In this paper, I explore the philosophical and scientific positions of Ludwik Fleck, author of the first theory of democratic science and, at the end of the day, a scientific realist. This interpretation of his work is somewhat at odds with the more standard approach, wherein Fleck is presented as a pioneer of relativism or of social constructivism in the philosophy of sciences. In the following, I discuss Fleck's philosophical context o er an analysis of a few of his better-known interpretations and offer a final perspective by showing his commitment to the reality of scientific practice, notwithstanding his scepticism towards scientific theories. And while this paper is an attempt to o er an alternative reading of Fleck's positions, it also aims at reaffirming a stance already defended by, among others, Ian Hacking. Scientific realism needs to be understood not in opposition to a historical perspective on dynamically developing sciences, but along with this perspective.