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The Spectrum of Perspective Shift: Protagonist Projection vs. Free Indirect Discourse*

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Abstract

This paper examines a little studied type of perspective shift that I call *protagonist projection* (PP), following Holton (1997). (Other names for what is arguably the same phenomenon include *non-reflective consciousness*, *represented perception*, *viewpoint shift*, etc.) PP is a way of describing the mental state of a protagonist that conveys, to some extent, her perspective. Similarly to its better known cousin *free indirect discourse* (FID), the shift in perspective is achieved without an overt operator. Unlike FID, PP is not based on a presumed (possibly silent) speech-act of a protagonist. Rather, it gives a linguistic form to pre-verbal perceptual content, sensations, feelings or implicit beliefs. I propose to analyse PP in a bi-contextual framework, extending Eckardt's (2014) approach to FID. Under the resulting analysis, FID and PP are two instances of a more general category of perspective shift.

1 Introduction

The history of human communication shows that we became more and more sophisticated in conveying meaning without actually saying it. An example is how authors of fiction invented means that allow narrators to represent a character's point of view in implicit ways. Observe (1):¹

- (1) The train was full of fellows: *a long long chocolate train with cream facings ... The telegraph poles were passing, passing.* (Joyces 1969: 20, cited in Brinton 1980, p.374)

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¹I use italics to represent presumed perspective shift, unless marked otherwise.

Clearly, the last sentence represents the perception of the character as she looks out the window of the train. But nowhere is this stated explicitly in the text, only the content and the repetition suggest a shift in the point of view. How is it possible that readers, instead of being hopelessly confused, are able to recover this shift in perspective?

The traditional answer is that readers have a mental interpretation manual, handed to them by their linguistic ability and general culture. This manual allows three modes of representing a character's point of view in discourse: *direct discourse* (aka quotation), *indirect discourse* and *free indirect discourse*. According to this, the perspective of a character is represented linguistically in a context whose coordinates have either (a) completely shifted to the character's discourse (as in direct discourse, DD), or (b) are completely those of the narrator's discourse (as in indirect discourse, ID) or (c) are a mixture of the two (as in free indirect discourse, FID).

- (2) a. John said: "I will leave tomorrow." [direct discourse]
 b. John said that he would leave the day after. [indirect discourse]
 c. John looked at Mary. *He would leave tomorrow.* [free indirect discourse]

Thus a hearer, when confronted with (2c) switches on the FID-mode of interpretation. This mode fixes which context-sensitive elements need to be interpreted from the perspective of the character (in (2c), *tomorrow*) and which from the perspective of the narrator (in (2c), the pronoun *he* and the past tense).

However, the tripartite division into DD, ID and FID is an idealisation in many ways. One way in which it is an idealisation is that the intermediate category of mixed perspectives is in fact a range of phenomena that show varying degrees of perspective shift. FID, as usually understood, is only a special case of a larger category of perspective shift. The main interest of this article is to get a better understanding of perspective shift and its subtypes.

So what else is there other than FID? The example of perspective shift in (1) is in fact a case that is not FID, as usually understood in linguistics.² One prominent aspect of FID is that it is supposed to rephrase a character's speech: perhaps it was uttered loud or only in the form of inner speech, but it is usually understood that the character performed an inner or external speech act (hence: *discourse* in the name FID). However, the example in (1) represents not so much (inner) speech but rather some form of perception that need not have a linguistic form. The described character need not tell himself "the telegraph poles are passing, passing", most likely she only registers this in her consciousness in a non-verbal form. Cases such as this have been sometimes discussed in literary theory under various names, e.g. *non-reflective consciousness* (Banfield 1982), *represented perception* (Brinton 1980), *narrated perception* (Fludernik 1993) and here and there in analytical philosophy and linguistics under yet other names, often unaware of previous discussions (*protagonist projection* (Holton 1997, Stokke 2013, Buckwalter 2014) *viewpoint shift* (Hinterwimmer 2017)).

The distinction between what Banfield (1982)(following Kuroda 1976) calls *reflec-*

²In literary theory FID (or *represented speech or thought* in Banfield's (1982) terminology) is sometimes used as umbrella term for a wider set of phenomena, including the ones discussed in this paper. In linguistics, however, the term is used to cover a rather specific case of a report of the protagonist's inner or external speech: thoughts that were given a linguistic form by the protagonist herself. I use FID in this narrower sense of the term.

tive vs. *non-reflective consciousness* exists in the philosophical tradition at least since Descartes' differentiation of the reflective *cogito* from the more passive faculties of perception. An example from Russell (1940) illustrates well the two types of consciousness:

Suppose you are out walking on a wet day, and you see a puddle and avoid it. You are not likely to say to yourself: 'there is a puddle; it will be advisable not to step into it.' But if somebody said 'why did you suddenly step aside?' you would answer 'because I didn't wish to step into that puddle.' You know, retrospectively, that you had a visual perception ... and ... you express this knowledge in words. But what would you have known, and in what sense, if your attention had not been called to the matter by the questioner? (Russell 1940, pp. 58-9, cited in Banfield 1982)

When a subject speaks about something, (even if silently, to herself), this knowledge has to be reflective. But non-reflective consciousness, the content of perceptions or non-verbal reasoning, does not have a linguistic form. This does not mean it cannot be represented by language, at a later time by the subject, or by an external party. This is indeed what happens in examples such as (1): the content of the character's consciousness is represented linguistically by a narrator, without assuming that the linguistic form of the expression corresponds to the character's representation of her perception.

The aim of this article is to propose a semantic analysis of sentences such as (1), sentences that describe a perception or belief of a character from a subjective point of view, but not necessarily by using (or even rephrasing) the character's own words. Following Holton (1997), I call these examples *protagonist projection (PP)*. The fact that the linguistic form of sentences in *protagonist projection* does not have to originate from the character distinguishes these examples clearly from the better understood examples of FID. Thus in the intermediate field between DD and ID we can distinguish at least two separate categories: *free indirect discourse, FID* and *protagonist projection, PP*. I reserve the name *perspective shift* to designate the whole terrain between DD and ID, encompassing FID, PP and perhaps further categories.

While FID and PP are clearly different, they also show many similarities and a certain amount of gradience. I propose a semantic framework that allows for such flexibility. The analysis, essentially an extension of Eckardt's (2014) framework for FID, builds in choicepoints that can result in either FID or PP, based on which type of discourse is pragmatically licensed in the context. Although I focus on PP, the view developed here is compatible with the idea that the spectrum of perspective shift might ultimately contain more intermediate categories than only FID and PP.³

³Fludernik (1993) for example argues for an entirely fluid spectrum of speech and thought representation:

Rather, therefore, than providing definitions of discrete categories of speech and thought representation, I see this study as circumventing the necessary compartmentalization of these categories. [...] No such clear-cut alignments can be posited for the written language, and least of all for fictional prose. Here context rules supreme, and aesthetic choice, if choice there is, tantalizingly removes itself from the grasp of neat, scholarly explication. (p.422)

Fludernik's position might be extreme, but her worry about the difficulty of establishing discrete cate-

The article proceeds as follows: After a presentation of the empirical facts in Section 2, I contrast PP with FID in Section 3. The analysis proposed in this paper is presented in Section 4 and compared with alternative proposals in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 The phenomenon and its many names

Narrators often evoke a character's inner perception of the world from her point of view but in ways that lack explicit markers of perspective shift. These descriptions, while having a subjective flavour, do not have to report an utterance made by the protagonist, not even a silent but linguistically explicit thought event; they merely represent the mental state of a protagonist. The representations have a linguistic form, but this form need not come from the protagonist herself. Literary and journalistic examples of this type of report have been discussed under many different names in philosophy, linguistics and literary theory (the authors often unaware of existing discussions in other fields.) Below is a collection of various names and discussions of what I think is essentially the same phenomenon.⁴

2.1 Protagonist projection

In a four-page reply to Tsohatzidis concerning the veridicality of the verb *tell*, Holton (1997) discusses the following examples:

- (3)
- a. *He gave her a ring studded with diamonds*, but they turned out to be glass.
 - b. *I saw a shooting star last night*. I wished on it, but it was just a satellite.
 - c. *He sold him a pig in a bag*. When he got home he discovered it was really a cat.
 - d. *She knew that he would never let her down*, but, like all the others, he did.

He observes that the reason why these sentences do not sound contradictory (or factive, in the case of (3b)) is that they involve a type of perspectival shift that he calls *Protagonist Projection* (PP). He says:

I suggest that these sentences work by projecting us into the point of view of the protagonist; let us call the phenomenon *protagonist projection*. In each case the point of view into which we are projected involves a false belief. We describe the false belief using words that the protagonists might use themselves, words that embody their mistake. So we deliberately use words in ways that do not fit the case. That is why they provide no evidence that some diamonds are made of glass, that some satellites are shooting stars and that *knows* is not a factive. (Holton 1997, p.626)

gories, is, I believe, well-motivated. And yet, from a linguistic point of view, a certain degree of compartmentalization seems necessary in order to allow a somewhat more precise, indeed scholarly, description of the phenomena at hand.

⁴It is possible that some cases of so-called reduced (or subtle) constructed action in Sign languages might belong to this category as well, cf. Cormier et al. (2015). Thanks to Kate Davidson for pointing this out to me.

Protagonist projection has been discussed in the philosophical literature in the context of the debate about factivity of the verb *know* (cf. Stokke 2013, Buckwalter 2014). Experimental evidence suggesting that speakers can indeed understand similar sentences under perspectival shift was given in Buckwalter (2014).

- (4) a. The Cuban missile crisis: *what you know is wrong*.
b. *Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers*, before two Australian doctors in the early 80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection. (Hazlett 2010)

2.2 Perspective shift

Arguably, examples that Harris and Potts (2009) call *perspective shift* are examples of the same phenomenon as well:⁵

- (5) I was struck by the willingness of almost everybody in the room—the senators as eagerly as the witnesses—to exchange their civil liberties for an illusory state of perfect security. They seemed to think that democracy was just a fancy word for corporate capitalism, and that the society would be a lot better off if it stopped its futile and unremunerative dithering about constitutional rights. *Why humor people, especially poor people, by listening to their idiotic theories of social justice?* [Lewis Lapham, Harper’s Magazine, July 1995] (Harris and Potts 2009)

Here is what Harris and Potts (2009) say about the above example:

“If we back up a few sentences, though, we see that a perspective shift has been achieved already going into this sentence. We have moved to the viewpoint of the senators and other powerful people involved. The adjective “idiotic” is meant to convey something about their views. There is no suggestion that they would overtly say or endorse such a characterization, but rather that their perspectives entail or justify it. The most important thing about this example, though, is that the adjective in question is not embedded at all. Whatever shift has happened is not one that is controlled by an attitude predicate.” (p. 529)

In an experiment that was devised to test this type of perspective shift, Harris and Potts (2009) asked subjects about examples such as the following:

- (6) *Context*: I am increasingly worried about my roommate. She seems to be growing paranoid.
a. The other day, she told me that we need to watch out for the mailman, a possible government spy.
b. The other day, she refused to talk with the mailman, *a possible government spy*.

Similarly to the examples by Holton (1997), the speakers Harris and Potts (2009) tested could understand “a possible government spy” as uttered from the point of view of the roommate even when it was not embedded under a verb of saying, as in (6b).

⁵Similar examples can also be found in Amaral et al. (2007), but those all involve speaker-oriented items in the scope of an overt attitude verb.

2.3 Viewpoint shifting

Hinterwimmer (2017) discussed yet another set of examples he called *viewpoint shifting*. The example in (7) is a case at hand:

- (7) I wanted to be home in case he came back early, made it in time ... The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he [Toph] came back home *his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left*. (D. Eggers, *A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius*, p.112, cited in Hinterwimmer 2017, p.288).

Hinterwimmer (2017) observes that the embedded sentence “his brother was home, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left” is interpreted from the point of view of Toph. Yet, he argues, this phrase is not FID for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can be embedded, while FID mainly occurs at the root level. Second, he observes that what is expressed in VS is not necessarily the content of a conscious thought or utterance. “Rather, a situation is described as it is perceived by a salient protagonist or in a way that reflects the doxastic state of such a protagonist at the relevant time” (p.283).⁶

In example (8), the embedded sentence *a T-Rex bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark* is interpreted from Billy’s perspective, who is one of the little dinosaurs. This is shown by the use of the indefinite [*a T-Rex*]. This indefinite seems to refer back to the T-Rex already introduced to the discourse, but given conditions on the use of indefinites, this only makes sense if the indefinite is interpreted from Billy’s perspective.

- (8) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds later, [*a T-Rex*] *bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark*.

Another characteristic example is (9), in which the second clause describes the internal sensation of Mary:

- (9) When Mary stepped out of the boat, *the ground was shaking beneath her feet* for a couple of seconds.

Rather than describing a conscious thought, this clause seems to capture a perception or sensation as experienced by Mary.

2.4 Non-reflective consciousness, represented perception, narrated perception, substitutionary perception⁷

Similar examples were also discussed in modern literary theory under the name of *substitutionary perception* (Fehr 1938), *non-reflective perception* (Banfield 1982, Kuroda 1976),

⁶Hinterwimmer (2017) argues that VS does not involve a partial context shift, i.e. all context sensitive expressions are interpreted with respect to the narrator’s context. This, however, does not seem to be correct, see Section 3.

⁷I am grateful to Sofia Bimpikou for drawing my attention to this literature.

represented consciousness (Brinton 1980) or *narrated perception* (Fludernik 1993).⁸ These terms all refer to a technique to express a character's perceptions of the external world.⁹ In these cases, "an author can directly represent perceptions with no suggestion of internal speech" (Brinton 1980). Observe an example of *unreflective consciousness* from Banfield (1982):

- (10) It hadn't been put to her, and she couldn't or at any rate, didn't put it to herself, that *she liked Miss Overmore better than she liked papa; but it would have sustained her under such an imputation to feel herself able to rely that papa liked Miss Overmore exactly as much.* He had particularly told her so.
(James, *What Maisie Knew*, p.33, cited in Cohn 1978, p.47)

In this example the point of view is that of Maisie; this is manifested not only by the word *papa* but also by the content of reflection. However, the reflection is not cast in a language that Maisie herself might have used, rather it reflects the style of the author [narrator]. (NB: This is also true in the case of example (8) above.)

In the next example, the expression *ce pauvre diable d'ouvrier* ('this poor devil of a worker') represents the perspective and attitude of the character described:

- (11) *Ce pauvre diable d'ouvrier, perdu sur les routes, l'intéressait.*
'This poor devil of a worker, wandering and on the road, interested him'
(Zola, *Germinal*, p.30, cited in Banfield 1982 p.202)

In some cases the order of words traces the order of perception on the part of the character. Other descriptions register the character's inability to name or even conceptualise what she is seeing:

- (12) Big dusty drops splash on the windshield. *Here he comes. Here comes something anyhow.* Rubber treads hum on the wet asphalt.
(Percy, *Love in the Ruins*, 1989, p.229, cited in Fludernik 1993 p.300)
- (13) They saw a place where something was caught. *It was a boat, or part of one.*
(Munro, *The Found Boat*, 1974, p.127, cited in Fludernik 1993 p.300)

This style is also characterised by the use of expressive devices such as repetition, root transformations and all kinds of lexical and evaluative phenomena. Here are some examples that contain interjections and repetitions:

- (14) *Yes, the breeze was freshening. The boat was leaning, the water was sliced sharply and fell away in green cascades, in bubbles, in cataracts.* Cam looked down into the foam ... (Woolf, 1970, p.187, cited in Brinton 1980, p.374)
- (1) The train was full of fellows: *a long long chocolate train with cream facings ... The telegraph poles were passing, passing.* (Joyces, 1969, p.20, cited in Brinton 1980, p.374)

⁸French and German names for this phenomenon cited by Brinton (1980) include *style indirect libre de perception* (Lips 1926), *erlebte Wahrnehmung* (Fehr 1938), and *erlebte Eindrücke* (Bühler 1937).

⁹Another term, sometimes cited in the same context, is Cohn's (1978) *psychonarration*. However, it seems to be a rather general term denoting any type of narration of concerned with the mediation of individual psychology.

It should be noted that the authors cited above differ slightly in their description of the properties of the relevant phenomenon. For example, Banfield (1982) defines *unreflective consciousness* as a description of a “sensation, perception or experience”, while FID (*represented speech and thought*, in her terminology) is assumed to be the expression of reflective consciousness. Brinton (1980), on the other hand, argues that both *represented perception* and FID may be either unreflective or reflective. Despite these differences, I believe that the above authors are all describing essentially the same phenomenon.

2.5 Summary of the data

In all of the above cases we see a special type perspective shift: the perceptions of a character are described in a way that at least partly incorporates her point of view. I will refer to these cases as *protagonist projection* (PP) from now on. Similarly to FID, the perspective shift in PP is not marked by any overt perspective-shifting operator. In contrast to FID, PP does not have a quotation-like aspect: though PP describes perceptions of a character, the linguistic form of the description of this perception is often given by the narrator. Unlike in typical cases of FID, in PP the characters are not assumed to have performed a mental speech act, silently uttering a sentence to themselves. This does not mean that PP is incompatible with inner speech, only that it does not require it. Finally, note that although the style is often found in literary works, it is not confined to literature; journalistic and conversational examples can be found as well.

3 Free Indirect Discourse vs. Protagonist Projection

In order to grasp the nature and properties of *protagonist projection* (PP), it is useful to compare it in some detail to a better understood case of perspective shift: *free indirect discourse* (FID). Below I first present some key aspects of FID, then I show in what respects PP differs empirically from FID.

3.1 Free Indirect Discourse (FID)

As was already mentioned above, FID allows sentences to be interpreted with respect to two different perspectives at the same time: the narrator’s perspective and the protagonist’s perspective (cf. Banfield 1982; Doron 1991; Recanati 2000, 2010; Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014; Maier 2015). Textbook examples of FID can be observed in the second sentence of the mini-discourses below:

- (15) a. Tom sighed. *Now he was rich.* (Schlenker 2004)
b. Tom frowned. *Unfortunately, the damn ghost in the attic was making noises again.* (based on Eckardt 2014)

In the second sentence of (15a) the past tense and the pronoun *he* are interpreted from the perspective of the narrator, while the indexical adverb *now* is interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist, Tom. Similarly, in (15b), the past tense is interpreted from the perspective of the narrator, but the evaluative adverb *unfortunately* and the

presuppositions of *ghost* and *again* are interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist, Tom.

Let me highlight here two important properties that characterise FID: (a) the types of elements that can receive a shifted interpretation and (b) that FID needs to be a report of thoughts or internal speech.

(a) The types of elements that shift in FID In the examples above a second perspective is introduced along with the perspective of the narrator (or speaker), that of the protagonist of the story, Tom. Here is an (incomplete) list of elements that can be interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist in FID:¹⁰

1. **Indexical adverbs**, such as *now*, *today*, *yesterday*, *here*, *etc.* For example, in (15a) the indexical adverb *now* selects the time of Tom's thinking, not the time of narration.
2. **Evaluative expressions**, such as adverbs such as *unfortunately* or adjectives (e.g. *dear*), nicknames and attitudinal nouns. For example, in (15b) Tom might characterise the appearance of the ghost as unfortunate. The narrator need not have this opinion.
3. **Presuppositions**. For example, in (15b) the narrator (or speaker) does not need presuppose that there is a ghost in the attic who used to make noises; only Tom needs to presuppose this.¹¹
4. **Expressive meaning**. For example, the modifier *damn* in (15b) is typically interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist. Similarly, the expressive content of exclamations and reflective questions (see below) is typically interpreted from the protagonist's perspective as well.

In contrast, the following elements are interpreted from the narrator's (speaker's) perspective in FID:

1. **Pronouns**. For example, the pronoun *he* in (15a) can be understood as being coreferential with Tom, hence it is evaluated with respect the narrator's perspective.¹²
2. **Tense**. For example, in (15) the past tense is the past of narration, and not interpreted as past with respect to Tom's thinking.

¹⁰In some languages another element that typically signals perspective shift in FID is the use of special tense, mood and aspect marking: for example *imparfait* in French or, in the case of *free indirect speech*, the *Konjunktiv* in German. (In English, in some cases the past progressive might signal perspective shift as well). I do not have the resources to elaborate on this interesting but very complex topic in this paper.

¹¹In Schlenker's (2004) approach to FID, at least some presuppositions are interpreted from the perspective of the narrator. I come back to this issue in Section 5.2.2.

¹²More precisely, it is person features of indexicals that do not shift in FID. Gender features can shift in FID, as it was shown in Sharvit (2008), cf. also Section 5.2.2 of the present paper. Number might shift as well, as in the following example by Stokke (pc):

- (i) She was so drunk Fred looked like two guys to her. *Oh no! Now they were coming towards her!*

In order to capture this dual dependency, most analyses propose that in FID semantic interpretation is related to two contexts: the context of utterance which is the context of the narrator (speaker) and an internal context that is tied to the protagonist. Context-sensitive expressions are interpreted as depending on one or the other context depending on the lexical specification they receive in their lexical entries.

(b) FID is a report of thoughts/internal speech The fact that certain elements in FID can be interpreted from the narrator’s perspective clearly distinguishes it from simple quotation. However, FID does have the characteristics of being a more or less faithful reproduction of the protagonist’s internal speech/ thoughts (their “stream of consciousness”). Arguably, this is shown by the following set of facts:

1. It is possible to add *x thought/said*, as an afterthought or interjection

(16) *Tomorrow was her sixth year anniversary with Spencer, she thought, and it had been the best six years of her life.* (Maier 2015)

2. Exclamatives and interrogatives are allowed:

(17) a. She stood up in a sudden impulse of terror. *Escape! She must escape!*
(Joyce, *Eveline*, cited in Oltean 1993 p. 695)

b. *Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!*
(Lawrence, *Women in Love*, cited in Banfield 1982, p98.)

(18) Mary paused when the doorbell rang. *Could that be Fred?*

3. Hesitation, disfluency is allowed

(19) She wondered if he was still asleep, *how did she even fall asleep and on top of him?!... Was he...shirtless? Oh, ... he was ...* (Maier 2015)

4. The protagonist’s nonstandard dialect can be retained

(20) He [Big Boy] remembered the day when Buck, jealous of his winning, had tried to smash his kiln. *Yeah, that ol sonofabitch![...]Yeah, po ol Buck wuz dead now.* (Maier 2015)

Although the ensemble of these types of facts is often used for arguing that FID is a report of a protagonist’s inner speech or thoughts, we need to be somewhat careful: Exclamatives, reflective questions and disfluencies can also be used by authors of fiction to ascribe a heightened emotional state to a protagonist without implying a report, as we will see below. Ultimately, the strongest argument for saying that FID is a type of speech report is the fact about parentheticals, as in (16).¹³

¹³Note that some authors, e.g. Fludernik (1993), disagree that FID is ever a report of some speech act. She argues that passages of FID present a series of typicality features which are meant to illustrate standard ways in which language is used, not one specific speech or thought act by a specific person.

3.2 PP, in contrast

Protagonist projection has different properties from free indirect discourse: (a) Although PP also makes reference to two simultaneous perspectives, not the same elements are interpreted from the protagonist's (and narrator's) perspective as in FID. (b) PP is not necessarily an internal speech or thought report. Let me elaborate on these two properties.

(a) Not the same elements shift as in FID Unlike in FID, in PP indexical adverbs such as *yesterday*, *tomorrow* cannot be interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist (cf. Stokke 2013):

- (21) a. A week ago, Ann was pacing around after coming home from the jeweller, disappointed and angry with John. #*Yesterday/the day before he gave her a ring studded with diamonds*, but they turned out to be glass. (Stokke 2013)
b. *Unfortunately #yesterday/the day before she received an idiotic ring studded with glass*, but it turned out to be diamond.

An exception seems to be the adverbs *now* and *here* that can (though rather infrequently) appear in PP (cf. Brinton 1980). Nevertheless it is hard to draw strong conclusions from these examples because *here* and *now* were argued to be unreliable tests for indexical shifting (Eckardt 2014). I come back to this issue in Section 4.2.

- (22) She [Florence] trembled, and her eyes were dim. His [Mr Dombey's] figure seemed to grow in height and bulk before her as he paced the room: *now it was all blurred and indistinct; now clear again, and plain*; and now she seemed to think that this had happened, just the same, a multitude of years ago. (Dickens, *Dombey and Son*, xxxv, 1985, p.585, cited in Fludernik 1993, p.301)
- (23) With the walls of the kitchen ended all the antiquity of the abbey; the fourth side of the quadrangle having, on account of its decaying state, been removed by the general's father, and the present erected in its place. *All that was venerable ceased here*. The new building was not only new but declared itself to be so; intended only for offices, and enclosed behind by stableyards, no uniformity of architecture had been thought necessary. (Jane Austen, *Northanger Abbey*, cited in Brinton 1980, p.373)

Nevertheless, there are many elements that can be interpreted from the protagonist's perspective. Here is an (incomplete) list of items that can receive a shifted interpretation:¹⁴

1. **Evaluative expressions**, e.g. *unfortunately*. For example, in (21b) the protagonist characterise receiving a glass-studded ring as unfortunate. The narrator need not have this opinion.
2. **Presuppositions**. For example, in (3d) the factive presupposition can be interpreted from the protagonist's perspective, the narrator (or speaker) does not need

According to her, FID only evokes a possible utterance that fits the discourse context; it does not presuppose such an utterance.

¹⁴Similarly to FID, in PP perspective shift is also often signalled by the use of special forms of tense/aspect marking: the imparfait in French and the past progressive in English. However, in German the Konjunktiv seems to be barred from the narration of perceptions, cf. Fludernik (1993) p.302.

to assume that he would never let them down. However, the protagonist’s belief state needs to entail this.

3. **Expressive meaning.** For example, modifier *idiotic* in (21b) is typically interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist.

In contrast, the following items are interpreted from the narrator’s (or speaker’s) perspective:¹⁵

1. **Indexical adverbs** (e.g. *tomorrow, yesterday*). For example, the adverb *yesterday* in (21a) is interpreted from the narrator’s perspective, and this is what makes it unacceptable in the context of the sentence.
2. **Pronouns.** For example in (21a), the pronoun *her* is clearly interpreted from the narrator’s perspective.
3. **Tense.** For example, the past tense in (21a) is interpreted from the narrator’s perspective.

(b) PP is not necessarily an internal speech/thought report PP describes the perceptions and mental states of a protagonist, taking her point of view. However, the linguistic characterisation of the internal world of the protagonist is external in the sense that the actual linguistic form that describes these perceptions and mental states is created by the narrator, and not (or at least not necessarily) by the protagonist herself. (cf. Brinton 1980, Banfield 1982, Oltean 1993 and Hinterwimmer 2017). In PP, in contrast to FID, there is no presumption of a silent (or loud), internal (or external) speech act. This can be seen in for example in the excerpts repeated below:

- (24)
- a. When Mary stepped out of the boat, *the ground was shaking beneath her feet for a couple of seconds.* (Hinterwimmer 2017)
 - b. *He gave her a ring studded with diamonds,* but it turned out to be glass. (Holton 1997)
 - c. A great brush swept smooth across his mind, sweeping across it moving branches, children’s voices, the shuffle of feet, and people passing, and humming traffic, rising and falling traffic. *Down he sank into the plumes and feathers of sleep, sank, sank and was muffled over.* (Mrs Dalloway, cited in Oltean 1993, p.711)

The example in (24a) describes a sensation of Mary’s as it was perceived by her. But there is no suggestion that Mary had a thought with a linguistic form “The ground is shaking beneath my feet”. In example (24b) both he and she might conceptualise the object in front of them as a ring studded with diamonds without actually telling this to each other or even themselves, similarly to when we see a cat we typically recognise it is a cat and form a mental representation of a cat in front of us without telling ourselves “this is a cat”. In example (24c) there is no suggestion that the protagonist would be

¹⁵Banfield (1982) claims that proper names can stand for a character in PP but not in FID. Puzzlingly, however, her examples of this are in fact examples of FID. See also Maier (2015) for examples of proper names in FID.

telling himself, as he falls asleep: “down I sink into the plumes and feathers of sleep, sink, sink and...” Rather, it is the narrator who is trying to recreate the internal sensation of the protagonist.¹⁶

That PP is not a speech or thought report is also shown by the fact that it is not possible to insert parentheticals such as *she thought, she said* in it. If such a parenthetical is added to a sentence interpretable as PP, it must be read as FID. The example in (25) is ambiguously reflective or non-reflective without the parentheticals; with them, it can only be read as FID.¹⁷

(25) *A few drops of rain were falling, she thought/realized.*

Inserting perception verbs seems to be marginally possible, cf. (26)¹⁸. However, perception verbs that can metaphorically imply a state of verbal reflection such as *see* can also have this metaphoric meaning in parentheticals, and they might create FID as a result as in (27) (cf. Banfield 1982, p.205):¹⁹

(26) There it [an element of joy] was, all round them. *It partook, she felt, carefully helping Mr Bankes to a specially tender piece, of eternity.*
(Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 1985, p.97, cited in Fludernik 1993)

(27) *It was raining, she saw.*

Instead of parentheticals, PP is more likely introduced in texts by what Fehr (1938) calls “perception indicators” or “window openers”, such as *Look!; She turned round; he looked up, etc.:*

(28) He looked back from the door: *Now she was astonishingly beautiful.*

Although PP does not presuppose a speech act on the part of a protagonist, exclamatives, questions, hesitations and interjections are allowed (if rare). These elements, rather than signalling an utterance, express the emotional and subjective state of the protagonist. In the example in (29) the exclamation expresses a heightened emotional state of the protagonist. Nevertheless, this clause need not be a report of the protagonist’s explicit thoughts.

(29) Mary looked out the window of her hotel room, and was speechless. *What a fantastic view!*

¹⁶This does not mean PP cannot be pragmatically licensed by a situation that includes inner speech: but unlike in FID, it is never a report; the thoughts of the character are filtered through the narrative voice.

¹⁷An exception might be inserting parentheticals inside the clause as in (ia)(pc. A. Stokke). But when the parenthetical is inserted after the clause, as in (ib), an FID reading seems to arise again:

- (i) a. He gave her a ring studded with, she thought, diamonds.
b. He gave her a ring studded with diamonds, she thought.

¹⁸Fludernik (1993) comments: “Formally, this is free indirect discourse (note the parenthetical she felt), but on an underlying direct discourse reading it cannot be free indirect discourse—Mrs Ramsay could not literally have thought ‘it partakes of eternity’.”

¹⁹Nevertheless, a perception reading might also be possible, as noted by a reviewer.

- (30) Laura bent her head and hurried on. She wished now she had put on a coat.
How her frock shone! (Mansfield, 1971, p.84, cited in Brinton 1980 p.375)

Questions are also allowed in PP, as shown in (31). In these cases questions do not come with the obligation to answer them, rather, they express a state of uncertainty, wondering, or a sense of puzzlement.²⁰ For example in (31), Mary need not be literally wondering if the ground is shaking beneath her feet, it is enough for her to be puzzled about her sensation.²¹

- (31) When Mary got off the boat, *was it the ground shaking under her feet?*

Literary examples are cited in Brinton (1980):

- (32) Then suddenly, as a train comes out of a tunnel, the aeroplane rushed out of the clouds again - *and the bar of smoke curved behind and it dropped down and it soared up and wrote one letter after another—but what word was it writing?* (Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, cited in Brinton 1980 p.374)
- (33) *They were like bright birds that had alighted in the Sheridan’s garden for this one afternoon, on their way to — where?*
 (Mansfield, 1971, p.81, cited in Brinton 1980 p.374)

Sentences of PP may also contain interjections and lexical fillers that serve to make the description of the perception of the protagonist more vivid:

- (14) *Yes, the breeze was freshening.* The boat was leaning, the water was sliced sharply and fell away in green cascades, in bubbles, in cataracts. Cam looked down into the foam ...
 (Woolf, 1970, p.187, cited in Brinton 1980 p.374)

²⁰Gyuris (2014) discusses what she calls *reflective questions*, a typical example of which is given by the second utterance of A in the example (i) below: It is clear in this context that the addressee cannot answer the question, but the reflective version prefixed with “*I wonder*” is allowed.

- (i) A: Do you know anything about Mary?
 B: Unfortunately, I don’t.
 A: I wonder if she still lives in Boston./ #Does she still live in Boston?

In many languages questions that suspend the obligation to answer them are marked by a special particle. In Hungarian, for example, the particle *vajon* is used to signal such a question, see Gyuris (2014). In the Hungarian version of (31), the particle *vajon* has to be used.

- (ii) Mikor Kati kiszállt a csónakból, vajon a föld remegett a lába alatt?
 when Mari stepped-out the boat-from, vajon the ground shoke the feet-poss3sg under
 ‘When Mari stepped out of the boat, was is the ground shaking under her feet?’

A reviewer notes that in German free *ob*-questions seem to fall in the category of reflective questions (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006), and are marginally acceptable in contexts as in (ii). Questions without *ob* seem to be acceptable as well in German. Cf. also Farkas (2020) for similar examples in Romanian.

²¹Fludernik (1993) argues also that questions can be used to express non-reflective puzzlement; a state of confusion that is not verbalised: “the syntactic criteria adduced by Banfield—that exclamations and questions necessarily imply reflectivity—do not constitute a valid criterion. As we have seen, consciousness ranges over varying depths of verbal and non-verbal substance, and questions can refer to mute puzzlement as well as active, reflective self-questioning. (p.423)”

- (34) One day, just as he's entering a narrow street all ancient brick walls and lined with costermongers, he hears his name called—and *hubba hubba what's this then, here she comes all right, blonde hair flying in telltales, white wedgies clattering on cobblestones, an adorable tomato in a nurse uniform, and her name's, uh, well, oh* — Darlene. Golly, it's Darlene.
(pynchon, *Gravity's Rainbow*, 1981, p.114–15) (from Fludernik 1993, p.301)

We also find incomplete sentences and repetitions that mimic the perceptual experience in some ways:

- (1) The train was full of fellows: *a long long chocolate train with cream facings ... The telegraph poles were passing, passing.*
(Joyces, 1969, p.20, cited in Brinton 1980 p.374)

Thus, although many speech-like elements are allowed in PP, their function is not to indicate that an actual verbal speech or thought act took place, but rather to express the emotional, perceptual or even iconic aspects of the perception of the protagonist. For example the repetition of verb *passing* mirrors the repetitive aspect of the impression of the passing telegraph poles.

3.3 FID and PP, intermingled

In actual texts PP and FID often intermingle and facilitate each other. This fact is stressed by literary scholars, e.g. Fehr (1938), Banfield (1982), Brinton (1980), Oltean (1993) and Fludernik (1993). Brinton (1980) analyses the following passage in detail:

- (35) ^aLaura put back the receiver, flung her arms over her head, took a deep breath, stretched and let them fall. ^b“Huh,” she sighed, and the moment after the sigh she sat up quickly. ^cShe was still, listening. ^dAll the doors in the house seemed to be open. ^eThe house was alive with soft, quick steps and running voices. ^fThe green baize door that led to the kitchen regions swung upon and shut with a muffled thud. ^gAnd now there came a long, chuckling absurd sound. ^hIt was the heavy piano being moved on its stiff castors. ⁱBut the air! ^jIf you stopped to notice, was the air always like this? ^kLittle faint winds were playing chase in at the tops of the windows, out at the doors. ^lAnd there were two tiny spots of sun, one on the inkpot, one on a silver photograph frame, playing too. ^mDarling little spots. ⁿEspecially the one on the inkpot lid. ^oIt was quite warm. ^pA warm little silver star. ^qShe could have kissed it.
(Mansfield, *The Garden Party* 1971, p.70, cited in Brinton 1980 p.371)

Brinton (1980) argues that in the above passage, sentences d-h, k-l, and o-p are examples of PP, j, m-n, and q are FID, and i is probably ambiguous between the two. She cites further examples of intermingling of PP and FID, for example (36):

- (36) ^{pp}And all at once the sun burned through in a new place, at the side, and shot out a ray that hit the Eagle and Child, next the motor boat factory, right on the new signboard. ^{FID}A sign, I thought.
(Cary, 1969, p.5-6, cited in Brinton 1980 p.372)

Brinton argues that “the co-occurrence of these styles suggests that both are representations of similar aspects of a character’s consciousness” (p.372). Likewise, the literary theorists cited above all argue that what we call FID and PP here are two subtypes of a wider category.

4 The proposal

The literary scholars cited above were right: FID and PP are special cases of the same larger category. This intuition is also shared by Stokke’s (2013) bi-contextual account, an important source of inspiration for the present proposal. From now on I call the overarching category *perspective shift* (for want of a better name). Perspective shift is a bi-contextual interpretation system that needs to be pragmatically licensed by the context and the nature of this licensing determines whether we get FID or PP. When perspective shift is licensed by an utterance (be it external or internal), we get FID; when it is licensed by a perceiving event, we get PP. I show that these varying licensing conditions also predict the empirical differences observed, namely the interpretation of adverbial indexicals and the capacity for being embedded. The resulting proposal is essentially an extension of Eckardt’s (2014) semantics for FID that can cover PP as well.

One result of the similar analysis of FID and PP is that it predicts that authors (and their hearers/readers) can move back and forth seamlessly between FID and PP, as we have seen in the previous section. Another welcome result is that it predicts why FID and PP behave similarly in many ways, in particular also with respect to presupposition projection.

4.1 Eckardt (2014)

Following Kaplan’s (1989) seminal work on indexical and demonstrative expressions, it is commonly assumed that logical forms of sentences are interpreted not only with respect to a model \mathcal{M} and an assignment function g , but also with respect to a context C . Intuitively, contexts determine the author of the utterance (auth_C), the time of the utterance (t_C), the location of the utterance (l_C) and the world of the context (w_C) (and possibly more, for example the hearer (h_C), etc.):²² Formally, for Kaplan (1989), contexts are unstructured objects $c, c', c'' \dots$. Their aspects can be retrieved by functions applying to the context. In the notation used here, auth_C abbreviates the value of the function auth for the context C (and so on for the other aspects). In this theory, indexicals in natural language are assumed to be directly referential, i.e. they pick out aspects of the context:

- (37) a. $\llbracket \text{I} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \text{auth}_C$
 b. $\llbracket \text{now} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = t_C$
 c. $\llbracket \text{here} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = l_C$

As we have seen above, the behaviour of certain indexicals in free indirect discourse suggests that such sentences are evaluated with respect to not one but two contexts si-

²²For the context C to be proper, certain conditions need to apply, e.g. the author of the context has to be located at l_C and exist at t_C . Also, for Kaplan (1989) context need not correspond to real utterance situations, thus talking about the *the context of utterance* is a simplification.

multaneously. Accordingly, a number of analyses for FID propose a bi-contextual analysis (cf. Doron 1991; Recanatì 2000, 2010; Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014). These analyses assume that in FID semantic interpretation is with respect to the external context (aka the context of utterance) and an internal context (aka the context of thought) at the same time.²³

Thus Eckardt's (2014) book assumes that FID is interpreted with respect to two contexts simultaneously. It differs from its competitors in some important aspects, especially concerning the treatment of tense, aspect and presuppositions. It will be useful to introduce some details. Eckardt (2014) proposes that the logical language contains the following set of variables (with R, r for reference time):²⁴

$$(38) \quad \{\text{AUTH}, \textit{auth}, \text{AD}, \textit{ad}, \text{NOW}, \textit{now}, \text{HERE}, \textit{here}, \text{WORLD}, \textit{world}, R, r\}$$

Utterances can be interpreted in two ways. They can have the ordinary interpretation and interpreted wrt. to an external context $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^{M,g,C}$ or they can be interpreted with respect to a pair of external and internal contexts $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle}$. Formally, contexts are special purpose variable assignments:

- (39) a. An external context C is an assignment with the following properties:
 $C: \{\text{AUTH}, \textit{auth}, \text{AD}, \textit{ad}, \text{NOW}, \textit{now}, \text{HERE}, \textit{here}, \text{WORLD}, \textit{world}, R, r\} \rightarrow M$
with $C(\text{AUTH})=C(\textit{auth}), C(\text{AD})=C(\textit{ad}), \dots, C(R)=C(r)$
- b. An internal context d is an assignment on the following variables:
 $d: \{\textit{auth}, \textit{ad}, \textit{here}, \textit{now}, \textit{world}, r\} \rightarrow M$
- c. A permissible pair of contexts $\langle C, d \rangle$ is one where
C is an external context and
d is an internal context and
 $d(\textit{now})=C(R)$

The two types of contexts, the single context $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket^{M,g,C}$ and the double context or $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle}$ are defined as follows:

$$(40) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{a.} & \llbracket \textit{auth} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = C(\textit{auth}) & \llbracket \text{AUTH} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = C(\text{AUTH}) \\ & \llbracket \textit{ad} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = C(\textit{ad}) & \llbracket \text{AD} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = C(\text{AD}) \\ & \text{etc.} & \\ \text{b.} & \llbracket \textit{auth} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = d(\textit{sp}) & \llbracket \text{AUTH} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = C(\text{AUTH}) \\ & \llbracket \textit{ad} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = d(\textit{ad}) & \llbracket \text{AD} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = C(\text{AD}) \\ & \text{etc.} & \end{array}$$

²³A reviewer notes that the narrator context and the protagonist context are both not really contexts in the sense of Kaplan, because they must be sets of worlds/contexts. One way to think about this issue is to say that even though it is not possible to say for any given possible world that that world is the world of the novel, we might still hypothesise that there is a single world that is the world of the novel; we can just never know which one it is. According to this way of thinking, narrators are like reporters who send home letters describing far-away lands. There is a single world that they describe, but their description never singles out one world.

²⁴Reference time is a third time point (in addition to utterance time and event time) originally proposed by Reichenbach (1947) for distinguishing the praeterite from perfect tenses. It encodes the point from which the event is 'seen'. Eckardt's (2014) reason for adding reference time as a parameter of context is that the analysis of aspect, mood and exclamatives in FID needs to refer to a shifted reference time.

As a result of the above rules, variables in small capitals behave as unshiftable parameters, since they can be only interpreted by C. Variables in lowercase letters, however, can be interpreted either by C (in single contexts) or d (in double contexts). Hence they can receive a shifted interpretation. Items that do not shift are therefore translated into the the logical language with small capitals, while shiftable items are translated with lowercase letters:

Unshiftable items Unshiftable indexicals in English (e.g. the first person indexical *I*) are translated with variables in small capitals in the logical language. As a result, they can only be interpreted by C under both modes of interpretation:

$$(41) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a. } \llbracket \text{I} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \llbracket \text{AUTH} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \text{C}(\text{AUTH}) \\ \text{b. } \llbracket \text{I} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = \llbracket \text{AUTH} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = \text{C}(\text{AUTH}) \end{array}$$

Tenses (and aspect, not discussed here) in English refer exclusively to rigid parameters R and NOW. They receive a non-presuppositional analysis, as illustrated below by the analysis of past tense: (recall that R is for reference time and P is a variable over sets of time intervals).

$$(42) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a. } \llbracket \text{past} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \llbracket \lambda P. (P(\text{R}) \wedge \text{R} < \text{NOW}) \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \lambda P. (P(\text{C}(\text{R})) \wedge \text{C}(\text{R}) < \text{C}(\text{NOW})) \\ \text{b. } \llbracket \text{past} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = \llbracket \lambda P. (P(\text{R}) \wedge \text{R} < \text{NOW}) \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = \lambda P. (P(\text{C}(\text{R})) \wedge \text{C}(\text{R}) < \text{C}(\text{NOW})) \end{array}$$

Shiftable items Shiftable indexicals, in contrast, are translated with lowercase variables, and so they are interpreted differently in single and double contexts:

$$(43) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a. } \llbracket \text{here} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \llbracket \text{here} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \text{C}(\text{here}) \\ \text{b. } \llbracket \text{here} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = \llbracket \text{here} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = \text{d}(\text{here}) \end{array}$$

Similarly, temporal adverbs (assumed to be event modifiers) are translated with variables in lowercase letters in the logical language. As a result, they are interpreted with respect to the external context if there is only one context, but with respect to the internal context in double contexts:

$$(44) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a. } \llbracket \text{yesterday} \rrbracket^{M,g,C} = \llbracket \lambda e. \tau(e) \subset \iota t. t \text{ DAY-BEFORE}(\text{now}) \rrbracket^{M,g,C} \\ \quad = \lambda e. (\tau(e) \subset \iota t. t \text{ DAY-BEFORE } \text{C}(\text{now})) \\ \text{b. } \llbracket \text{yesterday} \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} = \llbracket \lambda e. \tau(e) \subset \iota t. t \text{ DAY-BEFORE}(\text{now}) \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} \\ \quad = \lambda e. (\tau(e) \subset \iota t. t \text{ DAY-BEFORE } \text{d}(\text{now})) \end{array}$$

The same applies to speaker oriented expressions, e.g. *unfortunately*. Eckardt (2014) assumes that such items have a two-dimensional semantics in the style of Potts (2005), according to which in addition to their normal content, expressive elements have an expressive content as well. The speaker-dependence of such elements is encoded in their expressive meaning, as shown below:

$$(45) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{unfortunately } p \\ \text{a. } \text{asserted content: } \llbracket p \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} \\ \text{b. } \text{expressive content: } \llbracket \text{REGRET}_w(\text{auth}, \text{now}, w, p) \rrbracket^{M,g,\langle C,d \rangle} \end{array}$$

When interpreted in FID (double context) mode, the variables in lowercase letters *sp*, *now*, *w* will be evaluated with respect to *d*, and thus resolved from the point of view of the protagonist of the internal context. Otherwise, they will be interpreted with respect to the external context.

4.2 Indexical adverbs in FID and PP

As we have seen above, elements that are interpreted with respect to the author or the world parameter get a shifted interpretation in PP just as they do in FID. This is the case with speaker-oriented adverbs such as *unfortunately*, emotive and expressive items such as *idiotic* and other speaker-oriented constructions (questions, exclamatives, optatives, etc.).²⁵ The core empirical difference between FID and PP concern temporal indexical adverbs such as *yesterday* and *today* as well as locative adverbs. While we find examples of these with a shifted reading in FID, similar examples seem to be impossible with PP. Recall:

(46) [FID] Johnny was excited. Tomorrow was Christmas.

(21a) [PP] A week ago, Ann was pacing around after coming home from the jeweller, disappointed and angry with John. #*Yesterday/the day before he gave her a ring studded with diamonds*, but they turned out to be glass. (Stokke 2013)

Where does this restriction come from? Examples of protagonist projection describe non-reflective mental states that do not require that the mental state be put to a linguistic form by the protagonist. Perceptions, emotions, non-verbal beliefs are all examples of mental states that do not (have to) involve the linguistic faculty. I hypothesise that the use of temporal adverbs such as *yesterday*, on the other hand, presupposes a reflective mental state that is linguistically explicit. We cannot make sense of indexical temporal concepts such as *yesterday* without language. As a result, when we insert these adverbs into examples of protagonist projection one of three things can happen: (a) The example is unacceptable (b) the example is coerced into being interpreted as FID, i.e. as presupposing a verbalised, reflective mental state on the part of the protagonist or (c) the adverb is interpreted outside the scope of perspective shift, in a single context and expresses the perspective of the narrator.

This does not mean perceiving events cannot possibly have past or future events as their content. Even though most often we perceive events that happen at the time of the perception, we might also re-experience past events in the present or pre-view future experiences. The first might happen in the case of a sudden flashback or voluntary remembering of past experiences, and the latter in the case of imagining or forecasting an event. All of this might happen in a pre-verbal, non-reflective state of mind. However, I propose that temporally (or spatially) anchoring these perceiving experiences requires a degree of reflection that cannot be done without language.²⁶ This is why when we use

²⁵cf. Eckardt (2014) for a detailed semantic analysis of these elements.

²⁶A reviewer wonders about the following examples:

- (i) a. His [Mr Dombey's] figure seemed to grow in height and bulk before her as he paced the room: Now it was much more blurred than before.
- b. When Mary stepped out of the boat, the ground was shaking beneath her feet in the same

temporal or spatial indexical adverbs, the example turns into FID:

- (47) Last week Mary had a flashback of her recent wedding. (#Yesterday) She was walking down the aisle in her white dress.

Recall that we have discussed above examples of PP with *here* and *now*, where these adverbs were plausibly interpreted as describing the time and location of the perceiving event of the protagonist. Nevertheless, these examples are unreliable indicators of perspective shift because *here* and *now* also have demonstrative uses which do not behave as indexicals (cf. Recanati 2004, Hunter 2012, Eckardt 2014). Observe the following example:

- (48) Napoleon was banished to St. Helena 1815. Now he wasn't so popular any more. (Eckardt 2014 p.139)

In example (48) *now* does not refer to the time of the utterance, nor does it seem to get a shifted reading under which it refers to the now of some protagonist; the thought expressed in the second sentence seems to be that of the narrator and not that of Napoleon. Eckardt (2014) argues that we need to posit two different lexical entries for *now*: an indexical and a demonstrative one. Since it is hard to show that in examples (22)-(23) we are not seeing examples of such a demonstrative use of *here* and *now*, it is also hard to draw strong conclusions regarding the possibility of shifting from these examples.

In Eckardt's (2014) system it is decided once and for all whether an indexical item shifts or not in a double context. Variables in lowercase letters are interpreted with respect to the external context C in single contexts but with respect to the internal context d in double contexts. This gets the FID facts right, but in order to capture why indexical adverbs behave differently in PP we need to add some modifications to the lexical meaning of these elements.

Proposal I propose that the unavailability of a shifted interpretation of indexical adverbs such as *yesterday* in PP is because these adverbs come with a lexical presupposition that makes their interpretation contingent on being used in a speech act.

- (49) *yesterday*
- a. asserted content: $\lambda e.\tau(e) \subset \iota t. t \text{ DAY-BEFORE } (now)$
 - b. presupposed content: it occurs as part of a speech act by *auth.*

This essentially hardwires the observation made above that such indexical adverbs presuppose a mental state that involves (self-)talk, thus can only be used as part of a speech act. As a result, when we try to insert a temporal indexical adverb into a sentence that would otherwise be interpreted as PP, one of three things might happen: Either the

way as before.

I think the reason why it is not possible to insert genuine shifting indexical adverbs in these examples is because the act of explicitly comparing two experiences that happened at different times is one that presupposes language, thus requires FID. We can re-experience past events in the present by remembering them, and even have the impression of a picture being blurred to a greater degree than a previous one, but the explicit comparison of the two experiences requires language.

presupposition is accommodated,²⁷ turning the example into an example of FID, if this can be made sense of. If the presupposition cannot be accommodated, the use of the indexical adverb might simply be unacceptable on the intended reading. A third case might result from interpreting the adverb outside the double context, in a single context, in which case it will be interpreted with respect to the narrator’s now. This is possible, as we will see below, because unlike FID, PP can target constituents that are smaller than full sentences.

4.3 Embeddability

FID and PP differ in whether they can be embedded: a point that was emphasised by Hinterwimmer (2017) in his discussion of *viewpoint shifting*. Thus examples of FID are typically unembedded sentences, and embedding them leads to infelicity. Examples of PP, on the other hand, are often found in syntactically embedded positions, as we have seen in examples (3), (7), (8). It is also possible to interpret smaller constituents than full clauses in PP.

I propose that the restriction on embeddability of FID follows from its pragmatic licensing requirement: The reason why FID cannot be embedded is because it has to be licensed by a (silent or pronounced) speech or thought act. (Note that this is essentially the same as Hinterwimmer’s (2017) explanation as for why FID cannot be embedded.) Since speech acts are normally assumed to be root level phenomena, it follows that FID will not be normally embedded either. An exception to this syntactic generalisation is the appearance of parentheticals in FID, e.g. *she thought, etc.*, as shown in the last sentence of (50):

- (50) Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself. For Lucy had her work cut out for her. The doors would be taken off their hinges; Rumpelmayer’s men were coming. *And then, thought Clarissa Dalloway, what a morning—fresh as if issued to children on a beach.* (Mrs. Dalloway, cited in Sharvit 2008)

The reason for this exception to the syntactic generalisation might be that in these cases the main clause is pragmatically subordinated and the ‘at issue’ content (or main point) of the sentence is expressed by the syntactic complement (cf. Simons 2007, Hunter 2016, Jasinskaja 2016). In a pragmatic sense, at least, the main clause is not an embedder in these cases.

4.4 Presupposition satisfaction in double contexts

If a sentence is interpreted with respect to two contexts as in FID and PP, what is the context that is relevant for presupposition satisfaction (accommodation)? The issue is addressed briefly by Eckardt (2014) concerning FID. She discusses an example similar to the following one:

²⁷As will be discussed in Section 4.4, presuppositions of sentences interpreted with respect to double contexts are understood as presuppositions of the protagonist. If nothing prevents this, the presupposition of the author of the internal context can be exported to become the presupposition of the author of the external context as well (or the story, in the case of narrative fiction).

(51) Tom frowned. The ghost in the attic was making noises again.

Eckardt (2014) observes that if we interpret the second sentence in the above example as conveying the thought of Tom, the reader does not need to assume that the ghost in the attic is part of the world of the story. It is natural to interpret the second sentence as only making a claim about Tom’s beliefs regarding the ghost in the attic. As a consequence, the presupposition of the definite description ‘there is exactly one relevant ghost’ does not need to be taken as part of the story.

In this paper I follow a Stalnakerian view of presuppositions according to which presuppositions are pragmatic and are made by speakers, i.e. it is speakers that presuppose things, not sentences (cf. Stalnaker 1974).²⁸ Thus presuppositions of sentences are understood as presuppositions made by the speakers of these sentences, and need to be satisfied in the speakers’ beliefs (and in what they believe to be the common ground). I assume, in accordance with Eckardt (2014), that the relevant speaker in the case of FID is the author of the internal context, i.e. the protagonist. These presuppositions can be exported to become the presuppositions of the author of the external context as well, if there is nothing that blocks this. In the case of journalistic or real-life examples of FID the author of the external context is the journalist or the person speaking. In the case of fiction, I assume that the author of the external context is the narrator.²⁹ Let’s further assume that the presuppositions of the narrator at some point n in the fiction can be represented by the set of worlds that are compatible with the ensemble of the propositions expressed up to point n in the fiction, i.e. the story up to n (STORY_{n-1}).³⁰ Accommodating a presupposition made by the narrator simply means restricting STORY_{n-1} with the content of the presupposition. For example, the presupposition of (51) that ‘there is an attic’ might be exported, i.e. added to what the hearer knows about the story, if there is nothing in the story that is incompatible with this.³¹ In short, in the case of fiction internal accommodation means updating the (reader’s representation of the) beliefs of the protagonist, and external accommodation means updating the (reader’s representation) of the content of the story.

Similar considerations apply in PP. Recall for example the sentence in (3d) (repeated below), in which the factive verb *know* receives a non-factive interpretation.

(3d) *She knew that he would never let her down*, but, like all the others, he did.

The first clause *she knew that he would never let her down* is interpreted as PP, and

²⁸What it means for a speaker to presuppose a proposition p is to believe (or assume) that p is true and also believe (or assume) that her interlocutor believes (assumes) p to be true, and further that her interlocutor realizes that she is making these assumptions.

²⁹This assumption is too simplistic, but I hope it is defensible at least for the purposes of this paper.

³⁰Alternatively, we could assume that the relevant set of worlds is determined by the common ground between the narrator and the reader at a given point in the fiction. To what extent the hearer’s beliefs about the actual world shape their representation of the story is a very complex matter and I will not be able to enter into it here. See e.g. Lewis (1978) and much subsequent work on this topic.

³¹Note that this proposal also explains that possibility of a shifted interpretation of gender presuppositions of referential pronouns (cf. Sharvit 2008), as is discussed in Eckardt (2014) and Section 5.2.2. However, the question of the *de re/de dicto* interpretation of definites in FID (and in PP) is a more complex matter than simple presupposition projection, I believe: it is a question of what description of the individual denoted by the definite description is salient for the protagonist. In FID, this corresponds to the *de dicto* reading, since FID is licensed by an utterance of the protagonist.

its factive presupposition is interpreted as a presupposition of the author of the internal context, namely the subject of the sentence. Because of contradictory information in the second half of the sentence, it is not exported to become the presupposition of the author of the external context. This predicts why on the whole (3d) does not require that the speaker believe the content of ‘he would never let her down’.

Thus both in FID and in PP presuppositions are primarily understood as presuppositions of the author of the internal context, the protagonist. It is the protagonist that needs to believe that the proposition expressed by the presupposition is true (and believe that his belief is shared by their interlocutors, if there are any.) Presuppositions of FID and PP can be exported to become the presuppositions of the author of the utterance context, if there is nothing in the external context that prevents this. In the case of fiction, the presuppositions of the narrator at some point of the story can be equated with what the hearer (or reader) knows about the story at that point.

4.5 Story Update

Eckardt (2014) laid out how FID contributed to the overall story in which it appears. She assumes a broadly Stalnakerian approach, in which sentences update the previous common ground with their propositional content. Suppose, as before, that STORY_{n-1} is the set of worlds that represents the content of the story up to sentence s_{n-1} . If s_n is interpreted in a single mode $\llbracket s_n \rrbracket^{M,g,C}$, its asserted content p updates STORY_{n-1} directly, by intersection:

$$(52) \quad \text{STORY}_n = \text{STORY}_{n-1} \cap \llbracket s_n \rrbracket^{M,g,C}$$

If s_n is interpreted in a bi-contextual mode ($\llbracket s_n \rrbracket^{M,g,d,C}$), its asserted content p updates STORY_{n-1} as follows:

- (53) a. If d is plausibly a context of thought, STORY_{n-1} is updated with $\lambda w. \text{THINK}(author, now, w, p)$
- b. If d is plausibly a context of speech, STORY_{n-1} is updated with $\lambda w. \text{SAY}(author, now, w, p)$

Protagonist projection requires us to complement these rules with new ones for updating the story. I propose that hearers/readers of the story update it with the asserted content p of sentences in PP as follows:

- (54) a. If d is plausibly a context of perception, e.g. feeling, seeing, hearing, etc.: $\lambda w. \text{FEEL/SEE/HEAR/ETC.}(author, now, w, p)$
- b. If d is plausibly a context of non-verbal (or implicit) belief: $\lambda w. \text{BELIEVE}(author, now, w, p)$

Note that the story update proposed here predicts that we update the context with what a character feels and perceives, but without attributing the words to her. This is in accordance with the description of a passage of PP (in Flaubert’s *Madame Bovary*) by Auerbach (1968), cited in Banfield (1982):

“It is not, however, a matter — as it is in many first-person novels and other later works of a similar type — of a simple representation of the content of

Emma’s consciousness, of what she feels as she feels it. Though the light which illuminates the picture proceeds from her, she is yet herself part of the picture, she is situated within it. . . . Here it is not Emma who speaks, but the writer. *Le poêle qui fumait, la porte qui criait, les murs qui suintaient, les pavés humides*³² — all this, of course, Emma sees and feels, but she would not be able to sum it all up in this way ... she has neither the intelligence nor the cold candor of self-accounting necessary for such a formulation. To be sure, there is nothing of Flaubert’s life in these words, but only Emma’s; Flaubert does nothing but bestow the power of mature expression upon the material which she affords, in its complete subjectivity.” (Auerbach 1968, p. 484, quoted in Banfield 1982)

Not at-issue content in FID and PP such as presuppositions and expressive content update the story differently. Presuppositions of sentences interpreted as perspective shift, as was discussed above, need to be entailed by (or accommodated in) the beliefs of the author of the inner context. Expressive content, on the other hand, updates the story directly. For example, in the case of the adverb *unfortunately*, its expressive content in (55b) updates the the previous story directly.

- (55) unfortunately S
- a. asserted content: $\llbracket S \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$
 - b. expressive content: $\llbracket \text{REGRET}_w (\text{author}_d, \text{now}_d, w, S) \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$

Similarly, the expressive content of epithets, exclamations, etc. updates the story directly as well.

4.6 Pragmatic licensing

According to the proposal outlined above, both in FID and PP the internal context (i.e. the context of thought) can be introduced without an operator. In this sense the context shift is free. Yet, it needs to be pragmatically licensed by a rich discourse context in order to be recoverable by the hearer (or reader). Freedom, however, always implies a certain amount of danger, and in the present context this means the danger of communicative breakdown, as was emphasised by Harris and Potts (2009) in their discussion of the interpretation of speaker-oriented appositives:

“A speaker who utters an appositive with the intention of having it be understood as non-speaker-oriented has undertaken a risky communicative strategy in the following sense: it runs counter to hearer expectations about how these constructions will be used. *Thus, this is a reliable strategy only in contexts that are rich enough to support another perspective in just the right ways.* To put it another way: you might always be free to intend your appositive to be understood as non-speaker-oriented, but your audience will often be unable to recover your intentions. And you probably know that your addressee will be unable to recover your intentions, which will lead you to adopt another strategy (assuming you wish to be understood). So, in this broadly game-theoretic fashion, we arrive at the apparent defaults evident

³²The smoking stove, the creaking door, the oozing walls, the wet flagstones

in our corpus results, while at the same time allowing that contextual factors like those manipulated in our experiments might lead to different outcomes.”
(Harris and Potts 2009, p.546, emphasis mine)

Somewhat more precisely, Eckardt (2014) proposes with respect to FID that internal contexts are anaphoric to the preceding discourse. Thus the instantiation of author, time, place, and—in free indirect speech—the choice of the addressee of the internal context are determined by an anaphoric link with the context of utterance.³³

In this paper I assume, similarly to Eckardt (2014), that perspective shift needs to be pragmatically licensed and the coordinates of internal contexts need to be determined via anaphoric links to the preceding discourse. The shift is free, but constrained by pragmatic considerations that need to allow the hearer to be able to recover the intention of the speaker.

Note that according to my proposal there is no pragmatic licensing condition associated with FID or PP, *per se*. FID is a descriptive name given to the type of perspective shift that arises when a hearer can infer that the sentence in question describes a (possibly silent) speech act made by a protagonist. Likewise, PP is a descriptive name given to the type of perspective shift that arises when a hearer can infer that the sentence in question describes the content of perception or non-verbal belief of a protagonist. However, perspective shift itself needs to be licensed by a preceding context, allowing hearers to infer that they need to interpret the sentence in question in a bi-contextual mode. The narrative means to indicate perspective shift are varied and many (cf. Wiebe 1994, also *window openers* of Fehr 1938), and the availability of individuals as perspectival centers is subject to a prominence condition as was shown by Hinterwimmer (2019). A detailed investigation of this issue, however, is outside the scope of this paper (but see Abrusán *to appear*).

5 Alternative analyses of PP

Although PP has not been discussed much in the linguistics literature, two previous analyses exist of what are arguably the same phenomenon: a bi-contextual account of Holton’s (1997) facts by Stokke (2013) and an operator account of *viewpoint shift* by Hinterwimmer (2017). Both of these accounts have many virtues and made highly important empirical observations. Nevertheless, in this section I examine them with a critical eye. Finally, I discuss an interesting third logical possibility, namely an analysis in terms of mixed quotation advanced recently by Stokke (*to appear*).

5.1 A silent operator

One might imagine that perspective shift is brought about a silent element that acts similarly in many ways to an attitude verb. According to this view, passages of perspective shift are understood as if they were preceded by a silent “she thought that”, “she said

³³Similarly, Stokke (2013) proposes that the pragmatic licensing of inner contexts is mediated by an accessibility relation on contexts, R_C . This accessibility relation represents the range of contexts of thought that one can talk about in the context of utterance C . Thus it is the context of utterance that determines whether one can successfully speak of non-actual contexts of thought.

to herself”, “she felt that”, etc. An analysis along these lines was proposed by Sharvit (2008) for FID, according to whom FID arises via a covert context-shifting attitude operator. Recently, Hinterwimmer (2017) proposed to analyse PP (*viewpoint shifting* in his terminology) via a covert attitude operator (OP_{VS}) as well.³⁴ This operator can attach above the TP level and so it does not need to take scope over the entire sentence.

$$(56) \quad \llbracket OP_{VS} \ 1 \ C_2 \rrbracket^{g,C} = \lambda P_{\langle ev, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle} . \lambda e . \lambda w . \\ PERC(e)(w) \wedge g(C_2)(e)(w) \wedge \text{Experiencer}(e, g(1))(w) \\ \wedge \forall w' \in DOX_{(g(1))(\tau(e)+)(w)} [\exists e' [P(e')(w) \wedge \text{overlap}(\tau(e), \tau(e'))]]$$

The operator OP_{VS} introduces two covert arguments: a covert pronoun (1) introducing a free variable that ranges over individuals and another covert pronoun (C_2) introducing a free variable that ranges over eventuality predicates. The value of these variables needs to be given by the context, in the case of example (9) their values can be determined as Mary and the event of stepping out of the boat. The operator OP_{VS} then (i) takes an eventuality predicate P (e.g. earth shaking under the feet) and (ii) returns a predicate of perceiving events (C_2) (e.g. *feel, sense, etc*) of which P is the theme, and finally (iii) updates the belief state of the experiencer ($g(1)$, e.g. Mary) of the perceiving event with $\exists e' [P(e')]$ and the condition that e' overlap with the perceiving event e . The operator OP_{VS} thus principally does two things: it introduces a covert perceiving attitude (that needs to be identifiable in the context) and it performs a belief update.

The operator account of PP has some advantages. First, the idea that some kind of attitude of the protagonist character needs to be inferred to interpret PP is intuitively plausible. This intuition might be bolstered by the observation that approximately the same elements can have a subject oriented interpretation in the scope of attitude verbs as the ones that can get a shifted interpretation in PP. (Note that this latter point is not true for FID, which is one reason why Hinterwimmer 2017 himself assumes that in contrast to PP, FID should be analysed as mixed quotation, à la Maier 2015.)

Nevertheless, certain empirical facts make me skeptical about the operator account for PP. First, one of the appealing aspects of Sharvit’s (2008) theory of FID was that across various languages tense in FID seems to coincide with tense under attitude verbs. Thus, Sharvit (2008) argued that in languages that have sequence of tense under attitude operators (e.g. English), in past narration FID is in the past, while in languages that lack sequence of tense under attitudes (e.g. Russian, Hebrew), in past narration the tense of FID is typically the present.

If sequence of tense is a good diagnostic for covert attitude operators, then the prediction of the operator account is that we should see the same facts for PP: in a language

³⁴Note that Hinterwimmer’s (2017) account is quite different from that of Sharvit (2008) in its technical and conceptual details, and does not presuppose it. (Indeed Hinterwimmer’s (2017) endorses Maier’s (2015) quotational account of FID.) According to Sharvit (2008), while attitude words quantify over worlds compatible with the subject’s beliefs, the FID operator quantifies over contexts (and assignments) compatible with the subject’s beliefs:

- (i) *[simple, non-de se version]* For any function f from contexts-assignment pairs to propositions, and world w and any individual x , $\llbracket FID \rrbracket^{c,C,g}(w)(x)(f) = \text{True}$ iff for all context assignment pairs $\langle c', g' \rangle$ such that c' is compatible with what x believes in w and $g' = \text{assignment}(c')$, $f(c')(g')(\text{world}(c')) = \text{True}$

that does not have sequence of tense under attitude operators, examples of PP in an overall past narration should be in the present. However, this is not what we find. Observe the following facts from Hungarian, a non-sequence of tense language. In this language, present-under-past expresses past simultaneous readings:³⁵

- (57) Péter azt gondolta, hogy Mari alszik.
 Peter it think.PST that Mari sleep.PRES
 ‘Peter thought that Mari was sleeping’

In contrast, in examples of PP in overall past narration we find past tense and the present is not allowed, as shown by the following examples:³⁶

- (58) Mari kiszállt a hajóból. A föld remegett a lába alatt.
 Mari got-off.PST the boat. The earth shake.PST the feet under
 ‘Mari got off the boat. The earth was shaking under her feet.’
- (59) Mari kiszállt a hajóból. # A föld remeg a lába alatt.
 Mari got-off.PST the boat. # The earth shake.PRES the feet under
 ‘Mari got off the boat. The earth was shaking under her feet.’

These facts are surprising from the point of view of the operator account: it does not seem that tense supplies an argument for the operator account of PP. One could object that silent operators might behave differently from overt attitude verbs with respect of licensing tense. This is not impossible, but positing such rules makes the account significantly less appealing.³⁷

Another problem for Hinterwimmer’s (2017) proposal is that although a temporally and spatially anchored perceiving event is salient in all of Hinterwimmer’s (2017) examples, this is not true for all the cases of PP that we have seen. For example in Holton’s (1997) cases the relevant perceiving eventuality might be hard to identify or to locate in place and time. But in that case the value for the covert pronoun C_2 might be hard to determine.

There is also a question about the scope of the OP_{VS} in (56). Hinterwimmer (2017) argues that syntactically it attaches to the TP, which might explain why viewpoint shift is often found at an embedded level. However, if I am right that exclamations and questions might be used in PP (as in examples (29),(31) and (33)), then the operator account has a scope problem. Syntactically, both question and exclamation operators are normally assumed to be above the TP level. But if the question and the exclamation need to be interpreted as expressing the attitude of the author of the internal context, then these

³⁵In some cases past-under-past morphology can also have a past simultaneous reading. But present-under-past is *always* allowed to express this reading.

³⁶The present tense in (59) is marginally allowed if the example is read as being in the *historical present* (*sportscaster’s present*).

³⁷Tense in Hungarian FID is rather complex: The present is typically allowed and quite natural. However, in many cases both the present and the past are allowed, and depending on the matrix predicate and the content of the embedded clause, one or the other might be favoured. Given that, as noted above, past-under-past can also express simultaneous readings in Hungarian, more extensive research is needed to see if tense in FID mirrors tense in clausal embeddings. Based on my initial survey, the answer is “no”. A reviewer notes that in German, tense in FID does not show a clear parallel with how it behaves in embedded clauses. A detailed investigation of these questions would take me too far away from the main topic of this paper.

should be under the scope of the operator that brings the perspective shift about, not above.

A final but minor point is that Hinterwimmer’s (2017) proposal in its present state is incomplete and cannot explain all the PP facts discussed above. The account does not specify how to handle shifted readings of speaker oriented elements, expressive content or presuppositions. There is, however, no problem in principle for incorporating these into the account, as one could assume that these facts can be explained by embedding these elements under the doxastic attitude made available by the OP_{VS} .

5.2 Double context dependency

A number of analyses for FID propose a bi-contextual analysis (cf. Doron 1991; Recanati 2000, 2010; Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014; see also Reboul et al. 2016 for a review). According to these analyses, as we have seen with Eckardt (2014) above, semantic interpretation is with respect to two different contexts simultaneously: the context of utterance and an internal context. Stokke (2013) presents a proposal for protagonist projection based on Schlenker’s (2004) bi-contextual account of FID. It should be noted that Stokke’s (2013) account was an important source of inspiration for the present proposal, which uses many of Stokke’s key insights. Nevertheless, I argue below that Stokke’s (2013) theory cannot explain the behaviour of speaker oriented elements in PP, neither can it handle presuppositions in an elegant way.

5.2.1 Stokke’s (2013) proposal

Stokke (2013) starts from the intuition that PP is a type of free perspective shift just like FID, but it is less complete in that only a subset of the items that shift in FID shift in PP. Modelling his proposal on that of Schlenker (2004), he suggests that in PP interpretation is with respect to two contexts, just as in FID. However, in PP the context of thought coincides with the context of utterance *except* for w_d , which is shifted. Tenses, pronouns and indexical adverbs have the same meaning as what Schlenker (2004) proposed for FID, but will all be interpreted, in effect, with respect to the context of utterance. Perspectival shift is confined to non-indexical elements.

Thus the meaning of lexical items in Stokke’s (2013) proposal is exactly the same as in Schlenker’s (2004) theory. Adverbial indexicals such as *here*, *now* are directly referential, and are defined in the lexicon as depending on d .

$$(60) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a. } \llbracket \text{now} \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = t_d \\ \text{b. } \llbracket \text{here} \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = l_d \end{array}$$

When the two contexts coincide this makes no difference with respect to the interpretation of these items. But when the two contexts are distinct, as in FID, expressions that take their values from the context of thought (d) (such as *here and now*) are interpreted from the perspective of the attitude holder.

In contrast, indexical pronouns do not get a directly referential analysis, instead their interpretation is restricted via a presupposition. The context dependence of pronouns is thus only expressed in their presuppositions:

- (61) a. $\llbracket I_i \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = \#$ iff in w_C , $g(i)$ is different from auth_C . Otherwise $\llbracket I_i \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = g(i)$.
 b. $\llbracket \text{he}_i \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = \#$ iff in w_C , $g(i)$ is not a male individual different from auth_C and h_C . Otherwise $\llbracket \text{he}_i \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = g(i)$.

Schlenker (2004) assumes that tenses have a pronominal analysis (following Partee 1973) and that their interpretation is restricted via a presupposition, just as in the case of other pronouns. As a result, the temporal meaning of tenses is fully confined to their presupposition.

- (62) $\llbracket \text{past}_j \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = \#$ iff $g(j)$ is not before t_C . Otherwise $\llbracket \text{past}_j \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = g(j)$.

Thus Schlenker (2004) (and Stokke 2013) divide indexicals into two semantically distinct types: tense and pronouns are variables, carrying presuppositions that restrict their referential/binding possibilities. Other indexicals get their referent directly from the context in which they originate. This difference corresponds to the difference in shiftability of context-sensitive items: Indexicals that introduce variables depend on the external context, the context of utterance, directly referential indexicals are interpreted with respect to the internal context, the context of thought.

According to Stokke (2013), PP differs from FID in that the two contexts mostly coincide, except for the world parameter. As a consequence, even though the indexical adverb *yesterday* picks out the time of the context of thought, this will not result in a shifted interpretation in the case of PP because this mode of speaking imposes that $t_d = t_C$, (unlike FID). Given these ingredients, the analysis of the relevant clause in (21a) (repeated in (63) below) is as in (64):

- (63) Yesterday he_i gave her_j a ring studded with diamonds.

- (64) $\llbracket (63) \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = \#$ iff either
 in w_C $g(i)$ is not a male individual different from a_C and h_C , or
 in w_C $g(j)$ is not a female individual different from a_C and h_C , or
 $g(k)$ is not before t_C .
 Otherwise,
 $\llbracket (63) \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = 1$ iff in w_d $g(i)$ gave $g(j)$ a ring studded with diamonds the day before the day of t_d .

Because of the assumption that $t_C = t_d$, *yesterday* in the above example is interpreted as the day before the utterance time, which leads to its infelicity in the context of Holton's (1997) original example. The world parameter w_d however does not coincide with w_C , which is why *diamonds* can be interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist.

Examples with factive presuppositions get a similar analysis.

- (65) She_i knew that he_j would never let her_i down

- (66) $\llbracket (65) \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = \#$ iff either
 in w_C $g(i)$ is not a female individual different from a_C and h_C , or
 in w_C $g(j)$ is not a male individual different from a_C and h_C .
 $\llbracket (65) \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d} = 1$ iff in w_d $g(i)$ knew that $g(j)$ would never let $g(i)$ down.

Since the world parameters w_d and w_C pick out different worlds, (66) attributes knowledge

of the contents of the complement to the subject $g(i)$ in w_d but not in w_C . Stokke (2013) assumes that as a consequence the factive presupposition of *know* is also evaluated with respect to w_d . This assumption is natural, but not trivial, given that some other presuppositions, e.g. those of pronouns, are supposed to be evaluated with respect to w_C . I come back to this issue below.

Stokke’s (2013) proposal captures nicely the intuition that FID and PP represent two points on a continuum of perspective shift. This intuition is shared by the present account as well. Nevertheless, the idea that the two contexts mostly overlap creates empirical problems for Stokke (2013), as I show below. Further, it is not very clear, conceptually, why the two contexts should partially overlap: the whole point of perspective shift is to introduce a perspective of someone other than the author of the utterance.

5.2.2 Problems for Stokke (2013)

Speaker-oriented items As it was outlined above, Stokke (2013) proposed that the context of utterance and the context of thought coincide in Protagonist Projection except for w_d and w_C . Thus the author and the hearer of the context of thought are the same as the author and the hearer of the context of utterance. This assumption, however, leads to a difficulty when we try to interpret speaker oriented items (e.g. expressives and adverbs) embedded in such contexts:

- (67) Unfortunately she received an idiotic ring studded with glass, but it turned out to be diamond.

Clearly, in (67a) both the expressive *idiotic* and the evaluative adverb *unfortunately* can be interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist and not the perspective of the speaker. But this cannot be done in Stokke’s (2013) proposal, where the only difference between the two contexts is in the world parameter. Since in Stokke (2013) the author of the two contexts coincides, speaker oriented items will be interpreted with respect to the author of the external context.

The analysis of speaker oriented items usually makes reference to the author of the context in which these items are used. For example, under Eckardt’s (2014) proposal, the speaker-dependence of such elements is encoded in their expressive meaning:³⁸

- (68) $\llbracket \text{unfortunately S} \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d}$
 a. asserted content: $\llbracket \text{S} \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d}$
 b. expressive content: $\llbracket \lambda w.\text{REGRET}(\text{author}_d, \text{now}_d, w, p) \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d}$

Assume now that this meaning is applied to the second clause of (68b):

- (69) $\llbracket \text{who was unfortunately a possible government spy} \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d}$
 a. asserted content: $\llbracket x_i \text{ was a possible government spy} \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d}$
 b. expressive content: $\llbracket \text{unfortunately}(x_i \text{ was a possible government spy}) \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d}$
 $= \llbracket \text{auth}_d \text{ regrets at } t_d \text{ that } x_i \text{ was a possible government spy} \rrbracket^{M,g,C,d}$

Given that, by assumption, in Stokke’s (2013) system the author of C is the same as the author of d , the expressive content above will be in effect anchored to the author and the

³⁸I slightly modify Eckardt’s (2014) definition in order to fit it with Stokke’s (2013) approach.

time of the external context, the speaker and the utterance time. However, this is not the reading we are after: what we would like to explain is that *unfortunately* can receive a shifted meaning, i.e. it can be interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist. Stokke’s (2013) proposal does not predict this possibility.

Assuming that this line of analysis of expressives and other speaker oriented elements such as evaluative adverbs is correct, we need to be able to access the author of the context of thought as being separate from the author of the context of utterance in the case of Protagonist Projection, just as in FID. But it is unclear how this could be done under Stokke’s (2013) proposal, where the only difference between the two contexts is in the world parameter.

Presupposition accommodation A disharmonious aspect of Stokke’s (2013) (as well as Schlenker’s (2004)) proposal is presupposition accommodation. We have seen in connection with (65) that the factive presupposition was assumed to be true in w_d , the world of the internal context of the protagonist. However, the presupposition of pronouns and tenses is evaluated in w_C , as was shown in (61) and (62). This means that the evaluation of presuppositions in PP is not uniform: some of them need to be true in w_C while others need to be true in w_d .

Moreover, Sharvit (2008) has argued that syntactically free pronouns in FID are interpreted from the subject’s point of view, not the speaker’s.

- (70) Scenario: John looks at Bill, not knowing that he is a man (maybe because Bill is wearing a dress), and he says to himself: “She likes me, I can tell.”
 a. She/#he liked him, he could tell (, thought John). (FID) (Sharvit 2008, p.370)

In the above scenario, the presupposition of the pronoun *she* is evaluated from the perspective of John rather than the perspective of the speaker. But, as it was argued by Sharvit (2008), this is not predicted by Schlenker’s (2004) system. Note that the data above contrast with Standard Indirect Discourse, where the gender on the pronoun is evaluated from the perspective of the speaker:

- (71) John thought that (he could tell that) he/#she liked him.

The facts in PP pattern with FID: imagine that Holton’s (1997) sentence is uttered in Sharvit’s scenario, reporting John’s beliefs about Bill:

- (72) He knew that she would never let him down.

A simple solution, suggested by Eckardt (2014) for FID, is to let presuppositions of pronouns be accommodated with respect to the internal context, similarly to other presuppositions. This is possible in Eckardt’s (2014) system, where the context dependency of indexical pronouns and tenses are not captured via presuppositions. But such freedom would wreak havoc Schlenker’s (2004) and Stokke’s (2013) system, since it would predict that everything could get a shifted interpretation in FID (or PP), contrary to fact. So for these authors one would need to add the restriction that only gender presuppositions of pronouns have this freedom.

It is not inconceivable that presuppositions come with a lexical specification about the contexts in which they wish to be interpreted in double contexts. However, it would be better if we could avoid this stipulation, and assume that presuppositions are interpreted in a uniform fashion, as in the present proposal.

5.3 Mixed quotation

A prominent analysis of FID is mixed quotation, i.e. a form of quotation that contains elements that are unquoted (Maier 2015). According to this theory, the FID passage in italics below is quoted, except for the words in brackets which are unquoted:

- (73) Ashley was lying in bed freaking out. *Tomorrow [was] [her] six year anniversary with Spencer.* (Maier 2015, p.367)

For FID, this analysis is attractive for two reasons: First, by using familiar and independently needed techniques of quotation and unquotation, it avoids stipulating extra machinery designed to capture only perspective shift. Second, since FID is licensed by a contextually salient speech act (which might be uttered loud or only internally), mixed quotation seems like a natural way to approach the problem.³⁹

Mixed quotation, at least in its raw form, is not suitable as an analysis of PP: As we have just seen, in the case of this mode of presentation there is often no internal or external speech event (utterance) to quote. Indeed, FID and PP seem to be conceptually different in that PP often relies on pre-verbal consciousness: it might be a description of a character's visual or auditory perception, but not by using her own words. Nevertheless, one might imagine, as does Stokke (to appear), that PP can be captured by a modalized version of the mixed quotation account.

According to Stokke (to appear), passages rendered in PP should be interpreted as mixed quotation. But instead of being cases of actual (mixed) quotation, as FID, expressions in PP correspond to the text that the protagonist could have used (given her actual dispositions and beliefs) to refer to the content of the expression.

I think there are reasons to be skeptical that this kind of analysis can capture all the examples mentioned in this paper. Recall that in many examples of represented perception the perceptual experience of a character is described by using the linguistic style of the narrator. This was the case in the Jamesian description of the perceptions of Maisie, but we can even imagine a description of a pre-linguistic baby's experiences using PP. We can also imagine rendering the perceptions of patients who have lost the capacity of language in PP.⁴⁰ But if the relevant modality is based on the actual dispositions and beliefs of the protagonist, this could hardly be possible. Second, it is unclear where the restriction on using indexical adverbs in this theory comes from. Thirdly, for many examples at least, the analysis based on mixed quotation does not seem to capture what is really conveyed by using PP. The point of most of the examples discussed in this paper is that the character felt in a particular way, or had a particular perception, not that she could have said what is described in PP. This does not mean that there are no cases of

³⁹Although see Eckardt (2014) for arguments against the mixed quotation account for FID.

⁴⁰Examples of this can be found in Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain*. Thanks to Manfred Krifka for pointing this out to me (pc).

modalized FID; the phenomenon, I think is real.⁴¹ However, modalized mixed quotation is not a good explanation for most cases of PP discussed in this paper.

6 Conclusion

Perspective shift is a gradient phenomenon: The voice of the narrator and the voice of the protagonist can be present to varying degrees. Perspective shift also comes in many flavours depending on the situation that licenses the shift in perspective: Perspective shift that is based on a presumed speech act has different properties than perspective shift based on a presumed perception or implicit belief. This article has proposed a unified analysis of two different types of perspective shift, FID and PP, based on an extension of Eckardt’s (2014) system.

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⁴¹The last sentence of the following, I believe, is an example of modalized FID:

- (i) Having given a speech in November 2018 insisting that “no British Conservative government could or should sign up” to regulatory and customs checks in the Irish Sea, Johnson’s British Conservative government was just shy of three months old when it cheerily signed up to regulatory and customs checks in the Irish Sea. That was a great outcome, explained foreign secretary and famous geography dunce Dominic Raab, who said it was a “cracking deal” for Northern Ireland on the basis that they’d keep “frictionless access to the single market”. There it is: the dream. *Only a few more days of having to remember which lie you told*. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/18/david-cameron-greased-piglet-brexit>

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