Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2020

Prevention programs and advantageous selection: Evidence for Long-Term care insurance

Résumé

Prevention programs aim to reduce health risks by encouraging changes in behavior. Asymmetric information is often proposed as an explanation of the thinness of Long-Term Care (LTC) insurance markets, and we here theoretically and empirically consider how this is affected by prevention programs. Theoretically, the trade-off between self-protection and insurance changes: it is indeterminate in general and there is no impact on insurance coverage for a fair premium. These equilibrium properties are tested empirically with French original survey data on policyholders of an insurance company, which elicit the willingness to participate in a prevention program and contain additional information on preventive behaviors. The econometric results show that ex-ante moral hazard is rather driven by individual preferences. Moreover, program participation encourages both self-protection and LTC insurance purchase: this reveals initially-unobservable advantageous selection. JEL codes: D82, I11, J14, D91

Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Briand_Lesueur_Advantageous selection.pdf (582.34 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Licence

Dates et versions

hal-05022971 , version 1 (07-04-2025)

Licence

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-05022971 , version 1

Citer

Steve Briand, Jean-Yves Lesueur. Prevention programs and advantageous selection: Evidence for Long-Term care insurance. 2020. ⟨hal-05022971⟩
727 Consultations
147 Téléchargements

Partager

  • More