

Unveiling the Invisible Threads: Dynamic Information Flow Tracking and the Intriguing World of Fault Injection Attacks

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Unveiling the Invisible Threads: Dynamic Information Flow Tracking and the Intriguing World of **Fault Injection Attacks** William PENSEC, Vianney LAPÔTRE, Guy GOGNIAT

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Information Flow Tracking in a RISC-V processor

Different types of IFT [1, 2]:

- Static or dynamic
- Software, hardware (in-core, off-core [3] (dedicated CPU, co-processor)) or mixed

Three steps

- Tag initialization
- Tag propagation
- Tag verification

Levels of IFT

- Application level
- OS level
- Architectural level



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D-RI5CY [4] has been developed by researchers from Columbia University, and University of Turin.

Physical Attacks against DIFT

We consider an attacker able to:

- perform physical attacks to defeat the DIFT mechanism and realize a software attack,
- inject faults in registers associated to the DIFT-related components: set to 0, set to 1 and bit-flips.

| Cycle 3430 | Cycle 3431 | Cycle 3432 |
|--|---|---|
| Decode jalr to shellcode | Fetch 1 st instruction shellcode | Fetch 2^{nd} instruction shellcode Decode 1^{st} instruction shellcode |
| Register File Tag rf_reg[1] ID_stage | | |
| IF_stage | pc_if_o_tag | |



Results

We used CABA fault injection simulations to evaluate the sensitivity of DIFT. A total of 4212 simulations have been performed. About 2.21% lead to successful attacks.

55 registers DIFT-related. 13 critical registers highlighted with injection campaign. About 34.41% are due to set to 0 fault type, 11.83% are due to set to 1 fault type and 53.76% are due to a bitflip. About 2.59% of the simulated injections delay the DIFT exception.

| | Crash | NSTR | Delay | Success | Total |
|-----------------|-------|------|-------|------------|-------|
| Buffer overflow | 0 | 1362 | 20 | 22 (1.57%) | 1404 |
| Format string | 0 | 1743 | 77 | 52 (2.78%) | 1872 |
| Compare/Compute | 0 | 905 | 12 | 19 (2.03%) | 936 |

| | Cycle 3428 | | Cycle 3429 | | Cycle 3430 | | Cycle 3431 | | | Cycle 3432 | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------|--------------|--------------|------|--------------|--------------|------|--------------|
| | set0 | set1 | bitflip | set0 | set1 | bitflip | set0 | set1 | bitflip | set0 | set1 | bitflip | set0 | set1 | bitflip |
| pc_if_o_tag rf reg[1] | | | | | | | \checkmark | | \checkmark | \checkmark | | \checkmark | | | |
| tcr_q | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | |
| tcr_q[21] | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark |
| tpr_q | \checkmark | \checkmark | | \checkmark | \checkmark | | | | | | | | | | |
| tpr_q[12] | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | | | | | | | |
| tpr_q[15] | | | \checkmark | | | \checkmark | | | | | | | | | |

Buffer overflow: success per register, fault type and simulation time

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Perspectives

- Implement and evaluate countermeasures as simple parity and Hamming code (work in progress) taking into account constraints (performance, area, consumption) to protect critical computation related to DIFT.
- Extend the study to the entire D-RI5CY core and take into account a more complex threat model (multi-faults models).
- Perform a fault injection campaign targeting a FPGA implementation.

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