discrimination among beneficiaries. For doing so, they embarked in a number of projects beside the CAS reception. This permitted to integrate a number of services, from the legal helpdesk to the cultural integration, including the medical services, which were not scheduled in the CAS’ contracts. The partnership with public bodies such as the ASL – *azienda sanitaria locale* – or with other associations such as Caritas helped in the implementation of these parallel projects. Scaling up became a resource in this term as the organization appeared to be more reliable and stable, this is why it became a quite common path. Less frequently, but in some occasion, the association can rely on donation. A large size permits being known at the national level and counting on a good reputation.

Finally in the case of the CAS the organization decided to adopt the exit strategy. Two are the main reasons behind this choice. The first one is the price. The CAS has a price which corresponds to the lower price offered for the service in town. The

organization realised that the decreased number (almost 1000) of beneficiaries in town would have resulted in a lower price. Furthermore, decreasing the number of people in town probably for the second year, the structure would have been not totally filled up. In this case, the cost for each single person host would have increased as certain services, which could be shared, such as the space, and so the rent of the apartments, but also the retribution of the psychological consultancy, or the cultural mediator. The staff also became too expensive. Secondly there is a “*deontological*” (interview\_BEUTY\_1) reason. The BEUTY nonprofit decided actually to start these kinds of service as long as they would be able to offer the same quality than in the SPRAR. Obviously, as the price has been reduced this was not anymore possible. Furthermore the control experimented during the previous years made the social workers quite uncomfortable with this kind of rather disputable service. The beneficiaries transposed on the management bodies the responsibility and decisions of the public bodies, such as the delay in the distribution of their pocket money, the curfew at 9 p.m. and the signature at 8 a.m. All this control put the social workers in a very unpleasant position, not always well perceived.

Finally the certification UNI EN ISO 9001:2008 standards was also a strategy in order to guarantee the quality of the offered service. The ISO 9001 of quality management systems (QMS) standards could represent an important signal particularly at European level. If at national level the “emergency pressure” makes the prefectures being quite flexible on the selection of the management body, at the EU level specific requirements are requested to be selected and then being a virtuous organization helps in the complex management of the fund.

### 6.2.3 Case Study 3: DESTINY Social Cooperative

DESTINY is a small social cooperative created by a group of young people all resident in the neighbourhood *mater dei* in Naples. The neighbourhood is quite popular and poor. They met around the local church and almost all of them adhere to the catholic principles included the importance of helping others and the poor. The informal group has been operating for several years, without creating a stable recognised organization. Then they formed as social cooperative. Unfortunately, this experience did not have long life. Already in 2018 the social cooperative closed the door, renouncing to the management of the CAS service. The story of this CAS is very similar to a number of small organizations across the national territory, which have not been able to cope with a very changing and unstable external context. The size has had an important influence on the story of the social cooperative, and particularly on the interruption of the service. Despite the support of the local church, both in term of resources, opening some spaces for the CAS activities, and helping out in the daily activities, the organization, not being able to cover the costs, had to interrupt the service and is still trying to pay a part of the workers.

---

Kind of Structure	CAS
Legal form	Social Cooperative
Year of creation	In 2011 creation of <i>associazione di volontariato</i> In 2016 the social cooperative (with the aim of creating jobs for members)
Number of Workers	11 workers out of them 3 members
Number of asylum seekers hosted	23
Project in which the organisation is involved	“IAMM – <a href="#">Integrazione Accoglienza Mamme Migranti</a> ”
Project in which the organisation is involved	<a href="#">Centro “Talitakum”</a>

---

#### The organizational main steps

2011 -2015

Even if the informal group was already active before, in 2011, the group funded an association of volunteers. The main aim of the organization was to deal with the young of the neighbourhood. Actually the neighbourhood registered high rate of criminality and very often the young people were recruited for petty crimes, very often related to drugs trafficking. To change it, and give them a future, the group of the *mater dei* church organised afterschool and sustain activities to this population group. The activities have been developed from the beginning in strict coordination

with the nuns of *mater dei*, who offered the spaces and their help in carrying out the services.

### 2015 – 2018

After the end of the ENA, the institutional actor in charge of launching the call became the ministry of Interior, represented locally by the prefecture. In 2015, the d.lgs 142/2015 reformed the reception system for asylum seekers and refugees, and created the new centre of reception CAS – Extraordinary centre of reception. In this context the association of volunteers, based in the church of *mater dei*, took the decision to formalise more its activities and create a cooperative. After several meetings, they decided to take the step and move from a quite informal activity for the inhabitants of the neighbourhood to something more institutionalised. They decided to embrace this kind of activity for two reasons. Firstly, in the last years the demand for this kind of service had increased. Being the team members more interested to sustain any kind of poverty, they found interesting this type of service, although none of them was really specialised in the sector. Secondly, in 2015-2016 a large number of tenders have been opened, creating the real opportunity to put in place a service, being funded by the public authorities.

In 2015, the new rules for the participation to the tenders imposed some rules, including the condition of having already taken part to this kind of activity during the previous period (ENA). This is why the new-born cooperative DESTINY, used another cooperative as figurehead for the first year, which in partnership with the nuns of the *mater dei* church took part to the tender. Then, since the second year of activity DESTINY took the whole responsibility of the project, but the substance did not change, neither the place nor the organization of the work.

Concerning the choice of the category, namely women with their kids, it has been the only possible option, as the church is dedicated and managed by nuns.

The activity during the two years has not been always easy and a number of challenges have been confronted until when, after one year, the cooperative closed its doors. Actually as explained later, the cooperative not receiving any more beneficiaries from the centralised system of redistribution at local level, managed by the prefecture, did not gain enough money to pay the costs (this is due to the fact that as already mentioned the organizations are pay based on the number of beneficiaries host).

## The Isomorphic process

The organization shows, initially, a mimetic process of isomorphic. Members perceive that if they want to engage into a more formal service they need to become a legally recognised structure, as it is the only way to participate to public tenders. So, following the example of the other organizations in the sector, they try to transform their informal activity into a stable one. Firstly, they acquire a legal status, and then they shift the activity to a more remunerated one in order to obtain funds. Obviously, a more structured service also implies the presence of professionals next to volunteers, the members of the cooperative and the nuns, who supported the founding group from the beginning. Following the trend of the moment, the organization jumps into the sector of the reception for asylum seekers. On the one hand it is a real social need, which has risen in the last years at national level, and particularly new in the area of Naples. The group of volunteers, moved by a solidaristic spirit inspired by the catholic faith, does not find any difference in doing some good to migrants or to local people. On the other, they recognise that this specific choice has been due to the increasing public resources dedicated to the migration issue. A lot of organizations did the same, even if not all with the same good faith. As already shown above, the number of new actors has multiplied and, due to the large quantity of resources dedicated, even for-profit organizations and organised crime groups joined the sector. However, concerning the TSOs, which have been motivated by good intention, the sector grew up rapidly, and as also testified by a number of operators of the field, such as the President of the confcooperative “*although we were not alone, the TSOs took the opportunity to grow up, and to increase in size moving towards the market of the reception for asylum seekers and refugees*” (President\_Confcooperative<sup>62</sup>).

Despite the efforts, the organization has not been able to conform to “the rules of the game” and, at the end, succumbed to the strict regulation characterizing the entire migration-related sector. This actually had severe repercussion on the financial stability. The reform, which had a major impact on the DESTINY’s activities is the “*clausula di salvaguardia*”, the safeguard clause. As explained by the head of the SPRAR central service at the conference “*territori accoglienti*” – land of welcome – “*The application of this clause, introduced in 2016, represented a strong incentive for the municipalities to be part of the [Sprar] system. Indeed, it provided the prefectures’ commitment to not opening the CAS and progressively emptying those already present in the municipalities that adhered to the SPRAR. This political process brought the SPRAR passing by 3,000 reception places and 150 projects activated before 2014, to 36,000 places and 870 projects active on more than 1800 municipalities in January 2018. Therefore a huge evolution of the reception system, despite the strong increase in terms of arrivals and the mounting of the narrative on the “invasion”, has characterized these four years*”. (Head of central service SPRAR)<sup>63</sup>.

The framework has been then very unstable and the small organization soon experienced difficulties. Furthermore, another prefectural decree worsened the situation: “*By contract the capacity of our centre was 23 beds. Until September 30<sup>th</sup>, when the service has closed for a very simple reason. There has been a ban on receiving Naples on the order of the Prefect of security. For a security problem in the*

---

<sup>62</sup> Workshop “*territori accoglienti*” Trento, November 2018.

<sup>63</sup> Workshop “*territori accoglienti*” Trento, November 2018.

*Garibaldi area, called Vasto, for some time Naples did not receive any further asylum seekers. As a result, in some centre, such as for us, vacant posts remained. Actually, some centres remain empty, because they used to receive people, who finishing the process, either obtaining a type of protection, or having received a rejection, had to leave the CAS, left empty places. Due to the decree has not been possible to replace them. And, unfortunately, even if you keep two vacancies, you can't remove figures anyway since the contract still requires you to have them on the team. When the occupied places were reduced to 14 -15 we could no longer cover the service costs, therefore we asked the prefecture to relocate the women we had in the structure and consequently to close the service. It was the 30<sup>th</sup> of September. Still we are receiving the due money for the service already implemented".* (Interview\_DESTINY\_2).

The cooperative, even if it was critical of both the strategically and operative decisions of the public authorities, which on the one hand produced always more restrictive laws and on the other had not been able to manage the situation from an administrative point of view, always respected the prefectural impositions. The cooperative even created an internal regulation to ensure the respect of the curfew or the management of the medical issues. The inability to take part to other remunerative partnerships or to increase and diversify the entry made the cooperative unable to pay the wages and to continue the service. The organization, not being able to conform to the rules, did not resist to the external pressures.

The members of the cooperative, even if they do not regret the experience, do not deny the difficulties. Particularly due to the changing legal framework: *"We saw the system change several times. Before the Minniti's Decree and then... nowadays the greatest challenge today is posed by the Security Decree, which has now become law. Not only it objectively restricts fundamental rights and freedoms, but also caused many difficulties to the centres of reception"* (Interview\_DESTINY\_1).

### **Institutional Logics**

The most developed logics are the militant and the technical rationality ones. On the one hand, responding to a militant logic, the organization starts its activity helping the people who are most in difficult *" Furthermore, it was an emergency situation that knocked the doors several times during the last period...when we were engaged in different activities at the institute... and as we did know where to start from, we say that this emergency has knocked to our door, and we have decided to welcome immigrants, women and children."* (Interview\_DESTINY\_1).

In almost a messianic way the organization decided that this kind of population, the female migrants, could represent the most suitable beneficiaries. In this respect, actually they even found very strange and misplaced some recommendations received from other operators active on sector. Indeed, some of them recommended to avoid receiving certain nationalities, as could cause particularly problems or creating more work to do. *"Keep in mind that we started with this worm in our ears, with everyone saying "don't take the Nigerians"! But we don't choose! Among other things, because of the type of work, I mean you do a kind of job so if you put discrimination, and you want Cambodians but you don't want Nigerian... you're starting in the bad way!"*. The cooperative's members were quite shocked by this "normalization" of the social worker role, and this idea that the reception service could be a service among others.

The members of the cooperative were very engaged into the activity of the organization: *“So more or less I have to say that we have always added this famous “more” that also comes from our name to what the contract required. Because it really comes from us ... we have always tried to implement at 360° degrees what could respond to the needs and urgencies of these women who clearly are in a vulnerable condition and require serious and competent assistance”* (Interview\_DESTINY\_1). They also transcended the most technical aspects sometimes enhancing the human approach to this kind of work: *“In order to help and sustain them, you had to establish a human relationship before. For example it happened being confronted to a woman from Sub-Saharan Africa, who was in captivity, who was in Libya, she suffered violence of all sorts”* (Interview\_DESTINY\_1).

On the other hand, although their knowledge of the sector increased rapidly, they understood the need to have serious and qualified paid workers, especially in key positions, which is a sign of the importance of the technical rational logic. For instance one of the key figure has been the cultural mediator. In fact, only thank to this help, they have been able to understand some behaviour misinterpreted until then. However, this intermediation helped the girls to understand or just accept some very rigorous norms, particularly characterizing the last period of activity. *“The role of the mediator is fundamental, to solve problems let say concerning behavioural aptitudes. Also to understand what some attitudes corresponded to. We had not only the cultural mediator, but also a psychologist. A psychologist from the derman<sup>64</sup> social enterprise, also helped us sometimes to understand certain attitudes. Then some body signs have been explained and understood”.* (Interview\_DESTINY\_3). Although obliged by contract, the members very soon realised that a strong will to help was not sufficient but that instead professionals could be needed to solve specific issues. So they warmly welcomed the paid workers and their skills and accepted willingly recommendation and advices, as conscious of some difficulties: *“The worst I think at the level of reporting was anyway. The piece that gave more headaches...”* (interview\_DESTINY\_1).

Also to cope with the inexperience in managing this kind of projects, they reapplied the same organizational structure already implemented by the cooperative, which previously managed the service and showing a major level experience: *“there was this organization, which already had a fairly rigid organization chart that we replicated. Because having various partners that contributed differently to the realization of the project, they had given themselves a fairly binding structure. Which we replied at the beginning”* (interview\_DESTINY\_2).

Finally, the choice to create a cooperative was not linked to any particularly need of giving the opportunity to all members to participate or to make all the paid workers members. The members declared that they chose this legal form as a suitable organization to give the opportunity to those among them wanted to continue his/her activity to do it. At the opposite, those among the funders who wanted to engage in

---

<sup>64</sup> The two organizations are in contact as in the regular system once there is a free place in sprar, the asylum seekers passes from the CAS structure to the SPRAR. This does not happen very frequently as the CAS places are more in number than the SPRAR ones. So, most often the person spent all its application period in a CAS structure.



the daily activities, could do it – which was the case for a number of them, who finally were strongly involved in the organization and became essential, such as for the legal activities or the account.

The entrepreneurial logic almost does not appear and however it is not dominant, even if it is for an economic reason (differently than for BEUTY) that the organization stopped the activity. Probably it is this absence of market logic, neither for nor against, which makes the organization unable to find a strategy to cope with the decrease of funding.

## The Resource Dependence Perspective

The organization DESTINY struggles from the beginning due to the strong uncertainty characterizing the environment. Although the organisation has not been able to commit to a clear strategy, some kinds of strategic behaviours have nevertheless been observed. Firstly, the composition of the board of directors represented a crucial factor for the existence of the cooperative. The members of the board developed the partnership with the local church. This has represented the most important relationship with other actors. Then the composition of the organization has been characterised by an intense process of professionalism as already explained resulting both from coercitive and mimetic forces, not necessarily based on adherence to the faith but on the values attached to a good reception service. Finally, the organization tried to create a network and become partner of other projects but this has not been possible in a very competitive environment. In addition to the management of the CAS, DESTINY has been able to adhere only to another project, which has not been sufficient to ensure its survival in a difficult time.

The board of directors, on the one hand, has been crucial in order to create an intense exchange and then an informal partnership with the local Church Mater Dei. DESTINY social cooperative, from the beginning, enjoyed an important support from the local church, Mater Dei. Thanks to the nuns' support, the cooperative used for free the spaces and furthermore a nun - the so-called "jolly" thanks to her amazing ability to play in different roles- supported the cooperative's members in the daily activity becoming *de facto* part of the team. This has been always a very strong support, due to the adherence to the catholic values shown by most of the members of the cooperative that permitted to take the step and enter into the sector of the reception for asylum seekers. *"Initially the mater dei sisters participated with the endorsement of another cooperative. This cooperative was already involved in the sector, as this was a condition sine qua non to participate to the 2015 tender. Basically, you must have someone's endorsement, which already was involved. The following year, when the contract expired, we resumed the activity officially, with more or less the same organization and in the same place, as our activity has always been carried out within the mater of the charity institute, and our service born as a collaboration with this institute"* (Interview\_DESTINY\_1). On the other hand, this configuration of the board did not really help for other types of relationships with different actors, such as for example the public authorities. Concerning the relationship with public authorities, it was characterised by mixed feelings. Although they implemented all the rules and even some internal regulation to make this task easier, they felt sorry when the beneficiaries are not able to distinguished them from the public authorities. *"The first prefect we met for example was an extremely flexible person. One that before thinking about bureaucratic aspects used to look at fixing the people's situations, because they are human beings. Instead, the person who arrived later, was extremely strict with the bureaucracy. So you clash and adapt to different ways of organizing the system. We have seen the Minniti decree arrive and bring the reception system into crisis...and also the social workers and the directors of the centres, which at some point did not anymore how to deal with all this bureaucracy. Who didn't even know how to handle all this bureaucracy from the sky. Extremely stringent. Which is sometimes right, and sometimes a little less. Important and serious changes have been experimented also and especially at the legal level..."*

Beside the nun and the founder members, the cooperative also hired seven paid workers with a regular contract. They were professionals in different sector, nurses, cultural mediators, psychologists, while the members participated to the general efforts performing different roles, including the accounting and the legal activities to support to asylum seekers. Furthermore a gynaecologist, who frequented the Church, offered her services completely free of charge. The support of the Church has been then crucial in different steps of the evolution: in order to start more formal activities, to find an adequate and totally free of charge place where to set the activities, to find volunteers although the cooperative was very young. The close collaboration with the church has given strong legitimacy to this very young actor, as well as a material support. Nevertheless the inability to differentiate the source of funding has proved being an insurmountable limit.

#### 6.2.4 Transversal Analysis

The two systems of reception characterizing the Italian service, namely the ordinary, SPRAR, and the Extraordinary one the CAS, strongly differ from the presence of different actors and from different market mechanisms.

In the case of the SPRAR the local authorities such as the municipalities, the provinces or the regions are the bodies in charge of the service. They can choose between doing it in-house and producing directly the services or externalise them. The SPRAR system includes a central service, which is managed by the ANCI, the UNICEF, the ministry of interior, and the TSOs. The idea behind what it has been conceived as the ordinary service is the integration of the SPRAR services into the local network, each project being thought as a network of multiple actors, based at local level, both public and private. The CAS, by contrast, directly refers to the prefecture. The organizations to obtain the service take part to a competitive tender. Each contract lasts one year and is very detailed in terms of tasks and types of workers.

The two systems are not comparable in this sense, as the SPRAR proposes a co-production system and the CAS is a service totally externalised to the management body. But the TSOs managing the two services are very often implicated in both services and, since they are under the same external pressures, engage similar strategies and respond to the same kinds of logics.

All the cases studied struggled with the external context, so much that two of them, BEUTY and DESTINY renounced to the management of the service of reception, and one, DESTINY, decided to close. As also mentioned in the part dedicated to the sector as a whole, important changes occurred in the last 10 years. This is due to different reasons, political instability, increase in number of arrivals and different rhetoric concerning migration and reception, which in the last years have become more securitarian. The CAS for instance experienced a very important growth in number in very few years. Then due to the new law and in particular the “*clausola di salvaguardia*”, which aimed at privileging the regular system of the SPRAR, the management bodies in charge of the CAS experienced several financial difficulties, particularly those engaging in good practices and caring for high quality of the service.

The business-like evolution and in particular the professionalization characterize all the organizations studied, although with some differences. BEUTY, which is the largest one and also the most corporatized, used to operate both at local and national levels through a mechanism of high division and specialization of labour. The organization has a department dedicated to the quality control and drafting of the projects, centralised and unique for all the local field offices. In a more modest way, DERMAN as well divided the tasks and created a dedicated team for the drafting of projects. This helps to capitalise the knowledge and to diversify the activities between EU, national, and local projects and activities. The professionalization is not only related to the projectification but also to the transformation from an informal to a stable and legally recognised organization, such as in the case of DESTINY. The organization from the beginning recognises that the specificity of the sector requires specific professionals – psychologist, and the cultural mediators. In general, all the

case studies respect the ratio workers/beneficiaries, using different strategies. BEUTY and DERMAN use to piece together different projects in order to pay professionals, with resources, which arrive from different sources, they also can count on volunteers. In particular, DERMAN, being into a circuit of partnership with the university, gives the opportunity to carry forward the compulsory internship. Very often, students and young graduates remain until when they are internalised, normally through a long-term contract. DESTINY can rely on the help of the nuns and on the volunteers, which attend the local church, as the gynaecologist for example. This is a huge advantage for a small and relatively new reality.

All the organizations conform to the marketization. BEUTY in particular implements also internally a system of management control, finalised to contain the costs and enhance the efficiency of the processes. Concerning the competition, for the CAS, until late 2016, there was not really a mechanism of selection due to the high number of arrivals. The price is fixed on the basis of an auction and is therefore the same for all management bodies, which could choice to perform the service or exit the market, which is the strategy used by two of the three cases. For instance, as witnessed by BEUTY, one of the last call, in the late 2018, saw a limited number of participants – due also to the new very restrictive rules imposed on the management bodies from the prefecture – and a decrease of the person/day price of the service.

Finally for all the cases, the imposition of the legal rules has been quite important and a coercive isomorphism, particularly in the application of certain practices, related to the control of the beneficiaries, has been observed. Concerning the rules implemented to increase the efficiency, we can observe a certain adherence in BEUTY. The application of a certification UNI EN ISO 9001:2008 to increase the efficiency of the procedure, the standardization of the practices related to the definition of the project and a department for the control of the quality are proofs of it.

All the organizations are exposed to contradictory logics. The militant logic, which in the cases, is characterised by the values of support and help to migrants, in the case of DESTINY is experienced as a messianic way, based on the idea that all the humans being in troubles deserve help. The social logic is combined with the militant logic in the case of the organization DERMAN, which based its activities on anti-racism and anti-fascism principles. Concerning the organizational form, all the organizations show a certain a progressive corporatisation, differently experienced. DESTINY created a recognised organization in order to get funds, BEUTY extremely divided the work in order to become more efficient. DERMAN, although changing from an association to a cooperative, want to maintain a militant logic and decided to undergo for a cooperative form in order to implement more democratic practices and enable members to participate to the decision making process. Concerning the technical rationality logic, all the organizations embraced it. However while for BEUTY this is developed through a managerial lens, with the creation of the project and quality control departments, for DESTINY it concerns more the quality of the support and is therefore more technical. Finally the performance indicators are implemented internally for BEUTY but there is no compromise concerning the prefectural control. They first implement decoupling strategies, while this was possible, but then they prefer to quit instead of implementing certain rules. So although BEUTY seems to be the most entrepreneurial, it also remains quite militant and social, particularly in the way to develop the daily activities. DERMAN does not experience for instance the

same tensions, as the funding system is not controlled so strictly and instead is configured more as a form of collaboration. Furthermore, the political position of the municipality is not far from the position of the organization, which makes easier the job of combining logics.

As also mentioned in the final table, concerning the strategies put in place, the organizations studied in our work, as already mentioned, created partnership and participated to various projects in order to cope with uncertainty. The problem of the interdependency is quite experienced. Without a good network it is quite hard to find place in good and well remunerative partnerships. In the Italian system of reception, it is very important to create a good and stable network, and in particular to take part to a number of different projects. The context, characterised by high instability, has a severe impact on the projects, which are not very often renewed as the political colour of the local or national entities changes frequently. The solution found by the TSOs is very often the diversification of the activities and participating to different calls at the same time. The total budget of the organization is very often the result of a *bricolage* of different projects and collaborations. The organizations know each others very well and often are committed in bringing forwards activities together, which, as shown from the DERMAN experience, could also be characterised by the militant spirit, then applying or obtaining funds. The organizations, which are not able to enter in a large network neither to differentiate their funding sources may turn up fairly isolated. This is the case of DESTINY, which could count on a recognized partner as the local church but, as it remained dependent to a single resource, couldn't get through.

In the case of DERMAN as member of the SPRAR system, which is meant to work as a network of actors of different nature, the organization works in strict contact with the local authority, which in this case is the municipality. Both actors declared that their kind of collaboration is characterised by co- management and co-production of the service. DERMAN is part of a number of projects, at European and international levels, and with international organizations. And finally, thanks to the militant origins of the members, the organization remained involved in the most militant circuits of the city, such as the group of organizations and civil society which coordinated the claim against the management bodies in Piazza Garibaldi at the beginning of 2010s. Being part of the SPRAR system, the organization detains an advantage compared to other organizations on the relationship with public authorities. Therefore, the partnership and collaboration with the other TSOs see DERMAN as a quite central actor. Although the organization is perceived as a competitor by DESTINY, in the CAS market, BEUTY also made a number of partnerships, as very active actor on the territory. Actually, thanks to the EU projects, such as REACT, the organization is able to create platform to make different small local actors work together. Although, among the cases studied, DESTINY remains the most isolated, but also the younger and the smaller one, the organization enjoys a strong support from the local church. However both the organizations DESTINY and BEUTY opted for the exit strategy at the end, both for ethical and economical reasons the former, and mostly for the second reason the latter.

Because of all these reasons above mentioned, as exposed in the table below, we define DERMAN and DESTINY as an alternative ideal-type, while we defined

BEUTY as a follower, for clearly embracing a number of characteristics shown by bigger organizations, which in other regions monopolise the market.

	DERMAN	BEUTY	DESTINY
Sector Migration	Social 2000s	Mix 2000s	Social 2015
Size	Medium	Medium/Large	Small
Workers' selection base	Engagement	Professionalism	Engagement and Professionalism
Strategies	- Militantism - Partnership - Projects	- Professionalism - Scaling up - Projects	- Projects - Exit
Ideal-type	Alternative	Follower	Alternative

Source: Author, 2020

## CH.6 What to Remember?

This chapter focused on the investigation of six case studies, three TSOs based in Marseille, France and three in Naples, Italy. The main aim of the chapter has been to analyse their organizational behaviour. All the cases have been analysed through the theoretical lens of first the institutional approach, by mobilizing the concept of isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), then of Institutional Logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), and finally through the lens of the resource dependence approach (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978).

Firstly we observed that the external conditions strongly impacted the internal definition of all six case studies, even if in different ways. The processes of marketization of the reception for asylum seekers imposed the use of the market instruments both in France and in Italy. In the French cases, we observed that the system of *Appel à projet* encourages the organizations to merge and increase in size, in order to gain from economies of scale, obtain legitimacy, and in turn enjoy of a preferential, although in the limits of the law, relationship with the public authorities. In the Italian cases based in Naples, the projectification and the use of a number of short-term funding, 1 to maximum 3 years, with the aim to offer an integrated service of inclusion, drives the organization to create partnerships, but also to constantly compete in order to remain on the market. A strong process of professionalization has been observed, not only as a reaction of these market instruments, because specific professionals are expressly required in order to participate to the tenders, but also as a requirement to respond to complex needs. However, while for some organizations, and for ALAN and DESTINY in particular, we observed that coercive pressures were the most important, for others the situation is more complex. For instance, in the case of BEUTY and SAJIDA, normative pressures, based on the high professionalization of the team that has accelerated the process of isomorphism, were also observed. While FOFANA, as leader of the market is subject of reference for the mimetic process, the followers, such as SAJIDA, reproduce the organizational behaviour of the legitimized organizations.

In terms of institutional logics all the organizations studied present a strong hybridization. On the one hand the co-existence of different logics is the results of the marketization and the resulting dichotomy among the social logic and the entrepreneurial logic. Furthermore, these logics are also complemented by the militant logic and the technical rationality one, which are peculiar to this sector. While the entrepreneurial logic is observed in most of the cases, as result of the imposed instruments, however the organizations expressing a strong militant logic such as DERMAN and ALAN also find some space of resistance, or they try to resist, or as for the case of DESTINY they perish. However some of the organizations also show a certain ability to manage the co-existence of different logics, this is the case of the FOFANA, which expresses at the central levels the dominance of the entrepreneurial logic, while at the local level this is watered by the social logic, or the case of DERMAN, which openly declares a good balance among them. At the opposite, others, such as the ALAN association, have lived with suffering the mounting of logics such as the entrepreneurial and the Technical Rationality ones, and this has given rise to heated internal debates.

Finally in terms of strategies the organizations strongly differs. ALAN and DERMAN, being recognised as militant organizations did not hesitate to engage political actions in order to reclaim the rights of migrants. Some of the organizations used the influence of the members of the boards, in order to acquire more space on the market or to establish a privileged relationship with the public authorities. As already mentioned, however, the different market



instruments used in Italy and in France have an impact on the strategies used to remain on the market. While in France the scaling up strategy to enjoy of the economies of scale, such as merges, is very common, in Naples we did not observe the same. However while in France, the small organizations use the intermediate corps such as the federation of social actors FNARS, in order to be represented collectively in front of public authorities, in Naples we do not observe this kind of collective resistance. At the opposite the use of short-term project from the authorities to award the service, drive a strong competition among the local actors.


# Chapter 7 The Discussion of the Findings

**CH7: The Discussion of the Findings**  
 The analysis across the levels

- Macro
- Meso
- Micro

General Discussion

- Marketization
- Corporatization
- Performance
- The Different Responses to the Institutional Pressures



## Introduction

This chapter aims to show both similarities and differences in the dynamics that characterize the organizations dealing with reception in the two countries, France and Italy, which represent a continuum in the migration management circuit. The market-oriented evolution of the migration reception sector, and the business like evolution of the TSOs involved in, instead of diversifying the reception, enhancing the quality and lowering the price, turns out to overturn the daily activities and in some cases the mission for which they were created. The structure used to be employed for reception and integration, while nowadays it is based on a strict regulation, which does not entirely take into consideration the social services as such, but instead it encourages the organizations towards an efficient use of the resources. The funding structure, with the exception of few cases, leaves TSOs little freedom of choice, and is instead aimed at transforming the contractors into executors of the required tasks. Finally, the organizations became part of the management migration's circuit, which is based on control, selection and expulsion. Through public market and competitive tenders, the policy makers are operating a progressive transformation of the service.

In the two previous chapters, we have, on the one hand, described these trends for organizations based in France and in Italy. Once the evolution of the sectors has been described, in terms of market governance and interaction among the organizations, and the process of marketization, we used the concept of isomorphic transformation to describe the business-like organizational transformation. Although the isomorphism process to which organizations are subjected are different, a number of characteristics can be observed, which make the organizations' reactions quite similar, in terms of the use of market instruments to raise funds, or the processes of corporatization and professionalization.

On the other hand, we also show that, under the same external pressures, organizations can implement very different strategies to cope with the context. However, some organizations are able to maintain a certain freedom of action and positioning, while respecting selected "rules of the game" at the same time. They adopt strategies, which enable them to maintain a close contact with informal movements, which are free to act differently and maintain a position different from the expected by public authorities and sometimes they are even in contraposition.

This chapter will show that the results of the qualitative analysis carried out in chapters 5 and 6, are totally coherent with the literature, and with what has been shown in the quantitative studies, where detailed descriptive statistics, as well as the econometric analysis, define a clear picture. We demonstrated quantitatively and qualitatively, the evolution towards the marketization of social services, and a clear business like evolution of the organizations, in particular the process of professionalization and corporatization.

In order to maintain some expositive coherence, the chapter is organized based on the structure of the analysis, already shown in the previous chapters, the macro, meso and micro level. Once briefly summarized the analysis multi-level analysis, we will approach a general discussion.

## PART 1

### 7.1.1 The Macro Level

In chapter 4 we analysed the data describing the evolution of the third sector in France and Italy, in the last decade. In order to understand the direction of change, we observed in depth four aspects: first, the dimension of the TS in the country, in terms of number of organizations and of people employed; second, the heterogeneity of TSOs in terms of legal forms, sector of activities and territorial distribution; third, the distribution of TSOs among Italian provinces; four, the business like evolution of TSOs, which is analysed by specifically looking at its professionalization and corporatization.

In both the countries we observed that the number of workers increased. While in Italy also the number of organizations follows the same trend, this does not happen in France, where a contraction in the number of TSO is registered between the 2011 and the 2014. This is in line with the results concerning the merging trend registered in France. In particular we show that the biggest organizations also detain largest budget. The economic resources are very concentrated in this segment of the TSOs, and this is a factor, which leads the smaller organizations to continue increasing in size. As shown by Laurent, Eynaud, Giraudel and Schmidt (2017) the merge are very often the solution for the associations, medium large size, which experience difficulties due to their dependence on public funds. Actually the financial stability, the commitment to meeting the demands of public authorities, and the diversification of the services among the main explanatory notes. Furthermore in France, we also observed that in France the association's budget is very concentrated also in terms of sector of activities, with the with a predominance of actors in the social medical sector. For Italy, though a regression analysis we have tried to explain following the literature why in some areas the TSOs are more presented than others. We have showed that the well functioning of institutions matters on the hand, to explain why social entrepreneurs, co-operators and members of associations decide to create a TSO. On the other hand some demographic variables also shows that the most deprived areas, are the places where the TSOs are needed, and this is why they are present, in order to offer their services, in some cases in partnerships with the State.

In terms of the economic resources both the countries shows a clear trend, which is marked by the increase of the private sources. While the grants and contribution from the public sector are inexorably decreasing, also due to the national and European legal framework, which impose limited grants below determined by law threshold, the resources from sales are increasing. We observe that in both the country the percentage of the private funds compared to the public one is higher. In Italy only the 35% of the total budget sourced from public bodies, the remaining 65% comes from sales, donation, and annual subscription among other private sources. In France while in 2011 the share of the private resources allocated to the TSOs counted a share of 51%, in 2017 registered a share of 55%, which means that this trend is increasing. But if we look back tot the data collected in 1999 the difference is even more remarkable, as for this period the percentage of the private resources represented the 46% of the total budget.

But also among the public resources a distinction is due. The TSOs can sell their services and goods to private users, or to public authorities. The system of contracting the TSOs in order to

produce a number of services is the source of funding most used in Italy in absolute terms (30% of the budget is allocated in this way), followed by the sell to the users (19%). Together they represent almost the 50% of the total budget of the TSOs. In France the sale of goods and service represents nowadays the 66% of the total budget, and this share is constantly increased in the last 12 years, as in the 2005 represented only the 49% of the total economic resources. The sectors where this trend registered higher number are the humanitarian, social and health sector, with a share of more than 80% of the resources obtained through sales of services, and education. These are also the activities, which traditionally have been considered as provided within the “welfare partnership” (Salamon, 2003).

We also observe a trend of professionalization, which in the case of Italy have been study in depth, analysing different areas (north east, north west, centre, islands and south) and the different sectors of activities. The professionalization in this study is measured through the observation of the increasing number of paid workers employed. We observed that while in some sectors, such as the cultural one the number of volunteers remains quite high, in others such as the education and health sectors, have recently undergone a process of specialization and professionalization. Analysing this phenomenon again we observed a strong influences of institutions and in particular legal framework, which if in certain sectors (health and education) drives the increase of number of professionals, in other (culture, with the law Law 4/1993 (Ronchey Law and the article 112 of the 2004 *Codice dei Beni culturali e del paesaggio* (Code of Cultural Heritage and Landscape) - encourage the presence of volunteers.

## 7.1.2 The Meso Level

### 7.1.2.1 The Elements of the Field: Regulations, Actors, and Financial Instruments

As demonstrated in this work the “migration management” is characterised by a multi-level governance. At the European level, there are a number of directives and regulations, including the Dublin Regulation, which essentially defines which Member State is responsible for processing the asylum application for newcomers. The hotspot system allows a strict application of the regulation, making the registration of asylum seekers more widespread at EU borders. However, Member States shall retain the right to determine admission volumes for people coming from third countries to seek work, as well as the definition of the system of reception and integration. The EU grants incentives and support to measures taken by Member States to promote the integration of legally resident third-country nationals. However, the harmonization of national laws is not foreseen by the EU regulation, neither in terms of qualitative standards nor in terms of governance structure (actors involved and their responsibilities).

Nowadays in Italy and France, as in most EU Member States, the Ministry of Interior manages the reception system at national level. In Italy, it is the Central Directorate of Civil Services for Immigration and Asylum (*Direzione centrale dei servizi civili per l’immigrazione e l’asilo*), which is part of the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration (*Dipartimento per le libertà civili e l’immigrazione*) of the Ministry of Interior and in France the OFII (*Office Français pour l’immigration et l’intégration*) that deal with the planning and activation of the reception facilities. At the local level, the prefectures are responsible for entrusting TSOs or private profit-making organizations to carry out the service. In both countries, a double system has been implemented since the early 2000s, due to the number and the “rhetoric of the emergency”. While the ordinary model of reception is quite different, the emergency model is very similar in the two countries. In reality, the ordinary system is the result of the evolution, of the involvement of TSOs in a social service, and therefore still preserves specific characteristics and peculiarities of the country in which it is based. Consequently, the level of decentralization in the ordinary system is very different. While in Italy the system is notably decentralised (SPRAR system) with an elevated number of actors involved, the French one is deeply centralized.

In Italy, the two systems, the SPRAR and the extraordinary centres – CAS – also have significantly different market governance. The SPRAR system was born as the institutionalization of the decentralized and networked reception experience, developed by NGOs and associations in the late ‘90s. Thus, the first public system for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees was established, and with the involvement of central and local institutions it spread throughout Italy, on the basis of a shared responsibility between the Ministry of Interior and local authorities. In the system of assistance called SPRAR; the local authorities, in collaboration with the TS, guarantee interventions through an integrated assistance approach, such as the distribution of food and lodging, but also providing complementary information measures, accompaniment, assistance and guidance through the construction of individual pathways for socio-economic integration. This mechanism of co-production is based on mechanisms of selection, such as open tenders, but very often the local authority adheres to the system with the support of local TSOs, which is therefore

involved not only in the implementation but also in the definition of the sector. Management is based on the network, which is defined by public authorities, private actors, and a large number of local and well rooted TSOs, which together create specific programs for asylum seekers and refugees. The fundamental characteristics of the system are thus the differentiation of projects based on the needs of the specific person and the services that the territory can offer. This is because, in reality, the aim is to avoid duplication and introduce the asylum seekers to those services which are already active for local citizens. Unfortunately, even though in the last years and before the Salvini decree, the SPRAR system has constantly enlarged its network, it continues to cover only a residual part of the demand, which does not exceed 20% of the needs.

Over the years, there has been a transfer of responsibilities in France. In fact, until President Sarkozy and the Fillon government, the Ministry of social Affairs managed the reception system for asylum seekers, refugees, and other migrants. Then, in 2007 the Ministry for Immigration (*Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire*), was created with a shift of responsibilities concerning immigration, development, integration and national identity. In 2010 it was abolished and, in 2013, the competences were transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Foreigners General National Direction (*Direction générale des étrangers en France*). As shown in the chapter dedicated to the French evolution of the sector, a number of agencies have been created, namely the OFPRA and the OFII, both under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The implementation of services appears to depend, to a large extent, on third sector organizations. These organizations first began to treat this audience with the tools they had, hence in generalist centres, and then, once the sector was institutionalised, with structures created *ad hoc*.

As shown in the French case, each *appel à projet* is increasingly detailed, leaving very little room for *manoeuvre* for the organizations responsible for managing the centres. Social workers are less and less free to accompany and support people in an integration process, as their work is more related to fill in forms, bureaucratic tasks and control of the presence or absence of beneficiaries.

Moreover, the emergency model has rapidly grown over the past few years, and it is quite similar in both countries in terms of market instruments to implant the centres, and also in the type of services offered. Furthermore, behind the definition of “emergency” - terms often used to classify reception facilities such as emergency structures, special structures, temporary structures, etc. - is hidden the idea of finding a quick solution. Indeed these kinds of centres have short contracts that go from one to three years, and services are mainly administrative support, rather than fostering integration, by contract. Over these last years, in France, we have observed a multiplication of structures aimed at receiving asylum seekers and migrants, beyond the classical structure of CADA. All different types of accommodations are funded and coordinated by the Ministry of Interior, including emergency accommodations.

These kinds of centres, which are not sufficiently controlled, as demonstrated by the Italian case during the ENA period, are becoming more adapted to locking up and detaining than supporting newcomers. Very often, the quality of service is left to the will of the organizations, which for proper motivation, good faith, or internal mechanisms of control based on adherence to the highest standards for services, decide to implement a good service. The remaining control is based on the performance of the organizations without taking into account the beneficiaries’ voice, however for a few exceptions, it remains an instrument to calculate the performance of the organizations. In addition, as in the case of CADA in

France, the performance often includes indicators of the *fluidité*, namely the circulation of people, which is in line with the declared mechanism of “*control, differentiate, select*” (as mentioned by Prodi President of the European Commission, back in 2000) and finally expulsion.

Nowadays the first act of the migration process, landings, is already a fully-fledged part of the system of migration control devices and, as such, they are also subject to logic of security. In France, with the new financing law for 2018 (see document CIMADE), there will be less and less reception (in the sense of integration process) and increasingly more housing and rejection. Difficulties in accessing medical treatments (despite being guaranteed), and school (although it is mandatory) are just a couple of examples. The transfer of substantial funds from CADA to Prahda (a new centre of reception supposed to offer a poor quality service at a very low price) and other emergency structures is the objective of this change. These centres by contract, are asked to provide for less services.

In terms of the activity’s planning, the two countries strongly differ. It can be seen that in France a strong attention is paid to the efficiency and the effectiveness of the system. The OFII publishes an annual report on the expenses relative to the previous year, the budget for the following one, and a follow-up on the number concerning the reception, both ordinary and extraordinary. Furthermore, with regard to the strategy, a remarkably long study had already been carried out in 2013, in order to quantify costs, reduce expenses and identify quantitative indicator, subsequently implemented to make the activities of the TSOs more effective and under control. The report strongly supported the establishment of quantitative performance indicators, such as the number of structures in place; the number of days; the number and percentage of people hosted; the percentage of filling; of asylum seekers, and of the “undue people” (the centre is intended to host only asylum seekers, refugees and dismissed applicants are considered to be undue). The report also set objectives for the following period. Once the needs have been estimated, a rough approximation of the resources that would be allocated is given.

In Italy, the system is more chaotic. Information is very dispersed and the prefectures are in charge of a matter of transparency in order to update data. In the absence of a central body comparable to the OFII, everything remains quite fragmented. Finally, it should also be mentioned that in the last year, the main concern of public authorities involved the misuse of public money, embezzlement, and scandals concerning false cooperatives, such as in the *Mafia Capitale* and in the ENA cases. Although provided by law (328/2000), a planning activity has never been realised in Italy so far. In fact, the law 328/2000, proposed by the Social Affairs Ministry Livia Turco, was supposed to mark the transition from a public sector’s traditional function of service providers to a function of programming, coordinating, integrating, and evaluating (Piga, 2012). However, as indicated in the previous chapter, leaving the reception system without coordination structures in the vicinity, clear planning activities never happened.

Finally, in an attempt to make some order into the emergency reception system, a Parliamentary Committee of enquiry on the System of Reception was set up to report on the actual situation, in terms of number and performance of the system. In its first pages, the document analyses the situation of the reception system, in terms of number of people and the most used contracts and resources. Moreover, in the paragraph on resources, a long part focuses on how to deal with cases of mismanagement of expenditures and illegality. Finally, the excessive use of direct allocation (instead of market instruments) to facilitate the selection of actors is analysed.



**Table 7.1 The Regulation of the field FR - IT**

	France	Italy
European Framework	Dublin Regulation: the “Dubliners” will be sent back to the first country of registration, very often Italy.	
Centralization of the system	Very highly centralised system, mixed to agencies under control of the Interior Ministry	Centralised system concerning the emergency system, which is managed by the representative at the local level of the Interior Ministry, the prefecture
Activity of Planning and evaluation in the sector of reception for asylum seekers	Each year the OFII ( <i>Office français Immigration et integration</i> - French Immigration and integration office) delivers an annual report.	An Activity of Planning has never been implemented, even if provided by law (328/2000)
Strategic Analysis Documents	<p>Analysis of the situation + Strategic vision for the following years → The report on “<i>L’hébergement et la prise en charge financière des demandeurs d’asile</i>”. (IGF, IGS, IGA, 2013).</p> <p>It is a Strategic document on performance and planning, suggesting methods to cut the costs and increase the efficiency of the management bodies.</p>	<p>“Parliamentary Committee of enquiry on the System of Reception, identification and expulsion for migrants. Conditions of detentions and public resources involved”</p> <p>It is analysed the over- use of the direct allocation (instead of market instruments) to facilitate selected actors and the mismanagement of expenditures and illegality.</p>

Source: Author, 2019

### 7.1.2.2 The Evolution of the Organizational Field

Concerning the ordinary reception, the two countries have very different market governance systems in place, which also involves different inter-organizational configurations.

In France, the instrument used to select the management body is the *Appel à projet*. This instrument has been subjected to a dramatic transformation. As shown in the dedicated chapter (chapter 6), the tenders have changed becoming very detailed, including a very specific list of tasks that the public authorities require to be carried out (the “*cahier des charges*”). The *appel à projet* leaves very little freedom of choice to TSOs, in order to implement a different project and maintain an independent point of view.

The homogenization of the service in terms of costs, practices and activities is highly recommended and mentioned as one of the main objectives of tendering.

Market governance is in fact based on a centralised control by the Ministry of Interior and on a very strong competition at local level, which in turn has determined a concentration of the market in favour of four big national associations.

As a consequence, the market structure and the types of interactions at local level have deeply changed. The only instrument that small and local organizations will always recognise to have counter authority is the presence of intermediary bodies, namely the FNARS. The FNARS collectively represents the actors in charge of social policies (most of them TSOs, the majority are associations). The idea is to have a single spokesperson representing most parts of the associations to the government. This federation has played a particularly important role in the past in bringing the voice of small and local associations to the central government. On the one hand, it represents the spirit of “collectivism” of French associations based on a coordinated approach. On the other hand, the countervailing power of associations has been relevant for a long time, in representing the minority and oppressed. This body, despite the internal difficulties encountered, continues to maintain a central role for small local associations, in order to represent them and to make their voices heard by central institutions. However, with the concentration of the market, its power is diminishing. Conversely, big associations do not need an intermediary to communicate with the central authority and, thanks to their geographical position and their institutional headquarters in Paris, they have more opportunities to connect.

An example of how FNARS operates has been when public authorities opened the “Marché Public” (Public tender) for the PRAHDA. The associations under the guide of FNARS have decided to boycott the tender for two main reasons. Firstly, because the new market instrument (*marché public*) is very strict compared to the previous one (*appel à projet*); and secondly because the price was too low for an adequately high quality of service for the beneficiaries. Finally, ADOMA won the call, which is a mixed organization. This episode well describes the “collective attitude” of TSOs in France. On the contrary, in Italy single associations have decided, individually and without any coordination among them, after the Sicurezza Decree (Salvini), not to take part in the new tender. This is due to the absence of a real coordinating actor, although the SPRAR Central Office can sometimes be considered as a replacement body.

In Italy, the ordinary reception, although covering only 20% of the demand, is represented by the SPRAR system. The public funds, provided by the Ministry of Interior, are managed in cooperation with the municipality and the TSO, which are both responsible for the project.

Conversely, concerning emergency structures such as CAS, Prahda and CAO, they show some similarities. The economic pressure due to the relative short-term contracts, the re-reading of the balance-sheet figures and the tariff change even during the contract, does not leave much room for manoeuvre. The competition is based on several aspects. A competition among organizations (associations or cooperatives) to win the public procurement contract, maintains the services already established and survive; but there is also a competition between different reception structures. At the same time, the competition mechanism makes it difficult to collaborate and it creates networks of resistance against the new migration policies. The creation of big structures, such as CARA in Italy or Prahda in France, generates perverse results. We can observe fewer but bigger actors to deal with, which are often preferred by public authorities. Through tenders and public markets, prices continue to fall and so do service offerings in the structures. Quality control becomes more difficult because they cannot be closed. On the other hand, organisations are pushed to assimilate certain behaviours (working on efficiency, effectiveness and economy) to survive. The market orientation of the migration sector has also changed the internal mechanism and dynamics. As mentioned in this work, some actors try to resist but with extreme difficulty, and day-by-day their mission of reception is always more related to control and selection. The opening up of the market has enabled a greater control over structures and their goals as well as the

possibility of implementing a new migration policy paradigm very quickly. Moreover, through the establishment of market mechanisms, it becomes possible to change the reception policy into a policy of control and rejection in a few years.

The main difference between the two countries is the rate of the application of market instruments. While in France the percentage of public tenders implementation is 100%, in Italy the percentage of direct procurement is lower but still high. This is because it varies from region to region, as demonstrated by the “Parliamentary Committee of enquiry on the System of Reception, identification and expulsion for migrants. Conditions of detentions and public resources involved”. In Calabria, 50% of contracts are directly awarded; in Molise it is the 44% while in Sardinia it is 36%. At national level, the percentage of directly awarded contracts is 15,28%. In Italy, since the 2000s, practitioners and public opinion observed a twofold dynamic. On the one hand, an excessive outsourcing of social policy has been observed, finally denounced in the Welfare Manifesto (2016). On the other hand, as also argued by Pavolini, TSOs that receive public funding are not subject to adequate controls on their activities, and furthermore remain largely excluded from public decision-making processes (Pavolini 2003).

Another difference between France and Italy is the application of performance-based monitoring. In France, the Prefect is in charge of examining the annual accounts of the local associations responsible for the reception service. Each year, the Director of the centre meets with the prefect to explain the expenses and the divergence from the rules. One example is the *Taux d'indu*, namely the rate of undue people. The centres are only supposed to host asylum seekers. Refugees and dismissed plaintiffs are calculated as undue people and the State requests reimbursement of the money spent for their stay. Furthermore, the budget for the following year may be reduced as punishment. The occupancy rate is also discussed and if it is too low, a penalty could be applied. In Italy, the annual accounts are reviewed in order to refund the associations. Any control is done on the accuracy of the declaration. In the past few years, few controls have been carried out in order to prevent abuse and mistreatment of immigrants. Even if the associations have been found guilty of mistreatment against beneficiaries, they have not been removed, neither excluded from the subsequent tenders (Several cases in Naples). In fact, during the last years the sector has experienced a number of cases of misappropriation of public funds, corruption for procurements and collusion.

The strategies, which are applied, in order to interact with the public authorities, go to the compliance until the contraposition. As a matter of fact, if we define legitimacy as a resource, we will observe that organizations gain legitimacy differently. If some of them passively adhere to rules, or internalize them, particularly in terms of process efficiency and cost containment, others entirely refuse this logic. They do not accept this role as they feel that their mission is to deliver services and to care more about the quality than the price. To do so, they need to demonstrate that they are essential or able to provide the best services, or have the capacity to differentiate themselves.

Concerning the interactions among them, collaboration is nowadays more limited than in the past. In France, where TSOs used to work together to exchange information and resources, they do it much lesser than before. Firstly, because competition is proved to be more difficult, second because it is not the *modus operandi* of the big associations, and as they entered in the local market, such as in Marseille, they changed the relations among organizations. Finally it would be difficult in terms of accounting, to record and report this kind of collaboration.

The emergency of new actors such as the “*collectifs*” and social movements, has been quite similar in both countries. Social movements do not generally recognise the differentiation of public authorities among migrants (regular, irregular, and asylum seekers). Furthermore, they also play a role in controlling the action of public authorities. However, a major difference lies in the fact that while in France, certain centres, such as the centre of the administrative detention, are in charge of this control since their creation, in Italy, the social movements completely act in substitution to the public authorities control. Over the past twenty years, the CIMADE Association has been the only one authorised to enter administrative detention centres, managed by the French police, with the aim to provide legal and social assistance to detainees. This represented the only guarantee of transparency on the detention conditions. Then, the decree 22/08/2008 opened the market, in order to break the CIMADE monopoly. This decision was strongly criticised by the other associations and FNARS, which defined the “opening to competition” in order to maintain “neutrality”, a threat which in turn will lead to securing acquiescence in detention.

The new associations were also asked not to publish their annual report concerning this activity in order to preserve “confidentiality”. (See also Palidda 2016).

In Italy, there is no official externalised service of control of the centres. However, in the last two or three years, social movements and activists have exercised a so-called “Popular control”. Particularly important are the actions in Naples and Milan. In fact in Naples, the legal complaint led to police investigations on a number of centres (ndr. Mafia infiltration was found in a number of cases).

This episode well highlights the self-conception of the French “associationism”. This is because associations recognize themselves not as instruments of public services externalization, but as an actor who offsets and controls the public operate.

**Table 7.2 The Organization of reception services FR - IT**

	France	Italy
Application of market instruments	100% of application of market instruments (different types of tenders, but always based on a public call for competition).	In Southern Italy the public tender is not used very often to entrust the service of reception for asylum seekers (namely CAS – special Immigration reception facilities)
Intermediary corps	The FNARS is an intermediary body for the SSE organizations dealing with social issues. A specific department focus on migration.	No intermediary corps for social workers orgs, but more individualistic confrontation
	FNARS coordinate collective actions	TSOs act individually.
Information and control on the CRA (FR) ex-CIE (IT) [ndr. Immigration administrative detention centres]	The CIMADE association during the last 20 years has been the only association authorised to enter into the administrative detention centres, managed by the French police, with the aim to provide legal and social assistance to detainees	Officially does not exist this service. But in the last two – three years, a so-called “Popular control” has been carried out by social movements and activists

Control on performance and correction of alternative behaviour	The control is based on performance. The Prefect is in charge of scrutinising the annual accounts of the local associations in charge of the reception service.	No control. The prefect is in charge of scrutinising both the work and the annual accounts.
--	---	--

Source: Author 2019

### 7.1.3 The Micro Level

The case studies considered were subjected to different types of pressures, which had an impact at different levels on the structure and on the identity of organizations in the sector. First of all, the massive introduction of market-based tools has characterised the configuration of the field over the past 20 years. As already mentioned in the literature, competitive environment, the need for accountability in order to obtain funds and the imposition of market instruments could be at the origin of the TSOs business like evolution (Maier et al., 2016). Different authors claim that in recent years there has been a push for TSOs to become “more business-like” (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004, 2004; Maier & Meyer, 2011), which in turn encourage organizations to emphasize means beyond the limits, based on a managerial way of thinking (Gulrajani, 2010, 2011) (Clay 2012). This trend characterizes all the organizations on the field, even if in different ways.

In order to respond to tenders, public markets or *appels à projet*, the organizations are invited to comply with a number of requirements sometimes expressed directly, sometimes not. The marketization of the sector has had several consequences on the organizations. The text of the tenders requires teams with specific skills in order to obtain the contract – such as graduates social workers, but also personalities able to manage complex structures, managers, and lawyers, to follow the asylum seekers’ procedures. Furthermore, the complex raising of funds, particularly in Italy, required specific figures to deal with the draft of projects, and respond to tenders. In some cases, such as in Italy, the number of hours of service is mentioned, while in France it’s the percentage of workers’ categories that is mentioned. In both cases, this leads to a formalization of the organizations through legal recognition. Particularly, the small and local ones passed from a strong presence of volunteers to an almost exclusive presence of professionals. Despite these similarities, some differences are observed. In France, the professionalization is characterised by a strong specialization. In big organizations this specialization leads to a rigid division of tasks, for example between lawyers and social workers, or directors. On the contrary, this is less the case in small firms, even if most of the workers are graduates and trained to further improve their knowledge in specific fields.

The division of labour in the big associations is also associated with corporatization. With regard to corporatization, most organizations have undergone a major internal reorganization, which has resulted in a fairly rigid and sometimes very vertical structure. The organizations increasing in size tend to reorganize internally in order to rationalize the cost and benefit from economies of scale, such as in the case of FOFANA association. Therefore, in the case of the big associations, some tasks are centralised and developed by specific departments. For example, the accounting department, or the quality control department are centralised, and the local branches can rely on experts, who are responsible for controlling the budget at central level and keeping the exact number. This also applies to the Italian case, BEUTY non-profit. In fact, the national organization has a quality control department in Perugia, which is in charge of controlling for all the local branches. However, in Italy, the instability of

subsidies also requires the presence of profiles capable of writing complex projects such as the European projects, or of bringing the organization into contact with a strong and stable network able to attract funds. Furthermore, in the case of national organizations, they have an institutional headquarters, which could be located close to the central public authority power (Paris, Rome).

Moreover, the introduction of performance indicators is quite different in both cases. While in France they are imposed in order to increase the *fluidité* of people - such as the rate of undue people - whilst reducing costs; in Italy the main objective is to control beneficiaries, namely asylum seekers. Thus, contracts do not define clear indicators but rather a number of rules to be applied to the beneficiaries, such as the time of exit and entry into the structure. However, the accounting is very detailed, such as the list of the dresses or brushes, or how many euros could be charged in the phone card. Nevertheless, we observe that in the Italian cases study, organizations implemented internal rules and internal indicators of performance. Internal rules are applied to facilitate compliance with imposed rules (such as the Register of Signatures for Medicinal Products or the Register of Signatures for Entry and). Performance indicators are implemented to reduce costs and increase efficiency (for example, transparency rules included the presentation of multiple budgets to place an order, or to subcontract a service to a third party organization).

Performance indicators reduce the percentage of beneficiaries to be respected, which can be difficult in this kind of service to be accepted. In some cases, for instance for militant organizations, this creates strong tensions within organizations. But this is not always the case. In fact, the role of the authority is very often recognised, so the indicators are not questioned, but accepted as tasks, between others, to be carried out.

Although a clear process of isomorphism is observed, different strategies are implemented by organizations that can react to the business-like evolution of the organization. Some organizations, such as the DERMAN social enterprise in Italy and the ALAN association in France, have decided to remain strongly militant. This decision strengthens their legitimacy vis-à-vis part of the sector. In the French case, the organization only collaborates with selected partners, such as CIMADE, with whom they share a militant position, and a political claim. Specializing in a specific subcategory of the sector by creating a market niche is another tried and tested solution in order to find a space of freedom from institutional pressures. Keeping in contact with the local stakeholders also enables TSOs to maintain a certain level of autonomy towards public authorities. This is also true for the Italian case studies. In order to take part in the projects, the other actors' support is essential. Moreover, creating a good partnership is fundamental and organizations are looking for stable partners who can secure the economic resources for the entire partnership.

**Table 7.3 The micro level transformation**

	Italy	France
Professionalization	Specialization and division of work.	Specialization and division of the work
	Creation of specific figures or in case of the big association departments, for the collection of funds, and drafting of projects. This kind of figure is also in charge of managing the	Specialization due to specificity of the sector, in particular legal experts

	network in order to create partnerships.	
Corporatization	Division in departments	Division in departments
Introduction of Performance Indicators	Italian case studies organizations implemented internal rules and internal indicators of performance.	Imposed by law
Strategies for surviving	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Professionalization</li> <li>- Activism</li> <li>- Local stakeholders network</li> <li>- Projects</li> <li>- Corporatization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Professionalization</li> <li>- Specialization</li> <li>- Activism</li> <li>- Local stakeholders network</li> <li>- Increase in size</li> <li>- Corporatization</li> </ul>

Source: the Author, 2020

## PART 2

### 7.2. General Discussion

The analysis of the organizations, which manage the asylum seekers reception, is consistent with the main objective of this work, namely the analysis of the TSOs' answer to the institutional pressures, in a changing welfare mix.

The phenomenon has been observed from a macro, a meso and a micro level, in order to broaden and deepen the analysis. The multi-level analysis permitted to highlight the similitudes and the differences of the TSOs engaged in this process of transformation. Departing from a macro level, a broad picture of the TS evolution in the two countries, Italy and France, has been realised. In both countries the TS is growing, in particular in terms of number of employees. Despite the external constraints, the third sector registers a positive increase rate, which is, in the case of France, even higher than for the private for-profit and the public sectors. The analysis also registered an evolution, in line with what the literature describes as the business-like evolution (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Maier & Meyer, 2011; Weisbrod, 1998). Thanks to the meso and the micro levels, we focused on the process of this transformation in a specific sector, the reception services, in order to put into context the analysis, and conduct a processual analysis of the organizational change.

We observed at different levels a marketization process, namely the use of markets and market mechanisms to deliver services and regulate the relationships among actors, but also a corporatization process, i.e. the application of corporate management practices, accompanied by a strong professionalization, as characterising the evolution of the TS in the last decades. The analysis confirms the literature which argues that contracts and quasi-market systems may have pervasive impacts on organizational behaviours (D. Lewis, 2003). However this research also highlights the differences among organizations, in the way of embarking upon this transformation, in contrast with the idea that the organizations renounce to innovative forms of action (Bevan, 2006; Kendall & Knapp, 1996; J. Lewis, 2005). Through a close observation of the organizations, we have noticed that the process of business-like evolution could strongly differ across organizations. Despite an evident adherence to a similar trend, and respecting the "rules of the game" characterizing the organizational field (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), the organizations however maintain a certain freedom of implementing specific strategies and of combining alternative logics of action. In this part of the work, we will first explain the isomorphic process of becoming business-like observed at the different levels of analysis. Then we will focus on the differences characterizing the observed cases.

#### 7.2.1 Marketization

Marketization can be first observed from a macro level perspective. Data confirm an increase of the use of market instruments to entrust the services to the TSOs. Both in France and in Italy the process of marketization, which is defined as the increased use of market instruments and as the spreading of market type relationship with stakeholders (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004) is observed. As we repeatedly show in this work the percentage of private funding is increasing against the percentage public ones. Furthermore a high percentage of the public funds are nowadays allocated through competitive tenders and contracts. This confirms what is sustained by Gilbert (Gilbert, 2002) that market instruments is one of the most significant ways in which welfare states have been transformed. Furthermore as



observed by Tchernonog and Prouteau (Tchernonog & Prouteau, 2019) in France is registered a clear trend of increase of private funding (55% in 2017) and a decreased of public grant (20% in 2017). So even if the public procurement is the most used instruments to allocate public funds, however this funds remain very narrow compared to the past. This shows that the role of the TSOs in relation to the public sector is changing.

At the meso level, the public tenders transformed the state-society relations (Blank, 2000; Greener, 2008). As we observed for our cases, the organizational field has been changing over time, from a collaborative relation to a more competitive one. The case studies show that the collaborative mechanisms, such as exchanges of information, human resources and spaces sharing, left the room to competition. Furthermore, the big organizations, which gained spaces on the market, used different strategies to reduce the costs. Internally they can implement economies of scale, centralise services such as the quality control and the accountability services or “mutualise” services. Actually, the TSOs very often manage different services at the same time, so they can mutualise costs, resources and space. What was done in network with other organizations in the past, it is nowadays very often done internally. Furthermore, in line with the literature (Meagher & Szebehely, 2010) we observed a tendency to oligopolistic structure in case of marketization. In the reception service in France, where more data are available for the entire sector, we observed a strong concentration of the market, with four or five associations dominating the market (the so called “four big”).

The relationship with the public authorities changes as well. Following Gilbert (2002), the public authorities have to implement a number of actions in order to enforce the contracts. The relationship between buyer and sellers on the market is based on transparency, provision of information, and control on the top of the activities carried out by the providers. We observed in our cases that, particularly for those services where the beneficiaries have not the chance to express their opinions concerning the quality, or where they have not the option to change providers, such as in the case of reception for asylum seekers, the authority control is the only mechanism to determine the quality of the service. Furthermore we also observed that the centralization of the service, which is managed by the Interior ministry, does not allow any judgement based on reputation. Reputation is a mechanism, which works when the decision maker is close to the service providers and the local dynamics could be grasped. For this reason in the NPM rhetoric, the decentralization of strategic and budgetary responsibility, is intensely supported (Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashburner, & Fitzgerald, 1996).

In the French case for instance, although the prefects are based locally, the central authorities are making an effort to interact with and control the management bodies, but it is not easy to grasp the local dynamics. Thanks to the “*dialogue de gestion*”, the control on expenses and use of the budget is quite comprehensive. In the Italian case, the mechanisms of control are not implemented, as highlighted by the anti-corruption agency, which several times in these last years, investigated on the management bodies in the sector, for serious cases of mismanagement. The Italian anti-corruption agency also highlights that the competitive public tenders are not very often implemented in certain regions. This creates room for arbitrary choice, while the mechanisms of control is not well developed.

Following the neo-classical economics rhetoric, the market instruments are supposed to generate both an increase in the quality and a reduction of the price (Cleveland, 2008). However in the quasi-market the public authorities fix the price. Once the price made up of auction has been fixed, the actors more or less offer the same prices, and the price fluctuation is not very large. Furthermore, in the Italian case, due to the very high number of new

asylum seekers arrived in the last years, and the few centres already present on the national territory, the price had not been discriminant, the demand being too high and the competition dynamics did not work properly.

The buyer – seller relationship also does not allow a real participation neither to the decision making process at the strategic level, nor on the way of providing the services. The contracts we have analysed show that they become always more detailed, specifying the kinds of services which are subsidized and required to the selected organizations in charge of the service. In some cases, even the percentage of the budget required to be dedicated to one activity or another or to buy goods to satisfy basic needs (toothbrushes, recharge card for the phone) is mentioned.

Concerning the strategic decisions, we observed that one of the main differences in the ordinary reception between the Italian and French cases is the role played by the public authorities. First of all, in the network system implemented in Italy, the organizations and the municipality co-create the service. The TSO defines and implements a project, which is specific and takes into consideration the local characteristics. In the French cases, the push towards the “homogenization” of the service of reception is very keenly felt and suffered, to such an extent that some organizations talk about “repression of associationism freedom”.

The marketization also encourages the entry of for-profit providers into the sector previously dominated by TSOs (Brennan, Cass, Himmelweit, & Szebehely, 2012; Land & Himmelweit, 2010). As a result of generous funding and light regulation, Meagher and Szebehely (2010) observed in Sweden that the care market became very interesting for private actors. We observed a similar trend in the Italian cases, particularly during the period “North Africa emergency” when new actors entered into the sector. The private sector, particularly the hotel sector took that moment to jump into the sector. Cleveland (2008) sustains that for some commodities such as care, but we can easily include the reception for asylum seekers, it is very hard to implement a service of good quality without any experience of the sector. The competencies required are very specific and the commitment could not be improvised. Actually, this has proven to be true even in the case of new TSOs, which entered the sector with good will, but without experience or expertise. They found very hard to manage the service (see the Italian case DESTINY social cooperative). So in the case of organizations aimed at generating profit that see an opportunity to enter a sector dominated until then by TSOs, they may be unwilling to offer the services for a subsidy that is too low to cover a good quality. But as the price is fixed, they can only increase their margin of profit by reducing the quality.

At the micro level, we observe that the marketization has a deep impact on the fabric of the TSOs. Marival et al. speak about “*dispositifs*” (devices) of management and control, among them the market mechanisms of funding system, based on the dynamics of competition through public tender. They highlight the risk of “standardizing” practices and institutional isomorphism, for associations, in a competitive environment. Furthermore, facing the requirements of efficiency and effectiveness, on the model of classical capitalistic enterprises, associations adopt practices of this model, losing specificities (Marival, Petrella, & Richez-Battesti, 2015). This trend is very observed on our cases and in particular through a normative process of isomorphism. The contracts lay down specific provisions with regard to the quantitative indicators to be introduced. In some cases, these indicators are complemented with internal indicators, which sustain the organization in the effort of complying with the requirements of public authorities.

Taking part to a competitive process of public tendering is a very technical task. It requires a specific knowledge not only of the service and the sector, but also of the way to draft the offer, to calculate correctly a plausible budget. In the case of calls for projects, also a very specific vocabulary is required in order to make a good proposal and gain the call. Moreover, a large activity of reporting on materials, human resources and any other kind of cost encountered to realise the service, is required to the TSOs in order to receive the funds. These are new tasks, which require new kinds of skills compared to receiving a direct subsidy. Furthermore, in the system of direct subsidy or co-production of the service, the payment is not based on “results” as in the case of contracts based on performance- remuneration (Jany-Catrice, 2012). The performance-based remuneration, as explained by Jany-Catrice, implies a measurement of the outputs, a quantification of the management body efforts. The quantification of services is calculated through quantitative indicators. For this reason, the acceptance of this kind of instruments is quite controversial among TSOs. The organization’s members could accept this as a new task to take on in order to respect the contract. The creation of new positions such as project developer, professional accountant, and quality control officer therefore become a natural evolution. At the opposite, some organizations consider it as an imposition by the public authorities, which clearly goes beyond the role the organization would be supposed to play, namely to perform a social service of reception et integration for asylum seekers. Under a militant logic, the imposition of this particular evaluation regime is experienced as a form of, what Jany-Catrice defines as “performativity” (Jany-Catrice, 2012): the indicators change the reality they have to measure. As a result, the organization works essentially in order to respect the quantitative indicators, limiting the activity to what would be object of evaluation or source of funding.

### 7.2.2 Corporatization

Corporatisation focuses on changes in the TSO’s governance structure. It refers to the remodelling of a single organization’s governance in line with the corporate model (Alexander & Weiner, 1998), or to the integration of several organizations under a holding corporation (Horwitz, 1987). The process of integration, merge and acquisition, brings to a twofold result. On the one hand, it leads to an increase in size of the organizations and in the number of employees. On the other hand, the total number of organizations decreases (Scourfield, 2007). Horwitz noticed that non-profit hospitals to remain competitive either increase revenue by expanding their market base and their services or reduce costs by cutting the number of employees. But a drastic reduction of number of employees would affect the quality of service, so very often the latter solution is preferred (Horwitz, 1987). Furthermore, it is observed a division in department and a stricter internal re-organization of the work. Our study confirms this trend. The French data show that, under public authority pressure and call for competition, an increase in size of the TSOs and a budget concentration among the bigger organizations are registered. We also observed that for the associations, which represent the largest percentage of organizations in the French TS, the concentration is a phenomenon observable from different perspectives. For instance, the 1.3% of the associations registers the 71% of the total budget. This percentage represents the associations declaring a budget higher than 500 k of euros. This means that a small number of associations, but very large, detains the most part of the budget. This phenomenon of budget concentration among few associations is partly explained by the fact that a majority of associations in the social sector have paid workers and manage medico-social facilities. But it also reveals an increase in size

and a concentration movement of associations. The number of big associations even if not very large, is however increasing in the last years, due to the high number of merges, as shown in the chapter dedicated.

At the meso level we have shown in this study that the contracts, implemented with the public authorities, clearly push to this direction, promoting the big organizations. The economies of scale are openly mentioned as a required strategy to reduce the costs and the associations offering a higher number of places are rewarded economically. In addition, these organizations gain a certain power. However, as sustained by Scourfield (Scourfield, 2007) when actors detain too much market power and markets become too concentrated, competition no longer improves efficiency. In Italy for instance, when the centres are very big, they become “too big too fail”, as closing the centre would create a large number of persons without any place to stay. This has been the case for the CARA in Minneo. In France the big associations strongly impact on the representative role played until now by the intermediary corps. The interaction with centralised public authorities becomes harder for small and local organizations. When intermediary corps exists, they are in charge of keeping alive the discussion. However the emergence of big associations, or at least the share of budget they manage, make this process more difficult, as they could interact directly with the authorities. For instance, in the French case, one big association prefers to have its headquarters in Paris in order to remain in close contact with the public authority. Concerning the relationship among TSOs, not being anymore in a process of cooperation, merge and acquisition are now observed as practice of interaction.

The increase in size brings to an internal reorganization. The organizations chart becomes more complex and departments are created in order to divide the work. This could be a consequence of the professionalization process. As sustained by Gadrey (Gadrey, 1996) organizing in departments the internal organizational configuration is a trend associated to division and specialization of the work. The roles and tasks become very specific. In that respect, we observed that if some workers even prefer this division, because they feel more comfortable with the idea of covering a specific role in the organizations – the legal expert or the social workers – it is less the case for those inspired by social and militant logics. By contrast, some of the organizations advocate for a more “generalist approach”, which does not mean that employees have not specific skills but they consider that to accompany and sustain a person is a complex job, which cover the different aspects of the beneficiaries’ lives.

### 7.2.3 Professionalization

In the last years it has been observed an increase in number of paid workers, to the detriment of volunteers (Hwang & Powell, 2009; Salamon, 2003; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Salamon (1993) associates this trend to marketization, as the organizations looking for funds need to show certain stability but also capacity to implement services. Becoming more focused on efficiency the TSOs started to increase the number of paid workers (Hwang & Powell, 2009). In our research we can confirm this trend, through the data on the Italian TSOs. This is particularly true for certain sectors, such as social services, education and economic development, which show the highest values. In aggregated terms the number of paid workers is increasing more than the number of volunteers. Although the number of volunteers remains higher than the number of paid workers, in the period 1999-2011 we observe an increased rate of more than 55% for the paid workers and around 43% for the

volunteers. We also observe a clear difference based on territorial distribution, with highest values in the northern regions and the islands.

However Hwang and Powell highlight with this term both the process of substitution of volunteers with paid workers, people in charge devoted full time to the TSO mission (Hwang & Powell, 2009), but also the involvement of professionals with formal educational credentials. They differentiate these types of professionalization from the managerial professionalization, which involves more staff with a business management background, and finally professionalism in substantive fields, such as medicine, education, but also social work. At the meso and micro level we observed all the different types of professionalization. We noticed a shift from a majority of volunteers to a majority of paid workers. Furthermore, due to a professionalization of the social services as described by Gadrey (Gadrey, 1994), we observed a continuous specialization of the workers. In particular due to the complexity of the procedure, a team of legal experts is now often required. In addition, as already mentioned, organizations, looking for funds, have hired a project officer specialised in the development of project and fundraising. The increase in size of the organizations also influences the choice of division on department and so the specialization of the workers.

Finally, the professionalization is required by contract. Both in Italy and in France the tenders clearly specify the number of workers and the number of hours required for specific tasks. These indicators are also taken into account from public authorities in the evaluation for entrusting the service. In that sense, educational credentials of the workers also become an evaluation criterion.

The workers dealing with the sector develop a specific professional logic that we qualify as technical rationality logic, which could be in tension with the social one. While the social one is more related to the social aspects concerning the reception of asylum seekers, and solidarity, the technical rationality logic is more devoted to the respect of the specific rules imposed on the organizations. As already mentioned, the public authorities exercise a strong control on the organization not only in terms of budget and accountability, but also in terms of tasks required to be accomplished. The migration policy implemented by the public authority has been strongly criticised by a number of associations, the most militant ones, which also decided to boycott certain tenders for services. For instance this has been the case of the CAO and the PRAHDA in France, while in the last period we can observe the same with some CAS in Italy. In this case, although one of the main reasons is the drop of the price as a result of the new security decree, some TSOs also nevertheless reputed the service they have been asked to manage with the reason of not being in line with the standard of a social service. In other organizations, however, the workers recognised in the contract the main point of reference of their daily work. So being professional is to respond to this contract, and to implement the service required by the public authorities.

#### 7.2.4 The Performance

The performance is described as the quantitative comparison between goals and objectives (Jany-Catrice, 2012). In our cases, the use of quantitative performance indicators applied to the sector has been clearly observed. The quantitative indicators are used to evaluate the organizations ex ante, in order to understand if the organizations could be entrusted of the service, and ex post, after the funds have been allocated. The “*dialogue de gestion*” is exactly

the place where public authorities and TSOs in France discuss about the achievement or not of the threshold imposed. This study shows that the nature of the control from the public authority on the top of the TSOs could have major consequences. The quantitative performance indicators, which are supposed to be neutral numbers (Lemieux, 2007), could instead determine the mission shift of the organization. For instance in the sector this could be observed with the “*taux d’indu*” or with the number of signatures registered by the TSOs to control the time of arrival and time of departure of beneficiaries. These activities have nothing to do with the service, which the organisations are supposed to implement, namely the integration and the social support to asylum seekers. Without any declared will to do so, however the TSOs are submitted to the rules of the selection of migrants, as only certain among them, the asylum seekers, could be sustained into a path of regularization and finally integrated into the social fabric. In such a sensitive sector and in accordance with what is sustained by Jany-Catrice the evaluation process could not be retained apolitical (Jany-Catrice, 2012). In these terms, the organizations is required to ask doing something different than its original mission, as well as when implementing tasks such as the accountability and the research for funding.

The imposition of the quantitative indicators of performance is part of a frame, where the management bodies are essentially required to implement a service. As Lafore (2014) provocatively asks: which is nowadays the role of the TSOs? Are they just providers for public authorities? The performance indicators as well as the market instruments firstly imposed instead of a bottom up approach, a top down logic since it is the public authorities that are in charge of identifying the needs, the objectives and the means to achieve them. The measurement of the performance is based on a quantification of the organizational effort, which become numbers. The public authorities are in charge of controlling these numbers and make sure that the thresholds are respected. This obviously changes the nature of the interaction between public authorities and TSOs but also imposes a standardization of the service, through the quantification of the activity. In some cases, the control is realised by an external agency of accounting revision, so even the final link between the public authorities and the TSOs is cut down and the externalization of the service is accomplished. This is particularly true for the French cases, where instead of the “*appel à projet*” the “*public market*” is applied to entrust the service, and the instrument of “*the dialogue de gestion*”, which the TSOs do not appreciate as instrument of interaction *per se*, is not anymore implemented. In these cases, the quantitative indicators imposed by contracts are the only rules that the management body has to follow in order to be reconfirmed at the end of the contract.

As a result, the capacity of the TSOs to find new solutions, the capacity to personalise the service, and the ability of taking advantage of the local actors and knowledge of the local fabric are sacrificed to market logics. The homogenization of the “final product”, and the request for specific final results (the *fluidité* of the beneficiaries, the number of hours of specific services) emphasizes the standardization of the practices, the fragmentation and specialization of the work, and the division on specific teams or departments based on tasks to accomplish.

### 7.2.5 Different responses to the institutional pressures

Despite the very constraining context, our study highlights that organizations implement different strategies to respond to their new institutional environment. The process of business like evolution described in this work reflects a process of isomorphism undertaken by the

organizations. However, as we have shown in the two previous chapters, the rather isomorphic process of change observed at the macro level hides the fact the organizations could engage in it differently. For instance even if all the organizations have to conform to the market rules, the so-called rules of the game of the organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), they do it in different ways.

All the organizations undergo the market mechanisms imposition, and in order to continue to stay on the market they have no other choice than to respect the rules. While a majority of organizations develops an acceptance strategy, some organizations however continue to criticise the use of these instruments and try to resist. In the Italian case for instance, the different market governance characterizing the SPRAR permits to the DERMAN association to maintain certain autonomy. This militant organization is strongly linked to social movements and civil society organizations, and together with them has carried out different campaigns for the legality and the right of a decent service of reception for asylum seekers. Although not without its difficulties, the organizations continue to carry out services, which are not remunerated, but in which they firmly believe, such as the info and held desk for migrants. This organization has been also able to create a dense network of institutional actors, with important and recognised partners such as the municipality, or IOM, which permits the access of funds. The adherence to the local actors is a strategy implemented also by the medium organization in France SAJIDA association. The local partners are considered particularly important and although implementing economies of scale, merging and looking at the increase of size as a solution, this association continues to cultivate the local network. Even if embarking some mimetic process of transformation inspired by the big associations, SAJIDA does not want to increase in size until reaching a national size. The organization's members are conscious of the importance of the local dimension and of being rooted in the territory.

The sources of legitimization for the organizations are very different as well. If the implementation of standards for improving transparency and efficient use of resources are highly appreciated by public authorities and rewarded through entrustment of services, other sources of legitimacy have been deployed. While the big organizations such as FOFANA and BEUTY are legitimised by their financial stability and transparency of their accounts, the other cases have opted for different forms of legitimacy. For instance, the ALAN association and the DERMAN social enterprise have shown that the interaction with the local movements and a deep rooting into the territory could be source of legitimation as well. This works better when the authority is local, such as in the Italian case, although in both countries, we observe that this strategy enables a number of networks and more or less formal collaboration. Furthermore it attracts volunteers at very local level.

The merge strategy, very common among the French cases (actually all of them underwent through a process of merge during their existence) is not observed in the Italian cases. However the logics behind the organizations totally differ in doing it. FOFANA organization defines itself as an expert of corporate acquisition, which is an activity carried forwards at national level, while SAJIDA association opted for this solution in order to become a relevant actor at the local level. Thanks to this merge, although the size of the organization remains very small at national level, the organization is taken into consideration by public authorities when an urgent action is required. Others such ALAN associations merged with other associations but merges were always considered as ideologically kindred. The increase in size has been accepted but with the aim of disengaging from an activity considered as not

compatible with the vision of the association but in order to engage in another strategy, to carve out a niche market, with the special services to disable persons.

Thanks to an increased size, the organizations can deal with different services and expand their range of action. The differentiation of services is useful for two orders of reasons. Firstly, internally, the organization can mutualise some costs, smearing fix costs across different budgets. Secondly, taking part to different projects gives them the opportunity to differentiate their source of revenue, which, in a particularly strongly instable sector, such as the reception of asylum seekers, helps to maintain financial soundness. In both countries and in all the cases studied, the differentiation of the sources is the most used strategy of surviving. The different sources could be the result of the participation to a number of different projects or of the entrustment by public authorities for different services. The only actor not experimenting the differentiation of activities is the Italian organization BEUTY. BEUTY, not enough expert of these kinds of mechanisms and catapulted into a very complex sector, without a strong network in the back, perished. Moreover,, our results show that the differentiation could be undertaken with different degrees. Some of the organizations remained in the sector of migration, but managing several centres or various specific services, or deployed other social services, highlighting their general function of fighting against each form of exclusion and poverty. Others expanded their activities to very disparate sectors such as in the case of the FOFANA association, showing a strong entrepreneurial spirit.

We could say the same for the professionalization. Some organizations such as the FOFANA pursue multiple types of professionalization including the managerial professionalization. The general directors of the associations also created a university degree to teach how a TSO could be efficiently managed. A network of social entrepreneurs has also been created to make in contact the social entrepreneurs among them and with other actors. The other associations experienced the professionalization differently. Both the militant organizations DERMAN and ALAN interpret the professionalization as an instrument to improve their impact. However the selection of workers is more based on the adherence to the project than on skills, which could however been acquired with experience. The most part of the members and workers of both organizations define themselves as activists. They not only recognise themselves in certain values, such as the solidarity, the equality of all the people, but also put in practice these values in their daily live. Their job to sustain people less fortunate and to give a concrete contribution to the change of the world does not finish with the job-day. Most of them are part of *collectifs* and social movements, where they participate sometimes as militant and sometimes representing their TSO. The social cooperative DESTINY is the organization among the cases which was the less professionalized. Actually, the members very soon realised the need for professionals and with strong dedication, based on a very strong adherence to the social logic, learning a lot about the sector and allowed to be guided often by the professionals engaged.

While the TSOs are engaged in a path of business-like evolution, although different forms of “resistance” could be undertaken as revealed by our study, the civil society and the informal groups of activists continue to engage in actions in sustain to the migrant population. Refusing the conception of differentiation among migrants, they sustain them in the save and rescue actions – such as the activists engaged in the Mediterranean sea, Open Arms, and See watch – but also in the integration - such as Welcome refugees – or in the daily life, when the organizations in charge of the services are not able to offer an adequate sustain, because overcrowded, or for different reasons, incompetency, or mismanagement of resources. However, as activists, there are fewer limits of actions, as not subject to public funding. This



is particularly true in the borders regions, where sustain to migrants could be sanctioned, and the activists accused of supporting the irregular migration. The activists also engaged in a service of control on the public and TSOs actions. We observed particularly in this case, that the boundaries of actions between the most militant TSOs and activists groups are very subtle. Different organizations, such as the CIMADE, which is composed almost for 90% by volunteers, but also the DERMAN social enterprise, and the ALAN association, have been engaged together with local social movements and other TSOs in different actions. Not remunerated by the public authorities, they implemented a service of control on the top of crumbling structures or hotels, which improvised in this activity. The willingness of participation is also shown at macro level, where we observed that the number of volunteers remain very high and active in all the sectors of activities.

## CH. 7 What to Remember?

The chapter 7 is the chapter where the main findings are discussed. Before the discussion is addressed passing through the different levels, macro, meso and micro. Then a transversal analysis has guided the general discussion.

We then linked the specific case of the reception for asylum seekers to the multi-level analysis, which tries to respond to the question “how do TSOs in changing welfare system react to the institutional pressures?”

At a first glance we can observe a clear trend of homogenization. Isomorphic pressures of different natures, push the organizations to similar solutions to survive, namely scaling up, interaction through market instruments, competition, merges, corporatization and professionalization. At the macro level, these trends are confirmed for almost all the sectors, although we observed that the humanitarian and social services sector undergo to a serious transformation.

However in order to capture the phenomenon as a process, and understand how this transformation is accomplished by the TSOs, we continued our analysis at meso and micro levels. To do so we applied a qualitative approach, based on interviews and observation, collecting data, which have been triangulated with secondary sources such as public authorities documents and internal documents of the TSOs.

These levels of the analysis confirmed the transformation in act, but also introduced elements of diversification, such as different strategies implemented and the different logics characterising the organizations.

Although still observable the processes of professionalization and marketization, we noticed that the size and the ideological position of the organizations impacted in their *modus operandi*. The so defined “rules of the game” (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983) imposed at the organizational field, constraint the actors, which have two choices, exit or implement. But also in their implementation, differences are noteworthy, in order to understand how the TSOs are able to maintain distance for the private for profit organizations, maintaining, through hybridization of logics, peculiarities and an alternative organizational identity.

## Conclusion

In this PhD dissertation we analysed in depth the business-like evolution of the TSOs dealing with the reception services for asylum seekers. In a context of changing welfare systems, characterised by the strong implementation of market instruments to regulate the interactions, we tried to understand how the TSOs, under strong institutional pressures, were able to maintain their organisational identities, continuing to distinguish themselves from other organisational forms. In order to answer this question we analysed the process of transformation of the TS in the case of reception services for asylum seekers, applying a multi-level analysis with the aim to “broaden and deepen” our understanding of these evolutions, which allowed for the triangulation of different approaches. From the beginning, we developed a comparison between the Italian and the French processes of reception of asylum seekers at the field level and at the organizational level through the realisation of multiple embedded case studies.

### *The Sector of the reception for asylum seekers at the heart of deep social action transformations*

In the last 10 years, the constantly increasing number of people, which for different reasons have tried, and are still trying, to cross the Mediterranean, made the migration related issues rise to the top of the political agenda, in almost all the European countries. Since the flows don't hint at stopping, the sector will represent one of the main challenges for the future in the EU. As we have shown in this work, the “migration management” is a characterised by multi-level governance, with the presence of a large number of actors at European, national and local levels. The TSOs are playing a major role in this situation, covering several actions such as emergency relief and first reception of asylum seekers, migrants and refugees upon arrival, ensuring access to social services and international protection, as well as their longer-term integration into society.

The sector of reception and integration, in a very short period, has been struck by a massive number of reforms both in terms of market governance and migration regime regulation. The introduction of a number of new market instruments to regulate the interactions among actors triggered a transformation mechanism, which is much faster than in other social activities sectors, partly due to the security rhetoric, driven by many political parties. The sector is therefore revealing a whole range of transformations, such as the multiplication of tendering processes; the concentration of the market in the hands of few big TSOs; the entry of new actors both TSOs and for-profit enterprises, which in turns has increased the competition; the application of quantitative performance indicators. Furthermore, selection mechanisms, being very much focused on generating economies of scale, tend to favour large organisations or push the small ones to merge. The TSOs that were already active in the sector faced the new context with a set of strategies, trying firstly to survive the strong competition and continue to pursue their activities. As shown in previous chapters, some have adapted, others have tried to resist change, but despite clear differentiations, strategies such as the corporatization and the professionalization have been observed in all the case studies. In this context, although not much studied yet by academic research from an organizational point of view, the service of reception for asylum seekers deserves our full attention, being emblematic of the profound transformations under way in the social sector and at the heart of societal challenges.

### *The importance and relevance of conducting a multi-level analysis*

In this work, we have chosen to adopt a multi-level analysis, in order to grasp different aspects of the reception of asylum seekers and to study the third sector' transformation from different perspectives. This multi-level analysis has proven to be essential for a good understanding of the multiple institutional pressures, the organizational field and of the agency work at the organizational level.

At the macro level we observed that the TS both in France and in Italy has undergone major changes. In particular we observed that the TSOs increasingly use the market instruments to fund their own activities and that private sources are higher than public ones. The TS budget is highly concentrated in the hand of few large organizations, dealing in few sectors. We also observed, despite sectorial differences, a process of professionalization resulting from the increase of the number of paid workers. Finally, we highlighted that factors in the institutional, social, and economic environment could explain the evolution of TSOs organizational patterns. Indeed, through a cross-section regression analysis we specifically investigate whether the heterogeneity of TSOs presence in Italian regions is correlated with economic, socio-demographic and institutional contextual factors.

We also analyse the institutional environment of reception services and its profound transformations in terms of regulation and public policies, from the European level to the local one. While the impact of the EU policies is important, however we recognised that at the national and local levels some specific dynamics, due to the national administrative configuration tradition and the local characteristics, still make the difference on the final service.

At the meso level we observed that the application of the market instruments reduces the ability and the space of collaboration among TSOs, exacerbating the competition, instead. The introduction of quasi-markets and competitive tenders, followed by always more detailed contracts, reduces the organizational freedom of action.

If we had stopped our analysis at this level, although having already gathered much information concerning the isomorphic process in becoming business-like, we would have lost the differences characterizing the organizational changes that appear at the micro level. On the one hand, it is important to identify the nature of isomorphic processes that are at work in each organisation and the specific strategic answers to the external constraints, put in place by each organization. On the other, the deepest internal aspects, the construction of the institutional logics - interpretative instruments of the surrounding world - point out not only the different interpretations concerning the external context, but also concerning the role played by the organization in that field. In these terms, the multi-level analysis allows us to cross various elements to finally reconstruct a complex puzzle, made up of external (from different levels) and internal dynamics that interact constantly.

Furthermore, thanks to the multi-level analysis this study makes it possible to apply different institutional perspectives. Institutionalism, as a distinctive approach to study social, economic and political phenomena, has developed very differently based on the academic disciplines, with specificities that struggle to communicate very often. Although the proliferation of approaches and the large quantity of research on the subject, the study of institutions and their impact on the organizations remains a very open question. On the one hand, through a quantitative approach, we based on the New Institutional economics (NIE) approach, which

claims that the institutions contribute to define the “rule of the game” (North, 1992; Williamson, 2000) by reducing uncertainty (North, 1991), in order to investigate the correlation between the TSOs presence and the contextual factors. On the other hand, this time applying a qualitative approach, we put together a composed analytical framework, which instead of predicting, describe. So in order to interpret our observations, we have mobilised an integrated perspective, based on the organizational institutionalism approach focusing on isomorphism, institutional logics and resource dependence. As sustained by Oliver, where isomorphism explains the conforming actions, the resource dependence tries to find an explication for the active choice (Oliver, 1991). Recognizing a number of strategies for organizations to manage their environmental demands, the resource dependence highlights the agency of the organizations. Furthermore, shedding light on the institutional logics characterizing the organizations, we show how they are able to reinterpret themselves within a context, and to combine a plurality of logics in order to structure their legitimacy and their identity. A multi-level analysis is therefore crucial to analyse both the homogenization process at work and the variety of strategic responses of TSOs in this activity field.

Although the mixed methods design allows for an in depth exploration of the phenomena under analysis, mobilising both an economic and an organizational institutional perspectives, one of the limits of this work however is that does not bridge the gap between the two perspectives. One of the most ambitious attempts of this work is to show that although macro trends, such as the business-like evolution, still there is room for autonomy and differences in terms of organizational strategies, values and practices. Nonetheless, it is expected that the results and the points raised here, will pave the way and help future researchers to overcome the same shortcomings. Future research may focus on presenting a theoretical framework able to integrate elements from the two different disciplines, overcoming the incompatible aspects.

#### *A complex “comparative” work relying on multiple embedded case studies*

In our analysis, in line with what Maurice and Sorge (2000) expressed, we refused to look at organisations as functional entities, which can be isolated from their social environment, and instead propose to study them as the result of multiple causalities (Maurice & Sorge, 2000). For this reason, the analysis compares the process of transformation of the two systems of reception in France and Italy, instead of comparing organizations, which are rooted in different contexts.

The two countries are subjected to the process of Europeanization that characterized the migration policies during the last decades. In particular, based on the Dublin system, the EU member states engaged in a number of actions and policies to regulate and manage the migration flows, in order to control the external borders and contain the arrival of irregular migrants. Furthermore in both countries, there is a multiplication of structures, which are divided into ordinary reception and emergency ones. The institutional arrangement characterizing the emergency system is similar in France and Italy, based on a strong centralization of the power and on the application of market instruments, which do not take into account the local authorities. By contrast, the ordinary reception appears very different, and in this case the role played by the TSOs is significantly influenced by the different configuration of welfare services delivery in the two countries.

In France the system is very centralised and the relationship with the prefect is based on the enforcement of the performance control. The service is entrusted through the “*appel à projet*”, which is becoming always more detailed, as we observed, leaving little autonomy to

the TSOs in their actions. The homogenization of the service in terms of costs, practices and activities is highly recommended and mentioned as one of the main objectives in the tenders. In Italy, the service is heavily influenced by the local context and shaped by the local administration, which, together with the selected TSO, is in charge of the service. The process of services definition is configured as a co-constructive model and the TSOs involved work as a network to offer the appropriated services. So in the end, in Italy and France the administrative configuration is considerably different, as well as the role of the local authorities with regard to TSOs. This comparative work also permits to acknowledge the importance of “societal” effects in the national implementation of policies that are framed within the European context.

Finally, we would like to open up a reflection concerning the evolution of the sector. In this work we observed that in the recent decades, reforms aimed at managerializing the sector, in line with the spread of New Public Management principles, increased and even accelerated. We observed the increasing application of market instruments to entrust the services, while the price allocated for the single reception structure decreased. We also showed the implementation of quantitative indicators, which based the performance of the structures on the concept of “*fluidité*” namely increasing the speed and the fluidity of the outflow.

The widespread uncertainty surrounding the issue of immigration, combined with the fluctuating volume of migrants arriving at European borders, has led to a general rise in expenditures. The policy responses aimed at lowering migration and tightening of borders are complex and costly, and most EU member states have taken measures aimed at making their migration management systems as effective and economically viable as possible. But reducing costs for the services is not the only objective of this kind of policies. To improve the traceability of migrants seems to become another important issue. The border control technology and security programmes, together with an increasing manpower being directed towards the management of migration and the creation of specific structures to receive and detain non-EU migrants, are expected to ensure a better traceability of the migrants.

Through always more stringent contracts and system of remuneration by objectives, the public authorities show the will to distort the mission of the reception centres, in order to including them in the migration management cycle, based on arrival, detention, expulsion. This will is also shown by the last partnership signed with third countries, based on the readmission of irregular migrants in exchange of economic aid for development, such as for the “mobility partnerships”, signed with Morocco and Tunisia in 2014, the “partnership priorities”, signed with Egypt, the “migration global compact”, or the bi-lateral agreements between the EU member states and single countries, such as the last one signed at the end of this summer between Italy and nine countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

In this context, we observe a commodification of the migrants, not anymore beneficiaries of a social service, which is rightfully theirs, but criminalised through a political rhetoric of crisis, which place the irregular migration at the heart of the political debate. Furthermore this system of procurement procedures has attracted many self-interested non-state actors that are not inclined to deliver high quality services, as shown by the case of the North Africa Emergency period in Italy. Furthermore the last reforms of the sector, which have been analysed in this work, with few exceptions, do not seem to allow engaging the local community in the reception process, or to encourage the embeddedness of the service into the local fabric, which would permit a faster integration.



## List of Tables

Table 1.1 TSOs Market and non-market subsectors.....	31
Table 1.2 The Economic Theories of TSOs .....	36
Table 2.1 NPM and NPG characteristics.....	55
Table 3.1 NIE's Level of Analysis .....	72
Table 3.2 Institutional Pressures Characteristics and Predictors.....	80
Table 3.3 Analytical Grid for Drafting Institutional Logics .....	85
Table 3.4 Institutional Logics Main Characteristics .....	86
Table 3.5 RDT Actions Description and Specificities.....	89
Table 3.6 The Mixed Method Analysis .....	94
Table 3.7 Case Studies in Marseille, France .....	101
Table 3.8 Case Studies in Naples, Italy.....	101
Table 3.9 List of Interviews at EU level.....	104
Table 3.10 List of Interviews France .....	105
Table 3.11 List of Interviews Italy .....	106
Table 4.1: Third Sector Organizations (TSOs) in Italy (199, 2011 and 2015. Absolute values, percentage values and 1999-2015 growth rate .....	116
Table 4.2: Number of TSOs, and HR, 2015, 2011, 1999. Absolute Values and Percentage of change. ....	117
Table 4.3: TSOs distribution by Italian macro-areas. ....	119
Table 4.4: TSOs per Region (absolute values). ....	121
Table 4.5 Regional distribution of TSOs' human resources (absolute values). ....	123
Table 4.6 TSOs' human resources (per 10,000 inhabitants).....	124
Table 4.7: Distribution of Italian TSOs by field of intervention and by territorial repartition. 2011 and 2015 data (absolute values).....	126
Table 4.8: TSOs' human resources by field of intervention. 2011 and 2015 data (absolute values).....	127
Table 4.9: Share of TSOs by type of funding and by sector of intervention. 2011 data. ....	128
Table 4.10: TSOs in Italy by legal form: absolute values, share on the total number of TSOs and 1999-2015 growth rate. ....	131
Table 4.11 Distribution of TSOs by legal form and by macro-area (absolute values). 1999, 2011 and 2015 data. ....	132
Table 4.12: TSOs' human resources by field of intervention and by legal forms (absolute values). 2011 and 2015 data. ....	133
Table 4.13 Density by field of intervention, 1999 and 2011.....	137
Table 4.14: Description of Variables .....	140
Table 4.15: OLS estimates Coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable considered in each model is reported at the top of the column. ....	144
Table 4.16: OLS estimates Coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable considered in each model is reported at the top of the column. ....	145
Table 4.17: OLS estimates Coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable considered in each model is reported at the top of the column. ....	146
Table 4.18: <i>Professionalization</i> average values by year and TS field of .....	152
Table 4.19 <i>Professionalization</i> average values by year and TS field of.....	153
Table 4.20: <i>Professionalization</i> average values by year and TS field of .....	153
Table 4.21: <i>Professionalization</i> average values by year and TS field of intervention (Centre data). ....	154



Table 4.22: <i>Professionalization</i> average values by year and TS field of intervention (South data).....	154
Table 4.23: <i>Professionalization</i> average values by year and TS field of intervention (Islands data).....	155
Table 4.24 Number of TSOs. Absolute Values, Percentage Values, Percentage of Change.....	160
Table 4.25 Distribution of organizations among TS, private and public sector.....	160
Table 4.26 TS Labour Force distributed for legal forms.....	163
Table 4.27 Distribution of labour force par sector. TS, private and public sector.....	166
Table 4.28 TS Legal Forms' distribution 2014.....	168
Table 4.29 Budget of the associations with and without paid workers.....	170
Table 4.30 Budget of the associations based on sector of activity.....	173
Table 4.31 Economic Resources of the associations 2017.....	174
Table 4.32 Evolution of the budget based on size of the associations.....	177
Table 4.33 Annual Evolution Number and Budget of the Associations based on the Size 2011-2017.....	177
Table 5.1 Irregular Entries into the EU by main routes, 2014 -2017.....	188
Table 5.2 The reception centre for asylum seekers.....	199
Table 5.3 Number of places in CADA Evolution.....	203
Table 5.4 The Number of CADA, Accommodation places, and Demands for Asylum 1997-2017.....	209
Table 5.5 The Organizational Field 1970s - 1990s.....	213
Table 5.6 Number of CADA 1997-2001.....	214
Table 5.7 Number of CADA 2001-2006.....	216
Table 5.8 Number of CADA 2007-2011.....	217
Table 5.9 The Organizational Field during 2000s.....	219
Table 5.10 Number of CADA 2012 -2017.....	221
Table 5.11 the Organizational Field 2010s.....	224
Table 5.12 The evolution of the Organizational Field and the (market) instruments applied with the aim to regulate the exchanges.....	225
Table 5.13 France Time-line.....	226
Table 5.14 Types of Protection in Italy.....	234
Table 5.15 The reception centres in Italy.....	238
Table 5.16 Different processes of entrustment by region.....	248
Table 5.17 Italy the Organizational Field.....	252
Table 6.1 Reception centres in Marseille and number of places.....	264
Table 6.2 The Three Case Studies in Marseille.....	265
Table 6.3 ALAN Main Steps.....	269
Table 6.4 SAJIDA Main Steps.....	281
Table 6.5 FOFANA Main Steps.....	301
Table 6.6 the reception centre for asylum seekers in Naples.....	314
Table 6.7 DERMAN time-line.....	319
Table 7.1 The National Contexts FR - IT.....	359
Table 7.2 Organizational Field FR - IT.....	362
Table 7.3 The micro level transformation.....	364
Table 7.4 The service in IT - FR.....	258

## List of Figures

Figure 1.1 The TS Graphic Representation.....	27
Figure 1.2 Size of the TS workforce compared to other sector of activities in the EU .....	28
Figure 1.3 Composition of the TS workforce in the EU.....	29
Figure 1.4 European TS activities.....	29
Figure 1.5 European TS Revenue Structure .....	30
Figure 1.6 The European TSOs legal forms .....	32
Figure 3.1 Macro Meso and Micro Analysis.....	68
Figure 3.2 the mixed method applied to a multilevel analysis .....	69
Figure 3.3 Multiple embedded case studies.....	97
Figure 4.1 Human Resources distribution in the TSOs.....	118
Figure 4.2 TSOs Distribution by Italian macro-areas .....	120
Figure 4.3 TSOs by legal form, share values (1999, 2011, 2015) .....	131
Figure 4.4 Density_tot values in Italian provinces (1999).....	138
Figure 4.5 Density_tot values in Italian provinces (2011).....	138
Figure 4.6. Sources of TSOs funds in Italy 2011. ....	150
Figure 4.7 Avarage Growth Rate 2008-2014 Facilities and Workers TS, Private, Public Sector.....	161
Figure 4.8 Distribution of labour force within TS, public and private sector .....	162
Figure 4.9 Evolution of the Labour Force in the TS, Public and Private Sector .....	162
Figure 4.10 Distribution of Labour Force par Legal Form.....	163
Figure 4.11 The increase rate of volunteers in France .....	164
Figure 4.12 Regional Distribution of the HR implicate in the TS 2014.....	165
Figure 4.13 Regional distribution of the TS facilities 2014 .....	166
Figure 4.14 Relevance of the TS on the sectors 2011,2014 .....	167
Figure 4.15 Size of the TSOs' distribution.....	169
Figure 4.16 Evolution of the labour force's growth rate 2008-2014.....	170
Figure 4.17 Budget Concentration par Sector .....	172
Figure 4.18 Distribution of Organizations par Size .....	173
Figure 4.19 Evolution of the Resources for the Associations 2005-2017 .....	174
Figure 4.20 Resources Distribution, Associations, with and without Paid Workers .....	175
Figure 4.21 Distribution of resources par sector of activities.....	176
Figure 4.22 Annual Evaluation Number and Budget of the Associations Based on the Size 2011-2017 .....	178
Figure 5.1 Asylum Request Process in France .....	195
Figure 5.2 Asylum Application Process.....	197
Figure 5.3 French Reception Centres' characteristics .....	200
Figure 5.4 CADA distribution at national level .....	202
Figure 5.5 CADA Number of places and structures .....	203
Figure 5.6 The Evolution of French Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers .....	220
Figure 5.7 Italian Procedure for Asylum Application.....	233
Figure 5.8 The reception system in Italy .....	235
Figure 5.9 Municipality adhering to the SPRAR.....	237
Figure 5.10 Asylum seekers par year .....	249
Figure 6.1 SAJIDA organizational chart.....	292
Figure 6.2 FOFANA Organizational Chart .....	300

Figure 6.3 Derman Projects and Network .....	327
Figure 6.4 The BEUTY' project since 80s .....	331

## Bibliography

- Abbott, A. (1988). *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Acocella, N. (2005). *Politica economica e strategie aziendali* (Carocci Editore). Roma.
- Adelman, M. A. (1972). *The World Petroleum Market*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Agamben, G. (2005). *State of Exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Aguillon, M.-D. (2016). *Approche gestionnaire des migrations: Lieux d'expertises et carrieres d'experts. Le cas du Sénégal*.
- AIDA, A. I. D. (2017). *Country Report: Italy*.
- Alberti, P. (2015). Relazione Introduttiva. *POLIS, Working Papers n. 221*, 3–7. Alessadria.
- Alexander, J. A., & Morrissey, M. A. (1989). A Resource-Dependence Model of Hospital Contract Management. *HSR: Health Services Research*, 24(2), 259–284.
- Alexander, M. (2007). *Cities and labour immigration: Comparing policy responses in Amsterdam, Paris, Rome and Tel Aviv*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Ambrosi, A. (2018). *Law 328/2000: Urban governance and public- private relations in the city of Rome from the welfare reform to today*.
- Anheier, H. K., & Ben-Ner, A. (1997). Shifting boundaries. Long-term changes in the size of the for-profit, nonprofit, cooperative and government sectors. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 68(3), 335–353.
- Anheier, H. K., & Ben-Ner, A. (Eds.). (2002). *The study of the Nonprofit enterprise: Theories and approaches*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0573-0>
- Archambault, E. (2009). *Association gestionnaire* (L'économie sociale de A à Z, Alternative économique, Vols 1–38 bis). Paris.
- Ashworth, R., Boyne, G., & Delbridge, R. (2007). Escape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and Isomorphic Pressures in the Public Sector. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(1), 165–187. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum038>
- ATTI PARLAMENTARI XVII LEGISLATURA. (2017). *Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul sistema di accoglienza, di identificazione ed espulsione, nonché sulle condizioni di trattenimento dei migranti e sulle risorse pubbliche impegnate* (No. Doc. XXII-bis N. 21). Camera dei Deputati Italiana.
- Audebrand, L., & Michaud, M. (2015). Les enjeux de la professionnalisation des entreprises d'économie sociale. *RECMA*, N° 338(4), 54–68.
- Austin, J., Stevenson, H., & Wei-Skillern, J. (2006). Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or Both? *Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice*, 30(1), 1–22.

- Baines, D. (2010). Neoliberal Restructuring, Activism/Participation, and Social Unionism in the Nonprofit Social Services. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 39(1), 10–28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764008326681>
- Barberis, I. (2009). Le cauchemar de Paul Otlet. *Cités*, 37, 9–11.
- Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010a). Building sustainable hybrid organizations<. The case of commercial microfinance organizations. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 53(6,), 1419–1440.
- Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010b). Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of commercial microfinance organizations. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 53(6,), 1419–1440.
- Battilani, P., & Zamagni, V. (2012). *The Managerial Transformation of Italian Co-operative Enterprises*. 39.
- Bauby, P. (2008). L'eupéanisation des services publics. *Télescope. Revue d'analyse Comparée En Administration Publique*, 14(1), 11–22.
- Bazin, C., & Malet, J. (2019). *La France bénévole: Evolutions et perspectives* (No. 19). Paris: Recherches et Solidarités.
- Beaud, J.-P., & Prévost, J.-G. (2000). *L'ère du chiffre. Systèmes statistiques et traditions nationales* (Presses de l'Université du Québec,). Sainte-Foy (Québec).
- Ben-Ner, A., & Gui, B. (2002). The theory of nonprofit organizations revisited. In H. K. Anheier & A. Ben-Ner (Eds.), *The study of Nonprofit enterprise: Theories and approaches*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0573-0>
- Ben-Ner, A., & Gui, B. (2003). The Theory of Nonprofit Organizations Revisited. In H. K. Anheier & A. Ben-Ner (Eds.), *The Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise: Theories and Approaches* (pp. 3–26). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0131-2\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0131-2_1)
- Ben-Ner, A., & VanHoomissen, T. (1990). TheGrowthoftheNonprofitSector in the1980s: FactsandInterpretation. *Nonprofit ManagementandLeadership*, 1, 99–116.
- Ben-Ner, A., & VanHoomissen, T. (1991). Nonprofit organizations in the mixed economy: A demand and supply analysis. . *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 62(4), 519–550.
- Ben-Ner, A., & VanHoomissen, T. (1992). An empirical investigation of the joint determination of the size of the for-profit, nonprofit and government sectors. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 63, 391–415.
- Benz, M. (2005). Not for the Profit, But for the Satisfaction? Evidence on Worker Well-being in Nonprofit Firms. *Kyklos*, 58(2), 155–76.
- Bernardot, M. (1999). Chronique d'une institution: La 'sonacotra' (1956-1976). *Sociétés contemporaines*, 33(1), 39–58. <https://doi.org/10.3406/socco.1999.1750>
- Bevan, G. (2006). Setting Targets for Healthcare Performance: Lessons from a Case Study of the English NHS. *National Institute Economic Review*, 197(67), 67–79.
- Bidart, C., & Mendez, A. (2016). Un système d'analyse qualitative des processus dans les sciences sociales: L'exemple de la mutation d'une organisation. In D. Demaziere & M. Jouvenet (Eds.), *Andrew Abbott et l'héritage de l'école de Chicago, 2: Vol. Coll. En temps lieux* (EHESS, pp. 217–231).

- Birch, D. (2001). *Local Authority Procurement: A Research Report*. London: Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions.
- Blank, R. M. (2000). When Can Public Policy Makers Rely on Private Markets? The Effective Provision of Social Services. *The Economic Journal*, 110(462), 34–49. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00519>
- Bode, I., & Brandsen, T. (2014). State–third Sector Partnerships: A short overview of key issues in the debate. *Public Management Review*, 16(8), 1055–1066. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2014.957344>
- Bognetti, G., & Obermann, G. (2008). Liberalization and privatization of public utilities: Origins of the debate, current issues and challenges for the future. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 79(3–4), 461–485.
- Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, E. (1999). *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (Edition Gallimard). Paris.
- Bommes, M. (2010). Migration research in Germany: The emergence of a generalised research field. In D. Thränhardt & M. Bommes (Eds.), *National paradigms of migration research* (pp. 127–186). Osnabruck: V & R Unipress, Universitätsverlag Osnabrück.
- Borins, S. (1994). *Government in Transition: A New Paradigm in Public Administration*. Presented at the the Inaugural Conference of the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Islands.
- Borzaga, C. (1991). The Italian Nonprofit Sector. An Overview of an Undervalued Reality. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 62(4).
- Borzaga, C. (2004). From suffocation to re-emergence: The evolution of the Italian third sector. In A. Evers & J.-L. Laville (Eds.), *The Third Sector in Europe* (pp. 45–62). Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Borzaga, C., & Fazzi, L. (2011). Processes of institutionalization and differentiation in the Italian third sector. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 22(3), 409–427.
- Borzaga, C., Fazzi, L., & Galera, G. (2016). Social enterprise as a bottom-up dynamic: Part 1. The reaction of civil society to unmet social needs in Italy, Sweden and Japan. *International Review of Sociology*, 26(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2016.1148332>
- Borzaga, C., & Mittone, L. (1997). *The Multi-Stakeholders Versus the Nonprofit Organisation* (Draft Paper No. 7). Università degli Studi di Trento.
- Borzaga, C., & Santuari, A. (2001). Italy: From traditional co-operatives to innovative social enterprises. In C. Borzaga & J. Defourny, *The Emergence of Social Enterprises*. Routledge.
- Bovaird, A. G., & Löffler, E. (Eds.). (2009). *Public management and governance* (2nd ed). London ; New York: Routledge.
- Bovaird, T. (2006). Developing New Forms of Partnership With the ‘Market’ in the Procurement of Public Services. *Public Administration*, 84(1), 81–102. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0033-3298.2006.00494.x>

- Bovis, C. H. (2007). *EU Public Procurement Law*. Elgar European Law Series. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 9781847209474.
- Boyle, D., & Harris, M. (2009). *The challenge of co-production: How equal partnerships between professionals and the public are crucial to improving public services* (NESTA). London.
- Brandsen, T., Trommel, W., & Verschuere, B. (2017). The state and the reconstruction of civil society. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 83(4), 676–693. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315592467>
- Bregeon, P. (2009). Histoire du Réseau des Centres d'Hébergement et de Réinsertion Sociale et de l'Hebergement Social. *HAL Archives Ouvertes.fr*, 1–27.
- Brennan, D., Cass, B., Himmelweit, S., & Szebehely, M. (2012). The marketisation of care: Rationales and consequences in Nordic and liberal care regimes. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 22(4), 377–391. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928712449772>
- Brint, S. (1994). *In an age of experts: The changing role of professionals and public life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bruno, I. (2008). *À vos marques, prêts... cherchez, la stratégie européenne de Lisbonne. Vers un marché de la recherche* (Éd. du Croquant, coll.). Bellecombe-en-Bauge.
- Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Bloomberg, L. (2014). Public Value Governance: Moving Beyond Traditional Public Administration and the New Public Management. *Public Administration Review*, 74(4), 445–456. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12238>
- Burke, R., Onwuegbuzie, A.J., and Turner, L.A., (2016) Toward a Definition of Mixed Methods Research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1 : 2 , 112-133
- Burns, J., & Nielsen, K. (2006). How Do Embedded Agents Engage in Institutional Change? *Journal of Economic Issues*, 40(2), 449–456. Retrieved from JSTOR.
- Busso, S. (2018). Away from Politics? Trajectories of Italian Third Sector after the 2008 Crisis. *Social Sciences*, 7(11), 228. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7110228>
- Byatt, I. (2002). *Delivering Better Services for Citizens: A Review of Local Government Procurement in England*. London: Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions/The Local Government Association.
- Caffrey, L., Ferlie, E., & McKevitt, C. (2019). The strange resilience of new public management: The case of medical research in the UK's national health service. *Public Management Review*, 21(4), 537–558. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2018.1503702>
- Caponio, T., & Borkert, M. (2010). *The local dimension of migration policymaking* [IMISCOE reports]. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Carmel, E., & Harlock, J. (2008). Instituting the 'third sector' as a governable terrain: Partnership, procurement and performance in the UK. *Policy & Politics*, 36(2), 155–171. <https://doi.org/10.1332/030557308783995017>
- Casady, C. B., Eriksson, K., Levitt, R. E., & Scott, W. R. (2019). (Re)defining public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the new public governance (NPG) paradigm: An

- institutional maturity perspective. *Public Management Review*, 1–23.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2019.1577909>
- Castel, R. (1995). *La métamorphose de la question sociale, une chronique du salariat* (Fayard). Paris.
- Castells, M. (1977). *The urban question: A marxist approach*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Challis, L., Day, P., Klein, R., & Scrivens, E. (1994). Managing quasi-markets: Institutions of regulation. In *Quasi-Markets in the Welfare State: The Emerging Findings* (SAUS Publications). Bristol.
- Chandhoke, N. (2001). The ‘Civil’ and the ‘Political’ in Civil Society. *Democratization*, 8(2), 1–24.
- Child, J. (1972). Organization structure, environment, and performance: The role of strategic choice. *Sociology*, 6, 1–22.
- Chrisidu-Budnik, A., & Przedańska, J. (2017). The Agency Theory Approach to the Public Procurement System. *Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics*, 7(1), 154–165. <https://doi.org/10.1515/wrlae-2015-0059>
- Claeyé, F., & Jackson, T. (2012). The iron cage re-revisited: Institutional isomorphism in non-profit organizations in South-Africa: Institutional Isomorphism in South African NPOs. *Journal of International Development*, 24(5), 602–622.  
<https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2852>
- Clayton, R., & Pontusson, J. (1998). Welfare-State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies. *World Politics*, 51(1), 67–98.
- Clegg, S. (1990). *Modern Organisations: Organisation Studies in the PostModern World* (Sage). London.
- Cleveland, G. (2008). *If it don't make dollars, does that mean that it doesn't make sense? Commercial, nonprofit, and municipal child care in the city of Toronto* [Report to the children's service division, City of Toronto]. Toronto.
- CNCRESS. (2014). *Atlas commenté de l'ESS, hors série juris association* (Juris editions). Baume-les-Dames: Dalloz.
- Coase, R. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. *Jornal Law Economy*, 2(2), 1–40.
- Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3(1), 1–44.
- Coase, R. (1988). *The Firm, the Market, and the Law*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- COCOPS. (2013). *Trends and impact of public administration reforms in Europe: Views and experiences from senior public sector executives* [European Policy Brief].
- Coleman, J. (1990). *The Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Colucci, M. (2018). Per una storia del governo dell'immigrazione straniera in Italia: Dagli anni sessanta alla crisi delle politiche. *Meridiana*, 91, 9–36.



- Cook, K., Shortell, S. M., Conrad, D. A., & Morrisey, M. A. (1983). A Theory of Organizational Response to Regulation: The Case of Hospitals. *Academy of Management Review*, 8(2), 193–205.
- Costa, E., & Carini, C. (2016). Northern and southern Italian social cooperatives during the economic crisis: A multiple factor analysis. *Service Business*, 10, 369–92.
- Cottin-Marx, S., Hély, M., Jeannot, G., & Simonet, M. (2017). La recomposition des relations entre l'État et les associations: Désengagements et réengagements. *Revue Française d'administration Publique*, 3(163), 463–476.
- Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2007). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research* (Thousand Oaks). CA: Sage.
- Creswell J.W. and Creswell, J.D., (2018) *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Fifth Edition. Sage
- Dan, S, & Andrews, R. (2016). Market-type mechanisms and public service equity: A review of experiences in European public services. *Public Organization Review*, 16(3), 301–317.
- Dan, Sorin, & Pollitt, C. (2015). NPM Can Work: An optimistic review of the impact of New Public Management reforms in central and eastern Europe. *Public Management Review*, 17(9), 1305–1332.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2014.908662>
- Dart, R. (2004). Being “Business-Like” in a Nonprofit Organization: A Grounded and Inductive Typology. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 33(2), 290–310.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764004263522>
- De Tocqueville, A. (1835). *De la démocratie en Amérique*. Paris: GF Flammarion.
- Deal, T. E., & Kennedy, A. A. (1981). *Corporate Cultures: The Rites* (Tavistock). London.
- Dees, G. J. (1998). *The meaning of social entrepreneurship*. Working paper, Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership.
- Dees, G. J., & Anderson, B. B. (2006). *Framing a theory of social entrepreneurship: Building on two schools of practice and thought*. 1(3), 39–66.
- Defourny, J, Develtere, P., & Fonteneau, B. (1999). *L'économie sociale au Nord et au Sud*. Bruxelles & Paris: De Boeck.
- Defourny, Jacques. (2001). From Third Sector to social enterprise. In C. Borzaga & J. Defourny, *He Emergence of Social Enterprise* (pp. 1–18). London and New York,: Routledge.
- Defourny, Jacques, & Develtere, P. (2009). The Social Economy: The Worldwide Making of a Third Sector. In Jacques Defourny, P. Develtere, B. Fonteneau, & M. Nyssens (Eds.), *The Worldwide Making of the Social Economy. Innovations and Changes* (De Boeck).
- Defourny, Jacques, & Nyssens, M. (2010). Conceptions of Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurship in Europe and the United States: Convergences and Divergences. *Journal of Social Entrepreneurship*, 1(1), 32–53.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19420670903442053>
- Defourny, Jacques, & Nyssens, M. (2017a). Fundamentals for an International Typology of Social Enterprise Models. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and*

- Nonprofit Organizations*, 28(6), 2469–2497. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9884-7>
- Defourny, Jacques, & Nyssens, M. (2017b). Fundamentals for an International Typology of Social Enterprise Models. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 28(6), 2469–2497. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9884-7>
- Demsetz, H. (1997). The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution. *American Economic Review*, 87, 426–429.
- Desroche, H. (1987). Movement Coopératif et économie sociale en Europe. *Revue de l'Économie Sociale*, 11, 59–87.
- Desrosières, A. (1993). *La politique des grands nombres. Histoire de la raison statistique* (La Découverte). Paris.
- DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). *The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields*. 15.
- DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1991). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields. In W. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Douglas, J. (1997). Political theories of nonprofit organization. In W. W. Powell (Ed.), *The Nonprofit Sector, A Research Handbook*. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.
- Dowling, & Pfeffer, J. (1975). Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational behavior. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 18, 122–135.
- Dror, Y., & Hamel, G. (1998). *Alliance Advantage*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Dunleavy, P. (2005). New Public Management Is Dead—Long Live Digital-Era Governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16(3), 467–494. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui057>
- Dunleavy, P., & Hood, C. (1994). From old public administration to new management. *Public Money and Management*, 14(3), 9–16.
- Dunn, M. B., & Jones, C. (2010). Institutional Logics and Institutional Pluralism: The Contestation of Care and Science Logics in Medical Education 1967–2005. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55(1), 114–149.
- Eikenberry, A. M., & Kluver, J. D. (2004). The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector: Civil Society at Risk? *Public Administration Review*, 64(2), 132–140. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00355.x>
- Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. *The Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), 532. <https://doi.org/10.2307/258557>
- Enjolras, B., Salamon, L. M., Sivesind, K. H., & Zimmer, A. (2018). *The Third Sector as a Renewable Resource for Europe*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71473-8>

- Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A., & Myles, J. (2001). *A new welfare architecture for Europe. Report submitted to the Belgian Presidency of the European Union, 2001*. Brussels: the Belgian Presidency of the European Union.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton University Press). Princeton, NJ.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. (1999). *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies* (Oxford University Press). New York.
- Esposito, G., Ferlie, E., & Gaeta, G. L. (2018). The European public sectors in the age of managerialism. *Politics*, 38(4), 480–499.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717727253>
- Etzioni, A. (1973). The third sector and domestic missions. *Public Administration Review*, 33(4), 314–323.
- European Commission. (2018). *Public procurement guidance for practitioners* (p. 136). Brussels.
- Evans, B., & Sapeha, S. (2015). Are non-government policy actors being heard? Assessing New Public Governance in three Canadian provinces. *Canadian Public Administration*, 58(2), 249–270.
- Evers, A. (2005). Mixed welfare systems and hybrid organizations: Changes in the governance and provision of social services. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 28, 737–748.
- Evers, A., & Laville, J.-L. (Eds.). (2005). *The third sector in Europe* (Reprinted). Cheltenham: Elgar.
- Evers, C. W., & Lakomski, G. (2012). Science, systems, and theoretical alternatives in educational administration: The road less travelled. *Journal of Educational Administration*, 50(1), 57–75. <https://doi.org/10.1108/09578231211196069>
- EVPA. (2018). *THE THIRD SECTOR REFORM*. EVPA.
- Eynaud, P. (2019). Eclairages complémentaires. In V. Tchernonog & L. Prouteau, *Le paysage associatif français – Mesures et évolutions* (Daloz Juris Associations, Vols 1–3ème édition).
- Eyraud, B. (2013). *Protéger et rendre capable. La considération civile et sociale des personnes très vulnérables* (Erès). Paris.
- Fazzi, L. (1996). Social policies and the non-profit sector in Italy: A critique of the ideologies of contracting out. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 17, 75–97.
- Ferlie, E. (1986). Audit Commission, Managing Social Services for the Elderly More Effectively, HMSO, London, 1985, 81 pp., £4.85, ISBN 0 11 7012785. *Ageing and Society*, 6(02), 253–254. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0144686X00005857>
- Ferlie, E. (1992). The creation and evolution of quasi markets in the public sector: A problem for strategic management. *Strategic Management Journal*, 13(S2), 79–97. <https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250130907>
- Ferlie, E., Pettigrew, A. M., Ashburner, L., & Fitzgerald, L. (1996). *The new public management in action* (Oxford University Press). Oxford; New York.
- Ferrara, M. (2012). *Le politiche sociali* (Il Mulino Edizioni). Bologna.

- Fischer, N. (2017). *Le territoire de l'expulsion. La rétention administrative des étrangers et l'Etat de droit en France* (ENS Edition). Lyon.
- Fitzpatrick, R. (2014). What is payment by results? | Whatis Series...? Retrieved 29 October 2019, from <https://www.whatisseries.co.uk/payment-results/>
- Fligstein, N. (2001). *The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twentieth-first-Century Capitalist Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fondazione Symbola, Unioncamere, & Fondazione Edison. (2015). *I.T.A.L.I.A. Geografie del nuovo made in Italy Report* (p. 103).
- Fowler, A. (2002). Civil Society Research funding from a Global Perspective: A Case for Redressing Bias, Asymmetry and Bifurcation. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 13(3), 287–300.
- Frahm, K. A., & Martin, L. L. (2009). From government to governance: Implications for social work administration. *Administration in Social Work*, 33(4), 407–422.
- Freeman, E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 1, 53–73.
- Friedland, Roger and Alford, R. Robert. 1991. 'Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions,' in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, ed. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, pp. 232–263. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Froelich, K.A., (1999) Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, Volume: 28 issue: 3, page(s): 246-268
- Peter Frumkin & Joseph Galaskiewicz. "Institutional Isomorphism and Public Sector Organizations." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 14 (3):283-307, 2004
- Gadrey, J. (1994). La modernisation des services professionnels: Rationalisation industrielle ou rationalisation professionnelle? *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 35(2), 163. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3322031>
- Gadrey, J. (1996). *Services, La productivité en question* (Éd. Desclée De Brouwer). Paris.
- Galera, G. (2016). Verso l'inclusione sociale: Dall'accoglienza all'autonomia. *Welfare Oggi*, (3), 32–37.
- Geddes, A. (2016). *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe* (2nd ed.). London.
- Geiger, M., & Pécout, A. (2014). International Organisations and the Politics of Migration. *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, 40(6), 865–887. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.855071>
- Geyer, R. (2001). Can European Union (EU) Social NGOs Co-operate to Promote EU Social Policy? *Journal of Social Policy*, 30(03). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279401006353>
- Gilbert, N. (2002). *Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility*. Oxford Scholarship Online.
- Gisondi, R. (2015). Relazione Introduttiva. *COMMENTO ALLA DIRETTIVA 2014/24/UE, RELATIVA AGLI APPALTI NEI SETTORI ORDINARI*, Working Papers n. 221, 3–7. Alessandria: POLIS.

- Glennster, H., & Le Grand, J. (1995). Le développement des quasi-marchés dans la protection sociale. *Revue Française d'économie*, 10(3), 111–135.
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, (91), 481–510.
- Greene, J.C., Caracelli, V.C, Graham, W.F. (1989) Toward a Conceptual Framework for Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Design*, 11(3) , 255-274
- Greener, I. (2008). Markets in the public sector: When do they work, and what do we do when they don't? *Policy & Politics*, 36(1), 93–108.
- Gui, B. (1991). The economic rationale for the third sector. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 62(4), 551–572.
- Gulati, R., & Gargiulo, M. (1999). Where do interorganizational networks come from? *American Journal of Sociology*, 104, 1439–1493.
- Haleblian J, Devers, C.E., McNamara, G., Carpenter, M.A., Davison, R.B., (2009) Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda, *Journal of Management* 35 (3), 469-502
- Hannan, M., & Freeman, J. (1987). The Ecology of Organizational Founding Rates: The Dynamics of Foundings of American Labor Unions , 1836–1975. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92, 910–943.
- Hannan, M., & Freeman, J. (1989). *Organizational Ecology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hannan, M. T. (1991). Aggregation and disaggregation in the social sciences. San Francisco: New Lexington Press
- Hansmann, H. B. (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise. *Yale Law Journal*, 89(3), 835–901.
- Hansmann, H. B. (1987). *The nonprofit sector: A research handbook* (W. W. Powell, Ed.). New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.
- Hansmann, H. B. (1996). *The Ownership of Enterprise*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Harlock, J. (2014). From outcomes-based commissioning to social value? Implications for performance managing the third sector. *University of Birmingham: Third Sector Research Centre, Working Paper 123*.
- Harvey, D. (1982). *Limit to capital* (Blackwell). Oxford.
- Hawley, A. (1968). Human ecology. In D. L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (pp. 328–337). New York: Macmillan.
- Hély, M. (2017). De L'économie sociale 'historique' à "l'économie sociale et solidaire: Une nouvelle configuration des relations entre monde associatif et collectivités publiques. *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, 3(163), 543–556.
- Hemerijck, A. (2013). *Changing Welfare States* (Oxford University Press).
- Hillman, A.J., Withers, M.C., and Collins, B. J, (2009) Resource Dependence Theory – A Review *Journal of Management* , 35: 6, 1404-1427
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit voice and loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Hite, J. M. (2005). Evolutionary processes and paths of relationally embedded network ties in emerging entrepreneurial firms. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 29(1), 113–144.
- Hodge, G., & Greve, C. (2018). Contemporary public-private partnership: Towards a global research agenda. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 34(1), 3–16. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12132>
- Hoggett, P. (1996). New modes of control in the public service. *Public Administration*, 74(1), 9–32. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1996.tb00855.x>
- Hood, C. (1991). A Public Management for all seasons? *Public Administration*, 69(1), 3–19. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x>
- Horwitz, M. (1987). Corporate Reorganization: The Last Gasp or Last Clear Chance for the Tax-Exempt, Nonprofit Hospital. *American Journal of Law & Medicine*, (4), 527–560.
- House, R., Rousseau, D. M., & Thomas-Hunt, M. (1995). The meso paradigm: A framework for integration of micro and macro organizational. In L. L. Cummings & B. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior* (Vol. 17, pp. 71–114). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Hvenmark, J. (2013a). Business as Usual? *Administrative Theory & Praxis (M.E. Sharpe)*, 35(2), 223–247. <https://doi.org/10.2753/ATP1084-1806350203>
- Hvenmark, J. (2013b). Business as Usual?: On Managerialization and the Adoption of the Balanced Scorecard in a Democratically Governed Civil Society Organization. *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 35(2), 223–247. <https://doi.org/10.2753/ATP1084-1806350203>
- Hwang, H., & Powell, W. W. (2009). The Rationalization of Charity: The Influences of Professionalism in the Nonprofit Sector. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 54(2), 268–298. <https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.2009.54.2.268>
- Hyndman, N., & Lapsley, I. (2016). New Public Management: The Story Continues: NPM: THE STORY CONTINUES. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 32(4), 385–408. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12100>
- Hyndman, N., & Liguori, M. (2016). Public Sector Reforms: Changing Contours on an NPM Landscape: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS: CHANGING CONTOURS. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 32(1), 5–32. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12078>
- Ianes, A. (2016). Exploring the Origins of Social Enterprise: Social Co-operation in the Italian Welfare System and Its Reproduction in Europe (From the 1970s to the Present). *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2868025>
- ICMPD. (2015). *A Decade of Dialogue on Migration and Development*.
- IGF, I. G. des finances, IGAS, I. des affaires sociales, & IGA, I. générale de l'administration. (2013). *L'hébergement et la prise en charge financière des demandeurs d'asile* (p. 230).
- ISTAT. (2011). *Censimento permanente delle istituzioni no profit*.
- ISTAT. (2016). *Censimento permanente delle istituzioni non profit* (p. 17).
- ISTAT. (2018). *Struttura e profili del settore non profit* (p. 13).

- Jacobs, K. (2012). Making Sense of Social Practice: Theoretical Pluralism in Public Sector Accounting Research. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 28(1), 1–25.
- Jacobs, K. (2016). Theorising Interdisciplinary Public Sector Accounting Research: INTERDISCIPLINARY PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING RESEARCH. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 32(4), 469–488.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12093>
- Jäger, U. P., & Schröer, A. (2014a). Integrated Organizational Identity: A Definition of Hybrid Organizations and a Research Agenda. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 25(5), 1281–1306.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-013-9386-1>
- Jäger, U. P., & Schröer, A. (2014b). Integrated Organizational Identity: A Definition of Hybrid Organizations and a Research Agenda. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 25(5), 1281–1306.
- Jany-Catrice, F. (2012). *La performance totale: Nouvel esprit du capitalisme ?* (Presses universitaires du Septentrion). Villeneuve d'Ascq.
- Jick, T.D (1979) *Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action*. Edition Cornell University
- Johnson, R. B., & Turner, L. S. (2003). Data collection strategies in mixed methods research. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research* (pp. 297-319). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Johansson, H., Arvidson, M., & Johansson, S. (2015). Welfare Mix as a Contested Terrain: Political Positions on Government–Non-profit Relations at National and Local Levels in a Social Democratic Welfare State. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 26(5), 1601–1619.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9580-4>
- Jones, B. D. (2002). Bounded rationality and public policy: Herbert A. Simon and the decisional foundation of collective choice. *Policy Sciences*, 35, 269–284.
- Jones, B.M., (2007) The Multiple Source of Mission Drift. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 36(2), 299-307
- Kanter, R. M. (1994). Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances. *Harvard Business Review*, (July–August,), 96–108.
- Kazepov, Y. (2013). Exploring the multilevel governance of welfare provision and social innovation: Welfare mix, welfare models and rescaling. *Improve. Poverty, Social Policy and Innovation*, 13/12.
- Kendall, J., & Knapp, M. (1996). *The Voluntary Sector in the United Kingdom* (Routledge). London.
- Kerlin, J. (2006). Social enterprise in the United States and Europe: Understanding and learning from the differences. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 17(3), 247–263.
- Knorr-Cetina, K. (1981). *The Manufacture of Knowledge. An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science* (Pergamon Press). Oxford.
- Kobelinsky, C. (2015). Accueil ou contrôle ? *Plein droit*, 105(2), 14.  
<https://doi.org/10.3917/pld.105.0014>

- Klein, K. J., Dansereau, F., & Hall, R. J. (1994). Levels issues in theory development, data collection, and analysis. *Academy of Management Review*, 19, 195-229.
- Klein, K. J., Dansereau, F., & Hall, R. J. (1995). On the level: Homogeneity, independence, heterogeneity, and interactions in organizational theory. *Academy of Management Review*, 20, 7-9.
- Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Klein, K. J. (2000). A multilevel approach to theory and research in organizations: Contextual, temporal, and emergent processes. In K. J. Klein & S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), *Multilevel theory, research and methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions* (pp. 3-90). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- La Repubblica. (2018). Decreto Salvini, 'Circa 12 mila persone con protezione umanitaria finiranno in strada nelle prossime settimane'—Repubblica.it. Retrieved 28 September 2019, from [https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2018/12/18/news/decreto\\_salvini\\_oxfam\\_le\\_nuove\\_norme\\_sulle\\_migrazioni\\_sono\\_senza\\_umanita\\_-214564490/](https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2018/12/18/news/decreto_salvini_oxfam_le_nuove_norme_sulle_migrazioni_sono_senza_umanita_-214564490/)
- Larbi, G. (1999). *The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States* [Data set]. [https://doi.org/10.1163/1570-6664\\_iyb\\_SIM\\_org\\_39759](https://doi.org/10.1163/1570-6664_iyb_SIM_org_39759)
- Laville, J. L., & Nyssens, M. (2001). *Les services sociaux entre associations, État et marché* (La Découverte et Syros.). Paris.
- Le Grand, J. (1991). Quasi-Markets and Social Policy. *The Economic Journal*, 101(408), 1256–1267.
- Le Grand, J. (2011a). Quasi-Market versus State Provision of Public Services: Some Ethical Considerations. *Public Reason*, 3(2), 80–89.
- Le Grand, J. (2011b). Quasi-Market versus State PrvSION f Public Services: Some Ethical Considerations. *Public Reason*, 3(2), 80–89.
- Le Grand, J., & Bartlett, W. (1993). *Quasi-Markets and Social Policy* (Macmillan). London.
- Leblebici, H., Salancik, G.R., Copay, A., King, T (1991) Institutional Change and the Transformation of Interorganizational Fields: An Organizational History of the U.S. Radio Broadcasting Industry *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 333-363
- Levy, R. (2010). New Public Management: End of an Era? *Public Policy and Administration*, 25(2), 234–240.
- Lewis, D. (2003). Theorizing the organization and management of non-governmental development organizations: Towards a composite approach. *Public Management Review*, 5(325–344), 325–344.
- Lewis, J. (2005). New Labour's Approach to the Voluntary Sector: Independence and the Meaning of Partnership. *Social Policy and Society*, 4(2), 121–131. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474640400226X>
- Lopes Costa, P., Graça, A.M., Marques-Quinteiro, P., Marques Santos, C., Caetano, A., Passos, A.M., (2013) Multilevel Research in the Field of Organizational Behavior: An Empirical Look at 10 Years of Theory and Research First Published August 7, 2013



- Lorange, P., & Ross, J. (1992). *Strategic Alliances: Formation, Implementation and Evolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lu, J. (2017). Does Population Heterogeneity Really Matter to Nonprofit Sector Size? Revisiting Weisbrod's Demand Heterogeneity Hypothesis. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9915-4>
- Maier, F., & Meyer, M. (2011). Managerialism and Beyond: Discourses of Civil Society Organization and Their Governance Implications. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 22(4), 731–756.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-011-9202-8>
- Maier, F., Meyer, M., & Steinbereithner, M. (2016). Nonprofit Organizations Becoming Business-Like: A Systematic Review. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 45(1), 64–86. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764014561796>
- Mair, J., & Marti, I. (2006). Social entrepreneurship research: A source of explanation, prediction, and delight. *Journal of World Business*, 41(1), 36–44.
- Marcuello, C. (1998). Determinants of the Non-profit Sector Size: An Empirical Analysis in Spain. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 69(2), 175–192.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8292.00078>
- Masse, J.-P. (1996). L'intégration progressive des réfugiés européens dans le dispositif d'accueil, 1970-1990. *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, 44(1), 63–65.  
<https://doi.org/10.3406/mat.1996.403057>
- Matsunaga, Y., & Yamauchi, N. (2002). Is the government failure theory still relevant?: A panel analysis using the U.S. state level data. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 75(2), 227–263.
- Matsunaga, Y., Yamauchi, N., & Okuyama, N. (2010). What Determines the Size of the Nonprofit Sector?: A Cross-Country Analysis of the Government Failure Theory. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 21(2), 180–201. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-010-9125-9>
- Matthews, R. C. O. (1986). The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Economic Growth. *Economic Journal*, 96(4), 903–918.
- McKay, S., Moro, D., Teasdale, S., & Clifford, D. (2011). Social Marketisation and Policy Influence of Third Sector Organisations: Evidence from the UK | SpringerLink. *International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Working Paper 69*. Retrieved from <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11266-017-9853-1>
- Meek, V. L. (1988). Organizational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses. *Organization Studies*, 9(4), 453–473.
- Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM). (2018). *Flexible Solidarity: A comprehensive strategy for asylum and immigration in the EU* [Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe]. Kiel: IfW.

- Meyer, John W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 340–363.  
<https://doi.org/10.1086/226550>
- Meyer, John Wilfred, & Scott, W. R. (1983). Centralization and the legitimacy problems of local government. In John Wilfred Meyer & W. R. Scott (Eds.), *Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality*. Beverly Hills: CA: Sage.
- Meyer, John Wilfred, Scott, W. R., & Deal, T. C. (1981). Institutional and technical sources of organizational structure explaining the structure of educational organizations. In H. Stein (Ed.), *Organizations and the Human Services: Cross-Disciplinary Reflections*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1992). *Economics, Organization and Management*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall International Editions.
- Ministère de l'économie, de l'industrie et du numérique. (2015). *Tout savoir et tout comprendre sur la loi économie sociale et solidaire – ESS, trois lettres pour une nouvelle économie* (p. 16). Retrieved from  
<http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/PDF/ess-brochure.pdf>.
- Mohr LB (1982) Explaining Organizational Behavior, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass.
- Monzón, Jose Luis, & Chaves, R. (2017). *Recent evolutions of the Social Economy in the European Union* (p. 124). Brussels: EESC.
- Monzón, José Luis, & Chaves-Ávila, R. (2008). *The social economy in the European Union*. Bruxelles: European Economic and Social Committee.
- Munck, R. (2008). Globalisation, Governance and Migration: An introduction. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(7), 1227–1246.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802386252>
- Nee, V. (Ed.). (2005). The New Institutionalisms in Economics and Sociology. In *The handbook of economic sociology* (2nd ed). Princeton, N.J. : New York: Princeton University Press ; Russell Sage Foundation.
- Nifo, A., & Vecchione, G. (2014). Do institutions play a role in skilled migration? The case of Italy. *Regional Studies*, 48(10), 1628–1649.  
<https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/00343404.2013.835799>
- North, D.L., Weingast, B.R., (1989) Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 49, No. 4. (Dec., 1989), pp. 803-832
- North, D. (1991). Institutions. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1), 97–112.
- North, D. C. (1992). Institutions and Economic Theory. *The American Economist*, 36(1), 3–6. <https://doi.org/10.1177/056943459203600101>
- North, D. C. (1994). Economic Performance Through Time. *The American Economic Review*, 84(3), 359–368.
- Núñez, R. da C. (1995). *Partners in public service: Government-nonprofit relations in the modern welfare state*. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2151902>
- Nyssens, M. (2008). Les analyses économiques des associations. In C. Hoarau & J.-L. Laville (Eds.), *La gouvernance des associations: Économie, sociologie, gestion*. Ramonville Saint-Agne: Erès.

- Nyssens, M. (2017). Les Associations. In J Defourny & M. Nyssens (Eds.), *Economie Sociale et Solidaire* (deboecksuperior, pp. 119–149). Louvain-la-Neuve.
- Observatoire National de l'ESS – CNCRESS. (2014). *Atlas commenté de l'économie sociale et solidaire*. juris edition.
- Observatoire National de l'ESS – CNCRESS. (2017). *Atlas commenté de l'économie sociale et solidaire*. juris edition.
- OECD. (1993). *Managing with Market-type Mechanisms*. Paris.
- OECD. (1998). *INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM: A STUDY OF FIVE OECD COUNTRIES* (PUBLIC MANAGEMENT SERVICE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE No. 14).
- OECD/European Union. (2017). *The Law on the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE), France*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. *The Academy of Management Review*, 16(1), 145–179.
- Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1993). *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. London: Penguin Books.
- Osborne, S. P. (2006a). The New Public Governance? *Public Management Review*, 8(3), 377–387. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030600853022>
- Osborne, S. P. (2006b). The New Public Governance? <sup>1</sup>. *Public Management Review*, 8(3), 377–387. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030600853022>
- Osborne, S. P. (2010). Delivering Public Services: Time for a new theory? *Public Management Review*, 12(1), 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030903495232>
- Osborne, S. P., Radnor, Z., & Nasi, G. (2013). A New Theory for Public Service Management? Toward a (Public) Service-Dominant Approach. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 43(2), 135–158. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074012466935>
- Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2013). Inside the Hybrid Organization: Selective Coupling as a Response to Competing Institutional Logics. *Academy of Management Journal*, 56(4), 972–1001. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0405>
- Pape, U., Chaves-Ávila, R., Pahl, J. B., Petrella, F., Pielniński, B., & Savall-Morera, T. (2016). Working under pressure: Economic recession and third sector development in Europe. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 36(7/8), 547–566. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-01-2016-0010>
- Pascal, A., Aldebert, B. & Rouzies, A. 2018. Mobilisation des méthodes mixtes dans la recherche en systèmes d'information : exploration bibliographique d'une paradoxale discrétion , *Systèmes d'Information and Management*
- Pauly, S., Bank, K., Blöser, J., Arne Niemann, & Zaun, N. (2016). The EU's response to the so-called refugee “crisis”. *PSCA, Heft 7*, 14–20.
- Pennings, J. M. (1982). Organizational Birth Frequencies: An Empirical Investigation. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 27(1), 120. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2392549>
- Penninx, R., Kraal, K., Martiniello, M., & Vertovec, S. (2004). *Citizenship in European cities: Immigrants, local politics and integration policies*. Farnham: Ashgate.

- Pestoff, V. (2012). Co-production and Third Sector Social Services in Europe: Some Concepts and Evidence. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 23(4), 1102–1118. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-012-9308-7>
- Pestoff, V., & Brandsen, T. (2008). *Co-production: The third sector and the delivery of public services*. New York: Routledge.
- Pestoff, V., Osborne, S. P., & Brandsen, T. (2006). Patterns of co-production in public services. Some concluding thoughts. *Public Management Review*, 8(4), 591–595.
- Petrella, F. (2003). *Une analyse néoinstitutionnaliste des structures de propriété « multi-stakeholder »: Une application aux organisations de développement local* (Thèse de doctorat en Sciences Economiques). Université catholique de Louvain.
- Petrella, F., & Richez-Battesti, N. (2012). Les logiques d'interaction entre associations et institutions publiques dans la gouvernance locale. *Informations Sociales*, 172, 81–90.
- Petrella, F., & Richez-Battesti, N. (2014). Social entrepreneur, social entrepreneurship and social enterprise: Semantics and controversies. *Journal of Innovation Economics Management*, n°14(2), 143–156.
- Pettigrew, A. M. (1985). Contextualist Research and the Study of Organizational Change Processes. In *Doing Research that is Useful for Theory and Practice* (pp. 53–72).
- Pettigrew, A. M. (1987). Context and Action in the Transformation of the Firm. *Journal of Management Studies*, 24(6), 649–670.
- Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). *The external control of organizations. A Resource Dependence Perspective* (Stanford Business Books). Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press.
- Phillips, S. D., & Smith, S. R. (Eds.). (2011). *Governance and regulation in the third sector: International perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- Picciotti, A., Bernardoni, A., & Cossignani, M. (2014). Social cooperatives in Italy: Economic antecedents and regional distribution. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 85, 213–31.
- Picciotti, A., Bernardoni, A., Cossignani, M., & Ferrucci, L. (2014). SOCIAL COOPERATIVES IN ITALY: ECONOMIC ANTECEDENTS AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION: SOCIAL COOPERATIVES IN ITALY. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 85(2), 213–231. <https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12036>
- Piga, M. L. (2012). *Regolazione sociale e promozione di solidarietà. Processi di cambiamento nelle politiche sociali*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Pollitt, C. (1991). *Managerialism and the Public Services: The Anglo-American Experience* (2nd Edition, Blackwell). Oxford.
- Pollitt, C. (1994). *Modernizing the Management of the Public Services Sector: Between Crusade and Catastrophe?* Presented at the Administrative development agency, Helsinki.

- Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2000). *Public management reform, a comparative analysis* (Oxford University Press). Oxford.
- Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2004). *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis* (Oxford University Press). Oxford.
- Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). *Public management reform: A comparative analysis: New public management, governance, and the neo-weberian state* (Oxford University Press). Oxford.
- Powell, W. W., & DiMaggio. (1991). *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (University of Chicago). Chicago: Chicago Press.
- Powell, W.W. and Sandholtz (2012) Amphibious entrepreneurs and the emergence of organizational forms. *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, (6) 94-115
- Purdy, J. M., & Gray, B. (2009). Conflicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion, and multilevel dynamics in emerging institutional fields. *Academy of Management Journal*, 52(2), 355–380.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Queinnec, E. (2012). Les organisations sans but lucratif répondent-elles à une demande de biens de confiance? Le cas des services de prise en charge. *Revue d'économie Politique*, 122(1), 67–87.
- Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1940) On social Structure, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 70, 9-31.
- Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the Rivalry of Competing Institutional Logics. *Organization Studies*, 30(6), 629–652.
- Rees, J. (2014). Public sector commissioning and the third sector: Old wine in new bottles? *Public Policy and Administration*, 29(1), 45–63.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076713510345>
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1994). The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain. *The Political Quarterly*, 65(2), 138–151. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1994.tb00441.x>.
- Rocco, G., & Stievano, A. (2011). La professione infermieristica nel nuovo contesto legislativo italiano [The nursing profession in the new Italian legislative context]. In L. Lombi & A. Stievano (Eds.), *Introduzione alla sociologia della salute: Manuale per la professione infermieristica [Introduction to sociology of health: Handbook for nursing professionals]* (FrancoAngeli, pp. 143–160). Milano.
- Romano, S. (2012). Germania boccia Italia in tema profughi. *Il Referendum*.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). Altruism, ideological entrepreneurs and the non-profit firm. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 8(2), 120–134.
- Salamon, L. (1987). Of market failure, voluntary failure, and third party of government relations in the modern welfare state. *Journal of Voluntary Action Research*, 16(2), 29–49.

- Salamon, L. M. (1993). The Marketization of Welfare: Changing Nonprofit and For-Profit Roles in the American Welfare State. *The Social Service Review (Chicago)*, 67(1), 16–39.
- Salamon, L. M. (1995). *Partners in Public Services: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State* (The JHU Press). Baltimore.
- Salamon, L. M. (1999). *America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer*. New York: The Foundation Center.
- Salamon, L. M. (2003). *The Resilient Sector: The State of Nonprofit America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Salamon, L. M. (2014). *The third sector in Europe: Towards a consensus conceptualization*. 33.
- Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. (1997a). *Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-National Analysis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. (1997b). The Civil Society Sector. *Society*, 34, 60–65.
- Salamon, L. M., & Sokolowski, W. (2015). *The Third Sector in Europe: Towards a consensus conceptualization* [POLICY BRIEF NO. 01/2015].
- Salamon, L., Sokolowski, W., & Associates. (2004). *Global civil society: Dimensions of the nonprofit sector*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Sanjuar, P., & Lucas, E. (2006). *Rapport du groupe de travail « Le dialogue de gestion »*. Paris: SGAR - Intérieur, SGA Adjoint - Défense.
- Sargiacomo, M., Ianni, L., D'Andreamatteo, A., & Servalli, S. (2015). Accounting and the fight against corruption in Italian government procurement: A longitudinal critical analysis (1992–2014). *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 28, 89–96. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2015.01.006>
- Sassen, S. (2008). *Una sociologia della globalizzazione* (Einaudi). Torino.
- Satler, G. (2006). *Two tales of a city: Rebuilding Chicago's, Architectural and social landscape, 1986-2005*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Saxton, G. D., & Benson, M. A. (2005). Social Capital and the Growth of the Nonprofit Sector n. *Social Science Quarterly*, 20.
- Schneiberg, M., & Clemens, E. (2006). The typical tools for the job: Research strategies in institutional analysis. *Sociological Theory*, 24(3), 195–227.
- Scholten, P., & Penninx, R. (2016). The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration. In B. Garcés-Mascareñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe* (pp. 91–108). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_6)
- Schuler, D. A., Rehbein, K., & Cramer, R. D. (2002). Pursuing strategic advantage through political means: A multivariate approach. *Accademy of Management Journal*, 45, 659–672.
- Scott, W. R. (1983). Health care organizations in the 1980s: The convergence of public and professional control systems. In John Wilfred Meyer & W. R. Scott (Eds.), *Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality* (Sage, pp. 99–113). Beverly Hills, CA.

- Sena, B. (2017). Professionalization without Autonomy: The Italian Case of Building the Nursing Profession. *Professions and Professionalism*, 7(3), 1900.  
<https://doi.org/10.7577/pp.1900>
- Shoham, A., Ruvio, A., Vigoda-Gadot, E., & Schwabsky, N. (2006). Market Orientations in the Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector: A Meta-Analysis of Their Relationships With Organizational Performance. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 35(3), 453–476. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764006287671>
- Shore, C., & Wright, S. (1997). Policy: A New Field of Anthropology. In C. Shore & S. Wright (Eds.), *Anthropology of Policy. Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power* (pp. 3–39). London: Routledge.
- Skelcher, C., & Smith, S. R. (2015). THEORIZING HYBRIDITY: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS, AND ACTOR IDENTITIES: THE CASE OF NONPROFITS: Theorizing Hybridity. *Public Administration*, 93(2), 433–448.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12105>
- Slater, G., & Spencer, D. (2000). The uncertain foundations of transaction costs economics. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 34(1), 61–87.
- Smelser, N. J., & Swedberg, R. (Eds.). (2005). *The handbook of economic sociology* (2nd ed). Princeton, N.J. : New York: Princeton University Press ; Russell Sage Foundation.
- Smith, S. R., & Lipsky, M. (1993). *Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting*. Harvard University Press.
- Smithson, J., (2007) Using focus groups in social research. In book: *The Sage Handbook of Social Research Methods*. Editors: Alasuurtari, P., Bickman, L., Brannen, J. Publisher: Sage
- Sorrentino, M., Sicilia, M., & Howlett, M. (2018). Understanding co-production as a new public governance tool. *Policy and Society*, 37(3), 277–293.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2018.1521676>
- Stevenson, L., & Lundström, A. (2001). *Patterns and trends in entrepreneurship/SME policy and practice in ten countries*. Stockholm: Swedish Foundation for Small Business Research.
- Steward, J., & Walsh, K. (1992). Change in the management of public services. *Public Administration*, 70(4), 499–518.
- Suarez, D. F. (2011). Collaboration and Professionalization: The Contours of Public Sector Funding for Nonprofit Organizations. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21(2), 307–326.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/ALANart/muq049>
- Taylor, M., & Hoggett, P. (1994). Trusting in networks? The third sector and welfare change. In *Delivering Welfare: Repositioning non-profit and co-operative action in Western Europe* (Centre d'Initiatives de l'Economia Social). Barcelona.
- Tchernonog, V. (2013). *Le paysage associatif français* (Daloz, Juris Edition, 2e ed).
- Tchernonog, V., & Prouteau, L. (2019). *Le paysage associatif français – Mesures et évolutions* (Daloz Juris Associations, Vols 1–3ème édition).
- Thornton, P., and Ocasio W. (1999). 'Institutional Logics and the Historical Contingency

- of Power in Organizations: Executive Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958–1990.' *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (3): 801–843
- Thornton, P. (2011). Isomorphism. In D. Teece & M. Augier (Eds.), *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management*. Palgrave Macmillan Publishers.
- Titmuss, R. M. (1968). *Commitment to Welfare*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Tolbert, P.S., Zucker L. G., (1983) Institutional Sources of change in the formal structure of organizations. The diffusion of civil service reforms, 1880-1935 *Administrative Science Quarterly*, (28) 22-39
- Tortia, E. C., & Caroli, M. (2017). *The role of the social economy in migrants' reception and integration. The Municipalities of Romagna Faentina in Central Italy*.  
<https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.13575.09123>
- Trasciani, G., Mavin, R., Borrelli, L. M., & Alomar, A. (2019). 'A Forest with many trees' – *Mapping the migration industry and accountabilit(ies) in Europe* (p. 35) [FEPS Publication]. Brussels.
- Twombly, E. (2003). What Factors Affect the Entry and Exit of Nonprofit Human Service Organizations in Metropolitan Areas? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 32, 211–235.
- Van Erkelens, A. (2005). Comment est géré un Centre d'Accueil de Demandeurs d'Asile lorsqu'il donne lieu à une convention entre l'Etat et une association ou une entreprise ? *TERRA - Ed 'Collection Syntheses'*.
- Van Puyvelde, S., & Brown, W. A. (2016). Determinants of Nonprofit Sector Density: A Stakeholder Approach. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 27(3), 1045–1063. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9656-1>
- Weber, M. (1952). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Scribner.
- Weisbrod, B. (1998). Guest editor's introduction: The nonprofit mission and its financing. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 17(2), 165–174.
- Weisbrod, B. A. (1975). Toward a theory of the voluntary non-profit sector in a three sector economy. In E. S. Phelps (Ed.), *Altruism, morality and economic theory*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Weisbrod, B. A. (1977). *The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector: An Economic Analysis*. (Lexington Books). Lexington, MA.
- Whiteford, P. (2006). The Welfare Expenditure Debate: Economic Myths of the Left and the Right Revisited. *The Economic and Labour Relations Review*, 17(1), 33–78.
- Whitley, R. (2006). Project-based firms: New organizational form or variations on a theme? *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 15(1), 77–99.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtj003>
- Wilensky, H. L. (1964). The professionalization of everyone? *American Journal of Sociology*, 70, 137–158.
- Williamson, O. E. (1975). *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. New York: Free Press.



- Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 22(2), 233–261.
- Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36(2), 269.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2393356>
- Williamson, O. E. (2000). The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38(3), 595–613.
- Yin, R. (2014). *Case Study Research Design and Methods* (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Young, D. R. (1983). *If not for profit, for what?* Lexington, KY: Lexington Books.
- Zamagni, S., & Zamagni, V. (2010). *Cooperative enterprise: Facing the challenge of globalization*. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Zimmer, A., & Pahl, B. (2016). Learning from Europe: Report on third sector enabling and disabling factors. *TSI Comparative Report No. 1, Seventh Framework Programme (Grant Agreement 613034), European Union. Brussels: Third Sector Impact*, 30.
- Zucker L.G., (1988) Where do institutional patterns come from? Organizations as actors in social systems. In Ed L. G., Zucker Institutional Patterns in Organizations: Culture and Environment 23-49 Cambridge, MA Ballinger

## Annex 1 The Interview Guidelines

### Guide to the semi-structured interviews French Version

#### Brève biographie personnelle:

- Parlez-moi de vous et de votre parcours professionnel ?
  - Quel est votre parcours professionnel, quelle est votre formation ?
  - Depuis combien de temps travaillez-vous pour cette organisation ?
- Pouvez-vous me décrire votre rôle dans l'organisation et vos fonctions ?
  - Pouvez-vous me décrire votre journée typique ? Etes-vous en contact direct avec les demandeurs d'asile ? Si oui, que faites-vous exactement avec eux ? Quelle est votre mission ?

#### Description de l'organisation

- Que fait votre organisation? Quelle est sa mission ?
  - Quelles sont les activités qui vous faites avec aux migrants ?
- Quel est le rôle de votre organisation dans le secteur de l'accueil de migrants?
- Comment votre organisation elle-est née?
  - Quelle est son histoire ?
  - A-t-elle toujours été active dans le secteur de l'accueil des migrants ?
  - Est-ce qu'elle offrait les mêmes services ou activités?
  - Le rôle de votre organisation a-t-il évolué ?
  - S'il y a eu une évolution dans le temps, comment pourriez-vous l'expliquer ?
- Quelle est la structure de votre organisation ? Y a-t-il différents services ?
  - Y a-t-il un organigramme ?
- Combien y a-t-il de salariés (en équivalents-temps plein) ?

#### Le Secteur de l'accueil de Migrants en général

- Est ce que vous pouvez me décrire la structure du secteur?
  - Quels sont les principaux acteurs (institutionnels /publics / privés/associatifs/ etc. ?)
  - Que font-ils exactement ?
  - Quels sont leurs rapports entre eux (collaboration sur des projets communs ou concurrence) ? Est-ce qu'ils se connaissent ?

Est-ce qu'il y a eu des changements dans le secteur ? Quand, quelles sont les étapes principales ? Et si oui quelles en sont les étapes les plus importantes ?

*c'est très général peut-être faudrait-il donner des exemples seulement si la personne ne voit pas trop ce que tu attends d'elle)*

- Par exemple, l'arrivée de nouvelles associations, des fusions, des nouveaux modes de financement, des nouvelles lois... etc.
- Comment les politiques de l'accueil en France sont-elles définies et par qui ? (es. Les types de services à développer, qui, et comment ?)
- Comment décrivez-vous les relations entre le secteur public (= autorités publiques, administration ou organisations publiques ???) et les autres organisations ? Et entre le public et votre organisation?

#### Les organisations du secteur

*préciser à quel échelon ? régional ou national, sinon, cela risque d'être difficile de répondre... je n'en sais trop rien, tu sais mieux que moi si on peut répondre facilement au niveau national...*

- Est-ce qu'il y a beaucoup d'organisations dans ce secteur ?
  - Quelle est leur structure ? (petites, grandes, elles ont fusionné etc.)
- A votre avis, à quoi est du ce type de configuration?
- Le nombre d'organisations dans le secteur a-t-il augmenté ou diminué?
  - Selon vous, est-ce que cette augmentation ou diminution est –t-elle due à ce que les médias appellent « l'urgence migratoire »?

#### Les Financements et les modes d'évaluation

- Quel est votre budget en 2017 (approximativement)? A-t-il évolué ces trois dernières années ?
- Quelles sont vos principales sources de financement ?
- Est ce que les modes de financement ont changé ces dernières années ?
  - Si oui, quand et comment ?
- Quel impact ce changement a-t-il eu sur les pratiques de l'organisation ?
  - Comment se déroule la recherche de financement aujourd'hui ?
  - Et auparavant ?
  - Avez-vous recruté une ou plusieurs personnes spécialisées dans la recherche de financements ?
  - Si vous avez un département dédié au financement, combien de personnes y travaillent et quel genre de formation ont-elles ?
- Est ce que vous pouvez me décrire les nouveaux instruments que vous utilisez?
- Est-ce qu'il y a des critères/conditions à respecter pour obtenir des financements ? Si oui, sont-ils décrits de façon spécifique ou bien laissent-ils une marge de manœuvre à l'organisation dans leur interprétation ?
- Quels sont les critères d'évaluation de la structure par les financeurs ?
  - Où sont-ils décrits (dans quel document) ?
  - Existe-t-il une liste de critères précis ou plutôt des définitions larges ?
  - Ces critères sont-ils principalement quantitatifs (chiffres, tableaux de bord, coûts) ou qualitatifs ?
- Est ce que vous pensez que cette façon de financer les organisations influence ou risque d'influencer dans le futur leurs activités au quotidien ?

## Guide to the semi-structured interviews Italian Version

### 1. Breve Bio Personale:

- Mi può parlare del suo percorso personale?
- Da quanto tempo lavora per questa organizzazione?

Mi può descrivere la sua esperienza all'interno dell'organizzazione?

- Mi può descrivere una giornata tipica
- Mi può citare le mansioni più importanti di cui è responsabile?
- Quali sono i lavoratori in contatto diretto con i richiedenti asilo? E cosa fate esattamente insieme?

### 2. Descrizione dell'organizzazione:

- Cosa fa esattamente la sua organizzazione? Quale è la mission dell'organizzazione?
  - Quali servizi offre esattamente e a chi?
  - Quali attività vengono svolte esattamente con i richiedenti asilo?
- Che ruolo svolge la sua organizzazione nel settore dell'accoglienza?
- Come nasce l'organizzazione e quando (in che contesto)?
  - Quale è la sua storia?
  - Ci sono delle tappe particolarmente significative (cambiamenti organizzazionali / espansione/ fusione / cambiamento di mission etc)
  - L'accoglienza è sempre stato il settore di attività? Se no quale era e perché è avvenuto il cambiamento?
- Quale è la struttura della vostra organizzazione? È cambiata nel tempo? Più grande piccola o più o meno precisamente strutturata? Creazione di nuovi dipartimenti?
  - C'è un organigramma?
- Quanti salariati ci sono?
- Quanti volontari?

### 3. Il settore dell'accoglienza

- Come è cambiato il settore dell'accoglienza in Italia?
- Quali sono i principali attori (per importanza e per numero)
  - da un punto di vista istituzionale (stato/provincia/ regione etc)
  - da un punto di vista dei privati (ci sono delle associazioni particolarmente presenti nell'aria?)
- Che rapporto ha questa organizzazione con loro?
  - Come altre associazioni ci sono dei progetti in collaborazione?
- Ci sono stati negli anni dei cambiamenti del settore?
  - di che natura? (Agenzificazione del settore/ aumento della concorrenza?)
  - Quali sono le tappe principali di tali cambiamento (per es. da un punto di vista legislativo o nuove e grandi organizzazioni che entrano nel mercato etc)
  - Come sono definite e da chi le politiche dell'accoglienza in Italia?

- Come definiresti le relazioni tra le organizzazioni sul territorio (collaborazione o concorrenza) e tra autorità pubbliche e le organizzazioni?

#### 4. Le organizzazioni nel settore

- A Napoli ci sono molte organizzazioni che si occupano di accoglienza?
  - Che organizzazioni sono (associazioni/ cooperative sociali/ privati)
  - Ci sono delle collaborazioni?
  - Sono SPRAR o CAS?
  - Sono piccole o grandi?
- A suo avviso a cosa è dovuta tale configurazione?
- Secondo lei le organizzazioni sono aumentate / diminuite a causa della così detto emergenza migranti?

#### 5. Finanziamento e Valutazione

- Quale è stato il budget 2017 -2018? È cambiato negli ultimi 3 anni?
- Quali sono le fonti di finanziamento?
- Come sono cambiati i finanziamenti negli ultimi anni?
  - In termini di quantità
  - In termini di difficoltà nell'ottenimento
  - Quale è la procedura per ottenerli (potrebbe descrivermi passo passo la procedura)
- Che impatto ha il cambiamento di finanziamenti o di modalità di ottenimento sull'organizzazione?
  - Avete delle persone che si occupano principalmente o esclusivamente di finanziamenti?
  - Avete un apposito dipartimento per i finanziamenti?
  - Da quando?
- Mi può descrivere nel dettaglio lo strumento di finanziamento?
- Quali sono i criteri di valutazione?
  - Ci sono criteri quantitativi? Quali?
  - Ci sono criteri qualitativi? Quali?
  - C'è scritto esplicitamente da qualche parte che bisogna seguire tali criteri?
  - Ci sono delle conseguenze nel caso non si seguano?(riduzione dei finanziamenti per esempio?)
  - Lei pensa che questa modalità di finanziamento ha un impatto sull'organizzazione?
  - Le altre organizzazioni del settore vengono finanziate tramite medesimo strumento?

## Annex 2 The Case Studies Conflicting Institutional Logics

### The Case ALAN: Conflicting Logics

	Social Logic	Entrepreneurial Logic	Militant Logic	Technical Rationality Logic
<b>Values</b>	Sustain and help to beneficiaries “l’asilo è per me una passione la passione della mia vita” interview 2 “il faut que le personne qu’on a accompagne on les accompagne jusqu’au but et meme si le but est difficile de plus en plus je te confirme” interview 1		Solidarity and militancy “Cercano anche grazie a lei, di mantenere una certa indipendenza associativi e di lavorare su vari piccoli contro-poteri rispetto a ciò che la prefettura può chiedere” External Actor 1	
<b>HR</b>	Able to sustain the beneficiary from different aspects without any hierarchy among the social and psychological aspect and the legal and administrative one		Adherence to the organizational Values and identity “je pense que c’est important de parler de l’histoire de l’asso. En fait quand on va parler de résistance, déjà c’est logique de abord se rappeler de son identité” Interview1 “Io ho bisogno di lavorare in un posto che sia engage nei cui valori io mi riconosco ma nella misura in cui questi valori si perdono non ce la faccio”	Specialised “Noi penso che siamo un centro caro ma estremamente performante per tutta l’équipe è un’équipe che ha sia competenze educative sia competenze tecniche giuridiche che costa. Credo che facciamo un accompagnamento di qualità” Interview 2

**Size of Organization**

**the** *“Small is beautiful”*  
Piccole strutture come la nostra. Per esempio l' accueil inconditionelle restiamo una delle poche strutture a Marisiglia che la applica ancora grazie a dio e probabilmente la applichiamo perchè l'origine della struttura è protestante quindi ci sono dei valori che sono portati Avanti da quell lato lì però di fatto saremmo votati alla scomparsa  
Interview 2

**Organization Chart**

Horizontal  
“Donc on a décidait et je dit on parce que c' était une decision de toute l'équipe. On s'est vraiment pris le temps pour y réfléchir.”  
Interview 3

**Resources**

Difficulties to acceptance of the performance indicators Internal mutualisation of resources and cut of costs  
*“Si fa una constatazione sul fatto che I soldi sono sempre meno e con questi soldi si cerca di fare quello che si faceva prima. Ed è quello che stiamo facendo noi. I soldi sono meno ma cerchiamo di garantire un'ospitalità, fino a quando? Non lo so”*

---

Interview 2

**Relationship with other associations**

Competition

Selected cooperation based on shared values

**Relationship with public authorities**

Mediated by inter-diary actors  
*“Adesso come adesso in un sacco di centri, un sacco mica tanto. Dei centri, tra cui noi si sono opposti, c’è stato tutto un movimento di protesta in più con la federazione... però non so quanto questa cosa durerà, se durerà non ho idea”* Interview 2

**Founding**

Selected public resources

*“save money and decrease the costs It doesn't fall within our purview”* (Interview\_ALAN\_4)

**Reception services offered**

Selected instruments of reception, based on the quality of reception

*“l’abbassamento del prezzo al giorno che per farlo hanno quindi ridotto il numero di ... e si sono piegati a certe direttive di legge che per esempio non sono state fatte nel nostro CADA”* Interview 2

*“donc techniques sur les*

---



---

**Strategies**

Diversification from the other organizations and radicalization in the action

“le centre est pour le Femmes [...] est plus spécifique sur questions de sortie de prostitution parce la loi a changé au niveau prostitution”

---

missions de l'HUDA , il y a juste l'hébergement nous on fait le choix de faire plus et de ne pas faire que le minimum pour que les personnes puissent se poser en France le temps de leur demande [...]

Sinon on ouvre un hôtel mais ce n'est pas le but. ça résumait bien l'idée dans le sens de défendre notre manière de accompagner les personnes, de travailler, notre manière de les accueillir”

Interview 3

Exit and radicalization in the opposition

“quindi tu ti chiedi quale qualità stai garantendo tu di lavoro. Per me c'è tutto un compromesso etico che io non posso avere, non sono capace. Ci sono delle ingiunzioni istituzionali che sono intenibili” interview 2

---

Source: Re-elaboration of Pache and Santos (2013) based on the case study 1.

## The Case SAJIDA: Conflicting Logics

	<b>Social Logic</b>	<b>Entrepreneurial Logic</b>	<b>Militant Logic</b>	<b>Technical Rationality Logic</b>
<b>Values</b>	<p><i>Our association, and this is the case of many associations that today deal with assistance to asylum seekers, migrants and refugees, entered into this activity because their vocation was not to help migrants but to accompany and help people in distress in great precariousness and vulnerable people..</i> (Interview_SAJIDA_1)</p>		<p><i>since the 90s we've seen an impoverishment of the care for asylum seekers. Because we reduce the individuals to a file without taking into account the post-traumatic syndrome.</i> (Interview_ SAJIDA _2)</p>	<p><i>We do a special job. It's not social. It's a very special matter, it's very different. There are steps to be taken and respected. There is a very important administrative part and the population is very different from what we find in the CHRS.</i> (Interview_ SAJIDA _2)</p> <p><i>Indeed, it is an administrative accompaniment and the law does mention anymore the social aspects. Even if there is a the daily assistance, however there is not anymore the notion of the social assistance.</i> (Interview SAJIDA _2)</p> <p><i>[Le taux d'indu] c'est une regle et on doit tous le respecter! The undue rate is a rule and we all have to respect it!</i> (Interview_ SAJIDA 3)</p> <p><i>But compared to the department, we are one of the biggest associations, we have 19 establishments, 130 employees, but I will give you all the details of our figure. And so 130 employees with different jobs. A necessary professionalization</i></p>
<b>HR</b>		<p><i>I think that we have started a path for which grants will gradually disappear, to become only calls for projects. This is worrying because there are a lot of sector associations that are doing a great job, very adapted</i></p>		

---

(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_1)

*to the field, but they risk to disappear. We, as association, we are in the middle of a process, because we merged 10 months ago, and we are in the process of building this and we are in the process of building and operating this. For example, we have a person that we are currently recruiting, who will be a quality manager for social-educational intervention, who is going to be a quality manager for social intervention, which does not exist in our sector. The idea is precisely to bring someone whose job is precisely to design and develop projects and to work with us on the content of the call for projects*

(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_1)

**Size of Organization**

**the** *But after all, all our structures must establish the « social bond » as an essential character. That's a little bit of who we are. Of course we are a slightly larger association compared to other structures that manage disability or other social service, but however compared to, for example, FOFANA, we are still very small nowadays.*

(Interview SAJIDA \_1)

*There is a shared awareness in the Board of Directors, that we want to develop and strengthen ourself, to be able to respond in the most appropriate way We want to meet expectations in order to be able to protect our project, because the project is the quality we want to put into it.*

(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_1)

*So here it is, this evolution that leads the sector to being populated by big associations. it's true, very manifest and undeniable. We can observe that either there are big operators who arrive on a specific geographical area, it is the case today for Marseille and in the bouche du Rhone region, or these local operators merge to be more important and to be able to respond, or to save themselves at times. it is the case for us of SAJIDA association.*

(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_1)

---

*Forum Réfugiés et FTDA et eux ça fait longtemps qui sont de monstres du secteur, mais ce n'est pas forcément une mauvaise chose.*  
(Interview\_ SAJIDA 3)

## **Organization Chart**

Organized in specific departments under the control of a general director. The departments are d. asylum, d. reception, d. resources, d. health. A Director holds each department. The d. asylum is then divided in 7 different services, hold by a head of service; the d. Reception is divided in 12 services (see the organizational chart)

## **Resources**

*ce sens de réalité du terrain cette capacité de se adapter, et au meme temps de avoir une taille important pour pouvoir mutualiser certains fonctions au tour de toutes les fonctions supportes qui sont l'administratif la gestion, la capacité de ingegneria dont on parlait tout à l'heure. et de pouvoir effectivement maitriser nos couts, on est sur des économies d'échelle sur cette partie la et au meme temps de dégager cette capacité de ingegneria.*

Interview\_ SAJIDA \_1

c'est très important de se regrouper et de être forte

---

---

maintenant financièrement pour pouvoir répondre aux appels à projet. Si on a pas suffisamment de moyens, pour y aller, on gagnera pas. Le fait de fusionner je trouve que on addition nos forces, et on diminue le cout forcément [...]Quand vous fusionnez vous avez besoin que d'un comptable la plus parte de temps. on diminue les couts de structure. (Interview\_ SAJIDA \_2),

**Relationship with other associations**  
**Relationship with public authorities**

fusionne ensemble ça fait une moyenne asso, deux moyennes ça fait une grosse association. Nous c'est ce que on a fait a SAJIDA ASSOCIATION. et effectivement pour discuter avec les pouvoirs publics locaux, pas national encore , on est entendu de un autre oreille. (Interview\_ SAJIDA \_3)

Depuis 2002, les associations sont des gestionnaires l'état vous demande de répondre à un besoin, de répondre à un projet tant qu'on vous l'a demandé. De produire la qualité qu'on veut demande et vous vous demmerdez avec ça car vous etes

On a plus de liens avec le ministère et puis les appel à projet on tué un peu cette dynamique de du groupe parce que on devient des partenaires, mais on devient aussi concurrentes (Interview\_ SAJIDA \_2)

---

des gestionnaires.

(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_1)

les autorités publics ils ont maré de petits associations avec qui il faut discuter tout le temps mais c'est vrai que si tu as ADOMA qui a 400 CADA en France tu discute avec le directeur générale de ADOMA, tu lui dit de faire quelque chose tu sais que tu as 400 CADA.

(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_3)

Une forme de méfiance défiance des acteurs publiques par rapport aux associations, parce que sans doutes elles étaient un peu trop, incontrôlable et tout cas un peu trop libre, par le fait qu'elles étaient non-lucrative et donc il y avait pas trop d'enjeux de revenu. Et après je pense que le décideur public a une vision depuis toujours et encore plus depuis quelques années très libérale et économique des choses  
(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_1)

c'est un avantage par rapport à nous, ça veut dire que quand tu es un association style COALLIA, ADOMA, FTDA tu peut avoir un contact direct avec le ministère à Paris. SAJIDA ASSOCIATION, petite asso marseillaise, moi j'ai pas d'entre au cabinet ministériel, la par exemple il y a la réforme de l'asile. Jamais on pourrait faire valoir notre opinion. Par contre, maintenant moi j'ai un CADA, un HUDA, un CAO, ils s'en fout de moi. Par contre demain j'ai 400 CADA que je suis pas content il vont peut être m'écouter.

(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_3)

---

**Founding**

[L'appel à projet] c'est une instrument different, qui a des effets sur la structure associative. C'est pas juste un instrument ou l'autre, ici c'est toute la répartition de l'orchestre qui change. ça permet pas d'exercer un control à priori en tant que tel, l'appel à projet. ça permet pas de exercer un control sur ce qui est produit dans le projet.

**Reception services offered**

The quality of the service is very important. For this reasons the members of the association are highly qualified

**Strategies**

La strategie de survie c'est de prendre de la parte de marché. Il faut prendre de la parte de marché. meme si tu es perdant, ça veut dire que il faut grossir. c'est sure numéro 1. il faut etre irréprochable, numéro 2  
ça veut dire que tes taux, de 3% de 97% il faut montrer que ton travail tu le fait super bien. Et tu peux commencer dire voyez ce que vous me demandez de faire moi, je le fais super bien il y a pas de raisons pour que je ferme et la troisième stratégie c'est de fusionner ce que on a mit en place ici. deux que fusionne ensemble ça fait une moyenne asso, deux moyennes ça fait une grosse association. Nous c'est ce

---

que on a fait a SAJIDA  
ASSOCIATION. et  
effectivement pour discuter avec  
les pouvoirs publics locaux, pas  
national encore , on est entendu  
de un autre oreille.  
(Interview\_ SAJIDA \_3)

---

Source: Re-elaboration by the authors of Pache and Santos (2013) based on the case study 2.



## The Case of FOFANA: Conflicting Logics

	<b>Social Logic</b>	<b>Entrepreneurial Logic</b>	<b>Militant Logic</b>	<b>Technical Rationality Logic</b>
<b>Values</b>	<p><i>“La sortie du CADA pour moi c’est un moment difficile. Moi je suis pas flic”</i> (Interview_FOFANA_4)</p>	<p>“By placing social innovation at the core of its practices, the group shows that it is possible to build a solid organisation, capable of creating and sustaining its economic activities, while maintaining a strong social impact” (FOFANA, 2018).</p> <p>“It is indeed through the efficiency, that our Project could take form. Based on this principle our beneficiaries and customers, the local authorities, companies or individuals, trust us!” (FOFANA, 2018 ).</p> <p>“On est expert dans la reprise d’entreprise” (Rossi, Liberation, 2013).</p> <p><i>FOFANA s’occupe de addition à la base. Maintenant on crée ce CADA à Marseille. Je pense que ils ont de l’espace dans le secteur et ils ont rentré. La finalité est positive, donc...Pour moi ça va!</i> (Interview FOFANA_3)</p>	<p><i>“On est pas trop bien vécu par les autres organisations sur Marseille. Pour moi ça se passé bien, mais on est regardé comme l’organisation qui vient tout bouffer.</i> <i>Mais ce n’est pas de tout l’objectif. L’objectif est se battre pour mieux accueillir!”</i> (Interview_FOFANA_1)</p>	<p><i>The excellence of the services offered to our beneficiaries and clients relies above all on the know-how and interpersonal skills of our employees” (FOFANA web site 2018).</i></p>
<b>HR</b>				<p>Le Principe 5: <i>Principes de valorisation des ressources humaines Notre capital humain</i></p>

---

*représente notre principal atout, qui vient soutenir à la fois l'excellence reconnue de nos pratiques et la qualité de notre développement. C'est pourquoi les membres du FOFANA se doivent de développer une politique de ressources humaines ambitieuse et fédératrice, en cohérence avec notre Projet commun. (FOFANA, 2018 ).*

*L'excellence des services proposés à nos bénéficiaires et clients repose avant tout sur les savoir-faire et savoir-être de nos salarié-e-s. Il est donc indispensable de nous assurer que nous disposons des bons profils au bon moment, au bon endroit, et que tous les moyens nécessaires au développement de leur potentiel soient mis en oeuvre.*

*Disposer des compétences métiers stratégiques à jour et en adéquation avec nos besoins [...]; Proposer des parcours d'évolution et de mobilité individualisés. Pour cela, tout doit être mis en oeuvre pour favoriser la gestion des carrières de nos salarié-e-s, en cohérence avec leurs attentes et les possibilités offertes par le groupe; [...] Attirer et fidéliser les talents en accueillant des personnes aux profils variés. (FOFANA, 2018 ).*

---

---

*On fait pas mal de formation. J'en ai déjà fait deux sur l'asile. Ils sont très intéressants. Il se déroulent normalement à Paris"*  
Interview\_G-S\_2)

**Size of the Organization**

*"C'est une machine de guerre!"*  
(Interview\_G\_S\_1)

*"Franchement, il y a des choses positives et de choses négatives. Moi je sens le poids du multinational. Mais sur le terrain je ne vois pas trop l'impact. Je n'ai pas de imposition concernant mon travail. Rien de impose que se soit contre mon étique"*  
(Interview\_FOFANA\_3)

*"It is a very complex organization, but to us nothing change, I don't have very often contacts with Paris"*  
(Interview\_FOFANA\_2)

**Organization Chart**

*"Le suivi budgétaire par le siège central est bien évidemment un grand avantage pour nous"*  
(Interview\_FOFANA\_1)

**Resources**

*L'évaluation et l'audit interne, je suis très favorable. Ça permet de maintenir la qualité »*  
(Interview\_FOFANA1)

*"Entretenir un excellent niveau de management à tous les niveaux, en cohérence avec les principes définis dans le présent Projet"*

---

**Relationship with other associations**

---

(FOFANA, 2018)

*Parce qu'il ne peut, pour un acteur social tel que le FOFANA, être question ni de gaspillage ni de profit, les membres s'engagent à utiliser toutes leurs ressources financières à l'exécution et au développement de leurs missions. Les membres constituent les réserves strictement nécessaires à l'exigence de pérennité et de qualité des services rendus, au regard des ressources qui leurs sont allouées.*

(FOFANA, 2018)

*“On est pas trop bien veçu par les autres organisations sur Marseille. Pour moi ça se passé bien, mais on est regardé comme l'organisation qui vient tout bouffer”*

(Interview\_FOFANA \_1)

*“We were member of the fnars. They there had been some tensions. Nowadays we are not member, but we will see the next year”*

(Interview\_FOFANA1)

*“On est très mal vecu par les autres, une fois j'étais en formation à Aix... bref, on a une certain reputation”*

*“Le Groupe peut faire peur, moi aussi avant d'y travailler j'en entendu parler très mal!”*

(Interview\_FOFANA4)

---

		(Interview_FOFANA1)	
<b>Relationship with public authorities</b>		<i>“Les regles sont très strictes, moi je n’ai pas trop marge...”</i> (Interview_FOFANA4)	
<b>Founding</b>		<i>« On veut grandir, on participe à certains appel à projet pour la prochaine année »</i> (Interview_FOFANA1)	
<b>Reception services offered</b>	<i>« On [ndr. L’Etat français] toujours réagi à l’urgence. En générale, on a pas trop l’habitude a travailler pour prévenir. Mais alors dans l’asile, encore plus. On a été beaucoup dans l’action. On a crée plain de dispositifs.”</i> (Interview FOFANA3).		
<b>Strategies</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Scaling up and integrate organizations in difficult situation;</li> <li>- Economies of scale;</li> <li>- Excellent management of the different structures;</li> </ul>	- Professionalism
		<i>“Le Groupe propose une modele national, mais après il y a l’application de chaque directeur”</i> (Interview_FOFANA_1)	
		<i>On veut grandir, on participe à</i>	

---

---

*certains appel à projet pour la  
prochaine année. On le fait pour  
pouvoir intégrer plus de  
personnels que maintenant!*  
(Interview\_FOFANA\_1)

---

## The Case of DERMAN: Conflicting Logics

Values	<b>Social Logic</b>	<b>Entrepreneurial Logic</b>	<b>Militant Logic</b>	<b>Technical Rationality Logic</b>
	<p><i>DERMAN is an acronym that stands for Fight against Social Exclusion for Development, and since the beginning its mission has been to fight, let's say implement actions to promote the fight , against any kind of social exclusion, so not only addressing the target of migrants but in general to all those who may suffer social exclusion, so addressed to all disadvantaged people.</i> (Interview_DERMAN_4)</p>	<p><i>Then at first glance I would tell you that even our evolution has responded to what has been a bit the evolution of the tenders we have submitted our projects, the market where we have been active. We, we have succeeded while other realities that were born a bit like our NO</i> (Interview_DERMAN_1)</p>	<p><i>The legal form of the association was no longer sufficient to guarantee a cooperative mutualistic spirit that was what we wanted to go towards</i> (Interview_DERMAN_4)</p>	<p><i>Through the social condemnation, our mission from the beginning has been to raise awareness. Our activities on interculturalism, education for multiculturalism, cooperation: these were the first very crude strands of philosophical inspiration, which then had technical repercussions.</i> (Interview_DERMAN_4)</p>
			<p><i>And therefore we absolutely, contest this emergency-style management of reception. In particular we contest the system of public contract awarded. Actually, we observed that the services have been entrusted without respecting a significant number of principles in order to ensure a minimum standard of quality. The authorities did not hesitate to involve in the offer of the services fair the reception actors, who never before have been active in reception for asylum seekers, and who did not have the skills to do it. But this</i></p>	

---

*comes from a choice of define this policy based on a status of emergency. In turn it has had an impact on the management of reception and the structured involved. I have to say that we observe a certain continuity with this strategy, in particular with the new Salvini decree, which instead of strengthening the structured system SPRAR, at the opposite give more room to the extraordinary reception the CAS;*

*we [were born as] the “technical branch” of a more political movement: in the mean that a large part of our founding members, and I myself even though I was not the founder of DERMAN, had a political history that fundamentally distinguished us. We are historically, intimately linked to the Neapolitan racism body and to the piece of the left in this city.*

(Interview\_DERMAN\_1)

*Once an initial orientation and balancing phase has been carried out [Among our priorities there are] to create a network, involving the local companies, do corporate scouting, create and enhance job placement training opportunities for*

**HR**



---

refugees,  
(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)

**Size of the Organization**

*Yes, no, in 2015, as I told you when there was this enlargement, and therefore an increase in the number of people we wanted to hire, an increase in services carried out, etc. etc., at the level of the board of directors, we evaluated that to opt for the legal status of social enterprise, and then cooperative, it would have been the best for us*  
(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)

*a choice dictated by on the one hand the expansion of the challenges accepted and then the services delivered, and on the other hand because the cooperative, let's say is the legal status that we wanted to achieve internally in the board of directors. Actually we felt that the association was no longer sufficient to ensure a cooperative mutualistic spirit that was what we wanted to have. The division of roles, is based as least as possible on a principle of hierarchy in an organization like ours, dealing with a service which is based on the principle of an integrated service of reception, and a full cooperation among members of the teams. In our organization, everyone has his own role and responsibility and choice to be done, but in a shared way, we can take all the decisions that there are to be taken in a shared and cooperative way*  
(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)

**Organization Chart**

*there is the Board of Directors which is made up of the members of the cooperative, each member and therefore each member of the Board manages a department. There is the "work and*

---

*integration" department, "human resources" department, "budget and reporting" department, administration, "reception and protection" department, "logistics" department. Above these six departments, there is the department "international and national volunteering", this is another service we are developing in DERMAN organization, and above these departments, there is the directorate general, so there is a director general who defines a little bit what are the general lines of development of the entity; below the departments there are the "coordination team for the reception projects". The reception and protection department defines a little bit the guidelines of the reception and protection projects we are in charge of, for both residential and non-residential services, and interfaces with the various project coordinators, so the coordinator of the SPRAR IARA project in Naples, the coordinator of the AIDA project, the coordinator of the E. L.I.C.A project ect ect.*

*(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)*

---

**Resources**

*Over the years, DERMAN has*

---

---

*been able to guarantee continuity in the provision of service, precisely because the fundamental elements on which the evaluation of the bodies that can manage these services is based are: the years of experience, the territorial network activated around the reception service, the individual personalities and the professional skills that are employed.*

*(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)*

*This sector remains not very recognised, and very precarious. We are subject to public funding, so there are delays. Very we have to rely on loans erogated by those banks, which trust us. We actually finance our activities very often through loans from the banks, in orer to gain time and wait until when the public funding arrives. So over time we have also reinforced ourselves on this, because we had to understand what was the mechanism that allowed us to be a bankable body, so a body that let's say, could obtain financing from banks, which basically are asked to anticipate the money.*

*(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)*

---

*And then we became the kind of actors who present their proposal to the tenders. And as these tenders became more detailed, more stringent, we had to ensure a more stable and high turnover. Furthermore in order to have access to them, to participate, there were also a large number of technical requirements, which have the effect to push towards a more formal and structured organizations*  
(Interview\_DERMAN\_1)

**Relationship with other associations**

*How are relationships formalized then?" Through Memoranda of Understanding, which are signed between DERMAN and the other partners and which go to implement a whole series of relationships on different sectors that are related to the reception; therefore, on the one hand the strengthening of the material reception services, on the other hand the integration services, the training services, we have a whole series of Memoranda of Understanding with a series of training bodies where the children are then conveyed to follow training courses. We have agreements with local companies, with local services such as employment centers,*

*In short, we have recorded a whole series of complaints about the conditions in which they lived: from conditions of a structural nature, in the sense that they were crammed into very small rooms, without any respect for the regulations concerning the capacity of the rooms, without particular attention to their customs such as in terms of gastronomy or without any kind of linguistic-cultural mediation*  
(Interview\_DERMAN\_1)

*The most experimented activities, on which DERMAN has a much stronger expertise, are the reception projects, in particular the IARA-SPRAR project of the Municipality of Naples. Thanks to the IARA project, a whole series of relationships have been developed on the territory not only with organizations that also deal with reception and integration for migrants, but also with bodies private and public, that carry out similar activities but for other audience, and which expressed somehow an interest in being active in the sector the reception and immigration sector.*  
(Interview\_DERMAN\_4)

---

*health services: there is a protocol that begins in 2005 with the Ascalessi Hospital for the certification of torture and then fundamental for the presentation of the documentation in committee, then the networks are formed, and gradually grow these networks, cultural associations where the boys then go to do workshops, then all the result of a work we say planned then periodically on the territory, then they are relationships that grow as the project goes forward. (Interview\_DERMAN\_4)*

**Relationship with public authorities**

*They have the ability and "freedom" to manage it independently. Naples, as a big city, has a long tradition of co-management of Welfare with the third sector: so sometimes it is almost spontaneous to co-manage services with the private social sector.*

*I believe that this in term, which I have not used at random, is exactly the virtuous principle behind the creation of SPRAR: because the municipality, or rather the local authority, never loses sight of the services provided by SPRAR even when the service is totally outsourced, as for example in the case of the municipality of Naples.*

---

*(Interview\_Naples\_Municipality)*

*SPRAR reception services are first co-designed municipality, body, manager, and then instead co-managed ... G.: There is also a co-management then?*

*(Interview\_DERMAN\_1)*

**Funding**

*Because in any case, the municipality remains the owner of the funding and does not simply pass it on to the managing body, but it is part of the management. So much so that, this is not our case, but very often it happens that the services (especially in municipalities a bit 'more advanced, such as Turin) part of some services are managed directly by the community*

*(Interview\_DERMAN\_1)*

**Reception services offered**

*So the objective is to define personal path [of integration]. The social workers in contact with asylum seekers, in our structures are both the workers in charge of this specific task on the structures as well the social workers engaged into the transversal areas. The closest social workers, who follow the boy every day, they are in contact with the people host, they are*

to create a network with companies in the area, then do corporate scouting, to create and enhance training opportunities for job placement for welcomed refugees, once a first phase of orientation and balancing has been carried out

---

*the operators in charge of the structure, so they take care of the residential services. They stay in the structure with the boys and girls, they live their daily adventures with them, and they follow them in the health appointments, in the appointments they have at the territorial services such as the identity card, the tesserae sanitaria, the registration at the employment centre, and they follow the community life, so they try to create a human relationship with the boys and girls, in order to become their reference points.*

*On the top of that, there are the operators, who manage the transversal areas: training, legal area, etc who are in contact with the people in the structures, because for example the legal area prepares the guys to pass the commission, so there are a series of individual interviews in which the story of the country of origin is told, the journey, and then you build with the boy the story, in short, you help the boy to understand how to present himself in committee and beyond this even if the boys arrive with the blabla holders, in any case you make appointments to orient*

---

---

*them to the police headquarters for the renewal of the residence permit*

*In short, this is where you try to somehow better understand the person in order to orient them in the best possible way. So the first feedback is from us. The insertion in school, maybe the boy already has a good level of Italian then do the insertion already in a high school*

**Strategies**

*the reception was the most important sector followed by DERMAN, and let's say ours, the heart of our activity*

*This activity is linked to a whole other series of projects and to the strengthening of the reception systems already managed within the SPRAR, within the first reception centres;*

*Another area of activity that has been developing since 2015 is the development of the employment for the young. So we have created two work cooperatives, two social cooperatives, a cooperative that deals with ethnic catering called AutoBilling, and a cooperative that deals with cleaning and small maintenance called Partenop, managed by asylum seekers, refugees coming out of the SPRAR projects*

**Professionalism**



---

*together with young Italians or  
Italians who, together with them,  
carry on the activities, both at the  
management and operational  
level of the cooperatives. So there  
has been a strong expansion, let's  
say, an improvement of the  
activities starting from the year  
2015*

---

## The Case of BEUTY: Conflicting Logics

	Social Logic	Entrepreneurial Logic	Militant Logic	Technical Rationality Logic
<b>Values</b>	<p><i>We assess situation by situation, because we are dealing with human beings</i> (Interview_BEUTY_3)</p>		<p><i>Once finished the contract with the Prefecture, we did not participate at the new call for tender, in order to continue the CAS activity, because there were conditions that would have led us to go against our values of treating people with the dignity of people</i> (Interview_BEUTY_3)</p>	<p><i>“There has been really an effort to make them [beneficiaries] understand that this was not the case, that we too were subject to regulations, to controls, so we had to enforce those rules for reasons because we too had to comply with rules and that we were doing so in order to help them and not the other way around”</i> (Interview_BEUTY_3) <i>“The organization also is certified body under the UNI EN ISO 9001:2008 standard”.</i> (Interview_BEUTY_2)</p>
<b>HR</b>	<p><i>“as a cultural mediator I can really act as an interpreter between a resident person and a foreigner, trying to bring out within the translation and then the explanation to both sides of the intercultural aspects that can be a certain attitude, a certain belief; I tried to make sure that the two people obviously find a dimension of total understanding that also takes into account the intercultural elements”</i> (Interview_BEUTY_4)</p>			<p><i>We are very attentive to the application of a professional standard related to the organisation of our organisation.</i> (Interview_BEUTY_1)</p>
<b>Organization Chart</b>		<p><i>The least operative office is the one in Rome: in the sense that it</i></p>		<p><i>The quality management of BEUTY is controlled in the Rome office so</i></p>

---

*is an institutional office.*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*obviously the team there is in charge of spreading homogeneous guidelines to all the offices across the national territory. But you know, quality is really something very hard and demanding in term of effort, for a body to be maintained. It requires a lot of internal procedures: so it's good that there is only one place that somehow tries to aggregate everything and then delivers these procedures to the different locations.*

*There is, let's say, the operational centre of our quality processes: so quality tends to be managed from the Rome office. It is a centralised process.*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*for each specific service you activate there are procedures to follow. Let's say that it is a job that requires study*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*The office in charge of writing the projects is a central and unique one and it is based on Perugia, in Umbria, which is also our head quarter*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*We have both project officers, and a team specialised, which is somehow fixed, and always in charge of all the call for projects and tenders, and then, depending on where you are competing, there are people who maybe enter specific contributions and also take care of planify certain activities.*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*“For the CAS, in order to ensure transparency, on the basis of our quality procedures, I have to offer three estimates to our*

---

*administrative office before an expense is approved.*

*Just to get me to approve any expenditure!*

*I have to do the maintenance: I have to bring three quotes from different locksmiths.*

*I have to print the Italian L2 manual: I have to ask three printers.*

*These quality procedures guarantee the best transparency of the service and also the best use of public funds. For us, as for the other local offices, all this is done in Rome.*

*We want to hire a person, how should we do it? We have to do a vacancy, we have to take the curriculum, we have to do two interviews per person: because in our opinion this guarantees the highest standard of service”.*

*(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)*

### **Size of the organization**

*The CAS has 36 places but in average only 23 were filled. This could have created huge problems of liquidity, if we were not a solid organisation of a certain size.*

*(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)*

*But this, in my opinion, is linked to the size of the organism: the smallest ones have more difficulty: but this is precisely the system that tends to swallow up*

---

**Resources**

*Very often projects work well from the second or even the third year on but maybe that's when they finish.*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*the weakest. The one that has no volunteers, that has no professionalism, that is unable to invest in human resources, then does not hold up.*

(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*Let's say that I can make a lower price because one year I received a donation of an apartment and then actually my cost for the apartment is lower, I can make a more advantageous competition*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*It is a matter of competition in a tender. So the price, I repeat, the commission does it, and you choose whether or not to accept. It is based on the actors who take part to the tender: I offer 34 for this service, the other offers 32, the other offers 31. It depends on how the competition goes far.*

*Then once the price is set and you accept, you are saying say "ok, I'm fine with doing this service at this price".*

*In reality the service for people, for you, is always the same: so what changes, even with the same service, from one year to the next, is only the price. Because obviously who participates in every single tender then determines the price of that lot, compared to this list.*

(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

---

<b>Relationship with other associations</b>	<p><i>we also have collaborations related to the individual project, when we need specific services. In reality, there are two psychologists who support the team, one in particular who is an ethnopsychiatrist who follows both the team as a work team (us) and the team of beneficiaries who in SPRAR are all women, often single and therefore vulnerable. So for the group of women there was ethnopsychiatry and instead a psychotherapist for the group of men and the team that managed adult men.</i></p> <p><i>(Interview_BEUTY_2)</i></p>	<p><i>For each association it is a good point to work in a network. Otherwise there is absolutely no result. However, all the calls for proposals tend to involve a work not of a single association. As BEUTY, we can rely on a very important network of associations. Some of them involved in the same service, and other in different ones.</i></p>	<p><i>New calls may also encourage you to open up to new collaborations. And collaborations that work, So then it becomes important to maintain them.</i></p>	
<b>Relationship with public authorities</b>	<p><i>It was complicated. The reception was also complicated because the relationship with the guests in such a controlling context becomes complex. Telling a person that in the morning at 8 a.m. he has to sign the signature sheet that has to be sent to the prefecture and that the evening after 9 p.m. he must come back unless there is a written authorization because he is working... in the daily life becomes complicated.</i></p> <p><i>(Interview_BEUTY_1)</i></p>	<p><i>Small structures are certainly uneconomic [editor's note: Compared to calls for tenders]</i></p>	<p><i>As this call shows you, it is absolutely a situation generated by the system. so this call can be the opposite of everything that in the end ... It depends only on the seriousness, I repeat, of the body that chooses to offer this service. However, yes, there are a major attention to control, in this last period of time, there are</i></p> <p><i>(Interview_BEUTY_2)</i></p>	<p><i>Anyone who applied [to tenders for the reception service of emergency CAS] was involved.</i></p>

---

<b>Funding</b>	(Interview_BEUTY_2)	<p><i>Because the need was not covered. I repeat, these favoured infiltrations that were not transparent on the part of bodies that certainly did not have integration-oriented services.</i></p> <p>(Interview_BEUTY_2)</p>
	<p><i>This is not our case but it's very difficult for small realities to stay afloat in fact. I think the only way is to differentiate a little bit between projects and actions. So on the one hand specialize and on the other continue to experiment with other types of projects. For example, I am a small association very good at mediation projects and so I try to add to this competence of mine maybe also some others. Mediation and minors: so if I differ I can have a greater continuity.</i></p> <p>(Interview_BEUTY_2)</p>	
<b>Reception services offered</b>	<p><i>Absolutely we have chosen to do the "accoglienza diffusa". We absolutely believe that it is unfavourable for integration to think in terms of large numbers.</i></p> <p>(Interview_BEUTY_2)</p>	<p><i>There were several services, which they could access and which were provided directly within the center, such as Italian lessons, I think 10 hours a week, then there was the legal guidance service that was responsible for following them in all bureaucratic legal procedures, from the residence permit, to the preparation of the commission, to the appeal in case of refusal, and then the guidance on issues that</i></p>

---

---

*they needed to deepen; then there was the health service, then the health desk, which was in charge of offering them support in this sector, ranging from accompaniment in hospital in particular cases, from health documents, from registration at the registry office to the health card, to workshops on health issues, and was always there also in this case, 2 times a week available to all beneficiaries for matters concerning physical well-being, psychophysical health.*

*a number of rules that had to be respected inside the centre, which was for example first and foremost the time of entry and exit, not being able to stay outside the centre for no more than three consecutive nights, always having to inform about the reasons for their exit, not to introduce animals, not to introduce people inside the centre, not to take drugs, not to bring alcohol inside the centre, to respect public spaces, to respect the association's property, to respect the neighbourhood, the operators, not to use aggressive/violent attitudes*

*(Interview\_BEUTY\_3)*

*the organization also is certified*

---

**Strategies**

*Absolutely we have chosen to do the widespread reception. We*

*However, we are not an institution that has based its*

*Once finished the contract with the Prefecture we did not*



---

*absolutely believe that it is unfavourable for integration to think in terms of large numbers.*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*stability on hospitality. It is one of the services we offer as an association that offers services in general in the field of immigration and for immigrants, it has never been our spearhead.*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*participate in the new call to continue the cas activity because there were conditions that would have led us to go against our values of treating people with the dignity of people*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_3)

body under the UNI EN ISO 9001:2008 standards.

*a distortion that can happen especially if you're a little reality in my opinion. You're forced to take a little bit of what happens. Fortunately BEUTY has been in the territory for a long time, so the network is a network that widens, enriches and shrinks on the basis of the project in which you participate. Then as in all sectors, you get to know each other!*  
(Interview\_BEUTY\_2)

*So it really seemed to us a prison, there were still greater restrictions regarding the freedom to enter and exit, and there was also an increase in services: an assiduous control that provided for an increase in the services offered, so the visits of doctors and psychologists etc. with a very small budget, so even economically we would not return there, then eliminate a whole series of services that BEUTY instead boasts for years, and that serve precisely to make the person autonomous and independent.*(Interview\_BEUTY\_3)

---

Source: Author, 2020

## The Case of DESTINY: Conflicting Logics

	<b>Social Logic</b>	<b>Entrepreneurial Logic</b>	<b>Militant Logic</b>	<b>Technical Rationality Logic</b>
<b>Values</b>	<p><i>And so firstly, in order to be able to help them at the administrative level, you have to establish a human relationship, because at the beginning there is diffidence. We found ourselves in front of a woman from Subsarian Africa who has been in captivity, who has been in Libya, who has suffered violence of all kinds. But this is just one of the all, I'll give you just one example of all of them...</i></p>		<p><i>So I have to say that more or less we always added this famous "something more", which also comes from our name, to what the call asked for. Because it really comes from us... that is, we have always tried to integrate at 360 degrees what could be the needs and urgencies of these women who, clearly in a condition of vulnerability, really needed important assistance...</i></p> <p><i>Keep in mind that we started with this worm in our ears, with everyone saying "don't get Nigerian"!</i></p> <p><i>But we don't choose! By the way, for the kind of job, I mean do a job where if you discriminate, and you want Cambodian but you don't want Nigerian... you're off to a bad start!</i></p>	<p><i>So we decided that we could start an organization that would allow us to volunteer and work at the same time. And then the idea of a cooperative.</i></p>
<b>HR</b>			<p><i>We were very lucky because we found a gynaecologist who voluntarily made free private visits. We found her through our personal contacts</i></p>	<p><i>The figure of the mediator has been a crucial one, even in order to solve some problems, let's say to deal with some behavioural troubles. Also to understand what some attitudes corresponded to. So we had internally the specialised figure</i></p>

---

*of the cultural mediator, who told and helped us. Furthermore, a psychologist from the organization in charge of the SPRAR project helped us to understand what were the reasons for certain attitudes and cultural symbologies. To begin with the eyes low for example. They use to maintain the eyes low when you turned to them, then were explained and understood some sign and why of this attitude...*

**Size of the Organization  
Organization Chart**

*So as I was telling you, there was this organization, which already had a pretty rigid organization chart that we traced. Because having several partners who contributed in different ways to the realization of the project, they gave themselves a fairly binding structure. Which we replicated in the beginning. And that was: a director of services, an administrative part concerning two people because it was divided between warehouse and administration. The legal part, the kitchen part, then the cook. Initially there were three workers, a social worker, a language teacher, a psychologist, then the nun... The worst I think in terms of reporting was anyway. The most troubling piece of the puzzle... But here's a lot of documents here at the*

**Resources**

*All the rooms are double, and we can use the church structure*

---

**Relationship with other  
associations**  
**Relationship with public  
authorities**

*end of the month you had to produce a lot of documents and papers that you didn't come out anymore. So you opened this famous platform... you made a mistake... or they didn't understand a comma... the payment had to be postponed. Not by a year. Keep in mind that we are stopped at payments in December 2017, the last prefecture payment dates back there, if you miss a comma the payment slips and who knows how much more because it is blocked. In this respect there is zero flexibility, but also a disastrous organization.*

*The first prefect we met, for example, was an extremely flexible person. One who before thinking about bureaucracy said, but looks first at fixing people because they are human beings. The person who came next was extremely rigid bureaucracy. So you struggle and you adapt to different ways of organizing the system. We have seen the perido Minniti arrive in clear skies, which has sent the reception system into crisis, beyond, which has sent all the reception workers, including the ministry, into crisis. Who didn't even know how to manage all this bureaucracy that fell from the sky. Extremely*

---

---

*stringent. Which is sometimes right, sometimes a little less so. Which also brought about serious changes, especially at a legal level...*

**Reception services offered**

*Keep in mind that dealing with women and minors, one of the most significant aspects was the health aspect. Especially in the beginning One of the first tasks when you start is to transmit the numbers (of the people into the structure). Then in the breakfast room, in the morning the operator as soon as he took service, came here to the office, took the paper and went to the breakfast room to collect signatures, after preparing breakfast with the girls, he would slowly makes the girls sign. For our own rigidity we also had, to try to tighten up on the educational level, we also had internal registers.*

**Strategies**

*When the number of occupied posts was reduced to 14-15, we were no longer able to fill the posts in the service, so we asked the prefecture to relocate the women we had in the facility and consequently to close the service at the end of the contract extension. Note of 30 September*

*Moreover, it was an emergency that knocked on the doors several times during that period, during our time here at the institute and not knowing where to start we say that this emergency knocked on our door and we decided to welcome the immigrants. To women and children*

---

Source: Author, 2020

