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Fostering synergy between transit and Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand systems: a dynamic modeling approach for the morning commute problem

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Abstract

Autonomous Mobility-On-Demand (AMoD) provides new options for the morning commute problem. The flexibility of AMoD could help boost Public Transportation (PT) attractiveness and accessibility. Intermodal AMoD systems could become a competitive alternative to personal cars. However, considering the convenience, comfort, and expected low fares of autonomous vehicles, the risk of competition between privately operated AMoD and PT exists. The joint design of PT and AMoD can foster their cooperation. This study investigates the joint PT-AMoD design problem in a many-to-one multimodal corridor where three transportation alternatives are available: full personal car on a congested freeway, walk and massive rapid transit (MRT), or autonomous vehicle (AV) and MRT. We introduce a simple dynamic model incorporating time-dependent mode and route choice subject to user equilibrium (UE) constraints. The presented model: (i) accounts for how UE settles and evolves, (ii) provides insight on PT-AMoD cooperation opportunities and competition risks depending on the design choices, (iii) is compatible with design optimization heuristics. We apply the model to a realistic scenario based in the city of Lyon (France). The number of MRT stations, their locations, the number of AVs fleets, and their coverage zone boundaries are optimized with a metaheuristic. The optimization is conducted under three policies regarding AMoD (protectionism, opportunism, liberalism) and three priority objectives (maximize MRT usage, minimize travel times, mitigate cars). By evaluating the potential benefits of each policy, we formulate recommendations for the transportation authority.

Keywords: morning commute, corridor, Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD), user equilibrium (UE), intermodal trips, design

1 Highlights

- 2 • We compare a static and a dynamic model on their ability to capture PT-AMoD cooperation or competition.
- 3 • UE principles help to explain design impact on mobility patterns.
- 4 • Direct or long first-mile schemes emerge from individual usages depending on the corridor design.
- 5 • **One AV fleet covering the whole corridor naturally competes with MRT.**
- 6 • Segmenting AMoD coverage zone reduces competition with MRT.
- 7 • Protectionism, opportunism, and liberalism policies toward AMoD are compared.
- 8 • Opportunism performs the best, whatever the priority objective of the city.

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9 1. Introduction

10 Commuting journeys represent about 17% of daily trips (Ermans et al., 2018) and lead to significant delays. They
11 heavily impact citizens' health (Titos et al., 2015) and contribute to global warming (Nicolas et al., 2012; André
12 and Vieira da Rocha, 2020). Private companies are developing new mobility concepts and technologies to answer
13 these considerations (e.g., Bagloee et al. (2019)). Among prospective solutions, Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand
14 (AMoD) seems promising (Pavone, 2015).

15 AMoD presents advantageous features for the morning commute. As autonomous vehicles (AVs) are shared, the
16 number of vehicles operating in the city could decline (Bischoff and Maciejewski, 2016; Wilson, 2015). More flexible
17 than scheduled-based feeder transit services, AMoD could help extend the catchment area of mass transit stations
18 (Mounce and Nelson, 2019; Basu et al., 2018). Thanks to lower operating costs compared to human-driven taxis
19 (Becker et al., 2020), continuous rebalancing is conceivable and could improve the level of service. The compliance
20 of AVs with the centralized operator eases the control of the fleet (Yao et al., 2020). Tientrakool et al. (2011); Litman
21 (2021); Greenblatt and Saxena (2015); Kondor et al. (2019); Fagnant and Kockelman (2015) discuss many other
22 potential benefits of AVs in terms of traffic, parking, safety, energy, pollution, and social inclusion.

23 Negative impacts have also been highlighted, such as the vehicles-miles traveled growth (Dang et al., 2021; Zwick
24 et al., 2021) or the question of interactions with public transportation (PT), which is already an essential concern in
25 the context of MoD (Hall et al., 2018; Rayle et al., 2016; Sadowsky and Nelson, 2017). Competition with PT will
26 be even more relevant with AMoD, considering their large coverage zones, convenience, comfort, and lower fares
27 Gurumurthy et al. (2020).

28 Regulation strategies are needed to prevent direct competition between AVs and PT (Zardini et al., 2022). For
29 example, some studies consider pricing schemes. Salazar et al. (2018, 2020); Zraggen et al. (2019) show that an
30 intermodal AMoD can achieve significant benefits in terms of travel times, costs, and emissions compared to an
31 isolated AMoD. While Zraggen et al. (2019) suppose a centrally managed system for routing AVs and compliant
32 travelers, Salazar et al. (2018, 2020) use an optimized pricing and tolling scheme to push the system closer to the
33 social optimum. In Simoni et al. (2019), a congestion pricing scheme applying to both AVs and conventional cars
34 improves social welfare. Gurumurthy et al. (2020) indicate that high fares for AVs mitigate AMoD-PT competition.
35 Reck and Axhausen (2019) and Zhu et al. (2021) analyze the impact of subsidizing first and last-mile trips.

36 Other studies consider AMoD design and operation rules as levers to foster synergy between AMoD and PT. For
37 example, in Zhou et al. (2019), AMoD approves only first-mile, last-mile, or door-to-door trips, depending on the day
38 period. Instead, Militão and Tirachini (2021) limit the performance of the service by licensing a reduced number of
39 AVs. Gurumurthy et al. (2021) evaluate the impact of disaggregating the service into several fleets operating within
40 bounded areas.

41 The transportation authority (TA) holds a decisive control parameter by delivering licenses to AVs in a given
42 geographical area. We focus on this regulation measure and go further by jointly optimizing AMoD and PT con-
43 figurations. Indeed, intermodal trips require efficient PT, with short waiting times and few transfers (Gallotti and
44 Barthelemy, 2015; Zhu et al., 2020), to become viable alternatives to personal cars. AMoD and PT designs must be
45 connected to guarantee that both systems complement each other.

46 A crucial question is how to jointly design PT and AMoD to foster cooperation and reach environmentally-driven
47 policy goals. Our framework, presented in Figure 1, tackles the many-to-one corridor case where AMoD serves the
48 first-mile in connection with a massive rapid transit (MRT).

49 The PT design question in corridors has been mainly addressed using static approaches. Older studies do not
50 include congestion (Vuchic and Newell, 1968) while many works employ simple volume delay functions (Wang
51 et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2009). They miss the distribution of demand over time and departure rate evolution. These
52 approaches either ignore or poorly reproduce congestion dynamics which is essential during peak hours. The chosen
53 objective functions mainly focus on performance by minimizing the total travel time or cost (Vuchic and Newell,
54 1968; Wirasinghe et al., 1977; Shen and Zhang, 2009) but rarely consider current objectives of cities, such as PT
55 usage maximization (Vuchic, 1969).

56 Several studies evaluate a PT-AMoD system under different design parameters in a sensitivity analysis manner, but
57 they often focus on AMoD only. The AMoD system serves a predetermined (exogenous) demand emanating from or
58 targeting a PT line. There is no representation of intermodal trips: the PT-AMoD connection is assumed. For example,
59 Scheltes and de Almeida Correia (2017) use a travel demand survey to isolate the AMoD market. In contrast, Shen




Figure 1: General framework of the paper. Our modeling contribution allows to answer the MRT-AMoD design problem with corridor and AMoD configurations as decision variables.

et al. (2018) and Rifki et al. (2021) respectively use a transit smart card data-driven analysis and a macro-economic model. In these works, the coupling between supply and demand is lacking.

In PT-AMoD design literature, optimization and simulation approaches exist. Most of the optimization models proposed are static. They do not account for congestion, except Wei et al. (2022). Liu and Ouyang (2021) optimize several design parameters with a constrained non-linear program. The study focuses on the integrated PT-AMoD system and considers no other transportation alternative or mode-route choice model. In contrast, Basciftci and Van Hentenryck (2021) consider the car alternative and induced demand. They formulate a bi-level optimization problem, including a simple mode choice model. However, they lack an (A)MoD model by neglecting the waiting time for being picked up by an on-demand vehicle. Shan et al. (2021) make the same assumption. Kumar and Khani (2022) use a queuing model to approximate this waiting time. They include assignment variables in a mixed integer non-linear program to capture travelers' behavior in the network, but the assignment problem formulated does not account for the selfishness of commuters. It is not a user equilibrium (UE).

Few studies tackle the PT-AMoD design with a simulation approach under the dynamic UE. While Pinto et al. (2020) work in a cooperation context, Mo et al. (2021) question a competition scheme where AVs are unregulated and profit-oriented. These works ignore the competition with cars. They use agent-based simulation, which relies on a computationally greedy convergence loop (e.g., exact swapping or heuristics such as the method of successive average, evolutionary algorithms (Ameli, 2019)) to approximate the stable state of the system. The PT-AMoD design optimization process, on top of dynamic traffic assignment, is costly, and its convergence is uncertain. The complexity of the resolution algorithm limits the number of decision variables investigated (transit routes removal from an initial set, transit headway, and number of AVs). For these reasons, the approach is hardly compatible with the joint optimization problem. Moreover, it suffers from the black box effect, providing no knowledge about how UE settles and evolves.

State of the art lacks methods compatible with design optimization processes to solve and deeply understand the dynamic UE. Our work partly fills this gap by proposing a simple but dynamic model for calculating UE in the morning commute corridor context. Its computational efficiency makes it easy to couple with a design optimization heuristic. We use this model to solve the MRT-AMoD design problem with three different objectives for the TA: minimizing travel times, maximizing MRT usage, and minimizing car usage. The MRT design parameters are the number of MRT stations and their locations. The AMoD design parameters are the number of fleets and the boundaries of their coverage zones. If the corridor abstraction is restrictive, it is sufficiently generic to apply to many urban areas with little data. It allows drawing general conclusions on the interactions between MRT and AMoD. It helps analyze the impact of the TA policy toward AMoD on the Western Lyon (France) corridor. We compare three policies where TA prohibits AVs (protectionism), authorizes AVs with (opportunism) or without (liberalism) regulation.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the modeling framework. It introduces the problem set-

ting and assumptions, describes the proposed dynamic model, including how UE settles and evolves, and justifies its computational efficiency. Section 3 shows the advantages of our model in the context of PT-AMoD design. Even if it is restrictive regarding intermodality and network, it provides general insight into PT-AMoD cooperation opportunities and competition risks depending on the design. It shows more cooperation-competition schemes compared to an equivalent static model. *Understanding how UE settles and evolves allows a deep analysis of design influence on these schemes.* Section 4 applies our dynamic model to the MRT-AMoD design problem in the Western Lyon case. It presents the numerical results obtained. Section 5 formulates recommendations for the TA and discusses the limitations of our approach.

2. Modeling framework

This section presents the modeling framework. It introduces the problem setting and assumptions, describes the proposed dynamic model, including how UE settles and evolves, and justifies its computational efficiency. The reader can refer to appendix A for notations.

2.1. Problem setting and assumptions

We focus on the morning commute in a corridor where the many-to-one mobility pattern is problematic because an unbalanced competition occurs between the freeway and an MRT. While cars provide a convenient door-to-door trip, the MRT suffers from accessibility issues. Consequently, car usage is substantial, and the freeway is congested daily.

The TA considers accrediting an AMoD private operator. The improvement of the MRT service (by extending the line, building new stations, or updating the train service pattern) and the regulation of AMoD are jointly studied to mitigate cars and improve MRT attractivity while satisfying a performance criterion.

Figure 2 presents the assumptions made to tackle this problem and the associated parameters. The following sub-sections describe each of them.




Figure 2: Modeling framework.

115 *2.1.1. Multimodal corridor infrastructure*

116 Let us consider the part of a monocentric city surrounding a linear transportation axis composed of a freeway and
 117 an MRT system (e.g., suburban rail, subway, or tram) as represented in Figure 3a. This corridor goes from the city
 118 boundary B to the center of the business district (CBD) located at $x = 0$ and has a given width W . Both freeway and
 119 MRT line are assumed to overlap at $y = 0$ and to be connected through $M + 1$ collectors c_k located along the corridor
 120 at x_k , $0 \leq k \leq M$. A collector is composed of a freeway on-ramp, an off-ramp, and an MRT station. Collector c_0
 121 corresponds to the terminus station and the off-ramp leading to CBD.

122 *2.1.2. Demand spatial profile*

123 Commuters depart from home and want to join the CBD. There are many origins for one destination. The origins
 124 of travelers distribute along the x and y axes. Traveler i 's origin is located at (x_i, y_i) . Collectors are connected to
 125 homes by an uncongested local streets grid that can be traveled at speed v_{st} by vehicle and at speed v_w by walk.

126 *2.1.3. Deterministic mode and route choice based on travel time*

127 Four modes of transportation are available: car, MRT, AV, and walk. Three options, represented in Figure 3b, are
 128 considered: car-only (**c**), combined walk and MRT (**r**), intermodal AV and MRT (**a**). Each traveler chooses the mode
 129 and route that provides minimal travel time. Backward movements on the freeway are prohibited. A traveler accessing
 130 infrastructures by c_k has to choose between $k + 2$ itineraries:

- 131 • one corresponding to **c**: traveler drives until c_k , enters the freeway and keeps driving until c_0
- 132 • one corresponding to **r**: traveler walks to c_k station and takes the MRT until the terminus
- 133 • k corresponding to **a**: traveler rides an AV which joins c_k , then chooses to transfer to MRT at c_p , where
 134 $0 < p \leq k$. Indeed, AMoD operates within the corridor only, and AVs are not allowed to drop off commuters
 135 directly in the CBD.




Figure 3: Corridor sketch.

136 *2.1.4. Delay generator points*

137 Localized delay generator points exist in this network. A vehicle entering the freeway runs at speed u ($v_{st} < u$)
 138 in free-flow conditions. It may be caught in congestion due to a single capacity reduction point. The queuing delay
 139 experienced by a car exiting the freeway at c_0 is due to a demand rate higher than the destination off-ramp fixed
 140 capacity μ_0 . Queues form at AV-to-MRT transfer points due to the fixed number of stopping spots and the fixed time
 141 T_f needed for the drop-off maneuver. These delays are the only ones AVs face. Continuum approximation of the
 142 drop-off times comes down to modeling AV-to-MRT transfer capacity at a station by a fixed value μ_k . In practice,
 143 adding drop-off spots will increase this capacity.

144 2.1.5. MRT operation

145 All stations identified by a collector c_k belong to the same MRT line: a train stops at each one. This line is assumed
146 to have an unlimited passenger capacity, i.e., there is no left-behind on platforms because of saturated trains. Let us
147 neglect the MRT rolling stock kinematics. Since the wasted time due to limited acceleration and braking capacities
148 is ignored, no minimal spacing between two stations is required. The cruising speed of trains is v_r . We also neglect
149 the relation between the number of travelers boarding at a station and the dwell time. This assumption is consistent
150 with the unsaturated line hypothesis. Dwell time is therefore constant, equal for all stations, and noted T_d . **The
151 more collectors there are, the longer the total dwell time, and the lower the MRT line commercial speed. The design
152 parameter M impacts the MRT line travel time to the CBD.** Line headway h (in seconds) is considered stable during
153 the morning commute. The time a traveler needs to wait at a station is approximated by $\frac{h}{2}$ (Fu et al., 2012).

154 2.1.6. Access to infrastructure

155 Each traveler has a fixed access collector by vehicle and a fixed access collector by walking. An access collector
156 is chosen to minimize the travel time in free-flow conditions. The pool of commuters accessing the MRT line by
157 walking to station k is called the walking attraction area of c_k and noted Ω_k^w . It forms a rectangle around c_k , gathering
158 the origins of all commuters joining this collector rather than another by walking. Walking attraction areas boundaries
159 can be computed by considering a traveler i departing from an origin located on the line defined as the intersection
160 $\Omega_k^w \cap \Omega_{k+1}^w$ or as $x = X_{k,k+1}^w$. On this line, travel times to c_k by accessing it directly or via c_{k+1} are equal.

161 Similarly, a rectangle vehicle attraction area Ω_k^c surrounds c_k . It gathers all commuters accessing the freeway
162 through this collector by vehicle (car or AV) or directly accessing station k by AV. On the frontier $x = X_{k,k+1}^c$ between
163 Ω_k^c and Ω_{k+1}^c , travel times to c_k by entering freeway at on-ramp k or $k+1$ are equal for mode **c**. For mode **a**, with a
164 given transfer collector c_p , travel times to c_p by accessing infrastructure through c_k or c_{k+1} are equal on the frontier
165 $x = X_{k,k+1}^c$. Figure 2 provides an example of vehicle and walking attraction areas boundaries between c_k and c_{k+1}
166 where $v_w < v_{st} < u$.

167 2.1.7. AMoD operation

168 AMoD comprises one or several fleets of single-seat AVs. A fleet operates in a specific coverage zone, defined as
169 a union of vehicle attraction areas. The fleet can provide service to every commuter departing from its coverage area
170 and necessarily drops her off at a collector included in this zone. Booking is disabled: a commuter sends a request at
171 the moment when she departs from home. The service time undergone by a traveler represents the time she has to wait
172 before being picked up by an AV from when she issues a request. In section 2, we consider a unique fleet covering the
173 whole corridor length and width for travel time expressions readability. This assumption is removed in section 4.

174 2.1.8. Equilibrium

175 We study the system at equilibrium. Travelers have adapted their mode and route choices after MRT design
176 refinement and AMoD deployment. We assume the system respects the UE defined by Wardrop's first principle
177 (Wardrop, 1952). No one can reduce their travel times by unilaterally choosing another route of the same origin-
178 destination pair. Note that this is a pure route choice UE problem. Departure times are parameters.

179 Agent-based simulation approaches usually account for this process through a computationally greedy iterative
180 loop. Our model implements a fast converging loop to refine AMoD service time (see section 2.2.6). At one iteration,
181 the equilibrium can be directly derived (see section 2.2.5).

182 2.2. A computationally efficient dynamic model for the MRT-AMoD design problem

183 2.2.1. Dynamic demand

184 In the dynamic model, Demand is time-variant. Three trip generation rates reproduce congestion onset and offset.
185 They correspond to three phases of the morning commute, as shown in Figure 4: low loading, high loading, and
186 unloading phases.




Figure 4: Three trip generation rates are considered over time on the corridor.

2.2.2. Point-queue model for congestion

A point-queue model provides traffic delays. Introduced by Vickrey (1969), this model first dealt with the departure time choice of commuters on a single bottleneck-constrained one-to-one corridor (Arnott et al., 1990). It has been extended to many-to-one (Fosgerau and de Palma, 2012), multiple bottlenecks (Akamatsu et al., 2015), and multimodal corridor (Sean Qian and Michael Zhang, 2011; Wu and Huang, 2014; Chiabaut et al., 2018). It is one of the simplest models accounting for congestion dynamics. It can deal with aggregated (flow) and disaggregated (traveler-specific) points of view, allowing analytical and numerical resolution of UE.

Vertical queues allow modification of corridor configuration while preventing perturbation of upstream off-ramps by spillback congestion. **Cars and AVs flows do not interact in our model. This assumption is reasonable under two conditions. First, c_1 should be sufficiently far from c_0 compared to queue length, or AVs can run on a dedicated lane on the freeway. Second, cars and AVs use different roads or lanes on the local network nearby MRT stations.**

Delays given by the point-queue model are equivalent to the LWR model with spreading congestion. It is a suitable model for design purposes. Considering that traffic obeys a first-in-first-out (FIFO) rule at each bottleneck μ_k , $0 \leq k \leq M$, waiting delay can be formulated by:

$$w_k(t) = \max \left(0, \frac{A_k(t) - A_k(t_k)}{\mu_k} - (t - t_k) \right) \quad (1)$$

where $A_k(t)$ denotes the cumulative number of travelers arrived at bottleneck μ_k by t , t_k represents the time at which congestion starts at bottleneck μ_k . For $1 \leq k \leq M$, $w_k(t)$ includes T_f , the time for an AV to park at a drop-off spot and for the passenger to leave the vehicle in security. The application of the point-queue model allows writing delays as simple functions of time.

2.2.3. Travel times

The free-flow travel time by **c** for a commuter i departing from (x_i, y_i) is:

$$T_i^c = \frac{|x_i - x_k| + |y_i|}{v_{st}} + \frac{x_k}{u} \quad (2)$$

where c_k located at x_k is the vehicle access collector of i .

The free-flow travel time by **a** when i transfers at c_p ($1 \leq p \leq k$) is:

$$T_{i,p}^a = \frac{|x_i - x_k| + |y_i|}{v_{st}} + \frac{x_k - x_p}{u} + \frac{h}{2} + \frac{x_p}{v_r} + (p-1)T_d \quad (3)$$

Travel time by **r** is time-invariant:

$$T_i^r = \frac{|x_i - x_{k'}| + |y_i|}{v_w} + \frac{h}{2} + \frac{x_{k'}}{v_r} + (k' - 1)T_d \quad (4)$$

204 where $c_{k'}$ is the walking access collector of i .

Outside of free-flow conditions, the travel time of i by \mathbf{c} is:

$$\tau_i^c = T_i^c + w_0(t_i^0) \quad (5)$$

205 where t_i^0 is the theoretical arrival time of i at c_0 (when i travels by car in free-flow conditions).

Outside of free-flow conditions, the travel time by \mathbf{a} when i transfers at c_p ($1 \leq p \leq k$) is:

$$\tau_{i,p}^a = T_s(t_i^{\text{req}}) + T_{i,p}^a + w_p(t_i^p) \quad (6)$$

206 where t_i^p is the arrival time of i at c_p , t_i^{req} is the time at which i sends a request to AMoD, $T_s(t_i^{\text{req}})$ is the AMoD service
207 time experienced by traveler i (see section 2.2.6).

208 Additionally, free-flow extra travel times by \mathbf{r} and \mathbf{a} compared to \mathbf{c} are $\Delta_i^r = T_i^r - T_i^c$, and $\Delta_{i,p}^a = T_s(t_i^{\text{req}}) + T_{i,p}^a - T_i^c$
209 respectively.

210 2.2.4. Attraction areas boundaries

211 Vehicle and walking attraction areas boundaries are:

$$X_{k,k+1}^w = \frac{1}{2} \left[x_{k+1} + x_k + (x_{k+1} - x_k) \frac{v_w}{v_r} + T_d v_w \right] \quad (7)$$

$$X_{k,k+1}^c = \frac{1}{2} \left[x_{k+1} + x_k + (x_{k+1} - x_k) \frac{v_{st}}{u} \right] \quad (8)$$

212 Boundaries are well defined between two collectors when the spacing s_k between c_k and c_{k+1} verifies $s_k >$
213 $T_d v_w v_r / (v_w - v_r)$.

214 2.2.5. UE principles

215 Let service time T_s be an exogenous constant function here. The next section tackles the extension to an endoge-
216 nously computed time-variant service time.

217 **FIFO property.** As all travelers have the same AMoD service time and have a defined vehicle access collector, the
218 order of arrivals at bottleneck μ_k is the same as at bottleneck μ_0 . The route choice of a traveler depends only on the
219 choices made by travelers that have arrived before her at μ_0 in free-flow conditions.

220 **UE properties.** The FIFO property ensures UE existence (Tampere et al., 2010). It allows computing the exact
221 equilibrium with no need for a convergence loop by processing the itinerary choice of travelers in the order of free-
222 flow arrival at the CBD off-ramp. Hence, the resolution process always finds a solution: it is robust.

223 Our network has, at most, one bottleneck per route. Consequently, route cost functions are monotonous with
224 respect to their traffic flows, and the relaxed uniqueness of UE is ensured (Iryo, 2013). It has two additional charac-
225 teristics that ensure the strict uniqueness of UE:

- 226 • the routes travel costs in free-flow conditions are strictly ordered
- 227 • when a route travel cost does not vary on traffic flows variation, it is necessarily compared with a route
228 containing a bottleneck working over capacity (i.e., that has a strictly monotonous travel cost at that time).
229 It occurs for \mathbf{r} route, which has a constant travel cost, and for \mathbf{c} and \mathbf{a} routes when the bottleneck of the
230 route works under capacity.

231 **Resolution process.** The resolution process is inspired by Laval (2009). The original method performs in a one-
232 to-one corridor with cars only. We developed an extended method to deal with a many-to-one corridor with three
233 modes.

234 Complete knowledge about how UE settles and evolves is available. UE principles (diversion patterns, bottlenecks
235 synchronization, and out of sync) help describe the system's dynamics. They are analytically defined and illustrated
236 in the two simplified examples of appendix B, where travelers' origins stick to the locations of collectors. Figure 5
237 shows the equilibrium for the same instance but with uniform distribution of travelers' origins along axes.

238 **Stable states and transition conditions.** Bottleneck μ_0 is switched on (used) from the beginning of peak hours since
 239 \mathbf{c} is the best itinerary for all travelers in free-flow conditions. The theoretical arrival curve at c_0 , noted $A^{\text{th}}(t)$, can be
 240 computed by assuming that all travelers choose mode \mathbf{c} . It is the sum of the theoretical arrival curve at c_k transposed
 241 by the respective x_k/u . The theoretical arrival curve at c_k gathers all commuters within Ω_k^c .

242 A queue forms at c_0 's bottleneck when demand exceeds μ_0 . It is the transition condition to pass from system
 243 stable state 1 (\mathbf{a} diversion pattern 1 or \mathbf{a} -div1) to stable state 2 (\mathbf{a} -div2). In \mathbf{a} -div1, the arrivals rate is lower than the
 244 sum of switched-on bottlenecks capacities. In \mathbf{a} -div2, used bottlenecks are saturated.

245 As $w_0(t)$ increases, \mathbf{c} travel times will progressively equalize the travel times on other itineraries. Traveler's extra
 246 travel times Δ_i^r and $\Delta_{i,p}^a$ ($p \leq k$), can be sorted in ascending order. As soon as $w_0(t)$ equals one of the extra travel
 247 times, the commuter has a new worthwhile diversion itinerary.

248 In practice, $\Delta_{i,p}^a = \Delta_p^a$ does not depend on i since free-flow in-vehicle access times by \mathbf{c} and \mathbf{a} are equal and T_s is a
 249 constant function here. When $w_0(t)$ equals one of the Δ_p^a , the theoretical arrival flow at c_0 splits: one part keeps using
 250 \mathbf{c} while the other part diverts to another itinerary. It is the transition condition from \mathbf{a} -div2 to \mathbf{a} -div1. Opening a new
 251 diversion itinerary relieves the previously switched-on bottlenecks: they now work at capacity.

252 When $w_0(t)$ reaches Δ_i^r , mode \mathbf{r} starts to be worthwhile for traveler i . She chooses \mathbf{r} as long as travel times
 253 through downstream bottlenecks are strictly greater than Δ_i^r . This is \mathbf{r} -div1. Diversion pattern \mathbf{r} -div1 starts at c_k when
 254 $x_k/u + w_0(t) = h/2 + x_k/v_r + (k-1)T_d$. It is different from \mathbf{a} -div1 because it is continuous. Progressively, more and
 255 more travelers within Ω_k^w divert to \mathbf{r} while $w_0(t)$ increases. There is no \mathbf{r} -div2 since mode \mathbf{r} is uncongested.

256 The system simultaneously undergoes a continuous \mathbf{r} -div1 and an alternation between \mathbf{a} -div1 and \mathbf{a} -div2.




Figure 5: Equilibrium arrival ($A_k(t)$) and departure ($D_k(t)$) curves at bottlenecks in a corridor where $M = 2$. $A_k^r(t)$ designates the cumulative number of travelers within Ω_k^w diverting to \mathbf{r} . Note that all curves have been aligned in time on c_0 to highlight the diversion patterns better. Vertical lines show the state shifts. Congestion on μ_0 starts at the beginning of period B. In period C, \mathbf{a} -div1 occurs using c_1 as a transfer collector. Pattern \mathbf{a} -div2 occurs in period D as μ_1 becomes congested. The states shifts continue in periods E and F till demand decrease leads to the desertion of c_2 in period G, of c_1 in period H. Diversion to \mathbf{r} progressively concerns more travelers as waiting times at bottlenecks rise.

257 **Synchronization and out of sync conditions.** Bottleneck μ_0 is used for the whole period. It acts as a regulator and
 258 other bottlenecks will synchronize with it. When travel times by several bottlenecks are equal, these bottlenecks are
 259 said synchronized. With a one-to-one demand pattern, all bottlenecks are always synchronized. With a many-to-one
 260 demand pattern, bottlenecks can get out of sync.

261 Indeed, travelers have different diversion options. Those departing from downstream collectors have fewer possi-
 262 bilities than those from upstream collectors. When the commuters from downstream collectors have no more uncon-

gested bottlenecks to divert to, they may increase the travel times by the bottlenecks they are currently using and push them out of sync with upstream bottlenecks. Travel time equality does not hold anymore between the downstream and upstream groups. As a result, upstream travelers divert by routes belonging to the upstream group.

2.2.6. AMoD service time

The constant service time assumption is acceptable when fleet sizes are large enough. In general, AMoD service time depends on dispatching rules, the number of vehicles m in the fleet, and the amount of work to achieve, i.e., the distance to serve customers and relocate idle vehicles.

AMoD dispatching strategy. A traditionally used dispatching heuristic in MoD systems is the *nearest-idle-vehicle* (Maciejewski et al., 2016). It respects the FIFO rule by treating requests in the order of arrival. The first traveler that has ordered an AV is the first to be assigned a vehicle by the dispatcher. We consider such a dispatching strategy here. As no booking is allowed, $t_i^{\text{req}} = t_i^{\text{dep}}$ for each traveler i choosing \mathbf{a} , where t_i^{dep} is the time at which traveler i departs from home. The first traveler to depart is also the first to send a request. Service time is a function of request/departure time.

MSA process. To approximate the service time profile, we solve the fixed point problem $\widehat{T}_s(\text{UE}(T_s)) = T_s$ by the method of successive averages (MSA) detailed in algorithm 1.

In step 1 of the algorithm, one should choose an initial service time profile. It can be defined arbitrarily or computed in a prior iteration. During this prior iteration, the service time is computed online by considering that AMoD receives requests in the order of theoretical arrival at c_0 . We make the following strong assumption: $t_i^{\text{req}} = f(t_i^0)$ where f is a linear function. Each time a traveler chooses a route, the service time is re-computed following equation 9. Service time is updated only if the difference between the new and last values is above a certain threshold. It forms a step function. Once all travelers have chosen a route, they are sorted in the order of departure time, which is the effective order in which AMoD receives requests. Route choices being unchanged, the effective service time profile \widehat{T}_s is computed considering this order and following equation 9. It serves as the reference initial service time profile (or predicted service time profile) for the subsequent iterations of MSA ($T_s \leftarrow \widehat{T}_s$ at the end of the prior iteration).

Step 3 of the algorithm launches the MSA loop which contains at least one iteration. The quality criteria used as stopping conditions for the loop are detailed in the *UE properties* paragraph below.

In step 5, the predicted service time profile is a parameter for UE resolution. Each traveler chooses an itinerary knowing the service time she will experience on \mathbf{a} mode.

In step 6, effective service time profile \widehat{T}_s is computed similarly as in the prior iteration, considering the distribution of travelers on itineraries resulting from step 5.

In step 7, the predicted service time for iteration $K + 1$ of MSA is computed based on predicted and effective service time profiles of iteration K .

Service time computation. Equation 9 is used to compute the reference initial service time profile in the prior iteration and the effective service time profile in step 6.

$$T_s(t_j) = 2E_2 + E_3 - \left[t_i^{\text{req}} + \frac{\Delta t}{m} - E_1 \right] \quad (9)$$

It expresses the service time of traveler j as a function of E_1 , E_2 , E_3 and traveler i 's parameters, i and j being processed consecutively. It is an approximation based on the last m requests $\{l\}$ received by the fleet during Δt . If i is the last traveler processed, $\Delta t = t_i^{\text{req}} - \min_l(t_l^{\text{req}})$. As AMoD treats requests in order of reception, the next traveler choosing this fleet will necessarily ride one of the AVs serving $\{l\}$, a mean predecessor request, representative of $\{l\}$, is built. With $E[\cdot]$ being the expected value, the mean request is picked up at $E_1 = E[t_i^{\text{req}} + T_s(t_i^{\text{req}})]$, rides for $E_2 = E\left[\frac{|x_l - x_{k(l)}| + |y_l|}{v_{\text{st}}} + \frac{x_{k(l)} - x_{p(l)}}{u}\right]$ and waits for drop-off for $E_3 = E[w_{p(l)}]$ where $k(l)$ and $p(l)$ respectively label vehicle access collector and transfer collector for traveler l . AV relocates for E_2 to finally serve the next request, which is expected to be received by AMoD at $t_i^{\text{req}} + \frac{\Delta t}{m}$. AVs are initially located at the m first requests locations so that the service time of a fleet remains null until the m th request is received.

Algorithm 1: MSA process

```

1 Initialize  $T_s$  with an arbitrary step function or with a prior iteration (reference initial service time profile);
2  $K \leftarrow 1$ ;
3 while  $K = 1$  or  $UE(T_s)$  does not meet the quality criteria do
306 4    $K \leftarrow K + 1$ ;
5   Compute  $UE(T_s)$  by processing travelers one by one, taken in order of increasing  $t_i^0$ ;
6   Compute  $\widehat{T}_s(UE(T_s))$  based on equation 9 by processing travelers by increasing  $t_i^{\text{req}} = t_i^{\text{dep}}$ ;
7    $T_s \leftarrow \frac{1}{K}\widehat{T}_s + (1 - \frac{1}{K})T_s$ ;
8 Return  $UE(T_s)$ ;
```


UE properties. With a dynamic endogenous service time, the formal demonstration of UE existence and uniqueness is challenging.

As service time is a continuous function of departure time, it is a discontinuous function of theoretical arrival time at c_0 . Service time profile impacts the waiting times at drop-off bottlenecks w_k ($1 \leq k \leq M$). When service time increases between two travelers i and j taken in the order of theoretical arrival at c_0 ($t_i^0 < t_j^0$), this order is maintained at drop-off bottlenecks and the predicted a travel time equals the realized one. When service time decreases, travelers may be re-ordered: a customer requesting AV later may arrive earlier at the transfer collector. **A few commuters choose a non-optimal route because their waiting times at the AV-to-MRT transfer are greater than expected due to order rearranging.**


Discontinuities in the service time profile are local and bounded by the corridor parameters: the service time globally follows the loading of the network. It gives us confidence that jumps in service time have limited impact compared to the periods when T_s is constant and that existence and uniqueness of UE still hold.

Numerically, three criteria assess the convergence of the process and the quality of the solution found. The quality criteria (step 3) are the mean absolute error (MAE) between \widehat{T}_s and T_s , quartiles of the difference $\widehat{T}_s - T_s$, and the percentage of travelers that have made a wrong route choice due to local order rearranging. The process found a solution for each experiment achieved with the following criteria: MAE below 40s, 1st and 3rd quartiles respectively greater than -5min and lower than 5min, less than 10% wrong choices. Moreover, replacing the reference initial conditions (computed during the prior iteration of MSA as described above) with different initial service time profiles led to the same equilibrium.

Figures 6 and 7 present one of the tests for a generic scenario. The scenario deals with a theoretical monocentric city where a high-frequency subway serves the whole corridor. The demand level is high, with 13.4k travelers in 3 hours, leading to intense congestion from the second hour. Discontinuity threshold on T_s is 5min. Table 1 provides the scenario parameters.




(a) Evolution of $MAE(\widehat{T}_s - T_s)$ and percentage of travelers that have made a wrong route choice.




(b) Difference between \widehat{T}_s and T_s is acceptable at iteration 10 of the MSA process.

Figure 6: Convergence of the endogenous time-variant service time with the initial reference conditions.



(a) Initial and final service time profiles.



(b) Relative differences in travelers distribution are marginal.

Figure 7: Comparison of equilibrium obtained with reference and constant initial service time profiles.

330 Figure 7b compares the distribution of travelers obtained after convergence for the reference initial service time
 331 profile and a constant profile. Figure 7a shows the initial and final service time profiles. Differences are marginal.
 332 The MAE between final profiles is 57s. The maximum variation of travelers volume on a route represents only 0.28%
 333 of the total volume. Other initial service time profiles tested (translated reference, null, one-step function, three-steps
 334 function) led to similar results.

335 The number of iterations required to meet quality criteria differs depending on initial conditions. The prior iteration
 336 used to compute the reference initial conditions provides a good starting point. The process reaches the quality
 337 criteria in only ten iterations, as shown in Figure 6a. This fast convergence enhances compatibility with the design
 338 optimization framework.

Scenario name	Monocentric city	Western Lyon
Description	Wide monocentric compact city with its suburbs	Small suburban towns external to main urban area
Distribution of travelers	Uniform	BD TOPO addresses
MRT type	High freq. subway	Medium freq. regional trains
Corridor dimensions (km)	20*3	20*5
Morning peak duration (h)	3	5 2015 Lyon Area OD matrix
Number of travelers	15.5k	14k
v_w (m/s)	1.2	1.2
v_{st} (m/s)	9	14
u (m/s)	18	18
v_r (m/s)	14	25
h (s)	240	900
T_d (s)	45	45
$\mu_k, 0 < k \leq M$ (veh/s)	0.2	0.2
μ_0 (veh/s)	0.6	0.4
Nominal AVs ratio	10%	5%
Nominal number of collectors	5	7
Nominal spacing (km)	4	2,2,2,3,2,5,3
T_s step size (s)	300	150
α_c, β_c	222, 4	-
α_a, β_a	1, 2	-
Exogeneous constant T_s (s)	920	-
Pool dimensions (m^2)	300 * 300	-

Table 1: Scenarios parameters.

339 In this section, we have introduced our simple dynamic model for the morning commute in a many-to-one corridor
 340 with three combinations of modes. We have shown that exact UE is easily computable under an exogenous constant
 341 AMoD service time. The analysis of UE on an example has provided a deep understanding of how UE settles and

342 evolves. Under an endogenous time-variant service time, we have found that a few iterations of MSA lead to good
 343 quality UE, making our approach computationally efficient for design optimization.

344 3. Influence of design on MRT-AMoD cooperation or competition relations: the interest of dynamics and UE 345 principles

346 In this section, we demonstrate that dynamics in our model are crucial to capture the influence of design on MRT-
 347 AMoD cooperation or competition. This influence is analyzed regarding the UE principles introduced in section 2.2.5.

348 3.1. Why are dynamics crucial?

349 3.1.1. A static model for benchmark

350 Transportation studies usually use static approaches with time-invariant supplies and demand flows to deal with
 351 design. We compare our model with a static model to show how crucial considering dynamics is.

352 **Commuters aggregation.** The corridor splits into N equally proportioned zones aggregating the origins of travelers
 353 in an abstract origin O_i . The access travel time from O_i to c_k by vehicle (resp. walk) is defined as the average vehicle
 354 (resp. walking) access time of aggregated commuters. O_i 's vehicle (resp. walking) access collector corresponds to
 355 the one with the minimal vehicle (resp. walking) access time.

356 **Multimodal network directed graph.** The corridor is equivalent to a directed graph $G = (V, E)$ where V is the set of
 357 vertices and E the set of edges. Vertices include origins $\{O_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq N\}$, destination $\{D\}$ and three different nodes
 358 for each collector $\{C_k^c, C_k^r, C_k^a \mid 1 \leq k \leq M\}$. Commuters in Ω_k^c (resp. Ω_k^w) choosing **c** (resp. **r**) use C_k^c (resp. C_k^r).
 359 Commuters choosing **a** and transferring at c_k use C_k^a . Edges of the graph link:

- 360 • origins to their vehicle and walk access collectors,
- 361 • origins to transfer nodes associated with collectors located downstream of their vehicle access collector,
- 362 • **a** nodes of collectors to their **r** nodes,
- 363 • **c** nodes of collectors to C_1^c ,
- 364 • **r** nodes of collectors to destination,
- 365 • C_1^c to destination.

366 Figure 8 represents an example of G .




Figure 8: Corridor graph model G example where $N = 3$, $M = 2$, c_1 is the vehicle access collector for O_1 , O_2 , walk access collector for O_1 while c_2 is the vehicle access collector for O_3 , walk access collector for O_2 , O_3 . Solid edges carry constant travel times, while volume-dependent travel times are associated with dashed edges. Colors represent the mode used to travel the edge (car in blue, AV in orange, MRT in green, and walk in red).

367 **Travel times.** Travel times are constant except for edges passing through a delay generator point, namely (C_1^r, D)
 368 and (C_k^a, C_k^r) . The BPR volume delay function (Maerivoet and De Moor, 2005) gives the travel times on (C_1^r, D) and
 369 (C_k^a, C_k^r) links. Two parameters sets (α_c, β_c) and (α_a, β_a) determine the shape of functions for both delay generator
 370 point types. Volumes and travel times are respectively noted $v(\text{edge})$ and $\tau(\text{edge})$. AMoD service time T_s is assumed
 371 constant.

$$\tau(O_i, C_k^c) = \sum_{j \in O_i} \frac{|x_j - x_k| + |y_j|}{\text{card}(O_i) v_{\text{st}}} \quad (10)$$

$$\tau(O_i, C_k^r) = \sum_{j \in O_i} \frac{|x_j - x_k| + |y_j|}{\text{card}(O_i) v_w} \quad (11)$$

$$\tau(O_i, C_p^a) = T_s + \sum_{j \in O_i} \frac{|x_j - x_k| + |y_j|}{\text{card}(O_i) v_{\text{st}}} + \frac{x_k - x_p}{u} \quad (12)$$

$$\tau(C_k^a, C_k^r) = T_f \left(1 + \alpha_a \left(\frac{v(C_k^a, C_k^r)}{\mu_k} \right)^{\beta_a} \right) \quad (13)$$

$$\tau(C_k^r, D) = \frac{h}{2} + \frac{x_k}{v_r} + (k-1)T_d \quad (14)$$

$$\tau(C_k^c, C_1^c) = \frac{x_k - x_1}{u} \quad (15)$$

$$\tau(C_1^c, D) = \frac{x_1}{u} + \alpha_c \left(\frac{v(C_1^c, D)}{\mu_0} \right)^{\beta_c} \quad (16)$$

372 **Solving process.** The equilibrium of this system is computed through MSA using the conventional descent gradient
 373 based on an all-or-nothing assignment and step size $\frac{1}{K}$ where K is the iteration number (Sheffi and Powell, 1982).

374 **Static model calibration.** We calibrate static model parameters on the dynamic model outputs to maintain a certain
 375 consistency and facilitate results comparison. N is chosen to keep pools of travelers small enough to account for
 376 access times diversity (necessary smaller than attraction areas) and wide enough to gather a sufficient number of
 377 commuters for the flow balance procedure. T_s value equals the mean service time computed by the dynamic model.
 378 The congestion term in $\tau(C_1^c, D)$ (16) is intentionally independent of the free-flow travel time on edge (C_1^c, D) , which
 379 is controlled by the design parameter x_1 . It prevents unwanted modification of the congestion function when changing
 380 the corridor design. The free-flow travel time on (C_1^c, D) in the nominal monocentric city is used for α_c . The retained
 381 values for the other parameters $(\alpha_a, \beta_a, \beta_c)$ provide consistent total travel time and waiting times at bottlenecks
 382 regarding the dynamic model. Values for all parameters are provided in table 1. The MSA algorithm stops when the
 383 relative gap is below 10^{-4} . The tolerance for travel times equality is 30s.


3.1.2. Sensitivity of design on MRT-AMoD cooperation or competition with static and dynamic models

385 **Compared indicators.** We evaluate competition and cooperation between modes based on system-level and link-level
 386 indicators. The system-level indicators observed are volume-based and distance-based modal shares. A distance-based
 387 mode share corresponds to the total distance traveled by this mode over the total distance traveled by all modes. The
 388 link level indicators are the flows on each mode-route alternative.


389 **Design parameter.** A crucial design parameter in our study case is the number of collectors and their locations along
 390 the corridor. An *a priori* fair design strategy regarding a uniform distribution of travelers, as in the monocentric city
 391 scenario, is to fix the spacing between two collectors. With constant spacing, we analyze the sensitivity of the number
 392 of collectors M on the chosen indicators. We consider that the TA does not regulate AMoD here. AMoD comprises a
 393 single fleet operating on the whole corridor.

394 **Results analysis.** Figure 9 shows the results for dynamic and static models.


395 They both present a decreasing c volume-based mode share profile. The most significant modal shifts from car
 396 to other modes are achieved for a small number of collectors. Over eight collectors, accessibility improvement after
 397 adding a new collector has a limited impact on c volume-based mode share. The travelers who choose c whatever the
 398 number of collectors are "captives" to car mode. Their number directly relates to the CBD off-ramp capacity (μ_0) as
 399 c remains the most efficient mode of the system in free-flow conditions (we have $\Delta_i^r > 0$ and $\Delta_{i,p}^a > 0$). As expected,
 400 the static model underestimates congestion and overestimates c volume-based mode share compared to the dynamic
 401 model.




(a) Volume-based mode shares computed by the static model show only one cooperation behavior between r and a against c .



(b) Distance-based mode shares computed by the static model show cooperation then competition between r and a .



(c) Volume-based mode shares computed by the dynamic model show cooperation then competition between r and a .



(d) Distance-based mode shares computed by the dynamic model show cooperation followed by competition between r and a .

Figure 9: Impact of the number of collectors with a constant spacing on volume-based and distance-based mode shares for static and dynamic models. The dashed vertical lines capture the boundaries between two competition-cooperation schemes.

402 Models show different MRT-AMoD interactions. In terms of volume-based mode shares, the dynamic model
 403 highlights three competition-cooperation schemes over M (Figure 9c).

- $M \leq 4$: a new collector leads to modal shift from **c** to **r** and **a**. MRT and AVs cooperate against cars.
- $4 < M \leq 18$: **r** benefits from a higher number of collectors and steals market share from **c** and **a**. MRT and AMoD compete to the advantage of MRT.
- $18 < M$: MRT and AVs still compete but **r** now loses market share to **a**.

Opportunities to exploit **r-a** cooperation come for small numbers of collectors since competition starts from $M = 4$. The static model only shows the first of these schemes: MRT and AVs cooperate. This behavior is stable as M increases. **The static model does not identify competition between **a** and **r** in terms of volume-based mode share.**

Distance-based mode share measures the usage of a mode regardless of the trip in which it intervenes. In terms of distance-based mode share, the dynamic model reveals three schemes:

- $M \leq 4$: a new collector leads to lower car usage and higher MRT, AV, and walking usage. A positive synergy between MRT, AV, and walk occurs in this scheme.
- $4 < M \leq 8$: **a** benefits from a higher number of collectors. AVs steal kilometers from **r**, and to a lesser extent from **c**. AVs compete mainly with the MRT and secondarily with cars.
- $8 < M$: MRT usage declines against both AVs and cars. The usage of AVs and cars grows significantly.

The static model only captures the first two schemes, as shown in Figure 9b.

Figure 10 confirms that the static model misses the influence of design on travelers' distribution over itineraries. Travelers only divert to c_1 , the closest collector to the CBD off-ramp, which is available for everyone. Collector c_2 is only used marginally for high values of M). For low M values, close and distant travelers similarly load c_1 . As M increases, the provenance of AV riders and car drivers progressively imbalances. Distant travelers load more c_0 and c_1 than close travelers. (Figure 10b). Car mode share is greater in upstream vehicle attraction areas, while MRT mode share is greater in downstream walking attraction areas. Indeed, the MRT suffers from an increasing cumulative time lost due to train dwelling when M grows.




Figure 10: Impact of the number of collectors with a constant spacing on the distribution of commuters over itineraries for static and dynamic models. Only travelers that have chosen **c** or **a** appear here. The dynamic model shows an evolution in AMoD usage from a direct first-mile to a long first-mile pattern. The static model misses this behavior change.

426 The dynamic model leads to a more complex diversion pattern. Transfers take place at more than one collector.
 427 All collectors from c_1 to c_7 are loaded when $M = 14$. The distribution of commuters over transfer collectors is
 428 heterogeneous. As M increases, the distribution pattern evolves from the direct (Figure 10c) to the long first-mile
 429 (Figure 10d) type. In the direct first-mile pattern, most commuters in Ω_k^c request an AV to join c_k , their vehicle
 430 access collector. In the long first-mile pattern, more distant travelers use AVs to join the most downstream collectors.
 431 Cooperation-competition schemes and distribution patterns are consistent. The direct first-mile pattern is a cooperation
 432 scheme, while the long first-mile pattern is a competition scheme.

433 Considering dynamics allows for capturing the influence of design on cooperation-competition schemes and dis-
 434 tribution patterns. Moreover, the dynamic model can better describe the highlighted schemes and patterns based on
 435 the UE principles introduced in section 2.2.5.

436 3.2. Analysis of the dynamic model schemes and patterns regarding UE principles

437 To discuss the influence of design on cooperation-competition schemes in the same conditions as in section 2.2.5,
 438 we relaunch the sensitivity analysis of M with a constant T_s function. T_s equals the mean service time obtained through
 439 the MSA process. Schemes and patterns of Figure 11 are similar to the ones of Figures 9c, 9d, 10c and 10d.

440 Boundaries between schemes are different. Notably, the volume-based first competition scheme shortens. It
 441 extends from $M = 4$ to $M = 18$ with an endogenous time-variant service time and from $M = 6$ to $M = 12$ with a
 442 constant service time. A more significant distance-based modal shift occurs to the advantage of AVs. The lack of a
 443 feedback loop on service time favors AMoD.

444 Regarding the distribution of travelers over itineraries, the direct and long first-mile patterns are respectively more
 445 and less intense than in the time-variant service time model. For low M values, a larger part of AV riders transfers
 446 at their vehicle access collector. For high M values, the distribution of distant AV riders on downstream collectors is
 447 more spread.

448 At $M = 2$, Ω_1^c is wide enough to saturate both μ_0 and μ_1 : c_0 and c_1 are synchronized while c_2 is out of sync.
 449 Travelers in Ω_2^c divert through their vehicle access collector only: the direct first-mile pattern is almost perfect, with
 450 just 22 of them transferring at c_1 .


451 From $M = 3$ to $M = 5$, the first $M - 1$ bottlenecks are synchronized. A smaller vehicle attraction area surrounds
 452 c_M . This bottleneck is used but not overloaded: $w_M(t)$ is null. It is out of sync with downstream bottlenecks. The
 453 more distant commuters favor the direct first-mile pattern.

454 As M increases, attraction areas narrow, first diversions start earlier, and extra travel times values are closer to
 455 each other, i.e., successive bottlenecks switch on more quickly. Travelers better spread on the $M - 1$ first bottlenecks.
 456 The direct first-mile pattern here is less intense than in out of sync conditions.


457 At $M = 5$, out of sync of c_5 still guarantees that the more distant travelers follow the direct first-mile pattern.
 458 However, the acceleration of successive bottleneck switching-on and the reduced size of vehicle attraction areas
 459 generates the long first-mile pattern.

460 From $M = 5$, an additional collector will not necessarily attract diversions: the system has reached the maximum
 461 potential for diversion. The long first-mile pattern intensifies since the first five collectors are getting closer to the
 462 destination. These collectors attract fewer surrounding travelers and more upstream travelers who depart near bottle-
 463 necks with excessive extra travel times. M increment is equivalent to moving attractive diversion alternatives away
 464 from travelers on average. Car distance-based mode share increases during this scheme because \mathbf{r} suffers from a grow-
 465 ing cumulative dwelling time. Travelers departing from upstream attraction areas are more affected by the cumulative
 466 dwelling time increase than travelers departing from downstream attraction areas. Consequently, more drivers come
 467 from more distant vehicle attraction areas.


468 A good design should consider all the explained dynamics and behaviors regarding Ω_k^c size, the number of travelers
 469 diverting to \mathbf{r} , the maximum potential for diversion, and how extra travel times chain. The out of sync phenomenon
 470 forces the strict application of the direct first-mile pattern but might indicate that the overall diversion capacity is
 471 insufficient. A moderate long first-mile pattern is needed in practice to reach better car mitigation and MRT usage
 472 indicators.




(a) Volume-based mode shares with constant T_s show a smaller M range where r and a compete to the advantage of r .



(b) Distance-based mode shares with constant T_s show a greater modal shift toward AV.



(c) Itineraries for $M = 4$ show a more intense direct first-mile.



(d) Itineraries for $M = 14$ show a less intense long first-mile.

Figure 11: Impact of the number of collectors with a constant spacing on volume-based, distance-based mode shares, and travelers distribution over itineraries for a "semi" dynamic model with a fixed service time.

473 4. Addressing the MRT-AMoD design problem

474 In this section, design can change. We apply an optimization metaheuristic in a realistic study case to find good
 475 designs under six different policies. We check how each design exploits the UE principles and make recommendations
 476 to the TA.

477 4.1. Scenarios

478 4.1.1. Western Lyon corridor

479 We apply our framework to a scenario derived from the West part of the city of Lyon, France (Figure 12).




Figure 12: Lyon corridor is composed of 9 towns surrounding the A6 freeway and the regional train line from Marcilly-d’Azergues to Lyon-Gorge-de-Loup.

480 **Freeway.** The A6 freeway links several suburban towns with Lyon city center. The Fourvière tunnel, the final part of
 481 A6 road, is the entry point for the center. It acts as a bottleneck, causing significant congestion to arise daily.

482 **MRT.** A low-frequency regional train line operates along the corridor from Marcilly-d’Azergues to Lyon-Gorge-de-
 483 Loup. At Lyon-Gorge-de-Loup station, travelers can access the Lyon PT meshed network (subway, buses). In practice,
 484 the train line is underused because of its low frequency (waiting time can be up to 30 minutes in the morning) and lack
 485 of convenient access mode. Feeder buses operate in the downstream part of the corridor, but their routes are parallel
 486 to the train line. Their coverage is insufficient within this 5km-wide corridor. Moreover, its upstream part is out of the
 487 agglomeration bus network. The regional buses serving there are scarce.

488 **Relevancy of the territory.** The context is favorable to AMoD deployment. Today, car mode share from the corridor
 489 to the center is 64% against 31% for PT (Urba Lyon, 2018). At the local level, elected representatives request better
 490 first-mile solutions (Cerema, 2021). At the metropolitan area level, the political will is to improve the attractiveness of
 491 the train and change its role from a regional to an urban-suburban line. Public authorities have identified this corridor
 492 as an opportunity to develop new transportation systems. Several facilities favoring ridesharing have been deployed
 493 recently, including carpool areas and an HOV lane. The active entrepreneurial and research fabric on autonomous
 494 vehicles has already launched pilot projects in Lyon Confluence (Navly) and Meyzieu (Mia). AMoD may contribute
 495 to rebalancing mode shares in this corridor by providing on-demand home-to-station service to commuters.

496 **Realism of parameters.** Parameters for the Western Lyon case study are available in table 1.

497 The demand scenario has been built on the Lyon Area OD matrix (2015) and BD TOPO addresses (2021). The
 498 first database allowed the computation of hourly trip generation rates for 5 hours in the corridor. We distributed
 499 departures according to a Poisson process in time and uniformly on addresses. In total, 14k commuting trips occur.
 500 Such a disaggregation process is sufficient to compare policies. One could obtain a more precise design using more
 501 detailed data sources that render the relationship between origins locations and departure times.

502 Our model requires the separation of cars and AVs flows. This assumption is acceptable here as AVs could run
 503 on the HOV lane to escape the potential congestion spillback on A6. Two lanes are available for all vehicles in the

504 Fourviere tunnel. The considered demand represents only a part of the potential traffic passing through the tunnel. The
 505 capacity value chosen is half the maximal flow observed with inductive-loop detectors. The capacity value chosen for
 506 the other bottlenecks corresponds to 6 drop-off spots in front of a station and a drop-off time (T_f) of 30 seconds.

507 We assume a fixed headway that makes the MRT line attractive enough to justify the need for feeder service. A
 508 15 minutes headway corresponds to the highest frequency currently operated.

509 Finally, to ensure the realism of the scenario, the number of AVs operating in the corridor is limited to 700.

510 4.1.2. Investigated policies

511 We benchmark three distinct policies regarding AMoD deployment and three priority objectives for the TA. Pro-
 512 tectionism consists in refusing to accredit any AV and focusing on MRT design only (no AMoD). Opportunism relies
 513 on AMoD regulation to foster cooperation between MRT and AVs (regulated AMoD). Liberalism focuses on MRT
 514 design while allowing the AMoD operator to serve its interest, i.e., seek its profit increase (unregulated AMoD). Here,
 515 we consider a simple version of service pricing and cost schemes. The profit of AMoD is proportional to the amount
 516 of work achieved (in passengers * kilometers). AMoD operator’s objective is reduced to maximize the usage of AVs.
 517 The distance-based mode share associated with a mode measures its usage.

518 The priority objective of the TA may be to: maximize MRT usage, minimize car usage, or minimize the average
 519 travel time per traveler during the morning commute.

520 Table 2 presents the set of scenarios.

Policy	Protectionism		Opportunism			Liberalism		
Regulation strategy	Forbid AVs		Liscense AVs by fleet and coverage zone			No regulation		
Design optimization	Unilateral		Joint			Consecutive		
Priority objective	Max MRT usage	Min average travel time	Max MRT usage	Min average travel time	Min car usage	Max MRT usage	Min average travel time	Min car usage

Table 2: Summary of the policy scenarios.

521 4.2. Optimization framework

522 4.2.1. Degrees of freedom

523 Figure 1 lists the design parameters. This section justifies the choice for four of them as degrees of freedom: the
 524 number of collectors, their locations, the number of AVs fleets, and their coverage zones.

525 **Corridor configuration.** As shown in the monocentric city scenario, the number of collectors is a decisive parameter
 526 in fostering MRT-AMoD cooperation. If spacing was constant in section 3.1.2, it is not relevant for the Western Lyon
 527 scenario, which has an inhomogeneous distribution of origins. The only remaining constraint on spacing is a lower
 528 bound. It prevents unrealistic configurations where two collectors are very close to each other.

529 **AMoD configuration.** Enforcing a boundary to one fleet coverage zone can mitigate the long first-mile pattern as
 530 shown by the sensitivity analysis presented in Figure 13. Two groups of consecutive bottlenecks supplied by two dif-
 531 ferent fleets stay out of sync, so direct first-mile holds. One can obtain similar effects by decreasing (resp. increasing)
 532 downstream (resp. upstream) stations’ drop-off capacities. However, this solution is less flexible than coverage zone
 533 geofencing, which could be demand-responsive and reviewed daily.

534 Geofencing AMoD can have other positive effects such as service time reduction and reliability (Shen and Quadri-
 535 foglio, 2013), total distance traveled by empty AVs drop (Fagnant et al., 2016), equity gains with more uniform service
 536 times over space (Gurumurthy et al., 2021). Gurumurthy et al. (2021) evaluate only three fleets with predetermined
 537 boundaries. Here, we optimize these parameters.

538 **Fixed design parameters.** Freeway speed, bottlenecks capacities, MRT headway, and AVs ratio are other levers to
 539 lower car performance but remain untouched in this study.




Figure 13: Sensitivity analysis of the downstream boundary of one fleet coverage zone on distance-based mode shares for the Western Lyon scenario. Compared to a situation without AV, a unique fleet mitigates car usage, whatever its coverage zone, and improves MRT usage when its coverage zone includes up to 6 upstream collectors. Three schemes emerge: (i) MRT-AV cooperation against cars for coverage zones extending from c_7 to at most c_4 , (ii) AV competition with MRT and cars for coverage zone extending from c_7 to c_3 , (iii) AV-cars competition with MRT for wider coverage zones.

540 4.2.2. Optimization loop

541 Under protectionism, the TA unilaterally optimizes the MRT design. Under liberalism, this optimization assumes
 542 that AMoD is composed of one fleet serving the whole corridor. Then, the unregulated AMoD adjusts its configuration
 543 to maximize its profit. Under opportunism, the TA jointly optimizes MRT and AMoD designs.

544 As the nature of the function that links our freedom degrees with each objective is unknown (not necessarily
 545 convex nor linear), we choose to use a genetic algorithm (GA) when exhaustive research is not possible. Such a
 546 metaheuristic does not guarantee global optimality. Stopping criteria, such as the stability of the fitness function over
 547 a large number of iterations and the small number of distinct individuals in the current population, are signs that the
 548 algorithm has reached a local optimum. Local optimality is sufficient for this study's goal to highlight the benefits
 549 of a joint MRT-AMoD design. Finding a good design instead of the optimal one still allows evaluation of the lower
 550 bound of the gains achieved under each policy. Since a fleet coverage zone is compact and extends on one or several
 551 vehicle attraction areas, an exhaustive search for the optimal AMoD configuration is possible for $M < 10$.

552 Applying the GA to the MRT design requires corridor discretization into a given number of location spots. A
 553 spot length is sufficiently large to have meaningful configurations (two freeway ramps/MRT platforms cannot be too
 554 close to each other) and sufficiently small to keep precise locations. Lower and upper bounds constrain the problem to
 555 account for the current corridor configuration and the finite investment budget. Applying the GA to the AMoD design
 556 requires a ternary encoding where chromosome length equals the number of collectors. For the joint MRT-AMoD
 557 design, the problem is quaternary-encoded, and chromosome length equals the number of location spots. Figure 14
 558 provides an example of encoding.




Figure 14: The MRT design is binary-encoded: 0 and 1, respectively, stand for an empty spot and a collector. The AMoD design is ternary-encoded: 0, 1, and 2, respectively, stand for an unsupplied attraction area, the downstream extremity of a new coverage zone, and the continuity of a coverage zone. The MRT-AMoD design is ternary-encoded: 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively, stand for an empty spot, an unsupplied attraction area, the downstream extremity of a new coverage zone, and the continuity of a coverage zone.

4.3. Numerical results

Figure 15 presents the best designs found by the GA. Table 3 gathers the numerical results, and Figure 16 compares the scores obtained by each policy regarding five indicators: the average travel time per commuter (including those using streets only and located between c_1 and destination), MRT usage, car mitigation (sum of MRT, AVs and walk distance-based mode shares), the average number of commuters served per AV, the Gini coefficient of travelers waiting times (including service time and waiting time at bottleneck).

Scenario	Western Lyon								
	Maximize MRT usage			Minimize average travel time			Minimize car usage		
Policy	Protectionism	Opportunism	Liberalism	Protectionism	Opportunism	Liberalism	Opportunism	Liberalism	
M	15	9	6	17	13	12	5	10	
Number of fleets	0	8	1	0	2	2	1	1	
c volume-based mode share	51.1	48.7	48.6	51.2	49.0	49.6	48.9	48.5	
r volume-based mode share	48.9	5.0	9.3	48.8	0.0	0.0	25.2	12.9	
a volume-based mode share	0.0	46.3	42.1	0.0	51.0	50.4	25.9	38.5	
Car distance-based mode share	39.4	33.6	47.1	54.3	38.1	41.8	32.8	35.5	
MRT distance-based mode share	51.0	57.2	37.4	40.7	48.3	45.1	51.2	43.8	
AV distance-based mode share	0.0	8.2	14.6	0.0	13.7	13.1	8.6	19.1	
Walk distance-based mode share	9.5	1.0	0.9	4.9	0.0	0.0	7.4	1.6	
Avg. TT per trav.	36:37	21:45	22:13	28:23	15:28	15:31	33:21	25:46	
Gini coef.	0.68	0.68	0.51	0.68	0.63	0.63	0.57	0.52	
AV occupancy	-	15.6	9.8	-	10.3	10.4	10.9	7.8	

Table 3: Western Lyon results.

Maximize MRT usage. When the priority of the TA is to maximize MRT usage, opportunism performs better than other policies on all indicators except delays uniformity (Figure 16a). The MRT distance-based mode share reaches 57.5%, which is 6% more than under protectionism, and 20% more than under liberalism. The sum of AV and walk distance-based mode shares is similar in protectionism and opportunism scenarios (9.5%). It increases by 6% under liberalism, indicating the presence of long first-mile rides. These long AV trips compete with the MRT rather than the car: the car mitigation score of liberalism is lower than protectionism. Liberalism leads to counterproductive designs.

However, the MRT design found under liberalism is the closest to the current one (Figure 15d). It follows the urban geography, with one station per town. The deployment of AVs and the refinement of the MRT service pattern (skip stops c_2 and c_3) can bring benefits to commuters, notably reduced travel times and more uniformly distributed waiting times.

The liberalism to maximize the MRT usage scenario reaches the highest score regarding delays uniformity. Few travelers experience a null delay. Commuters departing from the downstream part of the corridor undergo waiting

577 time at the CBD off-ramp, just as those departing from the upstream part, which AMoD does not supply. Commuters
 578 departing from the middle experience non-null T_s and w_k .

579 On the contrary, 20% of travelers undergo 70% of the total waiting time under opportunism. Drivers mainly come
 580 from the downstream part of the corridor and undergo great w_0 . As AMoD splits onto small coverage zones, T_s and
 581 w_k are null or small for those diverting to **a**.

582 Protectionism reaches the same score as opportunism regarding delays uniformity. The MRT riders do not undergo
 583 any delay, while drivers do.




Figure 15: Resulting designs for opportunism and liberalism scenarios.




Figure 16: Scores depending on priority objective and policy for the Western Lyon corridor.

584 Under opportunism and liberalism, the optimization of design led to substantial s_2 (spacing between c_1 and c_2).
 585 This inter-station plays a considerable role in the distribution of travelers over itineraries since expanding Ω_1^c results
 586 in overloading bottleneck μ_0 with travelers close to the CBD. In this way, long-distance trips are subject to diversion.

587 A one fleet per collector strategy emerges from the joint optimization of MRT and AMoD designs, as shown by
 588 Figure 15a. This strategy avoids the long first-mile pattern since bottlenecks remain out of sync.

589 Moreover, it allows for keeping short service times. The service times of all fleets except those serving Ω_2^c and Ω_8^c
 590 remain below 150s. In Ω_2^c , travelers close to c_2 prefer to walk while travelers far from c_2 request an AV. Relocation
 591 and serving efforts being substantial, the service time in Ω_2^c is higher than 150s. Similarly, relocation and serving
 592 distances are high in Ω_8^c because travelers' origins are far from c_8 . The attraction area extends on a sparsely populated
 593 territory between Lissieu-Dommartin and Civrieux d'Azergues towns.

594 Finally, it improves the AV utilization rate. An AV serves 15.6 customers on average under opportunism, which
 595 is higher than in the other scenarios. The indicator is homogeneous across fleets, except for the fleet surrounding c_8 ,
 596 which has a slightly smaller score (12.8).

597 The geometry of coverage zones under liberalism is very different. One fleet covers a huge downstream part of
 598 the corridor. AMoD operator has better deploy one fleet on a wide area to increase AVs usage. In this way, it takes
 599 advantage of synchronization between bottlenecks and can exploit the total capacity of each a diversion itinerary. The
 600 exclusion of attraction areas where AMoD's market share is limited (here Ω_5^c and Ω_6^c) allows for keeping its service
 601 time as small as possible in other areas.

602 If protectionism performs well on MRT usage maximization, it has the worst average travel time among all sce-
 603 narios (36:37). AMoD deployment leads to a 15min reduction, AVs being regulated or not. When regulated, AVs
 604 utilization rate is higher, with, on average, five commuters transported per hour instead of 3.

605 **Minimize average travel time.** When the main objective is to minimize the average travel time, liberalism and oppor-
 606 tunism have similar results and outperform protectionism on all indicators (Figure 16b). Deploying AVs reduces the
 607 average travel time by 46%, reaching the value of 15:30. Regulation is not necessary here: improving performance
 608 comes down to increasing AMoD usage. MRT has been designed considering one fleet serving the whole corridor,
 609 which is not so far from what emerges through the profit maximization process by AMoD (Figure 15e). The car
 610 (resp. MRT) distance-based mode share is slightly smaller (resp. higher) under opportunism. If liberalism provides
 611 satisfying results, a joint design helps to reach an even better equilibrium that benefits travelers, AMoD, and the TA.

612 The positioning of collectors is similar in both scenarios, except for c_1 , which is closer to the destination under
 613 opportunism (Figure 15b). Thus, more downstream travelers are included in Ω_1^c and contribute to congestion at μ_0 .
 614 It can explain that opportunism performs slightly better in car and MRT distance-based mode shares than liberalism.
 615 The obtained AMoD configurations both have one downstream fleet, which coverage zone ends just before Civrieux
 616 d'Azergues (the most upstream town).

617 Since $v_r > u$ here, $\Delta_{i,p}^a$ decreases as p increments. All extra travel times are positive given the substantial headway,
 618 but traveler $i \in \Omega_k^c$ has better diverting in priority as upstream as possible, i.e., at c_k . The order of extra travel times

619 favors the direct first-mile pattern. The long first-mile pattern has almost entirely disappeared. Travelers use AV to
620 join one station downstream of their access collector at most.

621 Consequently, service time remains below the discontinuity threshold, and extra travel times by AVs are independent
622 of i ($\Delta_{i,p}^a = \Delta_p^a$). The positioning of the collectors is so that all Δ_p^a are very close to each other. Then, **a-div1** starts
623 on all collectors supplied by AVs nearly simultaneously. It occurs before **r-div1**, so walking distance-based mode
624 share is null. Bottlenecks are synchronized until the unloading phase. The design allows the system to enter as soon
625 as possible and remain in a global **a-div1** state. As a result, w_0 and w_k ($0 < k \leq 5$) remain small and stable (5min for
626 w_0 and 60s for w_k).

627 Upstream, around Civrieux d’Azergues, all designs share an accumulation of collectors. For scenarios with AVs,
628 among these collectors, none is used as an access point by walk, and only the most downstream one is chosen for
629 transfer from AV to MRT. Consequently, no traveler there undergoes a deterrent cumulative dwelling time. The
630 multiplication of collectors improves the travel times of drivers and AV riders. Keeping only the most downstream of
631 these collectors produces a marginal increase in the average travel time per commuter.

632 **Minimize car usage.** When car mitigation is the main objective, opportunism once again reaches the best score
633 among all scenarios (Figure 16c). It relies more on walking than liberalism (+5.8%). It can explain the higher average
634 travel time score (-8min).

635 Liberalism performs even worse than the "opportunism to maximize MRT usage" scenario. Though, the resulting
636 AMoD configuration is precisely the one considered by the TA to design the MRT line (Figure 15f). It is a sign that
637 MRT-AMoD cooperation is necessary to steal market share from **c**, especially concerning the drivers that cannot be
638 attracted to **r** whatever the MRT design.

639 5. Conclusion

640 In this paper, we proposed a dynamic model and an optimization framework to tackle the MRT-AMoD design
641 problem in a morning commute context. Under an exogenous constant AMoD service time, the FIFO rule charac-
642 terizes the system. This property enables specifying the dynamics of the system equilibrium, which is outside the
643 scope of DTA in more generic networks. We characterized the different stable states of UE and the conditions to
644 pass from one to another (UE principles). Under an endogenous time-variant AMoD service time, the proposed MSA
645 process approximates UE correctly in a few iterations, which makes our approach computationally efficient for design
646 optimization.

647 Comparison with a static model showed that considering dynamics allows capturing richer cooperation-
648 competition schemes between MRT and AMoD. Two extreme patterns emerged from individual choices depending
649 on the MRT design. In the long first-mile pattern, travelers favor downstream stations to transfer, so AV legs of trips
650 are long. In the direct first-mile pattern, travelers tend to use AVs on smaller distances to join their access collector
651 and transfer there. These patterns have been explained in light of UE principles.

652 The application of our model to the Western Lyon corridor showed that the joint design of MRT and AMoD can
653 foster their cooperation. Indeed, opportunism provides the best results for each priority objective of the TA. A single
654 fleet per collector design is found in the Western Lyon corridor when the objective is to maximize MRT usage. How-
655 ever, such regulation offers travelers fewer choices for diversion, less flexibility, and uniformity in experienced delays.
656 Liberalism is less reliable in achieving the given objectives but ensures greater uniformity of delays. Protectionism
657 may perform adequately depending on the distribution of origins but never reaches the highest scores.

658 The one fleet per collector design strategy emerging from the opportunism policy is consistent with the paradigm
659 of Autonomous Mobility District (AMD). AMD refers to using AV technology in a limited geographical area that
660 generally includes an MRT station. AMD could answer several urban planning goals. Hou et al. (2018) list the
661 proposed benefits of an AMD, including the reduction of car mode share, parking lots, and pedestrian-oriented land
662 use. Many publications have studied intra-AMD mobility with simulation (Huang et al., 2021; Shen et al., 2018;
663 Scheltes and de Almeida Correia, 2017), but few have studied inter-AMD mobility.

664 The presented model includes several strong assumptions and is quite restrictive regarding intermodality and net-
665 work. However, simplifications make UE dynamics explicit and allow escaping the black-box effect that characterizes
666 less restrictive frameworks. The network structure is generic enough to apply to several urban areas, and the approach

667 works with little data. When more precise data is available, refining the model parameters improves scenario real-
668 ism. Our model could be extended to more intermodal options. Extensions should maintain the network properties
669 (single bottleneck per route and combination of modes) and the ability of our UE resolution procedure to meet the
670 quality criteria in a few iterations. They should either preserve the theoretical arrival order at all bottlenecks (as in our
671 model under exogenous constant T_s) or generate local bounded order rearranging (as in our model under endogenous
672 time-variant T_s). For example, one can add a car + MRT option with capacitated park-and-rides at collectors. A
673 micro-mobility + MRT option would be similar to \mathbf{r} .

674 Another limitation of our model is the reality gap that stems from the deterministic route choice based on travel
675 time only. We did not include the monetary aspect because it involves making additional assumptions on AMoD
676 and MRT fare schemes. Such assumptions prevent us from accessing the primary cooperation-competition schemes
677 between MRT and AMoD. We did not include a transfer penalty to account for the discomfort of changing mode
678 because transfer between AV and MRT is already penalized with a wait time for drop-off. Adding a constant transfer
679 penalty to $T_{i,p}^a$ translates the extra travel times $\Delta_{i,p}^a$ and changes the times at which the system changes state but does
680 not modify the states themselves. In order to address the reality gap in the Western Lyon corridor, future research will
681 evaluate the designs found in this study through simulation on agent-based/activity-based platforms, which are more
682 accurate in reproducing travelers' choices and AMoD operation.

683 **CRedit author statement**

684 **Cortina Mélanie:** Funding acquisition, Visualization, Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Writing- Orig-
685 inal draft preparation. **Chiabaut Nicolas:** Funding acquisition, Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision,
686 Writing- Review & Editing. **Leclercq Ludovic:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing- Review
687 & Editing.

688 **Declaration of competing interest**

689 The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could
690 have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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696 Appendices

697 A. Table of notations

698 The notations used in this paper are summarized below in the order of appearance.

700 Nomenclature

701 Assumptions

702	B	Corridor length.
703	W	Corridor width.
704	M	Number of collectors along corridor without counting the CBD off-ramp and terminus MRT station as
705		a collector.
706	c_k	k^{th} collector of the corridor when $k > 0$, c_0 designates the CBD off-ramp and terminus MRT station.
707	x_k	Location of collector c_k .
708	(x_i, y_i)	Traveler i 's origin coordinates.
709	$v_{\text{st}}, v_{\text{w}}$	Speed of cars in streets, speed of pedestrians.
710	$\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{a}$	Superscripts designating car only, walk and MRT, AV and MRT options. In the core of the text we
711		note $\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{a}$ in bold for readability.
712	u	Free-flow speed on freeway.
713	μ_k	Capacity of delay generator point associated with c_k .
714	T_{f}	Time for the drop-off maneuver (for an AV to park at a drop-off spot and for the passenger to leave
715		the vehicle in security).
716	v_{r}	Speed of the MRT.
717	T_{d}	Dwell time at a MRT station.
718	h	Headway of MRT service during peak hours in seconds.
719	Ω_k^{w}	Set of travelers departing from the walking attraction area of c_k .
720	$X_{k,k+1}^{\text{w}}$	Frontier between two consecutive walking attraction areas ($\Omega_k^{\text{w}} \cap \Omega_{k+1}^{\text{w}}$).
721	Ω_k^{c}	Set of travelers departing from the vehicle attraction area of c_k .
722	$X_{k,k+1}^{\text{c}}$	Frontier between two consecutive vehicle attraction areas ($\Omega_k^{\text{c}} \cap \Omega_{k+1}^{\text{c}}$).
723	Dynamic model	
724	$w_k(t)$	Waiting time at bottleneck associated with c_k for a traveler arriving at t .
725	$A_k(t)$	Cumulative travelers count arrival curve at bottleneck μ_k .
726	t_k	Time at which congestion starts at bottleneck μ_k .
727	T_i^{c}	Free-flow travel time of traveler i by mode \mathbf{c} .
728	T_i^{r}	Travel time of traveler i by mode \mathbf{r} .
729	$T_{i,p}^{\text{a}}$	Free-flow (nor waiting for AMoD nor waiting at bottleneck μ_p are included) travel time of traveler i
730		by mode \mathbf{a} with a transfer at c_p .
731	t_i^0	Theoretical arrival time of traveler i at c_0 .
732	τ_i^{c}	Travel time of traveler i by mode \mathbf{c} outside of free-flow conditions.
733	$t_i^{\text{req}} = t_i^{\text{dep}}$	Time at which traveler i sends a request for AV, it equals traveler i 's departure time.
734	t_i^{p}	Time at which traveler i arrives at bottleneck μ_p when she chooses mode \mathbf{a} .
735	T_{s}	Service time function, $T_{\text{s}}(t_i^{\text{req}})$ is the service time experienced by traveler i when it requests an AV.
736	$\tau_{i,p}^{\text{a}}$	Travel time of traveler i by mode \mathbf{a} .
737	Δ_i^{r}	Extra travel time experienced by traveler i when she takes mode \mathbf{r} instead of free-flow \mathbf{c} mode.
738	$\Delta_{i,p}^{\text{a}}$	Free-flow extra travel time experienced by traveler i when she takes mode \mathbf{a} with a transfer at c_p
739		instead of free-flow \mathbf{c} mode (noted Δ_p^{a} when it does not depend on i 's origin which is the case when T_{s}
740		is a constant function).
741	s_k	Spacing distance between c_{k-1} and c_k .
742	$A^{\text{th}}(t)$	Theoretical global arrival curve at bottleneck μ_0 .

743	$A_k^r(t)$	Cumulative travelers count arrival curve at c_k by walk.
744	m	Number of AVs in a fleet.
745	K	K^{th} iteration of the MSA process.
746	\widehat{T}_s	Effective service time profile.
747	Δt	Time elapsed while a fleet receiving the m last request.
748	E_1	Expected pick up time for the mean request.
749	E_2	Expected running time for the mean request.
750	E_3	Expected waiting time at bottleneck for the mean request.
751	Static model	
752	N	Number of travelers pools.
753	O_i	Abstract origin aggregating several commuters.
754	$G(V, E)$	Graph representing the corridor.
755	D, C_k^c, C_k^r, C_k^a	Destination, on-ramp, station and transfer nodes in G .
756	$\alpha_c, \beta_c, \alpha_a, \beta_a$	BPR parameters respectively associated to freeway final off-ramp and drop-off delay generator points.
757	$v(\text{edge})$	Traffic volume on edge of G .
758	$T(\text{edge})$	Travel time on edge of G .

759 B. Simplified examples to illustrate UE principles and network characteristics

760 In order to better illustrate the notions associated with UE computation (diversion patterns, synchronization),
761 we use the constant T_s assumption in this appendix and limit the travelers origins to collectors locations. Thus, we
762 can treat travelers with flows. We note $A_k^{\text{th}}(t)$ the demand from c_k , T_k^c and $T_{k,p}^c$ the travel times by **c** and **a** for all
763 travelers departing from c_k , Δ_k^i the extra travel time experienced by travelers departing from c_k when they divert to **r**.
764 Example B.1 treats the case when only **c** and **a** modes are available, example B.2 deals with the three modes.

765 B.1. Example with modes **c**, **a**

766 To demonstrate desynchronization phenomenon, **r** is unavailable here. Extra travel times on diversion routes are
767 monotonically increasing from downstream to upstream collectors ($\Delta_1^a < \dots < \Delta_M^a$).

768 $M = 2$. Figure B.1 presents the resulting equilibrium.

- 769 1. Initially, every commuter chooses **c**. Congestion on freeway starts from the moment when $\dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) > \mu_0$ where
770 $A^{\text{th}}(t) = A_1^{\text{th}}(t) + A_2^{\text{th}}(t)$ denotes global demand as the sum of demands from both collectors. A queue forms and
771 grows till $w_0 = \Delta_1^i$. c_1 is the most downstream collector before destination, all travelers have a new alternative
772 to c_0 itinerary.
- 773 2. If $\dot{A}^{\text{th}} \leq \mu_0 + \mu_1$, **a** starts to be used by both travelers flows with a transfer at c_1 but μ_1 remains uncongested.
774 According to the UE principle, travel times of all routes should be equal: $T_k^c(t) = T_{k,1}^a(t), \forall k \in \{1, 2\}$, which can
775 be derived into $\dot{w}_0(t) = 0$. Replacing w_0 by its expression given by 1 leads to: $\dot{A}_0(t) = \mu_0$ which characterizes
776 diversion pattern 1 (div1). See period A in Figure B.1.
- 777 3. As soon as $\dot{A}^{\text{th}} > \mu_0 + \mu_1$, μ_1 starts to be congested, and diversion pattern 2 (div2) is observed (period B). It is
778 characterized by $\dot{w}_0(t) = \dot{w}_1(t)$: waiting times at μ_0 and μ_1 increase at the same pace till $w_0(t) = w_1(t) + \Delta_1^a =$
779 Δ_2^a .
- 780 4. At this time, we have $\mu_0 + \mu_1 < \dot{A}^{\text{th}} \leq \mu_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2$. Route c_2 starts to be used. This new alternative is only
781 accessible to travelers departing from c_2 . Two cases are possible:
 - If $\dot{A}_1^{\text{th}} \leq \mu_0 + \mu_1$, travelers flow from c_2 still uses μ_0 and μ_1 bottlenecks. Waiting times $w_0(t)$ and
 $w_1(t) + \Delta_1^a$ are maintained equal to Δ_2^a . This is a div1 where μ_0 and μ_1 work at capacity while μ_2
absorbs the surplus of demand coming from c_2 .

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = & \mu_0 \\ \dot{A}_1(t) = & \mu_1 \\ \dot{A}_2(t) = \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \mu_0 - \mu_1 < \mu_2 \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

- If $\dot{A}_1^{\text{th}} > \mu_0 + \mu_1$, div2 is maintained for travelers flow departing from c_1 only, while c_2 route is chosen by all travelers departing from c_2 . Waiting time on μ_2 gets out of sync with other bottlenecks: $w_0(t) = w_1(t) + \Delta_1^a > \Delta_2^a$ and $w_2(t) = 0$ (period C).

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + \mu_1} \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \\ \dot{A}_1(t) = \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_0 + \mu_1} \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \\ \dot{A}_2(t) = \dot{A}_2^{\text{th}}(t) \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

5. If global demand is still increasing, we get to a time when $\dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) > \mu_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2$. Again, several cases arise, depending on synchronization between bottlenecks and demand per origin collector.

- If bottlenecks are all synchronized ($w_0(t) = w_1(t) + \Delta_1^a = \Delta_2^a$), $\dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \leq \mu_0 + \mu_1$ or $\frac{\dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t)}{\mu_0 + \mu_1} < \frac{\dot{A}_2^{\text{th}}(t)}{\mu_2}$, a div2 is observed:

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2} \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) \\ \dot{A}_1(t) = \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2} \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) \\ \dot{A}_2(t) = \frac{\mu_2}{\mu_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2} \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.3})$$

- If μ_2 is not synchronized with others ($w_0(t) = w_1(t) + \Delta_1^a > \Delta_2^a$), and $\dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \leq \mu_0 + \mu_1$ or $\frac{\dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t)}{\mu_0 + \mu_1} < \frac{\dot{A}_2^{\text{th}}(t)}{\mu_2}$, div2 continues for travelers flow departing from c_1 while c_2 route is chosen by others till re-synchronization. Re-synchronization takes place when $w_0(t) = w_1(t) + \Delta_1^a = w_2(t) + \Delta_2^a$, at the end of period D, from when a div2 follows (period E).
- If $\frac{\dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t)}{\mu_1 + \mu_2} > \frac{\dot{A}_2^{\text{th}}(t)}{\mu_2}$, whatever the synchronization state of bottlenecks, div2 continues for travelers flow departing from c_1 , while c_2 route is chosen by others.

6. When global demand decreases, two possibilities emerge.

- If bottlenecks are synchronized, div2 continues (period F). A bottleneck ceased to be used as soon as its queue vanishes.
- If they are not, re-synchronization takes place during the demand decrease phase.

$M > 2$. We note p^* the index of the most downstream bottleneck synchronized with bottleneck μ_p .

- Bottlenecks μ_0 and μ_1 are always synchronized because they are accessible to every commuter.
- Bottleneck μ_{p+1} starts to be used when $w_p + \Delta_p^a = \Delta_{p+1}^a$.
- Bottleneck μ_{p+1} gets out of sync with bottlenecks μ_{p^*}, \dots, μ_p when:

$$\begin{cases} \sum_{k=p^*}^M \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t) \leq \sum_{k=p^*}^{p+1} \mu_k \\ \sum_{k=p^*}^p \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t) > \sum_{k=p^*}^p \mu_k \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.4})$$

– or


$$\begin{cases} \sum_{k=p^*}^M \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t) > \sum_{k=p^*}^{p+1} \mu_k \\ \frac{\sum_{k=p^*}^p \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t)}{\sum_{k=p^*}^p \mu_k} > \frac{\sum_{k=p+1}^M \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t)}{\mu_{p+1}} \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

- Re-synchronization between bottlenecks μ_{p^*}, \dots, μ_p and μ_{q^*}, \dots, μ_q takes place when:


– demand for μ_{p^*}, \dots, μ_p decreases to reach condition $\sum_{k=p^*}^p \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t) < \sum_{k=p^*}^p \mu_k$. Waiting times w_{p^*}, \dots, w_p decline till $w_p + \Delta_p^a = \dots = w_q + \Delta_q^a$.

– demand for μ_{q^*}, \dots, μ_q increases or demand for μ_{p^*}, \dots, μ_p decreases so that $\frac{\sum_{k=p^*}^p \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t)}{\sum_{k=p^*}^p \mu_k} < \frac{\sum_{k=q^*}^q \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}}(t)}{\sum_{k=q^*}^q \mu_k}$.

The gap between waiting times on these two bottleneck groups is reduced till $w_p + \Delta_p^a = \dots = w_q + \Delta_q^a$.



(a) Arrivals and departures at bottlenecks.



(b) Waiting times at bottlenecks.

Figure B.1: UE solving with $M=2$, modes **c**, **a** in a linear corridor. Div1 takes place during period A, div2 during period B. μ_2 gets out of sync with downstream collectors for period C and re-synchronizes for period D. Div2 continues on period E and F till the end on peak hours. Note that drop-off curves have been transposed in time to be aligned with CBD off-ramp bottleneck and a better highlight of patterns.

803 B.2. Example with all modes

804 $M = 2$. Mode \mathbf{r} is now available. We have $\Delta_k^a = \Delta_k^r + T_s$, $k \in \{1, 2\}$. Parameters are so that $\Delta_1^r < \Delta_1^a < \Delta_2^r < \Delta_2^a$.
 805 Figure B.2 represents UE solution.




Figure B.2: Arrivals and departures at bottlenecks with $M = 2$, modes \mathbf{c} , \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{r} . Diversion by \mathbf{r} at c_1 starts from period A and it applies to all travelers departing from c_1 during following periods. Div1 happens on period C, E and div2 on period D.

- 806
1. Just as in the previous case, commuters choose \mathbf{c} till $\dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) > \mu_0$ and $w_0 = \Delta_1^r$.
 2. Then travelers from c_1 start to use \mathbf{r} . If $\dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \leq \mu_0$, div1 happens. A part of demand uses \mathbf{c} while another part uses \mathbf{r} (period A). We note $A_k^r(t)$ the cumulative travelers arrival count at c_k by walking.

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = \mu_0 \\ \dot{A}_1^r(t) = \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \mu_0 \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.6})$$

3. When $\dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) > \mu_0$, all travelers from c_1 choose \mathbf{r} and waiting time on freeway CBD off-ramp bottleneck increases till $w_0 = \Delta_1^a$ (period B).

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \\ \dot{A}_1^r(t) = \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.7})$$

4. From this moment, it is worth for travelers from c_2 to use \mathbf{a} with a transfer at c_1 . If $\dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \leq \mu_0 + \mu_1$, we observe a div1 with the particularity that commuters from c_1 are out of the game (period C).

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = \mu_0 \\ \dot{A}_1(t) = \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) - \mu_0 \\ \dot{A}_1^r(t) = \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.8})$$

5. As soon as $\dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) > \mu_0 + \mu_1$, diversion pattern 2 applies similarly (period D) till $w_0 = w_1 + \Delta_1^{\text{a}} = \Delta_2^{\text{r}}$.

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + \mu_1} (\dot{A}^{\text{th}} - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}) \\ \dot{A}_1(t) = \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_0 + \mu_1} (\dot{A}^{\text{th}} - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}) \\ \dot{A}_1^{\text{r}}(t) = \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.9})$$

807 6. A last div1 concerning only travelers from c_2 happens (period E) and lasts till demand decrease and queues
808 vanishing.
809

$$\begin{cases} \dot{A}_0(t) = \mu_0 \\ \dot{A}_1(t) = \mu_1 \\ \dot{A}_1^{\text{r}}(t) = \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) \\ \dot{A}_2^{\text{r}}(t) = \dot{A}^{\text{th}}(t) - \dot{A}_1^{\text{th}}(t) - \mu_0 - \mu_1 \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.10})$$

810
811
812
813
814 **$M > 2$.** Let us note p, q , the indexes of the most upstream collectors at which \mathbf{r} and \mathbf{a} are worth respectively. Index
815 p is so that $\Delta_p^{\text{r}} \leq w_0 < \Delta_{p+1}^{\text{r}}$. Index q is so that $\Delta_q^{\text{a}} \leq w_0 < \Delta_{q+1}^{\text{a}}$. Because $\Delta_k^{\text{r}} < \Delta_k^{\text{a}}$ ($1 \leq k \leq M$), we do not find
816 the same kind of desynchronization effects due to \mathbf{a} as in the only-two-modes case. All $\mu_k, 0 \leq k \leq q$ are synchronized.
817

- 818 • Diversion at c_{p+1} by \mathbf{r} starts as soon as $w_0 = \dots = w_p + \Delta_p^{\text{a}} = \Delta_{p+1}^{\text{r}}$.
- 819 • MRT station at c_p can be involved in a div1 with downstream limited capacity bottlenecks if $\sum_{k=p+1}^M \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}} \leq$
820 $\sum_{k=0}^q \mu_k$.
- 821 • Desynchronization of A_p^{r} takes place when waiting times on μ_0, \dots, μ_q increase, i.e. when $\sum_{k=p+1}^M \dot{A}_k^{\text{th}} > \sum_{k=0}^q \mu_k$.

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