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Monica Brinzei, Chris Schabel

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## The Legacy of John of Ripa

Monica Brinzei and Chris Schabel\*

**Abstract:** Based on a wide investigation of the theological works of the later fourteenth century, this paper argues that the Franciscan John of Ripa was the most significant theologian whose activities date to the period between the Black Death and the Great Schism. After his Parisian *Sentences* lectures of the mid-1350s, Ripa's theories were copied, paraphrased, abbreviated, analyzed, adopted, or attacked not only by his confrères among the Friars Order, but also by secular theologians and members of the Augustinian, Carmelite, Cistercian, Victorine, Servite, and Trinitarian Orders at Paris. This paper first surveys this reception, focusing on the Sorbonne theologian Étienne Gaudet's version of a number of Ripa's questions and the reception of Ripa in the Augustinian John Hiltalingen of Basel, then presents the analysis of Ripa's ideas by the Franciscan Peter of Candia (Pope Alexander V), and concludes with an appendix on two fifteenth-century abbreviations, one by the famous Augustinian polymath Paul of Venice.

**Keywords:** John of Ripa, University of Paris, Étienne Gaudet, John Hiltalingen of Basel, Peter of Candia, abbreviations.

John of Ripa made a name for himself. Ripa's renown is immediately apparent on the sole basis of the roughly thirty known manuscripts preserving parts of his œuvre, including three fifteenth-century codices containing abbreviations of Ripa's questions on the *Prologus* and Book I of the *Sentences*: two of them are copies of the abbreviation done before 1402 by the famous Austin Friar Paul of Venice, while, at the time of writing, the third, holding a different abbreviation, is in private hands and can be purchased from Les Enluminures for \$27,500.<sup>1</sup> Among the witnesses to Ripa's *Sentences* questions, two open the text with a portrait of the author. If in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1083, f. 1va, Ripa is represented in the act of teaching in front of an audience composed of other Franciscans, in Casale

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\* Institut de recherche et d'histoire des textes, CNRS, Aubervilliers, France: mbrinzei@gmail.com / schabel@ucy.ac.cy. This paper has received funding from the ERC under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no 771589-Debate).

<sup>1</sup> See the appendix on these abbreviations.

Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, B 2, f. 1ra, the figure of the (future) master dominates a large illustrated initial. Holding his open book, Ripa is portrayed in this image as someone witnessing and supervising the readers who dive into his *magnum opus*. The iconography of these two initials differs in style, color, and dimension, but their intent is the same: to praise the authority of a major theologian beyond words, via an image.

There is little doubt that John of Ripa was the most important Franciscan theologian active between the Black Death and the Great Schism – probably even going back to Adam Wodeham at Oxford in the early 1330s – and indeed Ripa was probably the most influential theologian of the era *tout court*, until John Wyclif’s battle with Pope Gregory XI began in 1377, the year before the latter’s death and the outbreak of the schism. The evidence for Ripa’s dominance in the quarter century after his *Sentences* lectures lies in the frequent explicit citation and tacit quotation of his works by others. The first study devoted to Ripa was based on his reception in his famous Franciscan confrère Peter of Candia, the future Pope Alexander V (1409-1410), whose questions on the *Sentences* stem from lectures delivered at Paris in 1378-1379, beginning just when the Avignon Pope Clement VII was elected in opposition to the Roman Pope Urban VI. Candia described a number of Ripa’s theories at length, among them his take on divine foreknowledge, and Cardinal Franz Ehrle’s (1845-1934) discussion of this in his classic *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V.* of 1925 drew the attention of the young Hermann Schwamm (1900-1954).<sup>2</sup> As a result, Schwamm devoted his first monograph to *Magistri Ioannis de Ripa O.F.M. doctrina de praescientia divina: inquisitio historica*, published in 1930, which preceded his fundamental survey *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern* of 1934.<sup>3</sup>

Among John of Ripa’s early successors, he was best known for his focus on the latitude of species, although not everyone agreed on what his position was. In Paris in early 1383, in his second *Principium* on the *Sentences*, the Victorine Pierre Leduc<sup>4</sup> remarked that one of his *socii*, Étienne de Mesnil-Fouchart (or of Châlons-en-

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<sup>2</sup> Ehrle (1925).

<sup>3</sup> Schwamm (1930); Schwamm (1934).

<sup>4</sup> On whom see Courtenay (2020) and Schabel (2020).

Champagne), of the Trinitarian college of Saint-Mathurin,<sup>5</sup> had argued against one of Leduc's theses by declaring that "many people, both philosophers and theologians, have imagined that there is a supreme [creatable] species, such as Master John of Ripa," a subject that Ripa first addressed in his own first *Principium* at Paris in the fall of 1354. Leduc himself replied that "there is no wonder," because philosophers had asserted "many other false and impossible things," but he then implied that Ripa himself had not asserted this: "Saving [Stephen's] honor, no doctor, theologian or philosopher, could ever imagine a supreme creatable species" that would correspond to reality.<sup>6</sup> Although Leduc brought up Ripa here because Mesnil-Fouchart had done so, the Victorines knew Ripa directly, as is clear from an anonymous and incomplete Victorine set of questions on the *Sentences* in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14911, in which the latest scholastic cited is Ripa.<sup>7</sup>

As these examples show, besides being a towering figure among his own Minorite confrères, he was considered famous by others as well, including members of obscure or no longer dominant orders, such as the Trinitarians, the Victorines, and the Servites, whose only known medieval representative with a surviving set of *Sentences* questions, Lorenzo Opimo of Bologna, who lectured at Paris in 1370-1371, cites *Johannes de Ripa* or *Johannes de Marchia* three times.<sup>8</sup> The purpose of this chapter, then, is to examine the reception of John of Ripa in the quarter century after his *Sentences* lectures, mostly at Paris, and to determine what was he known for and by whom. The first section is a survey of Ripa citations and quotations in the surviving theological literature from 1354 to 1378, with a focus on the summaries of Étienne Gaudet and the reception in the Augustinian John Hiltalingen of Basel, and the second will look in more detail at how in 1378-1379 Peter of Candia relayed Ripa's doctrines to posterity. An appendix re-examines three fifteenth-century manuscripts that contain abbreviations of Ripa's *Prologus* and Book I.

### **The *École ripienne*, 1355-1378**

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<sup>5</sup> For his later career, see Sullivan (2004, pp. 253-254).

<sup>6</sup> Schabel (2020, p. 288.1-14).

<sup>7</sup> Schabel (2021, p. 256).

<sup>8</sup> Schabel (2022-2023, II, pp. 57-58).

In the epilogue to a volume that we jointly edited in 2020, Monica Brinzei launched the hypothesis of a “School of John of Ripa,” summarizing in four pages the ways in which Ripa was received in the half century after his Parisian *Sentences* lectures.<sup>9</sup> In this section we propose to expand on that synopsis by surveying in some detail who quoted Ripa explicitly and what theses from his theology and philosophy were embraced by his successors.

One of the most significant sources for Ripa’s reception is the collection of miscellaneous manuscripts that belonged to Étienne Gaudet, a secular theologian who first studied at the college de Navarre and later at the Sorbonne while Ripa was still active in Paris. These manuscripts were mistakenly attributed to Jean Falisca or Thomas of Krakow,<sup>10</sup> but in 1978 Zenon Kaluza demonstrated that they were produced by Gaudet for his own use over a period of decades.<sup>11</sup> In fact, Gaudet, who read the *Sentences* at Paris himself in 1359-1360, not only recorded many of the disputations that he witnessed, but he also copied and collected quires with all kinds of theological and philosophical texts that inspired and animated those debates, thus capturing the contemporary doctrinal tendencies in Paris. His notes abound in Oxonian philosophical texts and the number of the authors is quite impressive: Adam Wodeham, Geoffrey Hardeby, John Dumbleton, John Rodington, Nicholas Aston, Richard Kilvington, Richard Fitzralph, Richard Brinkley, Robert Holcot, Robert Halifax, Thomas Buckingham, Thomas Felthorp, Thomas Bradwardine, William Ockham, etc. Gaudet’s appetite for English thought is in tune with the times at Paris and makes his taste for the Parisian theologian Ripa all the more impressive. Besides the academic acts of his associates, Gaudet inserted in his notes the names of just a few authors active at the University of Paris, above all Gregory of Rimini, John Buridan, John Hiltalingen of Basel, John of Mirecourt, John of Ripa, and Nicole Oresme. Ripa seems to be a special focus of Gaudet’s interest, since Ripa’s name appears frequently in the margins of his notebooks. Yet Gaudet did not just refer to Ripa, but he also read and copied his texts.

Below is a chart of the Ripa material found in the Gaudet’s manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15888, known to Ripa specialists as manuscript *J*, of which folios 90ra-153r (a one-column cedula) are devoted to summarizing Ripa for

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<sup>9</sup> Brinzei (2020, pp. 426-429).

<sup>10</sup> Glorieux (1966)

<sup>11</sup> Kaluza (1978, esp. pp. 137-138).

Gaudet's own use. The chart establishes the concordance between the titles of questions and articles as found in the modern editions of Ripa's texts and those in Gaudet's notebook. André Combes made the first effort at such a chart 85 years ago, but he was able to detect less than half of the material, and he was not interested in the person responsible or the circumstances of the production of the text.<sup>12</sup> The editions published since then, as well as advances in our knowledge of Gaudet, permit a more complete, accurate, and clear update. As was often the case, Gaudet did not work in a linear fashion with his paper quires, so he sometimes went back and filled blank spaces, using a system of notes and symbols to direct himself or his reader, and on occasion he summarized the same material twice. The chart follows the sequence in the Gaudet manuscript, but here is the sequence according to the works of Ripa:

Principium in I (*Quaestio de gradu supremo*)

Prologus

I, d. 1

I, d. 2

I, d. 16, q. un.

I, d. 17, pars 1, qq. 1-2 (plus an extra question also in manuscript *S*)

*Determinationes*, qq. 1-3

In other words, Gaudet summarized the very lengthy first section of Ripa's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*, starting with his first *Principium* (known as the *Quaestio de gradu supremo*), continuing with all eight questions of the *Prologus*, and going on to include all five questions of distinction 1 and all four questions of distinction 2 of Book I, all of which have already been published by André Combes (with the collaboration of Paul Vignaux and Francis Ruello) and Andrea Nannini. Afterwards, he added Book I, distinction 16 and the first part of distinction 17, and finally the first three questions of the *Determinationes*.

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<sup>12</sup> Combes (1939, pp. 286-289), covering ff. 125-153. In Combes (1956, p. 164 and n. 3), he noted that he later realized that the actual Ripa questions begin on f. 90 and (p. 166) updated his catalogue, but skipped ff. 108rb-122vb. By 1964 (*Quaestio de gradu supremo*, p. 48), he added those folios to his lengthy description (pp. 45-53). Without mentioning Gaudet, Andrea Nannini discusses the nature of the abbreviation in *J* at length in his 2023 introduction to Iohannes de Ripa, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum*, distinctio prima, ed. A. Nannini, Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Rome 2023, pp. xxii-xlix.

Compared to the pagination in the modern editions, the foliation and sometimes the number of lines given in the chart for the articles helps highlight the differing degrees to which Gaudet abbreviated, with some articles reduced to just a few lines. Gaudet invested time and resources into his effort to sift out the core of Ripa's, at first probably attempting to collect as much as possible, but sometimes in his rush he kept only the essential, the titles of theses (*conclusiones* and *correlaria*). On folio 90r Gaudet interjects that *solus primus articulus habetur integrere, residium tabulatur*, to the first article of question 1 of the *Prologus* is copied at length, but the rest is more or less abbreviated. The final questions read more like a *tabula* than a real summary. Since Gaudet was not a mere scribe, he paid close attention to Ripa's ideas and quite often at the end of a folio he employed the blank space to add a small *résumé* of the copied question. Frequently he also inserted a *tabula* with the titles of *conclusiones* to produce a tool that would facilitate navigation through the text.

Gaudet's work on Ripa's writings was done with a precise goal: Ripa's philosophical arguments provide the blueprint for Gaudet's own doctrinal development. Gaudet's choice of materials to summarize was not dictated solely by time. Alexandra Anisie and Jordan Lavender have recently pinpointed clearly the innovative and radical elements in Ripa's theses, especially concerning the beatific vision, and Anisie traced his impact in Gaudet.<sup>13</sup> For the most part, Gaudet chose passages linked to Ripa's position on the beatific vision, epistemology, and latitudes of being and forms, the which is why he opted for the first *Principium* (*Quaestio de gradu supremo*), the *Prologus*, distinctions 1-2 and 16-17 of Book I of the *Sentences*, and the first three questions of the *Determinationes*. These texts likely served as sources for arguments and ideas to be used in Gaudet's principal debates with his *socii*, where he defended his own theses and attacked those of his fellow bachelors.<sup>14</sup> The fact that some questions are more abridged than others may be explained by a sense of urgency to cover all the subjects of the debates. This rush may also explain the fact that some sections are copied or abbreviated twice in different ways, namely articles 2 and 3 of the first question of the *Prologus* (ff. 96ra-va and 150ra-152r), question 2 of the *Prologus* (ff. 97rb-vb and 125ra-131vb), and the opening to distinction 2, question 4 (ff. 98ra and 123rb).

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<sup>13</sup> Lavender (2022); Anisie (2024, pp. 402-414); Anisie (forthcoming).

<sup>14</sup> See Schabel (2024, pp. 293-297).

Codicological speaking, a new quire begins on folio 125ra, and probably the various passages from Ripa were copied at different times and circulated on separate quires among Gaudet’s papers. The two articles of the first question of the *Prologus* were added at the end of a quire and on the recto of a smaller inserted *cedula* as folio 153.

Gaudet’s summaries of Ripa reflect the rapid reception and circulation of Ripa’s writings in Paris, just a few years after Ripa read the *Sentences* in 1354-1355 and almost immediately after his *Determinationes*. One of Ripa’s key concepts is *informatio*, which plays a central role in his position on the beatific vision, helping him explain how the divine essence can communicate itself to human minds in generating the beatific vision. Ripa’s opinion is developed in three stages that Combes traced in the different versions of Ripa’s texts, suggesting that Ripa tempered his view in advancing the idea of a communication of the divine essence itself as an intrinsic form in his *Determinationes*.<sup>15</sup> It seems that manuscript Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, E.71, manuscript *S* according to Combes’ *sigla codicum*, represents a first phase in this development, when Ripa, as Anisie remarks, “uses the term ‘informare’ freely to refer to the communication of the divine essence to the flesh and soul of Christ, as well as to other types of creatures.”<sup>16</sup> It appears that the text that Gaudet copies or summarizes belongs to the same family as *S*, since Gaudet reports some articles in distinction 17 that are present in *S* alone.<sup>17</sup> It thus seems that, insofar as Gaudet summarized the *Sentences* questions, he witnessed an early phase of Ripa’s doctrine on the communication on the part of the divine essence.

The following chart gives the titles in the critical edition, the variants in manuscript *J* of Gaudet (unless otherwise note, the variants refer to the previous word), the pagination in the critical editions, and the foliation in *J*:

John of Ripa in Étienne Gaudet, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15888 ( <i>J</i> )
<b>Prologus, q. 1:</b> Utrum divina essentia possit esse de immensa natura intellectui creato notitia theologica beatifica (ed. Combes, pp. 9-13; <sup>18</sup> <i>J</i> 90ra-b)
<b>A. 1:</b> Utrum sit possibile absolute aliquam formam creatam esse proprio subiecto formabili remissius actum vel formam intrinsecam quam sit in sua natura actus vel forma. (ed. Combes, pp. 15-59; <i>J</i> 90rb-95vb)
<b>A. 2:</b> Utrum sit absolute possibile divinam essentiam esse alicui creature formabili formam substantialem vel accidentalem sibi intrinsecam. (ed. Combes, pp. 60-201; <i>J</i> 96ra)

<sup>15</sup> Jean de Ripa, *Determinationes. Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. A. Combes, Vrin, Paris 1957, pp. 122, 75-84.

<sup>16</sup> Anisie (forthcoming, footnote 60).

<sup>17</sup> Jean de Ripa, *Determinationes*, p. 139, in the apparatus.

<sup>18</sup> Jean de Ripa, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum. Prologi: Questiones I et II*, ed. A. Combes, Vrin, Paris 1961.



<p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum intrinseca formatio cuiuscumque forme create ad suum subiectum formabile exigit necessario inherentiam. (ed. Combes, pp. 202-228; <i>J</i> 96va, 31 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum in qualibet forma vitaliter immutante potentiam perceptivam creatam sit possibilis habitudo vitalis immutationis absque habitudine informationis et e converso. (ed. Combes, pp. 229-305; <i>J</i> 96va-97rb)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, q. 2:</b> Utrum secundum positionem Philosophi eiusque commentatoris Averrois prima intelligentia cuilibet intelligentie citra se sit notitia theologica beatifica. (ed. Combes, pp. 307-311; <i>J</i> 97rb)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum secundum viam [intentionem <i>J</i>] philosophi aliqua intelligentia separata possit esse alterius entitatis a sua propria vitalis essentia sive forma. (ed. Combes, pp. 313-329; <i>J</i> 97rb, 25 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum secundum viam philosophi aliqua essentia possit esse [alterius <i>add. J</i>] forma vitalis et immutativa, absque informatione et inherentia. (ed. Combes, pp. 330-353; <i>J</i> 97va, 25 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum secundum viam philosophi omnino eadem essentia possit esse eidem potentie vel diversis intensius vel remissius formalis notitia. (ed. Combes, pp. 354-365; <i>J</i> 97va, 30 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum quelibet intelligentia separata possit esse per suam essentiam formalis notitia et beatifica de prima intelligentia. (ed. Combes, pp. 366-384; <i>J</i> 97vb)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 2, q. 4:</b> Utrum perfectio specierum possibilium citra primum [summum <i>J</i>] penes replicationem unitatis divine generaliter mensuretur. (ed. Nannini, pp. 301-305;<sup>19</sup> <i>J</i> 98ra: vide infra)</p>
<p><b>Questio de gradu supremo:</b> Utrum a supremo gradu entis simpliciter tota latitudo ymaginaria quam terminat sit derivabilis contingenter. (ed. Combes, pp. 143-222;<sup>20</sup> <i>J</i> 99ra-104ra)</p>
<p><b>Determinationes, q. 1, a. 1:</b> Utrum divina essentia secundum quamlibet perfectionem intrinsecam communicabilis sit ad extra ut forma informativa. (ed. Combes, pp. 19-63;<sup>21</sup> <i>J</i> 104ra-106vb)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 2, q. 3, a. 1:</b> Utrum aliqua sit possibilis suprema species a Deo creabilis et finita. (ed. Nannini, pp. 223-237; <i>J</i> 107ra-b)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum suprema species a Deo creabilis constituatur in esse per aliquam novam replicationem unitatis divine quam non participat aliqua citra ipsam. (ed. Nannini, pp. 265-294; <i>J</i> 107rb-va)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum in <i>A</i> specie sit possibilis multitudo numeralis vel etiam numeralis latitudo [vel – latitudo <i>om. J</i>] individuorum. (ed. Nannini, pp. 295-300; <i>J</i> 107va-b)</p>
<p><b>Determinationes, q. 1, a. 2:</b> Utrum necessario ad cuiuscumque forme create vel increate actuationem intrinsecam sequatur aliqua compositio seu resultatio essentie tertie constitute [<i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Combes, pp. 64-79; <i>J</i> 108ra-b)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum divina essentia secundum plenitudinem essentialem communicabilis sit ad extra ut forma constitutiva vel perfectiva. (ed. Combes, pp. 80-153; <i>J</i> 108va-109vb)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum divina essentia nature assumpte a Verbo sit unita ut forma intrinseca perfectiva vel constitutiva... Utrum in hac ineffabili unione divina essentia sit unita in esse essentiali vel solum in esse suppositali [p. 154.7-8 = title in <i>J</i>] (ed. Combes, pp. 154-167; <i>J</i> 110ra-vb)</p>
<p><b>Determinationes, q. 2:</b> Utrum intellectus possibilis sit potentia activa formaliter vel passiva. (ed. Combes, pp. 169-171; <i>J</i> 110vb)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum quelibet potentia perceptiva in eo quod perceptiva sit formaliter active seu passiva. (ed. Combes, pp. 172-180; <i>J</i> 111ra-b)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum quodlibet actuale percipere creature sit formaliter pati seu agere. (ed. Combes, pp. 181-240; <i>J</i> 111rb-112rb)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum quelibet species intellectui inexistens possit intelligentiam vitaliter immutare, id est, utrum species intelligibilis sit actus intelligendi vel possit esse. (ed. Combes, pp. 241-258; <i>J</i> 112rb-114ra)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum quelibet intelligentia seu intellectiva substantia sit essentia sui vitaliter cognitiva. (ed. Combes, pp. 259-283; <i>J</i> 114ra-115vb)</p>
<p><b>Determinationes, q. 3:</b> Utrum divina essentia ab aliqua creabili seu creata intelligentia sit visibilis comprehensive. (ed. Combes, pp. 285-287; <i>J</i> 115vb)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum sit possibile divinam essentiam esse memorie create lumen glorie seu speciem beatificam. (ed. Combes, pp. 288-357; <i>J</i> 115vb-119vb)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum possibile sit divinam essentiam intelligentie create esse de sua natura visionem beatificam. (ed. Combes, pp. 358-421; <i>J</i> 119vb-121vb)</p>

<sup>19</sup> Jean de Ripa, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum. Prologi: Questiones I et II*, ed. A. Combes, Vrin, Paris 1961.

<sup>20</sup> Jean de Ripa, *Quaestio de Gradu Supremo*, eds. A. Combes, P. Vignaux, Vrin, Paris 1964.

<sup>21</sup> Jean de Ripa, *Determinationes*, ed. A. Combes, 1957.

<p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum divina essentia in patria et in via sit voluntatis create caritas fruitiva (ed. Combes, pp. 422-442; <i>J</i> 121vb-122vb)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum intellectui creature divina essentia possit esse comprehensiva notitia. (ed. Combes, pp. 443-445; <i>J</i> 122vb-123rb)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 2, q. 4:</b> Utrum perfectio specierum possibilium citra primum penes replicationem unitatis divine generaliter mensuretur. (ed. Nannini, pp. 301-305; <i>J</i> 123rb)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum cuiuslibet speciei citra primum perfectio incipiat a non-gradu simpliciter et terminetur exclusive ad primum. (ed. Nannini, pp. 307-350; <i>J</i> 123rb-124rb)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum cuiuslibet speciei finite excessus tam individualis quam specificus supra speciem inferiorem sit solum finitus. (ed. Nannini, pp. 351-399; <i>J</i> 124rb-va)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum latitudo specierum possibilium citra primum habeat se in suis gradibus per modum continui vel discreti. (<i>J</i> 124va-b: vide infra, 147vb, for a. 4)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, q. 2:</b> Utrum secundum positionem Philosophi eiusque [et eius <i>J</i>] commentatoris Averrois prima intelligentia cuiuslibet [cuiuslibet <i>J</i>] intelligentie citra se sit notitia theologica beatifica. (ed. Combes, pp. 307-311; <i>J</i> 125ra-b)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum secundum viam Philosophi aliqua intelligentia separata possit esse alterius entitatis a sua propria vitalis essentia sive forma. (ed. Combes, pp. 313-329; <i>J</i> 125rb-126va)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum secundum viam Philosophi aliqua essentia possit esse forma vitalis et immutativa absque informatione et inherentia. (ed. Combes, pp. 330-353; <i>J</i> 126va-129ra)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum secundum viam Philosophi omnino eadem essentia possit esse eidem potentie vel diversis intensius vel remissius formalis notitia. (ed. Combes, pp. 354-365; <i>J</i> 129ra-130rb)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum quelibet intelligentia separata possit esse per suam essentiam formalis notitia et beatifica de prima intelligentia [<i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Combes, pp. 366-384; <i>J</i> 130rb-131vb)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, q. 3:</b> Utrum sola divina essentia possit esse intellectus creati notitia theologica beatifica. (ed. Combes, pp. 29-38; <i>J</i> 132ra)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum sola divina essentia possit esse intellectus creati in patria lux formalis et beatifica (ed. Combes, pp. 39-106; <i>J</i> 132ra-va)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum sola divina essentia possit esse species beatifica memorie create in patria. (ed. Combes, pp. 107-149; <i>J</i> 132vb-vb, 16 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum sola immensa natura possit esse verbum beatificum beatorum in patria. (ed. Combes, pp. 150-208; <i>J</i> 132vb)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum sit absolute possibile duo premia beatifica respectu eiusdem potentie esse alterius speciei et tamen eiusdem formalia premia. (ed. Combes, pp. 209-219; <i>J</i> 133ra-b)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, q. 4:</b> Utrum sola [<i>om. J</i>] divina essentia sit omnium relucendum verorum in ipsa intellectui [<i>om. J</i>] beato formalis notitia. (ed. Combes, pp. 221-225; <i>J</i> 133va)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum possibile sit divinam essentiam respectu alicuius entis possibilis in ipsa relucendum esse intellectui creato formalem notitiam. (ed. Combes, pp. 227-239; <i>J</i> 133va-b)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum possibile sit [est <i>J</i>] divinam essentiam tam perfecte esse intellectui creato de aliquo ente in ipsa relucendum formalem notitiam quam possibile est ipsam esse formalem notitiam de propria sua essentia. (ed. Combes, pp. 239-245; <i>J</i> 133vb, 15 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum possibile sit divinam essentiam respectu veri contingentis esse intellectui creato formalem notitiam. (ed. Combes, pp. 246-263; <i>J</i> 133vb, 17 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum divina essentia ut veri contingentis formalis notitia intellectui creature possit cum voluntate create active concurrere ad aliquam actionem. (ed. Combes, pp. 264-275; <i>J</i> 133vb-134ra)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, q. 5:</b> Utrum divina essentia sub quacumque ratione intrinseca menti obiecta sit de sua immensa natura sufficiens notitia theologica beatifica. (ed. Combes, pp. 277-280; <i>J</i> 134rb)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum sit absolute possibile divinam essentiam secundum omnem rationem intelligibilem sibi intrinsecam ab intellectu creato simul et semel intuitive videri. (ed. Combes, pp. 281-299; <i>J</i> 134rb, 7 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum possibile sit intellectum creatum beatifice videre divinam essentiam absque hoc quod videat aliquam emanationem personarum eternam. (ed. Combes, pp. 300-310; <i>J</i> 134rb, 18 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum divina essentia ab intellectu creato sit visibilis beatifice secundum unam rationem essentialem intrinsecam absque hoc quod videatur secundum aliam que ipsam formaliter non includit. (ed. Combes, pp. 311-318; <i>J</i> 134rb, 16 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum ad perfectam visionem divine essentie requiratur clara notitia cuiuslibet complexe significabile contingentie. (ed. Combes, pp. 319-321; <i>J</i> 134rb, 5 lines)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, questio ultima prime partis:</b> Utrum secundum rei veritatem et probabiliorem sententiam divina essentia sit creature rationali in patria de sua natura et relucendum veris [<i>om. J</i>] in ipsa notitia</p>

<p>theologica formalis et beatifica. (ed. Combes, pp. 323-328; <i>J</i> 134va)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum divina essentia sit lumen glorie et formale in patria. (ed. Combes, pp. 329-334; <i>J</i> 134va, 27 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum divina essentia sit species beatifica memorie beate in patria [m.b.i.p. <i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Combes, pp. 335-339; <i>J</i> 134va, 8 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum divina essentia sit intelligentie create in patria visio beatifica. (ed. Combes, pp. 340-346; <i>J</i> 134v, 17 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum sola divina essentia sit infallibilis contingentium verorum notitia. (ed. Combes, pp. 347-352; <i>J</i> 134vb: Hec de illa conclusione, quia de hiis magis in 3<sup>o</sup> libro.)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, q. 6:</b> Utrum possibile sit intellectum creature rationalis [i.c.r.: creature rationali <i>J</i>] habere notitiam theologiam claram et intuitivam in lumine naturali. (ed. Combes, pp. 353-355; <i>J</i> 135ra) 365)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Quid sit proprie intuitiva notitia et quomodo ab abstractiva distinguitur? (ed. Combes, pp. 357-365; <i>J</i> 135ra-b: Primus articulus est investigare descriptionem intuitive notitie quid sit proprie et...)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum quodlibet obiectum creatum ad sui intuitivam notitiam cum intellectu creato possit obiective concurrere. (ed. Combes, pp. 366-398; <i>J</i> 135va-136vb)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum aliqua entitas creata respectu divine essentie possit aliquo modo dici intuitiva notitia. (ed. Combes, pp. 399-416; <i>J</i> 137ra-vb)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum intellectus creatus in eternis rationibus intuitive cognoscat certas de rebus creatis et infallibiles veritates. (ed. Combes, pp. 417-430; <i>J</i> 138ra-vb)</p>
<p><b>Prologus, q. 7:</b> Utrum intellectui viatoris de veritatibus theologis possit adgenerari habitus proprie scientificus. (ed. Combes, pp. 431-433; <i>J</i> 139ra)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum eadem res creata possit esse sui ipsius notitia et obiecti quod in ipsa relucet. (ed. Combes, pp. 435-447; <i>J</i> 139ra-va)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum habitus fidei infusus vel acquisitus sit habitus evidens et cognitivus. (ed. Combes, pp. 448-453; <i>J</i> 139va-b)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum ex studio Sacre Scripture possit adgenerari [generari <i>J</i>] habitus proprie cognitivus. (ed. Combes, pp. 454-455; <i>J</i> 140ra, 17 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum viatori de veritatibus theologie sit compossibilis aliquis habitus proprie scientificus. (ed. Combes, pp. 457-459; <i>J</i> 140ra)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 1, pars 1 q. 1:</b> Utrum sola Trinitate incommunicabili creatura rationalis beatifice possit frui. (ed. Nannini, pp. 3-5;<sup>22</sup> <i>J</i> 140va)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum sola divina essentia possit esse voluntatis create fruitio beatifica. (ed. Nannini, pp. 9-30; <i>J</i> 140va)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum quodlibet divinum suppositum sit alterius obiectum fruibile beatificum. (ed. Nannini, pp. 31-35; <i>J</i> 140vb, 8 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum quodlibet divinum suppositum possit esse voluntatis create obiectum fruibile beatificum. (ed. Nannini, pp. 37-40; <i>J</i> 140vb, 18 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum sit absolute possibile voluntatem creatam uno divino supposito frui beatifice sine altero. (ed. Nannini, pp. 41-71; <i>J</i> 140vb-141ra)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2:</b> Utrum respectu cuiuslibet obiecti volibilis usus et fruitio sint actus immediati et realiter differentes [e.r.d. <i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Nannini, pp. 73-91; <i>J</i> 141rb)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum voluntas divina circa divinam essentiam precise sub una ratione perfectionali ostensam possit habere actum aliquem medium inter fruitionem et usum [i.f.e.u. <i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Nannini, pp. 93-99; <i>J</i> 141rb)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum quodlibet divinum suppositum circa seipsum vel alterum habeat actum medium inter fruitionem et usum [i.f.e.u. <i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Nannini, pp. 101-108; <i>J</i> 141rb, 6 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum voluntas creata in proprio genere possit elicere [habere aliquem <i>J</i>] actum medium inter fruitionem et usum [i.f.e.u. <i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Nannini, pp. 109-130; <i>J</i> 141ra, 12 lines, directed there from note on 141rb with symbol +)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum sit possibile aliquem actum elicited a voluntate esse simul fruitionem et usum. (ed. Nannini, pp. 131-154; <i>J</i> 141ra, 10 lines)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 1, pars 1 q. 3:</b> Utrum solo bono incommutabili voluntas viatoris licite possit frui. (ed. Nannini, pp. 155-158; <i>J</i> 141va)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum cuiuslibet intellectualis substantie limitate capacitas sit solum finita. (ed. Nannini, pp. 159-</p>

<sup>22</sup> Iohannes de Ripa, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum*, distinctio prima, ed. A. Nannini, Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Rome 2023.

<p>299; <i>J</i> 141va-144vb)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum proportionaliter [<i>om. J</i>] iuxta bonitatem obiecti diligibilitas mensuretur. (ed. Nannini, pp. 301-308; <i>J</i> 145ra)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum aliquod bonum commutabile ratione efficientie a voluntate sit diligibile supra se. (ed. Nannini, pp. 309-316; <i>J</i> 145ra)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum in lumine naturali sit evidenter probabile solum bonum incommutabile esse obiectum licite a voluntate nostra fruibile. (ed. Nannini, pp. 317-338; <i>J</i> 145rb-vb)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 4:</b> Utrum omnis qualitas subiective inexistenti voluntati sit operatio eius immanens. (ed. Nannini, pp. 339-341; <i>J</i> 146ra)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum omnis actus voluntatis create sit volitio vel nolitio. (ed. Nannini, pp. 343-356; <i>J</i> 146ra, 29 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum omnis actus voluntatis sit voluntati cognitio. (ed. Nannini, pp. 357-378; <i>J</i> 146ra, 8 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum in voluntate sit aliqua passio que non sit volitio vel notitio. (ed. Nannini, pp. 379-391; <i>J</i> 146ra, 10 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum voluntati divine correspondeat aliqua vitalis denominatio que non sit volitio vel nolitio. (ed. Nannini, pp. 393-395; <i>J</i> 146ra, 6 lines)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 1, pars 2, q. un.:</b> Utrum voluntas creata respectu sue libere motionis, puta frui vel uti sive alterius medie, sit necessitabilis obiective. (ed. Nannini, pp. 397-400; <i>J</i> 146rb)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum voluntas creata per aliquid bonum creatum propositum sit necessitabilis obiective. (ed. Nannini, pp. 401-434; <i>J</i> 146rb)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum aliquis habitus creatus possibilis possit voluntatem necessitare. (ed. Nannini, pp. 435-437; <i>J</i> 146va, 13 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum respectu obiecti sub pura ratione boni ostensi voluntas sit obiective necessitabilis. (ed. Nannini, pp. 439-451; <i>J</i> 146va)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum obiectum beatificum beatifice presentatum voluntatem beati necessitet ad fruendum. (ed. Nannini, pp. 453-469; <i>J</i> 146vb)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 2, q. 1:</b> Utrum in latitudine entium sit aliquis simpliciter primus gradus et omniquaque immensus (ed. Nannini, pp. 3-6;<sup>23</sup> <i>J</i> 147ra)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum in ordine essentiali causarum efficientium sit possibilis in infinitum processus. (ed. Nannini, pp. 7-49; <i>J</i> 147ra, 22 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum primi gradus essendi perfectio iuxta distantiam a non-gradu simpliciter valeat mensurari. (ed. Nannini, pp. 51-94; <i>J</i> 147ra, 18 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum ex dictis Philosophi et Commentatoris possit convinci immensitas primi gradus essendi. (ed. Nannini, pp. 95-104; <i>J</i> 147ra-b)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum ex quolibet gradu finito essendi probari possit immensitas primi gradus. (ed. Nannini, pp. 105-141; <i>J</i> 147rb, 6 lines)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 2, q. 2:</b> Utrum primum gradum simpliciter non esse omnem repugnantiam implicet a priori. (ed. Nannini, pp. 143-146; <i>J</i> 147rb, 4 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum in entibus esse plures simpliciter primos gradus claudat contradictionem [Utrum plures esse deos implicet contradictionem <i>J</i> (!)]. (ed. Nannini, pp. 147-169; <i>J</i> 147ra, 3 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum Deum esse sit primum principium significabile complexe. (ed. Nannini, pp. 171-185; <i>J</i> 147ra, 6 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum negatio divini esse sit simplici conceptu formabilis in mente. (ed. Nannini, pp. 187-208; <i>J</i> 147rb, 6 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 4:</b> Utrum ad Deum non esse evidenter [<i>om. J</i>] sequatur et formaliter Deum esse. (ed. Nannini, pp. 209-218; <i>J</i> 147rb, 15 lines)</p>
<p><b>I, d. 2, q. 3:</b> Utrum in latitudine entium sit possibilis aliqua species suprema creabilis et primo immediata. (ed. Nannini, pp. 219-222; <i>J</i> 147va)</p> <p><b>A. 1:</b> Utrum aliqua sit possibilis suprema species a Deo creabilis et finita. (ed. Nannini, pp. 223-237; <i>J</i> 147va, 16 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 2:</b> Utrum in latitudine entium sit possibilis suprema species a Deo creabilis. (ed. Nannini, pp. 239-263; <i>J</i> 147va, 30 lines)</p> <p><b>A. 3:</b> Utrum suprema species a Deo creabilis constituatur in esse per aliquam novam replicationem unitatis divine quam non participat aliqua citra ipsam [unitatis – ipsam: <i>om. J</i>]. (ed. Nannini, pp. 265-</p>

<sup>23</sup> Iohannes de Ripa, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum*, distinctio secunda, ed. A. Nannini, Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Rome 2020.

294; <i>J</i> 147va-b) <b>A. 4:</b> Utrum in A specie sit possibilis multitudo numeralis vel etiam numeralis latitudo individuorum. (ed. Nannini, pp. 295-300; <i>J</i> 147va, 3 lines)
<b>I, d. 2, q. 4, a. 4:</b> Utrum quodlibet individuum supra proprium gradum specificum aliquam perfectionem simpliciter superaddat. (ed. Nannini, pp. 469-495; <i>J</i> 147vb-148ra, note 147va infra: Item, sequens questio est utrum perfectui rerum possibilium citra primum penes replicationem unitatis divine generaliter mensuretur; cum suis tribus articulis habetur in 3 <sup>o</sup> sisterno...)
<b>I, d. 16, q. un.</b> <sup>24</sup> Utrum creatura rationalis prius naturaliter sanctificetur intrinsece per donum caritatis increate quam per donum caritatis create. [In materia de sanctificatione creature circa 16 distinctionem multa ponit qualis sit gratificatio intrinseca <et> extrinseca creature <i>J</i> ] ( <i>J</i> 148ra) <b>A. 1:</b> Utrum ad gratificationem intrinsecam creature sit necessario ponendum donum caritatis increate in mente. [ <i>titulus om. J</i> ] ( <i>J</i> 148ra-va) <b>A. 2:</b> Utrum ex actu intrinseca per donum increatum necessario consurgat in mente gratificatio ad beatificum premium. ( <i>J</i> 148va) <b>A. 3:</b> Utrum simul stet mentem gratificari per utrumque donum caritatis creatum et increatum [c.c.e.i. <i>om. J</i> ] ( <i>J</i> 148va-b) <b>A. 4:</b> Utrum prius secundum naturam sit mentem gratificari intrinsece per donum creatum quam [vel <i>J</i> ] increatum vel e converso. ( <i>J</i> 148vb)
<b>I, d. 17, pars 1, q. 1, a. 4:</b> Utrum solum agere Spiritus Sancti ut habitus sit dignum meritum ad Spiritus Sancti immediate augmentum. [4 <sup>us</sup> articulus sequentis questionis utrum solum... <i>J</i> ] ( <i>J</i> 148vb) <b>I, d. 17, pars 1, q. 1:</b> Utrum absolute sit possibile voluntatem creatam acceptari ad beatificum premium sine dono supernaturali infuso creato vel increato. ( <i>J</i> 149ra) <b>A. 1:</b> Utrum per solam gratificationem extrinsecam legis divine stet voluntatem creatam ad premium acceptari. ( <i>J</i> 149ra) <b>A. 2:</b> Utrum quodlibet agere voluntatis, circumscripta omni intrinseca imputabilitate, sit ad premium acceptabile. ( <i>J</i> 149ra) <b>A. 3:</b> Utrum solum agere ex caritate increata procedens sit ad premium beatificum intrinsece imputabile. ( <i>J</i> 149rb, completed on 149ra infra, then a. 4 on 148vb, then dubium on 149va)
<b>I, d. 17, pars 1, q. 2</b> (mss SV, <i>Conclusiones</i> , p. 139, note): Utrum ad [in <i>S</i> ] omnem actum meritorium prius naturaliter influat caritas increata ac etiam creata quam ipsa voluntas. ( <i>J</i> 149va) <b>A. 1:</b> Utrum caritas increata respectu actus meritorii sit prius secundum naturam et causalitatem influens quam increata prius quam voluntas creata. [Utrum increata prius quam creata <i>J</i> ] ( <i>J</i> 149va, 17 lines) <b>A. 2:</b> Utrum caritas creata infusa sit habitus educibilis de potentia voluntatis. [e.d.p.v. <i>om. J</i> ] ( <i>J</i> 149va, 8 lines: Hec questio non perficitur per ipsum)
<b>I, d. 17, pars 1, q. 2:</b> Utrum per solum donum caritatis create voluntas viatoris ad beatificum [ <i>om. J</i> ] premium sit intrinsece acceptabilis. (ed. Combes, p. 139; <i>J</i> 149vb) <b>A. 1:</b> Utrum sit absolute possibile Spiritum Sanctum esse voluntati [voluntatis <i>J</i> ] create intrinsecum donum gratificativum [eiusdem <i>add. J</i> ]. (ed. Combes, p. 140; <i>J</i> 149vb) <b>A. 2:</b> Utrum sit absolute [ <i>om. J</i> ] possibile Spiritum Sanctum esse creature principium intrinsecum imputabilitatis ad premium. (ed. Combes, p. 142; <i>J</i> 150ra, 12 lines) <b>A. 3:</b> Utrum cuilibet voluntati creabili vel create donum caritatis create possit esse donum supernaturale. (ed. Combes, p. 143; <i>J</i> 150ra-b) <b>A. 4:</b> Utrum per solum tale donum creatum agere voluntatis create habere possit intrinsecam imputabilitatem ad premium. (ed. Combes, p. 144; <i>J</i> 150rb)
<b>Prologus, q. 1, a. 2:</b> Utrum sit absolute possibile divinam essentiam esse alicui creature formabili formam substantialem vel accidentalem sibi [ <i>om. J</i> ] intrinsecam. (ed. Combes, pp. 59-201; <i>J</i> 150va-152vb) <b>a. 3:</b> Utrum intrinseca formatio cuiuscumque forme create [ <i>om. J</i> ] ad suum subiectum [ <i>om. J</i> ] formabile exigit necessario [ <i>om. J</i> ] inherentiam. (ed. Combes, pp. 202-228; <i>J</i> 153r)

Based on his summaries, at first glance one might think that Gaudet was a follower of Ripa, but based on his own lectures at the Sorbonne it seems that the secular bachelor

<sup>24</sup> Jean de Ripa, *Conclusiones*, ed. A. Combes, 1957.

did not share all the teachings of the Franciscan master. In fact, Gaudet was often critical, such that in his *Principia* he employed Ripa's text mainly to reject the theses of his *socii*, as Alexandra Anisie has demonstrated in a recent paper.<sup>25</sup> Thus Gaudet did not agree with his *socii* when they embraced Ripa's theory that the divine essence can be the form of the creature during the beatific vision or Ripa's Christological view that during the hypostatic union divine perfection and the divine attributes are communicated by the *communicatio idiomatum* to the human nature.

Besides the beatific vision and Christology, the theory of the latitude of forms and perfections of species was also discussed by Gaudet, especially in the context of the principal debates with his *socii*. This is apparent from Gaudet's notes in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16535, which Combes dubbed codex *L*, in the quire (ff. 178r-189v: *Pro principio aliqua collige ...*) that collects fragments and notes from the exchanges with his fellow bachelors. Ripa's name is shown up quite frequently in the margins of the abbreviated text. One detail draws the attention of the reader: all these references are highlighted by the formula *contra Ripa*, or even with crossed out passages (see ff. 176r, 179r, 181r-v, 182r, 182<sup>bis</sup>r, 183r, 183<sup>bis</sup>r, 184v, 187v, 189v, 190r-v, 191r). From these references one gathers that the main confrontation on the interpretation of Ripa's position was between Gaudet and his Carmelite *socius*: Gaudet does not accept the Carmelite's position, following Ripa, that God can communicate divine perfection to the human nature during the hypostatic union and thus that "the human nature is God on account of the divine essence," to such an extent that attributes like omniscience and omnipresence can be predicable on the side of a human being.<sup>26</sup> Here Gaudet refers not only to Ripa's first *Principium*, his *Quaestio de gradu supremo* ("Item vide ea que de Ripa in illa questione – scilicet 8 conclusiones – utrum a supremo gradu essendi simpliciter tota latitudo ymaginaria etc.," f. 181v), but also to Ripa's third *Principium* ("Item in sequenti questione: utrum anima Christi ex ineffabili unione ad verbum etc. ponit aliquas propositiones," f. 191r).

The bachelors of theology at Paris were thus quite familiar with Ripa's doctrines, and Gaudet was not a mere copyist or abbreviator, but an interlocutor and commentator on Ripa's texts and a crucial witness to the early dissemination of Ripa's ideas in Paris

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<sup>25</sup> Anisie (forthcoming).

<sup>26</sup> Anisie (forthcoming).

among other theologians. For the latter claim two examples will suffice. In his notebook *L*, Paris, BnF, lat. 16535, Gaudet summarized a notebook of another interesting theologian. In the tenth quire of *L*, Gaudet lists the contents “in 23 sisternis” of Galeranus of Pendref that today are lost, and Ripa’s name appears already in the first lines of these notes from notes.<sup>27</sup> Galeranus, representing the Collège de Navarre, read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1370-1371 as a *socius* of Henry of Langenstein,<sup>28</sup> but afterwards he excelled in medicine, becoming the physician of Pope Clement VII and of Cardinal Jean de la Grange. These biographical elements not only contribute to the intellectual portrait of a reader of Ripa’s texts, but, together with the fact that another physician, Henry Doigny, was involved in the sale of one manuscript of Ripa’s *Sentences* question, the present Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14580, to the library of Saint-Victor at the beginning of the fifteenth century, they indicate that Ripa was known not only in the camp of theologians but also among the doctors of medicine in Paris.

Gaudet is also witness to an author who was called by his contemporaries a *Ripista*: Richard Barbe, active at the Collège de Navarre in Gaudet’s time.<sup>29</sup> In his notes Gaudet emphasizes Barbe’s interest in the nature of the infinite latitude of perfection of things, the nature of the first necessary being, and divine causation.<sup>30</sup> Barbe’s teaching on the latitude of forms is deeply inspired by and rooted in Ripa’s metaphysics. There is independent evidence for Ripa’s influence on Barbe in the German Augustinian John Hiltalingen of Basel, as the following passages reveal:

1. Et hoc consequens reputat etiam falsum Richardus **Barbe** quaestione 1 *Lecturae* suae, et Iohannes de Marchia 2 questione *Determinationum* articulo 2, ubi etiam tractat materiam, qualiter ars est ipsa anima, circa medium istius articuli. (*Prologus*, q. 1, a. 4, vol. I, p. 203.1-4)
2. Sed secundum opinionem Iohannis de Marchia, quem **Barbe** sequitur quaestione sua prima, diceretur, quod non ab obiecto, sed solum a specie intelligibili. (*Prologus*, q. 1, a. 5, vol. I, p. 217.4-6).
3. Ex quo patet, quod plura dicta Iohannis de Marchia et Richardi **Barbe** fundantur super falso, ut videbitur infra distinctione 1. (*Prologus*, q. 1, a. 5, vol. I, p. 286.2-3)

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<sup>27</sup> Zenon Kaluza published the quire because it contains a summary of Richard Brinkley’s *Sentences*: Kaluza (2023, pp. 145-189).

<sup>28</sup> Brinzei, Schabel (2020, pp. 337, 342, 345).

<sup>29</sup> For a doctrinal portrait of Richard Barbe see Brinzei (forthcoming, a)

<sup>30</sup> Texts edited by Florina Hariga and translated in Brinzei (forthcoming, a).

4. Nam Iohannes de Ripa in actuacione mentis in patria beatifica ponit duas necessitates et unam libertatem sive liberalitatem. Similiter habet dicere **Barbe**. (I, d. 1, q. 2, conc. 1, vol. I, p. 317.4-6)<sup>31</sup>
5. Primum corollarium contra Barbe in questione utrum voluntas iam elevata et beata sit ex lege certo gradu limitata... Secundum corollarium contra Iohannem de Marchia quaestione 1 *Determinationum*, conclusione 1, corollario 4 et **Barbe** ubi supra. (IV, q. 39 = d. 49, 2<sup>a</sup> pars, ms. Toulouse, BM, 248 [I 158], f. 110ra)

John Hiltalingen, who also appears quite often in Gaudet's later notebooks, was himself another observer of Ripa's dissemination in the Faculty of Theology of Paris when he read the *Sentences* about a decade after Gaudet, in 1368-1369, although Hiltalingen was consistent in rejecting Ripa's ideas on the beatific vision, fruition, the incarnation, and Christology more generally. Remarkably, Hiltalingen, who usually calls Ripa *Iohannes de Marchia*, quite often refers to Ripa's texts with very precise citations indicating the question, article, and conclusion of the Franciscan. Here is a chart according to question in Hiltalingen (with references to the edition), the text(s) of Ripa cited explicitly (implicit citations are in parentheses), and the context:

1. *Prologus*, q. 1, a. 5 (I, pp. 203, 216-217, 286<sup>32</sup>) → *Determinationes*, q. 2, a. 2: divine illustration and the mental art of the soul
2. I, d. 1 = q. 2 (I, pp. 308-311, 315, 317) → *Prologus*, q. (5); *Determinationes*, q. 3, a. 1; *Prologus*, q. 2, aa. 2-3: on fruition *in via* and *in patria*
3. I, d. 3 = q. 4 (II, pp. 10, 11, 13<sup>33</sup>) → *Determinationes*, q. 2, a. 1 et q. 1, a. 1: *potentia vitalis intellectualis*
4. I, d. 7 = q. 8 (II, p. 58) → (I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1): on the production of the Word
5. I, d. 8 = q. 9 (II, p. 75) → (I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 4): latitude of perfections
6. I, d. 9 = q. 10 (II, pp. 97-99) → *Determinationes*, q. 1, a. 1: *gradus latitudinis*
7. I, dd. 10-11 = q. 11 (II, p. 118) → (I, d. 10, q. 1, a. 1): *voluntas divina principium communicandi, non spirandi*
8. I, d. 14 = q. 13 (II, pp. 143-146, 153) → *Determinationes*, q. 3, a. 3; I, d. 16; I, d. 17: *caritas et gratia gratificativa*

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<sup>31</sup> All the published references are from Iohannes de Basilea OESA, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Tomus I. Super primum librum: Principium primum, Quaest. 1-3*, ed. V. Marcolino, coop. M. Brnzei et C. Oser-Grote, Cassiciacum, Würzburg 2016.

<sup>32</sup> Iohannes de Basilea OESA, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Tomus I*, ed. Marcolino, coop. Brnzei et Oser-Grote, Cassiciacum, Würzburg 2016.

<sup>33</sup> Iohannes de Basilea OESA, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Tomus II. Super primum librum, Quaest. 4-35*, ed. V. Marcolino, coop. M. Brnzei et C. Oser-Grote, Cassiciacum, Würzburg 2017.



9. I, d. 15 = q. 14 (II, pp. 155, 162, 164) → *Determinationes*, q. 2, a. 1 et q. 3, a. 3: perception of *divinae personae*
10. I, d. 16 = q. 15 (II, pp. 166-169) → *Determinationes*, q. 2, a. 3: the role of *species inexistens memoriae* in actualizing thought
11. I, d. 17 = q. 17 (II, pp. 192, 198) → I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3: *caritatis gradualis intensio*
12. I, d. 17 = q. 18 (II, p. 205) → *Determinationes*, q. 3, a. 2: *caritas gratuita*
13. I, dd. 32-33 = q. 26 (II, p. 307) → (I, d. 40, q. 2, a. 1): *dilectio intensiva vel intensive (Pater et Filius)*
14. I, dd. 38-39 = q. 29 (II, pp. 336, 339, 343, 344) → (I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1; d. 39, q. 1, a. 1; d. 38, q. 2, a. 1; *Prologus*, q. 4, a. 3): *essentia divina sit not ratio necessaria future contingentis*
15. I, d. 41 = q. 31 (II, p. 361) → (I, d. 39, q. 1, a. 1): *homo poterit esse ratio distinctivae causalis ipsius future*
16. I, d. 45 = q. 33 (II, p. 386) → general: *velle divino non correspondet causalitas ad extra*
17. II, d. 1 = q. 1 (III, pp. 52, 56<sup>34</sup>) → I, d. 2, (q. 1, a. 4): *non gradus essendi evidentia naturali infert evidenter immensitatem gradus primi*
18. II, dd. 12-13 = q. 9 (III, p. 169) → I, d. 2, pars 2, q. 2 (= q. 4), a. 3: perfection of finite species
19. II, d. 1 = q. 10 (III, pp. 182, 183) → I, d. 2, pars 2 (= q. 4), a. 1: *cuiuslibet speciei perfectio intensive*
20. II, d. 15 = q. 11 (III, pp. 191, 196) → (I, d. 46, q. 1, a. 1): *terminus divini posse est omnis totalis possibilis latitudo creaturarum*
21. II, dd. 33-34 = q. 22 (III, p. 320) → (I, d. 2, a. 3, a. 2); I, d. 2, pars 2, q. 1 (= q. 2), a. 2: *supremum possibile malum*
22. III, dd. 5-6 = q. 3 (IV, pp. 39, 47, 50, 51<sup>35</sup>) → *Determinationes*, q. 1, aa. 3-4: *communicatio divinae naturae*
23. III, dd. 10-12 = q. 5 (IV, p. 66) → *Determinationes*, q. 1, a. 2: *communicatio divinae naturae: ratio constitutiva et ratio informativa*

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<sup>34</sup> Iohannes de Basilea OESA, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Tomus III. Super secundum librum*, ed. V. Marcolino et M. Brinzei, coop. C. Oser-Grote, Cassiacum, Würzburg 2018.

<sup>35</sup> Iohannes de Basilea OESA, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Tomus IV. Super tertium librum*, ed. V. Marcolino et M. Brinzei, coop. C. Oser-Grote, Cassiacum, Würzburg 2020.

24. III, dd. 15-16 = q. 7 (IV, p. 93) → *Determinationes*, q. 3, a. 4: Christology: *cognitio animae Christi*
25. III, dd. 17-18 = q. 8 (IV, p. 103) → *Determinationes*, q. 3, a. 3: Christology: *voluntas create et gratia gratificata*
26. III, dd. 21-22 = q. 10 (IV, pp. 116, 118) → *Determinationes*, q. 1, aa. 2-3: Christology: *infra triduum mortis Christis caro Christi non fuit mortua*
27. IV, d. 49, 2<sup>a</sup> pars = q. 39 (f. 110ra<sup>36</sup>) → *Determinationes*, q. 1, (a. 1): beatific vision, *beatum esse est Deum summum bonum*
28. IV, d. 49, 4<sup>a</sup> pars = q. 41 (ff. 111vb, 112ra) → *Determinationes*, q. 3, a. 1: beatific vision: *essentia divina intellectui creato beato non est species*
29. IV, d. 50, 1<sup>a</sup> pars = q. 42 (f. 112rb) → *Prologus*, q. penultima, a. 3: beatific vision: *nulla nec ullis perfectionibus finitis potest mens beati quietari*

Hiltalingen was thus quite familiar with Ripa, particularly his *Determinationes*, but his focus centered on a cluster of topics, mainly the beatific vision, Christology, and some metaphysics, as was the general trend among Parisian theologians reading Ripa. Hiltalingen constantly rejects Ripa's positions, sometimes vehemently: *plura dicta Iohannis de Marchia fundantur super falso* (I, p. 286); *Iohannes de Marchia male exposuit doctorem istum (Thomam)* (III, p. 118); *multae rationes Iohannis de Marchia fundantur super falso et per ignorantiam logicae peccant* (II, 75). One passage seems to make reference to the so-called condemnation of Ripa's thesis in Paris,<sup>37</sup> since Hiltalingen witnesses that Ripa's doctrine was prohibited in Paris: *Quamvis non appareat in formis, continent tamen haec dicta laqueos, propter quos doctrina Iohannis de Marchia prohibita fuit, quia aliqui ipsum sequi volentes haec concesserunt et alia plura magis male sonantia*.<sup>38</sup>

These condemnations, which Jean Gerson would mention later,<sup>39</sup> did not inhibit the circulation of Ripa's texts among other theologians at Paris, for example, the Augustinian Angelus Dobelin and the secular Pierre d'Ailly, who both read the *Sentences* in the 1370s. While d'Ailly followed the mainstream and embraced some

<sup>36</sup> The edition of book IV is not yet edited, I will refer here to ms. Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale, 248 (I 158).

<sup>37</sup> Combes (1940, pp. 674-687); Combes (1956, pp. 176-220).

<sup>38</sup> Iohannes de Basilea OESA, *Super primum librum*, d. 45 = q. 33, concl. 1, ed. V. Marcolino, p. 386: For an analysis of the *mala sonat* during the condemnation see Brinzei (forthcoming, b).

<sup>39</sup> See the details of his reaction in Combes (1940, pp. 674-687).

epistemological tools from Ripa, such the *immutatio vitalis*,<sup>40</sup> Dobelin was familiar with Ripa's theses on creation, quoting Ripa a few times in Book II, question 30,<sup>41</sup> on the issue of creation, whether God communicates to creatures the highest degree of being, and on how a lower species can be close to the highest degree of supreme perfection. Dobelin focused on Ripa's Book I, distinction 2, question 3, article 2, conclusion,<sup>42</sup> discussing how the metaphysics of the latitude of forms can be used to explain creation (*ad intra* and *ad extra*). Dobelin's quotations are quite accurate, suggesting that he had Ripa's texts before his eyes. Nevertheless, as with his confrère Hiltalingen, Dobelin did not share Ripa's ideas, but rejected his arguments and his examples (Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Ms. El. 47):

f. 75rb: Item per Johannem de Ripa arguitur ex duabus propositionibus quarum prima est: *signata aliqua latitudine intensiva, talis est tam intensa precise sicut esset terminus supremus qui inclusive terminaret latitudinem istam*. Secunda est: *quilibet gradus citra immensum est effective derivabilis a gradu immenso, et hoc tam in esse causalitatis quam in esse entitatis*.<sup>43</sup>

f. 75va: Ad rationem Johannis de Ripa potest negari prima propositio. Etiam sibi non multum suffragatur, cum solum veritatem habeat de latitudinibus finitis, et non infinitis, que nec quantificari nec mensurati proprie possunt. Sed tunc af formam rationis patet quod minor est falsa, et ipse abutitur secunda sua propositione cum dicitur, "A est derivabilis a C," quia hoc non est probatum per eum. Nec propositia secunda hoc dicit, sed tantum illud: quod quilibet gradus citra immensum est effective ab eo derivabilis. Et ex hoc vult inferre quod etiam tota latitudo illius, et patet quod consequentia non valet. Et ista sufficiant de isto articulo.

f. 76vb: Secundus articulus est utrum Deus eternaliter creaverit mundum sive universum. In ista materia ponit magister Johannes de Ripa talem conclusionem: quod omnem rem productam vel producendam Deus eternaliter produxit. Pro cuius probatione premitit duas suppositiones. Prima est quod Deus eternaliter et semper idem vult voluntate efficaci... Secunda suppositio est quod hec consequentia est necessaria: 'Deus vult hoc producere, ergo hoc producit', et si nullum impediens est, valet etiam in creaturis...

f. 77rb-va: Ad rationem Johannis de Ripa, cum arguitur: "Deus vult A creaturam producere cras, ergo ab eterno voluit A producere cras," concedo consequens. Et ulterius, cum infertur: "ergo eternaliter produxit a cras," nego consequentiam istam. Et cum dicit quod "consequentia patet per secundam suppositionem, que est 'Deus vult hoc producere, ergo hoc producit', hec consequentia est bona," nego illud... Et ex hoc sequitur <quod> [quia] secunda conclusio predicti doctoris sit falsa...

<sup>40</sup> Rode (2015, pp. 300-302); Biard (2019, pp. 88, 91, 111).

<sup>41</sup> Ms Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Ms. El. 47 (*Utrum causa prima tam mirabiliter creavit mundum quam mirabiliter potuit producere universum*, ff. 73ra-78ra): see Trapp (1963, p. 400).

<sup>42</sup> Johannes de Ripa, *Lectura super I Sententiarum*, distinctio secunda, ed. Nannini, pp. 239-263.

<sup>43</sup> Johannes de Ripa, *Lectura super I Sententiarum*, dist. 2, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Nannini, p. 243.

This strong but often negative interest in John of Ripa at Paris in the decades after his *Sentences* lectures, especially among seculars and Augustinians, but his reception among Franciscans was more positive. It has been shown that Francis of Perugia, Franciscan regent master at Paris around 1370, was a close follower and even summarizer of Ripa, likely the source for the citations of Ripa in the Servite Lorenzo Opimo, mentioned above.<sup>44</sup> The positive citation of Ripa would reach its zenith at the end of the 1370s with his most famous Franciscan successor at Paris.

### **The Reception of John of Ripa in Peter of Candia**

The previous section has revealed how John of Ripa was received in the works of the theologians active between Ripa's lectures on the *Sentences* in 1354-1355 and the outbreak of the Schism when classes were beginning at Paris in September of 1378. Perhaps the most spectacular example of Ripa reception comes in the *Sentences* lectures of the Franciscan bachelor who was just performing his *Principia* when the schism began, the Cretan Greek Peter of Candia, whose questions on the *Sentences* survive in dozens of witnesses and who went on to be elected Pope Alexander V at the Council of Pisa in 1409, in a failed attempt to end the schism, which resulted in a third papal line, continued by John XXIII after Alexander's death in 1410.

Not only did Ripa's opinions reach an even wider public through Candia's questions, but Candia's *modus operandi* made his work a reliable doxographical replacement for Ripa's original. Candia wanted his text to be transparent, so he told his readers what he was doing. This often involved presenting the opinions of other theologians, mostly Franciscans from earlier in the century. Usually Candia would paraphrase or explain in his own words the main points of these earlier scholastics, and occasionally he would conclude by giving the gist of the positions in a wonderfully succinct paragraph. In fact, during the famous quarrel over future contingents at Louvain almost a century after Candia's *Sentences* lectures, in which Peter de Rivo defended the position of Peter Auriol, Rivo would remark in that Lord Peter of Candia "explained his opinion in clearer words."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Brinzei (2020, pp. 427-429); (2022-2023, II, pp. 57-58).

<sup>45</sup> Schabel (1995-1996, II, p. 405.36-37).

Candia's questions are huge, six for the *Prologus* and Book I (one for the *Prologus* and five for Book I, but numbered 1-6), three for Book II, and one each for Books III and IV. It is clear that Candia always proceeded by first checking what his earlier fourteenth-century confrères John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, William of Ockham, and John of Ripa had to say, for the theologians he cites in his eleven questions, not including his citations of his *socii* in his *Principia*, are as follows, in chronological order:

I (*Prologus*), q. 1: Utrum intellectus viatoris per exercitium theologicum acquirat evidentem notitiam de credibilibus revelatis.

Scotus, Auriol, Ockham, Ripa + Aquinas, Rimini, Heytesbury

I, q. 2: Utrum sola natura universaliter et complete perfecta sit obiectum fruitionis totaliter quietantis.

Scotus, Auriol, Ockham, Ripa + Aquinas, Caracciolo, Wodeham, Monachus, Brinkley

I, q. 3: Utrum alicui rationi, cui entitatis conditio inest intrinsece, correspondeat formaliter omnium perfectionum essentialium plenitudo.

Scotus, Ockham, Ripa + Hales, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Giles, Wodeham, Bradwardine

I, q. 4: Utrum simplicitati divine substantie sit intrinsece compossibilis qualiscunque distinctarum rationum realium multitudo.

Scotus, Auriol, Ockham, Ripa + Aquinas, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Caracciolo, Marchia, Meyronnes, Wodeham, Rimini

I, q. 5: Utrum creatura rationalis sine create vel increate caritatis presentia possit ad beatificum premium acceptari.

Scotus, Auriol, Ockham, Ripa + Aquinas, Burley, Rimini, William of Cremona

I, q. 6: Utrum divina essentia habeat distinctam notitiam cuiuslibet gradus possibiliter vel realiter existentis.

Scotus, Auriol, Ockham, Ripa + Grosseteste, Bradwardine, Brinkley, Gerard Kalkar

II, q. 1: Utrum immensitas divine potentie ad plura se valeat extendere causaliter effective quam limitata intellectualis substantia possit capere cognitive.

Scotus, Auriol, Ockhamists, Ripa

II, q. 2: Utrum quelibet intellectualis natura certis circumscripta limitibus corporum extrinsecis passionibus naturalibus sit subiecta.

Bonaventure

II, q. 3: Utrum forma reponens hominem in esse specifico sit intellectualis entitas incorruptibilis per naturam.

Scotus, Ockham, Ripa + Hales, Bonaventure, Gerard Kalkar

III, q. un.: Utrum ineffabile Dei Verbum naturam passibilem assumpsit de Virgine propter liberationem humani generis a dyabolica potestate.

Scotus, Auriol, Ripa + Grosseteste, Hales, Bonaventure, Meyronnes, War' (see note)

IV, q. un.: Utrum eukaristia sit sacramentum ex institutione divina corpus et sanguinem Christi signans veraciter sub speciebus panis et vini realiter contineri.

Scotus, Ockham, Ripa + Hales, Bonaventure, Caracciolo, Gerard Kalkar

(*Principia*: Scotus, Ockham, Ripa + Grosseteste, Bradwardine, Brinkley)

In these eleven units plus *Principia*, John Duns Scotus OFM and John of Ripa OFM each appear in all but one question, followed by William of Ockham OFM (8 + *Principia*), Peter Auriol OFM (7), Bonaventure of Bagnoregio OFM (6), Thomas Aquinas OP (5), Alexander of Hales OFM (4), Gregory of Rimini OESA (3), Landolfo Caracciolo OFM (3), Gerard Kalkar (3), Thomas Bradwardine (2 + *Principia*), Richard Brinkley OFM (2 + *Principia*), Robert Grosseteste (2 + *Principia*), Adam Wodeham OFM (2), Francis of Meyronnes OFM (2), William Heytesbury (1), Monachus Niger OSB (1), Giles of Rome OESA (1), Henry of Ghent (1), Francis of Marchia OFM (1), Walter Burley (1), William of Cremoma OFM (1), and probably William of Ware (1).<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> In Vat. lat. 1081 he is cited as “Magister Iohannes War” on ff. 226va, 227va, and 231vb. These either refer to someone who is otherwise unknown or are mistaken reference to John of Ripa and/or to William of Ware. In the reference on f. 226va, which cites “*Principio sui tertii*,” Paris, BnF, n.a.l. 1467 and Assisi 151 have instead “Ripa,” while Erfurt, CA 2<sup>o</sup> 94 omits the last name. In the case of the citation on f. 227ra, however, Paris 1467 has “Ubare” or “Uuare” and both Assisi and Erfurt omit the first name while having “Varre” and “Guarronis” respectively. In the place corresponding to f. 231, Assisi even has “magistri Guilielmi Varre,” but Erfurt has “magistri Io. Guaronis.” Could the first reference be to John of Ripa and the other two should be to William of Ware? Aside from his first *Principium*, the *Quaestio de gradu supremo*, John of Ripa’s only other *Principium* to survive is his *Principium tertii*, preserved in the following Ripa manuscripts, according to Combes (1956, pp. 165-170): Archivio della Basilica di San Pietro, G 37, ff. 9vb-10vb (a. 1, conc. 1-7) et ff. 98rb-101rb (aa. 1-3); Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 184, ff. 225rb-226vb; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15888, ff. 103ra-104ra (a. 1, conc. 1-7, et a. 4 = *Prologus*, q. 4, a. 2); Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16533, ff. 89r (a. 1, conc. 1-7); Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16535, ff. 191r (a. 1, conc. 1, 2, 4-7, in brief); Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale, 1725 (21866), ff. 47r-49r; Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 159, f. 17r. The *conclusiones* of the *Principium tertii* were published in Jean de Ripa, *Conclusiones*, ed. A. Combes, Vrin, Paris, 1957, pp. 281-282, and neither they nor the Paris manuscripts contain the passage indicated: Candia says on V 226va: “Primo investigabo possibilitatem incarnationis per varias vias... Quantum igitur ad primum est advertendum quod quadruplex modus ymaginandi istam possibilitatem a diversis doctoribus est expressus, prout recitat magister Iohannes de War’/Ripa in *Principio sui tertii*...” William of Ware’s first question for Book III is “Utrum incarnatio sit possibilis,” precisely the issue that Candia is treating, and

That is, of the 23 university-era scholastics whom Candia cited, Ripa ranks first with Scotus in terms of numbers of questions in which they are cited.

It is fortunate that Candia divided these eleven questions into three self-contained articles each, some of which are also very large, so they are further subdivided into parts, again usually three. Of the 33 articles, John of Ripa appears in fifteen, almost half, and indeed twelve of the first nineteen. The following chart gives the place and article title in Candia, then in brackets the text of Ripa cited explicitly, if applicable, and finally the name of the person responsible for the transcription or edition of the text, if applicable:<sup>47</sup>

- I (*Prologus*), q. 1, a. 3: Utrum studenti theologie, ut viator est, repugnet cognitio scientifica credibilium veritatum. [*Prologus*, q. 7, a. 1] [Unedited]
- I, q. 2, a. 2: Utrum eternis relationibus possit correspondere formaliter a divina essentia distincta ratio fruitiva. [*Sent.* I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4; *Sent.* I, d. 19, q. 1, a. 3] [Unedited]
- I, q. 2, a. 3: Utrum voluntas creata respectu fruitionis elicite sit a suprema substantia necessitabilis obiective. [*Sent. (Scriptum)* I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 3] [Severin Kitanov]
- I, q. 3, a. 1: Utrum sit naturaliter demonstrabile quamlibet condicionem primitatis simpliciter alicui enti per rationem propriam convenire. [*Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1] [Girard J. Etzkorn]
- I, q. 3, a. 2: Utrum enti cui primitas correspondet intrinsece repugnet formaliter quidditatis multiplicatio numeralis. [Girard J. Etzkorn]
- I, q. 3, a. 3: Utrum infinitatis positiva conditio sit evidenter demonstrabilis de qualibet entis primaria ratione. [*Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 3, a. 4] [Girard J. Etzkorn]
- I, q. 4, a. 1: Utrum supremo rerum principio correspondeat in esse proprio fecunditas productiva. [Girard J. Etzkorn]
- I, q. 4, a. 2: Utrum productorum in divinis realis distinctio sit absoluta penitus vel simpliciter relativa. [*Scriptum* I, dd. 25-26] [Girard J. Etzkorn]
- I, q. 5, a. 1: Utrum caritas immensa formaliter possit esse formalis caritativa dilectio rationali creature. [Girard J. Etzkorn]

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early on he says that “dicunt quidam quod quadruplex est unitas...” (Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Mériadeck, 163, f. 156ra). It seems that all three references should belong to William of Ware, who is not otherwise cited in Peter of Candia.

<sup>47</sup> *The Peter of Candia Homepage* has migrated from Cyprus to Romania: <http://thesis-project.ro/petrusdecandia/texts.html>. The HTML files are online, but those by Girard J. Etzkorn, in PDF format, have yet to be restored.

- I, q. 6, a. 1: Utrum divina essentia sit tantummodo secundum rationem essentiali-  
 cuiuslibet entis realis vel possibilis ratio formaliter cognitiva. [Chris Schabel]
- I, q. 6, a. 2: Utrum intellectiva divine substantie habeat distinctam et infallibilem notitiam  
 futurorum contingentium. [Chris Schabel]
- II, q. 1. a. 1: Utrum ab immensa deitatis omnipotentia sit effective derivabilis aliqua  
 species simpliciter infinita. [*Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 4, a. 3; *Prologus*, q. penult., a. 2] [Girard  
 J. Etzkorn]
- II, q. 3, a. 2: Utrum forma reponens hominem in esse specifico sit per species a  
 corruptibilibus causatas cuiuscumque ab ea cognoscibilis cognitiva. [*Sent.* I, d. 3, q. 3,  
 a. 3; *Determinationes*, q. 1, a. 4] [Unedited]
- III, q. 1, a. 1: Utrum Verbum aeterni Patris potuerit in unitatem suppositalem assumere  
 naturam certis limitibus circumscriptam. [*Determinationes*, q. 1, a. 4] [Girard J.  
 Etzkorn]
- IV, q. 1, a. 2: Utrum corpus dominicum sub speciebus panis et vini realiter contineatur  
 secundum quamlibet conditionem proprie quantitatis. [Paul Bakker and Chris Schabel]

That is to say, Candia cites the following places in Ripa's œuvre:

- Prologus*, q. 7, a. 1, in Candia, I (*Prologus*), q. 1, a. 3
- Prologus*, q. 7, a. 2, in Candia, II, q. 1. a. 1
- Sent.* I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, in Candia, I, q. 2, a. 2
- Sent.* I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 3, in Candia, I, q. 2, a. 3
- Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, in Candia, I, q. 3, a. 1
- Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 3, a. 4, in Candia, I, q. 3, a. 3, and II, q. 3, a. 2
- Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 4, a. 3, in Candia, II, q. 1. a. 1
- Sent.* I, d. 19, q. 1, a. 3, in Candia, I, q. 2, a. 2
- Sent.* I, dd. 25-26, in Candia, I, q. 4, a. 2
- Determinationes*, q. 1, a. 4, in Candia, II, q. 3, a. 2, and III, q. 1, a. 1

Naturally, when Candia cited Ripa in a context where a specific topic was almost always discussed in the same place, as for example foreknowledge in distinctions 38-39 of Book I, no explicit citation was deemed necessary.

The amount of space that Peter of Candia devoted to John of Ripa in several of these contexts is impressive, as much as 2000 lines or more. Due to restricted space, the focus



below will mainly be on instances where Candia gives the gist of Ripa's position, while trying to at least mention what Candia says elsewhere. We will cite online editions according to paragraph number in square brackets, e.g. [§10],<sup>48</sup> and for the Latin we employ the following manuscripts of Candia's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*:

F = Fribourg, Couvent des Cordeliers, 20

P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3084

V = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 1081

The topic that has received the most attention in this regard, starting from Erhle, rising in Schwamm, and culminating in the online edition of Peter of Candia, is divine foreknowledge of future contingents, the subject of Candia's Book I, question 6, article 2. There, in part 3, Candia runs through the opinions of doctors of the Parisian Faculty of Theology, in this case all Franciscans. Candia announces that he will first deal with Peter Auriol, then "ymaginationem Magistri Iohannis de Ripa," and finally the Subtle Doctor [§31]. In his usual way, Candia presents at length in his own words (circa 2500 of them) "ymaginationem Magistri Iohannis de Ripa" in avowedly neutral fashion, starting with theses "que sive sint vere sive false non multum curo nisi volo solum ostendere mentem suam" [§100, theses on §§101-126]. Then, in order to see better the "radix" of Ripa's theses, Candia offers objections to the theses and responds according to his conception of Ripa's opinion, again in his own words (circa 3200 more of them), concluding "Et sic patet ymaginatio istius doctoris" [§155; §§127-155]. Unlike his usual practice of summing up a position in one succinct paragraph, Candia immediately switches to John Duns Scotus, whose view is presented more briefly (in circa 2700 words) [§§156-176]. After offering his own synopsis of Scotus, he concludes: "Unde si quis bene advertit, positio Magistri Iohannis de Ripa nichil aliud est quam positio Doctoris Subtilis diffusius declarata" [§176].

Having devoted the equivalent of a couple dozen pages to Ripa and Scotus, carefully analyzing what they have to say, we should take seriously Candia's contention that Ripa's view is effectively the same as Scotus', only explained at greater length. In other

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<sup>48</sup> On the THESIS website: <http://thesis-project.ro/petrusdecandia/texts.html>.

words, Candia's synopsis of Scotus' theory in the final paragraph is also meant to be a synopsis of Ripa's own:

One must pay attention to the fact that, according to this doctor, four things are in sequence, namely the divine essence, the volitional power, the act of willing, and the willed object. Therefore, I state four negative propositions in sequence. The first, that the divine essence as such does not represent any contingent *ratio*. The second, that neither does the volitional power. The third, that neither does the act of willing, because it is also formally necessary. [Fourth], neither does the willed object represent anything to the divine essence, because in this way the divine intellect would become worthless. Therefore a future contingent is represented by the determination of the divine will as by a *ratio* of knowing, and similarly this determination is known by itself. And through this I say that the very determination of the divine will is the cognitive *ratio* of itself and of future contingents. And through this it is apparent that no necessary cognition follows with respect to a future contingent. And if it is said that, according to the way of this doctor, this determination would then be formally a contingent *ratio*, I say that such a determination can be considered by reason of the substrate or by reason of the denomination. In the first way it is necessary, because it is the volitional power or the act of willing itself. In the second way it is true. Whence for him it is really necessary and formally contingent. So if someone pays close attention, the position of Master John of Ripa is nothing but the position of the Subtle Doctor more diffusely explained.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura in Sententias* I, q. 6, a. 2, pt. 3 [§176], V 128rb: "Hic pro responsione ad dubium est advertendum, secundum istum doctorem, quod ista quattuor sunt ordinata, videlicet divina essentia, potentia volitiva, actus volendi, et obiectum volitum. Dico igitur quattuor propositiones negativas per ordinem. Prima, quod divina essentia ut sic non representat aliquam rationem contingentem. Secunda, quod nec potentia volitiva. Tertia, nec actus volendi, cum sit etiam necessario formaliter. Nec obiectum volitum representat divinae essentiae aliquid, quia sic ipsius intellectus vilesceret. Futurum igitur contingens representatur per determinationem divine voluntatis tanquam per rationem cognoscendi, et similiter ipsa determinatio se ipsa cognoscitur. Et per hoc dico quod ipsamet determinatio divine voluntatis est sui ipsius et futurorum contingentium ratio cognitiva. Et per hoc apparet quod non sequitur aliqua cognitio necessaria respectu futuri contingentis. Et si dicatur quod tunc ista determinatio secundum viam istius doctoris esset formaliter ratio contingens, dico quod talis determinatio potest considerari ratione substracti vel ratione denominationis. Primo modo est necessaria, quia est ipsamet potentia volitiva seu actus volendi. Secundo modo verum est. Unde apud eum

In part 4 Candia turns to pointing out the flaws that he sees in the theories that he had presented in part 3. Explicitly against Ripa, Candia puts forth the thesis that “no *ratio* that is contingent in any way is for God the formal *notitia* of knowing future contingents with certitude.”<sup>50</sup> In the end, when Candia states that, “like a little hound, I have let loose the hare for the reader. Capture him in any path of the aforesaid ways you wish,” he refers to the six ways he had summarized after his extremely lengthy article on foreknowledge (over 25,000 words). The sixth of these, “that deity itself is the eminent *similitudo* of all things and the intuitive knowledge of them,” Candia criticizes in that “it fundamentally explains nothing, but only responds to the arguments,” yet “because it is easy, it is commonly held, which way nevertheless Master John of Ripa ridicules more than the others.” For Candia, Scotus’ way, which he claims is also Ripa’s, is the most intellectually satisfying, even if it still has its problems.<sup>51</sup>

Candia did not limit himself to this aspect of Ripa’s modal theory. In book I, question 2, article 3, part 3, where Candia dealt with the problem of whether the created will can be necessitated with respect to choosing fruition, which was asked in a theological context, Candia begins by opposing the view of Master John of Ripa:

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realiter est necessaria et formaliter est contingens. Unde si quis bene advertit, positio Magistri Iohannis de Ripa nihil aliud est quam positio Doctoris Subtilis diffusius declarata.”

<sup>50</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 6, a. 2, pt. 4 [§201], V 130va: “Secunda conclusio est haec: nulla ratio quovismodo contingens est Deo formalis notitia certitudinaliter futura contingentia cognoscendi. Haec conclusio ponitur contra Magistrum Iohannem de Ripa, qui oppositum, ut prius apparuit, tenuit.”

<sup>51</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 6, a. 2, pt. 4 [§§228-230], V 132rb-va: “Ex quibus omnibus recapitulando, apparet quod sex modis possumus intelligere Deum cognoscere futura contingentia: (1) vel per distinctas ipsorum rationes ydeales; (2) vel per hoc quod Deus ratione suae immensitatis est presens toti fluxui ymaginario temporis; (3) vel per hoc quod indistat negative ab actualitatibus futurorum; (4) vel per rationes rerum varias contingentes; (5) vel per hoc quod Deus conspicit limpide determinationem proprie voluntatis; (6) aut certe per hoc quod ipsa deitas est eminenter similitudo omnium et ipsorum notitia intuitiva. [§229] Et quilibet istorum modorum aliquid imperfectionis dicit, nam (~1) primus [V 132va] non declarat nisi quod Deus habet notitias incomplexorum; (~2) secundus ponit eternaliter quodammodo fuisse; (~3) tertius non assignat differentiam inter possibile et futurum; (~4) quartus iuxta communem extimationem Deo attribuit aliquam imperfectionem, videlicet contingentiam; (~5) quintus ponit interpretative in Deo discursum; (~6) et sextus fundamentaliter nichil declarat, sed solum ad argumenta respondet. Unde omnibus computatis, magis satisfacit intellectui modus quintus, videlicet Doctoris Subtilis, quam aliquis alius. Sextus vero, quia facilis est, communiter tenetur, quem tamen pre ceteris deridet Magister Iohannes de Ripa. [§230] Sicut parvus canis, excitavi vobis leporem. Capiatis eum per quamcumque predictarum viarum semitam vultis. Et sic secundus articulus terminatur.”

I posit six theses, the first of which is this: an object shown to a created will under the ratio of something delightful or lamentable does not always necessitate that will to produce any positive act. This thesis I posit directly against the imagination of Master John of Ripa. For he imagines that, if any object is shown to the will by the intellect under any *ratio* in the world, at once that will of necessity has nilling or willing with respect to that object, such that it cannot be the case that it remains neutral through pure non-willing. So I imagine the opposite, that it can be the case that it remains neutral in this way with the motion of the object remaining without having willing or nilling.<sup>52</sup>

This does not mean that Candia disagrees completely with Ripa in this context, because although it does not happen all the time, he later clarifies that such an object offered under the *ratio* of something good can necessitate the will: “This is clear through the adversary, namely Master John of Ripa, who says in distinction 1, question 3, article 3, thesis 4 that with respect to any object presented under the *ratio* of something good the will necessary has willing.”<sup>53</sup> When Candia wishes to test his theses, he presents again opposing theories:

But so the root (*radix*) of the position is seen, one must pay attention briefly to the conceptions of three solemn doctors whom fame exalts not a little, against

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<sup>52</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 2, a. 3, pt. 3 [§§68-69], V 36rb: “Pro cuius declaratione sex pono conclusiones, quarum prima sit ista: non semper obiectum voluntati create sub ratione delectabilis vel tristabilis demonstratum necessitat ipsam ad producendum actum aliquem positivum. [§69] Istam conclusionem directe pono contra ymaginationem Magistri Iohannis de Ripa. Ymaginatur namque ipse quod, si aliquod obiectum voluntati per intellectum ostendatur sub quacumque ratione mundi, statim ipsa voluntas respectu illius habet nolle vel velle de necessitate, ita quod non stat ipsam neutram permanere per purum non velle. Ymaginor ergo oppositum, quod stat ipsam sic neutram permanere stante motione obiecti absque hoc quod habeat velle vel nolle.”

<sup>53</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 2, a. 3, pt. 3 [§77], V 36vb: “Preterea, quodlibet existens in rerum natura participat aliquid bonitatis; sed quodlibet tale potest voluntati intellectus offerre sub praecisa ratione boni; ergo quodlibet tale potest necessitare voluntatem. Consequentia patet per adversarium, utpote Magistrum Iohannem de Ripa, qui dicit in quarta conclusione tertii articuli questionis tertie prime distinctionis quod respectu cuiuslibet obiecti sub pura ratione boni ostensi voluntas necessario habet velle.”

whom I have founded by entire position, namely Blessed Thomas, Lord Peter Auriol, and Master John of Ripa.<sup>54</sup>

Here, unlike in the case of divine foreknowledge, Candia deems Ripa's opinion to be sufficiently distinct to warren its own synopsis, although it is in agreement with the others:

But Master John of Ripa's imagination consists in this, as appears in book I of the *Scriptum* on the *Sentences*, distinction 1, question 3, article 3: that concerning any good thing proposed to it under any *ratio*, be it lamentable or delightful, the will at once has actual willing or nilling. And so if anything is shown to the will by the intellect, it is either shown to it under the *ratio* of something good alone, or under the *ratio* of something bad alone, or as mixed. If it is shown in the first way, it can never have nilling with respect to that, but it always has willing. If in the second way, namely under the precise *ratio* of something bad, it can never have willing with respect to that, but always nilling, and this while the showing lasts. But if it were shown in the third way, then it can have nilling or willing indifferently as it pleases. So applying this to the proposed, because God in heaven will show himself the most clearly to the intellect, and this is how the will will perceive it, and because the intellect will always represent it in this way, therefore of necessity the will will always have fruitive delight with respect to God clearly seen.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 2, a. 3, pt. 3 [§94], V 38ra: "Ut autem videatur radix positionis, advertendum est breviter quid ymaginantur tres solemnes doctores quos fama non modicum exaltavit, contra quos fundavi totam meam positionem, videlicet Beatum Thomam, Dominum Petrum Aureoli, et Magistrum Iohannem de Ripa."

<sup>55</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 2, a. 3, pt. 3 [§97], V 38rb: "Ymaginatio vero Magistri Iohannis de Ripa consistit in hoc, ut apparet I *Scripto* super *Sententias*, distinctione 1, questione 3, articulo 3, quod voluntas circa quodlibet bonum sibi propositum sub aliqua ratione sive tristabili sive delectabili habet statim actuale velle vel nolle, et idcirco si aliquid ostenditur voluntati per intellectum, aut ostenditur sibi sub ratione boni praecise, aut sub ratione mali praecise, aut mixtim. Si primo modo ostendatur, respectu illius numquam potest habere nolle, sed semper habet velle. Si secundo modo, videlicet sub precisa ratione mali, numquam respectu illius potest habere velle, sed semper nolle, et hoc durante ostensione. Si vero ostenderetur tertio modo, tunc indifferenter potest habere nolle vel velle prout sibi placet. Applicando igitur ad propositum, quia Deus in patria ostendet se clarissime intellectui, et sic voluntas percipiet. Et quia sic semper intellectus representabit, ideo de necessitate semper voluntas respectu Dei clare visi habebit fruitivam dilectionem."

Candia disagrees with all three, so to further explain his position, he decides to reformulate their arguments in a more succinct and effective fashion, he says, so he begins by creating six arguments against two of his own theses, arguments based on the “sayings of Master John of Ripa in *Super Sententias*, book I, distinction 1, question 3, article 3.” Candia uses about 1000 words to present these six arguments [§§100-107] and then another 1000 or so refuting them, before turning to Aquinas and Auriol [§§108-115].

Peter of Candia thus remained fascinated and, negatively or positively, inspired by his late confrère’s ideas on the relationship between the will and the intellect in creatures and God. Before Candia dealt with Ripa on the divine will and intellect in foreknowledge, he discussed the “ymaginationem Magistri Iohannis de Ripa” in twelve theses on the subject of ideas in divine knowledge more generally in book I, question 6, article 1, part 3, which is devoted entirely to Ripa. It would be so tedious to explain these twelve theses without interruption that Candia divided them into three groups that would function “probative, reprobative, et responsive.” Candia explained that the reason he devoted so much attention to Ripa here was that one of his *socii*, Gerard of Calcar, perhaps in his *Principia*, held a different view: “And I treat this opinion more extensively because I have wanted to uphold it against my venerable master, Master Gerard of Calcar, so that from this the main root (*principium radicale*) of this opinion is clearer.”<sup>56</sup>

Candia employed some 1600 words for the first four theses [§§64-76], then took a break with objections and solutions in some 1300 words [§§77-88], proceeded with the next five in roughly 2400 words [§§89-103], before pausing to offer Ripa’s concept of what a divine idea is:

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<sup>56</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 6, a. 1, pt. 3 [§61], V 108rb: “Nunc consequenter est declaranda ydealium rationum condicio secundum ymaginationem Magistri Iohannis de Ripa. Pro cuius declaratione sic procedam: primo premittam quandam distinctionem de perfectione simpliciter; secundo ponam XII conclusiones ymaginationem Magistri Iohannis plenarie continentes; et tertio contra ipsas obiciam et obiectionibus respondebo. Ad presens vero, quia nimium foret prolixum singula pertractare post distinctionem positam, quatuor pertractabo conclusiones probative, reprobative, et responsive. Et istam opinionem pertracto latius, quia ipsam volui sustinere contra venerabilem magistrum meum, Magistrum Gerardum de Calcar, ut ex hoc magis appareat istius opinionis principium radicale.”

From these an idea can be described thus: an idea is an essential divine ratio, principal form, formed by nothing, unchangeable and eternal, formative of a creatable thing of a consimilar denomination, most perfectly representative of it, and clearly cognitive of it. This description follows formally from the statements of Master John and from the aforesaid [§104].<sup>57</sup>

Candia pauses for a few objections and solutions, using about 450 words [§§109-113], then moves to the final three theses with 2000 or so words [§§114-128], and more objections and solutions using circa 700 words [§§129-134]. Once again, Candia has used well over 8000 words, more than twenty typical pages, in his own words, to present and strengthen on the scholastic anvil John of Ripa's position, before boiling it all down to the following example of his classic synopses in about 280 words:

Thus the imagination of the entire position, recalled by way of an epilogue, consists in this: the intellect tied to the body proceeds from visible things to the invisible things of God, according to the saying of the Apostle: "For the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" [Romans 1:20, Douai]. So because in creatures the intellect finds a multiplex distinction and not a primary one, therefore it brings it back to the invisible things of God, which distinction, because it cannot be understood in a good way as real, was rightly called by the elevated theologians a "formal distinction." And so in God there was located a plurality of infinite essential *rationes*, which are in a perfect way containing consimilar denominations in creatures. And because the intellect finds these to be simply infinite, therefore it attributes to them the conditions of perfection, that is, to form, to represent, and to be a *ratio* of knowing. Inferring from these he wanted to call them "ideal forms." And because the unchangeable *rationes* of things were unable to be understood via an ideal way in the super simple substance of the Maker, because in this way it would be depicted as a shape in some way, like a cow or a

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<sup>57</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 6, a. 1, pt. 3 [§104], V 111va: "Ex quibus potest ydea taliter describi: ydea est divina essentialis ratio, forma principalis, a nullo formata, incommutabilis et eterna, rei creabilis denominationis consimilis formativa, ipsius representativa perfectissime, et eiusdem limpide cognitiva. Ista descriptio sequitur formaliter ex dictis Magistri Johannis et ex predictis."

donkey, therefore it attended to divine *rationes* other than the first ones, naturally spreading by way of an intrinsic property, which it decided to call “causal,” through which the unchangeable existences of things are derivable and surrounded by fixed limits. And because the intellect sees that this can happen in an infinite number of ways, it notices that they can hardly be contained in a fixed finite number. And since it perceives that effect comes about in three ways – namely exemplatively with respect to essential *rationes*, executively with respect to the various participable degrees in the essential *rationes*, and determinatively with respect to their continual conservation – therefore it named the causal *rationes* in three ways, namely formative, executive, and determinative. Now, however, because all these *rationes* are in the art of the Omnipotent Artifex, therefore He most clearly regards every essential or unchangeable circumstance of a thing, and even if not singular things by their own ideas, since they do not have them, nevertheless through determinative *rationes* or through causally executive *rationes* He surveys all other things clearly. And I believe that this was the imagination of this doctor, whose speculation shall suffice for the present.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura I*, q. 6, a. 1, pt. 3 [§135], V 113va-b: “Ymaginatio ergo totius positionis per modum epilogi recollecta in hoc consistit: intellectus namque corpori alligatus a visibilibus ad Dei invisibilia procedit, iuxta dictum Apostoli [Romans 1:20]: *Invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea que facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur*. Unde, quia in creaturis reperit distinctionem multiplicem et non primariam, ideo ipsam ad invisibilia Dei reducit, que, quia non potest bono modo realis intelligi, [V 113vb] ab elevatis theologis fuit ‘formalis distinctio’ merito appellata. Et idcirco, infinitarum essentialium rationum in Deo fuit locata pluralitas, que sunt denominationum consimilium in creaturis perfectionaliter contentive. Et quia ipsas reperit intellectus infinitas simpliciter, ideo ipsis attribuit condiciones perfectionis, ut pote formare, representare, et esse rationem cognoscendi. Ex quibus illative ‘ydeales formas’ voluit appellare. Et quia rerum incommunicabiles rationes non poterant per modum ydealem intelligi in supersimplici substantia Conditoris, quia sic esset quodam modo ut bos vel asinus effigiata, ideo advertit alias rationes divinas a primis per modum proprietatis intrinsece naturaliter pullulantes, quas ‘causales’ censuit nominare, per quas rerum incommunicabiles existentie sunt derivabiles et certis limitibus circumcluse. Et quia hoc videt intellectus infinitis modis posse fieri, animadvertit ipsas sub certo finito numero minime contineri. Cumque conspiciat tripliciter effectum fieri – videlicet exemplative quoad rationes essentielles, executive quoad gradus varios in rationibus essentialibus participabiles, et determinative quoad talium continuam conservationem – ideo causales rationes tripliciter nominavit: formativas videlicet, executivas, et determinativas. Nunc autem, quia omnes iste rationes sunt in arte Omnipotentis Artificis, ideo clarissime conspiciat omnem rei circumstantiam essentialem vel incommunicabilem, et si non tales singulas per ydeas proprias, cum non habeant, tamen per rationes determinativas cuncta alia circumspicit limpide vel per rationes causaliter executivas. Et istam credo fuisse imaginationem huius doctoris, cuius speculatio sufficiat pro presenti.”



This may seem to be complicated, but so is the subject matter, and this translation does not do justice to Candia's eloquent rendering. This may also appear verbose, but Candia has taken over 8,000 words of detailed analysis of Ripa's position and offered what he thinks is the kernel in just 3% of that.

In the end, however, having presented William of Ockham's view against divine ideas, then Scotus' and Ripa's opinions that God intelligized creates via a plurality of ideas, Candia seems to prefer the theory whereby only one unique and most simply *ratio* is needed for God to know all, which theory Candia attributed to the Pseudo-Dionysius, perhaps because this theory was usually brought up anonymously and rejected by previous university scholastics [§158].

John of Ripa was best known for his position on the latitude of being and perfection, so it is no surprise that in the opening article of question 1 of Book II, when Candia asks whether any species infinite without qualification can be effectively determined by God's immeasurable omnipotence, he dwells on Ripa much longer than in any other context, such that over 20,000 words concern Ripa or primarily Ripa, citing explicitly Ripa's *Prologus*, penultimate question, article 2 [§145] and Book I, distinction 17, question 4, article 1 [§137]. After explaining his terms, Candia declares that "intentionis mee est istam materiam secundum ymaginationem magistri Iohannis de Ripa per prius aliquantulum declarare, et consequenter alias vias" [§11], with Ripa's position taking up the bulk of the question [§§11-173], compared to the others, Scotus, Auriol, and the *antiqui*: "nunc breviter declarare intendo modum quem credo fuisse Doctoris Subtilis, domini Petri Aureoli, et communiter antiquorum doctorum" [§§174-234]. In the last section Candia sums up in a way that is supportive of Ripa but, in the end, as in the case of divine foreknowledge, also non-committal: "Each of these paths can be maintained *probabiliter*, but none of them can be impugned with convincing arguments in this life with the guide of natural light, until we gaze clearly and in the mirror of divinity what the latitude, sublimity, and depth of divine power is" [§§235-285].<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 1, a. 1 [§285], F 98ra; P 137va; V 167va: "Illud ergo quod michi de presenti quesito videtur, dicendum est quod quolibet istarum viarum potest sustineri probabiliter, sed non potest aliqua ipsarum pro statu vie ductu naturalis luminis rationibus convincentibus impugnari quousque clare et in divinitatis speculo conspexerimus que sit divine potentie latitudo, sublimitas, et profundum. Et in hoc iste primus articulus termiantur."

Candia's presentation goes on for almost 100 paragraphs [§§11-108] before the first summing up [§109].<sup>60</sup> Candia then tests Ripa's theory with various series of objections that he solves according to Ripa's imagination [§§110-172], before concluding with the following summary [§173]:

Thus the imagination of this position consists in this: the divine essence can be participated in *ad extra*. A simply infinite number of perfections correspond to the divine essence, both perfections that are constitutive by way of mathematical unity and others. Now the first replication of this unity is the most common one, by which prime matter is constituted in being and which in all other created beings has potentiality toward further perfection. Next to this prime matter begin genera and species, which are bound according to their own intrinsic limitations by some addition of denomination of perfection, which is bound exclusively at the unbounded degree of similar denomination. And thus there are two exclusive limits that contain every *ratio* of genus and species: one is the highest in potentiality, namely prime matter, and the other is the highest in actuality, namely God Himself, because the *ratio* of genus and species is related as in the way of act and potency. Therefore, because the highest degree of potency excludes the *ratio* of act, and similarly the highest degree of actuality excludes the *ratio* of potency,

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<sup>60</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 1, a. 1 [§109], F 92vb; P 126ra; V 155vb: “Ymaginatio sua de additionibus in hoc consistit, quantum possum ex verbis suis capere: ratio entis, cum sit prima et transcendens, nec [om. V] ad aliquam aliam rationem priorem essentialiter reducibilis, est potentialis ad infinitas latitudines generum et specierum, et ideo ex se non habet intrinsecam limitationem sui esse. Unde genera respectu istius [eius F] rationis sunt quodammodo actus. Ulterius, ratio generis est potentialis ad actus posteriores, qui sunt species specialissime, sed non ad infinitas, et hoc loquendo de genere proximo propter sui limitationem intrinsecam. Similiter, species specialissima est potentialis ad posteriores perfectiones, que sunt individuales perfectiones, et huiusmodi sunt possibiliter [possibilitatis F] infinite. Idcirco sicut transcendens est ratio potentialis ad infinita genera, ita ratio specifica est ratio potentialis ad infinitas individuales perfectiones. Nunc autem quemadmodum ratio generis superaddit rationi transcendentis [transcendentis F], ita species superaddit rationi generis, et individuum superaddit proprie specificæ rationi. Et hoc totum habet pro radice, quia ratio posterior presupponit priorem et non econtra, et ideo superaddit. Unde ex hoc apparet quod individuum perfectius est extensive quam species, genus, vel transcendens, nam ab esse individui ad esse speciei et generis bona consequentia est, licet econtra non multum valeat, quia si Sortes est homo, et animal est et ens est. Unde sicut Ockamiste ymaginarentur additionem conceptuum, ita iste imaginatur additionem rationum formalium ex natura rei, quae sunt in re ad extra preter omnem negotiationem provenientem ex operatione intellectus. Sic igitur apparet qualiter est ymaginanda additio individualis perfectionis supra propriam specificam rationem, quod erat principaliter declarandum.”

thus prime matter and the simplest (*supersimplex*) degree of being are not at all contained in a genus. But the other denominations of perfection that are simply constitutive by way of mathematical unity begin from the non-degree of their proper denomination and are bound exclusively at the unbounded degree of similar denomination. But species and genera begin from the non-degree of their proper denomination and are bound according to their proper intrinsic limitation. And beyond the *rationes* of species and genera, individuals add on (*superaddunt*) without qualification (*simpliciter*) perfections, taking their beginning from the non-degree of their proper species and taking their end up until God exclusively. These genera, species, and individuals add on (*superaddunt*) to the quidditative and common perfections incommunicable *rationes*, which can with merit be labelled ‘distinctive *rationes*’. So the *ratio* of being is the most common; next the *ratio* of genus adds on to this; to which the *ratio* of species adds on; and to these the individual *ratio* adds on. And in this way it appears that the latitude of species is imagined to be in some way as with a continuum and in some way as with something discrete. And this seems to be the fundamental position that Master John of Ripa is recognized to have had in this area.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 1, a. 1 [§173], F 95ra; P 130vb; V 161ra: “Ymaginatio ergo istius positionis in hoc consistit: divina essentia est ad extra participabilis, cui infinite denominationes perfectionum simpliciter correspondent, tam constitutive per modum unitatis mathematice quam alie. Nunc autem prima replicatio istius unitatis est communissima, qua constituitur in esse prima materia, et que in omnibus aliis creatis entibus est potentialis ad ulteriorem perfectionem; citra quam materiam primam incipiunt genera et species, que terminantur secundum proprias limitationes intrinsecas per additionem aliquam denominationis perfectionis simpliciter ad gradum immensum denominationis consimilis exclusive terminate. Et sic sunt duo exclusivi termini omnem rationem generis et speciei continentes: unus est summe potentialis, videlicet prima materia, et alter summe actualis, videlicet ipse Deus, quia ratio generis et speciei se habent per modum actus et potentiae. Quia igitur summus gradus potentie excludit rationem actus, et similiter summus gradus actualitatis excludit rationem potentie, ideo prima materia et supersimplex [super simpliciter V] gradus essendi in genere minime continentur. Cetera vero denominationes perfectionis simpliciter per modum unitatis mathematice constitutive incipiunt a non-gradu proprie denominationis et terminantur ad gradum immensum denominationis consimilis exclusive. [P 131ra] Species vero et genera incipiunt a non-gradu denominationis proprie et secundum propriam limitationem intrinsecam terminantur. Et ultra rationes specierum et generum, individua superaddunt perfectiones simpliciter a non-gradu proprie speciei sumentes exordium usque ad Deum exclusive terminum capientes. Que genera, species, et individua perfectionibus quidditativis et communibus superaddunt incommunicabiles rationes, que possunt ‘rationes distinctive’ merito nuncupari. Unde ratio entis est communissima, et consequenter huic ratio generis superaddit, cui superaddit speciei ratio, et hiis individualis ratio superaddit. Et sic apparet quod latitudo specierum quodammodo per modum continui et quodammodo per modum discreti existit ymaginanda. Et

Given the lengths to which Peter of Candia went to understand, explain, and defend against possible objections John of Ripa's most famous theory, we should take very seriously this presentation of what he took to be the gist of this position. Indeed, Candia's treatment is so detailed that at one point he mentions in passing that "if one grasps Ripa's opinion on the perfection of species well," as Candia has interpreted it, "then one can easily see his intention concerning the intension of forms," Candia jokes, "what elsewhere I hardly recited because of the coincidence" of the two doctrines [§138].<sup>62</sup>

If Candia was partial to Ripa's theory of latitudes, he professed his ignorance about the truth, and this agnosticism is the cause of Candia's rejection of Ripa's use of his famous theory to prove God's existence. In Book I, question 3, article 1, Candia groups Ripa together with Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Adam Wodeham as claiming that 'God exists' is not a proposition *per se nota*, but that it is demonstrable, against which Candia will argue [§8]. Nevertheless, to support his view Candia employs an argument from Ripa to the effect that there is a possible process *in infinitum* in essentially ordered causes [§35]. But whereas Ripa thinks that he can prove the existence of a single being supreme being from his theory of latitudes, as Candia derives from Ripa's Book I, distinction 2, question 1, article 1 [§65], Candia replies that Ripa can only prove that there is a first within a specific sequence, not that there is a first being without qualification in the order of all beings, which is how Candia concludes the article [§84]. In the following article 2, Candia argues against Scotus and Ripa that one cannot demonstrate that there is more than one God [§12]. To make his point clearer, Candia declares that will defend this truth against its many enemies, first the philosophers, then the *antiqui* doctors, then Scotus and Ripa [§19]. Once again, Candia concludes the article with Ripa, first his arguments and then their refutation [§71-76]. Finally, in the third and final article, Candia goes up against Ripa, who in Book I, distinction 2, question 3, article 4, argued that any degree of being proves the immeasurable (*immensa*) magnitude of the first being [§§23-35].

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ista michi apparet fundamentalis positio quam in hac parte magister Iohannes de Ripa dinoscitur habuisse."

<sup>62</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 1, a. 1 [§138], F 93vb; P 128va; V 158va: "Unde si quis bene capit opinionem suam de perfectione specierum, leviter poterit suam intentionem videre de intensione formarum, quam alias propter coincidentiam minime recitavi."

At times when Candia leans toward Ripa he does not present Ripa's opinion along with those of others in order to explain it and weigh its and the other views' merits, but rather he claims to defend Ripa's doctrine without summarizing its gist. In the first article of question 5 of Book I, "Whether immense grace (*caritas*) formally can be the formal gracious (*caritativa*) love of a creature," Candia immediately informs his reader that "I intend to treat the first article according to the imagination of John of Ripa, who worked more than the others concerning this matter, and I also strove to defend his side in my first *Principium* against the position of the venerable *socii*" [§7].<sup>63</sup> Yet in his first *Principium* Candia never mentions Ripa, although certain elements defended there do correspond to ideas found in question 5, article 1, where, likewise, Candia is mostly silent about Ripa after his initial announcement. Thus, it is not until 25 paragraphs into the article that he remarks, "Sed tamen ad mentem magistri Iohannis diceretur quod..." [§32], then slightly below, "apparet secundum viam magistri Iohannis quod..." [§35]. A bit later Candia defends Ripa against some other detractors, who "say that Master John's proposition taken in the common way is not universally true. I heard this response once from Master William of Cremona when he was reading the *Sentences* here, but, saving his reverence, he did not then have the mind of a doctor" [§44].<sup>64</sup> It is only toward the end that we are reminded offhandedly that the sixth of the six theses presented at the beginning of the article [§21] "iuxta ymaginationem magistri Iohannis" is immune to the arguments later presented against it, at which point Candia posits three propositions "que possunt elici ex dictis prefati doctoris" in order to solve those arguments [§65] and then says what "diceret magister Iohannes" [§66]. Before concluding, Candia admits that he is not in complete agreement with Master John about one item [§75], but in the final paragraph he expresses his support and admiration: "From this is appears that this is not a new opinion, but rather an old one, but very

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<sup>63</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 5, a. 1 [§7], V 81va: "Primum articulum intendo pertractare iuxta ymaginationem Iohannis de Ripa, qui circa istam materiam pre ceteris laboravit, et etiam ipsius partem nisus sum defendere in meo principio primo contra positionem venerabilium sociorum."

<sup>64</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 5, a. 1 [§44], V 84vb: "Et per istum modum dicunt quod illa propositio magistri Iohannis communiter accepta universaliter non est vera. Istam responsionem audivi semel a magistro Guilielmo de Cremona quando hic Sententias actu legebat. Sed salva sui reverentia non habebat pro tunc mentem doctoris."

lucidly explained by Master John... And without doubt this way of understanding is quite possible and in conformity with reason” [§79].<sup>65</sup>

When Candia’s opinion is opposed to Ripa’s, Candia may simply use Ripa’s arguments to hone his own view. An example of this is in Book I, question 2, article 2, on fruition and trinitarian relations, where Candia supports Scotus, but devotes almost a folio of Vat. lat. 1081 to Ripa:

But against this position Master John of Ripa argues in the first book on the Sentences, distinction 1, question 1, article 4. From his statements I gather seven arguments because of the seven roots he lays down, from which for the sake of brevity I will form seven arguments in a briefer form... These are his arguments collected in brief. Notwithstanding these arguments, the first position is still to be held, unless something else appears.<sup>66</sup>

There is no proper summarization here, only a series of arguments and the refutation.

Much later in the article Candia mentions at three points Ripa’s well-known position on degrees of perfection, but also the weak, for Ripa, ontological status of the *ratio suppositalis*, citing Ripa’s Book I, distinction 19, question 1, article 3, and then Book I, distinction 1, question 2, article 2.<sup>67</sup> Later, in question 4, article 1, Candia refers back to

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<sup>65</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 5, a. 1 [§79], V 87vb: “Ex quo apparet quod ista non est nova opinio sed potius antiqua, per magistrum tamen Iohannem lucidius declarata. Per hoc non excluditur a voluntate actus eius vel motus quo tendit in obiectum, sed precise actus immutans potentiam per modum representativum in quo reluceat obiectum. Et sine dubio iste modus intelligendi est valde possibilis et rationi conformis. Et sic consideratio istius primi articuli terminatur.”

<sup>66</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 2, a. 2, V 24vb: “Contra tamen istam positionem [scilicet Scoti] arguit magister Iohannes de Ripa, primo super Sententias, questione prima, articulo quarto prime distinctionis. Ex cuius dictis colligo septem rationes propter septem radices quas dirigit, ex quibus propter brevitatem formabo rationes sub breviori forma. Prima ratio est...” 2 columns, then V 25rb: “Hec sunt rationes sue breviter recollecte. Quibus non obstantibus, adhuc prima positio est tenenda, nisi aliud appareat. Ad primam igitur...” with 1.5 columns against Ripa’s arguments.

<sup>67</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* I, q. 2, a. 2, V 30va: “Preterea, si Deus, ut aliqui ymaginantur, produceret aliquam creaturam cui communicaret quamlibet denominationem perfectionis simpliciter quiditativam, ut ymaginatur magister Iohannes de Ripa...” F 38rb, V 31va: “Tertia opinio est magistri Iohannis de Ripa, qui dicit quod ratio suppositalis nullum gradum perfectionis dicit, ut patet distinctione 19, questione prima, articulo 3. Et iste breviter diceret quod relationi formaliter nulla diligibilitas correspondet [corresponderet F], et per consequens nec usus nec fruitio.” F 38rb, V 31vb: “Secundum vero viam magistri Iohannis de Ripa,

this discussion in the context of the ontological status of the *positiva ratio proprietatum*, giving the opinions of Scotus, Auriol, and Ripa, with Ripa claiming that such things are nothing [§91]. Accordingly, in the following article 2, on whether the real distinction of the *producta* in the divine is completely absolute or merely relative, after excluding Praepositinus' extreme opinion, Candia places *Magister Iohannes de Ripa*, in his *Scriptum* on Book I, distinctions 25-26, with Richard of Saint-Victor and Bonaventure in claiming that the distinction between the divine *supposita* has to be via intrinsic and really absolute modes [§§1-2]. One should add that Candia deals with Ripa's opinion on a related matter in Christology in Book III, question 1, article 1, where Candia cites Ripa's *Determinationes*, question 1, article 4, the only place where Candia mentions Ripa's magisterial work.<sup>68</sup>

Candia does not always go into such depth when he mentions other theologians, of course. In some contexts, John of Ripa is merely mentioned in passing or relatively briefly. The first time we encounter Ripa is article 3 of Candia's *Prologus*, in the context of intuitive cognition, where the position of Scotus is said to be that one cannot have intuitive cognition of an object without its presence, the contrary of which "has many defenders, men of no little authority, among whom are Lord Peter Auriol, William of

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negaretur quod omne cognitum a Deo sit volitum vel nolitum, sed verum est quod circa quodlibet obiectum volitum proponibile voluntati sub ratione boni vel mali voluntas potest habere velle vel nolle. Sed quia nulla ratio suppositalis est huiusmodi, ideo non oportet quod voluntas habeat velle vel nolle [sed... nolle *om. hom. F*] respectu illius. Ad tertium, cum dicitur quod Pater diligit Filium in esse Filii [filiali F], respondendum est sicut prius dictum est secundum primas duas vias, tamen secundum tertiam est difficultas, tamen [cum F] ad mentem istius doctoris [Ripa] negandum esset antecedens. Et ad auctoritatem Evangelii diceretur dupliciter, ut ipsemet dicit distinctione 1, questione 2, articulo 2, quod auctoritas potest intelligi de Christo secundum naturam assumptam, quia Deus Pater diligit Filium in natura assumpta, dilectione tamen que est usus. Secundo potest dici: 'Diligit Filium', id est, 'Diligit suam essentiam in ratione formali gignendi Verbum', sicut dicitur diligere creaturam et complacere in creatura quia placet sibi in essentia propria, que est ars causalis creature."

<sup>68</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura III*, q. 1, a. 1 [§71], V 230rb: "Istam conclusionem pono contra imaginationem magistri Iohannis de Ripa, qui oppositum imaginatur. Unde imaginatur quod ex unione deitatis ad humanitatem vere humanitas dicitur Deus et econtra deitas dicitur homo." [§75], V 230va: "Et ex hoc sequitur ulterius quod ista unio non est per modum actuativum, ut imaginari videtur magister Iohannes quod est per modum forme subducta imperfectione forme." [§203], V 238rb: "Sed forsitan contra hoc diceret aliquis, ut videtur dicere magister Iohannes in suis *Determinationibus*, questione 1, articulo 4, quod licet non sit possibile quod divina essentia uniat alicui primo et immediate et non persona, tamen non oportet quod ex tali unione sequatur necessario unio cuiuslibet persone. Unde ipse imaginatur sicut est de specie respectu suorum individuorum quod quamvis ex positione humanitatis non sequitur per se Sortem esse, tamen bene sequitur aliquod individuum esse. Ita in proposito staret divinam essentiam primo et immediate uniri alicui et non Patrem, quia posset alicui uniri prout est in Filio."

Ockham, and John of Ripa.”<sup>69</sup> In particular, Ripa’s definition, in article 1 of question 7 of his *Prologus*, which is said to be aligned with Ockham’s and Auriol’s: “Intuitive cognition is a simple entity through which the object appears to be apt to cause evident assent concerning the existence of that object.”<sup>70</sup> The same issue resurfaces here and there, as in article 2 of the sole question for Book IV, where because of their view of intuitive cognition, in contrast to Scotus, Ockham, Auriol, and Ripa “would absolutely grant that it would be possible for the bodily eye to have intuitive cognition of Christ as He exists in the sacrament [of the Eucharist], not via a species caused by the object toward the organ, but by God’s omnipotence alone.”<sup>71</sup>

Candia’s proper treatment of human intellection is in Book II, question 3, where a total of roughly a folio in Vat. lat. 1081 of the long article 2 (over 40 columns) is devoted to Ripa. What is the first object of the human intellect? Candia will first treat Scotus’ view and then those of Ockham, Ripa, and many other *moderni*, before turning to older doctors.<sup>72</sup> After discussing Ockham, Candia presents Ripa’s opinion in one column, beginning thus:

The second position is that of Master John of Ripa, containing two points *sententialiter*: first, that the singular is the first known by the intellect on account of the connection that exists between the sense and the intellect. And because the

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<sup>69</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura I*, q. 1 (*Prologus*), a. 3, V 15vb: “Videtur ergo huius Doctoris [scil. Subtilis] opinio in hoc consistere: quod non potest haberi notitia intuitiva obiecti presentia separata. Secunda vero opinio huic contraria habet multos defensores, non parve auctoritatis viros, inter quos existunt dominus Petrus Aureoli, Guillelmus Ochan, et Iohannes de Ripa.”

<sup>70</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura I*, q. 1 (*Prologus*), a. 3, V 16ra: “Tertius vero, videlicet magister Iohannes de Ripa, septima questione sui Prologi, articulo primo, conformiter ad dicta istius auctoris Ochan, notitiam intuitivam taliter describit: notitia intuitiva est entitas simplex per quam obiectum apparet apta nata causare evidentem assensum de esse existere talis obiecti. Et consequenter eandem sententiam sequitur cum predictis duobis auctoribus, Petro videlicet et Guillelmo.”

<sup>71</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura IV*, q. 1, a. 2 [§90], V 281ra: “Okan tamen, dominus Petrus Aureoli et magister Iohannes de Ripa, quia aliter sentiunt de condicione intuitivae notitiae, ideo ipsi absolute concederent quod possibile foret oculus corporalem habere notitiam intuitivam Christi prout existit in sacramento, non per speciem ab obiecto causatam ad organum, sed solum per Dei omnipotentiam.”

<sup>72</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura II*, q. 3, a. 2, V 209vb: “Finita ergo consideratione de obiecto nostre intellective potentie in ratione adaequationis, superest videre de ipso in ordine executionis, et hoc est investigare quid sit illud quod primo intellectui occurrit. Pro cuius declaratione sic procedam: primo declarabo quid super hoc sentit Doctor Subtilis; secundo declarabo quid sentit Ochan, Iohannes de Ripa, et plurimi modernorum; et tertio declarare intendo modum doctorum veterum.”



sensus is not altered intuitive except by the singular, nor is the intellect altered except by what is received by the senses, therefore generally the first known by the intellect is the singular, and in this the position agrees with the preceding one [of Ockham]. Second, he says that generally the singular moves/alters not under the ratio of singularity, but rather under the *ratio* of the universal.<sup>73</sup>

Later Candia will spell out the contrast between Ripa and Ockham.<sup>74</sup> After giving Ripa's supporting arguments, Candia assesses his opinion as follows:

And thus it appears, if someone wishes to look at the roots (*radicaliter*), that this position that Master John holds is the position of the *antiqui* doctors differing only in the expression. For the *antiqui* say that the more the universals, always in the order of nature, are the prior known. Now they did not understand that universals are some things subsisting separately from matter, as is commonly imputed to Plato, but rather that they are common concepts of things, as is apparent from their statements, namely of the venerable Alexander of Hales, Blessed Thomas, and Lord Bonaventure.<sup>75</sup>

Thus interpreting the ancients in a rather conceptualist fashion, Candia later focuses on Ripa's denial of sensible and intelligible species, where Ripa maintains in Book I, distinction 3, question 3, article 3, that sensing and understanding require only the sensitive and intellective potency and the object. As for Candia, he is totally opposed to

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<sup>73</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 3, a. 2, F 117ra, V 212ra: "Secunda positio est magistri Iohannis de Ripa duo sententialiter continens: primum quod singulare est primo cognitum ab intellectu propter colligantiam que est inter sensum et intellectum. Et quia sensus non immutatur intuitive nisi per singulare, nec intellectus immutatur nisi per illud quod a sensibus est susceptum, ideo generaliter primo cognitum ab intellectu est singulare, et in hoc ista positio convenit cum precedente. Secundo dicit quod generaliter singulare non sub ratione singularitatis primo movet/mutaret, sed sub ratione magis universalis."

<sup>74</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 3, a. 2, V 213vb: "Ad rationem magistri Iohannis, que videtur huic positioni [Ockan] radicaliter oppositum..."

<sup>75</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 3, a. 2, F 117rb, V 212rb: "Et sic apparet, si quis vult radicaliter inspicere, quod positio ista quam tenet magister Iohannes est positio antiquorum doctorum nisi sola locutione differens, nam antiqui dicunt quod magis universalis semper ordine nature sunt prius nota; nunc autem non intellexerunt quod universalis essent quedam res subsistentes a materia separate, ut communiter imponitur Platoni, sed potius rerum conceptus communes, ut apparet in dictis ipsorum, utpote venerabilis Alexandri de Halis, beati Thome, et domini Bonaventure."

this view and declares that the opposite is obvious.<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless, Candia allows Ripa a column of arguments,<sup>77</sup> and before concluding the article with a column and a half of rebuttal, Candia admits that Ripa's reasons are *pulchre et apparentes*.<sup>78</sup> Thus even when he disagreed with his illustrious predecessor, the future pope of the Pisan line expressed his admiration.

## Conclusion

The beauty of arguments, the originality of his ideas, and the challenge of his doctrinal positions did not cease preoccupying theologians at Paris with the outbreak of the Schism, but they continued to fascinate and even found a wider audience with the dispersal of Parisian scholars as a result of the Schism itself. We have little information about the Dominican reception, because practically nothing significant survives from the Friars Preacher at Paris in the latter half of the fourteenth century, or anywhere else in Europe in the four decades before 1400. We do have the example of a Carmelite, however, the German John Brammart, who began reading the *Sentences* at Paris, but finished at Bologna in or by 1383 following the departure of the Germans from Paris in the previous year or two.<sup>79</sup> Strong interest in Ripa continued at Bologna in the *Sentences* lectures of the Augustinian Augustinus Favaroni de Roma from 1388-1389.<sup>80</sup> As we shall see in the appendix, Ripa remained very prominent in Bologna and the surrounding area into the fifteenth century. At Paris, perhaps it was one chancellor, Pierre d'Ailly, who passed Ripa's on to another, Jean Gerson, the famous conservative who tried to stifle complex new ideas such as those of the *Doctor Supersubtilis*, but not

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<sup>76</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 3, a. 2, F 118rb, V 215ra: "Ex qua conclusione sequitur manifeste contradictorium positionis magistri Iohannis de Ripa, qui primo Sententiarum, distinctione tertia, questione tertia, articulo tertio dicit oppositum, ubi breviter omnem speciem, sive in parte sensitiva sive in intellectiva, negat, unde ad actum sentiendi vel intelligendi sufficit potentia cum obiecto. Patet hoc non esse verum."

<sup>77</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 3, a. 2, F 118rb-va, V 215rb-va: "Sed contra illam conclusionem quintam arguit magister Iohannes de Ripa in loco preallegato, et primo de potentia sensitiva, secundo de intellectiva, probando quod nulla species est ponenda preter potentiam et obiectum. Arguit enim primo sic..."

<sup>78</sup> Petrus de Candia, *Lectura* II, q. 3, a. 2, F 118va-b, V 215va-216ra: "Ad istas rationes, que sunt pulchre et apparentes..."

<sup>79</sup> Alexandra Anisie contributes with her recent publication to highlight the huge influence of Ripa on John Brammart. See Anisie (2024 and forthcoming).

<sup>80</sup> See on Ripa's influence on Favaroni see Brinzei (2022, *passim*).

enough to eliminate his material legacy, though which John of Ripa is finally receiving the attention he deserves.

## Appendix

### A Note on the Later Abbreviations of John of Ripa

Since the Bodleian Library acquired a manuscript containing the text in the 1950s, it has been known that the great logician and polymath Paul of Venice OESA produced an abbreviation of John of Ripa's *Prologus* and Book I of the *Sentences*. This occurred between 1390, when Paul began his theological studies at the Augustinian convent in Oxford, and the start of 1402, when, according to colophons, John de Veriliano of Milan OESA was already producing a copy (now Oxford, Bodleian, Lat. Theol. E 34) in Padua, where Paul had been teaching since at least 1395.<sup>81</sup> After Francis of Ruello published this abbreviation, first the *Prologus* in 1980 and then Book I in 2000,<sup>82</sup> what was thought to be a second abbreviation surfaced in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1084, containing works by various authors in an autograph of Bartassar of Tolentino OESA, also working in Padua, in which the colophon on folio 106va dates the abbreviation to 19 May 1460.<sup>83</sup> More recently, an incomplete manuscript, also from Northern Italy and containing an abbreviation considered close to Paul of Venice's, missing its colophons but dated on the front flyleaf to 1479, appeared for sale on the *Les Enluminures* website, provisionally labelled TM 339.<sup>84</sup> It should be noted that none of these manuscripts is related to the version of Étienne Gaudet discussed above, in Paris, BnF, lat. 15888 (*J* in the critical edition of John of Ripa).

Four images of the text in TM 339 are, at present, online, and a collation of sections chosen at random against the critical edition of John of Ripa, the edition of the Paul of Venice abbreviation, and the text in Vat. lat. 1084 (images online) revealed that TM 339 does not rely on the text in either Bodleian, Lat. Theol. E 34 or Vat. lat. 1084, because

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<sup>81</sup> Ff. 1r-114v: Francis Ruello's "Introduction", pp. 9-12 and 68-69, to Paulus Venetus, *Super primum Sententiarum Johannis de Ripa Lecturae Abbreviatio, Prologus*, ed. F. Ruello, Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 1980. For Paul of Venice, see F. Amerini (2011, especially 926a).

<sup>82</sup> Paulus Venetus, *Super primum Sententiarum Johannis de Ripa Lecturae Abbreviatio, Prologus*, ed. Ruello, and Paulus Venetus, *Super primum Sententiarum Johannis de Ripa Lecturae Abbreviatio. Liber I*, ed. F. Ruello, Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2000.

<sup>83</sup> Ff. 1ra-106va: [https://www.mirabileweb.it/search-person/baltassar-de-tolentino-\(sec-xv\)-in-padua-frater-oe-person/1044/12130](https://www.mirabileweb.it/search-person/baltassar-de-tolentino-(sec-xv)-in-padua-frater-oe-person/1044/12130).

<sup>84</sup> Ff. 1ra-123vb plus 10bis: <https://www.textmanuscripts.com/medieval/peter-lombard-sentences-60624>, last accessed 18 June 2024.

TM 339 contains passages from John of Ripa that are absent in the Bodleian and Vatican codices. In addition, in the sections collated the text in the Bodleian matches that in the Vatican verbatim.

The sections collated were from the end of the *Prologus* and the start of Book I. In the abbreviation of Paul of Venice the *Prologus* contains eight questions, but question 6 is only in some of the witnesses used for the edition of John of Ripa's text, manuscripts *PQRSW*, and is hence unnumbered. Below is a parallel passage from the end of article 2, of the final question 8 in the abbreviations, which is question 7 in the original text. This is where the *Les Enluminures* codex stops at the bottom of a verso, only 50 lines before the end of Paul of Venice's abbreviation, because someone has cut out three folios, which may have contained a colophon. Text common to all four columns is in bold; text common to John of Ripa, the Bodleian, and the Vatican witnesses is in italics; text common to John of Ripa and TM 339 is underlined; the sole difference between the Bodleian and the Vatican codices is in bold and underlined; and, in the section missing in the Bodleian and Vatican manuscripts the differences between John of Ripa and TM 339 are in italics and underlined:

John of Ripa, p. 452	Paul of Venice, p. 299	Vat. lat. 1084, f. 26va	TM 339, f. 24vb
<p><b>4<sup>a</sup> conclusio: Omnis assensus fidei est alterius rationis ab omni actu scientifico respectu eiusdem <u>obiecti</u>. Patet ex <i>priori</i>.</b></p> <p>Dico igitur quod, licet idem actus sciendi possit desinere esse scientia per solam variationem obiecti – sicut si sciam Sortem esse album, talem actum <u>sciendi stat Deum</u> conservare in mente, et cum hoc Sor(tem) non esse album –, talis <u>tamen</u> actus, <u>si sic esset</u>, non esset pura</p>	<p>[Decima] Ultima <b>conclusio: Omnis assensus fidei est alterius rationis ab omni assensu scientifico respectu eiusdem. Patet ex <i>prioribus</i>.</b></p>	<p>[Decima] Ultima <b>conclusio: Omnis assensus fidei est alterius rationis ab omni assensu scientifico respectu eiusdem. Patet ex <i>prioribus</i>.</b></p>	<p><b>4<sup>a</sup> conclusio: Omnis assensus fidei est alterius rationis ab omni assensu scientifico respectu eiusdem <u>obiecti</u>. Patet ex dictis.</b></p> <p>Dico igitur quod, licet idem actus sciendi possit desinere esse scientia per solam variationem obiecti – sicut si sciam Sortem esse album, talem actum <u>potest</u> conservare in mente, et cum hoc Sor(tem) non esse album –, <u>et tunc</u> talis actus non esset pura credulitas, <u>sed</u> formalis</p>

credulitas, <i>ymo</i> apparentia formalis de sic esse, et tam intense <i>apparentia</i> sicut prius.			apparentia de sic esse, et tam intense sicut prius.
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John of Ripa, pp. 452-453	Paul of Venice, p. 299	Vat. lat. 1084, f. 26va	TM, f. 24vb
<p><b>Ex hiis</b> autem apparet – applicando ad propositum premissa <i>de habitu fidei infuso</i> – <i>quod quantumcumque sit qualitas supernaturalis, non tamen potest esse habitus evidens et adhesivus, nisi actus eius sit non solum adhesio sed apparentia formalis et evidentia de obiecto: et hoc loquendo de proprio actu talis habitus. Et ideo concedo quod hic, in via, habemus proprium actum fidei infuse, ex quo talis actus est pura adhesio et non apparentia formalis de obiecto credito, sicut experimur. <u>Oportet consequenter ponere habitum fidei infuse esse habitum precise adhesivum, et non evidentem, et ideo talem fidem non esse proprie lumen, cum lumen magis proprie dicat apparentiam quam adhesionem. Hoc autem dico, quoniam oppositum probabiliter multum et subtiliter posset fundari et teneri. Posset enim probabiliter dici quod, sicut nunc in via caritati create, que est habitus supernaturalis, non correspondet aliquis actus proprius, qui sit per se fruituo, sed solum denominative – sicut patebit distinctione 15 –, ita habitui [p. 453] fidei nullus proprius actus correspondet; et ideo possit dici quod talis qualitas, que est fides infusa, est in se quoddam lumen in quo repucent credibilia; que qualitas non solum est adhesiva, sed apparentia formalis de relucentibus; et talis qualitatis proprius actus non est pura credulitas, sed apparentia formalis de talibus veris. Talis autem actus non correspondet nobis pro hoc</u></i></p>	<p><b>Ex hiis</b> igitur patet <i>de habitu fidei infuso quod</i>, quamvis <b>sit qualitas supernaturalis, non tamen potest esse habitus evidens</b> respectu actus eius, et sic in via <i>talis actus est pura adhesio et non apparentia formalis de obiecto credito</i>.</p> <p>Et ideo talis fides non potest esse proprie lumen, cum lumen proprie dicat tam apparentiam quam adhesionem. Quia igitur in</p>	<p><b>Ex his</b> igitur patet <i>de habitu fidei infuso quod</i>, quamvis <b>sit qualitas supernaturalis, non tamen potest esse habitus evidens</b> respectu actus eius, et sic in via <i>talis actus est pura adhesio et non apparentia formalis de obiecto credito</i>.</p> <p>Et ideo talis fides non potest esse proprium lumen, cum lumen proprie dicat tam apparentiam quam adhesionem. Quia igitur in</p>	<p><b>Ex</b> quo patet quod habitus <b>fidei</b> infusus, <u>quantumcumque sit qualitas supernaturalis, non tamen potest esse evidens et adhesivus, nisi actus eius sit non solum adhesio sed apparentia formalis et evidentia de obiecto: et hoc de proprio actu talis habitus. Et ideo concedo quod in via pro statu habemus propter actum fidei infuse, qui est pura adhesio et non apparentia formalis de obiecto credito. Oportet ponere habitum fidei</u> [Next folios</p>

statu, et quia talis qualitas et est evidens et adhesiva de relucetibus, ideo potest in unum actum specie distinctum, et in actum qui sit precise adhesio sine apparentia, et in actum perfectiorem, qui simul sit apparentia et adhesio – sicut experimur –, ideo in nobis est precise ut habitus adhesivus, et ideo precise ut fides, et non ut scientia de reponentibus in ipsa veris.	nobis talis habitus est precise adhesivus, et ideo est precise ut fides et non ut scientia relucetium in ipso, quare etc.	nobis talis habitus est precise adhesivus, et ideo est precise ut fides et non ut scientia relucetium in ipso, quare etc.	removed]
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Likewise, at the start of book I proper, TM 339 follows John of Ripa’s text from the start, while the Bodleian and Vatican manuscripts skip the introductory section entirely and are almost identical.

While the above demonstrates the independence of TM 339 from the Bodleian and Vatican witnesses, it also proves that either the abbreviation in Vat. lat. 1084 stems from the one in the older Bodleian manuscript or they share a common exemplar, which means that Vat. lat. 1084 is either another copy of the Paul of Venice abbreviation or derives from Paul’s abbreviation. The above also strongly suggests that no hypothetical ancestor of TM 339 was the source for Paul’s abbreviation, but it does not entirely rule it out, since what little is common to Ripa and Paul and different in TM 339 could be scribal changes.

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