Characterizing Strategyproofness Through Score Functions in Voting Mechanisms
Résumé
This work focuses on the strategyproofness of voting systems in which voters select multiple options from a set of possibilities. These systems include those that are used for Participatory Budgeting, where elections are held to determine the allocation of a community budget (e.g., city or regional level) for funding various projects.We present a model for analyzing voting mechanisms and the Constrained Change Property (CCP), which serves as a criterion for designing strategyproof voting mechanisms. Additionally, we define a new concept of a social choice function and leverage it to develop a new class of utilitarian voting mechanisms, referred to as score voting. We prove that the mechanisms designed with core voting with a neutral score function are equivalent to knapsack voting on the same instance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a score voting mechanism based on a total score function is strategyproof if and only if its score function satisfies CCP.Building on these findings, we propose an algorithm capable of identifying the closest total score function that ensures the strategyproofness of any given score voting mechanism.
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