Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2014

Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity

Résumé

This paper develops an equilibrium search model that allows rms to invest in worker's health. Heterogeneous health endowment of the employee is not observed by the employer, and rms also di er regarding their productivities. We emphasize that wage and health expenditure policies of the employer are tightly related, and show how those policies relate to rms' type. A noticeable implication is that there is an ambiguous relationship between wage earnings and health expenditures supported by fi rms.

Mots clés

Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
WP_14-16_Cheron_final.pdf (508.17 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01100345 , version 1 (06-01-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01100345 , version 1

Citer

Arnaud Chéron, Pierre-Jean Messe, Jerome Ronchetti. Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity. 2014. ⟨halshs-01100345⟩
141 Consultations
112 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More