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From Author to Authority:
The Legacy of James of Eltville in Vienna

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When James of Eltville left Paris, his scholarly career ended.¹ As abbot of Eberbach, other challenges surely kept the German Cistercian from such activities as teaching and writing theological treatises.² Eltville's intellectual legacy, however, exceeded the chronological and geographical limits of his academic life: from an author he became an authority. Eltville's sole academic work, his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, produced at the old University of Paris, was absorbed at the new University of Vienna, becoming an important source, nourishing and inspiring generation after generation of members of the Viennese Faculty of Theology. The Paris-educated Cistercian is thus crucial for understanding the intellectual exchanges between Paris and Vienna, since his words—sometimes quoted explicitly, but mostly implicitly—permeate the corpus of *Sentences* commentaries produced in Vienna. Just as Eltville's *Sentences* commentary, as this volume clearly reveals, is an eclectic composite of doctrines collected from the most trendy theologians popular in Paris in the decades before his lectures—Robert Holcot, Thomas of Strasbourg, Gregory of Rimini, John of Mirecourt, Alfonsus Vargas of Toledo, John Hiltalingen of Basel—when the Viennese authors of their shared *Sentences* corpus confronted topics such as epistemology, the *Filioque*, predestination, and the sacraments, they placed Eltville in their own Pantheon of revered authorities.

James of Eltville was read, copied, and commented upon in Vienna. This paper shows how and by whom, gathering evidence to explain why Eltville became and remained an authority among Viennese theologians. After surveying recent publications that illustrate the relationship between Eltville and theologians in Vienna, we will divide our investigation into two sections for two case studies, on Peter Reicher of Pirchenwart and on Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach, in order to shed new light on the circulation of the Cistercian's *Sentences* commentary and to demonstrate the longevity of his legacy in Vienna.

The Status quaestionis on Eltville's Presence in Vienna

In the last few years, the common interest of a few scholars has opened new vistas on the beginnings of the Faculty of Theology in Vienna. Critical or diplomatic editions³ of texts produced at the start of the fifteenth century in this new academic milieu has highlighted,

* Brinzei is mainly responsible for Pirkenwart and Curut for Ebendorfer.

¹ See the Introduction and Courtenay in this volume.

² For instance, the medieval catalogue of Eberbach Abbey does not list other texts of Eltville, except a copy of his *Sentences* commentary, which is lost today. A collection of letters completes the list of writings of Eltville. N. PALMER, *Zisterzienser und ihre Bücher. Die mittelalterliche Bibliotheksgeschichte von Kloster Eberach im Rheingau*, Regensburg 1998, pp. 126, 323, 330.

³ See: C. SCHABEL, "Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the *Filioque* at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century", pp. 15-83, ed. 39-83 and U. ZAHND, « Plagiats individualisés et stratégies de singularisation. L'évolution du livre IV du commentaire commun des *Sentences* de Vienne », in *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the Sentences at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth century*, ed. M. BRINZEI (Studia Sententiarum, 1), Turnhout 2015, pp. 85-265, ed. 189-265. I. CURUȚ, "Viennese University Theologians on Practical Theology", in *Archa Verbi. Yearbook for the Study of Medieval Theology*, 14 (2017), pp. 101-156. A diplomatic transcription of distinctions 1-10 of the *Lectura Mellicensis* of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, done by Maria Ingegno, can be accessed at: <http://thesis-project.ro/nicholausdedinkelsbuhl/> (last access 15.05.2018).

among other exciting discoveries, the admiration Viennese theologians had for James of Eltville.

The critical edition of much of question 6 of book 1 of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's *Sentences* commentary in his autograph manuscript Schotten 269 reveals via its complex *apparatus fontium* how often ideas are recycled from the *Sentences* commentary of James of Eltville, without a single explicit reference to his name. Of the 143 paragraphs of this elegant edition, 20 sections are extracted verbatim from Eltville's work. These fragments influenced how Viennese theologians dealt with the problem of the *Filioque*, as Chris Schabel has magisterially shown in the study accompanying his edition.⁴ Brinzei and Schabel have also demonstrated that the following question 7 of Dinkelsbühl's book 1 is based on Eltville's own question 14, and that Eltville was one of the main sources for Dinkelsbühl's previous question 5, while in his paper in this volume Schabel opens with Dinkelsbühl quoting Eltville in the former's question 10. Yet this turns out to be the only citation of Eltville in all of Dinkelsbühl's book 1 in Schotten 269. We can thus expect to find more Eltville there and in the other books in Schotten 269, where there are just three other explicit citations to Eltville, all in book 2. Given that Schotten 269, composed around 1400, is the basis for what is now called the 'Vienna Group Commentary', this already displays Eltville's prominence in fifteenth-century Vienna.⁵

Another example attesting to the early reception of Eltville is provided by manuscript München, Clm 3546, which, according to Ueli Zahnd,⁶ represents the first version of the Carmelite Andrew of Seehausen's *Sentences* commentary.⁷ The scribe of the manuscript, the Carmelite Paulus Weischenfelder from the Nuremberg convent, was very generous in giving details indicating that the text stemmed from lectures delivered in 1404–1405 in Vienna.⁸ Seehausen's text in München, Clm 3546, is a heterogeneous composition of questions probably gathered for the purpose of teaching theology. For much of the text it remains to find his sources. The situation is more fortunate for book 4 where, because of scribal notations on folios 227vb and 232rb,⁹ it is possible to recognize the first four questions of

⁴ SCHABEL, "Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the *Filioque* at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century".

⁵ M. BRINZEI, C. SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late Medieval Theology: The Commentary of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl", in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. P.W. ROSEMANN, vol. 3, Leyden 2014, pp. 174-266, at pp. 186, 190-191, and *passim*.

⁶ U. ZAHND, *Wirksame Zeichen? Sakramentenlehre und Semantik in der Scholastik des ausgehenden Mittelalters* (Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation, 80), Tübingen 2014, pp. 312-313.

⁷ On his commentary, see BRINZEI, SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late Medieval Theology", pp. 206-209.

⁸ The new catalogue gives the extensive passages of the colophons, which are very useful for knowing more about the text and its production. On f. 132rb we are informed that the lectures on the second book were finished on 18 November 1405 (*in octava Sancti Martini episcopi et confessoris*, f. 132rb), 21 July 1405 for the end of book 3 (f. 199rb: *in crastino sancte Margarete virginis*), and 1404 for book 4 (f. 286va: *in universitate Wiennensi anno domini MCCCCIII per reverendum*) (f. 200ra-308ra). Following these dates, we can also deduce that Seehausen read according to the earlier Parisian sequence I-IV-II-III (See W. DUBA, C. SCHABEL, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris", in *Recherche de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 84/1 (2017), pp. 143-179 at pp. 146-159; W.J. COURTENAY, "From Dinkelsbühl's *Questiones Communes* to the Vienna Group Commentary. The Vienna 'School'", in *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the Sentences at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth century*, ed. M. BRINZEI, (Studia Sententiarum, 1), Turnhout 2015, pp. 268-316). E. RAUNER, *Katalog der leteinischen Handschriften der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München. Clm 3501-3661*, Wiesbaden 2007, pp. 155-159. f. 132rb, 286va, 287ra, 308ra.

⁹ München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 3546, f. 227vb: *in quo homo fit totus caro et sic est finis totius materie de sacramento eucharistie. Reverendi magistri Jacobi de alta villa ordinis sancti venerandi vel sancti bernardi in quo adhuc dubitavi cuius ordinis pro vero esset stet hoc propter complementum. And f. 232rb: (...) et ergo non concludit articulum et tantum de illa questione et ita materia. Laus Deo. Nota questiones a principio quarti libri sunt questiones Jacobi de Alta Villa et questiones nunc sequentes sunt de lectura Ar. (lacuna) usque ad finem 4ti libri. Paul Weischenfelder also suggests the name of Oyta at the end of book I: f. 69ra: *Esset dicenda quare in Oyta. Laus Deo.**

Eltville's book 4,¹⁰ reproduced in full at the beginning of book 4 of Seehausen's text.¹¹ This is definitely not a case of flagrant plagiarism, but just another piece of evidence showing that Eltville's book 4 was one of the main sources for teaching the sacraments in Vienna in the first decade of the fifteenth century.

Since we are now privileged to have access to Zahnd's excellent edition of the first question of book 4 of the common commentary from Vienna, we can evaluate the extent to which Eltville's position on the definition of the sacraments provided the framework for Viennese theologians to develop their own conceptions. Zahnd demonstrates how this influence was perpetuated among five generations of theologians: John Berwart of Villingen, Peter Czech of Pulkau, Conrad of Rothenburg, George Wetzels of Horaw, and Peter of Pirchenwart.¹² Zahnd's edition provides ample material for measuring the legacy of Eltville in Vienna and this will be discussed more broadly in the section dealing with the first quotation from Pirchenwart's commentary.

Peter Pirchenwart

Peter of Pirchenwart read the *Sentences* in Vienna in 1417–1419 and as regent master he was one of the lucky few that got the chance to publish his commentary,¹³ of which we have thirteen surviving copies of his book 4.¹⁴ Pirchenwart enjoyed public recognition in his day, and his work was important enough that Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455) possessed in his library¹⁵ a deluxe copy of his book 4, which today has the shelfmark Vat. lat. 1120, from which we will extract all our quotations. As Zahnd has noted, Pirchenwart's ambition was to create a very complete version of book 4 dealing with all the topics covered Lombard's original. For this reason, Pirchenwart's commentary is a *pièce maitresse* for the Faculty of Theology from Vienna. Below we analyze the explicit references to Eltville found in Pirchenwart's book 4, divided according to the topics to which Eltville's name is attached.

Zahnd's impressive investigation of the first question of book 4 from the 'Vienna Group' of the *Sentences* reveals different stages in its evolution. The only explicit quotation from Eltville in the question is not a personal contribution of Pirchenwart, but an omnipresent citation in the previous and later stages of the 'Vienna Group' commentary.¹⁶

Propter ista motiva et alia plura Scotus tenet oppositum. Et quamvis illa motiva Scoti et aliorum possunt solvi seu potius apparenter evadi secundum quod tangit Petrus de

¹⁰ ZAHND, *Wirksame Zeichen?*, p. 313. We should add that other questions of Seehausen's commentary are actually very close to Eltville's text, although not completely verbatim, since questions 8, 11, 13, and 14 (see the *tabula* in B.M. XIBERTA, *De scriptoribus scholasticis XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum*, Louvain 1931, pp. 470-471) correspond to the last four questions of book 4 of Eltville's complete commentary.

¹¹ A *Tabula questionum* of his commentary can be found in XIBERTA, *De scriptoribus scholasticis XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum*.

¹² For some chronological considerations on these authors, see the annex on pp. 298-303 of W.J. COURTENAY, "From Dinkesbühl's *Questiones Communes* to the Vienna Group Commentary", pp. 267-315.

¹³ COURTENAY, "From Dinkelsbühl's *Questiones Communes* to the Vienna Group Commentary", p. 277.

¹⁴ To the eleven manuscripts attributed by Stegmüller to Pirchenwart we need to add another two, Vat. lat. 1120 and 1221, containing book 4. Cf. F. STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, vol. 1, Würzburg 1947, n° 172, p. 283. The attribution of the two Vatican manuscripts was first proposed by L. STURLESE, *Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werk Dietrichs von Freiberg*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1984, pp. 78-82.

¹⁵ The medieval catalogue of his library was compiled (16 April 1455) by Cosme de Montserrat and edited by E. MÜNTZ, P. FABRE, *Bibliothèque du Vatican au XV^e siècle d'après des documents inédits. Contribution pour servir à l'histoire de l'humanisme*, Paris 1887, p. 70.

¹⁶ In his study, Zahnd reproduces the same quotation, collating two different manuscripts: Klosterneuburg 315, f. 6rb (commentary of Conrad of Rothenburg) and Klosterneuburg 340, f. 6rb-va. ZAHND, «Plagiats individualisés et stratégies de singularisation», pp. 133-134, 148.

Tharantasia et Jacobus de Altavilla (qui etiam in prima questione quarti dicit quod sacramenta nove legis non solum sunt causa sine qua non infunditur gratia, sed etiam realiter sunt gratie causativa, quod ibidem probatur et argumenta ad oppositum solvit), tamen opinio Scoti apparet multis verisimilior. Unde et Bonaventura dicit quod dominus Wilhelmus Parisiensis episcopus in determinando in scolis Fratrum Minorum coram fratre Alexandro approbavit modum dicendi quod non esset talis virtus ponenda in sacramento.

Zahnd demonstrates that, at the Vienna Group's third stage, Pirchenwart reorganized the question, even adopting the title from James of Eltville's first question of book 4.¹⁷ In addition to this appropriation, many of Eltville's arguments were also borrowed. Significantly for the content of the debate, Eltville introduces into the discussion a focus on the efficacy of the sacraments, an issue that Dinkelsbühl completely ignored in stage one.

Eltville's second question of book 4, dealing with the sacrament of baptism, is the source for Pirchenwart's second explicit reference to the German Cistercian. In the second conclusion of his question, Eltville lists eight types of liquid (hot water, sulfurous water, sea water, rain water, sandy water, artificial water – sweat, urine, etc. – tea, and, apparently, melted candle wax), asking whether a priest can use these liquids in celebrating the sacrament of baptism. Pirchenwart reproduces the entire list, with some variation,¹⁸ but he refers explicitly to Eltville only in the case of the eighth and final example. Eltville's catalogue of fluids apparently interested the Viennese theologians, since we can read them in Dinkelsbühl's *Lectura Mellicensis*.¹⁹ Is Pirchenwart Dinkesbühl's source? It is still hard to say. Pirchenwart's text seems closer to the original, as is in the following example: *fluxus arene sicut hic riparum*, which appears as *fluxus arene sicut hic aque* under Dinkesbühl's plume²⁰, is *fluxus arene sicut hic riparum* in Eltville's original.²¹ Nevertheless, Pirchenwart ends by confusing the two parts of the corollary:

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 2, Bruges 181, f. 207va	PETRUS PIRCHENWART, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 3, BAV, Vat. lat. 1120, f. 17ra-b	NICOLAUS DE DINKELSBÜHL, <i>Lectura Mellicensis</i> , dist. 3, q. 3, ms. T536, f. 46ra
Octava propositio: quamvis	Octavum, licet baptizmus posset	Nono, licet baptizmus posset fieri

¹⁷ ZAHND, « Plagiats individualisés et stratégies de singularisation », p. 131.

¹⁸ In the 6th example, he replaces the reference to the remanence case of the substance and accidents of the bread and the wine during the eucharistic with a quotation from Duns Scotus, which is also reproduced in the *Lectura Mellicensis*: *Sextum in ptisana (!) potest fieri baptismus quia non est ibi per longam decoctionem aqua transmutata in aliam speciem nec est aliquid alterans commixtum, sed de longis coctionibus vel brodio carniū cervisia, medone et similibus. Dicunt aliqui quod in eis non possit fieri baptismus, quia vi decoctionis transmutata sunt a specie aque in alteram speciem ut dicunt. Sed Scotus dicit non sit manifestum an per decoctionem vel per actum corrumpens commixtum sint transmutata in aliam speciem. Et ad Philosophum naturalem pertinet inquirere que alteratio mutet speciem aque et que non, quod si de aliquibus manet dubium et in talibus fuerit factus. Baptismus utendum est ibi tribus maximis prius positus de forma baptismi de remediis adhibendis circa ea de quibus probabiliter dubitatur* (VAT, Vat. lat. 1120, f. 17ra). The source of this passage in Eltville is as follows (Cambrai, BM, f. 207vb): *Sexta propositio quod in tisana potest fieri baptismus tamen in aliqua decoctionis carniū vel fruitia vel similibus que ex vi decoctionis totaliter videretur transmutata a specie. Non potest fieri baptismus propter causam supradictam. Unde etiam remanens in pene et aqua posset sumere de tisana et non de aliis.*

¹⁹ On the *Lectura Mellicensis* see recently: M. BRINZEI, C. SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late Medieval Theology: The Sentences Commentary of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl", in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 3, ed. P.W. ROSEMANN, Leiden 2014, pp. 174-266; M. BRINZEI, « La *Lectura Mellicensis* de Nicholas de Dinkelsbühl dans le sillage de l'esprit réformateur de Jean Gerson », in *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the Sentences at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century*, ed. M. BRINZEI (Studia Sententiarum, 1), Turnhout 2015, pp. 318-383.

²⁰ Two others manuscripts of *Lectura Mellicensis* have been checked here Klosterneuburg 47 (f. 27rb) and Kremsmünster 367(f. 22va) and they have also the same reading : *fluxus arene sicut hic aque*.

²¹ We also find *ripiritarum* in Bruges, 181, f. 207va.

baptizmus posset fieri in aqua fluente in arena et eam deferente, non tamen potest fieri cum arena sola quantumcumque fluente. Quod dico propter terras quasdem in quibus est continuus fluxus <arene> sicut hic riparum. Quod etiam dico propter monachum quemdam in arena baptizatum, quem post, quamdiu officium sacerdotis sacramentis exercuerat, oportuit rebaptizari et omnes ordines de novo suscipere.	fieri in aqua fluente cum arena et eam deferente, /17rb/ non tamen potest fieri in arena sola quantumcumque fluente, sicut dicitur quod in quibusdam terris sit continuus fluxus arene sicut hic riparum. Et dicit Iacobus de Altavilla quod quidam monachus fuerit baptizatus in arena quem, cum diu officium sacerdotis exercuerat, oportebat baptizari et omnes ordines de novo suscipere. Prima pars corollarii patet, quia arena non est aqua et sola aqua est materia congrua baptismi, igitur.	in aqua fluente in arena et eam deferente, non tamen potest fieri in arena sola quantumcumque fluente, sicut est in quibusdam terris ubi – ut fertur – est continuus fluxus arene sicut hic aque. Et dicit Iacobus de Altavilla quod quidam monachus fuit in huius arena baptizatus quem, cum diu officium sacerdotis exercuerat, oportuit rebaptizari et omnes ordines de novo suscipere. Tunc prima pars corollarii patet, quia talis aqua est vere aqua, quamvis habeat arenam commixtam, igitur.
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The sacrament of baptism is also covered in question 5 of Pirchenwart's book 4: *Utrum militia ministri impediatur efficaciam sacramenti*, which is divided into four articles, the last one composed of 33 *dubia* or examples of practical situations that can occur in this sacrament. At the end of the fifteenth *dubium*, in Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek 340, f. 34vb, a marginal note contains an explicit quotation from question 2 of Eltville's book 4. Eltville himself ends his question on baptism with a list of thirteen *casus* presenting *discordia inter theologos et iuristas* about the efficacy of this sacrament. As with the others, the Cistercian's final *casus* is taken from the first question of Robert Holcot's book 4, inserted in Klosterneuburg 340 on the bottom of f. 34v. It is a medieval case of alien abduction.

According to the *casus*, which our theologians present irrespective of truth or falsity, little old ladies allege that non-human spirits abduct babies and replace them with inferior infants. The theological worry is not about witches or UFOs, but whether the new babies should be baptized. Attributing the example to Eltville, Pirchenwart seems to be unaware that Holcot is the Cistercian's source. At the same time, this fragment from Eltville, added to Klosterneuburg 340 and then incorporated within the text in Göttweig, Klosterbibliothek 261 (272), is missing in Vat. lat. 1120, which shows how Pirchenwart's commentary on book 4 was a work in progress. Eltville seems to be an inspiring source in Pirchenwart's progression.

ROBERTUS HOLCOT, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 1, ed. Paris 1515, f. 372b	IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 2, Bruges 181, f. 212rb	PETRUS PIRCHENWART, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 5, Göttweig 261 (272), f. 62va
Decimoquinto, pono casum iuxta narrationes mulierum, sive dicant verum, sive falsum. Narrant enim quod quidam spiritus quandoque pueros earum auferunt, et alios deteriores loco eorum reponunt. Isto casu posito, queritur: nunquid puer talis debeat rebaptizari, an non? Quod sic, quia forte est unus puer ablati aliunde de alia patria, et dubium est an sit baptizatus, an non. Unde	Ultimus casus quem pono iuxta dicta vetularum, sive dicunt verum, sive falsum non curo. Dicunt enim quod quidam spiritus aliquando veniunt et auferunt pueros earum aliosque reponunt deteriores in loco eorum. In illo casu queritur utrum talis puer sic loco alterius positus debeat baptizari. Et videtur quod sic, quia forte est unus puer ablati aliunde de alia patria, et dubium est an	Dubium iuxta dicta vetularum, sive dicant verum sive falsum non curo. Narrant enim quod quidam spiritus aliquando adveniunt et auferunt pueros earum et alios deteriores in loco illorum reponunt. Modo queritur in illo casu an puer sic in loco alterius repositus debeat baptizari. Videtur quod sic, quia forte est puer ablati aliunde de aliena patria, et dubium est an sit baptizatus vel non. Et ideo

<p>videtur ibi faciendum secundum consilium illud <i>Extra</i>, De baptismo, capitulo De quibus dubium.</p> <p>Contra: probabile est quod angelus malus assumit effigiem pueri ad tempus, quia tales pueri aliquando mirabiliter disparent, et faciunt quedam non naturalia hominibus. Unde videtur mihi quod baptizari debet sub conditione duplici sic: 'si non es baptizatus et capax sis baptizmi, ego te baptizo' etc.</p>	<p>sit baptizatus, vel non. Et ideo videtur ibi faciendum secundum consilium <i>Extra</i>, De baptismo et eius effectu etc.</p> <p>Sed oppositum videtur, quia angelus malus assumat effigiem pueri ad tempus, quia tales pueri aliquando mirabiliter disparent et faciunt quedam non naturalia hominibus. Videtur mihi quod baptizari debet sub conditione duplici sic: 'si non es baptizatus et capax sis baptisimi, ego te baptizo'.</p>	<p>videtur ibi esse faciendum secundum consilium quod ponitur <i>Extra</i>, De baptismo et eius effectu.</p> <p>Sed oppositum videtur, quia probabile est quod angelus malus assumat effigiem pueri ad tempus, quia tales pueri aliquando mirabiliter disparent et faciunt quedam non naturalia hominibus. Respondet Iacobus de Altavilla quod debet baptizari sub duplici condicione sic: 'si tu non es baptizatus et es capax baptismi, ego te baptizo' etc.</p>
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The the development of Pirchenwart's text is also visible in his presentation of the sacrament of the eucharist. Question 11 is divided into three articles, the second one *de modo mutationis quam fit in consecratione*, or how the accidents of the bread and wine remain or not in the body of Christ. Here Klosterneuburg 340 adds two *marginalia* containing passages from Eltville, and for the first and only time Pirchenwart gives precise information about their provenance. First, f. 60r: *Notandum quod Iacobus de Alta villa dicit in corollario ultimo conclusionis secunde questionis unice...* This fragment is again incorporated into the text in Göttweig 261 (272), f. 97rb, and is also missing in Vat. lat. 1120. Second, f. 60v: *tenetur a Jacobo predicto in solutione rationis secunde facte contra corollarium tertium conclusionis secunde questionis prime illius quarti*. In the last Appendix we present some photographs showing how the *marginalia* in Klosterneuburg 340 were incorporated into Göttweig 261 (272).

Pirchenwart's question 11 is interesting in that, when he presents the sacrament of the eucharist as the transubstantiation or transformation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ during the celebration, he denounces a dangerous doctrine disseminated in a small *tractatus* entitled *De corpore Christi*, written by a Bohemian master, Stanislaus of Znoymo, who is of the opinion (without assertion) that, via the consecration, the bread and wine do not lose their substance, but somehow join with Christ in such a way that their and His substances both remain.²² This is Wycliff's doctrine of remanence from his treatise *De eucharistia*, which is actually Stanislaus' main source of inspiration, as Jan Hus confirms.²³ Pirchenwart condemns Stanislaus' position as heretical, but what concerns us here about their confrontation is that Pirchenwart uses James of Eltville against Stanislaus regarding the

²² PETRUS DE PINCHERWART, *Sent. IV*, ms. BAV, Vat. lat. 1120, f. 53va: *Unde quidam magister theologie nomine Schanyslaus de Bohemia quendam tractatum Prage suscripsit, quem tractatum De corpore Christi intitulavit, in quo dicit sine tamen assertionem quod panis per sanctificationem et quandam mirabilem non tamen suppositalem unionem ad corpus Christi fit corpus Christi et econverso corpus Christi fit panis, et cum hoc quod propria substantialitate naturali iste panis sit aliud a corpore Christi quo ad ipsius corporis propriam substantialitatem, quia dicit: 'Panis est aliqua propria substantia naturalis et suppositum proprium aliud quam sit corpus Christi,' et huius sanctificationem panis et admirabilem unionem ipsius ad corpus Christi vocat transubstantionem panis in corpus*. Fragment of Stanislaus treatise are edited by J. SEDLAK, "Mfri Stanislai de Znoyma Tractatus primus de Eucharistia", in *Miscellanea husitica Ioannis Sedlak*, Praha 1996, pp. 100-120.

²³ Cf. J. LOSERTH, *Wyclif: De Eucharistia tractatus maior*, London 1892, pp. 46-47, n. 1: *Documenta mag. Joannis Hus*, p. 56: *Vos scitis quomodo Palecz loquebatur prius in domo vestra. Et scio certitudinaliter quod Stanislaus tenuit et in scripto sententialiter scripsit 'de remanencia panis'; et a me quesivit antequam disturbium incepit, si velle idem sensum tenere. Ecce postea iuravit et abiuravit... dixit per iuramentum quod tractatum illum non perfecit*.

interpretation of the *Confessio Berengarii*.²⁴ As in the case of the first quotation, this one does not follow Eltville's commentary verbatim, but it is certain that Pirchenwart is ignorant of the fact that Eltville's position is just copy-pasted from Thomas of Strasbourg's solution, as Paul Bakker has shown:²⁵

THOMAS DE ARGENTINA, <i>Sent. IV</i> , d. 10, q. 2, a. 1, ed Venice 1564	IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>Sent. IV</i> , q. 4, Besançon 198, f. 263ra-b	PETRUS PIRCHENWART, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 11, VAT, Vat. lat. 1120, f. 54vb
/89rb/ Patet enim <i>De consecratione</i> , dist. 2, 'Ego Berengarius', ubi Berengarius de ista opinione errorem suum publice confitetur coram papa Nicolao et aliis 11 episcopis. Etiam contra istius erroris palliationem qua dicitur Christum locutum fuisse figuraliter cum dixit 'hoc est corpus meum', est beatus Augustinus 83 <i>Questionibus</i> , ubi ait: 'universaliter intellectus verborum Christi, an loquitur figurative an non, colligi potest ex precedentibus et consequentibus ibidem, vel ex aliis locis scripture'. Unde cum Christus ait 'ego sum vitis vera' subiunxit: 'et vos palmites'; constat autem quod discipuli non erant palmites naturales, sed tantum figuraliter. Sed cum dicit 'hoc est corpus meum' subdit: 'quod pro vobis tradetur'; cum etiam dixisset 'hic est calix sanguinis mei' subdit: 'qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur'; sed planum est quod Christus suum verum et naturale corpus tradidit pro nobis, et suum naturalem sanguinem effundit pro nobis; ergo	Patet ex prima parte conclusionis. /263rb/ Etiam patet illud <i>De consecratione</i> , dist. 2, 'Ego Berengarius', ubi Berengarius, qui tenuit oppositum correlarii, errorem suum coram Nicolao papa et multis aliis episcopis publice confitetur. Ex quo patet quod periculose erraverunt dicentes istam propositionem, <quam> Christus dicebat; 'hoc est corpus meum', solum fuisse veram significative sicut etiam ista: 'ego sum vitis vera', vel figurative, sicut ista: 'petra enim erat Christus', quia hoc Berengarius in forma revocavit dicens: 'bene possum scire quod iste locutiones fuerunt figurative vel significative, et ista non: 'hoc est corpus meum'.' Dico quod ad hoc sciendum habemus regulam a beato Augustino 83 <i>Questionum</i> <q.> 69, ubi dicit: 'universaliter intellectus verborum Christi, an loquebatur figurative, an non, colligi potest ex precedentibus et sequentibus ibidem, vel ex aliis locis scripture'. Unde cum Christus ait 'ego sum vitis vera', subiunxit: 'et vos palmites'; constat autem quod discipuli non erant palmites naturales, sed solum figuraliter. Sed cum dixit 'hoc est corpus meum', sub<d>it: 'quod pro vobis tradetur'; cum etiam dicit 'hic est calix sanguinis mei' <subdit>: 'qui pro vobis et multis effundetur'; sed planum est quod corpus suum Christus universaliter pro nobis tradidit, et sanguinem verum suum	Idem etiam Bartholomeus glosator Decreti hortatur quemlibet legentem ut iuxta illum intellectum sane intelligat verba Berengarii ne incidat in maiorem heresim quam ipse Berengarius, quia sine dubio enormis esset error credere quod corpus Christi realiter divideretur. Et ideo bene mirandum est, ut dicit Iacobus de Altavilla, quod papa Nicolaus cum centum et 12 episcopis istam confessionem Berengarii recepit sine maiori declaratione veritatis. Sed forte Ecclesia confessionem eius sub planis verbis, apertis, et captabilibus ab omnibus recepit propter infamiam sui erroris quam apud omnes publice incurreretur, ut apparet omnibus ipsum hoc revocasse quod dixerat verum corpus Christi non esse in altari neque sumi sed solum panem. Quare non oportet verba sue confessionis tam stricte intelligi ut sonant in superficie, quia hoc esset in maioris heresim ruere, ut pertactum est. Sed contra hanc solutionem arguit Sthanislaus prenominatus, dicens quod videatur nimis difficile vel quasi impossibile efficaciter defendere quod non remaneat panis in sacramento altaris,

²⁴ For the relation between Pirchenwart, Eltville and Stanislaus see: M. BRINZEI, "The Reception of Stanislaus of Znojmo at the University of Vienna", in *Wycliffism and Hussitism: Contexts, Methods, Perspectives*, ed. K. GHOSH, P. SOUKUP, M. BOSE, E. SOLOPOVA, Turnhout (forthcoming).

²⁵ See P.J.J.M. BAKKER, C. SCHABEL, "Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century," in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, ed. G.R. EVANS, Leiden 2002, pp. 425-464, at pp. 455-456.

licet figuraliter loqueretur cum dixit ‘ego sum vitis vera’, tamen non loquebatur figuraliter, sed realiter, cum dicit ‘hoc est corpus meum’.	naturalem effundit pro nobis; ideo, licet figuraliter loqueretur cum dixit: ‘ego sum vitis vera’, tamen non sic loquebatur, sed realiter, cum dixit: ‘hoc est corpus meum’.	cum dicat Apostolus 1 Cor. 10: <i>panis quem frangimus nonne participatio corporis Domini est?</i>
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The fourth explicit reference to Eltville is in question 37, corresponding to distinction 31 from Lombard’s *Sentences*, on the sacrament of marriage as a contract for the *bonum prolis* or the ‘good of the offspring’²⁶, where Pirchenwart again introduces the Cistercian master as an authority. This reference is particularly significant for our investigation, since it helps us better understand the material reception of Eltville in Vienna. In book 4 of Eltville’s commentary on the *Sentences*, what we call the ‘German family’ of manuscripts preserves only six questions, not nine, unlike the rest of the manuscript tradition for this text²⁷. Below in Appendix 1, we present a complete table of questions and the content of each manuscript for book 4. The *tabula* clearly shows that the ‘German family’ omits the last three questions and among them question 8 on marriage: *Circa distinctionem 26am usque ad 43am exclusive quero utrum matrimonii sacramentum per mutui consensus expressionem contractu sit aliququaliter dissolubile*. The manuscripts from Vienna, those connected to the Viennese milieu, and those from Basel also omit this question. This is an interesting detail, since Pirchenwart’s reference is extracted exactly from this question. We can thus conclude that the complete version of Eltville’s book 4, will all nine questions, was known in Vienna. The following chart shows how closely and accurately Pirchenwart quotes Eltville on the subject of marriage:

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 8, Bruges 181, f. 239va-b	PETRUS PIRCHENWART, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 37, BAV, Vat. lat. 1120, f. 157rb
Quinta quod inter bona matrimonii bonum sacramentii est /239vb/ dignius, sed loquendo de essentialibus matrimonii, sicut est quidam contractus, bonum prolis se habet tanquam finis respectu boni fidei et non alia essentialia matrimonio ut sic, ergo.	Aliud corollarium quem ponit Jacobus de Alta Villa, quod ‘inter bona matrimonii bonum sacramenti est dignius, sed loquendo de essentialibus matrimonio secundum quod est quidam contractus bonum prolis’ secundum obligationem est principalis.

The last explicit quotation from Eltville confirms that, despite the lack of complete surviving manuscripts in the region, his final questions on book 4 did circulate in Vienna. Pirchenwart returns to our Cistercian in question 59 when, dealing with the subject of distinction 49, Pirchenwart discusses the nature of the human body after death, with special attention to the nature of the bodies of saints after their resurrection. After presenting four articles, he introduces a *conclusio responsalis* proposing a final solution on this issue. At one point he names Eltville:

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 9, Bruges 181, f. 245ra-va	PETRUS PIRCHENWART, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 59, BAV, Vat. lat. 1120, ff. 208vb-209ra
Tertia conclusio principalis: corpus glorificatum perfecte subicietur anime dotibus. Probatum sic:	Ex omnibus illis 4 articulis sequitur conclusio responsalis ad quesitum ista: beata corpora erunt

²⁶ A new analysis of the marriage sacrament and an explanation of *bonum prolis* and *bonum sacramenti* is proposed by P. REYNOLD, *How Marriage Became One of the Sacraments*, Cambridge 2016, pp. 120-133 and 134-151.

²⁷ This detail undermines the hypothesis that, while visiting Eberbach, Langenstein helped Eltville finish the publication of the commentary, which was then transmitted to France as an official version (see Courtenay in this volume for the hypothesis). The manuscripts associated with Langenstein are all incomplete and could not have been the source for the complete tradition.

<p>corpus cuiuslibet beati post resurrectionem vel in resurrectione habebit 4 dotes, quibus mediantibus anima perfecte dominabitur sui, ergo consequentia vera. (...) /245rb/</p>	<p>4 dotibus gloriosa. Probatur: cuiuslibet beati corpus post resurrectionem vel in resurrectione habebit 4 dotes, quibus mediantibus anima perfecte dominabitur sui, igitur conclusio vera. (... idem)</p>
<p>Ex ista conclusione sequitur primo quod licet corpora sanctorum sint impassibilia a ledentibus, tamen sunt et erunt passibilia a perficientibus. Patet ex dictis.</p>	<p>Ex illa conclusione infert Iacobus de Alta Villa primo quod licet corpora sanctorum sint impassibilia a ledentibus, tamen sunt et erunt passibilia a perficientibus. Patet ex dictis.</p>
<p>Secundo sequitur quod sicut in statu innocentie fuit, sic in statu glorie erit impassibilitas corporum, sed non per aliquam formam inherentem. Quod in statu glorie erit impassibilitas patet ex dictis...</p>	<p>Secundo sequitur quod sicut in statu innocentie fuit sic in statu glorie erit impassibilitas corporum, sed non per aliquam formam inherentem. Quod in statu glorie erit impassibilitas patet ex dictis...</p>
<p>Tertio sequitur quod sicut et passibilitas a convenientibus augetur in beatis usque ad capacitatis repletionem, sic in dampnatis respectu nocivorum periret nisi /245va/ a Deo conservaretur...</p>	<p>Tertio sequitur quod sicut et passibilitas a convenientibus augetur in beatis usque ad capacitatis repletionem, sic augetur in dampnatis respectu nocivorum, quia periret nisi a Deo conservaretur...</p>

It is clear that Pirchenwart does not restrict himself to Eltville's name, but he actually reproduces the entirety of conclusion 3 of Eltville's question 9 *verbatim*, which in Bruges 181, ff. 245ra-va, amounts to almost two columns of text²⁸. So Eltville's entire conclusion falls *sous la plume* of Pirchenwart in his *conclusio responsalis*, an indication of the high regard the Viennese theologian had for the Parisian master. Finally, Pirchenwart shows that Eltville's final question 9, omitted in the German family of manuscripts, circulated in Vienna and was used for lectures on the *Sentences*. (See the first appendix for the *tabula quaestionum* of Eltville's book 4.)

From the above analysis of the explicit references to James of Eltville in Pirchenwart's *Sentences* commentary on book 4, we can infer that these citations are just the tip of the iceberg, since much of the text is actually a reproduction of Eltville's commentary. Moreover, the citations follow the sequence of Eltville's text, which is employed as authoritative in connection with the most important aspects of sacraments theology: the nature of the sacraments, baptism, the eucharist, and marriage, and Eltville's role continues in the discussion of the resurrection. The Cistercian's conception of the sacraments was developed from some of the same sources he had employed in book 1, for example, the Augustinian Thomas of Strasbourg, who seems to be one of Eltville's permanent sources. Since Pirchenwart quotes Thomas of Strasbourg and Robert Holcot in other contexts, he does not recognize when Eltville copies from them, further indicating that Eltville was considered an important authority on the eucharist and baptism.

Of course, the Carmelite Andrew Seehausen's incorporation of Eltville's book 4 into his own commentary is even more striking evidence that Eltville's text was the basis for teaching the sacraments at Vienna. It is thus no surprise that the case of Thomas of Ebendorfer also demonstrates the strength and longevity of Eltville's legacy in Vienna.

Thomas Ebendorfer

²⁸ This is the last question of Eltville's book 4 and it is composed of three conclusions, as follows: Bruges 181, f. 243ra: *Prima conclusio est ista: possibilis omnium hominum mortuorum resuscitatio fiet infallibiliter miraculose et subito.* (...) f. 244ra: *Secunda conclusio: licet in nullo homine resurget aliquid quod fuerit de veritate eius corporis, tamen idem que prius erant resuscitabuntur quantitate inequali.* (...) f. 245ra: *Tertia conclusio principalis: corpus glorificatum perfecte subicietur anime dotibus.*

Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach (1388–1464) was one of the most important professors active in the Viennese Faculty of Theology, where he became professor in theology in 1428, having lectured on the *Sentences* in 1420–1421.²⁹ Like his famous predecessors Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and Peter Czech of Pulkau, both of whom were involved to some degree in the political and social events of their day, Ebendorfer's fame did not derive solely from his chair in theology,³⁰ but the German secular did enjoy a scholarly reputation at the University of Vienna.

Ebendorfer's *Sentences* commentary exhibits both elements of the traditional Viennese 'Group Commentary' and what might be seen as a personal effort to detach himself from the same tradition. Within this tension, James of Eltville plays an extremely important role. In what follows, we will argue that the Cistercian represents a vehicle through which Ebendorfer departs from the common Viennese mode of commenting on the *Sentences*, such that the Cistercian's text stimulates Ebendorfer to reach new conclusions. The more general issue of Eltville's reception in Ebendorfer's various redactions of his *Sentences* commentary will be approached via a list of the major themes on which Eltville's authority had an impact at Vienna and by zooming in on some of the most relevant cases. This survey is based on a complete reading of the following autograph texts attributed to Ebendorfer containing material related to his *Sentences* commentary:

Ebendorfer's <i>supplementa</i> ³¹	Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 170r-196v (book I) Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 203r-223v (book IV) Wien, ÖNB 4393, ff. 9v-44r (book II) Wien, ÖNB 4590, ff. 8v-22v (book III)
Ebendorfer's later commentary on book I	Wien, ÖNB 4387, ff. 3v-319r (book I)
Ebendorfer's marginal annotations to his personal copy of Horaw's commentary on book I	Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 21r-163v (book I)

The first approach involves a thorough investigation of Ebendorfer's implicit sources from his Prologue to his later commentary, while the second approach is based on a statistical analysis of Ebendorfer's explicit citations appearing in his *Sentences* commentaries

²⁹ For more details on his education at the University of Vienna, see the registers of the Faculty of Arts: *Acta facultatis artium universitatis Vindobonensis, 1385-1416*, ed. P. UIBLEIN (Publikationen des Institut für Österreichischen Geschichtsforschung, 6,) vol. 2, Wien 1968 and of the Faculty of Theology: *Die Akten der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Wien (1396-1508)*, ed. P. UIBLEIN (Verband der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs), vol 1, Wien 1978. See also COURTENAY, "From Dinkelsbühl's *Questiones Communes* to the Vienna Group Commentary", pp. 267-315.

³⁰ The two theologians, who were Ebendorfer's masters, had previously participated at the Council of Constance (1414-1418) and Ebendorfer carried on the conciliarist tradition by participating at the Council of Basel in 1432-1434. In 1433 he was also sent to the Council of Prague. For a brief overview of Ebendorfer's intellectual profile and his *Sentences* commentary, see I. CURUȚ, "Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach", in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. H. LAGERLUND and J. MARENBOON, Dordrecht-Heidelberg (forthcoming). A survey of all of Ebendorfer's roles throughout his life – as a diplomat, historian, rector of the University of Vienna, or preacher in the parishes of Perchtoldsdorf and Falkenstein – exceeds the scope of this article, but see the monograph devoted to Ebendorfer in A. LHOTSKY, *Thomas Ebendorfer. Ein österreichischer Geschichtsschreiber, Theologe und Diplomat des 15. Jahrhunderts* (Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 15), Stuttgart 1957.

³¹ Ebendorfer's additions on the four books of the *Sentences* are supplementary questions composed and grouped together by Ebendorfer under the name *complementum* or *supplimentum*, which he added in autograph to his copies of Georg Wetzels own *Sentences* commentary, probably before starting to compose his more mature commentary found in Wien, ÖNB 4387, ff. 3v-319r for book 1 and ff. 332r-415v for book 2 (the *terminus ante quem* for this later commentary is 1427). The supplements and his *marginalia* to Horaw's commentary on book I should be considered part of Ebendorfer's commentary while being a bachelor reading the *Sentences*. On the dating of and relationship between these texts, see I. CURUȚ, "The *Sentences* Commentary of Thomas Ebendorfer: Manuscripts and Question Lists" (forthcoming).

mentioned above, which are dispersed in several autograph manuscripts. Although the limits of this publication do not allow us to be exhaustive, we will be able to grasp Eltville's influence on Ebendorfer in both a qualitative and a quantitative manner. In our analysis, as far as possible, we will quote Eltville's text from the two (incomplete) manuscripts that were actually in Vienna, Wien, ÖNB 4371, and Basel, Universitätsbibliothek A.X.40 (tacitly corrected with Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 2^o 118), although turns out that neither of these witnesses is related to Ebendorfer's model.

First, in order to reveal James of Eltville's tacit impact on Thomas Ebendorfer, this survey will explore the secular theologian's Prologue from his autograph manuscript Wien, ÖNB 4387, ff. 3v-23r. Following the methodology of creating a diplomatic edition in order to showcase the meaningful variations within Viennese texts that are usually grouped together under the label 'Vienna Group Commentary', Curuț has published an edition of the second question from several Prologues composed between ca. 1398–1425, dealing with the specific problem of whether theology is speculative or practical in nature and the issue of the subject of theology, in the following Viennese authors: Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, John Berward of Villingen, Peter of Pulkau, George Wetzels of Horaw, Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach, John Angerer of Müldorf, and Andrew of Waytra.³² With regard to Ebendorfer, the edition only included Ebendorfer's marginal annotations to Horaw's version in Wien, ÖNB 4369, since Ebendorfer's treatment of the same topic from his own Prologue in Wien, ÖNB 4387, ff. 21r-23r, does not coincide with the text of the diplomatic edition. Instead, Ebendorfer went in a different direction in redacting his own version of a *Sentences* commentary, which was completed in 1427.

Thus, the autograph manuscript Wien, ÖNB 4387, containing a later version of Ebendorfer's *Sentences* commentary, bears witness to his mature development on traditional questions from the *Sentences*.³³ The Prologue is much longer than those of the Viennese theologians writing before him and has a more complex structure, containing three large questions.³⁴ The focus of the discussion here is on the last question, which is in turn divided into four articles, the first dealing with the subject of theology (*subiectum theologie*), the second with theology's principles, the third with the question itself (*de quesito*), and the fourth with the nature of theology (whether it is speculative or practical).

In the first article of his third question (ff. 12r-14v), asking "Whether in theology knowledge acquired by way of theological discourse is science proper", Ebendorfer begins by reprising some passages from his copy of Horaw's Prologue to the commentary on the *Sentences*.³⁵ In addition to this verbatim borrowing, we find some very similar arguments that

³² See Appendix IV in CURUȚ, "Viennese University Theologians on Practical Theology", pp. 125-149. For other diplomatic editions of questions from Viennese *Sentences* commentaries, see above footnote XXX.

³³ See the colophon in Wien, ÖNB 4387, f. 319r. M. BRÎNZEI and C. SCHABEL, "The Past, Present, and Future of Late-Medieval Theology", p. 212, have already drawn attention to the fact that Ebendorfer's own commentary on book 1 of the *Sentences* is to be identified with the text in Wien, ÖNB 4387 rather than with the commentary found in Wien, ÖNB 4369, which is merely Ebendorfer's copy of Wien, ÖNB 4820 (containing Georg Wetzels of Horaw's commentary on book 1), but without discussing Ebendorfer's earlier redactions, i.e., his supplements, found in other manuscripts. For an extensive analysis of Ebendorfer's earlier supplementary questions and their relationship with the text in Wien, ÖNB 4387, see I. CURUȚ, "The *Sentences* Commentary of Thomas Ebendorfer (forthcoming).

³⁴ In the first question, Ebendorfer asks *utrum preter disciplinas philosophorum fuerit ad salutem necessariam homini aliquam scientiam supernaturaliter inspirari* (ff. 3v-5r); in the second, *utrum cognitio supernaturalis viatori ad salutem necessaria sit sufficienter tradita in Sacra Scriptura* (ff. 5v-11v); in the third, *utrum notitia in theologia per discursum theologicum acquisita sit proprie scientifica* (ff. 12r-23r).

³⁵ On question 1 of a later Viennese Prologue asking *utrum per discursum theologicum acquiratur scientia proprie dicta*, see M. Brînzei's edition of Andreas of Waytra (who read the *Sentences* in 1423-1425, building much on Dinkelsbühl's text) in M. BRÎNZEI, C. SCHABEL, "Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the University of Vienna

do not appear in other Viennese prologues, but seem to have been taken by Ebendorfer directly from Eltville's own Prologue, without explicitly citing the Cistercian.

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prolog., q. 1, Wien, ÖNB 4371, f. 104ra-b.	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prolog., q. 3, Wien, ÖNB 4387, f. 12r.
<p>Primo quod non: illa non est scientifica proprie que non causatur ex principiis per se <notis>; theologia est huiusmodi, igitur. Maior nota.³⁶ Minor probatur, quia theologia vel processus theologicus incipit a creditis, iuxta illud: <i>nisi credideritis, non intelligetis</i>.</p> <p>Oppositum arguitur: illa notitia est scientifica que scientificè argumentis infidelium /104rb/ respondetur sive fides non implicare ostenditur; talis est processus theologicus. Aliter enim esset frustra theologia et studium per istam, cum per illam non posset plus periti in ista articulos fidei sustinere contra infideles quam una antiqua vetula.³⁷ Maior nota: sicut scire est arguere ad conclusiones probandas, ita per eam est respondere ad omne dubium motum contra istam.</p>	<p>Quarto: illa notitia non est scientifica que non causatur ex principiis per se notis; sed theologia est huiusmodi; igitur. Maior patet 1 <i>Posteriorum</i>. Minor patet, quia <theologia> [processus] vel processus theologicus incipit a fide creditis, que non videntur, igitur.</p> <p>Oppositum probatur. Arguitur per Augustinum, 14 <i>De Trinitate</i>. Item, alias frustra studeremus in ea, si non esset scientifica.</p>

Further into his text, after the *divisio questionis*, Ebendorfer formulates three *notanda*, the first on theology in general, another on theological discourse, and the third on the subject of theology. Within the first *notandum* we already find an implicit borrowing from Eltville's text, in which the Cistercian makes a distinction between two types of theology:³⁸

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prolog., q. 1, Wien, ÖNB 4371, f. 104va.	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prolog., q. 3, Wien, ÖNB 4387, f. 12r.
<p>Ad secundam dico: licet theologia multipliciter capiatur, tamen ad presens potest dupliciter capi: uno modo pro theologia positiva vel narrativa, alio modo pro ratiocinativa vel defensiva. Prima est fidelium qui sciunt textum Bible legere et superficialiter intelligere et etiam populo exponere, et de hac non est ad propositum. Alia est que acquiritur ex studio librorum canonis et doctorum cooperantibus aliis artibus et scientiis precognitis.</p>	<p>Nec mirum, quia theologia isto modo non est scientia, sicut nec logica usualis etiam vocatur theologia narrativa vel positiva, et etiam convenit fidelibus scientibus textum Bible legere et intelligere, et de ista non querit questio.</p>

on the Eve of the Reformation", in *What is New in the New Universities? Learning in Central Europe in Later Middle Ages (1348-1500)*, ed. E. JUNG (forthcoming). For Horaw, see above [n. 30](#).

³⁶ Only one manuscript of Eltville's commentary, ms. Basel, Universitätsbibliothek A.X.40, f. 109r, also has the reference to Aristotle (*per Aristotelem I Posteriorum*), which also appears in Ebendorfer's text but not in other witnesses of Eltville's text.

³⁷ Again, Eltville's text from the Basel manuscript contains an addition after *vetula*, in which we find the same reference to Augustine as in Ebendorfer's text, which is not to be found in other witnesses of the Cistercian's text: *quod est inconueniens, sicut patet per experientiam. Propter quod dicit Augustinus 14 De Trinitate, capitulo primo: huic scientie tribuo illud tamen modo quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur* (Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, A.X.40, f. 109r)

³⁸ This section of Ebendorfer's text is mainly based on ms. Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 15v-16r, containing Ebendorfer's copy of Horaw's *Sentences* commentary to book 1, which is found in Wien, ÖNB 4820, ff. 9v-135v.

Moreover, in the central part of the question, Ebendorfer's first conclusion is basically the same as Eltville's. Both theologians hold that the subject of theology is God as considered absolutely. There is, however, one notable difference, consisting in Ebendorfer's characterization of the same conclusion added immediately after the formulation of the conclusion:

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prol., q. 1, concl. 2, Wien, ÖNB 4371, f. 103ra.	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prol., q. 3, concl. 1, Wien, ÖNB 4387, f. 13v.
Secunda conclusio: quod habitus theologicus, qualiscumque sit ille, qui est respectu veri theologici, habet pro subiecto immediate et primo ipsum Deum absolute et non sub ratione speciali consideratum.	Quibus premissis sit conclusio prima ista: quilibet habitus theologicus qui est respectu veri theologici, immo et tota theologia, habet pro subiecto immediato et primo ipsum Deum absolute et non sub ratione speciali consideratum. Illa conclusio est de intentione Sancti Thome prima parte Summe, circa principium, Petri de Tarantasia et Scoti, in scriptis primi.

With regard to the attribution of the conclusion, Ebendorfer states that is the intent of three famous theologians, whom he probably sees as the *antiqui doctores*:³⁹ Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise, and John Duns Scotus. How can one account for this method of composing a text? The practice is not confined to Ebendorfer himself, nor to the Viennese *Sentences* commentaries, but to many commentaries on the *Sentences* produced in the Middle Ages. Ebendorfer's mode of presenting the thesis and its treatment seems rather peculiar, however, especially due to his attribution of the conclusion. Indeed, such a favorable approach to the *antiqui* might be seen as an echo of the path initiated at the very start of the fifteenth century with Jean Gerson's view on theological education, recommending that students in theology rely more on the authority of the *antiqui* (mainly thirteenth-century theologians) than on the *moderni* (referring generally to masters active in the fourteenth century).⁴⁰

The irony in Ebendorfer's text, however, is that, in spite of his explicit attribution of the conclusion to the *antiqui doctores*, his treatment is in fact based *verbatim* on a theologian who, in his eyes, was probably a *modernus*: James of Eltville.⁴¹ This is the case not only for the conclusion but also for all the following arguments in support of the thesis, two corollaries, the first three objections to the conclusion⁴², as well as the solutions to the respective counter-arguments. And despite his massive reliance on Eltville (about an entire folio⁴³), the reader is left with no mention at all of the Cistercian within Ebendorfer's discussion. The secular prefers, as we have seen, to ascribe the conclusion specifically to some older authorities, instead of naming his real, immediate, and singular source.

In advancing the position that God is the subject of theology *sub ratione absoluta* and not in a limited respect, as he stated in the first conclusion, Ebendorfer breaks from the

³⁹ There are other instances in Ebendorfer's commentary where he explicitly calls Peter of Tarantaise an *antiquus*: *Et ista necessitas vocatur ab antiquis, ut a Petro de Tarantasia et aliis, necessitas immutabilitatis* (THOMAS EBENDORFER, Wien, ÖNB 4369, f. 3v)

⁴⁰ See M. BRÎNZEI, R.L. FRIEDMAN, C. SCHABEL, "The Late-Medieval Reception of Durand's *Sentences* Commentary, with Two Case Studies: Peter Auriol (†1322) and Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl (†1433)", in *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His Sentences Commentary*, ed. A. SPEER, F. RETUCCI, T. JESCHKE, G. GULDENTOPS (RTPM Bibliotheca, 9), Leuven 2014, pp. 295-341, here p. 321.

⁴¹ W.J. COURTENAY, "Antiqui and Moderni in Late Medieval Thought", in *Ancients and Moderns: A Symposium, Journal of the History of Ideas* 48 (1987), pp. 3-10.

⁴² Ebendorfer's fourth objection is borrowed from Gregory of Rimini.

⁴³ THOMAS EBENDORFER, Wien, ÖNB 4387, ff. 13v-14r.

common Viennese view on the issue of the subject of theology, according to which God is the subject of theology as glorifier (*glorificator*), an opinion that goes back to Giles of Rome.⁴⁴ In doing so, Ebendorfer prefers Eltville's position to that of Gregory of Rimini, who was one of the leading authorities at Vienna, starting even before Dinkesbühl's own commentary on the *Sentences*. But this change of perspective is already anticipated by Ebendorfer in his *marginalia* to his copy of Horaw's prologue (q. 2), where he exposed his early impressions on the issue, claiming that Rimini's arguments are insufficient for proving why the subject of theology could not actually be God *sub absoluta ratione*.⁴⁵

Even if much of Ebendorfer's text dealing with the first conclusion is copied from Eltville, their views, as we shall see, are not strictly identical. In the *responsio* section, answering the first objection, Ebendorfer borrows from Eltville a threefold division of the manner in which God – as considered absolutely – can be the subject of theology. As far as we can tell, Eltville's source is the Dominican James of Metz, who read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1300–1301, although Eltville only loosely paraphrases and summarizes Metz here, unlike the verbatim copying we find elsewhere.⁴⁶

IACOBUS METENSIS, <i>In I Sent. (Redactio secunda)</i> , prol., q. 2, art. 2, ed. cit., pp. 60.54-61.85.	IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prol., q. 1, concl. 2, Wien, ÖNB 4371, f. 103va-b.	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>In I Sent.</i> , prol., q. 3, concl. 1, Wien, ÖNB 4387, f. 14r.
Propter quod notandum quod hoc quod dicitur: 'Deus absolute est subiectum in theologia vel subiectum theologie' potest tripliciter intelligi. Primo quod Deus secundum omnem rationem qua est cognoscibilis sit hic subiectum, ita quod formale obiectum huius scientie sit quoddam aggregatum ex rationibus divinis, ita quod quelibet ratio	Aliter tamen potest dici quod hoc quod est 'absolute' potest tripliciter capi seu intelligi. Uno modo sic: absolute, id est secundum omnem rationem, et sic Deum esse subiectum in theologia sub ratione absoluta non est aliud nisi quod Deus secundum omnem rationem qua cognoscibilis est sit subiectum,	Aliter tamen potest dici quod ly 'absolute' capitur tripliciter. Uno modo sic: absolute, id est secundum omnem rationem, et sic Deum esse subiectum sub ratione absoluta non est aliud nisi quod Deus secundum omnem rationem qua cognoscibilis est sit subiectum,

⁴⁴ For Giles of Rome, see EGIDUS ROMANUS, *Quodlibet* III, q. 2, in *Quodlibeta*, Louvain 1646, f. 129a: *Et quia hec scientia est organum ad beatitudinem sive ad felicitatem: quidquid considerat de Deo, considerat sub hac ratione, et sub hac ratione, ut est glorificator, et beatificator noster*; for Rimini, see GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, prol., q. 4, ed. D. TRAPP, V. MARCOLINO, M. SANTOS-NOYA, (Spätmittelalter und Reformation 6), vol. 1, Berlin 1981, p. 138, ll. 2-4. For a diplomatic edition and analysis of the Viennese discussions on the subject of theology, see CURUȚ, "Viennese University Theologians on Practical Theology", pp. 119-121, and Appendix IV.

⁴⁵ See §25 in our diplomatic edition of *Questiones communes*, I Sent., Prol., q. 2 (*Utrum theologia sit practica vel speculativa*, edited in CURUȚ, "Viennese University Theologians on Practical Theology", Appendix IV, p. 127, ll. 20-23: *Sed rationes iste solum probant ut apparet contracte. Forte etiam argumentum Gregorii non probat quin sub absoluta ratione ibi sit subiectum*. The second question of Ebendorfer's copy of Horaw's Prologue is found in Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 12r-21r.

⁴⁶ The redactions of James of Metz's Prologue to his *Sentences* commentary have been edited in MIKOŁAJ OLSZEWSKI, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis* (Archa verbi. Subsidia 2), Münster 2010, pp. 21-81. For the dating of the redactions, see C. SCHABEL, "James of Metz's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*," in *Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought. A Tribute to Kent Emery, Jr.*, ed. A.H. PICH A. SPEER (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 125) Leiden 2018, pp. 342-426. For the connection between both James, Metz and Eltville, in another context, see C. SCHABEL, "Dominican Anti-Thomism. James of Metz's Question on Divine Foreknowledge, with a Rebuttal from the *Correctorium Iacobi Metensis*", in *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 20 (2014), pp. 35-72.

<p>se habeat ad obiectum formale sicut pars integralis secundum nostrum modum intelligendi. Et hoc non potest esse, quia omnis scientia, preter ea que considerat ut partes integrales sui obiecti – sive sint partes secundum rem sive secundum rationem – oportet quod considerat quedam alia, ut passiones vel proprietates probandas de subiecto. [...]</p> <p>Secundo potest intelligi Deus esse subiectum absolute secundum quod Deus, quia non est subiectum secundum aliquam specialem rationem, sed indeterminate secundum hanc vel illam, ita quod formale subiectum theologie sit aliquid commune ad quamlibet perfectionem divinam sicut ad partes subiectivas. Nec hoc potest esse, quia omnis scientia preter partes subiectivas debet habere alia que ut passiones probentur de subiecto. Unde multe proprietates divine non considerantur a theologo ut partes subiective sui subiecti, sed ut proprietates de subiecto probande.</p> <p>Tertio potest intelligi quod Deus sit absolute subiectum ut hoc quod dicitur absolute sumatur secundum absolutionem substantie ab accidente, ita quod Deum accipiamus pro substantia, alia vero quasi pro accidentibus consequentibus, sicut attributa; ita quod sit sensus quod subiectum theologie sit Deus non secundum aliquam determinatam rationem attributalem que secundum nostrum modum intelligendi se habet ad Deum ut accidens, sed secundum quod Deus, id est, secundum rationem substantie divine que omnium istorum est fundamentum, sicut substantia est fundamentum omnium suarum proprietatum. Et sic credo quod Deus ut Deus</p>	<p>ita quod formale obiectum sit aggregatum ex rationibus omnibus divinis, et quelibet se habet ad obiectum sicut pars integralis ad suum totum, quoad nostrum modum intelligendi. Et sic non intelligo conclusionem, nec rationes probantes vadunt ad illum sensum.</p> <p>Alio modo intelligitur quod Deus absolute, id est indeterminate et secundum nullum specialem modum, dicitur hoc esse subiectum, ita quod formale obiectum esset quoddam commune ad quamlibet perfectionem divinam, sicut totum universale ad partes subiectivas, ut adhuc tali termino 'absolute' in conclusione.</p> <p>Tertio modo, ut 'absolute' intelligitur secundum absolutionem subiecti ab accidente, sicut Deus se habeat per modum substantie et attributa per modum accidentium, secundum nostrum usum intelligendi. Et sic intelligo conclusionem et etiam ad hoc vadunt rationes, ut patet intuenti.</p> <p>Per hoc ergo dicam ad formam rationis prime, /103vb/ quando dicitur 'sequeretur quod scientia Dei et nostra essent eiusdem speciei', nego consequentiam. Ad probationem, quando dicitur 'Deus sub ratione absoluta deitatis est subiectum scientie sue' capiendo 'absolutum' primo modo, si est</p>	<p>ita quod obiectum formale sit aggregatum ex omnibus rationibus divinis, quarum quelibet se habet ad obiectum, sicut pars integralis ad suum totum, quoad nostrum modum intelligendi. Et sic non intelligo conclusionem, nec probationes ad hoc vadunt.</p> <p>Alio modo 'absolute' intelligitur, id est secundum nullum modum specialem dicendi 'hoc est subiectum', ita quod formale obiectum esset quoddam commune ad quamlibet perfectionem divinam, sicut totum universale ad partes subiectivas, et sic iterum non capitur in conclusione secundum multos.</p> <p>Tertio modo, ut 'absolute' intelligitur secundum absolutionem subiecti ab accidente, sic ut Deus se habeat per modum substantie, et attributa per modum accidentium, secundum nostrum usum intelligendi. Et sic intelligitur conclusio et ad hoc vadunt probationes eiusdem.</p> <p>Ad formam igitur, quando dicitur 'sequitur quod scientia Dei' etc., negatur consequentia. Ad probationem, quando dicitur 'Deus sub absoluta ratione deitatis est subiectum scientie sue et nostre', dico quod capiendo 'absolutum' primo modo, tunc est subiectum scientie sue; sed</p>
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<p>absolute est subiectum theologie.</p>	<p>subiectum scientie <sue; sed sub est subiectum scientie> nostre sub ratione absoluta capiendo 'absolutum' tertio modo. Nec ex hoc sequitur identitas specifica inter scientiam Dei et nostram.</p> <p>Ad secundam, 'in essentialiter ordinatis' etc., concedo maiorem et minorem. Et quando infertur, 'ergo nihil potest esse subiectum in eadem ratione in scientia Dei et nostra', concedo. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod Deus non sit subiectum in theologia sub ratione absoluta capiendo 'absolutum' tertio modo.</p>	<p>capiendo 'absolutum' tertio modo, tunc est subiectum scientie nostre sub absoluta ratione, id est non contracte. Nec ex hoc sequitur identitas specifica inter scientiam Dei et nostram.</p> <p>Ad secundam, 'in essentialiter ordinatis' etc., conceditur maior et minor. Et quando infertur, 'ergo nichil potest esse subiectum eadem ratione in scientia Dei et nostra', concesso isto, tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus non sit subiectum in theologia sub ratione absoluta capiendo 'absolutum' tertio modo.</p> <p>Tamen mihi videtur quod Deus subiectum sit theologie sub absoluta ratione captus capiendo 'absolutum' secundo modo, ut deduci potest ex diffinitione subiecti attributionis.</p>
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If Metz is the source, the transmission of ideas illustrated by the passages in the chart above is rather ironic once again: while Eltville ends up adopting the same point of view as Metz, Ebendorfer ultimately disagrees with Eltville's position, despite much of his text being visibly closer to Eltville than Eltville was to Metz.⁴⁷ More precisely, according to the first way of understanding God as the subject of theology in an absolute sense, which is not adopted by any of the three theologians, God can be considered the subject in terms of a certain aggregate of divine properties (*quoddam aggregatum ex rationibus divinis*). The option accepted by Metz and Eltville is the third way of understanding 'absolute', i.e., understanding God in terms of a substance with all of its accidents removed (*secundum absoluteionem substantie ab accidente*). Contrary to the common stance of both his direct and indirect source, Ebendorfer supports the second way of understanding the term 'absolute', namely God as what is common to all of His attributes.

The difference of perspective lies in the focus of each of the three interpretations: the first manner of taking *absolute* concentrates on the multiplicity of divine properties (here the term *absolute* refers to *all* of the attributes taken together), the third way focuses on the absence of the same attributes (*absolute* meaning that the subject is considered as lacking *all* of its accidents), and the second mode is the only one aimed at the unity of the subject and not at the specificity of its attributes (*absolute* referring to what is common to all of the attributes). In this last sense, Eltville makes an important addition to the discussion in claiming that God is the subject of attribution (*subiectum attributionis*), namely the subject that is common to all divine attributes. In order to see exactly what Ebendorfer understands by the subject of attribution, we should consider the paragraph immediately preceding the first

⁴⁷ Here we recognize a common attitude among theologians that has been dubbed "bricolage polemique" by M.B. CALMA, « Plagium », in *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, ed. I. ATUCHA, D. CALMA, C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, I. ZAVATTERO (FIDEM, TEMA), Turnhout-Porto 2011, pp. 509-510.

conclusion under consideration. Here, Ebendorfer quotes Peter of Tarentaise's distinction between two manners of understanding the subject:

Therefore, Peter of Tarantaise affirms that "the subject is taken in two ways: in one way, in a restricted sense, as the subject of intention", namely of attribution, "that which is primarily considered, which everything else is reduced to, and which is the reason under which things are contained in a certain way, by which the science is distinguished from others, and therefore it is even titled after it. In another way, the subject can be grasped in a large sense as the subject of accomplishment, and it is that which is treated in the science. For instance, the subject of intention of the art of house building is said to be the house; however, its subject of accomplishment is matter, concerning which one does business, namely wood and stone. In the first way, God is the subject of theology. In the second way, all divine things, inasmuch as they participate in the divine being."⁴⁸

According to Peter of Tarantaise, God is the subject of theology insofar as it is the subject of intention (*subiectum intentionis*), a term that Ebendorfer equates with the subject of attribution, as is seen in his addition to the text cited from Tarentaise. This last term is not part of the terminology found in Metz, Eltville, or Tarentaise, but is found in other Viennese prologues.⁴⁹ Thus, Ebendorfer juxtaposes a more recent terminology over an older one, in what seems like an attempt to accommodate Parisian theology and philosophy to the Viennese intellectual milieu.

But returning to what interests us, the manner in which Ebendorfer manages to use Eltville's text is creative insofar as he succeeded in expressing a personal view, distinct from that of the Cistercian. According to our analysis of Ebendorfer's Prologue, merely looking at the number of times Eltville is mentioned by Ebendorfer clearly does not permit an adequate grasp of the extent of the Cistercian's influence, since it might be the case that a large portion of a text in Ebendorfer is copied from Eltville *verbatim* without any reference to the source. Moreover, we must also take into consideration the widely shared practice of medieval scholars who were not in the habit of explicitly and precisely citing their direct sources of inspiration, in contrast to our established modern academic practice.

Nonetheless, what the lists of Ebendorfer's citations of Eltville that we present in Appendix II can offer us is an approximate case study of Eltville's impact on Ebendorfer.

⁴⁸ THOMAS EBENDORFER, *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 3, Wien, ÖNB 4387, f. 13v: *Igitur dicit Petrus de Tarantasia quod "subiectum capitur dupliciter: uno modo stricte pro subiecto intentionis", id est attributionis, "de quo principaliter agitur, ad quod omnia alia reducuntur et sub eius ratione aliquo modo continentur, per quod scientia ab aliis distinguitur, et ideo etiam ab eo intitulatur. Alio modo capitur large pro subiecto executionis, et est omne illud de quo in scientia tractatur. Verbi gratia, artis domificatorie subiectum intentionis dicitur domus; subiectum vero executionis est materia, circa quam negociatur, scilicet ligna et lapides. Primo modo Deus est subiectum theologie. Secundo modo omnes res divine inquantum esse divinum participant."*. Cf. PETRUS DE TARANTASIA, *In I Sent.*, prol., q. unica, art. 3 (*utrum Deus sit subiectum theologie*), Toulouse 1652, ff. 4b-5a.

⁴⁹ For instance, see the definition of the subject of attribution in Horaw's Prologue, which was read and annotated by Ebendorfer: *Quantum ad primum est notandum quod in proposito volo loqui de subiecto attributionis, quod per Aristotelem I Posteriorum vocatur genus scibile. Dicit enim ibidem: "sicut unus sensus est unius generis sensibilis, ita una scientia est unius generis scibilis."* *De ratione autem huius generis scibilis est quod sit terminus communissimus in scientia cuius est genus principaliter consideratus, non transcendens metas ipsius, ad quem seu modum eius significandi formalem omnia principaliter in illa scientia considerata habeant analogiam et attributionem* (§§ 6-7 in Appendix IV, in CURUT, "Viennese University Theologians on Practical Theology", pp. 126-127, ll. 2-10). The source of this passage might have been IOHANNES BURIDAN, *Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam)*, I, q. 2, ed. M. STREIJGER, P.J.J.M. BAKKER, Leiden 2015, p. 20, ll.11-17: *Septima conclusio est quod huiusmodi subiectum dicitur ex eo quod est genus communissimum inter considerata in illa scientia non transcendens metas illius scientie, et quod se habet per modum subiecti respectu primarum et principalium passionum illius scientie, et quod nihil in illa scientia consideratur nisi inquantum habet attributionem ad ipsum, quia sic ex eius unitate potest dici totalis scientia una, quamvis sit congregata ex multis et multum diversis.*

These 25 cases of Eltville citations concern doctrines that are usually treated at the outset of a *Sentences* commentary, within the first eight distinctions of book I, in conformity with Lombard's order of topics: fruition in distinction 1 (four times in the *marginalia* and four other times in his later commentary), the existence of only one God in distinction 2 (four times in his *Complementum*, two of which are reused in his later commentary, nos. 19 and 20 in the chart in Appendix II), trinitarian theology in distinctions 7-8 (four times in his *marginalia*, two of which reappear in his later commentary, nos. 23 and 24, along with two other independent citations within the same text), divine attributes in distinction 8 (once in his *Complementum*, no. 13, reutilized in his later commentary, no. 25).

Ebendorfer stops quoting Eltville in his later commentary approximately at the end of the first third of the text and within the same distinction 8 in which he quotes Eltville, also for the last time, in his supplementary questions. Consequently, one might think that Ebendorfer only had access to a partial witness of Eltville's commentary on book 1, such as is the case with the Vienna and Basel codices.

The number of citations Eltville that receives within Ebendorfer's treatments devoted to fruition, the existence of only one God, and the Trinity in particular is striking. On fruition, Eltville's first conclusion from his second question devoted to distinction 1 is formulated thus: "Although fruition is an act of will, not everything can be the object of generic fruition/enjoyment." (*Quamvis fruitio sit actus voluntatis, non tamen quodlibet potest esse obiectum fruitionis in communi.*) Here, *fruitio in communi* designates, as in the scholastic tradition, an act of enjoyment taken generally.⁵⁰ The Cistercian makes his intention clear when he adds that, even though fruition is an act that is freely caused and proceeds from a free faculty, this faculty cannot love just any object for its sake.⁵¹ Thus, Eltville prescribes some limits to the human will, which cannot find enjoyment in everything it wills. This claim is refuted by several counterarguments, some of which mainly attack the first part of the conclusion, where the Cistercian states that fruition is an act of the will. Eltville's formulation of the second counterargument runs as follows: if fruition were to be an act of the will and its sole product, then, *stante communi influentia Dei*, one who has better natural qualities will necessarily have more of the glory and elicit a more perfect act. Eltville states that logically the argument is valid but the consequent is false and seems to support some of the articles condemned in 1277 by Étienne Tempier.⁵²

In denying the consequent of the counterargument, Eltville also says that, according to some doctors, God does not want a more perfect fruition/enjoyment, either because God wants only that which acts according to its own merits, or because a greater charity can inhabit someone having lesser or equal natural qualities. What Eltville wants to affirm is that the will is not such an independent faculty, since God concurs effectively in every volitional act.⁵³ Tacit in this discussion is the fact that Eltville here copies partially from John of Mirecourt's *Sentences* commentary, a detail that probably remained hidden from Ebendorfer too. Just as we saw previously for Ebendorfer's Prologue, in the case of implicit passages borrowed from Eltville – which turned out to be copied from James of Metz – the following

⁵⁰ Cf. S.V. KITANOV, *Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates: The Complex Legacy of Saint Augustine and Peter Lombard*, Lanham 2014, p. 78.

⁵¹ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 2° 118, f. 13rb.

⁵² He might be referring to art. 130, 131, but also art. 157. See, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire*, ed. D. Piché (Sic et Non), Paris 1999, pp. 118, 126.

⁵³ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 2° 118, f. 14ra: *Dico igitur quod nihil potest causare voluntatem nisi Deus concurrat effective. Deus autem concurrat quantum sibi placet. Potest etiam esse quod quilibet diligat Deum quantum potest ex suis naturalibus et adhuc plus, quia potest Deus supplere defectum et efficere in quolibet ultra naturalia. Unde etiam iste status dicitur supernaturalis. Et per hoc patet quid dicendum ad confirmationem, quia innititur eidem fundamento.*

comparison illustrates once again how Eltville also represented a vehicle for transmitting the thought of previous fourteenth-century theologians:

IOHANNES DE MIRECOURT, <i>Commento alle Sentenze</i> , q. 15, ed. M. PARODI, §6 ⁵⁴	IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In I Sent.</i> , d. 1, q. 2, concl. 1, Wien, ÖNB 4371, f. 121vb.
Secundo, quia omnis voluntas diligens vel ex motu naturali vel ex caritate vel ex rationis naturalis dictamine vel ex cupiditate diligit; voluntas autem diligens solum naturaliter non potest quocumque frui, constat nec ex caritate potest frui nisi Deo, nec ex dictamine sic aliquo fruitur nisi sibi appareat propter se bonum, nec ex cupiditate fruitur aliquo nisi se ipso, ut patet per Augustinum 14 <i>De civitate Dei</i> : “amor qui edificat civitatem dyaboli est respectu sui usque ad contemptum Dei.”	Confirmatur: omnis voluntas diligens vel naturaliter vel ex cupiditate diligit. Sed planum est quod voluntas solum diligens naturaliter non potest quocumque modo frui, etiam diligens ex caritate non potest non bono frui, nec ex cupiditate fruitur alio quam se ipso, ut patet per beatum Augustinum 14 <i>De Trinitate</i> , <capitulo> 7: “amor qui edificat civitatem diaboli est respectu sui usque ad contemptum Dei.”

In discussing the question “whether just as ‘God is one’ is known by itself, ‘there is only one God’ can be demonstrated to the wayfarer” (*utrum sicut ‘unum esse Deum’ sit notum per se, sic et ‘tantum unum esse Deum’ est viatori demonstrabile*), Ebendorfer adopts Eltville’s definition of a *propositio per se nota*.⁵⁵ In the last passage cited in our chart, relating to the divine attributes (no. 13, corresponding to no. 25), his later commentary Ebendorfer adopts and further adapts Eltville’s example of Socrates’ location, replacing Paris with Vienna.

At one point in his marginal annotations to Horaw’s text, Ebendorfer notes that the conclusion is contrary to Eltville, but invites the reader to check what the Cistercian has said (*cuius dicta vide*) – no. 6 on the chart. In fact, the eight citations of Eltville in Ebendorfer’s marginal annotations to his copy of Horaw’s commentary on book 1 of the *Sentences* are not few considering that this exceeds the number of references to authors such as William of Ockham and Peter Auriol in the same *marginalia*.

This textual archaeology centred around Eltville citations has shown that, when composing a final version of a *Sentences* commentary, an author such as Ebendorfer often recycles his previous material on the same subject, even from very early marginal annotations to a *Sentences* commentary authored by someone else (no. 23 corresponding to no. 5 and no. 24 corresponding to no. 8 on the list). Our excavation also reveals that Eltville is cited in different parts of Ebendorfer’s questions in different ways and for different purposes with regard to Ebendorfer’s own position on a given topic. Moreover, very often when there is a citation of Eltville, much of the following text is implicitly copied from the Cistercian (as in distinction 8 in Ebendorfer’s *Complementum* to book 1). Consequently, this suggests that much more of Ebendorfer’s text might in turn tacitly rely on Eltville’s, although the task of digging up all of this kind of material will only be possible once we have a critical edition of Eltville’s text.

The high number of references in book 1 testifies to Eltville’s authority in Ebendorfer’s discussion of some particular theological and philosophical issues of book 1, but this is not so much the case for the remaining books. For instance, in Ebendorfer’s supplement to book 2, Wien, ÖNB 4393, ff. 9v-44r, we have found no explicit mention or citation of Eltville. As regards his supplement to book 3, Wien, ÖNB 4590, ff. 8v-22v, we find merely one reference to Eltville’s commentary, not on the same book, but on book 1:

⁵⁴ See the online edition: <http://filosofia.dipafilo.unimi.it/~mparodi/mirecourt/testi/questioni/questio15.htm> (last accessed 20 May 2018)

⁵⁵ For a study on this topic as discussed by Eltville, see Luciana Cioca’s contribution to the present volume.

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In I Sent.</i> , Wien, ÖNB 4371, d. 1, q. 2, concl. 2, f. 123ra	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>Supplementum ad III Sent.</i> , Wien, ÖNB 4590, dd. 28-29, q. 1, concl. 1, f. 21r
Ex quo sequitur ultra quod nullus potest ex puris naturalibus Deum super omnia diligere, quia aliter non esset impossibile homini per se aliud plusquam se diligere, cuius oppositum dicit corollarium. Et probatur auctoritate beati Bernardi in libro <i>De diligendo Deum</i> , ubi dicit: “Difficile, ymmo impossibile est quodpiam suis libertate a Deo adepta ad Deum ex toto convertere voluntatem et non magis ad commodum proprium extorquere, sicut scriptum est: <i>Omnes que sua sunt querunt.</i> ”	Ideo concludit quod homo in statu nature integre non indigebat dono gratie superaddite naturalibus bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia, licet indigeret ad hoc auxilio Dei ipsum moventis. Sed in statu nature corrupte indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratie naturam sanantis. Et hoc etiam tenet Iacobus de Altavilla in Scripto primi, distinctione prima , et allegat ad hoc auctoritatem beati Bernardi in <i>De diligendo Deum</i> , ubi dicit: “Difficile est, ymmo impossibile quodpiam suis virtutibus libertate a Deo adepta ad Deum ex toto convertere voluntatem, et non magis ad commodum proprium extorquere, sicut scriptum est: <i>Omnes que sua sunt querunt.</i> ”

The lack of any reference in Ebendorfer to Eltville’s *Sentences* commentary on books 2 and 3 might indicate either that Ebendorfer simply chose not to quote Eltville or that he did not have access to these particular texts. From Ebendorfer’s quotation of Eltville’s commentary as the *Scriptum* (see the passage just above), we can conclude that this was how Eltville’s commentary on book 1 was labelled in the manuscript Ebendorfer employed. This citation is the only instance where Ebendorfer’s reference to Eltville includes full details such as indications of books and distinctions.


Concerning Ebendorfer’s supplement to book 4, as found in Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 203r-223v, we find two explicit quotations of the Cistercian, in discussing distinction 17 of book 4. Since neither the Vienna manuscript nor the Basel codex contains questions from book 4, in the following comparison we will use the Erfurt manuscript as a source for the quotations from Eltville’s commentary on book 4:

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 2° 118, ff. 153vb-183vb	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>Supplementum Lecture IV Sent. (= ad Lecturam Georgii de Horb in IV l. Sent.)</i> , Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 203r-223v
d. 8 et sequentes, q. 1 (utrum ad iustificativam penitentiam hominis peccatoris requiritur contritio necessario, confessio et opus satisfactionis), f. 182rb: Indistincta autem dilatio pensatis circumstantiis constitueret hominem transgressorem; videtur igitur esse dicendum, sicut de baptismo, quod etiam est sacramentum necessitatis, et non obligat ad subito suscipiendum, nisi in certis casibus, et tamen minima dilatio esset periculosa.	d. 17, q. 1 (utrum necessarium sit peccatori mortali stanti habita oportunitate confiteri suo proprio sacerdoti), concl. 1, f. 215v: Et dixi notanter in corollario 'regulariter', quia indistincta dilatio pensatis circumstantiis constitueret hominem transgressorem; videtur ergo, ut dicit Iacobus de Altavilla , sicut de baptismo, quod est sacramentum necessitatis, et tamen non obligat ad subito suscipiendum, nisi in casu necessitatis, tamen dilatio esset periculosa, sic in proposito.
Quarto, cum quis debet ministrare in ordine suo, quod si faceret in peccato mortali peccaret. Unde quibusdam videtur quod ministrando quodcumque sacramentum in peccato mortali sit peccatum. Unde audiens confessionem alicuius	f. 216r: Iacobus de Altavilla ponit sextum, scilicet cum quis debet ministrare in ordine suo, quia faciendo in peccato mortali peccares. Unde quibusdam videtur, ut dicit ille doctor, quod ministrando quodcumque sacramentum in

prius debet esse confessus, aliter indignus digna traderet et irreverentiam sacramento faceret. Tamen hoc intelligitur si tempus et copiam confessionis habuerit.

peccato mortali sit peccatum. Unde audiens confessionem alicuius prius debet esse confessus, aliter indignus tractaret et irreverentiam sacramento faceret. Et hoc intelligitur si tempus et copiam confessorum habuit.

Whether this it is a coincidence or not, the second of Ebendorfer's quotations of Eltville is marked in the Erfurt witness of Eltville's text with a pointing hand in the margin, a sign that is rare in this manuscript:



Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 2° 118, f. 182rb.

The citations from Ebendorfer's supplements (to books 1, 3 and 4) are indicative of the influence Eltville had on Ebendorfer even before the secular began composing his mature commentary in Wien, ÖNB 4387.

Our research into Ebendorfer's citations from Eltville's *Sentences* commentary aimed at grasping the influence the Cistercian had on the Viennese secular master. Even though Ebendorfer's text may still conceal an even stronger influence from Eltville, with many more verbatim parallels than we have been able to identify thus far, we are also left guessing about the extent to which they would be indicative of a "positive" or a "negative" use of the Cistercian's arguments. As we have seen in the case of the implicit quotations of Eltville in Ebendorfer's Prologue, the secular may ultimately disagree with the position cited from the Cistercian's *Sentences* commentary. Nonetheless, we have sufficiently demonstrated that, in Ebendorfer's text, there is a dialogue between the two theologians, a dialogue with an authority whose ideas can be embraced, slightly transformed, or bluntly rejected.

James of Eltville's reception at the new University Vienna marks the moment when, having ceased to be a mere author, he began to be an authority. Based on this legacy we can better understand the networking of medieval universities, since we can trace connections between Oxford, Paris, and Vienna via Eltville's *Sentences* commentary. Theological ideas traveled from one quotation to another, inspiring doctrinal debate on topics ranging from the simple though mysterious abduction of infants to the complicated issue of the transubstantiation or remanence of accidents and substance during a religious ceremony. The textual archaeology on which we based our investigation also shows, via Pirchenwart and Ebendorfer, that other manuscript witnesses of Eltville's text once circulated in Vienna. Without measuring James of Eltville's legacy in Vienna, our understanding of what is theology and philosophy at the new university during the fifteenth century would be impoverished.

Appendix I
Tabula quaestionum Jacobi de Altavilla in quartum librum Sententiarum

We have compiled the *tabula* of Eltville's book 4 following a new list of manuscripts, which updated the one published in 2015⁵⁶ and adds two new *codices*: T and Se. Book IV is missing in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, A.X.40 and A.VI.22; Kassel, Gesamthochschul-Bibliothek, 2° Ms. theol. 16; Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, CCI 304; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Ms 593; Linz, Oberösterreichische Landesbibliothek, Cod. 340 (Olim 31); München, Universitätsbibliothek, 2° Cod. Ms. 91; Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 4371. In what follows, we employ

∅ for a missing question,

* to indicate that the question is incomplete,

** when the question is a different version, which situation occurs in the case of the last questions in manuscript München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 3546, which are reworked by Arnold of Seehausen.

A = Besançon, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 198, ff 231ra-300rb (q. 1-9).

B = Brugges, Stadsbibliotheek, Hs. 181, ff. 198ra-245va (q. 1-9)

C = Cambrai, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 570, ff. 207vb-246vb (q. 1-5 et 9)

E = Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 2° 118, ff. 152vb-183vb (q. 1-6)

K = Koblenz, Landeshauptarchiv, Best. 701, nr. 208, ff. 272ra-322ra (q. 1-6)

L = Laon, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 180, ff. 253rb-303v (q. 1-9)

N = Lincoln, Cathedral Chapter Library, Ms. 83, ff. 182rb-227vb (q. 1-9)

M = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 11591, ff. 319ra-373ra (q. 1-6)

O = Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.106 inf, ff. 140ra-165ra (q. 1-6)

P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15896, ff. 147ra-208vb (q. 1-9)

S = Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l'Agglomération, Ms. 158, ff. 280ra-331ra (q. 1-9)

Se = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 3546, ff. 200ra-232rb (q. 1-6)

T = Toulouse, Archive de la Haute-Garonne, Ms. 5, ff. 198-247va (q. 1-9)

W = Wolfenbütthel, Herzog-August-Bibliothek, Cod. Helmst. 230, ff. 264va-320ra (q. 1-6)

Wb = Wertheim, Evangelische Kirchenbibliothek, Hs. 608, ff. 204vb-219ra (q. 1-6)

1. Circa principium quarti *Sententiarum* moveo talem questionem: Utrum nove legis sacramenta creativa gratie aliquam spiritualem virtutem ipsis formaliter inherentem habeant, quam in animam possint agere. A 231ra-238va; B 198va-204va; C 207vb-215va; E 152vb-157va; K 272ra-**280ra**; L 253rb-260vb; N 182rb-189rb; M 319ra-327ra; O 140ra-143vb; P 147ra-152ra*; S 280ra-285va; Se 200ra-206rb; T 198⁵⁷-203vb; W 264va-272vb; Wb 204vb-206vb.

2. Circa distinctionem tertiam et sequentes usque ad sextam inclusive, in quibus tractat Magister de sacramento baptismi, quero talem questionem: Utrum sacramentum baptismi viatori cuilibet a ministro quocumque in debita materia et forma collatum auferat quoad culpam et penam omnem penitus obligationem et reatum. A 238va-249rb; B 204va-212va; C 215va-225ra; E 157va-163vb; K **280ra**-290va; L 260vb-271ra; N 189rb-195vb; M 327ra-337rb; O 143vb-148va; P 152ra*-161vb; S 285va-292vb; Se 206rb-214ra; T 203vb-212rb; W 272vb-284rb; Wb 206vb-209vb.

⁵⁶ M. BRINZEL, « Enquête sur la tradition manuscrite du commentaire des *Sentences* du cistercien Jacques d'Eltville », in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 56 (2014), pp. 247-262.

⁵⁷ F. 198 is missing in the manuscript; the beginning of book 4 probably had a decoration that was stolen, as is the case with f. 1 at the beginning of the commentary.

3. Circa distinctionem septimam moveo talem questionem: Utrum confirmationis sacramentum secundum traditionem evangelii et Scripture Sacre a Christo institutum recipienti gratiam conferat et novo caractere signet confirmatum. A 249va-254ra; B 212va-215va; C 225ra-228va; E 163vb-166ra; K 290va-294va; L 271ra-274vb; N 195vb-198va; M 337va-341vb; O 148va-150rb; P 161vb-166rb; S 292vb-296ra; Se 214ra- 216vb; T 212rb-215rb; W 284rb-288vb; Wb 209vb- 210va*.
4. Circa distinctionem octavam et sequentes, in quibus Magister tractat de sacramento eucharistie, moveo talem questionem: Utrum corpus Christi in sacramento eucharistie sub speciebus panis et vini realiter existat cum suis dimensionibus. A 254ra-271rb; B 215va-226va; C 228va-241va; E 166ra-175rb; K 294va-309ra; L 275ra-289ra; N 198va-209va; M 341rb-357vb; O 150rb-157va; P 166rb-180rb; S 296ra-307va; Se 216vb-227vb⁵⁸; T 215rb-228rb; W 288vb-304vb; Wb 210va-213vb*
5. Circa materiam de penitentia quero: Utrum virtuosa et sacramentalis penitentia cuilibet rationali creature ad salutem necessaria sit totius culpe et pene pro ipsa debite remissiva. A 272va-278va; B 226va-230vb; C 241va-242vb⁵⁹; E 175rb-179rb; K 309ra-314rb; L 289ra-295rb; M 357vb-363vb; O 157va-160va; N 209va-213vb; P 180rb-186vb; S 307va-312vb; Se Ø; T 228rb-241rb; W 304vb-310vb; Wb 214ra-215va*.
6. Queritur consequenter: Utrum ad iustificativam penitentiam hominis peccatoris necessario requiratur contritio, confessio, et opus satisfactionis. A 278va-288rb; B 230vb-237va; C 0⁶⁰; E 179ra-183vb; K 314rb-322ra; L 295rb-303*; M 363vb-373ra; m 160va-165ra; N 213vb-220va; P 186vb-196vb; S 312vb-321ra; Se 238va-247va^{**}; T 233va-241rb; W 310vb-320ra; Wb 215va-219ra.
7. Queritur consequenter: Utrum extreme unctionis sacramentum hominis efficiens sanitatem ministrum exigat ordinatum sacerdotem. A 288va-290rb⁶¹; B 237va-138vb; C Ø; E Ø; K Ø; L Ø; M Ø; O Ø; N 220va-221va; P 196vb-198vb; S 321ra-322va; Se 253rb-256vb^{**}; T 241rb-242rb; W Ø; Wb Ø.
8. Circa distinctionem 26am usque ad 43am exclusive quero: Utrum matrimonii sacramentum per mutui consensus expressionem contractum sit aliquo modo dissolubile. A 290rb-296vb; B 238vb-242vb; C 243rb*-244rb; E Ø; K Ø; L Ø⁶²; M Ø; O Ø; N 221va-225va; P 198vb-204vb; S 322va-328ra; Se 262rb-271ra^{**}; T 242rb-245va; W Ø; Wb Ø.
9. Queritur consequenter: Utrum homo resurgens in ydemptitatem numeralem sit habiturus dotes glorie secundum naturam. A 296vb-300rb; B 243ra-245va; C 244rb-246vb; E Ø; K Ø; L Ø; M Ø; O Ø; N 225va-227vb; P 205ra-208vb; S 328ra-331ra; Se 272ra-278va^{**}; T 245va-247va; W Ø; Wb Ø.

⁵⁸ Reference on f. 227vb: *in quo homo fit totus caro et sic est finis totius materie de sacramento eucharistie. Reverendi magistri Jacobi de alta villa ordinis sancti venerandi vel sancti bernardi in quo adhuc dubitavi cuius ordinis pro vero esset stet hoc propter complementum.*

⁵⁹ On the next column at f. 243ra, q. 8 starts abruptly.

⁶⁰ One or two quires are missing from the manuscript.

⁶¹ At the end of this question we read the colophon on f. 288rb: *Explicit lectura quarti Sententiarum edita a venerabili magistro Jacobi de Alta Villa ordinis Cystersienis*, which might indicate that the exemplar that he copied from was composed of only six questions, as in the case of the group of German manuscripts.

⁶² Questions 8 and 9 have been cut out from L, but the manuscript originally included them.

Appendix II
James of Eltville and Thomas of Ebendorfer

The comparative table below contains only explicit mentions of Eltville, along with the context of each reference, which occasionally includes associations with other authors.⁶³ First, we provide a list of the issues from book 1 in which Eltville is cited, as found in three different types of material composed in Ebendorfer's autograph. The first column contains the text of the passages from Eltville from Wien, ÖNB 4371, ff. 101ra-187vb. The second column gives the passages where Eltville is cited in Ebendorfer's *marginalia* to his copy of Horaw's commentary on book 1 (Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 12r-163v). The third column contains citations from Ebendorfer's supplementary questions added to Horaw's commentary on the same book (*Complementum ad Lecturam Georgii de Horb in primum librum Sententiarum*, found in Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 170r-196v).⁶⁴ The fourth column contains citations of Eltville in Ebendorfer's later and larger commentary on Book 1 found in Wien, ÖNB 4387, ff. 3v-319r.

By means of this comparison we are able to grasp the dynamics of how Ebendorfer cites Eltville in a range of texts and over a certain period of time. Thus, we see Ebendorfer dropping, preserving, or developing Eltville as an authority on certain topics throughout his various redactions. The table also shows how citations of Eltville migrated from Ebendorfer's early material on the *Sentences* to his more mature œuvre and to what extent these quotations overlap.

IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, <i>In I Sent.</i> , Wien, ÖNB 4371, ff. 101ra-187vb	GEORG DE HORB, <i>In I Sent. (cum Thome Ebendorfer marginalibus)</i> , Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 12r-163v	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>Complementum ad I Sent. (= ad Lecturam Georgii de Horb in I l. Sent.)</i> , Wien, ÖNB 4369, ff. 170r-196v	THOMAS EBENDORFER, <i>In I Sent.</i> , Wien, ÖNB 4387, ff. 23v-319r
d. 1, q. 2, concl. 1, f. 122va: Ad secundam rationem, sequeretur quod habens media naturalia plus habet necessario de fruitione ista, quia, sicut dicunt doctores, Deus non vult perfectiorem fruitionem, vel quia Deus non vult nisi quod agat secundum merita sua, vel quia maior caritas potest esse in habente peiora naturalia vel equalia.	[1] d. 1, q. 1, concl. 3, f. 26r, <i>in marg.</i> : Sed quid tunc habens meliora naturalia necessario haberet plus de fruitione? Respondetur quod non oportet, quia secundum doctores et Iacobum de Altavilla , Deus non vult perfectiorem fruitionem, vel quia Deus non vult nisi quod agat secundum merita sua, vel quia maior caritas potest esse in habente peiora naturalia vel equalia.		
			[14] d. 1, q. 1, concl. 1, f. 25v: Et dixi notanter 'de communi lege', quia aliqui doctores concedunt

⁶³ For a complete citation list of all of Ebendorfer's redactions of his *Sentences* commentary, see CURUT, "The *Sentences* Commentary of Thomas Ebendorfer" (forthcoming).

⁶⁴ Horaw's text is in square brackets in the table.

			quod Deus possit creare unam creaturam que intelligeret per suam essentiam et quod talis creatura esset cognitio sua et beatitudo; sed illud non diffinitio pro presenti, licet Iacobus de Altavilla dicat quod implicet contradictionem aliquam creaturam esse que intelligit per suam essentiam.
			[17] concl. 3, f. 29r: Si autem diligit propter se, ita quod non propter Deum, actualiter vel habitualiter peccabit. Hec est responsio Iacobi de Altavilla .
	[2] concl. 4, f. 27r, in marg: [Conclusio quarta: nullo uno actu homo viator vult illud quod est ad finem et ipsum finem distincte velit.] Conclusio Gregorii et Iacobi de Altavilla .		[16] d. 1, q. 2, concl. 1, f. 30v: Sed opposite opinionis est Gregorius de Arimino et Iacobus de Altavilla .
concl. 2, f. 124ra-b (water damage): Ad secundam, si hoc cadat sub precepto aut obligat etc., dico quod semper homo obligatur ad habitualiter diligendum. Dices: ergo habens in baptismo habitum caritatis et numquam Deum diligens satisfaceret precepto. Respondeo negando consequentiam, quia quando dico quod semper homo tenetur habitualiter Deum diligere, hoc non est prescise intelligendum \124rb\ de habitu infuso aut de acquisito fixo, sed de quodam habitu qui est quasi in quodam fluxu et quem per frequentiam actuum oportet sustentari, aliter caderet in non ens, et tunc forte homo esset transgressus preceptum. Et est exemplum de projectione lapidis ubi virtus semel impressa per tempus manet.	[3] d. 1, q. 2, concl. 2, f. 30v, in marg: Respondetur secundum Iacobum de Altavilla ubi supra quod semper homo obligatur ad habitualiter diligendum. Et si dices: ergo habens in baptismo habitum caritatis et numquam Deum diligens satisfaceret precepto. Respondet negando consequentiam, quia quando dico quod homo tenetur semper Deum habitualiter diligere, hoc non est prescise intelligendum de habitu infuso aut de acquisito fixo, sed de quolibet habitu qui est quasi in quodam fluxu et quem per frequentiam actuum oportet sustentare, alias caderet in non ens, et tunc homo transgressus esset hoc preceptum. Exemplum de projectione lapidis ubi virtus impressa semel		

<p>Sed si debet continuari, oportet quod frequenter iteretur. Quando ergo dicitur, 'ille non diligit actualiter, sed habitualiter', intelligitur per hoc quod sit quedam dispositio impressa et relicta in voluntate ex frequentibus et fortibus actibus disponentibus vitam hominis et ordinantibus in finem ultimum ab ipso electum, ad quam dispositionem principaliter sua facta ordinat, licet non semper actu sicut de avaro est respectu pecunie et sicut de eunte Romam est qui non semper ad hoc cogitat, tamen quemlibet passum non actualiter, sed habitualiter ad hoc ordinat.</p>	<p>manet per tempus. Sed si debet continuari, oportet quod frequenter continuetur et iteretur. Quando ergo dicitur, 'ille actualiter non diligit, sed habitualiter', intelligitur quod sit quedam dispositio impressa et relicta in voluntate ex frequentibus et fortioribus actibus disponentibus vitam hominis et ordinantibus in finem ultimum ab ipso electum, ad quam facta sua ordinant, licet non semper actu, ut patet de eunte Romam et de avaro respectu pecunie.</p>		
<p>d. 1, q. 2, concl. 1, f. 121vb: Confirmatur: omnis voluntas diligens vel naturaliter vel ex cupiditate diligit. Sed planum est quod voluntas solum diligens naturaliter non potest quocumque modo frui, etiam diligens ex caritate non potest non bono frui. Nec ex cupiditate fruitur alio quam seipso, ut patet per beatum Augustinum 14 <i>De Trinitate</i>, 7: "amor qui edificat civitatem diaboli est respectu sui usque ad contemptum Dei." Igitur sequitur conclusionis secunda parte vera, scilicet quod non quodlibet potest esse obiectum fruitionis in communi. [...] Tertio sequitur quod ad libertatem voluntatis non requiritur quodlibet sibi presentatum per intellectum posse diligere et posse non diligere. Patet ex secunda parte conclusionis, quia est dare aliquid circa quod voluntas non potest habere nisi nolle, et tamen voluntas semper est libera, ergo ad voluntatis libertatem non requiritur quodlibet posse diligere. (... water damage)</p>	<p>[4] f. 34v, <i>in marg</i>: Respondendum quod, propter illam et similes rationes, Iacobus de Altavilla tenet oppositum secunde partis conclusionis, dicens: non quodlibet potest esse obiectum fruitionis. Probat de summa miseria, que non sumitur in facultatem voluntatis propter se. Item, nihil bonitatis includit. Confirmatur: voluntas diligens vel naturaliter vel ex cupiditate diligit. Sed planum est quod voluntas solum diligens naturaliter non potest quocumque modo frui, etiam diligens ex caritate non potest nisi bono frui. Nec ex cupiditate fruitur nisi seipso, ut patet per Augustinum 14 <i>De civitate Dei</i>, 7 capitulo: "amor qui edificat civitatem diaboli est respectu sui usque ad contemptum Dei." Ex quibus patet quod ad libertatem voluntatis non requiritur quodlibet sibi presentatum per intellectum posse diligere et non diligere. Patet ex dictis, quia dabile est secundum ipsum aliquid respectu cuius voluntas</p>		<p>[17] d. 1, q. 3, concl. 2, f. 33v: Item arguit Iacobus de Altavilla qui etiam tenet oppositum prime partis. Et probat hoc de summa miseria sic quia talis non sumitur in facultatem voluntatem propter se, igitur.</p>

	non potest habere nisi nolle, et tamen voluntas semper est libera.		
			[18] f. 35v: Ad tertiam responditur secundum Iacobum de Altavilla quod semper homo obligatur ad habitualiter diligendum.
dd. 2-3, q. 6, concl. 1, f. 143rb-va: Secunda propositio: quod nulla propositio demonstrabilis est per se nota. Probatur: nulla propositio dubitabilis est per se nota, sed quelibet propositio demonstrabilis est huiusmodi, alias non fieret evidens per demonstrationem. [...] Quarta propositio: omnis alia propositio et solum talis est per se nota que sic significat sicut est evidens esse cuilibet advertenti, et numquam potest naturaliter alicui esse dubium an ita sit sicut illa propositio significat esse.		[9] d. 2, q. 1, concl. 1, f. 170r, <i>in marg.</i> : Vel sic secundum Iacobum de Altavilla : propositio per se nota est que sic significat sicut est evidens esse cuilibet advertenti, et numquam potest naturaliter esse dubium sic esse sicut illa propositio significat. Corollarium: nulla propositio demonstrabilis est per se nota. Probatur, quia quelibet talis est dubitabilis, alias non fieret evidens per demonstrationem.	[19] d. 2, q. 1, f. 46r-v: Et hoc, puto, voluit Iacobus de Altavilla cum dixit: propositio per se nota est que sic se habet sicut est evidens esse cuilibet advertenti, et numquam potest naturaliter esse dubium sic esse sicut illa propositio significat.
f. 144ra: Ad primam dico quod notitiam alicuius nobis esse incertam potest intelligi tripliciter. Uno modo, quod omnes desiderent naturaliter cognoscere illud, et sic non oportet illud esse per se notum cuius notitia omnibus est certa, et sic maior non est vera. Alio modo, quod omnes illud tenuerunt, et sic non oportet illud esse per se notum, quia multa dubia aliqui tenuerunt et asseruerunt, et sic etiam nego maiorem. Alio modo, quia nullus potest naturaliter dubitare quamcumque propositionem in mente formatam significantem quod Deus est, et sic dico quod notitia illius non est naturaliter certa omnibus, et sic maior est falsa. Ad secundam dico quod est notum ex alio. Et ad improbationem dico tria. Primum est quod si aliquis potest habere propositionem		[10] f. 171r: Ad primam respondet Iacobus de Altavilla quod notitiam alicuius nobis esse certam potest intelligi tripliciter. Uno modo, quod omnes desiderent naturaliter cognoscere illud, et sic non oportet illud esse per se notum cuius notitia est omnibus certa, et sic negat maiorem. Alio modo, quod nullus potest naturaliter dubitare quamcumque propositionem in mente formatam significantem quod Deus est, et sic dicit quod notitia illius non est naturaliter certa omnibus, et sic minor est falsa. Tertio modo, quod omnes illud tenent, et hoc non oportet illud esse per se notum, quia multa	

<p>probabilem ad probandum Deum esse, et talis prescise habens rationem probabilem opinabitur Deum esse. Secundo dico quod illi qui assentiunt Deum <esse sine ratione> quacumque, <sed dicente esse> Deum quocumque, illis notum est Deum esse per fidem. Tertio dico quod, apud credentes ex fide Deum esse, Deum esse non est talis articulus cuius oppositum teneret qui prescise inniteretur lumen naturali, sicut est de multis aliis articulis. Et per hoc patet ad formam rationis, quia tam per fidem Deum esse potest esse notum quam etiam per rationem.</p>		<p>dubia aliqui tenuerunt et etiam asseruerunt, et sic etiam negat maiorem.</p> <p>Ad secundam respondet quod est notum ex alio. Ad improbationem dico tria. Primum, quod si aliquis potest habere propositionem probabilem ad probandum Deum esse, et talis prescise habens rationem probabilem opinabitur Deum esse. Secundo dico quod qui assentiunt Deum esse sine quacumque ratione, sed auctoritate dicentis vel revelantis, illis Deum esse est notum per fidem. Tertio dico quod, apud credentes ex fide Deum esse, Deum esse non est talis articulus cuius oppositum teneret qui prescise inniteretur lumen naturali, sicut est de multis aliis articulis. Et sic patet ad formam rationis, quia tam per fidem Deum esse potest esse notum quam etiam per rationem.</p>	
		<p>[11] f. 171v: Tamen istis non obstantibus, via opposita apparet michi valde probabilis, sicut et ipsa est de intentione Scoti, Landolphi et Iacobi de Altavilla.</p>	
		<p>[12] f. 173r-v: Propter istas rationes et similes, Brinkel et Iacobus de Altavilla tenent quod non sit demonstrative probabile ex propositionibus per se notis et nobis evidentibus, evidentia scilicet reducta ad certitudinem primi principii.</p>	<p>[20] concl. 3, f. 51v: Propter istas et similes rationes Brinkel et Iacobus de Altavilla tenent oppositum conclusionis. Ex quo inferunt primo quod non est demonstrative probatum Deum esse ex propositionibus per se notis et nobis evidentibus evidentia reducta ad certitudinem primi principii.</p>

<p>dd. 4, 5, et 6, f. 155vb: (... water damage) Et quia distinctio nominum et eorum notitia in proposita materia multum est necessaria, ideo pro solutione argumentorum infra fiendorum est notandum quod nominum significantium Deum quedam sunt essentialia, quedam personalia, quedam communia, quedam notionalia. [...]</p>			<p>[21] d. 4, f. 70v: Ideo notandum secundum Iacobum de Altavilla <quod> nominum significantium Deum quedam sunt essentialia, quedam personalia, quedam communia. [...] Et quomodo unaqueque illarum distinctionem predicetur de essentia et personis et an in singulari vel pluraliter, de hoc circa secundam et tertiam distinctiones ponit Iacobus de Altavilla plures doctrinas.</p>
<p>dd. 4, 5 et 6, concl. 3, f. 161ra: Tertia conclusio in ordine sit hec: quamvis essentia divina non sit subiectum divine generationis, ipsa tamen divine generationis est terminus formalis.</p>			<p>[22] d. 5, f. 81r: Ex istis videtur eis concedendum quod divina essentia sit terminus formalis divine generationis, sicut expresse ponit Iacobus de Altavilla, distinctione 5, et videtur sentire Gregorius, distinctione 5, articulo 2.</p>
<p>dd. 2-8, q. 1, concl. 3, ff. 148vb-149ra: Ex quo infero quod nulla ratio attributalis necessario includit imperfectionem, quia sic tale attributum Deo non conveniret. Secundo infero quod tales rationes non excludunt omnem imperfectionem. Patet, quia tunc creature non convenirent. [...] Aliter etiam posset describi attributum: est perfectio simpliciter communis Creatori et creature secundum quandam analogiam ex innotescentia creaturarum investigata in Creatore. Per hoc quod dicitur 'perfectio simpliciter' differt ab illis que in creaturis non dicunt perfectionem ubicumque reperiuntur, sicut esse rudibile est in asino perfectionis, in homine tamen si ponentur, diceret</p>	<p>[5] dd. 2-8, q. 1, a. 3, f. 54v, in marg: Iacobus de Altavilla dicit: attributum est perfectio simpliciter conveniens Creatori et creature secundum quamdam analogiam ex innotescentia creaturarum investigata in Creatore. Et per ultimam particulam distinguitur ab hiis que fide credimus, sicut Deum esse incarnatum, natum de virgine, talia namque ex creaturis nequaquam possumus investigare. Et dicitur 'perfectio simpliciter': per hoc differunt ab illis que in creaturis non dicunt perfectionem simpliciter ubicumque inveniuntur, sicut esse rudibile dicit perfectionem in asino, tamen si in homine inveniretur, esset imperfectionis. Per hoc quod dicit 'communis</p>		<p>[23] d. 8, q. 2, f. 99v: Aliter dicit Iacobus de Altavilla: attributum est perfectio simpliciter communis Creatori et creature secundum quandam analogiam ex innotescentia creaturarum investigata in creatura, et per ultimam particulam distinguitur ab hiis que fide credimus, sicut sunt esse incarnatum, natum de virgine, talia namque ex creaturis nequaquam possumus investigare. Et dicitur 'perfectio simpliciter': per hoc differunt ab hiis que in creaturis non dicunt perfectionem simpliciter ubicumque inveniuntur, sicut esse</p>

<p>imperfectionem. /149ra/ Per hoc quod dicitur 'communis Creatori et creature' <differt> ab illis que soli Deo conveniunt, ut omnipotentia etc. Per hoc quod dicitur 'per quamdam analogiam' differt ab illis que ex creaturis Deo attribuuntur secundum oppositionem et causalitatem. [...]</p> <p>Per hoc autem quod dicitur 'ex innotescencia creaturarum investigata in Creatore' differt attributum ab his que fide credimus Deo convenire, maxime quantum ad ea que mere ex divine libertatis arbitrio dinoscimus dependere, sicut est esse Deum incarnatum, de virgine natum, et similia, talia namque ex creaturis nequamquam possumus investigare.</p>	<p>Creatori' etc. differunt ab illis que soli Creatori conveniunt, ut omnipotentia. Et per hoc quod dicitur 'per quamdam analogiam' differunt ab illis que creaturis attribuuntur secundum operationem et causalitatem, ut 'creator'. Ex quibus patet quod nulla ratio attributalis necessario includit imperfectionem, quamvis tales rationes non excludant omnem imperfectionem. Prima pars probatur, quia sic tale attributum Deo non conveniret. Secunda pars probatur, quia tunc creature non conveniret.</p>		<p>rudibile dicit perfectionem in asino, et tamen si in homine inveniretur, esset imperfectionis. Per hoc quod dicit 'communis Creatori' differt ab istis que soli Creatori conveniunt, ut est omnipotentia. Et per hoc quod dicitur 'per quamdam analogiam' differunt ab istis que attribuuntur creaturis vel Creatori secundum operationem et causalitatem, ut 'creator'. Ex quibus infert quod nulla ratio attributalis necessario includit imperfectionem, quamvis tales rationes non excludant omnem imperfectionem. Prima pars probatur, /100r/ quia alias tale attributum non conveniret Deo in quem nulla potest cadere imperfectio. Secunda pars patet, quia tunc tale non conveniret creature, que est ex parte et habet aliquam imperfectionem admixtam.</p>
	<p>[6] d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 1, f. 68r, <i>in marg</i>: [Istud est contra Gregorium distinctione ista, questione secunda, articulo secundo, quem articulum totum fundat super opposito illius corollarii] et etiam contra Iacobum de Altavilla, cuius dicta vide.</p>		
<p>d. 7, q. 1, concl. 1, ff. 163va-b: Ad primum istorum, quando dicitur 'nulla potentia est in Deo, ergo nec potentia activa' etc., nego antecedens, quia potentia semper est imperfecta respectu sui actus. Dico quod potentia</p>	<p>[7] f. 70r, <i>in marg</i>: Ad primum, dico secundum Iacobum de Altavilla quod in Deo proprie nec est potentia activa nec passiva, sicut nec actio nec passio, ut diffinitur in <i>Libro sex principiorum</i>, sed est idem purus actus</p>		

<p>semper est imperfecta que est distincta ab actu et perficitur per ipsum, sive sit coniuncta sive non, sed ubi est omnino eadem, ibi non oportet. Sed sic est hic.</p> <p>Ad confirmationem, 'quia in divinis nec est potentia activa, nec passiva', dico quod in divinis /163vb/ est potentia. Et tamen nec proprie passiva nec activa, sicut nec actio nec passio, sicut diffiniuntur in <i>Libro sexto principiorum</i>, sed est idem purus actus cum respectibus oppositis. Et sic est hic aliquis se habens per modum potentie active, et aliquid per modum passive. Et sic, cum quoad aliquid sit simile, non tamen quoad omnia, nullo modo est concedendum quod Filius sit actus vel factus, sed bene productus. Unde, sicut in absolutis in Deo est species et non genus, scilicet scientia et non qualitas, sic in relativis in Deo est productio et non productum, et non proprie actio, nec actum saltem ad sensum dictum.</p>	<p>cum rebus et relationibus oppositis. Et sic ibi est aliquis se habens per modum potentie active, et aliquid per modum passive. Et sic, cum quoad aliquid sit simile, non tamen quoad omnia, nullo modo etiam concedendum est quod Filius sit actus vel factus, sed bene productus. Unde dicit 'sicut in absolutis est in Deo species et non genus, scilicet scientia et non qualitas, sic in relativis in Deo est productio et non productum, et non proprie actio, nec actum saltem ad sensum dictum'.</p> <p>Ad secundam nego antecedens. Ad probationem, dico quod potentia semper est imperfecta que est distincta ab actu et perficitur per ipsum, sive sit coniuncta sive non, sed ubi est omnino eadem, ibi non oportet.</p>		
<p>d. 7, q. 1, concl. 3, ff. 165vb-166ra: Sed tamen audi vi a magistris meis quod hec causa potest esse quoad primum, scilicet quod Pater non potest alium quam Filium generare, quia potentia generandi in Patre est coniuncta actui sibi totaliter adequato, ergo illa stante non potest in alium, et per consequens nec alium Filium generare. Et cum omne in divinis ad intra fuerit necessarium, oportet semper sic stare. Antecedens patet, quia si non, Filius non esset omnino equalis Patri. Et si non semper staret, Filius posset non esse, et esset sic mutatio in Deo. Sed consequentia principalis probatur, quia si potest alium generare, vel ergo per eundem actum generare vel per alium. Non per alium,</p>	<p>[8] d. 7, q. 1, concl. 4, f. 72v, <i>in marg</i>: Sed Iacobus de Altavilla dicit: causa quare Filius non potest alium generare, nec Pater alium Filium, est quia potentia generandi in Patre est coniuncta actui sibi totaliter adequato, ergo illa stante non potest in alium, et per consequens nec alium Filium generare. Et cum omne in divinis ad intra sit necessarium, oportet semper sic stare. Antecedens patet, quia si non, Filius non esset omnino equalis Patri. Et si non semper staret, Filius posset non esse, et sic esset mutatio in Deo. Sed consequentia principalis probatur, quia si potest alium generare, vel ergo per eundem actum generandi vel per alium.</p>		<p>[24] d. 7, q. 2, f. 92r: Et hoc est quod Gregorius et Iacobus de Altavilla arguunt sic, quia potentia generandi in Patre est coniuncta actui sibi totaliter adequato, ergo illo Filio existente non potest in alium, et per consequens nec alium Filium generare. Et cum in divinis ad intra sit necessarium, oportet semper stare, alias Filius posset non esse, et sic esset mutatio in Deo. Sed consequentia principalis probatur, quia si potest alium generare, vel ergo per eundem actum generandi vel per alium. Non per alium,</p>

<p>quia isto stante non potest alium, quia aliter non esset adequatus. Nec per istum eundem, quia vel Filius esset equalis Patri vel non. Si non, neuter esset Deus. Si <sic>, ergo quilibet esset adequatus illi actui, et sic idem haberet duos terminos distinctos adequatos.</p> <p>Ad probationem secunde partis antecedentis, scilicet quod Filius nullum Filium potest generare, arguo sic: Filius non habet, nec habere potest generationem activam, ergo illa pars vera. Antecedens probo per duas suppositiones. Prima est quod Filius nihil habet nisi illud reciperet a Patre. Secunda est quod Pater non dedit Filio, nec Filius recepit a Patre illud in quo Pater opponitur Filio. Patet, quia talibus proprietatibus incommunicabilibus persone distinguuntur. Ex hoc patet antecedens, quia per generationem activam Pater opponitur Filio. Et ideo sibi hanc non communicavit, per secundam suppositionem. Et Filius non habet eam aliunde, per primam, ergo nullo modo.</p>	<p>Non per alium, quia illo stante non potest alium, quia aliter ille non esset adequatus. Nec per istum eundem, quia vel Filius esset equalis Patri vel non. Si non, neuter esset Deus. Si <sic>, ergo quilibet esset adequatus illi actui, et sic idem haberet terminos distinctos adequatos. Sed quod Filius nullum Filium generare possit, arguitur sic: Filius non habet nec habere potest generationem activa. Probatur, respondendo quod Filius nihil habet nisi idem receperit a Patre. Secundo, probatur quod Filius non recepit illud a Patre in quo sibi relative opponitur. Probatur, quia talibus proprietatibus incommunicabilibus persone distinguuntur. Ex hoc patet antecedens quod per generationem activam Pater opponitur Filio, ideo sibi hanc non communicat, per secundam suppositionem. Et Filius etiam non habet eam aliunde, per primam, ergo nullo modo.</p>		<p>quia illo stante non potest alium, alias ille non esset adequatus. Nec per istum eundem, quia sit ille Filius b et prius a. Tunc vel quilibet illorum esset adequatus illi actui, et sic idem actus haberet terminos distinctos adequatos, quod implicat. Sed quod Filius nullum Filium generare possit, patet ex conclusione et corollario 4. Et probatur, quia Filius non habet nec habere potest generationem activam, igitur antecedens patet supponendo prius quod Filius nihil habeat nisi quod recepit a Patre. Secundo, supponitur quod Filius non recepit a Patre illud in quo sibi relative opponitur. Probatur, quia talibus proprietatibus incommunicabilibus persone distinguuntur, et quia per generationem activam Pater opponitur Filio, ideo sibi hanc non communicavit, per secundam suppositionem. Et Filius etiam non habet eam aliunde, per primam, ergo nullo modo.</p>
<p>d. 8, q. 1, concl. 2, f. 169va-b: Dico quod, per illud transitum de contradictorio in contradictorium, transitus talis quando<que> fit per veram mutationem, vel essentialem, vel actualem, formalem vel localem illius rei que significatur per utrumque subiectum contradictorium, sicut quando primo Socrates est et postea non est, vel quando primo est Parisius et postea</p>		<p>[13] d. 8, q. 1, concl. 2, ff. 178v-179r: Dicit hic Iacobus de Altavilla quod transitus de contradictio in contradictum quandoque fit per veram mutationem, vel essentialem vel accidentalem, formalem vel localem illius rei que significatur per utrumque subiectum</p>	<p>[25] d. 8, q. 1, ff. 98v-99r: Unde secundum Iacobum de Altavilla quandoque fit transitus de contradicto in contradictum per veram mutationem vel essentialem vel accidentalem, formalem vel localem istius rei que significatur per utrumque</p>

<p>non est Parisius. <Quandoque> talis transitus non per talem mutationem talis rei, sed per veram mutationem alterius, ut quando Socrates est similis Platoni, postea, per corruptionem albedinis vel alterius accidentis in Platone efficitur non similis per augmentationem, vel per diminutionem vel motum localem etc. Quandoque fit transitus talis per solum actualem <transitum> temporis, utpote primo Socrates non vixit quantum Plato continue. Potest fieri talis transitus propter solum transitum temporis potentialem, sicut si ponamus tempus esse motum celi, et celum per potentiam Dei quiescere, adhuc propter transitum temporis potentialem potest esse talis transitus. Quandoque fit talis transitus nulla mutatione facta, sed mutatio aliquo debet esse in aliquo, sicut si aliquis deberet aliquid /169vb/ facere, et non faceret, sicut est in casibus argumentorum, quia in primo casu talis deberet illam delectationem dimittere, et sic mutari antequam peccaret mortaliter; in casu secundo, talis deberet preceptum exequi; et ideo potest talis transitus fieri sine quacumque mutatione reali, sed non sine mutatione que deberet fieri. Et sic glosari potest articulus et intelligere.</p>		<p>contradictorum, sicut quando primo Socrates est et postea non est, vel quando primo Socrates est Parisius et postea non est Parisius. Quandoque talis transitus non propter mutationem talis rei, sed per veram mutationem alterius, ut quando Socrates est similis Platoni, et post, per corruptionem albedinis vel alterius accidentis in Platone, efficitur non similis per augmentationem, vel per diminutionem vel per motum localem. Quandoque vero fit transitus talis solum per actualem transitum temporis, sicut si primo Socrates vixit tantum quantum Plato et post non. Quandoque potest fieri talis transitus propter solum transitum temporis potentialem, sicut si ponamus tempus esse motum celi, et celum per potentiam Dei quiescere, adhuc propter transitum temporis potentialem potest esse talis transitus. Quandoque fit talis transitus nulla mutatione facta, sed mutatio aliquo debet esse in aliquo, sicut si aliquis deberet aliquid facere, et non faceret; et illud est in casibus argumentorum, quia iste deberet illam dimittere delectationem, et sic mutari antequam peccaret mortaliter. In casu secundo, talis deberet preceptum exequi, et ideo dicit quod talis transitus potest fieri sine quacumque mutatione reali, sed non sine mutatione que deberet</p>	<p>contradictorum, ut si Socrates prius est et posterius non, vel prius Wienne, posterius non. Quandoque vero fit per mutationem non istius sed alterius rei, ut si Socrates prius fuit similis Platoni in albedine, per corruptionem albedinis in Platone Socrates post non est similis. Quandoque propter actualem transitum temporis, ut patet de grosso si ex mandato principis hodie solveret 7 denarios et cras solum sex. Quandoque per potentialem, ut si celum quiesceret. Quandoque autem fit /99r/ talis transitus nulla facta mutatione reali, sicut in casu confirmationis, in quo talis deberet preceptum exequi. Et ideo dicit: quamvis talis transitus posset fieri sine quacumque mutatione reali, tamen non sine mutatione que deberet esse. Et sic glossari posset articulus, talis enim, quia infra tempus sibi prestitutum non expedit se de tali illecebra, igitur committit negligentiam, tamen cum sensu interpretativo, qui sufficiunt ad verificandum successive contradictoria. Tamen mihi videtur quod facilius sit dicere quod lapsus temporis sit in causa et sit pertinens modo predicto. Illa enim mutatio que deberet esse et non est nihil facit etc.</p>
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		feri. Et sic glossari potest articulus, vel forte verius ibi lapsus temporis esset in causa. Sed tamen primus modus, scilicet quod veniale non fiat mortale idem in numero, tenent antiqui communiter.	
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