Max Kistler
Causes as events and facts
Dialectica
53 (1999), pp. 25-46.
Abstract.
The paper defends the view that events are the basic relata of
causation, against arguments based on linguistic analysis to the effect that
only facts can play that role.
According to those arguments, causal contexts let the meaning of the
expressions embedded in them shift: even expressions possessing the linguistic
form that usually designates an event take a factual meaning.
However, defending events as fundamental relata
of causation turns out to be possible only by attributing a - different -
causal role to facts as well. The role of facts in causation is characterized
as "causal responsibility". This relation, and its connection to
causation between events, is clarified by way of the analysis of different
inference patterns between causal statements of the two sorts: statements
linking events and statements linking facts.
Recently,
objections of a new kind have been raised against the view that causes and
effects are particular entities. These objections are based on results of
linguistic analysis of expressions designating causes and effects. In this
paper, I shall attempt to respond to these objections and in so doing defend
the view that causes and effects are particulars or, more precisely, events. It
should become clear that I do not intend to demonstrate positively that events
are always involved in causation. The aim is only to show that the linguistic
facts are compatible with that view which, I take it, is supported on grounds
independent from linguistic considerations[1].
1. Two kinds of expression designating causes
Rather
than rehearsing all the results of this linguistic analysis, I shall try to
show the most important differences between two basic types of expressions
capable of designating causes and effects, with the help of a standard example.
In English, there exist at least the following types of expressions capable of
identifying as a cause of my surprise something about Mary's performing the
song.
(1) Her
performing the song surprised me.
(2) The
performing of the song surprised me.
(3) The
performance of the song surprised me.
(4) That
she performed the song surprised me.
(5) The
fact that she performed the song surprised me.
In (1) and
(2) the cause is designated by an expression resulting from the nominalization
of a verb phrase. Since Vendler (1962; 1967a; 1967b), considerable efforts have
been deployed to find clear criteria to distinguish various types of
nominalized expressions of English.
According
to Vendler's and Bennett's (1988) results, although the five expressions
designating the cause in (1) through (5) are all syntactically different, they
fall semantically into two groups: the expressions (1a), (4a) and (5a)
designating the cause in (1), (4) and (5) have a factual meaning, whereas the
expressions (2a) and (3a) designating the cause in (2) and (3) have an eventive
meaning. I shall make the hypothesis (cf. (H2) below) that this difference in
meaning can be understood as one of reference: gerundive expressions of the
type of (1a) designate facts whereas
gerundive expressions of the type of (2a) designate events.
(1a) her
performing the song.
(2a) the
performing of the song.
(3a) the performance of the
song.
(4a) that she performed the
song.
(5a) the fact that she performed
the song.
It is
quite easy to show that there is a semantical difference between the first
group and the second. Imagine that Mary used to perform the song in a small
club (or in her bathroom) but that she is terribly frightened by the idea of
doing the same thing before a large audience, in a big concert hall. Now I
learn that she performed the song for the first time, to everyone's surprise,
on the stage of the Paris Opera. In this situation, statements (1), (4) and (5)
are false, for it is not the fact that
she performed the song, but the particular
circumstances under which she did it, that are responsible for my surprise.
On the other hand, statements (2) and (3) are true, for there is something about her performing the song
that causes my surprise. The following hypothesis explains why (2) and (3) can
be true although they do not explicitly state the causally relevant factor.
The
expressions (2a) and (3a) designate events. Events are particulars. They have
more properties than those which are explicitely named in the expressions, (2a)
and (3a), designating them. In this respect, events are like objects: "My
computer" refers to my computer as a particular thing - this thing is not
only a computer and mine, but also black, has a German keyboard, a defective
battery and innumerable other properties. In a similar way (3a) refers to
Mary's performance as a particular entity that is not only a performance of a
song by Mary, but that takes place let's say on May 15th, in the Paris Opera,
before an audience of 500 people, in which Mary wears a blue dress, and so on.
Designating
the particular event (3a) as the cause of my surprise is less precise than
designating (1a) or, equivalently, (5a) as the cause of my surprise. (2) and
(3) neither say nor imply what it is about Mary's performance that was so
surprising. By contrast, naming the fact (5a) as being the cause means that it
is one of the properties explicitly named, or their combination, which is
causally efficacious in bringing about my surprise[2], namely that it is a
performance of the song and that it is by Mary.
This
difference in precision with respect to the property causally efficacious in
provoking the effect, i.e. my surprise, makes it possible for the two types of
statement to diverge in truth value. If (2) or (3) is true, then it is possible
that it is the property of taking place in a large concert hall that produced
my surprise, whereas this is impossible if (1), (4) or (5) is true. As the
evaluation of (2) or (3) in the imagined situation shows, an eventive statement
can be true without containing any information about the efficacious property
of the cause. On the other hand, a factual causal statement designates as the
cause a fact which consists in the
possession of a certain property by a particular. The factual causal statements
(1), (4) and (5) imply that it is this very property, i.e. to be her performing
the song, which is efficacious in bringing about the effect, i.e. my surprise.
If this property has not in fact been efficacious in bringing about the effect,
as in the situation imagined, these statements are false.
Some of
the most important grammatical differences between expressions with a factual
meaning of the type of (1a) - from now on called "G" for "verbal
gerund" - and expressions with an eventive meaning like (2a) - from now on
called "P" for perfect gerund - and (3a) - from now on "D"
for derived nominal - are the following[3]:
G: (1a)
Her performing the song.
P: (2a)
The performing of the song.
D: (3a)
The performance of the song.
Expressions
of types D and P, contrary to expressions of type G, can take an article
(definite or indefinite), but the latter, contrary to D and P, can appear
without a determinator; expressions D and P, but not G, can be modified by an
adjective. By contrast, expressions of type G, but not those of types D and P,
can be modified by adverbs and auxiliaries, and can be put into the past tense.
G, but not P, can be negated[4].
These
observations can be accounted for by the hypothesis that the nominal phrases
(NP) of type G, but not the others, contain a verbal phrase (VP).
A VP
cannot be modified by an article or adjectives; but it can be modified by
adverbs and auxiliaries; it can be negated, and it can take tense. All these
modifications are specific to VPs. The fact that expressions of type G admit
them speaks in favour of hypothesis (H1) which holds that they contain a VP. On
the other hand, the fact that expressions of type D and P do not take the same
kind of modifications can be most easily explained by the hypothesis that they
are pure NPs, not containing a VP. D and P take precisely the sort of
modifications that are typical of NPs, in particular, an article and
adjectives.
Our
hypothesis for the syntactical structure of the two types of gerundive
expressions P and G - based on Zucchi's (1993) analysis - is the following:
(H1) In English, there are two types of gerundive
nominalizations of a verb phrase. Their syntaxical structure - (1a) exemplifies
structure G and (2a) exemplifies structure P - is the following:
(G) [NP [NP Her] [VP performing the song]][5]
(P) [NP [Det The] [N' [N performing] [PP of the song]]]
We add a
hypothesis concerning the semantic difference between expressions of type G and
of type D and P:
(H2) Expressions of type (G) designate facts;
expressions of types D and P designate events[6].
In
considering (H2) as an hypothesis of the semantics of two types of expressions
of English capable of designating causes, we presuppose that the sense of the
expressions occurring in it can be independently specified. (H1) indicates how
the identity conditions of expressions of the kinds G, D and P can be specified
in purely syntactical terms; (H2) conjectures that their meanings
systematically differ according to their syntactical type. Now, (H2) can
correctly be called a hypothesis, rather than a definition of the expressions
"fact" and "event" only if the meaning of these terms too
can be independently specified. Whether this can be done is a difficult and
controversial issue, and it is one of the aims of the present paper to help
clarifying the distinction between facts and events by analysing the meaning of
expressions designating these entities, when they occur in causal contexts.
Nevertheless, one can also characterise them independently of the linguistic
analysis of the expressions designating them. An event can be conceived as the
particular entity filling some determinate portion of space-time. Events differ
from ordinary objects, like tables and chairs, by the fact that the temporal
boundaries of events contribute to their identity conditions whereas only the
spatial boundaries of ordinary objects are an essential part of their identity
conditions.
The
concept of a fact is more difficult to characterise. Facts will be considered
as individual entities reference to which can be made by singular expressions
of type G[7]. With Fine (1982), we
can distinguish three types of conceptions of facts. According to one (Ducasse
1940; Carnap 1947), facts are true propositions, according to another (Moore
1953), a fact is the truth of a proposition, i.e. a property of a proposition.
In the present analysis of causal statements, the concept of facts will be
taken in a third way. In our conception, facts are, to use Fine's expression,
"worldly", i.e. they belong to the world, whereas in propositional
conceptions, facts are descriptive of the world, rather than being part of it.
I shall not try to dispute the merits of the other conceptions of facts and
limit myself to the consideration of those worldly facts to which expressions
of type G can make reference when they occur in nominal positions in causal
statements. These facts are complex objects which can be seen as "the
result I(x,P) of applying an operation I of inherence to an individual x and
property P" (Fine 1982, p. 54). What is crucial for our analysis of
causation is the distinction between an event and a worldly fact. With singular
terms of the appropriate type, one can make reference to both, and one can do
so in particular in causal statements where these terms occupy the argument
places of the cause and the effect. To put it briefly, the distinction between
events and facts is this: an event is a particular which is individuated by the
space-time zone it occupies but whose identity does not depend on any one of
the intrinsic properties it possesses, whereas a (worldly) fact is a complex
built out of a particular (event or enduring object) and one determinate
property this particular possesses. We shall designate events by individual
constants, like c or e, or variables like x or y, and facts by complex
expressions like Fc and Ge, which stand for nominalized expressions of type G,
namely c's being F and e's being G. It is true that symbolic expressions of the
type of "Fc" and "Ge" are also, in other contexts, employed
to represent statements expressing propositions but there should be no risk of
confusion for they are never used this way in the present paper. This is also
why it seems unnecessary to introduce an expression different from
"fact", such as Fine's (1982) "circumstance" or Armstrong's
(1997) "state of affairs", to make clear that what is meant are
worldly facts, not facts of a propositional type.
Our
examples given above seem to show that both types of nominalization are capable
of designating causes and effects. The fact that there exist causal statements
containing expressions of both types, suggests that both types of expression are capable of designating causally
interacting entities - whence the conclusion that language reveals the
existence of two categories of
entities playing the role of cause and effect.
We can sum
up this idea by the following two hypotheses:
(H3) Gerundive nominalizations both of type G and of
type P and derived event nouns of type D maintain their usual designation even
when they are embedded in a causal context. As usual, expressions of type G
designate facts, whereas expressions of types P and D designate events.
(H4) Causal verbs can express two different concepts.
They always take two arguments. However, in the case of eventive causal
statements, the argument places of the causal verb are filled by expressions
designating particulars[8], whereas in the case of
factual causal statements, they are filled by expressions designating facts.
The
position based on hypotheses (H3) and (H4) is opposed to the most influential
views on the issue. Against (H4), Davidson (1980) explains the fact that there
are two kinds of causal statements by his thesis that causal statements in the
proper sense are always eventive and
that statements in which factual
expressions occupy the positions of cause and/or effect, are in fact
"rudimentary causal explanations" (Davidson 1980, p. 161) and do not
directly designate causal relations. For a nominalist such as Davidson, there
is nothing more in the idea of an objectively existing property than the
predicate which is satisfied by a certain number of objects or events.
According to Davidson, when we explain a causal relation, we do indeed
something different from just designating the events related as cause and
effect and stating that they are causally related. But in pointing out what
aspects of a cause make it into a cause of a given effect, a causal explanation
does not, according to his view, designate any relation between non-linguistic
facts: In Davidson's words, "explanations typically relate statements, not
events" (ibid.). Pointing to the
relevant aspects of the cause makes a good explanation which can be
nominalistically interpreted within the model of deductive-nomological
explanation. In this model, a law of nature is considered to be a well
confirmed universal generalization embedded in successful theories. For a
nominalist, to say that an aspect of the cause explains firstly its being the
cause of an effect, e, and secondly e's having certain aspects, because
these aspects of the cause and the effect are related in virtue of a law of
nature, does not imply that such an explanation makes reference to aspects (properties) of events or to laws of nature
linking these aspects.
My main
objection to Davidson's theory that gives a realist interpretation to eventive
causal statements, but a nominalist interpretation to factual ones, is the
existence of relations of entailment between causal statements of these two
kinds. According to the analysis I shall propose (cf. section 4) these
entailments can be explained by a common referential element to events in both
types of statements which is supplemented in statements of the factual type by
the additional reference to properties which are instantiated by the cause and
the effect and to a law linking these properties. Davidson's analysis seems
unable to account for relations of entailment between eventive and factual
causal statements because he takes them to express relations between entities
of an entirely different ontological type: particular events in one case and
statements in the other. Nevertheless, although my analysis of the semantics of
factual causal statements differs from Davidson's, the opposition is not as
fundamental as it might seem at first sight. It is true that my analysis does
not, as Davidson's, reduce factual causal statements to explanations in the
sense in which such explanations express relations between linguistic entities.
It implies on the contrary that factual causal statements designate relations
between non-linguistic entities, namely facts, just as eventive causal
statements designate relations between events that are not linguistic entities
either. But the analysis of the nature of the causal relations between facts
will make clear why factual causal statements expressing these relations are
particularly apt to be used for explanatory purposes, and thus ends up
vindicating Davidson's thesis as to the explanatory importance of factual
causal statements.
I now
propose to examine in some detail some arguments questioning not Davidson's
analysis of the meaning of factual causal statements, but his central thesis on
causation a version of which I defend in this paper. According to this thesis,
the truth of many typical causal statements implies the existence of causal
relations between events. Horgan
(1978), Mellor (1987) and Zucchi (1993) argue that linguistic analysis licenses
instead the conclusion that facts are the only (at least the only fundamental)
type of entities capable of interacting causally[9]. They assert that,
contrary to our hypothesis (H3), causal contexts let the meaning of the
expressions embedded in them shift: in them, even expressions possessing the
linguistic form that usually designates an event take a factual meaning. If it
is true, as these authors contend, that the causal context has this property,
it turns out that appearances nonwithstanding, facts are the only type of entities which are involved
in causation; events fall out of the picture.
We can
certainly agree that some contexts do force factual readings on expressions
which would ordinarily be eventive. Here are two kinds of example. The first is
the context created by the verb "to inform". All of the following
(15) I was
informed of his clumsily stealing the bicycle.
(16) I was
informed of his clumsy stealing of the bicycle.
(17) I was
informed of his clumsy theft of the bicycle.
are
synonymous, in spite of the fact that the predicate "was informed of"
takes a factual argument of type G in (15), but an eventive argument of type P
in (16) and of type D in (17). The explanation is that the meaning of "to inform" requires that its arguments
designate facts, not particulars, be
they objects or events. This has the consequence that whenever an argument of
"to inform" is grammatically
of a type which usually designates a particular, it gets its meaning shifted.
The following example shows how the meaning of a NP designating an object, changes.
(18) I was
informed of a new post office in my street.
can only be
interpreted as synonymous with
(19) I was
informed that there is a new post office in my street.
A sentence
containing "to inform" can only be interpreted if the meaning of its
argument is taken to be factual. If the actual argument doesn't have such a
meaning by virtue of its grammatical structure, the context of "to
inform" forces it to take one.
The second
kind of example is constituted by sentences in which an eventive expression is negated. Negation also has the effect of
forcing a factual meaning on the negated expression. Compare
(20) The
train's unexpectedly not arriving in time caused some confusion in the station.
and
(21) The
unexpected non-arrival of the train caused some confusion in the station[10].
The
presence of the adverb unexpectedly
shows that
(20a) The
train's unexpectedly not arriving in time
possesses
structure G, which means that in ordinary circumstances it designates a fact.
On the other hand,
(21a) The
unexpected non-arrival of the train
is of type
D, and in ordinary circumstances designates an event : "arrival" is a
noun derived from the verb "to arrive"; this noun is preceded by the
adjective unexpected. One could
therefore expect that (20) et (21) differ in meaning, more precisely that (21)
admits of interpretations which are excluded for (20) because (21) is eventive
and (20) is factive. But this is not the case. It is
impossible that (21) be true, but that the confusion in the station be caused
by a property not expressed in (21a). We can explain this by making the hypothesis
that the negation in (21a) has the same effect on its meaning as the context
created by "to inform". Both let the meaning of expressions of type P
or D embedded in them shift: the context gives them the meaning of a fact.
Now, as I
have already said, Horgan (1978), Mellor (1987) and Zucchi (1993) hold that
causal contexts are of the same type as those created by "to inform"
and by the negation. This can't be true in general for I have introduced the
distinction between eventive and factual expressions using as an example a
statement where these expressions are precisely embedded in a causal context.
On this occasion, I have shown that the causal context created by "to
surprise" is not such as to cancel the semantic difference between expressions
of the two kinds.
What kind
of evidence speaks in favor of the opposite thesis, namely the thesis according
to which the causal context is like the one created by "to inform",
in that the meaning of expressions embedded in it is always factual, independently of their
grammatical form? This thesis has been defended by providing an analysis of a
number of specific types of causal statements, the result being in each case
that the causes and/or effects involved can only be interpreted as being facts,
not as being events.
Mellor
(1987), for instance, analyses both
(22) John
did not die because he did not fall.
and
(23) Don's
rope being the weakest caused his fall to be the first.
in this
sense. According to Mellor, when a negative - as in (22) - or comparative - as
in (23) - predicate constitutes the fact referred to as the cause, no event is
involved in the causal relation described by the statement. In the next two
sections, I shall expose in some detail Mellor's (and Bennett's) arguments for
the thesis that those are cases of causation in which no events are involved.
In section 4, I then attempt to show, with the help of the distinction between
causation (linking events) and causal responsibility (linking facts), that
these arguments are not conclusive.
2. Negative facts and omissions as causes.
Mellor's
argument is the following : there are true causal statements like (22) where
the expression designating the cause contains a negated predicate. So if causes
are events, the cause designated by (22) is a "negative event". But
negative events don't exist - the reason being the same as for "negative
objects". The argument against negative objects is simple:
(24) Italy
has no King.
is true.
Suppose there were a negative person making (24) true. That negative person
would have contradictory properties. This is because (24) entails both
(25) Italy
has no unmarried King.
and
(26) Italy
has no married King.
From the
fact that the hypothetical non-King makes (24) true, and that (24) entails (25)
and (26), it follows that this hypothetical negative person makes both (25) and
(26) true. This proves that there can be no "negative person", i.e.
no non-King of Italy: if he existed, he would have to be both married and
unmarried.
Mellor
(1987) constructs an argument having the same logical structure which is
supposed to show that causes can't be events. It is a general requirement on a
correct analysis of the logical structure of action statements and causal
statements, that it should explain inferences of the following kind:
(27) Don
dies instantly.
entails
(28) Don
dies.
According
to the analysis proposed by Davidson (1967) these inferences are possible
because (27) has the structure
(27-D[11]) ($ e) (Dying(e) & By Don(e)
& Instant(e)).
where the
variable e ranges over events.
As a
matter of fact, (27-D) implies
(28-D) ($ e) (Dying(e) & By Don(e)),
where
(28-D) reveals the logical structure of (28).
Similarly,
Parsons' (1990) analysis of (27) yields
(27-P) ($ e) (Theme(Dying,e) &
Patient(Don,e) & Instant(e)).
and (28)
as
(28-P) ($ e) (Theme(Dying,e) &
Patient(Don,e)).
I shall
not compare the merits of Davidson's and Parsons' analysis, but rather defend a
presupposition common to both, namely that one is justified analyzing both (27)
and (28) by quantifying over events. My aim is to show that Mellor's and
Bennett's arguments do not establish that the ontological commitment to the
existence of events carried by theses analyses is misleading.
Mellor
(1987, p. 208) tries to refute that presupposition, namely that Don's dying is
an event e, by a reductio ad absurdum analogous to the argument about the King of
Italy. He begins by observing that
(29) Don
does not die.
entails
both
(30) Don
does not die instantly.
and
(31) Don
does not die slowly.
Then he
supposes that, on Davidson's (and Parsons' which is posterior to Mellor's
critique) analysis, (29) entails that there is a "negative event",
namely Don's non-death.
(29-M) ($ e) (Non-dying(e) & By Don
(e))
Now, such
a "negative event" cannot exist because it would have to have
contradictory properties. For (29) to entail (30) and (31), (29-M) must entail
both
(30-M) ($ e) (Non-dying(e) & By Don
(e) & Instant (e))
and
(31-M) ($ e) (Non-dying(e) & By Don
(e) & Slow (e)).
But this
shows that the Non-dying doesn't exist because it would have to have
contradictory properties, namely the properties of being instant and of being
slow.
Bennett's
(1988) attack against events is stated in somewhat different terms. He doesn't
argue that causes and effects are never
events and always facts, but rather
that, in his words, "the fact causation approach is superior". He
offers a statement of omission as an
example of a statement designating a "negative cause". It is indeed
frequent that we assign moral responsibility in cases like the following.
(32)
"Something bad happened because a gate remained open; John could have
closed it, but he didn't." (Bennett 1988, p. 140).
Depending
on the circumstances, we would blame John or not "in the light of the
negative fact that he did not close the gate" (Bennett 1988, ibid.). But, as Bennett argues
convincingly, it is misleading to search for an event underlying this negative
fact. The thesis that all causation is event causation seems to have the
unwelcome consequence that there must be such an event : perhaps the cause of
the disaster alluded to by (32) is an "act of omission" which John
committed by not closing the door. Now, Bennett argues that one can bypass such
obscure questions, by simply dropping the thesis that causes must always be
events. It is more simple and thus more satisfying, he says, to remain within
the domain of facts. John has not prevented the disaster. This fact gives us the reason for blaming
him.
We shall
return to both Mellor's and Bennett's challenge in section 4.
3. Comparative facts as causes
Comparative
causes are the second type of case Mellor (1987) takes to support his thesis
that causes are facts, and not events.
(23)
"Don's rope being the weakest caused his fall to be the first."
(Mellor 1987, p. 211).
(23)
identifies both the cause and the effect to be comparative facts. Why does
Mellor hold that (23) does not express, or at least imply, a relation between
particulars ?
His
argument in the case where cause and effect are identified by way of a
comparative predicate, is the following. (23) is equivalent, Mellor says, to
(33) Don's
fall is the first fall because Don's rope is the weakest rope.
Then
suppose that there exists an event which is the cause of Don's fall and an
event which is the effect of Don's rope being the weakest. Both "Don's
fall" and "the first fall" refer to the latter event, just as
both "Don's rope" and "the weakest rope" refer both to the
same thing. From this Mellor infers that (33) implies all of the following:
(34) Don's
fall is Don's fall because Don's rope is the weakest.
(35) The
first fall is the first fall because Don's rope is the weakest.
(36) Don
falls first because his rope is his rope.
(37) Don
falls first because the weakest rope is the weakest rope.
But all of
the statements (34) to (37) are false.
What is
going on here? Mellor admits that (33) refers to particulars, but contests that
one can "get from it a relevant truth of type 'c causes e'" (Mellor
1987, ibid.). He justifies this claim
by observing that "'Don's rope being the weakest' is a nominalised
sentence, not a singular term. It does more than refer to Don's rope: it
asserts in the context that his rope is the weakest." (Mellor 1987, ibid.). Thus far I agree. My proposal is
actually based on the fact mentioned by Mellor. But I don't follow him any more
when he says: "What [(33)] says is that each of two particulars satisfies
two given descriptions - and that one does so because the other does. That is
why this causal claim depends for its truth on how these particulars are
referred to, which a report of a relation between them would not do."
(Mellor 1987, pp. 211f.).
4. An analysis according to which causation
between facts is dependent on causation between events
To see why
it is possible to resist Mellor's conclusion while accepting his premiss, I
propose to introduce two distinctions. The first is between eventive causal
statements and factual causal statements. Statements of the latter type express
a relation between two facts
(O) CF (Fc, Ge)
where the
first fact is said to be causally
responsible for the second fact. CF designates the relation of
causal responsibility and takes two factual arguments, Fc and Ge. Fc and Ge can take the form of a nominalized expression of type G (as in
(1a)) or other forms capable of designating facts (like in (4a) and (5a)). I
propose to analyse the meaning of (O) to be:
(O') CE(c,e) Fc Ge N(F,G),
where CE represents a predicate
expressing the causal relation between the events c and e. The proposition
Fc attributes an efficacious property
F to the cause, and the proposition Ge
attributes the property G to the effect, where e's exemplifying G is due to the
instantiation of a law of nature linking properties F and G. Fc and Ge are facts. The law statement is represented by N(F,G). The form
of (O') makes apparent that the factual statement CF (Fc, Ge) implies the
eventive statement CE(c,e), but not vice versa.
The second
distinction we need to introduce is between the linguistic surface structure of
a causal statement and its logical deep structure. In the simplest case, the
surface structure of the causal statement is such as to show overtly the
logical structure (O), as in "e
is G because c is F", where the
connective "because" is interpreted as expressing the relation of
causal responsibility.
Let us call "FACT"[12] the explicit
grammatical expression naming the causally responsible fact, where FACT need
not have the structure Fc of
attributing the property F to an explicitly named event c. Let us first
consider the special case where it is possible to transform FACT into the EVENT
expression corresponding to it. As we have seen, in English this transformation
can be carried out by taking an expression of type G as its input and an
expression of type P as its output. Then the following inference is valid, by
virtue of a purely grammatical transformation.
(I1) FACT
causes .... (is causally responsible for)
Therefore,
EVENT causes ...
The
expression FACT has a complex meaning : it refers to a particular (an object or
an event) as possessing a certain
property. This contrasts with the expression EVENT which designates directly a particular entity[13]. Here is an exemple of
an inference of type (I1). It is possible to infer both (2) and (3), from (1).
(1) Her
performing the song surprised me.
(2) The
performing of the song surprised me.
(3) The
performance of the song surprised me.
As I have
tried to show, the factual statement (1) - and the synonymous statements (4)
and (5) mentioned in section 1 - contain a more specific information on the
causal relation than the eventive statements (2) and (3). To say that the
information the former convey is more specific than that conveyed by the
latter, is to say that the former imply the latter, but not vice versa. In this
case, it is possible to retrieve, from the factual statement, the information
about the identity of the events c and e. One possesses all the ingredients of
the logical structure
(O) CF (Fc, Ge).
where c designates
(2a) The
performing of the song,
or
equivalently
(3a) The
performance of the song.
and e designates me at a suitable time which
is fixed by the context of the utterance.
Now, the
factual causal statement says of event c
that the fact that c has property F
is causally responsible for the fact that e
has property G. According to our analysis,
(1) Her
performing the song surprised me.
has the
same meaning as
(1-O) Is causally
responsible for (Is her performance of the song (The performance of the song at
t), Am surprised (I at t)).
(1-O)
means, more informally : the fact that the performance of the song has the
property of being her performance of the song was causally responsible for my
surprise.
By
contrast, eventive statement like (2) and (3) do not contain any information on
the causally relevant properties F and G. Their content is only a part of the
content of a factual statement.
(2) The
performing of the song surprised me.
(3) The
performance of the song surprised me.
have the structure:
(T) CE (c,e).
(2) and (3) can be restated in the form (T) :
(2-T)
Causes (The performing of the song, my surprise).
(3-T)
Causes (The performance of the song, my surprise).
By designating an event, i.e. a particular, as the cause (the analog
is true of the effect), one does not affirm of any particular property of the
cause that it is efficacious in bringing about the effect. Still, if the
nomological theory of causation is correct, there must be some causally efficacious property. We can express this idea by
postulating that we can infer from a statement of type (T) an existential
generalization where the relevant properties of cause and effect are quantified
over.
(TE) ($ F)($ G) CF (Fc, Ge)
As (O) is equivalent to (O'), (TE) is equivalent to
(TE') ($F)($G) [CE(c,e) Fc Ge N(F,G)]
Informally
spoken, eventive statements like (2) and (3) imply that something about Marys performance caused my surprise, but without
containing the information on which
particular property that was.
On the
other hand, if we start from the factual statement (1), we can retrieve all the
information required to reconstruct it in the logical form (O). But then we see
immediately that one can infer from it, via (O'), an eventive statement (T). It
is also clear that the opposite inference is not possible. From (T) one can
only infer (TE), not (O).
But it is
not always possible to infer an eventive statement from a factual causal
statement. It is not possible whenever the factual statement cannot be
reconstructed in the logical form (O). My hypothesis is that this is the case
if and only if the fact designated as the cause is negative or consists in an external
relation[14].
The causal
statements analysed by Mellor and Bennett are of this type. They do not have
the surface structure (O); in particular, they do not contain the information
which is necessary to construct explicit expressions naming the events c and e. In their case, one can only infer the existence of an event playing the role of the cause, according to
the inference pattern (I2).
(I2) FACT
is causally responsible for ...
Therefore,
it exists an event e which is the
cause of ...
Now we can
see how to resist Mellor and Bennett's arguments to the effect that in the
cases they analyse, there can be no
causing event. The distinction between the surface structure and the logical
deep structure suggests the following response. What their examples show is
that factual causal statements do not always contain explicit information
permitting to explicitly designate
the causing event. However, this does not imply that there is no such event.
Let us
reconsider Mellor's and Bennett's examples in the light of our analysis.
(22) John
did not die because he did not fall.
has the
structure
(22-O) Is
causally responsible for (Not fall (John at t), Not die (John at t+dt)).
The cause
event consists of a time slice of John at instant t, the effect event of a
later (at t + dt) time slice of the same individual.
The reason
why we can't explicitly designate the cause event by virtue of a complete
expression EVENT is simply that in (22) both the cause and the effect are
designated by negative predicates.
But this doesn't prevent the events "John at t" and "John at t +
dt" from existing and the former from being the cause of the latter.
Furthermore, nothing Mellor has said gives us reason to doubt that these events
have properties which are responsible for their being causally related. It's
just that (22) doesn't tell us which properties they are. The following seems
to be a plausible guess:
(38) Is
causally responsible for (Hangs on (John at t), Lives (John at t+dt)).
These
predicates being positive, we can use them to form a positive causal statement
where both cause and effect are designated by eventive expressions.
(39)
John's hanging on at t caused (was causally responsible for) his surviving at
t+dt.
Still we
should not forget that (22) does not
imply (38)/(39), although the converse is true. If we admit the truth of
(22) as a premiss, then (38)/(39) is only a "plausible guess". John
could have had some other causally efficacious property at t which had a causal
impact on the event "John at t+dt" which has the property that John
is alive. For example, John could have released his hold at t but still been
held by a security rope. Then (38)/(39) would be false, and (22) would be true
in virtue of other properties of the
related events "John at t" and "John at t+dt". This is just
to say that in case FACT is constituted by a negative predicate, we cannot
infer to EVENT by virtue of (I1), but only to the existence of some event or other, by virtue of (I2). We can guess
at what the causing event is, but the factual statement doesn't contain
sufficient information for explicitly constructing an EVENT expression
designating it.
As to
Mellor's non-existence proof of the "negative event" of Don's
"non-death": if Don does not die at t, then Don lives at t. The
time-slice of Don at t is an event. What we have to conclude from Mellor's
observation that (8) entails both (9) and (10), is that the negative predicate
"does not die" doesn't give us the means necessary to construct an
eventive expression. In particular "Don's non-death" is not
a possible EVENT expression which is capable of figuring in a causal statement.
Still if (8) is true, there exists an event, consisting of Don at t. But to
name it by virtue of an explicit EVENT expression we would have to know some
positive property of Don's at t, which (8) doesn't give us. In particular we
don't know whether this event has the property of being instant or the property
of being slow. These could indeed only be properties of Don's death, not of
Don's non-death.
To return
to Bennett's omission example: to account for it, it suffices to distinguish
moral responsibility and causal responsibility. An omission involves the former
but not the latter. If we say of John that he is responsible for the disaster,
we are attributing moral responsibility to him. But that does not imply that
anything causal links him - or some
act of his - to the disaster[15]. In the case of an
omission, it is true that there is no event causally responsible for the
result, but this can be explained by the fact that no causation is involved
either. This conclusion will result from any analysis of causation which
requires some kind of physical interaction between cause and effect[16]. The situation
described by Bennett in (32) is compatible with John being completely
physically isolated from the gate. In that case, his relation to what happens
to the gate cannot be causal. Note that our position is compatible with
Bennett's thesis that moral responsibility is always assigned in terms of
facts. John is responsible for the disaster because he did not close the door.
"He did not close the door" expresses a fact, and the contexts gives
the expression "the disaster" a factual meaning, namely the meaning
of "that the disaster occurred".
Similarly,
if
(23) Don's
rope being the weakest caused his fall to be the first.
is to be
interpreted as a causal statement at all - rather than as an explanatory
statement linking two properties of the same event - we can analyse it as
(40) Is
causally responsible for (Is weaker than the other ropes (Don's rope at t),
Falls earlier than the others (Don at t+dt)).
Once
again, (23)/(40) don't tell us which property of Don's rope at t it is that
caused Don's fall at t+dt. But this does't constitute at all an argument
against the existence of both the
event and the efficacious property. That property is presumably the combination
of the pull exerted on the rope together with the rope's internal structure. In
any case, (23) itself doesn't designate that property for if no other ropes had
been there and thus no other falls to be compared with, the causal process
designated by (23) would still have taken place.
To sum up,
in cases in which the cause is designated by a FACT expression whose predicate
is negative or expresses an external relation, we can only infer -
according to (I2) - that there exists
a cause event, but we cannot extract an explicit expression designating this
event.
5. Disjunctive cause
Bennett
(1988) presents another example of a factual causal statement which is not
equivalent to any eventive causal statement. The information contained in the
factual causal statement exceeds the
information which could possibly be expressed by an eventive statement. In the
light of our analysis, the existence of such statements comes as no surprise
because the logical structure of (O) and (O') is richer than that of (T).
Furthermore, Bennett's example is of a type where it is only possible to make
an inference of type (I2), i.e. where one can only infer an existential
generalization over the causing event. But this doesn't mean that there is no causing event. I shall try to show
this by suggesting a plausible candidate for that role.
In
Bennett's example, the expression designating the cause has the form of a
disjunction: he considers "an electric motor that is hooked up
symmetrically to two sources of power, each circuit having a switch. Current
from either source would suffice to make the motor go, though its speed depends
on how much current it gets. Now, both switches are closed at the same instant,
whereupon the motor starts" (Bennett 1988, p. 139). Bennett now argues
that only a factual causal statement
can correctly designate the causal process resulting in the motor's starting,
namely the following.
(41) The
fact that at least one of the switches was closed brought it about that the
motor started[17].
This is
once again an example where we can only infer according to (I2), to the existence of a cause event. (41) does
not tell us whether it was the closing of flip 1 or that of flip 2 or that of
both that was the cause of the motor's start. But if (41) is true, then we are
certain that one of these three possible situations was realized.
Eventive
and factual causal statements provide very different types of information.
Eventive statements inform us only of the actual situation, and they don't
identify the causally efficacious property of the cause. But it reveals a
misunderstanding of the semantics of eventive statements to accuse them, as
Bennett (1988, p. 140) does, of not doing the job of factual statements. The
latter, it is true, can carry more detailed information about both cause and
effect. First, they can convey information on the efficacious property of the
cause, and on the property of the effect which is affected by the cause.
Second, they can convey counterfactual information. Let's say, both flip 1 and
2 were closed and caused the motor's start together. Then the eventive
statement
(42) The
closure of both switches at the same time caused the motor's start.
cannot
tell us what would have happened if only one switch had been closed. On
the other hand, (41) is shown to be more informative by the fact that it can
provide this information.
Bennett
protests against the idea to consider "the closure of both switches"
as an event because that would mean that "the motor's start was caused by
a spatially discontinuous event, namely the fusion of the two switch-flips. But
not everyone is happy with such fusions, and in any case this account of the
matter is misleading at best, because it seems to imply that the two flips
collaborated on getting the motor to start, and that is not so." (Bennett
1988, ibid.).
But, or so
it seems to me, in case the motor started upon closing of both switches, they did collaborate in the sense that the
current starting the motor was the sum of the currents that had flown through
the two switches. What Bennett should say is just that their collaboration is
not necessary for the effect. But
this information is something that an eventive causal statement could not
possibly convey, because it is information of a counterfactual type: if flip 2
had not been closed, the motor would have started nevertheless.
As to the
"fusion" of events, it can be correct to say of an event that it is a
cause of some given effect without needing to identify all of its causes. The latter would always be a "fusion"
of spatiotemporally discontinuous events because the causal ancestors of an
event may spread out in many directions. But if we want to embrace more than
one cause, it is not misleading to name an event which is identified through a
fusion of the spatio-temporal locations of its parts.
Conclusion
The aim of
this paper was to defend the traditional position, according to which events
are basic entities involved in all causation, in the face of the linguistic
evidence. This defense turned out to be possible only by attributing a causal
role to facts as well, although one distinct from the role played by events. I
tried to characterize the role of facts in causation as "causal
responsibility". This relation, and its connection to causation between
events, has been clarified by way of the analysis of different inference
patterns between causal statements of two sorts: statements linking events and
statements linking facts. From a factual causal statement, it is possible to
infer an eventive causal statement if the predicate of the expression FACT
designating the cause is neither negative nor expresses an external relation.
Otherwise, one can only infer the existence of an event which is the cause, but
one cannot derive an expression EVENT explicitly naming it. From an eventive
causal statement, one can never infer
a factual causal statement, naming the properties which the causal relation
between two events brings into play. This is because the assertion of the
existence of a relation between particulars is weaker than the assertion of the
causal responsibility of one fact for another.
I agree
with Bennett (1988) insofar as it can sometimes be misleading to use eventive
causal statements, because the pragmatic rules of relevance let the hearer
expect that the events are named by virtue of their causally efficacious
properties. If this is not the case, the eventive statement is misleading. Yet
this doesn't imply that it is false[18].
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[18]I should like to thank Joan Cullen,
Steven Davis, Dorothy Edgington, Kevin Mulligan, Joëlle Proust, and an
anonymous referee for "dialectica" for their helpful suggestions and
critique.