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            <title xml:lang="en">Informal risk-coping and the allocation of farm land</title>
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                <forename type="first">Gwendoline</forename>
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                <title xml:lang="en">Informal risk-coping and the allocation of farm land</title>
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                    <forename type="first">Gwendoline</forename>
                    <surname>Promsopha</surname>
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                  <date type="dateDefended">2012-12-04</date>
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                <authority type="institution">Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense</authority>
                <authority type="supervisor">Eric Brousseau</authority>
                <authority type="supervisor">Jérome Sgard</authority>
                <authority type="jury">Sylvie Lambert</authority>
                <authority type="jury">Jean-Philippe Platteau</authority>
                <authority type="jury">Pierre Dubois</authority>
                <authority type="jury">Flore Gubert</authority>
                <authority type="jury">Eric Brousseau</authority>
                <authority type="jury">Jérome Sgard</authority>
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                <term xml:lang="en">vulnerability</term>
                <term xml:lang="en">poverty</term>
                <term xml:lang="en">income shocks</term>
                <term xml:lang="en">subsistence agriculture</term>
                <term xml:lang="en">migration</term>
                <term xml:lang="en">property rights.</term>
                <term xml:lang="en">land market</term>
                <term xml:lang="fr">développement économique</term>
                <term xml:lang="fr">marchés fonciers</term>
                <term xml:lang="fr">vulnerabilité</term>
                <term xml:lang="fr">pauvreté</term>
                <term xml:lang="fr">risque</term>
                <term xml:lang="fr">agriculture de subsistance</term>
                <term xml:lang="fr">droits de propriété.</term>
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              <p>This PhD research proposes to study the relationship between informal risk-coping strategies and the nature of land allocation. Informal risk-coping mechanisms are studied here as one potential factor in the failure of land market reforms and the persistence of 'non-market' exchange -gifts or free loans. In particular, we show that the bipolar view of land tenure, which opposes 'customary' to 'market' transfers, does not adequately approach informal risk-coping motivations in land transfers. Two hypotheses are analysed: first, in the absence of insurance markets and publicsocial protection, land has a 'safety net' function and households do not sell land but prefer other types of transfers (which retain part of the land's 'safety net' function). Secondly, informal risk-coping leads households to participate to hybrid forms of transfers (neither market nor non-market) allowing to combine risk-coping motives with other types of economic necessities. Those two hypotheses are then looked at empirically in two case studies: in Vietnam, where households sell their land only if they are economically stable or have suffered income shocks (distress sales); and in Thailand, where a survey has been done among permanent rural-urban migrants. This survey confirms that informal risk-coping slows down land sale markets and sustains transfers such as free-loans. Finally, the Thai data identify traditional risk-sharing institutions in the allocation of land, especially through intra-family free-loans or 'disguised rentals'. As a main conclusion, insurance and public protection policies could have a key role in the evaluation of land allocation systems in Thailand and Vietnam.</p>
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              <p>Cette recherche de doctorat étudie la relation entre la gestion informelle des risques de subsistance et l’allocation des terres agricoles. La gestion informelle des risques de subsistance est analysée ici comme explication potentielle de l'échec des politiques foncières de marché, et de la persistance de modes d'échanges `non-marchands'. En particulier, nous montrons que la vision bipolaire de l'allocation des terres opposant marchand et non-marchand n'est pas toujours pertinente pour l'analyse de la gestion des risques dans les pratiques foncières. Deux hypothèses sont analysées: en l'absence de moyens d'assurance publique ou privée, la terre prend une valeur de sécurité sociale qui peut détourner les ménages de la vente et leur faire préférer des transferts non-marchands ou temporaires, protégeant mieux la valeur assurance de la terre. Ensuite, des pratiques foncières hybrides, ni purement marchandes ni non-marchandes, se développent pour combiner la gestion des risques de subsistance avec d'autres motivations économiques. Ces hypothèses sont étudiées dans deux contextes: au Vietnam d'abord où les ménages les plus stables ou ceux subissant des chocs sévères vendent leur terre. En Thailande ensuite où, grâce à des données collectées sur le terrain, nous confirmons le rôle des stratégies de gestion des risques de subsistance dans l'activité ralentie des marchés de vente, et identifions ces fameuses pratiques foncières hybrides (ici des locations déguisées) . En conclusion, le développement de la protection (privée ou publique) des moyens de subsistance pourrait jouer un rôle privilégié dans l'évolution des modes d'allocation foncière.</p>
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