Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2024

Equitable Auctions

Résumé

We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is efficient, Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible, and achieves surplus parity among winners ex-post. The uniform-price auction is equity-optimal if and only if buyers have a pure common value. Against intuition, the pay-as-bid auction is not always preferred in terms of equity if buyers have pure private values. In auctions with price mixing between pay-as-bid and uniform prices, we provide prior-free bounds on the equity-preferred pricing rule under a common regularity condition on signals.

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hal-05225702 , version 1 (27-08-2025)

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Simon Finster, Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras, Mathieu Molina, Bary Pradelski. Equitable Auctions. EC 2025 - 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Jul 2025, Stanford, United States. pp.304-304, ⟨10.1145/3736252.3742531⟩. ⟨hal-05225702⟩
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