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**TEXTUAL EVIDENCE FOR THE DOCTRINE OF JEAN CORBECHON,
AUGUSTINIAN BACHELOR OF THE *SENTENCES* AT PARIS, 1369-1370***

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The iconic image of Jean Corbechon, chaplain of King Charles V and translator of *De proprietatibus rerum*, kneeling before his sovereign, offering a book, and dressed in a sober black Augustinian habit¹, equally expresses the canonical portrait of Corbechon as viewed through the lens of modern scholarship. The secondary literature on the royal chaplain focuses solely on his activities as a royal translator, such that it is a commonplace in all the biographical investigations dedicated to Corbechon that we know nothing of his writings beyond his monumental translation of *Bartholomaeus Anglicus*². This profile can, of course, be supplemented by the *ex-libris* found in his personal books, where Corbechon is introduced as *sacre pagine professor*³. The aim of this paper, however, is to shed light on Corbechon's academic career in the years preceding his translation efforts for the royal family, since for almost a decade he had been teaching at the University of Paris. In fact, we now have textual evidence for this period, which expands the limits of our current knowledge about a figure who is already famous for his later life.

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¹ For some examples see manuscripts Paris, Bibliothèque de Saint-Généviève, 1028, f. 14r; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16993, f. 1r; Amiens, Bibliothèque Municipale, 399, f. 1r (dressed in brown); Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. f. 80, f. 9r. See also the iconographical details in *Le livre des propriétés des choses. Une encyclopédie au XIV^e siècle*, trans. B. RIBEMONT, Paris 1999, p. 50-51. For some interpretation of this iconography see, e.g., S.E. HOLBROOK, «The Properties of Things and Textual Power: Illustrating the French Translation of *De proprietatibus rerum* and a Latin Precursor», in G. CROENEN – P.F. AINSWORTH (ed.), *Patrons, Authors, and Workshops: Books and Book Production in Paris around 1400* (Synthema, 4), Louvain 2006, p. 367-403, and B. VAN DEN ABEELE, «Illustrer le *Livre des propriétés des choses* de Jean Corbechon: quelques aspects particuliers», in J. DUCOS (ed.), *Encyclopédie médiévale et langues européennes. Réception et diffusion du 'De proprietatibus rerum' de Barthélémy l'Anglais dans les langues vernaculaires* (Colloques, congrès et conférences. Sciences du langage, histoire de la langue et des dictionnaires, 12), Paris 2014, p. 125-166.

² See, for example, J. DUCOS (ed.), *Encyclopédie médiévale et langues européennes. Réception et diffusion du De proprietatibus rerum de Barthélémy l'Anglais dans les langues vernaculaires*, Paris 2014; P.T. RICKETTS, «Le *De proprietatibus rerum* de Barthélémy l'Anglais et ses traductions française et occitane», in V. FASSEUR (ed.), *Froissart à la cour de Béarn. L'écrivain, les arts et le pouvoir* (Texte, codex et contexte, 7), Turnhout 2009, p. 215-222; G. VEYSSEYRE, «Le *Livre des propriétés des choses* de Jean Corbechon (livre VI) ou la vulgarisation d'une encyclopédie latine», in M. GOYENS – P. DE LEMANS – A. SMETS (ed.), *Science Translated: Latin and Vernacular Translations of Scientific Treatises in Medieval Europe*, Leuven 2008, p. 331-360; B. VAN DEN ABEELE – H. MEYER (ed.), *Bartholomaeus Anglicus, "De proprietatibus rerum". Texte latin et réception vernaculaire. Lateinischer Text und volkssprachige Rezeption*, Turnhout 2005, p. xii; B. RIBEMONT, «Jean Corbechon, traducteur encyclopédiste au XIV^e siècle», *Cahiers de Recherches Médiévales* 6 (1999), p. 75-98; G. SODIGNE-COSTES, «La botanique de Barthélémy l'Anglais mise en français par Jean Corbechon: traduction ou adaptation?», *Bien lire et bien apprendre* 14 (1996), p. 249-261; M. SALVAT, «Jean Corbechon, traducteur ou adaptateur de Barthélémy l'Anglais?», in C. BRUCKER (ed.), *Traduction et adaptation en France à la fin du Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance. Actes du colloque organisé à l'Université de Nancy II, 23-25 mars 1995*, Paris 1997, p. 37-46.

³ Two manuscripts in the collection of the Mazarine Library contain his *ex-libris*: *Iste liber est fratris Johannis Corbechon, sacre pagine professoris* (mss. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 181 and 849).

Manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15156, contains among other texts the Franciscan Jean Regis' questions on *Sentences* on Peter of Lombard⁴. This set of questions is preceded by two quires in which Regis reports his doctrinal confrontations with his *socii*, competing bachelors of the *Sentences*, recorded from their *principia* during the academic year 1369-1370⁵. In a previous paper, published in 2020 in this venerable journal, I discussed how this section of the manuscript is a precious source for sketching the doctrinal portrait of the Augustinian Onofrio of Florence⁶, which in turn contributes to our meagre knowledge of the thought of the Augustinian Hermits in the second half of the fourteenth century⁷. In this gallery of Augustinian scholastics belongs Jean Corbechon, prior of the Austin Friars in France in 1376⁸, and in these same quires in Paris, BnF, lat. 15156 we find not only the name of Corbechon, but also some ideas that are connected to the name.

First appearing in the early fourteenth century, *principia* on the *Sentences* were mandatory exercises that required all bachelors of theology, aspiring future masters, to deliver a *sermo* and to engage in debate with their *socii* in front of a wide academic audience. This exercise inaugurated the academic year in the Faculty of Theology, preceding the lectures on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and continuing throughout the year, such that to each of the four books of the *Sentences* corresponded a *principium*. Complete sets of *principia* thus consist of four *sermones* and four disputed questions.

Jean Regis's *principia* are significant examples of the genre. The first section (ff. 34r-42r) of the two quires that I propose to call the '*principia* file' contains a summary of Regis's four *principia* (four *sermones* and four questions introduced by *Utrum*) of Regis, while the second (ff. 42r-55v) transmits Regis's notes on each of his fellows with whom he debated during the *principia*. In the following table we can see how Regis introduces his *socii* and the identification that I propose for each of these bachelors⁹:

<Primus> <i>Bachalarius de domo Carmelitarum</i> (f. 42r-43v)	Conradus Zollner, OCarm
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⁴ For a recent description of this manuscript see the introduction to NICOLE ORESME, *Questiones in Meteorologica de ultima lectura, recensio parisiensis. Study of the Manuscript Tradition and Critical Edition of Books I-II.10*, ed. A. PANZICA (Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy and Science, 32), Leiden 2021, p. 50-52. Panzica's analysis is a compilation of old sources, which provide a date of ca. 1369, which is too early, considering that the manuscript contains lectures that were not completed until the late spring of 1370.

⁵ On *principia* see Debate ERC project: <https://debate-erc.com/> For a technical explanation of the practice of *principia* see: M. BRINZEI, « A Guide for Understanding *Principia* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard », in M. BRINZEI – W.O. DUBA (ed.), *Principia on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Exploring an Uncharted Scholastic-Philosophical Genre* (SSent., 7), Turnhout 2024, p. 1-34.

⁶ M. BRINZEI, « Nouveaux témoignages sur les textes perdus d'Onofre de Florence OESA (1336-1403), bachelier en théologie à Paris », *Archives Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 87 (2020), p. 59-86.

⁷ On these Augustinians, building on the earlier work of Willigis Eckermann, Venicio Marcolino, Damasus Trapp, and Adolar Zumkeller, see recently E.L. SAAK, *Creating Augustine. Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages*, Oxford 2012, and *Augustinian Theology in Later Middle Ages*, vol. 1-2 (Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, 196), Leiden 2022; C. SCHABEL, "Tolerating the Greeks? Augustinian Hermits on the *Filioque* from the Black Death to the Great Schism", in M.W. DUNNE – S. GOTTLÖBER (ed.), *Toleration and Concepts of Otherness in Medieval Philosophy* (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 25), Turnhout 2022, p. 25-53; and M. BRINZEI, "Performing *Principia* in the Faculty of Theology of Bologna: The Case of Augustinus Favaroni of Rome (†1443)", *Traditio*, 77 (2022), p. 377-463.

⁸ See E. YPMA, « Les auteurs augustins français: Liste de leurs noms et de leurs ouvrages (suite) », *Augustiniana* 20 (1970), p. 347-396, at 361-363.

⁹ I first published this list in M. BRINZEI, « When Theologians Play Philosopher: A Lost Confrontation between James of Eltville and His *socii* on the Perfection of Species and Its Infinite Latitude », in M. BRINZEI – C. SCHABEL (ed.), *The Cistercian James of Eltville (†1393): Author at Paris and Authority at Vienna* (SSent., 3), Turnhout 2018, p. 43-77, at p. 49-50, and again in BRINZEI, « Nouveaux témoignages sur les textes », p. 61. Since then I have updated the information on the anonymous *socii*.

<i>Secundus magister Richardus de Bellomonte secretarius regine</i> (f. 43v–44r)	Richardus de Bellomonte
<i>Tertius bachalarius magister Franciscus Christofori de Cerbono</i> (f. 44r–45v)	Franciscus Christofori, Sorbonne
<i>Quartus bachalarius Johannes Textoris de Cerbono</i> (f. 45v–46v)	Johannes Textoris, Sorbonne
<i>Quintus bachalarius magister Johannes de Diadona</i> (f. 54v–55v) (sic!)	Johannes de Diadona
<i>Sextus bachalarius bernardista</i> (f. 46v–47v)	Jacobus de Eltville, OCist
<Septimus> <i>alius bachalarius ordinarius de domo Predicatorum</i> (f. 47v–49v)	Franciscus de Melduno, OP
<i>Octavus: Ego frater Johannes Minor</i> (f. 49v)	Johannes Regis, OFM
<Novus> <i>Frater Onofrius de Florentia bachalarius ordinarius Augustini</i> (f. 49v–52r)	Onofrius de Florentia, OESA
<Decimus> <i>Frater Johannes Corbechon bachalarius secundarius Augustini</i> (f. 52r–54v)	Johannes Corbechon, OESA

There turns out to be a remarkable common element in the *vita* of several of the members of this cohort: a connection with the royal court of Charles V¹⁰. The Cistercian James of Eltville also recorded some of the *principia* from 1369-1370, surviving in manuscript Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. f. 47. Just as Regis remarks, Eltville acknowledge the social position of their common *socius* Richard of Bellomonte. Each time they refer to him¹¹, they highlight that Richard was the secretary of Queen Jeanne de Bourbon (*secretarius regine*), duchess of Normandy and wife of Charles V¹². It is thus possible that this Richard, whom the Queen herself agreed to release temporarily from his duties as secretary to complete his education by reading the *Sentences*¹³,

¹⁰ Besides Corbechon, none of these names is discussed in D. MCGRADY, *The Writer's Gift or the Patron's Pleasure? The Literary Economy in Late Medieval France*, Toronto 2019.

¹¹ See references in Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 36r: *Magister Richardus de Bellomonte secretarius domine regine regnantis...*; f. 43v: *Secundus magister Richardus de Bellomonte secretarius regine posuit...*; and in Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. 47, f. 221rb: *Contra Magister Richardus de Bello Monte secretarium regine Francie...*

¹² For an intellectual portrait of Jeanne de Bourbon and a list of some books from her personal library, see M. PEYRAFORT-HUIN, « Une reine en sa bibliothèque: Jeanne de Bourbon et ses livres », *Bulletin du bibliophile*, 1 (2007), p. 43-65.

¹³ From the *Rotuli Parisienses* (II, 455) and papal letters (LC Urbain V, #20157) we get some more information about Richard: a secular clerk from the diocese of Rouen, he was master of arts and student in theology already in 1343. In 1359 he was already a secretary of the duchess, with whose support he received considerable benefices from the archbishop of Rouen. He obtained other benefices in the period 1360-1361. According to these documents, he was already biblical cursor in 1361, but he had to interrupt his *cursus* a few times because of his work as the queen's secretary, which is why did not read the *Sentences* until 1369-1370. He became master of theology in 1373, and in 1375 he acted as *nuntius* for the Faculty of Theology.

could be the person who introduced Corbechon to the royal court, with which Corbechon would collaborate as translator.

Corbechon was not the only member of this cohort who translated for King Charles V. In fact, Johannes de Diadona is none other than Jean Daudin¹⁴, described by Frédérique Hamm as « un personnage sans histoire(s) », who translated Petrarch's *De remediis* in 1374 on the request of the king, but also works of St Jerome and Vincent of Beauvais's *De eruditione filiorum nobilium*¹⁵. Even for Jean Textoris, who was active in the academic milieu of Paris for a long time, is possible to establish a connection with the royal court, since it appears that in 1359 he was in the service of the then Dauphin Charles¹⁶. The other *socii* did not collaborate with the royal court on the project of translations into the vernacular for the simple reason that they were all foreigners whose ability to translate into French was probably inadequate and who in any case returned to their homeland. There is no trace of the Iberian Franciscus Christophori¹⁷; James of Eltville became abbot of Eberbach near Mainz; Conrad Zollner went to Vienna, where he introduced the practice of reading the *Sentences* in the Carmelite convent; Onofrio of Florence returned to Italy; and the Dominican Franciscus de Melduno ended his career by teaching theology near Lausanne¹⁸.

From these ten theologians, only the questions on the *Sentences* of Regis and Eltville survive today. The 25 existing manuscripts of Eltville's questions demonstrates that the text circulated widely. Among these manuscripts, most of them ugly academic copies, the most intriguing is the Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15896¹⁹, a luxury copy, decorated with a portrait depicting Eltville in the act of teaching before an audience. Each initial opening books II, III, and IV of the *Sentences* is tinted with gold and the *feuilles de vigne* graciously keep company with the text. This level of decoration, surprising in the work of a Cistercian theologian, is not a complete mystery, when one notices that the same style is on display in the copies of Corbechon's translations ordered for the king's library, especially the Sainte Geneviève and Jena codices. It is thus not totally absurd to hypothesize that the Paris manuscript of James of Eltville was also commissioned by the king or queen.

¹⁴ Frédérique Hamm drew attention to the problem of his name: « Au fait, s'appelait-il *Daudin*, *Daudain*, *Dandin*, *Deudin*, *Dendin*, *Dangin*, *D'Augin*, *Doudin*...? Les histoires littéraires, comme les actes originaux, hésitent. La forme *Daudin*, choisie par Léopold Delisle, a finalement, été adoptée »: F. HAMM, « Jean Daudin, chanoine, traducteur et moraliste », *Romania* 116/461-462 (1998), p. 215-238, at 216.

¹⁵ See B. SERE, « Les *Rèmedes de l'une et l'autre fortune* en français et la réception d'une étique stoïcienne de l'amitié », *Friburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), p. 151-163; L. DELISLE, *Mandements et actes divers de Charles V*, Paris 1874, p. 836, n°1696; M.J. WALKLEY, « Skilful Recastings, Creative Liberties or a Comedy of Errors? Jean Daudin as a Translator of St. Jerome », in P.R. MONKS – D.D.R. OWEN (ed.), *Medieval Codicology, Iconography, Literature and Translations: Studies for Keith Val Sinclair* (Litterae textuales), Leiden 1994, p. 312-320. For the translation from Vincent of Beauvais, see C. BRUCKER, « Pour une typologie des traductions en France au XIV^e siècle », in C. BRUCKER (ed.), *Traduction et adaptation en France à la fin du Moyen Age et à la Renaissance. Actes du colloque organisé par l'Université de Nancy II, 23-25 mars 1995* (Colloques, congrès et conférences sur la Renaissance, 10), Paris 1997, p. 63-79.

¹⁶ T. SULLIVAN, *Parisian Licentiate in Theology, A.D. 1373-1500. A Biographical Register. Vol. II: The Secular Clergy* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 37), Leiden 2011, p. 10, 519-520; W.J. COURTENAY, « James of Eltville, O.Cist., His Fellow *sententiarum* in 1369-70, and His Influence on Contemporaries », in BRINZEI – SCHABEL (ed.), *The Cistercian James of Eltville (†1393)*, p. 21-42, at 33-34.

¹⁷ T. SULLIVAN, *Parisian Licentiate in Theology, A.D. 1373-1500. A Biographical Register, vol. I: The Religious Orders* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 18), Leiden 2004, p. 132.

¹⁸ See S. STELLING-MICHAUD, « Les Frères-Prêcheurs en Suisse romande d'après les archives de Sainte-Sabine », *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Kirchengeschichte* 33 (1939), p. 50-70, at 54.

¹⁹ For a discussion on this manuscript see M. BRINZEI, « Enquête sur la tradition manuscrite du commentaire des *Sentences* du cistercien Jacques d'Eltville », *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 56 (2014), p. 247-262, and the introduction of the forthcoming edition of James of Eltville's *Sentences* accepted in the collection of *Corpus Christianorum*.

Corbechon was thus part of an elite group of advanced students in theology lecturing on the *Sentences* in 1369-1370, a fact that may be linked to his future intellectual association with the royal court. But what of Corbechon as theologian?

Folios 52r-54r of Paris, BnF, 15156 contain Jean Regis's report of his debate with *Frater Johannes Corbechon bachalarius secundus Augustiniorum*, edited below in an appendix, but Regis refers to Corbechon in a total of three places in the manuscript, as follows:

Primus locus, Regis's second *Principium*: Corbechon is named as taking part in a discussion with Regis and the Dominican Franciscus de Melduno. Opposing Regis here, Corbechon rejects the idea that under the current law a viator via finite grace could obtain eternal life *de condigno*. This is precisely the issue that is expanded on in the third and most substantial *locus* in which we find Corbechon's name under Regis's pen, which will be discussed in greater detail later.

*Utrum communicabilis sit homini viatori finita gratia tanta quod nullo modo valeat dari maior. Quod sic: gratia Christi per nullam potentiam potuit dari maior, etsi sit essentialiter limitata, igitur. Antecedens est secundum correlarium secunde conclusionis bachararii ordinarii de ordine Predicatorum. In oppositum: per nullam gratiam finitam potest viator mereri lege stante vitam eternam de condigno, igitur qualibet tali gratia dari potest maior. Consequentia est nota. Antecedens est quinta conclusio **fratris Johannis Corbechon**. Premissis protestationibus...²⁰.*

Secundus locus, Regis's fourth *Principium*: Corbechon is again involved in a moral discussion with Regis and the same Dominican *socius*. This time Regis refers to Corbechon as the *secondary* Augustinian bachelor taking part in the debates, the first one being Onofrio of Florence²¹. The discussion involves the grace given through the sacraments. Corbechon seems to agree this time with Regis (*concessit michi*) on the fact that the grace obtained by the sacraments is as good as bad is the mortal fault.

*Utrum sacramentalis gratia sit vel esse possit tam bona quam mala est mortalis culpa. Arguo quod sic: stat gratiam esse finitam et limitatam in essentia et illimitatam in esse gratie, igitur. Consequentia probatur, quia mortalis non potest esse peior quam infinita. Antecedens ponit et concedit pater meus bachalarius ordinarius de domo Predicatorum concedendo de gratia Christi quod est limitata in essentia et illimitata in esse gratie, et hoc, sicut dicit, prolixius declaravit. In oppositum: mortalis culpa peior est quam quodcumque bonum creatum sit bonum, ergo. Consequentia est nota. Antecedens posuit et concessit michi reverendus pater **bachalarius secundarius de domo fratrum Augustini**. Hic erunt tres conclusiones principales. Premissis protestationibus...²².*

²⁰ JOHANNES REGIS, OFM, *Principium IV*, Ms. Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 39v.

²¹ Note that in the cohort of Regis and Eltville were two members of the Sorbonne, two Augustinians, and probably two Dominicans, although only one debated with the Franciscan and Cistercian. The presence of two representatives of the same order or college was not uncommon at the time and occurred on occasion at least as far back as the early 1330s: On the presence of two Dominicans in the case of *principia* of Denys of Montina during the academic year 1371-1372 see M. BRINZEI – C. SCHABEL, « Henry of Langenstein's *principium* on the *Sentences*, His Fellow Parisian Bachelors, and the Academic Year 1371-1372 », *Vivarium* 58 (2020), 335-346, at 337, 345.

²² JOHANNES REGIS, OFM, *Principium IV*, Ms. Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 41v.

Tertius locus, on ff. 52r–54v, reports in dialogue form the exchange between Corbechon and his Franciscan *socius* Jean Regis. The text cannot be followed without some clarification concerning its structure, because Regis appears to have summarized their confrontation displayed as it occurred in different episodes. Regis first presents the initial positions of the two protagonists, then the objections to the those views, followed by the responses to the objections, and finally the replies to the responses to the objections. Beside this intricate plan, the degree of difficulty is increased by the fact that this segment, edited in the appendix, is itself divided into two parts. On the lower part of f. 53r, after 29 lines of written text, Regis leaves a blank line to mark the difference between the two sections. Some arguments from the first section are repeated verbatim or reiterated in abbreviated form in the second section.²³ This sort of recycling, rather than erroneous repetition, was common in debates that took place at intervals over a long period of time, such as the disputations that continued from one *principium* to another. In these repeated passages, Regis did not copy from one section to the other, but employed two different *cedule* from the events, the first from the second *principium* (identified above as *primus locus*) and the second from the resumption of the exchange in the fourth *principium* (labelled above the *secundus locus*). In support of this hypothesis are doctrinal links between the second *principium* and the first section, ff. 52r-53r, and between the fourth *principium* and the second section, ff. 53r-54v. In the first paragraph of this *tertius locus* the text has been copied out of order and then corrected in the margin, which seems to have been copied from an exemplar that had an omission *per homoeoteleuton* corrected in the margin. In the *tertius locus* the scribe first copies the marginal correction in the wrong place, then expunges it and copies it at the bottom of the page.²⁴

The complex codicology does not facilitate the reconstruction of Corbechon’s own ideas. Through Regis’s glasses we discover that their dispute concerns the nature of merit, specifically whether humans can merit eternal life *de condigno*. This was a controversial issue in fourteenth-century scholasticism, which John Slotemaker and Jeff Witt describe as follows: “merit is a concept that can be broken down into two specific species, which are sometimes called merit *de congruo* and merit *de condigno*, reflecting a complex vision of the pilgrim’s path toward salvation”²⁵. Merit *de condigno* is in itself deserving of salvation, and a theory maintaining that humans can merit *de condigno* holds that God rewards humans at least in part for their own choices to do good and act morally. Merit *de congruo* presupposes God’s infusion of grace and perhaps other assistance in the path to salvation, limiting the human role to cooperation.

On the question of whether humans could merit *de condigno* or only *de congruo* two opposing positions emerged, one most associated with certain members (not all) of the Augustinian Order, that of Corbechon, which minimized any possible human contribution to salvation, and another found in the thought of some (not all) Franciscans, the order of Regis, which allowed for a greater human role in the process. Corbechon the Augustinian rejects the possibility that under the current law or in the natural course of things, without miraculous or other divine intervention, the pilgrim (*viator*) could earn eternal life based on his own efforts and with a finite grace, for example that obtained from the sacraments. The Franciscan Regis’s objection claims that a rational creature can obtain eternal life *de condigno* with grace, although only if there is a commitment of God based on a *pactum divinum*.

Corbechon presents three propositions:

²³ I marked these overlapping arguments in italics inside of the edition.

²⁴ See in the apparatus of the edition footnote xx.

²⁵ J.T. SLOTERMAKER, J.C. WITT, *Robert Holkot*, Oxford 2016, p. 42. Their chapter on *Merit* is a useful continuation to the pionnering study of H.A. OBERMAN, *Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism. The Harvest of Medieval Theology*, Durham 1983.

(1) God is not bound by the necessity of justice to grant eternal life as a reward for the good deeds of the rational creature. Moreover, if God does not grant eternal life to seemingly deserving creatures for their good deeds, this does not mean that he is unjust.

(2) God is not a debtor, so he does not owe, nor is obliged to grant, his grace and to provide salvation or the eternal life to humans that are doing good. In support the authority of Augustine is invoked, since *Deus nulli est vel esse potest debitor, sed omnia illi debentur*. All creatures are indebted to God, but God is free of any obligation. The quote from Augustine is said to be taken from *De libero arbitrio*, but it does not appear in that precise form there.

(3) When the reward exceeds the merit, there is no salvation *de condigno*. In this case the *praemium* is salvation through eternal life, which far exceeds all meritorious acts of the rational creature.

The three statements that Regis attributes to Corbechon reflect non only his doctrinal position, but also his spiritual affiliation. Indeed, the following table reveals that Corbechon reproduces *verbatim* the position of one of the most illustrious members of his order, Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus, who read the *Sentences* in Paris in the academic year 1344-1345²⁶:

ALFONSUS VARGAS TOLETANUS, <i>Questiones super libros Sententiarum</i> , I, dist. 18, q. 1, concl. 2, art. 2 ²⁷	JOHANNES CORBECHON, <i>Principium</i> , apud Johannes Regis, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 52r-v
<p>Primo sic: nullus actus est meritorius vite eterne de condigno quo posito in homine Deus non tenetur de necessitate iustitie dare illi vitam eternam, sed posito quocumque actu elicito mediante habitu caritatis in homine Deus non teneretur etc. Probatur minor, quia posito quod Deus non beatificaret hominem [122ra] adhuc non esset iniustus. Et confirmatur, quia certum est quod Deus potest illum hominem annihilare et nunquam velle creare sine aliqua iniustitia, igitur, si non beatificaret ipsum, non esset iniustus.</p>	<p>Prima ratio: ille actus non est vite eterne meritorius, quo posito in homine, Deus non tenetur de necessitate iustitie dare illi vitam eternam; sed quocumque actu posito in homine, Deus non tenetur de necessitate iustitie dare illi vitam eternam; ergo. Probatur minor, quia si Deus non daret habenti talem actum vitam eternam, non propter hoc esset iniustus. Confirmatur: Deus istum cum actu suo potest adnichilare et numquam postea reparare sine iniustitia, ergo potest istum cum actu suo conservare et numquam dare ei vitam eternam sine iniustitia.</p>
<p>Secundo sic: ille actus non est meritorius vite eterne de condigno quo posito in homine Deus non est illi debitor glorie sue. Hoc patet, quia actus meritorius de condigno nihil aliud est quam actus propter quem alicui debetur premium ex debito iustitie, sed posito quocumque tali actu in quocumque Deus illi non est debitor glorie</p>	<p>Secundo: ille actus non est meritorius vite eterne de condigno, quo posito in homine, Deus non est debitor illi glorie sue – ista patet ex vi istius nominis ‘de condigno’; sed quocumque actu posito in homine, Deus non est illi debitor glorie sue, dicente Augustino 3 <i>De libero arbitrio</i>, c. 35, quod Deus nulli</p>

²⁶ J. KÜRZINGER, *Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Scholastik im 14. Jahrhundert* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 22.5–6), Münster i.W. 1930 and more recently on his *Sentences* commentary C. SCHABEL, «The Genre Matures. Parisian *principia* in the 1340s, from Gregory of Rimini to Pierre Ceffons», in M. BRINZEI – W.O. DUBA, *Principia on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Exploring an Uncharted Scholastic-Philosophical Genre* (Studia Sententiarum, 7), Turnhout 2024, p. 148-260, at 150-156.

²⁷ ALFONSUS VARGAS TOLETANUS, *Questiones super libros Sententiarum*, dist. 18, q. 1, concl. 2, art. 2, ed. Venice 1490 (reprint 1950; a searchable digital transcription of this edition has been made available by L. CIOCA on the THESIS website: <http://thesis-project.ro/alfonsusvargas/texts.html>).

sue, dicente beato Augustino 3 <i>De libero arbitrio</i> , capitulis 35 et 36, quod Deus est nulli debitor, sed omnia sibi debent.	est vel esse potest debitor, sed omnia illi debentur; ergo.
Tertio sic: ubi premium excedit meritum, ibi non est meritum de condigno. Hoc patet, quia ubi meritum est dignum tanto premio, ibi premium non excedit meritum, sed constat quod premium quod est vita eterna excedit omnem actum meritorium viatoris; ergo etc.	Tertio, ubi premium excedit meritum, ibi non est condignitas; sic est in proposito; ergo.

Rather than a sign of lack of creativity on Corbechon's side, we should interpret this borrowing as an expression of his commitment to the Augustinian tradition or ideology, which since the 1340s had tended to reject any form of Pelagianism. The concern of the Augustinian Hermits was that any slackening would open the path to accepting that humans by their own actions or by the right choices of their own will could obtain salvation. Repeating Vargas, Corbechon embraces the *via communis* of the doctrinal school to which he belongs. In this he seems to be more traditionalist than his Italian Augustinian *socius* Onofrio of Florence, who, according to Regis, was more inclined to embrace Pelagian tendencies in defending that Christ himself could be meritorious without divine grace²⁸.

Regis and Corbechon seem to agree on the terminology with which they begin. In preparing his objections, Regis introduces three *distinctiones* with technical explanations of *condignum* or *condignitas*, *obligatio*, and *iustitia divina*, based on the authority of Hugh of Saint Victor:

Secundo principaliter pro evasione rationum sit prima distinctio: condignum vel condignitas potest attendi primo secundum medium equalitatis iustitiae directive et commutative secundum quam datur equale pro equali. Secundo modo potest attendi condignitas secundum medium liberalitatis iustitiae distributive.

Secunda distinctio: duplex est obligatio, quedam propria per modum exactionis necessarie necessitate simpliciter; impropria ex pacto voluntarie promissionis et ex pacto gratuite actionis.

Tertia distinctio sumpta a Hugone 1 De sacramentis, parte 8, 9 et 10 capitulis: «alia est iustitia divina secundum debitum facientis, alia secundum debitum patientis».

While they agree on the definition of these terms, they are not of the same mind concerning how these concepts can be used to defend their doctrines. Their confrontation exceeds the limits of theology, and the analysis of whether eternal life can be earned *de condigno* with finite grace becomes a battle of arguments in which logic, the theory of supposition, *syncategoremata*, and exegesis of authority are sharp weapons employed to expose the contradictions in the argumentation of the opponent. During this combat Regis seems to show much respect to Corbechon (*probo patri ... cum reverentia arguo* or *patri meo, cui me carius in Domino recomendo*) and appreciates that some of his solutions are quite clever (*in ista solutione subtili replicantur multa michi dubia*). The climax on the deployment of logical artillery is when Regis decides to respond to Corbechon *secundum logicos* and to annihilate one of his theses about acts that result from divine love [38]. Regis strives to rise to the level of his *socius* and decides to reproduce a very sophisticated rule of supposition from the

²⁸ See discussion in BRINZEI, «Nouveaux témoignages sur les textes perdus d'Onofre de Florence», p. 72-76.

Logica of Albert of Saxony: “whatever mobilizes the immobilized term, immobilizes the mobilized term” (*quidquid mobilizat immobilitatum immobilizat mobilitatum*)²⁹.

A final detail can be added to this portrait of Corbechon as theologian. In the background of his discussion with Regis on grace and merit, one should recognize the role played by the *Monologion* of Anselm, quoted explicitly 18 times, especially from chapter 70. Both Corbechon and Regis seem to know this text intimately³⁰, as is shown by their recurrent quotations on the nature of God’s love (*amor divinis*). In his chapter 70 Anselm presents his conception of divine justice, which is understood as the gift of love to creatures. God gives to all what they need, and makes a return to all souls that love him. To those who love him he gives salvation, and to those who sin he gives punishment. Regis uses Anselm to reinforce his position that divine love is the highest reward that God gives to humans through grace and that this good is better than all temporal goods [14]. This is divine justice and this justice is manifested *ex pacto divino*, based on this pact the pilgrim (viator) can reach salvation *de condigno*. Thus the entire opposition between Jean Regis and Jean Corbechon is rooted in chapter 70 of Anselm’s *Monologion* and in the interpretation of his position on divine justice.

Conclusion

The new textual evidence for the theological ideas of Jean Corbechon as Augustinian bachelor of the *Sentences* at Paris in the academic year 1369-1370 brightens the colors of the famous portrait of the scholar, in which he is depicted on his knees before Charles V, offering the king the text that would ensure his posterity, his French translation of the *De proprietatibus rerum* of Bartholomaeus Anglicus. These new passages, preserved by his *socius*, the Franciscan Jean Regis, from their principal debate, reveals that Corbechon was a member of an elite group of already interconnected academics who joined the royal court. Through Regis’s lens it is possible to reconstruct Corbechon’s views on merit and his strong belief that the viator cannot earn salvation *de condigno*. In this context Corbechon was a partisan of the extreme anti-Pelagian wing of his Augustinian Order, choosing in particular to follow the ideas and even the words of his recently deceased confrere Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus (+27-12-1366). Regis opposed this position, and the pair’s disputation culminated in a duel over the proper interpretation of Anselm of Canterbury’s *Monologion*, illustrating another unknown aspect of the translator’s intellectual profile.

²⁹ Philotheus Boehner explains: «‘Mobilization’ means here that a term has confused and distributive supposition. ‘Immobilization’ means that a term has determinate supposition. The *syncategorema* which is added is the negation ‘non’; the *syncategorema* to which the negation is added is either the sign of universality (and its equivalents) or the sign of particularity (and its equivalents)»: P. BOEHNER, “A Medieval Theory of supposition”, *Franciscan Studies*, 18 (1958), p. 240-289, at 288.

³⁰ Concerning a renewal in the interest for Anselm during the fourteenth century see D. COMAN, “Cistercians and the Assimilation of Anselm in the late 14th Century — A Case Study of Quaestio in vesperis fratrii Chunradi de Ebrako (†1399)”, in M. HEALY-VARLEY, G. YOUNGE, G.E.M. GASPER (ed.), *Anselm of Canterbury: Communities, Contemporaries and Criticism*, Leiden 2021, p. 216-238.

Appendix I

Johannes Corbechon, OESA
Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, ff. 52r-54v

Frater Johannes Corbechon bachalarius secundus Augustinianorum

[1] <Corbechon> Posuit in 5 conclusionem suam quod stante lege viator non potest mereri ex gratia vitam eternam de condigno.

[2] <Regis> Cuius oppositum posui in 3 conclusionem 2i articuli mei sub hac forma : stante pacto divino viator potest ex gratia mereri gloriam de condigno.

[3] <Corbechon> Conclusionem suam probavit primo sic: Ad Rom. 8, <18>: *Non sunt condigne passionem etc.* Ad Rom. 6, <23>: *Gratia Dei vita eterna.* Ad Tit. 3, <5>: *Non ex operibus iustitiae etc.*

[4] Prima ratio: ille actus non est vite eterne meritorius, quo posito in homine, Deus non tenetur de necessitate iustitiae dare illi vitam eternam; sed quocumque actu posito in homine, Deus non tenetur de necessitate iustitiae dare illi vitam eternam³¹; ergo. Probatur minor, quia si Deus non daret habenti talem³² actum vitam eternam, non propter hoc esset iniustus. Confirmatur: Deus istum cum actu suo potest adnichilare et numquam postea reparare sine iniustitia³³, ergo potest istum cum actu suo conservare et numquam dare ei vitam eternam sine iniustitia. [52v]

[5] Secundo, ille actus non est meritorius vite eterne de condigno, quo posito in homine, Deus non est debitor³⁴ illi glorie sue – ista patet ex vi istius nominis ‘de condigno’; sed quocumque actu posito in homine, Deus non est illi debitor³⁵ glorie sue, dicente Augustino 3 *De libero arbitrio*, c. 35, quod Deus nulli est vel esse potest debitor³⁶, sed omnia illi debenturⁱ; ergo.

[6] Tertio, ubi premium excedit meritum, ibi non est condignitas; sic est in proposito; ergo.

[7] <Regis> Probavi conclusionem meam primo sic: cuilibet operi theologicæ virtuoso ex pacto divino correspondet aliquod premium de condigno³⁷; sed actus procedens ex gratia est sic virtuosus, ut constat, et non sufficienter premiatur aliquo bono temporali lege posita stante, ut³⁸ deducit Anselmus *Monologion* c. 70ⁱⁱ; ergo.

[8] <Corbechon> Dictus pater concedit totum usque dum dicitur ‘non sufficit aliquod premium temporale de condigno’. Negat hoc. Ad probationem Anselmi dicit quod ibi loquitur de congruo, ut patet inspicienti dicta eius.

[9] <Regis> Secundo arguebam sic: Deus iuste premiat, ergo condigne. Consequentia est nota. Antecedens patet 2 Thim. 4, <8>: *Reposita est michi corona iustitiae.*

³¹ sed quocumque - dare illi vitam eternam] *in marg. infra*

³² talem] quocumque actu posito in homine Deus non tenetur de necessitate iustitiae dare illi vitam eternam] *add. sed exp.*

³³ iniustitia] *p. c.*

³⁴ debitor] *deator a. c.*

³⁵ debitor] *deator a. c.*

³⁶ debitor] *deator a. c.*

³⁷ condigno] *cogno a. c.*

³⁸ ut] *a add. sed del.*

[10] <Corbechon> Dicit quod si intelligatur de iustitia legali, concedit antecedens et negat consequentiam. Si de iustitia equali, negat antecedens et concedit consequentiam. Et ad probationem antecedentis Apostolus loquitur de iustitia legali et non equali.

[11] <Regis> Tertio probavi conclusionem meam sic: Deus de lege ordinata potest tantum acceptare bonum actum quantum³⁹ deacceptat malum actum; sed tantum deacceptat actum malum quod pro illo condigne infligit penam eternam de facto; ergo stante pacto divino viator poterit mereri gloriam de condigno.

[12] <Corbechon> **Dictus pater** negat maiorem, quia si⁴⁰ illa esset vera, sequitur, ut dicit, quod Deus pro toto posse suo non posset premiare actum bonum ad condignum. Probat, quia⁴¹ ipse sic deacceptat actum malum quod non potest eum punire ad condignum, ergo etc.

[13] <Regis> Primo volo conclusionem meam probare. Arguo primo sic: stante pacto divino cuilibet condigno gloria debetur gloria de condigno; sed quilibet viator qui meretur ex gratia est stante pacto divino condignus gloria; igitur cuilibet tali debetur gloria de condigno. Maior est nota. Probat minor Hest 6, <9>: *Hoc honore condignus est quemcumque rex voluerit honorare*. Et ad Colos. c. 1, <3, 12>: *Gratias agamus Deo et Patri qui⁴² nos dignos fecit in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine*.

[14] Secundo reduco rationes factas. Probo **dicto patri** quod actus ex gratia procedens non sufficienter premiatur aliquo bono temporali lege posita stante. **Et hoc ostendo esse de intentione venerabilis Anselmiⁱⁱⁱ⁴³**. Arguo sic: actus amoris divini procedens ex gratia est melior quocumque bono temporali lege posita stante, ergo non sufficienter premiatur etc. Antecedens et consequentia sunt de intentione venerabilis Anselmi ubi supra dicentis: «si rationalis creatura, que sibi inutilis est sine hoc amore, sic eminent omnibus creaturis, utique nichil potest esse premium huius amoris, nisi quod supereminet in omnibus naturis^{iv}». Sed quod nullum aliud premium sit satisfactorium et merces condigna probat Anselmus dupliciter. Primo, quia «quidquid aliud divina bonitas tribuat, non retribuit^v»; probatio: «quia nec compensatur amori nec consolatur amantem, nec satiat desiderantem^{vi}». Secundo arguit sic Anselmus: «si Deus vult se amari et desiderari ut aliud retribuat, non se vult amari et desiderari propter se, sed propter aliud. Et sic non se vult amari, sed aliud, quod cogitare nephas est^{vii}», hec Anselmus.

[15] Tertio sic: Deus iuste premiat iustitia legali, ergo condigne stante pacto. Antecedens est concessum. Et consequentia patet, quia dignum et condignum est veracem principem et summe liberalem [53r] tenere pactum et premiare meritum; Deus est huiusmodi; ergo.

[16] Quarto: Deus de lege ordinata potest tantum acceptare bonum actum quantum deacceptat malum actum, ergo. Antecedens michi negatum probo: aliquis actus procedens ex gratia potest esse lege stante tam bonus ymmo melior quam mala est mortalis culpa, ergo. Antecedens verum. Probat consequentia, quia aliter Deus ceteris paribus minus amaret bonum quam odiret malum.

[17] Secundo principaliter pro evasione rationum sit prima distinctio: condignum vel condignitas potest attendi primo secundum medium equalitatis iustitie directive et commutative secundum quam datur equale pro equali. Secundo modo potest attendi condignitas secundum medium liberalitatis iustitie distributive.

³⁹ quantum] quod a.c.

⁴⁰ si] sup. l.

⁴¹ quia] quod a. c.

⁴² qui] d add. et del.

⁴³ Et hoc ostendo esse de intentione venerabilis Anselmi] in marg., ergo non sufficienter sufficit premiatur etc. Antecedens et consequentia sunt de intentione venerabilis Anselmi add. sed exp.

[18] Secunda distinctio: duplex est obligatio, quedam propria per modum exactionis⁴⁴ necessarie necessitate simpliciter; impropria ex pacto voluntarie promissionis et ex pacto gratuite actionis.

[19] Tertia distinctio sumpta a Hugone 1 *De sacramentis*, parte 8, 9 et 10 capitulis: «alia est iustitia divina secundum debitum facientis, alia⁴⁵ secundum debitum patientis». Item «alia est iustitia patiens, alia cogens^{viii}». Primus modus iustitie attenditur penes condecenciam⁴⁶ divine bonitatis, qua quidquid operatur iustum est; si tamen non fieret, non esset iniustum. Secundus modus est secundum condecenciam⁴⁷ divine equitatis.

[21] Per hoc ad auctoritates. Procedunt de condignitate equalitatis secundum medium iustitie directive, non de condignitate liberalitatis secundum medium iustitie distributive.

[21 ≈ 4] Ad primam rationem. Ad maiorem, si intelligitur de iustitia cogente, negatur. Si de patiente, conceditur, et in hoc sensu negatur minor. Ad confirmationem negatur antecedens stante lege et loquendo de iustitia secundum condecenciam divine bonitatis, quia ut ait⁴⁸ Anselmus *Monologion*, capitulo 70: «nullatenus verum videri potest, ut iustissimus et potentissimus nichil retribuatur amanti se perseveranter^{ix}».

[22 ≈ 5] Ad secundam conceditur maior, si Deus nullo modo sit debitor, et in hoc sensu negatur minor. Ad probationem, ‘Deus nulli potest esse debitor’, verum est per modum necessarie exactionis, sed ex pacto libere promissionis potest esse debitor.

[23 ≈ 6] Et ad tertiam concedo maiorem de condignitate secundum medium equalitatis, sed de condignitate secundum liberalitatis medium, negatur maior, etc.

Per hoc patet ad reductionem argumenti mei contra me⁴⁹.

[24] <Corbechon> **Pater meus arguit** sic: si Deus potest tantum acceptare actum bonum quantum⁵⁰ deacceptat actum malum, sequitur quod Deus pro toto⁵¹ posse suo non posset premiare actum bonum⁵² ad condignum.

[25] <Regis> Concedo consequentiam et consequens loquendo de condigno secundum medium equalitatis. Loquendo autem de condigno secundum exigentiam liberalitatis, negatur consequentia et eius probatio⁵³ in eodem sensu sumpta.

[26] <Regis> Alias in principio meo posui conclusionem istam sub hac forma: stante pacto divino viator potest ex gratia mereri gloriam de condigno. Conclusionem istam impugnavit subtiliter et profunde reverendus **pater meus frater Johannes Corbechon bachalarius secundus** de domo Augustini.

Et pro evasione rationum posui tres distinctiones.

[27=18] Prima quod condignitas potest attendi vel penes medium iustitie commutative secundum quod datur equale pro equali, vel penes medium iustitie distributive.

[28=19] Secunda distinctio: obligatio potest accipi proprie, scilicet pro obligatione exactionis necessarie simpliciter. Alio modo improprie pro⁵⁴ obligatione voluntarie promissionis et ex pacto gratuite actionis.

⁴⁴ exactionis] actionis *a. c.*

⁴⁵ alia] aut *ms.*

⁴⁶ condecenciam] condeocenciam *a. c.*

⁴⁷ condecenciam] a o *add. sed exp.*

⁴⁸ ait] at *a. c.*

⁴⁹ me] con *add. sed exp.*

⁵⁰ quantum] quam *ms.*

⁵¹ toto] *sup. l.*

⁵² bonum] malum *a. c. sup. l.*

⁵³ probatio] probatio *ms.*

⁵⁴ pro] impro *a. c.*

[29=30] Tertia distinctio, quam ponit Hugo *De Sacramentis* parte 8, 9 et 10 capitulis: «alia est iustitia secundum debitum facientis, alia secundum debitum paci(entis)^x»⁵⁵. Prima est respectu divine bonitatis. Secunda est respectu divine equitatis.

[30] Per istas distinctiones respondi ad auctoritates et rationes inductas contra me, dicendo quod omnes intelliguntur de pacto voluntarie promissionis et de condignitate secundum medium iustitie commutative, non autem procedunt de condignitate secundum medium iustitie distributive, de qua condignitate stante divino pacto posui conclusionem meam, [53v] ut patet evidenter per auctoritates et rationes quas adduxi pro conclusione mea.

[31] <Corbechon> Ex istis **pater meus** conclusit⁵⁶ quod ipse et ego sumus concordēs, scilicet quod actus procedens a gratia non est meritorius vite eterne de condigno, sed solum de congruo. Et hoc probant mee distinctiones, ut dicit. Probat etiam quia⁵⁷ ubi non datur equale pro equali, ibi non est condignitas, sed solum congruitas; sed sic est in proposito; ergo. Quare **pater meus** dicit nos esse concordēs sicut declarant distinctiones quas⁵⁸ posui. Et probavit per hoc, quia ubi non datur equale pro equali, ibi non est condignitas.

<Regis> Breviter nego sibi istam maiorem, quia procedit ab insufficienti.

[32] Constat enim quod in commutationibus, politicis⁵⁹, et iustis hec est falsa de equalitate moralis. Etiam falsa de equalitate essentialis perfectionis, quia animal et aurum non possunt sic equari. Falsa etiam de equalitate gradualis intensionis, quia albedo et nigredo vel etiam penes⁶⁰ Aristotelem equales in gradibus non sunt equalis valoris. Ergo relinquitur quod hec equalitas iustitie commutative est ex Dei et hominum voluntaria institutione ad serviendum nature. Et habetur propositum, quod pulchre deducit Aristoteles I *Politicorum*, capitulo 6^{xi}.

[33] <Corbechon> Et probō sibi quod habet istam universalem negare, quia **pater meus concedit** istam distinctionem que sumitur ex dictis Aristotelis: quod quedam est condignitas secundum iustitiam commutativam, alia secundum iustitiam distributivam, et alias ipse posuit distinctionem equivalentem quod est iustitia equalis et iustitia legalis.

[34] Ex hoc arguo: ex negatione unius membri unius distinctionis⁶¹ cuius membra non coincidunt non sequitur negatio omnium membrorum eiusdem distinctionis; sed sic **arguit pater meus**; ergo. Maior est nota. Probatur minor, quia cum dicit, «ubi non datur equale pro equali, ibi non est condignitas», ibi ly ‘non’ equivalet signo universali negativo. Unde sequitur: ‘ibi non est condignitas, igitur ibi nulla est condignitas’, quod habet **pater meus** negare.

[35] Secundo sic: per conclusionem meam et distinctiones meas, actus ex gratia procedens est aliquo modo de condigno vite eterne meritorius⁶² ex pacto divino stante; et per conclusionem suam nullo modo est de condigno meritorius; ergo non sumus concordēs. Secundam partem antecedentis probō: **pater meus** conclusionem istam posuit sub hac forma: ‘non obstante pacto divino, actus factus in gratia et procedens a gratia non est de condigno vite eterne meritorius’; nunc autem sequitur evidenter: actus procedens ex gratia non est de condigno vite eterne meritorius, ergo nullo modo est de condigno vite eterne meritorius, quia ‘non’ et ‘nullus’ equipollent.

Ex hoc probō **patri meo** quod sibi contradicit, cum reverentia arguo sic :

⁵⁵ alia secundum detrimentum paci(entis)] *in marg.*

⁵⁶ conclusit] exclusit *a. c.*

⁵⁷ etiam quia] *marg.*

⁵⁸ quas] *et add. et exp.*

⁵⁹ politicis] *add. in marg.*

⁶⁰ penes] *sup. l.*

⁶¹ distinctionis] *p. c.*

⁶² meritorius] *et per conclusionem add. sed exp.*

[36] <Corbechon> **pater meus ponit** quod actus ex gratia procedens nullo modo est de condigno vite eterne meritorius, et aliquo modo est de condigno vite eterne meritorius, igitur. Consequentia est nota. Prima pars antecedentis sequitur formaliter ex conclusione sua, sicut deductum est. Secunda pars antecedentis sequitur evidenter ex responsione sua ad illam auctoritatem Hest. 6, <9>: *Hoc honore condignus est, quemcumque rex voluerit honorare.* Dicit quod verum est ex gratia et ordinatione acceptantis; ergo aliquo modo condignus est secundum solutionem istam.

[37] Item, **pater meus** respondendo ad tertiam rationem meam concedit istud consequens in forma: quod Deus premiat condigne stante pacto, quia decet iustum iudicem tenere pactum. Ex quo concesso sequitur quod Deus aliquo modo premiat de condigno, quod repugnat conclusioni sue, ergo.

Ad rationes meas respondit **pater meus** subtiliter.

[37=14] Arguebam sic primo: actus amoris divini procedens ex gratia est melior quocumque bono temporali stante lege posita, ergo non sufficienter premiatur aliquo bono temporali. Antecedens et consequentiam probavi per Anselmum dicentem: «si creatura rationalis, que sibi inutilis est sine hoc amore, sic eminent omnibus creaturis, utique nichil⁶³ potest esse premium huius amoris, nisi quod superest omnibus meritis^{xii}». Sed quod nullum aliud premium sit pro divino amore satisfactorium probat ibidem Anselmus dicens: «quidquid aliud tribuat divina bonitas non retribuit, nec recompensatur amori nec consolatur amantem, nec satiat desiderantem^{xiii}».

[38] <Corbechon> Ad hoc **dicit pater meus** negando maiorem istam: actus amoris divini procedens ex gratia est melior quocumque bono temporali. Hec, inquit, est falsa, quia non est melior se ipso. Ad probationem Anselmi dicit quod ipsa facit ad oppositum, nam illud quod est super omnia merita potest esse aliquod bonum temporale quod sic est premium quod non est meritum, et sic superest omnibus meritis. Ideo hoc non convincit, ut dicit. Ad Anselmum, «quidquid aliud tribuit non retribuit», dicit quod non retribuit saciativum et quietativum illius amoris, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod illud sit meritum de condigno. Multa enim possum desiderare que non possum mereri de condigno.

[39] <Regis> Quia in ista solutione subtili replicantur multa michi dubia, ideo primo proba sibi quod non habet negare maiorem propter causam quam assignat. Suppono primo secundum logicos quod comparativus gradus habet confundere et distribuere tantum communem cui immediate additur, quod si **neget pater meus**, habet concedere quod ipse est fortior homo mundi, quia ad veritatem istius sufficeret una particularis. Secundo suppono istam regulam esse veram: quidquid mobilitat⁶⁴ immobilitatem immobilitatem mobilitatem.^{xiv} Tunc arguo sic: in ista propositione, ‘actus amoris divini est melior quocumque bono temporali’, sunt [enim] 2 mobilitantia, scilicet comparativus gradus et signum universale, ergo predicatum huius propositionis non tenetur mobiliter et distributive. Per consequens male **negavit pater meus** maiorem meam et negationis malam causam assignavit. Antecedens istius consequentie patet per primam regulam. Et consequentia tenet per regulam secundam.

[40] Secundo sic: «creatura rationalis amore divino eminent omnibus creaturis», ergo «amor divinus eminent omnibus creaturis et est melior omnibus creaturis». Antecedens est venerabilis Anselmi.^{xv} Et consequentia probatur, quia eminentia effectus arguit eminentiam cause; modo per Anselmum amor divinus est causa talis eminentie in creatura rationali, quia sine tali amore creatura sibi inutilis est, et cum tali amore creatura eminent omnibus creaturis; ergo consequentia bona. Sed huius consequentie **pater meus negat** consequens, igitur et habet antecedens negare, quod est Anselmi in forma.

⁶³ nichil] vel *a. c. s. l.*

⁶⁴ mobilitat] immobilitatem *a. c.*

[41] Tertio ex hoc, concesso quod potest esse aliquod bonum temporale quod sic est premium quod non est meritum et sic superest omnibus meritis, sequitur quod posset esse aliquod bonum utile vel delectabile temporale quod non esset bonum iusti vel virtutis quod esset melius et eligibilius bono iusti. Consequentia est evidens **ex dictis suis**, quia tale esset illud premium iusti temporale supereminens omnibus meritis. Consequens est contra Aristotelem et contra conscientiam rectam et etiam pervertit ordinem nature, scilicet quod bonum non sit supra bonum nature, ergo.

[42] Quarto, **quia pater meus**⁶⁵ ad Anselmum dicit quod Deus non retribuit saciativum et quietativum illius amoris, ex hoc sequitur quod cum premio meriti stat miseria pene, quia mentis inquietatio. Ad quod sequitur ulterius quod Deus in premiando legem liberalitatis et amicitie non servaret. Probatio, quia perpetuo dimitteret casum⁶⁶ suum non saciatum et inquietatum, quem tamen posset facillime saciare et etiam quietare.

[43=14] Secundo principaliter arguit sic Anselmus pro conclusione mea: « si Deus vult se amari et desiderari, ut aliud retribuat: non se vult amari et desiderari propter se, sed propter aliud, quod nephas est cogitare »^{xvi}.

[44] <Corbechon> Dicit **pater meus** hoc totum concedendo, sed negat quod homo potest Deum mereri de condigno, licet bene de congruo.

[45] <Regis> Primo⁶⁷ recipio istud quod necessario sequitur ad concessum: nephas est cogitare quod Deus aliud pro premio tribuat quam se ipsum, igitur nephas est cogitare quod Deus pro premio tribuat temporale non quietativum – quod tamen **pater meus concessit** in solutione precedenti; igitur concedit quod nephas est cogitare.

[46] Secundo, ex concesso concludo propositum principale: eo modo homo meretur Deum quo modo Deus vult diligi ut se ipsum retribat in premium; sed modo condigno Deus vult diligi ut se ipsum tribuat in premium; igitur modo condigno homo meretur Deum. Maior apparet, quia aliter ille modus merendi non esset conformis divine voluntati; per consequens non esset meritum. Minor probatur, quia modus iste <est> ita condignus quod oppositum cogitare nephas est per Anselmum concessum.

[47] Ad quartum argumentum meum, cum arguebam quod Deus potest tantum acceptare bonum⁶⁸ actum de lege ordinata quantum deacceptat malum actum, probavi per hoc [54v] quia aliter Deus minus diligeret bonum quod odiret malum; nunc autem potest esse aliquis actus tam bonus ex gratia quam mala est mortalis culpa; ergo.

[48] <Corbechon> **Pater meus** negat antecedens. Negat etiam quod aliquis actus possit esse tam bonus ex gratia etc. Dicit etiam quod probatio antecedentis non valet, quia Deus tantum diligit bonum quantum est bonum, et tantum odit malum quantum est malum, et quia nullum est bonum⁶⁹ creatum tam bonum quam culpa mortalis est mala, ideo etc.

[49] <Regis> Contra ista subtilia primo proba antecedens negatum. Deus de facto actum ex gratia elicatum acceptat ad bonum glorie, quod est tantum vel maius bonum quantum malum est infernalis pena, ergo antecedens verum. Consequentia est nota, quia Deus tantum acceptat quantum remunerat. Item, dicere quod Deus hoc non possit, cum non claudat contradictionem, repugnare videtur divine potestati, divine bonitati, divine libertati. Confirmatur: nullum est mortale peccatum nisi quia contrarium caritati et divine legi, ergo per prius Deus diligit caritatem quam odiat culpam.

[50] Secundo contra illud negatum, scilicet quod aliquis possit esse actus tam bonus ex gratia quam mala est mortalis culpa, proba quod male negavit, quia ad illam negationem

⁶⁵ meus] dicit *add. sed del.*

⁶⁶ casum] causam *a. c.*

⁶⁷ primo] quia *add. sed del.*

⁶⁸ bonum] actum *add. sed del.*

⁶⁹ bonum] est *add. sed del.*

sequitur quod nunc, supposito quod aliquis viator sit in mortali peccato, non tantum bonum creatum esset in paradiso quantum malum est nunc in mundo. Ad hoc etiam sequitur quod gratia et gloria Christi creata non esset tantum bonum quantum esset mala una mortalis culpa, nec etiam tam bonum esset velle creatum Christi quam malum est velle malum actualiter⁷⁰ peccantis mortaliter, que non videntur concedenda.

[51] <Corbechon>Tertio **pater meus concedit** quod Deus tantum diligit bonum quantum est bonum, et loquimur in argumento de bono meriti: si intelligit de dilectione activa que Deus est, notum est illud esse falsum. Si intelligat de dilectione, ut infertur ad bonum glorie, etiam illud est falsum, quia premium est melius quam meritum. Si intelligit de dilectione que causatur et mensuratur ex intrinseco valore boni creati, illud etiam est falsum, quia sicut Dei scientia non causatur ex entitate creaturarum, sic nec⁷¹ Dei dilectio causatur seu mensuratur ex intrinseca bonitate creaturarum, quia in hoc vilesceret et dependeret. Ergo **pater meus magis** debuit dicere quod bonum creatum tantum est bonum quantum Deus diligit ipsum quam oppositum.

Ista modica et puerilia sufficiant **patri meo**, cui me carius in Domino recommendo.

ⁱ Augustino 3 – illi debentur] AUGUSTINUS, *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, 35 non found it in Augustin, but see same indication in ALFONSUS VARGAS TOLETANUS, *Questiones super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 18, q. 1, concl 2., ed. Venice 1490 (reprint 1950).

ⁱⁱ Anselmus – 70] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. F.S. SCHMITT, vol. 1, Edimburg 1948, p. 80.

ⁱⁱⁱ Intentione Anselmi] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80.

^{iv} Anselmi – naturis] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80.

^v Anselmus – retribuit] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80.

^{vi} quia nec – desiderantem] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80.

^{vii} Anselmus – nephas est] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80.

^{viii} Hugone – alia cogens] HUGO DE ST. VICTORE, *De sacramentis christinae fidei* I, ch. 8, ed. R. BERNDT (*Corpus victorinum*, 1), Münster, 2008, p. 8.

^{ix} Anselmus – perseveranter] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80.

^x Hugo – pati<entis>] HUGO DE ST. VICTORE, *De sacramentis* I, ch. 8, ed. BERNDT, p. 8.

^{xi} Aristoteles – capitulo 6] ARISTOTELES, *Politica*, I, c. 6, 1255a 38-39.

^{xii} Anselmum – meritis] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80.

^{xiii} Anselmus – desiderantem] ANSELMUS, *Monologion*, c. 70, ed. SCHMITT, p. 80, l. 24-26.

^{xiv} Istam regulam – mobilitatum] ALBERTUS DE SAXONIA, *Logica*, I, cap. I, (reg. 5), f. 13rb. Apud P. BOEHNER, "A medieval theory of supposition", *Franciscan Studies* 18 (1958), p. 240-289, at 288.

^{xv} Anselmus] *Vide supra nota 7*

^{xvi} Anselmus – cogitare] *Idem nota 7*.

⁷⁰ actualiter] *alca*² *ms.*

⁷¹ nec] *enim ms.*