Max Kistler
Causation as transference and responsibility
in Wolfgang Spohn,
Marion Ledwig & Michael Esfeld (eds.), Current
Issues in Causation, Paderborn, Mentis, 2001, pp. 115-133.
During the last decades there has
been a remarkable renewal of interest in theories of causation which is linked
to the decline of the orthodoxy of the Logical empiricist school. A number of
alternatives to the traditional covering-law account have been proposed. I
shall defend a version of an approach that has been undeservedly neglected: the
Transference Theory (TT) of causation. Accounts of this type elaborate the
intuition that there is a material link between the cause and the effect,
consisting of something transmitted between them.
I shall start from the following
basic thesis (T).
(T) Two events c and e are connected by
a causal relation if and only if there exists a conserved quantity Q which is
exemplified by both c and e and of which a particular amount A is
transmitted between c and e.
The notion of a conserved quantity
(CQ) figures prominently in this version of Transference Theory (TT). It was an
important shortcoming in earlier versions of TT that they couldn't provide a
justification of the list they proposed of entities transference of which is
claimed to be the basis of causation. Their lists of such entities, such as
energy, momentum, or force, seemed arbitrary. The idea of transference itself
provides the crucial constraint: Only what is conserved can be transmitted. We
can appeal to physics for providing both theoretical grounds for the existence
of CQ, and a provisional list of such quantities. (T) implies the thesis that
it is amounts of CQ, the transference of which is necessary and sufficient for
causation.[1]
This thesis sets my proposal apart
from two theories of causation which have recently been put forward and which,
upon a first look, one might be tempted to assimilate to some version of TT.
These theories are Phil Dowe's (1992) conserved quantity theory and Douglas
Ehring's (1997) trope persistence theory.[2] Both deny that transference is what
is crucial for causation. For Dowe, what makes a process causal is the
"manifestation" of a CQ, but he denies that individual amounts of CQ
can be transferred. Ehring has more metaphysical objections to the idea of
transference and tries to ground the causal link on "persistence"
instead of transference; moreover, he doesn't give a special role to CQ. In
what follows I shall confront TT to Ehring's objections.[3]
Ehring's criticisms of TT have been
so successful that many authors seem to consider it as definitely refuted. For
John Carroll, e.g., Ehring's (1986) arguments against TT are strong enough to
disqualify it as a serious candidate who might provide any "reason for
thinking that causation is analysable in purely noncausal terms" (Carroll
1994, p. 120, note 4). It is indeed undeniable that Ehring (1986) presents a number
of strong arguments against Aronson's (1971) and Fair's (1979) versions of TT,
arguments which he partly takes up again in his book Causation and persistence (Ehring 1997).
Some of these criticisms can be
overcome by our version of TT, based on thesis (T). However, some other of
Ehring's criticisms call for supplementing the theory by an aspect of causation
which goes beyond mere transference and constitutes a link between causation
(in the ontological sense) and (what is ordinarily understood by) causal explanation.
I propose to analyse this as an aspect of causation in which it is facts, not only events, which are
causally linked; to distinguish this factual causal link from the link provided
by transference between events, I shall call it "causal responsibility".[4] But first, let us have a look at
the "easy" objections which can be solved by (T) itself.
1. Causes as things or events
The first two objections turn around
the issue whether the relata of causation are things or events. Both Aronson
and Fair take things or objects to be the relata of causation.
In the present context, a thing or concrete physical object is meant to be an
entity whose identity conditions can be given in terms of its spatial
localisation alone, and which is capable of persisting through time.[5] In particular, a physical object
like a chair or a human individual is one
object, even when it is considered at different times. A first problem with the
hypothesis that the relata of causation are things in this sense, is the
following: everyone agrees that causality requires that the cause not be
identical with the effect. Thus, if the relata of causation are things, cause
and effect must be two different things. But this consequence is incompatible
with the fact that there exist causal processes going on within a single thing.
A substance's undergoing a chemical transformation which is not due to external
influence and the radioactive decomposition of a sample of uranium are clear
examples (Cf. Ehring 1986, p. 250; 1997, p. 9). A second problem with taking
things as relata is that there are cases of causal interaction which don't
involve things in an intuitive sense, e.g. interactions between electromagnetic
waves (Cf. Ehring 1986, p. 254).
TT can overcome both of these
problems, by switching from things to events
as the relata of causation. In order to account both for causal processes
within a single thing and causation between non-concrete entities (such as
electromagnetic waves) events have to be conceived in a neutral and general way
as "the content of a space-time-zone" or as "what fills" a
space-time-zone. This concept of an event covers waves at a time and a place
just as well as things at a time. The hypothesis that the relata of causation
are events conceived of as the contents of space-time-zones permits to solve
the first problem because one way to conceive of a process occurring within a
single enduring object is to say that earlier time stages of the object cause
later stages of the same object. But such temporal stages, or "time-slices",
of an object are events in the intended sense and thus can be causes and
effects. In fact, this conception lays the ground for a causal theory of the
persistence of concrete objects through time. To this end, concrete objects may
be identified with sequences of events.
In a similar way, the second problem
can be overcome by conceiving causal interactions between non-concrete entities
like electromagnetic waves as interactions between events.
2. Causation without change, not
requiring "causal explanation"
The foregoing reply puts us in a
position to counter another of Ehring's objections. As I have noted, our
account leads us to consider the mere persistence over time of a concrete
object as a causal process, whether or not the object manifests any change in
its observable properties. To this consequence, Ehring objects that
"certain transferences of energy in this new sense [i.e. without taking
objects as the relata[6]; M.K.] do not involve causation. In
the case of inertial motion, for example, no causal explanation is required
although a quantity of kinetic energy is transported from one point of space to
another" (Ehring 1986, p. 254). It must be conceded that the generality of
the transference account in terms of events makes it contradict common sense
(and most traditional accounts of causation) at this point. However, I think it
is in fact a strength of TT to be able to provide a causal underpinning of the
persistence of objects through time, and this independently of whether their
apparent properties change or not. It is no doubt a result of metaphysical
reflection rather than of an analysis of common sense, that the difference
between an object which persists without changing and an object that changes is
irrelevant from the point of view of the grounds of its persistence. But this
result could only be used as an argument against the theory if it were clearly
counterintuitive which I think it isn't.[7]
3. Simultaneous causation.
Aronson and Ehring take it for
granted that there are cases of simultaneous causation where c and e are at some distance from each other. Ehring (1986, pp. 250/1;
1997, p. 9) advances its incapacity to handle simultaneous causation as an
argument against TT. Now, it is true that, should there really be simultaneous
causation over a distance, TT would be incapable to account for it since there
can be no instantaneous transference over some finite distance. Let me be
dogmatic on this point[8]: in fact, there is no simultaneous
causation in nature. Either the cause is only apparently, but not really,
simultaneous to the effect, or the link between the two events is simultaneous
but it is not the link between cause and effect, but rather, e.g., between two
effects of a common cause.[9]
4. Violation of transitivity.
The following objection (Ehring
1896, p. 256)[10] is more important because
overcoming it requires a modification of the formulation of TT given in (T). It
requires the introduction of a distinction between events which are directly
and indirectly causally related. Consider the situation sketched in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 : Causal chain.
a is causally related to b by
transmission of A1; b is causally
related to c by transmission of A2.
In a causal chain a-b-c, different individual amounts of CQ are transferred between a and b - let us call this amount A1 - and between b and c - let us call
this amount A2. To make the case as strong as possible, let us assume that the
amount A1 which is transmitted between a and
b, is of a different type of CQ than A2 which is transmitted between b and c. In this situation, it is clear that there does not exist a
particular amount of a CQ which is present in both a and c. TT therefore
predicts wrongly that a and c are not related as cause and effect,
whereas the intuition that causation is transitive leads to the result that
they are.
However, this problem can be
overcome by a rather slight modification of TT, and without abandoning, as
Ehring urges, the fundamental idea that both the cause and the effect of a
particular causal relation are concrete, i.e. have numerous properties, many of
which play no role in that causal relation.
TT can be made compatible with cases
of this kind by distinguishing between direct and indirect causation. The
original requirement of transmission of an individual amount of a CQ between
two events is now taken to apply to direct causation only, while indirect
causation between two events requires the existence of a chain of intermediate
events, such that each neighbouring pair is directly causally linked.[11]
In (1997) Ehring directs his
argument concerning the transitivity of causation not against transference
theory as such, but against the idea that causal relata are concrete. I shall
first present one of the cases he presents as counterexamples to any theory of
causation with concrete causal relata, and then give a twofold reply. In a
first stage, I explain how the concept of indirect causation allows to deny
that there is any violation of transitivity, and in a second stage I explain
the initial plausibility of Ehring's claim to the contrary, by introducing the
notion of causal responsibility.
Ehring's case (cf.
fig. 2) contains the following events: d is
a chess championship part of which is d3, Fred's game; c is a party two of whose parts are c1, the toasting of Fred's performance, and c2, Mark's dancing; e is a medical emergency part of which
is e1, Mark's having a heart attack.
Fig. 2: Causal chain
According to Ehring,
this situation constitutes a violation of the transitivity of causation, for d causes c and c causes e, but "the chess championship (d) contributes not at all to the
emergency (e)" (Ehring 1997, p.
75). My first reply is to deny the latter claim which Ehring variously
expresses later on by saying that these events "are not causally
linked" because none of their subevents are so linked (op. cit., p. 75), that the first
"is not in any sense a cause" (op.
cit., p. 77) of the second, and that the first is "completely
irrelevant" for the second, a locution which he later makes more precise
by saying that this means "explanatorily irrelevant" (op. cit., p. 77).[12] I take it that it is indeed the
issue of explanatory relevance which leads to a satisfactory analysis of the
case. d indirectly causes e, or is indirectly causally linked to e. Now, in order to show that this is
more than an ad hoc move, let me introduce a distinction between two different
questions one may ask of a given causal link. One aims at the ontological
notion of causation and the other at the epistemological notion of (causal)
explanation.[13] Ehring proposes an excellent way of
expressing this distinction when he says that the "how question" (op. cit., p. 69): "In virtue of
which mechanism are c and e causally related?" and the "why
question": "In virtue of which properties are c and e causally
related?" concerning a given particular causal relation are
"independent questions". His own account is meant to be a
"mechanistic" theory addressing only the how question and, I would
add, the still more general whether question :"Are events c and e causally related?". Ehring explains this distinction in the
following passage.
Even if a theory of causation
answers the how question, it may not answer the why question, and an answer to
the why question does not guarantee an answer to the how question. The why
question about direct causation has an answer only if there is generally an
explanation for why an event c causes
another event e. Whether there will
be such an answer depends on whether causal relata exemplify explanatorily
relevant properties - on whether, in general, if c causes e there will be
properties exemplified by c and e such that those events are causally
related in virtue of those properties. Mechanism does not address the issue of
whether there is generally this kind of explanation for why c causes e."
(Ehring 1997, p. 69).
In fact, this analysis fits my account better
than Ehring's own, for Ehring (1997, chap. 3) denies in general that causes are
efficacious in virtue of any of their properties. Ehring argues that no theory
can at the same time answer both the how and the why question; his own theory
is meant to answer only the how question for it is "mechanistic but
nonexplanatory" (op. cit., p.
70). I agree with him that these two questions should be addressed separately.
In itself TT also answers only the whether and how questions.
However, contrary to what Ehring
holds, answering the whether and the how question is not absolutely non-explanatory. Giving a positive reply to the whether
question and replying to the how question by indicating a mechanism at work
between c and e, is certainly giving some kind
of explanation of why c causes e. In particular, TT's reply to the how
question contains a specification of the type of CQ which is the ground of the
causal relation in the case at hand. Nevertheless, I still think that it is
reasonable to say that TT doesn't address the why question, and is in this
sense "non-explanatory": in the case of causation between macroscopic
events which are the usual focus of our interests, our quests for explanation
(why?) are formulated in terms of the macroscopic, observable properties of the
causally related events. Yet TT has nothing to say about such properties, being
formulated exclusively in terms of CQ which are much more general than
observable categories.
But nothing stands in the way of
supplementing TT so as to take account of the why question: why is it that c causes e - where c and e are known and described on a
macroscopic level ? In most cases of causal relations we are ever led to
examine, it is legitimate to ask for an explanation of why c causes e which goes
beyond that given by TT, and which is stated in terms of those macroscopic[14] properties of c and e. TT can indeed
be so completed. To this end, I shall propose a general format for expressing
the link between what it is about the cause that makes it causally responsible[15] for something.
Let us assume that our causal
analysis of a given particular situation has reached the point where we have
established that c is the cause of e (whether question), and how c causes e (how question), namely by having identified the CQ of which a
particular amount is transmitted between these events, possibly stepwise if the
causal link is indirect. We can address the why question within this framework,
on the condition of conceiving of c and e as concrete events - which is the
view Ehring seeks to refute with his argument from transitivity. As concrete
events, c and e have more than just one property. In particular, they possess
properties other than the amount of CQ which links them causally. The why
question: "why is c a cause of
e?" can be interpreted as a request for a covering law explanation, with
the important qualification that the expected explanation must be embedded in a
causal framework. Typically, one wants to know what is causally responsible for
the fact that a given effect e has some property G, where G is a
macroscopic property.[16] This can be done by finding a
property F of the cause c, such that
a law of nature L(F,G) makes the property G of the effect e dependent on the property F of the cause. I then propose to say
that the fact that c possesses F is
causally responsible for the fact that e possesses
G. The meaning of the statement R(Fc,
Ge) to the effect that the fact Fc is
causally responsible for the fact Ge
can then be analysed by the following conjunction: C(c,e) Fc Ge L(F,G). The first conjunct says that c and e are causally linked by transference, the second and third that
they exemplify properties F and G which, according to the last conjunct, are
linked by a law of nature such that e's
possessing G is due to the instantiation of a law of nature linking properties
F and G.
We must be careful not to identify
any relations whose existence and nature are the objects of ontological claims,
with explanations of phenomena which may include some reference to those
relations. Keeping this distinction in mind is especially important (and far
from trivial) in the case of the relation of causal responsibility. Although
that relation typically constitutes the main target of requests for causal
explanation, it should be construed as a relation whose objectivity is
independent of the existence of explainers or explanation-seekers. As such it
should not be identified with the explanation whose target it is. Let me express
the idea behind this distinction in another way. A correct explanation has two
sides to it. The first is truth and the second is its pragmatic adequacy given
the interests and previous knowledge of the hearer. To count as a good
explanation, it is necessary but not sufficient that it be true. The relation
of causal responsibility (CR) is meant to be what makes causal explanation
true, independently of the epistemological and pragmatic aspects which also
enter into its evaluation. In this sense, the analysis of CR falls into
ontology as much as thesis (T).
With the relation of CR in place, I
can make a second attempt to justify my reply to Ehring's case of the chess
championship and the medical emergency (Ehring 1997, p. 74ff.). In terms of
transference, the chess championship (d)
is a cause of the medical emergency (e),
at least indirectly, simply because they are linked by an intermediate event c (the party) which is caused by d and is the cause of e. It is of little importance, and of
no practical interest, whether d and e are also directly linked. What makes
this result so counterintuitive as to lead Ehring to argue that it constitutes
a reductio of a theory of causation
with concrete relata, is the conflation of causality with causal
responsibility. The confusion is subtle and important: In this case, there is a
positive reply to the whether (and how) question, but no answer is given (nor
is it plausibly possible to give one) to the why question. It is crucial to
note that the specification of the cause and effect it requires can be
accomplished by describing them with the help of any property these events
possess and which is sufficiently specific to single them out in the context.
In particular, they need not be described by reference to their possession of
the determinate CQ which is transmitted between them - although that is
necessary to give a precise answer to the how question for that case - but
neither need it be by reference to any explanatorily relevant property, where I
understand by an "explanatory relevant property" just those lawfully
linked properties F and G which appear in the relation of causal
responsibility. This is exactly what happens in the chess game/medical
emergency case. Here, the events, though indirectly causally linked, not only
are not described by reference to properties which are lawfully linked, but
(arguably) could not thus be described because they don't possess such
properties. This makes them indeed "explanatorily irrelevant" for one
another. To give an explanatorily relevant description of the cause and effect
is simply something much more demanding than to just designate them in an
arbitrary way.
What fails in cases of this type is
not really the transitivity of causation between concrete events, but rather explanatory transitivity: Suppose that
there is a causal chain d-c-e, such
that the events d, c, and e are described in such a way that a
covering law explanation is available for why d causes c, and a
different covering law explanation for why
c causes e. This does not imply,
and no one would have expected it to imply, that the very same descriptions of d and e can enter in a covering law explanation of why d causes e. The failure of explanatory transitivity between successive
links of causal chains comes as no surprise, but it is a fallacy to conclude
(as Ehring does) from the failure of explanatory transitivity to the failure of
causal transitivity.
It is remarkable that Ehring who
repeatedly calls attention to the necessity of distinguishing between ontology
and epistemology[17], should fall victim to the fallacy
of identifying the causal relatedness of
c and e in an ontological sense,
and the causal relevance of the descriptions given of c and e, in the sense
that those descriptions contain a reference to the properties F and G playing a
role in the relation of CR. His argument goes like this: There is nothing in
the description of d as a chess
championship and in the description of e as
a medical emergency which would permit to identify some property of d nomically linked to some property of e. Therefore, d and e are not causally linked. (Then, the argument continues: But
transitivity leads to the result that they are causally linked. This
contradiction can serve as a reductio
of one of the premises. As transitivity is unquestionable, Ehring concludes
that it is the conception of the events
d, c and e as concrete entities
which is refuted.). The fallacy should now be easy to identify: From the
premise it is possible to infer that the descriptions of d and e do not contain
reference to any properties F and G which would partake in the relation of CR
between the fact that d is F and the
fact that e is G, and which would in
this way enable us to explain why d caused e, what it is about d which is causally responsible for its causing the fact that e is G. But, in Ehring's own terms, our
incapacity to answer the why question doesn't show that there is no answer to
the how question.[18] In fact, it doesn't even show that
there is no answer to the why question. The fact that we ignore their existence
does not show that there objectively exist no such properties F and G which
stand, together with their possessor events
d and e, in a CR relation R(Fd,
Ge) and thus form a basis for an answer to the why question.
Once we have introduced the notion
of causal responsibility, we are able to reply to some other important
objections to TT, as I shall briefly try to show now.
5. Interruption
Consider the following statement (1)
reporting the interruption of an enduring causal relation.
(1) "A switch is turned off
causing the light to go out" (Ehring 1986, p. 251; 1997, p. 9).
Ehring objects that TT wrongly
predicts that some amount of a CQ is transferred from the cause, the turning of
the switch, to the effect which he takes to be the light's going out. The
prediction is wrong because, he says, "there is no transference of a
quantity from the switch to the light" (Ehring 1986, p. 251). This seems
to be a bad way of formulating the objection for if the effect is taken to be
the light's going out, one should not blame TT for the fact that there is no
transference to the light which is
very different from the event of the light's going out. But let us restate the objection: TT must be wrong
because nothing is (and presumably even could be) transferred to the event of
the light's going out and the subsequent state of the light's being out, a
state negatively characterised by the absence of light.
I shall try to show that TT can
handle cases as this. The crucial point is that (1) delivers a complex piece of
information which is causal only in part. (1) makes reference to a causal
relation t, but it explicitly
designates only its cause event c
which is the turning of the switch.
Fig. 3: Interruption
c: turning of the switch
e: opening of the electrical circuit
i : initial state : light on
f : final state : light out
However, it designates neither the
effect event e which is the final
point of t nor a relevant fact
implying this event. Instead, it designates a state f (the light's being out) which is negatively characterised as a
consequence of t. One can deduce from
the nature of the physical process underlying what is stated in (1) that the
end point of the causal process launched by c
is the opening e of the electrical
circuit including the light source, or some equivalent event. Instead of
directly stating e, (1) rather
expresses one of its results, f. f is a nomic, but not causal,
consequence of e, and thus of t. f's
nomic dependence on e can be
expressed by saying: state f is
present because e has occurred. In
this statement, the word "because" does not have a causal, but a more
general explanatory sense. It is backed by a lawful dependence which might be
expressed by saying: If the circuit linking a light source to the source of
electric energy is interrupted, no current flows and no light is emitted.
Indeed, there could be no cause of f,
for f is the negative state of the
absence of light. No causal account of the absence of anything is needed, nor
is it possible. The absence can be explained, but not by indicating its cause.
In fact the situation is still more
complex because f is not designated
in a purely negative way. Rather, (1) says, that t makes the light "go out", that is to say provoked a
transition between an initial state i
where there has been light, to f.
The difficulty in giving a causal
analysis of statement (1) lies in the fact that t, the causal relation expressed, is not a relation linking i to f.
It is just that the result e of t is such as to make impossible the
causal relations underlying the state i,
namely the flow of electrons through a wire. Now someone might be prepared to
accept the idea that the relation between e
and f is not causal because nothing
can cause the absence of something, but still ask whether i might not somehow be implied in the causal process designated by
(1). The answer is again, no: i is a
stable state consisting of the permanent flow of electrons through a wire and a
light source. i is in itself a causal
process but it is not the cause of any of the events constituting t which is referred to by (1). (1) does
not say, nor is it the case in standard situations in which (1) would be true,
that the flow of electrons constituting i
intervenes either as the cause nor as the effect in the causal relation t resulting in the interruption e. Maybe the flipping of the switch c uses some electrical current, but this
need not be the same current which is the basis of state i.
In the end, Ehring's objection can
be answered in the following way. TT can handle the causal relation t to which (1) directly refers and which
goes from c, the turning of the
switch, to e which is not explicitly
named, but can be deduced from the described situation to be the interruption
of the electrical circuit. The case is difficult because the effect event e of t
is not explicitly designated, and because the fact which occupies its place in
(1) can't possibly be even indirectly caused by c for it is negative. This fact is that state f obtains after the causal relation t has been accomplished. Our analysis suggests that f results indeed from e, (and thus from t as a whole), but not in the same way as an effect results from
its cause. Another aspect of statement (1) which is potentially misleading for
its causal analysis, is the fact that f
is described by putting it in contrast it with a previously obtaining state i which is not causally involved,
neither as a cause nor as an effect, in t.
6. Release/triggering
Releasing or triggering processes
pose a similar problem for TT. Consider the following statement (2).
(2) "A catch is released
'causing' a spring to pull a weight some distance" (Ehring 1986, p. 252).
Ehring argues that such situations
are counterexamples to TT because "the release of the catch certainly did
not transfer any quantity to the spring" (ibid.).[19]
This objection can be answered in
the following way. (2) refers to a causal process (cf. fig. 4) which can be
seen as making a transition t between
an initial i and a final state f.
Fig. 4: Releasing/triggering
c : action causing the releasing of the catch
e : the catch getting released
i : initial state : spring compressed
f : final state (process) : spring expanding
t itself is
clearly causal and compatible with TT: the releasing of the catch is a causal
process. The difference with the interruption case lies in the characteristics
of i and f: now i is the stable
situation characterised by the absence of movement, whereas f is in itself a causal process,
consisting in the transformation of the potential energy stocked in the
compressed spring in kinetic energy, itself transferred to the weight it moves
by contact. Once more, (2) should be considered as giving an explanation of why
the stable state i gives way to state
f which contains a dynamic process.
Once more it accomplishes this by referring to a causal relation t. However, contrary to what we would
expect from a straightforward causal statement, (2) does not designate directly
a cause and an effect, as could be the end points of t. Rather it designates the end point of t - the catch's getting released - and the state f - the process of the expansion of the
spring.
A potentially misleading aspect of
the situation is the fact that f
consists itself in a causal process, but that its cause in general doesn't even contain the effect event of the
triggering relation t as one of its
parts.[20] The relation between the effect of t - the removal of the catch - and the
causal process f is one of nomic
dependence, but not itself causal. The absence of the catch is a negative
condition which makes it possible for the cause of f to act. But it is not even part of the cause because an absence
cannot be a cause any more than it can be an effect. (The latter fact is relevant
in cases of interruption which have been discussed before.)
According to Ehring and Krajewski
(1997), TT wrongly predicts in a case like (2) that the energy - or an amount
of some other CQ - which is found at the end point of the triggered process f, must
have been transmitted from the initial point of the triggering process t.
This is clearly not the case, but neither is it the case that TT has to predict
this. To explain why requires acknowledging that these are indeed two different
causal processes. TT can easily account for each of them taken in itself, the
difficulty lying in the analysis of their link. The objection can be overcome
by pointing out that the link between the effect of the triggering process t and the cause of the triggered process
f is nomic but not causal.[21]
7. Informational causes
Let me end by asking whether TT can
acknowledge Krajewski's (1982, p. 225; 1997, pp. 195ff.) claim that there are
"informational causes".[22] According to this author, the
"transmission of information" provides a grounding of the relation of
causation independent of the transmission of energy. In (Krajewski 1997), he
takes care to note that this is only an independence "in principle".
In effect he vindicates the central thesis of TT when he says that "in all
six kinds of CC [Causal Connection] there is a flow of energy. It seems that
causation without such flow is impossible. However, for some kinds of C
(trigger C, information C), the amount of this energy is inessential, it may be
very small" (1997, p. 199).[23]
Our account allows to clarify the
role Krajewski attributes to information. To take one of his own examples,
"the cause of an infectious disease is the penetration of bacteria or
viruses into the organism. As we have noticed, it is not an energetic cause of
the disease. It is a triggering cause but at the same time an informational
cause because it brings information on the structure of pathological changes in
the tissues of the organism." (Krajewski 1997, p. 196). To express what
Krajewski means by saying that this is not an energetic cause, in the
terminology of the preceding section: The energy deployed in the result of the
triggered process (or at least the major part of it), i.e. the disease, is not
transmitted from the triggering process. His reason for saying that it is an
informational cause instead is that what is crucial in the process of the
infection, is not the amount of energy carried by the bacteria into the host
organism, but the structural information it carries about the disease. This
structural information would also constitute the primary target of a causal
explanation of the disease in a particular individual.
Our account enables us to describe
the case in the following way. The bacteria's arrival in the victim's organism
is a cause of the subsequent evolution of the disease, and this causal relation
is covered by TT. But what is more interesting for us, is what is causally responsible for the fact that
the individual contracted this disease at that moment. We can then identify the
fact that the bacteria are of a certain pathogenic type, as the causally
responsible fact, which, it seems to me, captures Krajewski's intuition.
Nevertheless, this analysis allows us to escape the erroneous impression that
information as such might be carrying causation, in the same way as amounts of
CQ can. This is clearly wrong for the simple reason that information is not a
CQ in the physical sense, and thus cannot be transmitted in the material sense
required by the TT.[24] Information is no intrinsic
property of physical processes, but is well determined only within the
background of a reference frame which is fixed by the observer. To show that
the relation of carrying information is not sufficient for causation, consider
two effects of a common cause, e.g. the receiving of a radio signal by two
distant receivers. The receivers are informationally related but need not be
causally related.[25]
Conclusion
Transference theory is
controversial. I have here tried to answer some objections that have been put
forward against Aronson's and Fair's earlier versions. If my attempts have been
successful, the theory comes out strengthened from this confrontation for the
problematic cases we have considered are so many constraints which sharpen our
understanding of the concepts needed to the make the account viable. We have
been led to make some important adjustments to the theory. In particular, we
have introduced a distinction between causation linking events and causal
responsibility linking facts. The latter relation is stronger: the causal
chains we have examined show that only the evential causal relation based on
transmission, but not the relation of causal responsibility is transitive. Our
problem cases are compatible with the thesis that the failure of the
transitivity of causation is due to the non-transitivity of causal
responsibility. However, the distinction between causation and causal
responsibility is not an ad hoc move to overcome some counterexamples. It is
independently motivated by the need to close the gap between the transference
account which is formulated in physical terms and common or scientific causal
explanations which need not invoke physical vocabulary. Transference though
being fundamental is too general to be able to provide satisfying responses to
all questions as to why a given cause
acts as it does. Causal responsibility is conceived as the relation between
what is it about the cause that makes it cause the effect. It is the immediate
object of a causal explanation.
The modified transference theory has
interesting consequences. In particular, we have seen that triggering and
interruption have to be analysed in a causal and a non-causal component which
is lawful dependence. In the case of the turning out of the light, we have come
to the conclusion that the light's going out is not caused but only conditioned
by the flipping of the light switch. The light's going out is the transition of
a causal process - the emission of light from the wire - to the absence of that
causal process, and that transition is not an effect any more than the
subsequent absence of light. It is just lawfully dependent on the condition of
the electrical circuit.
The very generality of the intended
concept of causation, allowing it to cover causation between different material
objects, between non-material objects such as fields, and between different
temporal stages of one object has led us to conceive the relata of causation as
the particular content of a space-time zone. This has the controversial, but in
my view in the end fruitful and plausible consequence that causes and effects
need not be changes, at least not at every level on which they can be
described. A stable state such as that of a bridge may be the cause of the
stable position of someone standing on it. There will be microscopical changes
consisting in the exchange of particles, but in virtue of the absence of
observable changes, traditional accounts of causation could not account for
these states being causally linked, because they exclude stable states from
possible causes or effects. Related to this, another important result is that
our version of transference theory allows us to conceive of the persistence of
material objects through time as of a causal process, independently of whether
the objects change or not.[26]
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[26]I thank Douglas Ehring, Pierdaniele
Giarretta, Françoise Longy, and my auditors in Paris, Konstanz and Durham, for
helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.