Actions that are blatantly inefficient to achieve non-social goals are often used to convey information about agents’ social affiliation, as in the case of rituals. We argue that when reproduced, actions that are individually inefficient acquire a social signaling value owing to the mechanisms that support humans’ intuitive analysis of actions. We tested our hypothesis on 15-month-old infants who were familiarized with an agent that reproduced or merely observed the actions of efficient and inefficient individuals. Subsequently, we measured the infants' expectations of the agent’s preferences for efficient and inefficient individuals. Our results confirmed that when agents act alone, infants expect a third-party to prefer efficient over inefficient agents. However, this pattern is entirely flipped if the third-party reproduces the agents’ actions. In that case, infants expect inefficient agents to be preferred over efficient ones. Thus, reproducing actions whose rational basis is elusive can serve a critical social signaling function, accounting for why such behaviors are pervasive in human groups.