Article Dans Une Revue Economics Bulletin Année : 2025

Per unit versus ad valorem taxes under strategic bilateral trade

Gagnie Pascal Yebarth

Résumé

This paper compares ad valorem and per-unit taxes in a bilateral market where all traders have market power. To do so, we use a simple prototype of strategic market games, namely bilateral oligopoly models, and show that ad valorem taxation welfare-dominates per-unit taxation under strategic bilateral trade. Moreover, ad valorem and per-unit taxes have qualitatively different effects on strategic equilibrium offers.

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hal-05066263 , version 1 (14-05-2025)

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  • HAL Id : hal-05066263 , version 1

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Gagnie Pascal Yebarth. Per unit versus ad valorem taxes under strategic bilateral trade. Economics Bulletin, 2025, 45 (1), pp.384-391. ⟨hal-05066263⟩
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