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Verified compilation: the case of CompCert

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Verified compilation: the case of CompCert

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VERIMAG – CNRS

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Compiler safety

Scheduling

Fun stuff in compiling

Usual compiler

source code



target code (assembler source, object code, bytecode...)

tens of thousands of bugs in gcc's bug tracker



Why compiler bugs are nasty

A compiler bug may disappear

- ▶ if optimization levels are changed to ease debugging
- ▶ if a different compiler is used
- ▶ if debugging code is added to the program (even just `printf`)

A compiler bug is most often at first **undistinguishable from reliance on undefined behavior** in the program.



CompCert

Formally verified C compiler

project led by Xavier Leroy, then at INRIA, now at Collège de France

Non-commercial <https://github.com/AbsInt/CompCert>

Commercial <https://www.absint.com/compcert/index.htm>

trace of execution = sequence of external calls, volatile read/writes

valid trace of execution at C level



same trace of execution at assembly level



Trace of execution

A compiler optimizer may reorganize everything internally...
but must preserve all **interactions** with the outside world and their **ordering**

- ▶ calls to external functions (system calls, I/O, GUI...)
- ▶ read/write to volatile variables (for system-level programming)



Use case: traceability

Safe-critical systems (e.g. avionics)

Obligation to match object code to source

Conventional method: ~ 00 and some manual inspection

CompCert replaces this by mathematical proofs.

Can **use optimization**.



Semantics and proofs in CompCert

Each intermediate language comes with a **semantics** written in Coq.
Gives a **mathematical meaning** to all constructs in the intermediate language.


e.g. at C level, gives a notion of environment of variables (local and global), defines + as addition on various data types depending on types of inputs

Optimization / transformation phases written in Coq.
(Can call external untrusted OCaml code.)


Must prove **simulation** for each phase



Intermediate languages (1)



Intermediate languages (2)



Simulation proofs

Lockstep

one step of program before the transformation



one matching step of program after the transformation

More complex simulations replace sequences of steps by sequences of steps.



Overall use

These proofs concern the compiler designer only (and those who file for qualification for safety-critical systems).

For most users, using CompCert is just like using `gcc` or `clang`.

```
$ ccomp hello_world.c -o hello_world
$ ./hello_world
```

Or to produce assembly code

```
$ ccomp -S hello_world.c
```

Assembly output

```

// File generated by CompCert 3.10
// Command line: -S hello_world.c
.section .rodata
.balign 1
__stringlit_1:
.ascii "Hello, world!\012\000"
.type __stringlit_1, @object
.size __stringlit_1, . - __stringlit_1
.text
.balign 4
.globl main
main:
mov x29, sp
sub sp, sp, #16
str x29, [sp, #0]
str x30, [sp, #8]
adrp x0, __stringlit_1
add x0, x0, #:lo12:__stringlit_1
bl printf
movz w0, #0, lsl #0
ldr x30, [sp, #8]
add sp, sp, #16
ret x30
.type main, @function

```



Alternate front-ends

Many high-level languages / domain-specific languages compile to C.

- ▶ bugs in the high-level language compiler
- ▶ “semantic mismatches” between the high-level compiler and the C compiler

Solution: compile directly to one of CompCert’s early intermediate representations!

e.g. **Vélus** <https://velus.inria.fr/> compiles a subset of the synchronous data-flow Lustre / SCADE language used in avionics etc.

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Scheduling

An example of an **optimization**, particularly for low-power / embedded cores.

Instructions produce outputs a number of clock cycles after receiving their inputs.

Take this into account to **schedule** instructions.

A menu

1. oysters
2. veal blanquette
 - 2.1 prepare blanquette
 - 2.2 cook it
3. millefeuille
 - 3.1 **puff pastry**
 - 3.1.1 fold 1, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.2 fold 2, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.3 fold 3, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.4 fold 4, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.5 fold 5
 - 3.2 cream

Scheduling

“Official” CompCert produces instructions roughly in the source ordering.

Not the best execution order in general!

Especially on in-order cores.

Our solution: **verified scheduling**

Superblock scheduling

1. Partition each function into **superblocks**: one entry point, possibly several exit points, no cycle
2. Possibly do some other reorganization: tail duplication, etc. to get bigger superblocks
3. Schedule the superblock (no proof needed)
4. Witness through symbolic execution that the original and scheduled superblocks have equivalent **semantics** (proof needed)

Before register allocation, on IR.

On Kalray K VX and AArch64: reschedule basic blocks on assembly instructions after register allocation.



Equivalent semantics

- ▶ Same order of exit branches in original and scheduled superblock
- ▶ All live pseudo registers and memory have the same value at same exit point (non-live registers can differ)
- ▶ Same (or smaller) list of instructions that may fail (division by zero, memory access) reached at same exit point

Obtained by **symbolic execution**: two registers are considered equal if computed by exactly the same symbolic terms



Example

$$r_1 := a * b$$

$$r_3 := a - b$$

$$r_2 := r_1 + c$$

branch($a > 0$, EXIT1)

$$r_3 := a - b$$

$$r_4 := a * b$$

$$r_2 := r_4 + c$$

branch($a > 0$, EXIT1)

r_1 and r_4 are both dead at EXIT1 and at final point.

These two blocks are **equivalent**: in both cases

$$r_2 = (a * b) + c \text{ and } r_3 = a - b$$



Acceptable refinement

$$r_1 := a * b$$

$$r_3 := a - b$$

$$r_2 := r_1 + c$$

$$r_5 := a/b$$

branch($a > 0$, EXIT1)

r_5 dead on EXIT1.

$$r_3 := a - b$$

$$r_4 := a * b$$

$$r_3 := r_4 + c$$

branch($a > 0$, EXIT1)

$$r_5 := a/b$$

On x86, the division may fail:

- ▶ it's allowed to move it beyond the branch
- ▶ the converse is not allowed



What our CompCert does (roughly)

1. partition functions into superblocks
2. reorder instructions in each superblock
3. for each superblock, check that symbolic execution modulo live variable produces the same symbolic values for the original and transformed superblocks
4. (if the check fails, optimization fails; this does not happen in practice)

Simulation proof: if the check succeeds, a number of steps of the original program are simulated by a number of steps of the transformed program



Information needed

For all instructions

- ▶ **latency**: clock cycles between consuming operands and producing the value (or, more generally, a timetable of when each operand is consumed after the instruction is issued)
- ▶ **resource consumption**: CPU units in use that preclude other instructions being scheduled at the same time

Very difficult to find even for “open cores”!!!
(Reverse-engineer gcc and LLVM?)

Performance gain

CPU	Differences in cycles spent (%) compared to no CSE3, no unroll					
	avg	min	max	gcc -O2	avg	min
Cortex-A53	-16	-63	+3	+10	-23	+87
Rocket	-10	-43	+1	+29	0	+184
Xeon	-21	-56	+4	+21	-3	+189
KV3	-11	-32	+3	+8	-13	+88

Reducing the proof workload

We split most of our optimizations into:

- ▶ an **untrusted** program transformation
- ▶ a **verifier**, which is proved to answer “yes” only if semantics is preserved

Advantages:

- ▶ reducing the proof effort
- ▶ easing changes to the transformation (no need to redo proofs)

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Strength reduction

(Work in progress)

Rewrite costly instruction into cheaper instructions.

```
for(int i=0; i<n; i++) {
    tab[i*M] = 42;
}
```

into

```
data *p = tab;
for(int i=0; i<n; i++) {
    *p = 42;
    p += M;
}
```



Invariants

Being added to our compiler infrastructure for verifying optimizations.

Instead of just symbolic execution within the loop body, needs **invariants**.

Here, **at every loop iteration**, $p = \&\text{tab}[i * M]$.

True at loop start, then holds by induction over the number of loop iterations.

Fun CPU feature: conditional move

For predictable hard real time code (fewer execution paths)

Branches are **bad** for worst-case execution time static analysis (Absint aIT, etc.)

Suggestion: add **conditional moves for integer and floating-point registers**
at least on in-order cores

Fun CPU feature: dismissible loads

An operation that may fail cannot be moved before a branch

$$r_1 := a + i \lll 3$$

$$\text{branch}(i > 3, \text{EXIT1})$$

$$r_2 := \text{load}(p)$$

$$r_1 := a + i \lll 3$$

$$r_2 := \text{load}_s(p)$$

$$\text{branch}(i > 3, \text{EXIT1})$$

Cannot be done if the load can fail.

Need special load returning a **default value** instead of trapping.

- ▶ easy without virtual memory
- ▶ needs OS collaboration with virtual memory

Dismissible load on K VX

8 cycles

L100:

```

compw.ge $r32 = $r4, $r2
;;
cb.wnez$r32? .L101
;;
sxwd $r5 = $r4
addw $r4 = $r4, 1
;;
lws.xs $r3 = $r5[$r1]
;;
addw $r0 = $r0, $r3
goto .L100
;;

```

6 cycles

.L100:

```

sxwd $r5 = $r4
compw.ge $r32 = $r4, $r2
;;
lws.s.xs $r3 = $r5[$r1]
;;
cb.wnez $r32? .L101
;;
addw $r0 = $r0, $r3
addw $r4 = $r4, 1
goto .L100

```



A general call for collaboration

Need collaboration between

- ▶ compiler writers
- ▶ architecture / core designers
- ▶ operating systems (low level)

Our version of CompCert with optimizations not found in the “official” releases + the K VX target:

<https://gricad-gitlab.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/certicompil/compcert-kvx>

Pre-pass scheduling: K VX; Cortex-A53/A35 (AArch64); Rocket, SweRV EH1 (Risc-V)

Post-pass scheduling: K VX; Cortex-A53/A35 (AArch64)

