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Broadening the scope of anthropogenic influence in extreme event attribution

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18 Abstract

19 As extreme event attribution (EEA) matures, explaining the impacts of extreme
20 events has risen to be a key focus for attribution scientists. Studies of this type
21 usually assess the contribution of anthropogenic climate change to observed
22 impacts. Other scientific communities have developed tools to assess how
23 human activities influence impacts of extreme weather events on ecosystems
24 and societies. For example, the disaster risk reduction (DRR) community
25 analyses how the structure of human societies affects exposure, vulnerability,
26 and ultimately the impacts of extreme weather events, with less attention to the
27 role of anthropogenic climate change. In this perspective, we argue that
28 adapting current practice in EEA to also consider other causal factors in
29 attribution of extreme weather impacts would provide richer and more
30 comprehensive insight into the causes of disasters. To this end, we propose a
31 framework for EEA that would generate a more complete picture of human
32 influences on impacts and bridge the gap between the EEA and DRR
33 communities. We provide illustrations for five case studies: the 2021-2022
34 Kenyan drought; the 2013-2015 marine heatwave in the northeast Pacific; the
35 2017 forest fires in Portugal; Acqua Alta (flooding) events in Venice and
36 evaluation of the efficiency of the Experimental Electromechanical Module
37 (MoSE), an ensemble of mobile barriers that can be activated to mitigate the
38 influx of seawater in the city; and California droughts and the Forecast Informed
39 Reservoir Operations (FIRO) system as an adaptation strategy,

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41

1) Introduction

Scientific frameworks to attribute the occurrence of an extreme weather event to anthropogenic climate change have been discussed at least since 2003, when Allen (2003) introduced the idea of comparing the probability of occurrence of an event in the *factual world*, i.e., the world as we know it, to its probability in a *counterfactual world*, i.e., a world that could have been, in the absence of climate change. This idea is also commonly used in epidemiological research (Maldonado and Greenland, 2002), with the goal to attribute changes in the odds of a certain event, e.g. developing lung cancer, to underlying factors such as exposure to asbestos. Stott et al. (2004) provided the first application of this framework through analysing the 2003 European heatwave and showing that anthropogenic climate change had at least doubled the likelihood of the heatwave. Since then, the science of extreme event attribution (EEA) has developed in several directions, through different approaches to the contextualisation of observed events in a changing climate (Jézéquel et al., 2018; Otto, 2017; Shepherd, 2016; Trenberth et al., 2015) and different methodologies (e.g. Faranda et al., 2022; Meredith et al., 2015; Pall et al., 2011; Robin and Ribes, 2020).

While the first studies focused mainly on extreme heat, attribution is now covering growing numbers of weather extremes such as heavy precipitation (e.g. Tradowsky et al., 2023), droughts (e.g. Uhe et al., 2018), cyclones (e.g. Risser and Wehner, 2017), fire or wildfire danger (e.g. Abram, 2021; van Oldenborgh et al., 2021), and marine heatwaves (e.g. Li et al., 2023), with the development of methodologies to deal with compound events (Qian et al., 2023; Zscheischler and Lehner, 2022).

However, human influence on climate-driven catastrophes goes beyond the potential influence of anthropogenic climate change on extreme weather events. For example, water consumption can lead to anthropogenic droughts (AghaKouchak et al., 2021, 2015; Van Loon et al., 2016) and it has been shown that water management practices aggravate both streamflow droughts (Van Loon et al., 2022) and groundwater depletion (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2021; Wendt et al., 2020). Similarly, forest management and ecological dynamics (e.g. forest structure, phenology, pathogens) play key roles in ecological disturbance events (Bastos et al., 2023), and direct effects of elevated CO₂ and nutrient deposition on plant growth impose changes beyond climate change itself (Walker et al., 2021). Zhang et al. (2018) showed the role played by urbanization to exacerbate both the rain and the flooding caused by Hurricane Harvey.

1 Since one of the motivations for extreme event attribution is to understand
2 the impacts of climate change on human societies, rather than its effects on
3 extreme weather events alone, recent literature has sought to extend attribution
4 methods to the impacts of those weather events. Such studies have typically
5 relied either on tailored statistical analyses such as transfer functions or
6 Bayesian regression models commonly used in epidemiological studies (Frame
7 et al., 2020b, 2020a; Litzow et al., 2021; Mitchell et al., 2016; Vicedo-Cabrera
8 et al., 2023, 2021), or on dynamical impact models, deriving impacts in both the
9 factual and counterfactual worlds obtained from climate models (Schaller et al.,
10 2016; Sebastian et al., 2019; Sippel et al., 2017; Smiley et al., 2022; Wehner
11 and Sampson, 2021). The type of impact studied and disciplines required to
12 evaluate them varies. Key developments have been done through
13 collaborations with epidemiologists (Mitchell et al., 2016; Vicedo-Cabrera et al.,
14 2023), hydrologists (Schaller et al., 2016; Sebastian et al., 2019; Wehner and
15 Sampson, 2021) and economists (Frame et al., 2020a, 2020b; Newman and
16 Noy, 2023). These studies use the climate risk framework, namely describing
17 impacts that are the result of the combination of hazards, exposure and
18 vulnerability of populations or assets, and sometimes societal response to
19 hazards that mediate or amplify their impact (Simpson et al., 2021).

20 The use of impact models is usually specific to the context within the area
21 where the event occurred, thus requiring local model verification. Models that
22 aim to represent the relationship between drivers and impacts are also affected
23 by epistemic uncertainty, caused by the lack of data and the complex
24 interactions between society and impactful events. It is often unclear to what
25 extent past observations of drivers and impacts can be used, how they may
26 change over time due to changes in vulnerability or exposure, and whether they
27 can accurately describe the most extreme events (Rufat et al., 2015). For
28 example, during long-lasting extreme events such as droughts and heatwaves,
29 impacted people respond during the event, causing dynamic vulnerability and
30 therefore changing the impacts even during the event (Ruiter and Van Loon,
31 2022). The same can be said for ecosystems, where for example, responses to
32 hot-dry conditions in spring might contribute to summer water depletion (Bastos
33 et al., 2020) and ecosystem vulnerability to summer drought (Buermann et al.,
34 2018). After a particularly impactful event, response systems may improve such
35 that a very similar event a few years later has a much smaller impact (Fouillet
36 et al., 2008; Kreibich et al., 2017a, 2022).

37 The current perspective on EEA, including attribution of impacts,
38 highlights human influence on these impacts only through climate change, by
39 quantifying how the hazard leading to the disaster was impacted by greenhouse
40 gas emissions (Mengel et al., 2021). Establishing the link between these

1 emissions and impactful weather events is key to highlighting the emitters'
2 responsibilities in current climate-driven impacts. However, a too climate-centric
3 perspective poses the risk of limiting the attribution of the impacts of extreme
4 weather events to greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions, and thereby making
5 the role of other anthropogenic drivers of disasters, in particular dynamic
6 vulnerability and maladaptation, invisible (Wisner, 2016) and blaming the
7 climate for disasters (Raju et al., 2022). Most of the attribution studies cited
8 above attribute the role of *human-driven* changes in the vulnerability and
9 exposure leading to impacts, but are limited to the attribution of impacts to
10 climate drivers. Sebastian et al. (2019) disentangled the impacts of urbanization
11 and climate change on catchment response during Hurricane Harvey. They built
12 three counterfactuals: pre-development conditions, urbanization without climate
13 change, and climate change without urbanization. They found that urban
14 development alone increased peak discharges by 54% ($\pm 28\%$) and climate
15 change alone increased them by 20% ($\pm 3\%$) with a combined effect of 84%
16 ($\pm 35\%$). This shows the potential of such studies to highlight the compound
17 effect of two anthropogenic changes.

18 Another scientific community working on impactful extreme weather
19 events is the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) community. DRR spans a wide
20 range of hazards, including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, floods,
21 tsunamis, and sometimes also man-made or technological hazards such as
22 chemical spills, dam failures and nuclear meltdowns (Brinkmann, 2020).
23 Climate change adaptation is the branch of DRR that focuses on climate-related
24 hazards. We will use the term DRR in the remainder of this text. For example,
25 Meza et al (2020) assess the different components of risk (hazard, exposure
26 and vulnerability) for agricultural drought at the global scale. Ward et al. (2013)
27 assess global flood risk using a model cascade that includes hydrological and
28 hydraulic modelling, extreme value statistics, inundation modelling, flood impact
29 modelling, and estimating annual expected impacts. The DRR community is
30 more focused on the quantification of risk, so the chance that something might
31 happen, than on looking at a specific event and attributing the drivers of the
32 event (see e.g. Blauhut (2020) for a drought risk review).

33 While the integration of DRR issues in EEA is a challenge, the same can
34 be said of the integration of climate change as an additional layer of human
35 influence on disasters within the DRR community. For example, Hsu et al.
36 (2021) show inequalities in exposure to urban heat island intensity between
37 populations of different ethnicities and different income, but their study does not
38 take into account the evolution of urban heat island intensity in a changing
39 climate. Similarly, Sanders et al. (2023) highlight that flooding risks are
40 disproportionately higher for non-Hispanic Black and disadvantaged

1 populations in Los Angeles, but the evolution of these inequalities in the context
2 of climate change is not discussed. Van Loon et al. (2022) also analyse direct
3 human influences on streamflow drought without taking into consideration
4 trends caused by climate change.

5 Taking into account the non-stationarity of hazards (for example, the
6 changes—especially increases—in disaster risk due to flooding, drought, or fire
7 getting more frequent and/or intense because of anthropogenic climate change)
8 in DRR studies is important, because with changes in extreme event
9 characteristics, neighbourhoods once deemed safe become newly exposed to
10 hazards, causing the monetary value of their properties to plummet (Köhler et
11 al., 2023). This traps the most exposed residents - who cannot afford to move
12 out - making them vulnerable, and the neighbourhood retains only the most
13 vulnerable groups, hollowing out any adaptation action (Rufat et al., 2020).

14 EEA adds an event perspective to the risk discussion and provides a new
15 basis to attribute responsibilities for disaster impacts. It can be used to underline
16 the causal link between emissions and losses in a context of climate justice
17 (Otto et al., 2022). However, highlighting the contribution of humans to disasters
18 through anthropogenic climate change may paradoxically hinder efforts from
19 the DRR community to “take the naturalness out of the natural disasters”
20 (O’Keefe et al., 1976), by (re)focusing attention on the hazard instead of
21 vulnerability. Lahsen and Ribot (2022) have shown how “climate-centric
22 framings of disasters” can be used as a way for local politicians to shirk
23 responsibilities in the aftermath of a disaster (see also Grant et al (2015) on
24 “climatization” of cyclone impacts in Bangladesh, Savelli et al (2021) on the
25 2015-2017 drought in Cape Town, and Lahsen et al (2020) for two Brazilian
26 case studies). Narratives overemphasizing the role of climate change in crises
27 such as the Syrian war or African migrations have also been challenged
28 (Fröhlich, 2016; Ribot et al., 2020; Selby et al., 2017), and pose problems in
29 terms of what this climatization of conflicts might mean for international policies
30 and agendas (Lahsen and Ribot, 2022).

31 To our knowledge, the only EEA study so far to address human influence
32 on both the hazard, and a part of vulnerability and exposure is Sebastian et al.
33 (2019) by quantifying the roles of both climate change and urbanization on
34 Hurricane Harvey’s peak discharge. There are however many examples of
35 detection and attribution of trends in biophysical variables to different types of
36 anthropogenic factors. Vicente-Serrano et al. (2019) attribute streamflow trends
37 in countries bordering the Northeast Atlantic to climate, irrigation and land-cover
38 changes. Litzow et al. (2014) discuss biological variability in the North Pacific in
39 the context of both climate change and commercial fishing. Tait et al. (2021)
40 found that poor water clarity, partly driven by extensive land-use change,

1 amplified impacts from the 2017/18 marine heatwave off southern New Zealand
2 on habitat-forming kelp forests.

3 To our knowledge, Smiley et al (2022) is the only EEA study focusing on
4 social inequalities due to climate change in the context of an extreme event
5 impact. They show that the increased flood depths attributed to climate change
6 arising from Hurricane Harvey were particularly felt in Latina low-income
7 neighbourhoods. While not an attribution study, Rusca et al. (2023) highlight
8 how unprecedented droughts that are projected to happen in future scenarios
9 could exacerbate urban inequalities in Southern Africa. These studies indicate
10 how information on climate hazards can be synthesised with vulnerability
11 information to assess different contributions to risk.

12 Here we propose a multidimensional framework for EEA, built on the
13 framework proposed by Bastos et al. (2023) to study compound eco-climatic
14 events. The goal is to bridge the EEA and DRR communities and to provide
15 insight into the contributions made by climate change and other factors to
16 disaster losses. This new framework could help to enhance knowledge about
17 the causes of climate-related impacts by including both the effects of
18 anthropogenic climate change and other human influences on risk by building
19 *pertinent counterfactual and factual* worlds, based on an inclusive co-
20 construction process between scientists, decision makers, and the most
21 vulnerable communities. It also aligns with a push within the EEA community to
22 propose frameworks grounded in causally understood processes — so-called
23 storylines — able to include different approaches and methodologies of EEA
24 (e.g. Lloyd and Shepherd, 2023, 2020).

25 We first explain the general framework, which can be used as a canvas
26 describing the general picture of the event and its causes. Furthermore, we
27 provide illustrations for five case studies: the 2021-2022 Kenyan drought; the
28 2013-2015 marine heatwave in the northeast Pacific; the 2017 forest fires in
29 Portugal; Acqua Alta (flooding) events in Venice and evaluation of adaptation
30 strategies; and California droughts and the Forecast Informed Reservoir
31 Operations (FIRO) system as an adaptation strategy. We discuss how our
32 approach could be applied qualitatively and quantitatively, based on the current
33 state of the art and highlight the limitations and opportunities. We conclude with
34 a discussion of the advantages and limitations of our framework.

35

36 2) General framework

37

38 a) Differences of vocabulary

39

1 While the framework we present in this paper relies on the commonly
2 used climate risk perspective (Simpson et al., 2021) where impacts result from
3 the combination of hazard, exposure and vulnerability, these words can cover
4 a wide range of meanings depending on the disciplinary context in which they
5 are used. For example, while a flood would be considered a hazard in the DRR
6 community, the climate science community would consider it an impact, in
7 which case the hazard would be, e.g., a storm or heavy precipitation. Similarly,
8 for droughts: from the climate perspective, low soil moisture or groundwater
9 levels could be seen as impacts, but from the DRR perspective these are
10 regarded as hazards and the impact arises only when the social system is
11 affected.

12 As a consequence, the meanings of vulnerability and exposure also vary
13 from one community to another. In DRR, vulnerability is broadly defined as the
14 potential to disproportionately suffer loss, harm or longer recovery, with a focus
15 on finding the “root causes” and dynamic pressures that produce vulnerability
16 (Wisner, 2016). Vulnerability can be divided into physical or biophysical
17 vulnerability of people and places to hazards and extreme events, structural
18 vulnerability of buildings and lifelines, as well as social vulnerability, describing
19 differential susceptibility based on social, economic and political factors (Burton
20 et al., 2018). Physical vulnerability is sometimes conflated with hazard exposure
21 in a DRR context (see for examples De Sherbinin et al., 2019), but for the
22 climate community, vulnerability often only encompasses exposure or damages
23 (e.g. Formetta and Feyen, 2019) as a result of a focus on impacts rather than
24 the processes and root causes of DRR.


25 These differences of meaning matter as they tend to highlight some parts
26 of the chain of causation more than others and can hence conceal some parts
27 of the processes at work. They also influence the framing around disaster
28 causes and potential solutions, which has consequences when the science is
29 communicated to decision makers. A focus on the social determinants of
30 vulnerability can help explain why people with similar levels of exposure may
31 experience very different levels of adverse impact (Kuhlicke et al., 2023). For
32 example, the African-American communities have borne a disproportionate
33 burden following Hurricane Katrina (Colten, 2006), studies across continents
34 highlight that floods disproportionately affect lower-socioeconomic status
35 households (Rufat et al., 2015), whereas the recent drought and flood events in
36 the Horn of Africa combined with ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and Kenya, leading
37 to displacement, further violence and mutually reinforcing interactions (Matanó
38 et al., 2022). Social vulnerability arises as the result of a progression that
39 proceeds from root causes through dynamic pressures to unsafe conditions.
40 Root causes are societal scale and interrelated political, economic, and

1 demographic structures that establish and sustain power relationships, and
2 govern the allocation of resources (Wisner, 2016). Whilst the importance of
3 social and behavioural determinants of vulnerability and resilience has been
4 addressed by a wide range of approaches, their multidimensionality makes it
5 difficult to represent them with a universal set of metrics across scales and
6 hazards (Rufat et al., 2019).

7 As already discussed in the introduction, anthropogenic influence also
8 covers different realities in different scientific communities. On the climate side,
9 this influence would generally be regarded to consist of greenhouse gases and
10 aerosol emissions, while for example some studies on drought focus on
11 anthropogenic influence in the form of water management practices.

12 It is neither realistic nor respectful to force very precise definitions of
13 these words on different communities, beyond the generic definitions from the
14 IPCC. It is however crucial to clarify the meaning of the words used in specific
15 studies, in order to move forward on a more systemic approach to attribution of
16 the impacts of disasters to anthropogenic forcing, so that scholars from different
17 disciplines can understand each other and integrate their respective
18 understanding of the role of human activities.

19
20
21 b) The framework
22
23



24
25 *Figure 1: Conceptual framework for a broader attribution of disasters to human*
26 *influence, adapted from Bastos et al (2023)'s framework of ecoclimatic events*
27 *(figure 2 of their work). The blue frame corresponds to a traditional EEA*
28 *framework, The red arrows are generally not considered in EEA studies.*

29

1 Bastos et al. (2023) introduced a new framework to study eco-climatic events
2 as a bridge between two approaches to analyse the impacts of climate extremes
3 and disturbances on ecosystems: climate risk and disturbance ecology. This
4 framework presents a causal chain between anthropogenic activities and
5 ecological impacts. The key aspect that makes it relevant for our purpose is that
6 it includes compounding characteristics that reflect the dynamic and complex
7 relationships between climate, societies and impacts, hence highlighting the
8 effect of anthropogenic activities on different steps of the causality chains
9 towards impacts. It is an opportunity to move towards a more holistic
10 perspective of the multi-causal charts that have been proposed for extreme
11 attribution, such as Lloyd and Shepherd (2023, 2020) and for risk assessment
12 (e.g. Hagenlocher et al., 2023). Bastos et al (2023)'s conceptual framework can
13 be straightforwardly broadened to more types of impacts of climate extremes
14 with a few changes, explained below. Figure 1 sums up our proposed
15 conceptual framework for enhanced EEA. Concrete examples of how this
16 framework could be applied to different types of events are given in sections 3
17 and 4.

18 *Hydro-climatic drivers* correspond to the extreme events that are called
19 hazards in the climate science community. They would typically be climate or
20 meteorological variables that would describe an extreme weather situation,
21 either univariate or multivariate. These include for example extreme low and
22 high temperatures, extreme precipitation or a lack of precipitation, high wind
23 speed, and extreme values of relative humidity. From fields of basic
24 meteorological variables, one can also explore diverse spatial and temporal
25 scales, as well as compound weather events deriving from the interaction of
26 anomalous states of these basic variables (Zscheischler, 2020; Zscheischler et
27 al., 2018).

28 Hydro-climatic drivers can be affected by *anthropogenic activity* through
29 the forced response of climate change, but also by *internal climate variability*.
30 Internal variability may result in particular from well-known modes of variability
31 that affect regional climate from seasonal to decadal scales, e.g. the El Niño
32 Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Goddard and Gershunov, 2020), the Indian
33 Oscillation Dipole (IOD), or the Atlantic Meridional Oscillation (AMO) (Zhang,
34 2019). We note that internal climate variability may interact with anthropogenic
35 climate change and thus modulate the severity of hazards, for example
36 attenuate or reinforce (Karamperidou et al., 2020; Kimutai et al., 2022).

37 *Stressors* are defined, following Bastos et al. (2023), as “physical,
38 chemical or biological phenomena that can impose changes” in ecosystems and
39 social systems (such as people or infrastructures). While hydro-climatic drivers
40 only describe weather and climate, stressors are one step closer to impacts,

1 including e.g. hydrological, chemical or biological processes. In the DRR
2 literature, these are called hazards. They include for example anomalously high
3 or low streamflow, soil moisture, groundwater levels, heat stress, air pollution,
4 fire intensity, or fire extent. They can also be multivariate and affect different
5 spatial and temporal scales.

6 Following a conventional disaster risk perspective, *exposure and*
7 *vulnerability* include all the other social, economic and environmental factors
8 that interact with stressors to lead to impacts. Similar to Bastos et al.'s definition,
9 they can modulate both stressors and impacts. They include all the non-
10 weather-related factors that influence climate-related risks, such as
11 demographic characteristics (e.g. density, age, gender, income, unemployment
12 rate) and access to infrastructure or to ecosystem services.

13 While recognizing other human factors that contribute to exposure and
14 vulnerability is crucial for comprehending how stressors escalate into impacts,
15 challenges exist in measuring and assessing them. Comprehensive databases
16 or inventories of impacts are country-dependent and are often incomplete.
17 Information about employment rates, income levels, and industry-specific data
18 is lacking. This kind of data is essential for understanding the economic
19 vulnerabilities of different populations and regions. Moreover, data related to
20 the quality of housing and infrastructure is also limited, which can significantly
21 influence the ability of communities to withstand and recover from disasters.
22 Additionally, knowledge about health insurance coverage and accessibility to
23 medical services is limited, which affects disaster response and recovery.
24 Understanding the societal aspects that influence vulnerability is also important.
25 Data on traditional coping mechanisms and local adaptation practices that
26 communities have historically employed can be limited too. Moreover, social
27 norms, cultural practices, and beliefs play a significant role in shaping
28 vulnerability (Kuhlicke et al., 2023). Inadequate data on internal and cross-
29 border migration patterns limits the understanding of how population
30 movements can be influenced or triggered by disasters.

31 *Impacts* are anomalous states of ecosystems or social systems
32 compared to a reference state or variability range. They can be positive,
33 negative or both at the same time. Moreover, the impacts themselves may span
34 multiple dimensions, including economic losses, infrastructure damage, crop
35 yield or plant productivity, as well as non-economic losses, such as impacts on
36 human health, cultural, or biodiversity losses. Impacts can also cascade in
37 society, between different sectors or different regions.

38 The added value of our proposed framework is that anthropogenic
39 activities are not only included as an external forcing on hydro-climatic drivers,
40 but also on the other factors leading to the impact, through socio-environmental

1 factors that can affect both the stressors and the impacts, for example through
2 water or forest management, urban planning or agricultural policies. This
3 corresponds to long-term adaptation policies. The framework can also include
4 short-term response to an event (i.e. coping), either on stressors, such as
5 sandbags to contain flooding or irrigation to prevent soil moisture drought, or
6 directly on impacts, such as emergency response through e.g., humanitarian
7 help, or population displacement.

8 The framework can be applied qualitatively and quantitatively, based on
9 quantitative data, qualitative documents, and expert views.


11 **3) Case studies**

13 A qualitative version of this framework could be established quickly after
14 a disaster, as part of a fast-track attribution study and could help to determine
15 the relevant factors at play in a given event. This type of approach would be
16 complementary to the efforts undertaken by initiatives such as World Weather
17 Attribution (Philip et al., 2020), which have sought to add to their climate change
18 attribution analysis a discussion on exposure and vulnerability. We believe that
19 our approach places the contributions of climate change and drivers of
20 vulnerability on a more equal footing. We illustrate this with case studies of the
21 2021-2022 drought in Kenya, the 2013-2015 marine heatwave in the northeast
22 Pacific and the 2017 fires in Portugal.

23 The framework described in this article could also facilitate attribution
24 studies that make a more comprehensive assessment of one or several causal
25 relationships between human activities, socio-environmental factors, the
26 climate and disasters. As such, the objective would not be to achieve a
27 complete study of all the causal ramifications behind each weather-related
28 disaster, but to start by focusing on some of the causal links that can be studied
29 using quantitative models. In the other two case studies, we describe how this
30 quantification could be envisioned with further research based on existing
31 models and methods, with a focus on a subset of the causality chain. We
32 present two case studies accounting for part of the anthropogenic activity on
33 socio-environmental factors, with counterfactual based adaptation strategies:
34 the Aqua alta in Venice with a simple economic model of losses, and the
35 California drought with a model of reservoir water level. We chose a case study
36 grounded in extreme attribution framing with the Acqua Alta case study to
37 discuss how to get closer to impacts while exploring non-climatic
38 counterfactuals. On the other hand, the California drought is grounded in a DRR
39 approach, where we detail the use of an adaptation counterfactual and discuss
40 options to add a climate change component to this kind of analysis.

1 We chose case studies of different types of events and different regions to
 2 illustrate the diversity of issues surrounding anthropogenic influence on climate-
 3 related disasters. These case studies are exploratory discussions and do not
 4 pretend to be full applications of the proposed framework.

5
 6 a) Kenyan drought (2021-2022)
 7



8
 9 *Figure 2: Causality chart for the 2021-2022 Kenyan drought. This is a partial*
 10 *causality chart based on information collected from academic literature and*
 11 *reports, which are detailed in the text. A more complete chart could be*
 12 *established in partnerships developed with subject matter and local expertise.*

13
 14 **The event and its impacts**

15 For a period of 2 years, Kenya experienced an exceptional drought event that
 16 was considered the worst in 40 years (Kimutai et al., 2023). Over the period,
 17 persistent drought conditions led to substantial harvest failure, poor pasture
 18 conditions, livestock losses, decreased surface water availability, and fueled
 19 both human-wildlife and human conflicts and migration (including internal
 20 displacements) (WFP, 2022). The livelihoods of the agro-pastoralists were
 21 severely threatened with increased risk of disease, malnutrition, hunger and
 22 death (MPI, 2023). In September 2021, the Kenyan government declared a
 23 drought emergency (WFP, 2022). The drought situation remained critical (alert
 24 and alarm drought phases) until February 2023 in most arid and semi-arid
 25 counties with 4.35 million people in need of aid (NDMA, 2022). The number of
 26 livestock deaths rose to over 2.4 million and cases of acute malnutrition were
 27 reported among 942,000 children aged 6-59 months and 134,000 pregnant or
 28 lactating women (UN News, 2022). The government allocated a further Ksh. 4
 29 Billion (approx. US\$ 30 million) to the nation's drought alleviation programme

1 (Kenya Government, 2023) in February 2023. By that time close to 9,210 metric
2 tonnes of food commodities had been distributed and Ksh. 1 Billion (approx.
3 US\$ 7.29 million) cash-based transfers had been made (World Food
4 Programme (WFP), 2023). This list of impacts is summed up in the green box
5 of Figure 2.

6 7 **Hydro-climatic drivers and attribution to anthropogenic climate change**

8 The hydro-climatic drivers of the drought are multiple, but at the first order, they
9 can be described through precipitation and evapotranspiration (see blue box in
10 Figure 2). Attribution analysis of rainfall trends and the combined effect of
11 rainfall deficit with high temperatures in the Southern Horn of Africa covering
12 parts of southern Ethiopia, southern Somalia, and eastern Kenya showed that
13 anthropogenic influence on both rainfall and evapotranspiration increased the
14 drought severity to "exceptional" (based on the US Drought Monitor
15 classification (U.S. Drought Monitor)), whereas in the absence of climate
16 change it would have been a normal drought (Kimutai et al., 2023). Kimutai et
17 al. (2023) also found that in today's climate, dry conditions in the March-April-
18 May rainfall season with a return period of 10 years have become twice as likely
19 due to climate change. The drought years (2021-2022) have also been affected
20 by internal variability, as they coincided with consecutive La Niña conditions
21 which are associated with reduced rainfall over the region in the October-
22 December (OND) season.


23 24 **Exposure and vulnerability**

25
26 Key stressors in this event were soil moisture, water scarcity or water quality
27 (pink box of Figure 2). Lam et al. (2023) showed that soil moisture deficit and
28 water scarcity are key elements determining differential drought impacts for
29 different counties of Kenya. These indices are modulated by a variety of long-
30 term environmental and socio-economic factors such as long-term aridity,
31 poverty, lack of economic development, limited access to basic social services,
32 low education levels, as well as water management, maintenance of the supply
33 system, and the presence or absence of reservoirs. These human factors have
34 been identified in reports (FEWS NET 2017, 2013), and documented by small-
35 scale sociological studies (Adano et al., 2012; Quandt, 2021). For example,
36 Nyberg et al. (2020) conducted interviews with smallholders in Western Kenya
37 and found that money, knowledge and labour are key to understanding
38 individuals' ability to cope with rainfall variability. Some similar studies could be
39 done in the region affected by the 2021-2022 drought.

1 The impacts of droughts can also be mitigated by policies, coping strategies,
 2 early warning, early action, and timely response (Wens et al., 2022). As an
 3 example, the implementation of climate services based on seasonal forecasting
 4 to help local farmers make decisions regarding crop and livestock management
 5 could be an efficient adaptation measure to reduce the impacts of droughts
 6 (Busker et al., 2023). International aid also plays a role in building community
 7 resilience to drought (Kithikii, 2023), but focus on emergency response can also
 8 lead to long-term dependency (Ng and Yap, 2011).

9
 10 A key problem with better accounting for exposure, vulnerability and the effect
 11 of human activities on drought stressors and impacts is that the existing
 12 datasets do not include granular local knowledge. For example, the global water
 13 scarcity dataset of McNally (2019) takes into account population density, but is
 14 blind to reservoirs and other water management systems or inefficiencies (Lam
 15 et al., 2023). Additionally, this dataset has also never been validated on the
 16 Horn of Africa. This means there is still a lot of work to be done to provide a
 17 comprehensive understanding of the way human activities influence drought
 18 impacts.

20 b) The 2013-2015 marine heatwave in the northeast Pacific



21
 22 *Figure 3: Causality chart for the 2013-2015 Pacific marine heatwave. The*
 23 *references used to fill each box are listed in the text. This is a partial causality*
 24 *chart, based on the literature listed in the text. A more complete chart could be*
 25 *established in partnerships developed with subject matter and local expertise.*

26 **The event and its impacts.**

27 Between 2013 and 2015, the northeast Pacific experienced the most intense
 28 and longest-lasting marine heatwave ever recorded, with maximum sea surface
 29 temperature (SST) anomalies of more than 5°C lasting for more than 350 days

1 (Di Lorenzo and Mantua, 2016; Laufkötter et al., 2020). The record-breaking
2 marine heatwave, referred to as the 'Blob', had unprecedented impacts on
3 marine ecosystems and the societies relying upon them. Ecological impacts
4 included increased mortality of many marine species, which resulted from a
5 combination of stressors, all listed in the pink box in Figure 3. First, low
6 phytoplankton productivity (Le Grix et al., 2021; Whitney, 2015; Wyatt et al.,
7 2022) caused significant changes in zooplankton and marine invertebrate
8 populations (Leising, 2016), with many species shifting their distributions toward
9 higher latitudes (Cavole et al., 2016; Cheung and Frölicher, 2020). Second, an
10 increased proportion of less nutritious warm-water copepods in the north-
11 eastern Pacific reduced prey energy content for forage fish, while the heatwave
12 enhanced the metabolism and thus food demand of predators, thereby
13 depleting forage fish stocks. Third, the heatwave also triggered an
14 unprecedented harmful algal bloom off the U.S. west coast, which, in
15 combination with changing prey dynamics, amplified the heatwave's impacts on
16 sea-birds and mammal species (Cavole et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2018; Piatt et
17 al., 2020). Mass strandings of whales in the Gulf of Alaska and sea lions in
18 California were reported during the Blob. Toxins produced by the algae also
19 contaminated shellfish and prompted the prolonged closure of valuable shellfish
20 fisheries. Economically, the 'Blob' led to millions of dollars in losses among
21 fishing industries. Shellfish fisheries incurred estimated losses of \$48 million
22 (Cavole et al., 2016). These impacts are listed in the green box of Figure 3.

23 **Hydro-climatic drivers and attribution to anthropogenic climate change**

24 In this case, the main hydroclimatic proxy is the high SST. The
25 unprecedented heatwave primarily resulted from natural climatic variability.
26 Bond et al. (2015) attributed the development of the 'Blob' to an unusually
27 strong and persistent weather pattern, featuring sea level pressure much higher
28 than normal over the Gulf of Alaska. These sea level pressure anomalies were
29 forced from the atmosphere by the North Pacific Oscillation (Tseng et al., 2017).
30 Reduced circulation in the North Pacific Subtropical Gyre suppressed the heat
31 loss from the ocean to the atmosphere and caused relatively weak cold
32 advection in the upper ocean (Leising, 2016). The resulting warming in the
33 northeast Pacific is characteristic of the second mode of SST variability in the
34 North Pacific, the Victoria Mode, thought to have acted as a precursor to the
35 development of the 2015/16 El Niño (Di Lorenzo and Mantua, 2016), which
36 further enhanced the 'Blob' (Tseng et al., 2017).

37 The 'Blob' was a compound extreme event; it combined extreme
38 temperatures with anomalies in multiple ocean ecosystem metrics, such as low

1 oxygen and nutrient levels, which we also classify here as hydroclimatic drivers
2 of the event (Gruber et al., 2021; Le Grix et al., 2021; Mogen et al., 2022). The
3 severity of the Blob's impacts is partly explained by these anomalies, to which
4 human-driven climate change possibly contributed. First, without climate
5 change, the Blob may have been less intense and long-lasting. Long-term
6 ocean surface warming has caused longer and more frequent marine
7 heatwaves over the past century (Frölicher et al., 2018; Oliver et al., 2018).
8 Laufkötter et al. (2020) attribute the long duration and high intensity of the Blob
9 to human-induced ocean warming. Furthermore, climate change has also been
10 associated with ocean deoxygenation, which compresses marine species'
11 habitats, acidification, and lower nutrient levels over certain regions (e.g. Bopp
12 et al., 2013).

13 **Exposure and vulnerability**

14 Human activities modulate exposure and vulnerability (see yellow box of
15 Figure 3) and can directly influence both the stressors and the impacts of the
16 event. As an example of the former, pollutants emitted by industries may fertilise
17 coastal waters and facilitate the onset of harmful algal blooms, although, to our
18 knowledge, no link has been established between coastal pollution and the
19 harmful algal bloom that occurred during the Blob. The opening of the crab
20 fishing season was delayed until late March 2016 due to unsafe toxin levels
21 (Santora et al., 2020). This prevented food poisoning, but affected sales and
22 job security in the crab industry. There is a lack of studies regarding the way
23 this event interacted with social vulnerability, and the type of populations who
24 suffered from these changes, both within fisher communities and the people
25 relying on crabs for food consumption.

26 In addition, while crab fishing activity is usually highest in November and
27 December, the reopening of the season in spring 2016 coincided with the arrival
28 of migrating whales off California. The delayed season resulted in record
29 entanglements of whales in crab fishing gear. Cooperation between fisheries,
30 resource managers, and scientists is necessary to develop more efficient
31 mitigating strategies (Gissi et al., 2019; Hazen, 2018). Catch limits must also be
32 adapted to species migration during marine heatwaves, e.g. raised when a
33 species population is growing and lowered when it is declining. Permits to target
34 a more diverse portfolio of species may also be delivered to fishers during
35 heatwaves, so they can better pivot toward a species that is abundant.

36 c) Extreme fire season of 2017 in Portugal

37

The event and its impacts

The year 2017 was one of the worst fire seasons recorded in Europe, with over 1.2 million ha burned, and it directly killed at least 127 persons in the European Union (European Commission et al., 2018). Of these, 540 thousand ha and 114 fatalities occurred in Portugal, mostly due to two mega-fire events in central Portugal, one in June and another in October 2017, months which were not considered in the official definition of critical fire season by the Portuguese authorities. The 2017 wildfires in Portugal resulted in major forest biomass losses, and damages to agriculture, buildings and other infrastructure, totalling 1.2 billion USD in economic losses and insurance costs of 295 million USD (Ramos et al., 2023).

While both events were exceptional, here we focus on the event occurring between 15 and 16 of October, in which over 200 thousand ha were burned, most of them in under 24h (Castellnou et al., 2018), and 51 people died (Rodrigues et al., 2022). The mega-fires generated a smoke plume that raised particulate matter concentrations in the atmosphere above safe levels, resulting in an increase in hospital admissions due to asthma and other respiratory diseases in Portugal (Oliveira et al., 2020). Figure 4 shows the different hydro-climatic drivers, elements of exposure and vulnerability and stressors contributing to these impacts.




Figure 4: Partial causality chart for the October 17 fires in Portugal, based on Ramos et al. (2023), and additional studies including additional socio-environmental factors listed in the text. A more complete chart could be established in partnerships developed with subject matter and local expertise.

1 Ramos et al. (2023) analysed this compound event following a storyline
2 approach. They based their analysis on a commonly used fire risk model, the
3 Canadian Forest Fire Weather Index System (CFFWIS) to decompose the
4 event into the most relevant components of the “fire triangle”: hydroclimatic
5 drivers, fuel characteristics, and ignitions. Their analysis does not assess the
6 way anthropogenic climate change modulated the event, but we discuss how
7 it could be done below. It is also qualitative in nature, but detailed enough that
8 it could be used as a canvas for more quantitative protocols. Such protocols
9 could in principle be implemented by land surface models that simulate
10 burned area prognostically, based on fire weather, fuel dynamics and ignitions
11 (Jones et al., 2022), for which counterfactuals could be built. [Including](#)
12 [interactions with human activities is more challenging, although first attempts](#)
13 [to develop such models exist \(Perkins et al., 2024\).](#)

14 Each of the elements of the fire triangle was associated with exceptional
15 conditions that compounded on October 15th, as described below.

16

17 **Hydro-climatic drivers and role of anthropogenic climate change**

18 The passage of Hurricane Ophelia along the Iberian Peninsula coast is
19 considered a key element in the development of this fire event. Ophelia
20 developed in early October in the central North Atlantic basin and, moving in a
21 north-eastward direction from October 12th onwards, transitioned to an
22 extratropical storm. On October 15th Ophelia was close to the coast of the
23 Iberian Peninsula and promoted the advection of extremely hot and dry air from
24 Northern Africa, with near-surface temperature reaching over 30°C and relative
25 humidity below 20% over most of the Portuguese territory (Ramos et al., 2023).
26 Ophelia was the easternmost major hurricane on record in the Atlantic and its
27 passage sustained very strong wind speeds, especially in central Portugal
28 where fires occurred (maximum wind speed between 50-80km/h). These three
29 exceptional hydrometeorological conditions implied a high propensity of fires to
30 spread, once ignited.

31 In Ramos et al. (2023) no storm-specific attribution statement was made. A
32 quantitative application of our framework to this event would require a formal
33 attribution study on at least one or several of the hydroclimatic drivers of the
34 event. This attribution could be conditional to the circulation (e.g. using the
35 same methodology as Faranda et al., 2023), or unconditional (e.g. Philip et al.,
36 2020).

37 Turco et al. (2019) have already shown that the climate change signal would
38 have led to larger burned areas for the 2017 fire season over Portugal (not
39 restricted to the October event), in the absence of other drivers. It thus appears
40 reasonable to hypothesize (although no specific attribution analysis has been

1 conducted to our knowledge) that climate change may have contributed to
2 increasing the heat and atmospheric dryness advected by Ophelia (López et
3 al., 2021). The highly active 2017 Atlantic hurricane season as a whole, with six
4 major storms, has been traced to unusually warm North Atlantic tropical SSTs
5 (Murakami, 2018), a warming that is projected to increase further. In general,
6 tropical cyclones have become more intense in the North Atlantic, which is
7 unlikely to be explained by natural variability alone (Seneviratne et al., 2021),
8 and tropical cyclones are projected to further intensify due to anthropogenic
9 forcing (Seneviratne et al., 2021).

10 **Exposure, vulnerability, and human influence**

11 Fuel characteristics

12 This exceptional fire event was preconditioned by extremely high levels of
13 vegetation stress associated with the prolonged drought conditions that had
14 started in July 2016. Remote sensing data indicated strong vegetation browning
15 from August to October 2017 (Ramos et al., 2023), which implies very dry – and
16 easily flammable – fuel. Indeed, the moisture content of fine fuels was estimated
17 at 3-6% (Castellnou et al., 2018). Moreover, forests dominated by highly
18 flammable tree species (*Pinus Pinaster*) comprised the majority of the burned
19 area, most of which had not burned in the previous 19 years, therefore likely to
20 hold high fuel load (Castellnou et al., 2018).

21 In the Mediterranean, there is a high confidence in the increase in frequency
22 and severity of hydrometeorological droughts, and medium confidence for soil
23 moisture and ecological droughts in the historical period. There is medium
24 confidence that these signals can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change
25 (Seneviratne et al., 2021). There is, however, low confidence in trends and
26 attribution of meteorological droughts (Seneviratne et al., 2021). This difference
27 highlights the role of increased evaporative demand, rather than precipitation
28 deficits, in driving the observed increases in hydrometeorological, ecological
29 and soil moisture droughts. Furthermore, increased evaporative demand due to
30 warming trends results in *more severe* droughts in the Mediterranean (Vicente-
31 Serrano et al., 2014), influencing fuel buildup and dryness. However, a separate
32 attribution of climate change on fuel characteristics has not been done. This
33 attribution is complicated by multiple ecological and other human influences on
34 fuel dynamics (e.g. elevated CO₂ and land-use change), as illustrated by Bastos
35 et al. (2023) using a storyline approach. A simple model of the total seasonal
36 burnt area over Portugal (thus *not* restricted to fuel characteristics or the
37 October events) indicated that temperature and dryness variability are
38 statistically moderately predictive, and without the historical trends in
39

1 temperature and dryness, the 2017 fire season would have been much less
2 severe (Turco et al., 2019).

3 4 Ignitions

5 The critical fire season considered by the Portuguese authorities was typically
6 considered between July and September. The critical period was prolonged
7 until November 23rd, which imposed a prohibition of management fires in forest
8 and agricultural areas (European Commission et al., 2018). This is, however, a
9 time of the year when fire is commonly used in local agricultural management
10 practices. On October 15th, an extremely high number of ignitions was
11 registered (over 500 in a single day), partly attributed to the fact that rain had
12 been forecasted for the next day (Ramos et al., 2023).

13
14 The combination of high wind speeds, exceptionally dry fuel and the extremely
15 high number of ignitions led to the development of multiple mega-fires
16 progressing at very high speeds, with over 10000 ha burned per hour between
17 4pm and 5am of the next day (Castellnou et al., 2018). Some of the most intense
18 fires developed into pyroconvection events that further intensified strong winds
19 and contributed to unpredictable and long-distance fire spread (Castellnou et
20 al., 2018). These pyroconvective events were the largest reported until then in
21 Europe, and the largest globally in that year (Gomes Da Costa et al., 2020). All
22 these elements made fires very difficult to fight and exceeded the response
23 capacity of the Portuguese Civil Protection authorities (Viegas et al., 2019),
24 leading to major losses of infrastructure and human lives.


25
26 Adding to the specific drivers of this event, additional socio-environmental
27 factors contributed to the observed impacts. While being relatively small,
28 Portugal is the country with the highest values of annual burned area in the
29 European Union (Gomes Da Costa et al., 2020), with 97 thousand ha/year on
30 average in the period 2006-2020 (EFFIS, 2024). It is recognized that the
31 predominance of such large and frequent fires in Portugal is explained not only
32 by the occurrence of favourable fire weather conditions, but also by territorial
33 and landscape planning policies (e.g., land ownership), and land-use and
34 demographic changes (e.g. rural abandonment and expansion of the wildland-
35 urban interface) that result in a large extent of poorly managed forests and
36 shrublands, which facilitate the occurrence of very large and uncontrollable fires
37 (Barros and Pereira, 2014; Benali et al., 2021; Fernandes et al., 2016).

38
39 Additionally, underlying socio-environmental factors are likely to have
40 contributed to the high mortality rates. The Portuguese territory is characterised

1 by small villages dispersed in the forested landscape. Traditionally, rural
 2 populations protected their villages from fires with surrounding agricultural
 3 fields, but rural abandonment and aging of the rural population have led the
 4 forest-urban interface closer to rural populations (Rodrigues et al., 2022). The
 5 elderly population in rural areas is especially vulnerable due to reduced mobility
 6 and a potential underestimation of the fire risks under the new landscape
 7 characteristics. In the case of the October 2017 fires, the majority of the victims
 8 were rural inhabitants over 50 years old, many with health and mobility
 9 limitations, who were taken by surprise in their homes (Rodrigues et al., 2022).
 10 Adding to this, no preemptive evacuation measures were carried out by the
 11 Portuguese Civil Protection authorities (Rodrigues et al., 2022), possibly
 12 because of the fast-developing and to some extent surprising nature of the
 13 hydro-meteorological compound event described above. One of the key issues
 14 with potential quantitative frameworks based on a land-surface model would be
 15 to integrate these aspects of social vulnerability to the risk of fire and total
 16 burned areas.

17
 18
 19
 20
 21

d) Attribution of Acqua Alta events and evaluation of adaptation strategies



22
 23 *Figure 5: Partial causality chart for the Acqua Alta Events in Venice modulated*
 24 *by the activation of the MoSE, describing the protocol used by Faranda et al*
 25 *(2023). Many impacts and most of the exposure and vulnerability are not*
 26 *addressed in this study.*

27
 28 **The event and its impacts**

29 Coastal cities, such as Venice, are confronted with escalating climate extremes
 30 that test their urban resilience (Tebaldi et al., 2021). Among these challenges,

1 the prominent issue of flooding stands out, with “Acqua Alta events” describing
2 an exceptionally high tide peak. Acqua Alta events in Venice are primarily
3 triggered by intense extratropical cyclones around the Adriatic Sea, making
4 them a significant concern (Bevacqua et al., 2017; Umgiesser et al., 2021). The
5 rising sea levels caused by human-induced climate change further compound
6 the vulnerability of coastal cities to extratropical cyclones, underscoring the
7 urgency of adaptive measures. Here, we focus on one of those adaptive
8 measures: the Experimental Electromechanical Module (MoSE), an ensemble
9 of mobile barriers that can be activated to mitigate the influx of seawater in the
10 city, in a changing climate. Faranda et al. (2023) attributed the extreme water
11 level in Venice during Acqua Alta events, as well as their economic cost for the
12 city to both the influence of anthropogenic climate change on the weather
13 patterns responsible for those events and the activation of the MoSE. Here, we
14 show how their results can be interpreted to produce a more holistic
15 understanding of the human contribution to impacts through anthropogenic
16 climate change and a technical adaptation strategy, using our framework.

17

18 **Hydro-climatic drivers and role of anthropogenic climate change**

19 This study focuses on four high-impact Acqua Alta incidents — 1966, 2008,
20 2018, and 2019 — that flooded Venice. These events occurred during increased
21 Mediterranean cyclone activity, leading to damage to infrastructure and
22 historical heritage. The complex interplay between these climatic events and
23 the intricate geography of the Venetian lagoon highlights the dynamics of Acqua
24 Alta. Mediterranean cyclones, resulting from interactions between Atlantic low-
25 pressure systems and the Mediterranean Sea, draw energy from the warm
26 basin waters (Lionello et al., 2021). These cyclones intensify Acqua Alta through
27 the convergence of winds and associated storm surge towards the northern
28 Adriatic Sea coast, as well as through higher water levels due to the lowered
29 sea level pressure (barometric pressure effect) (Bevacqua et al., 2017). The
30 synergy between these cyclones and the Adriatic's geographic features
31 magnifies their impact on Venice (Zanchettin et al., 2021).

32

33 To attribute Acqua Alta events, Faranda et al. (2023) employed analogues of
34 atmospheric patterns (Faranda et al., 2022). The study selects distinct periods
35 - [1950-1979], the counterfactual with a lesser influence of anthropogenic
36 climate change, and [1993-2022], the factual with current level of anthropogenic
37 climate change, and identifies analogous atmospheric situations for the four
38 events in both periods. This allows the authors to assess both the change in
39 key variables describing hydroclimatic drivers such as wind and precipitation for
40 similar types of circulation, and the quality of analogues in both periods, i.e.

1 whether this type of weather pattern's frequency is changing. They also used
2 the sea level data in the Venice lagoon (stressor) at the dates of the analogues
3 for both periods to assess the change in sea level and relate it to climate
4 change. With this method both the effect of sea level rise and of changes of
5 weather-related variables are taken into account. An exponential model, based
6 on limited existing data, is used to derive damage based on sea level in Venice.
7 For the 1966 Acqua Alta event they estimated both sea level and damages for
8 both the counterfactual and factual worlds with large uncertainties: 122 cm
9 (uncertainty interval 116-189) and 0.13 (0.09-1800) million euros for the
10 counterfactual world, and 123 cm (107-156) and 0.45 (0.06-28) for the factual
11 world (according to Table 1 of Faranda et al., 2023).

12

13 **Human influence on exposure: the MoSE as an adaptation policy**

14 In this study, the exposure and vulnerability components are limited to the
15 activation (or not) of the MoSE, which does not account for any aspects of social
16 vulnerability. As the MoSE has been activated 40 times since its
17 operationalization in 2019, the authors can evaluate the decrease of sea level
18 in Venice subsequent to its activation. To assess the MoSE system's
19 effectiveness, the study uses sea level data from Punta della Salute (inside the
20 lagoon) and Piattaforma (outside the lagoon) stations to construct two damage
21 statistics. One uses Punta della Salute's MoSE values, while the other employs
22 counterfactual Piattaforma values. This approach factors in Piattaforma's
23 location and feeds it to the damage models.

24

25 Faranda et al. (2023) built a new counterfactual world that corresponds to the
26 factual world with the current climate, 1993-2022 in their study, with the MoSE
27 activated. Additionally, when analysing MoSE-activated statistics, the study
28 substitutes damages with the daily operational cost of MoSE. The authors found
29 that MoSE proves effective against three of the four events—1966, 2008, and
30 2019—highlighting its adaptability (see Table 1 and Figure 3 of Faranda et al.,
31 2023). For the 1966 event, they estimated that the MoSE decreased the sea
32 level to 111cm (59-156) with a cost of 0.25 (0.07-28) millions of euros.


33

34 This study however presents some limitations. While it covers both a part of
35 climate change influence on weather extremes that can lead to Acqua Alta and
36 one potential adaptation strategy, key factors like land subsidence, tidal effects,
37 local precipitation, river discharge, local influences on flooding susceptibility, as
38 well as social vulnerability, including the differentiated impacts the building and
39 activation of the MoSE may have on different populations, are not fully
40 considered. The interaction between land subsidence, climate-induced sea

1 level rise, and other local dynamics necessitates comprehensive analysis
 2 beyond this study's scope (Ferrarin et al., 2022). Many counterfactual worlds
 3 would have to be designed to better encompass human factors. Another
 4 limitation of this study is its focus on a single technical solution for adaptation,
 5 without exploring other options, which could be nature-based (Sudmeier-Rieux
 6 et al., 2021) or human-centered (Hore Katherine et al., 2020; Lewis and
 7 Kelman, 2012).

8
 9

e) The 2020 California drought and the FIRO system



10
 11

12 *Figure 6: Partial causality chart for the 2020 California drought modulated by*
 13 *the use of the FIRO system. Here, we only discuss how to achieve a quantitative*
 14 *attribution of stressors, not impacts, and the causality chains inside the red box.*
 15 *Many impacts and most of the exposure and vulnerability are not addressed in*
 16 *this study.*

17

18 **The event and its impacts**

19 Since 2010, California has had two major drought events: in 2012-2016
 20 and more recently in 2020-2022. From 2012 to 2016, California experienced
 21 one of its deepest, longest, and warmest droughts in history, with a return period
 22 estimated at one in 1,200 years (Lund et al., 2018). The 2012-2016 drought was
 23 responsible for a reduction in snowpack and streamflow leading to vegetation
 24 stress and a deficit in hydroelectric power production, wildfires, and water
 25 shortages for rural drinking water supplies, agriculture, and cities. Overall, the
 26 drought caused billions of dollars in economic losses (Lund et al., 2018). More
 27 recently, the three-year period that started in 2020 was among the driest and
 28 hottest in California since 1895 (Medellín-Azuara, 2022). In addition, low
 29 precipitation and above-normal temperatures resulted in higher
 30 evapotranspiration, which decreased water availability and increased the water

1 demand from agriculture, ecosystems and communities (Medellín-Azuara,
2 2022). The reduction in crop production during these 3 years of drought caused
3 gross farm revenue losses estimated at \$3 billion. The food industry also
4 incurred large impacts with revenues declining by 7.8% and an estimated
5 12,000 agricultural jobs lost in 2022 (Medellín-Azuara, 2022).

6 In this context, several measures of adaptation were proposed or
7 introduced during the 2012-2016 drought (e.g. Delaney et al., 2020; Flint et al.,
8 2018). In this case study we focus on how one of those adaptation measures
9 applied to a subsequent drought from 2020-2022 affected water withdrawals
10 and use, with a focus on 2020.

11 **Hydro-climatic drivers and role of anthropogenic climate change**

12 Both droughts developed due to a precipitation deficit, one of the main
13 hydroclimatic drivers in this case, amplified by the gradual background warming
14 from anthropogenic climate forcing, thus implicating anthropogenic climate
15 change as a driver of increased drought risk in the region (e.g. Williams, 2020;
16 Williams et al., 2015; Diffenbaugh et al., 2015; Swain et al., 2014).
17 Mediterranean climates, like that found in the western U.S. state of California,
18 are sensitive to droughts caused by hot and dry conditions (e.g. Cheng et al.,
19 2016; Diffenbaugh et al., 2015). Although California's climate is inherently
20 variable, recently California has been experiencing increasing hydrological
21 extremes, including droughts (DeFlorio et al., 2024). The severity of these
22 extremes is predicted to increase with climate change, with high uncertainties
23 on the average precipitation trends (Bevacqua et al., 2022; Gershunov et al.,
24 2019, 2017; Swain et al., 2018).

25
26
27 While there have been a few EEA studies on different subperiods of the 2012-
28 2016 drought, with mixed results depending on how the attribution question was
29 framed and which models were used (e.g. Diffenbaugh et al., 2015; Funk et al.,
30 2014; Shukla et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2017; Lehner et al., 2018). A NOAA
31 report concluded that the precipitation deficit during the 2020-2021 drought
32 "appears to have been largely due to natural, but unfavourable, variations in the
33 atmosphere and ocean" (Mankin et al., 2021). Hoell (2022) however found at a
34 larger scale that climate change has increased the risk for the record low
35 American Southwest precipitation in June-September 2020, with low
36 confidence due to model biases and no significant observed trends. Seager et
37 al. (2022) also concluded about the 2020 drought that "there is also evidence
38 that the southern part of the region in spring is drying due to human-driven
39 climate change", but this statement refers to the desert southwest, rather than
40 Northern California rainfall which controls most of California's water availability.

1 In addition, Paciorek and Wehner (2024) found that the significance of observed
2 drying trends in the southwest is likely overstated, highlighting the difficulty to
3 distinguish any trends in California meteorological drought from natural
4 variability. New studies related to the “pattern effect”, however, suggest that
5 anthropogenic forcing has at least contributed to the recent precipitation decline
6 over the Southwest (Kuo et al., 2023).

7
8 However, precipitation may not be the best proxy to evaluate the influence of
9 climate change on California droughts. Seager et al (2015) concluded for the
10 2011-2014 California drought “a long-term warming trend likely contributed to
11 surface moisture deficits during the drought”. In other words, while there is no
12 clear influence of climate change on meteorological drought, the influence on
13 agricultural drought is significant due to increases in evapotranspiration in a
14 warmer climate. Presumably, this leads to increases in hydrological drought as
15 runoff is lower when soils are drier and have more capacity to store incoming
16 precipitation (Sumargo et al., 2021).

17 18 19 **Human influence on exposure: the FIRO program as an adaptation policy**


20 The Forecast Informed Reservoir Operations (FIRO) program was first
21 conceived during the 2012-2016 drought. In response, Federal, State and local
22 agencies initiated a Research and Operations Partnership with the University
23 of California to investigate the viability of using forecasts to enable more efficient
24 use of available storage. The pilot project was Lake Mendocino, a reservoir with
25 a maximum storage of 111,000 acre-feet in the upper Russian River watershed
26 in coastal northern California. The overarching goal of FIRO at Lake Mendocino
27 is to apply forecasting advances to increase water supply reliability without
28 reducing—and even potentially enhancing—flood protection capacity and
29 downstream flows for ecosystem services (Wilson et al., 2022). The main
30 strategy in terms of the forecast was to evaluate and improve the understanding
31 and prediction of atmospheric rivers (Ralph et al., 2020), since these features
32 contribute up to 50% of the state’s annual precipitation (Dettinger et al., 2011).

33 In this case study, we focus on the adaptation, enabled by the viability
34 assessment (Jasperse et al., 2020), of adding flexibility to reservoir operating
35 procedures to increase water availability, thereby building an adaptation
36 counterfactual. The stressor is the water level in Lake Mendocino (Figure 6).
37 We present two versions of the water storage levels in the first FIRO pilot
38 reservoir, one with the extra storage enabled by FIRO (factual) and another with
39 the reservoir being managed to its previously mandated storage limits
40 (counterfactual). To construct the counterfactual, we limit the storage to the

1 mandated level during the cool season when water input is provided from
2 atmospheric rivers. We do not attempt to reproduce the periods when the
3 reservoir would have gone above the mandated storage level until it was safe
4 to release water downstream. When the mandated storage level begins to rise,
5 we calculate the water level based on the prior water level in the counterfactual,
6 and then the change (plus or minus) of the observed storage. Through
7 investigating both scenarios, we quantify the tangible benefit of FIRO as an
8 adaptation strategy against the ever-increasing water availability challenges in
9 California.

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17 *Figure 7: Storage and guide curves for Lake Mendocino during Water Year*
18 *2020, illustrating the factual (actual storage using the FIRO-enabled deviation*
19 *(blue dashed line)) in the black curve, and the counterfactual (storage if the*



1 *reservoir had been managed to the existing guide curve (grey dashed line)) in*
 2 *the orange curve.*

3

4 In the case of Lake Mendocino, FIRO provides better water availability
 5 outcomes in both drought years and flood years as well as additional flood
 6 protection. The water saved through the use of a major deviation, requested as
 7 a result of the positive FIRO viability assessment, was close to 20% in water
 8 year 2020 (Fig 6).

9

10 Based on these first results, such a model could be used to compare Lake
 11 Mendocino storage, with and without FIRO (as shown here), and with and
 12 without climate change. In order to do so, a counterfactual world with reduced
 13 greenhouse gases and aerosol emissions could generate counterfactual
 14 temperature, precipitation and evaporation that could be translated into
 15 streamflows, to test if there is a significant change in inflows to Lake Mendocino
 16 related to climate change. Counterfactual worlds with higher concentrations of
 17 greenhouse gases could also be tested to assess whether the FIRO system will
 18 be robust to higher warming. These tests could be done using the framework
 19 we described here with synthetic forecasts as described in Brodeur et al. (2024).
 20 This type of approach is symmetric to the one described in the previous case
 21 study, as it would build on an approach tailored to compare worlds with and

1 without an adaptation measure and add the anthropogenic climate change
2 component. A limit is that it still covers only a small techno-centric part of
3 adaptation options and does not take into account social and environmental
4 vulnerabilities (Hore et al., 2020; Lewis and Kelman, 2012).

5 6 7 4) Discussion

8
9 The case studies detailed above show several directions in which our
10 framework could be used to expand extreme event attribution. We hope that
11 this framework could help to shed light on shifting spaces for action in disaster
12 risk reduction through the exploration of different causal drivers corresponding
13 to different adaptation strategies to prevent the most adverse impacts of
14 extreme weather events. It could also help to disentangle better how the non-
15 stationarity of climate change interacts with the non-stationarity of vulnerability
16 and exposure to modify the impacts of extreme weather events.

17
18 While this framework is promising, it is also ambitious as it is accompanied by
19 three main limitations (which, however, also apply to any study of climate
20 impacts). The first limitation is the lack of observed impact, vulnerability,
21 exposure, and adaptation data. The availability of this data is typically not
22 homogeneous in space and time, and is often not free to access, or is held
23 under confidentiality clauses. Data limitations are particularly problematic in
24 most vulnerable countries and for some health data such as mortality or
25 hospitalisation data. Ongoing data collection and availability of vulnerability,
26 exposure, adaptation and impact data in socio-economic and socio-ecological
27 systems is thus of crucial importance. There is also a potentially large
28 opportunity to tap into Earth observation data to assess exposure to support
29 attribution, for example night-light data (Ceola et al., 2014).

30
31 The second hurdle is the readiness of impact models and how much we can
32 rely on them to test the effect of different counterfactuals on impacts. Available
33 process-based impact models could be used for this purpose. It is noteworthy
34 that so far, the attribution part of the ISIMIP project – a flagship project of impact
35 attribution – focuses on the attribution to climate change only (Mengel et al.,
36 2021). Provided large enough datasets, quantification could also be achieved
37 through the application of causal theory, for example using graphical models for
38 causal discovery (Ebert-Uphoff and Deng, 2012).

1 The case studies on the Acqua Alta and on the FIRO system suggest that
2 simple models can evaluate the influence of two different adaptation strategies
3 on the water level in Venice during a flood and on the water level in the
4 Mendocino reservoir during a drought, with suggestions on how to also include
5 counterfactual events not affected by climate change. The models however
6 explore technological adaptation options. Including social vulnerability metrics,
7 the distribution of inequalities, the spatial distribution of sociodemographic
8 segments of the population, and evaluating the effect of public policies on the
9 way some population segments disproportionately suffer from impactful events
10 would require different databases and more complex models. Agent-based
11 models, for example, have been used to differentiate effects of climate change
12 and different policies on people's adaptation behaviour and impacts in scenario
13 analysis (e.g. Wens et al., 2021), but they could equally well be applied for event
14 attribution.

15

16 The third issue is the definition of pertinent factual and counterfactual worlds.
17 While the counterfactual is straightforward in the case of specific adaptation
18 systems as the ones described in two of our case studies, it is more challenging
19 to evaluate potential maladaptation. For example, while it is possible to use a
20 coupled vegetation model to evaluate the influence of the choice of crops on
21 crop yield during droughts or of the choice of trees on burned areas, the choice
22 of the relevant type of crops or trees to test is more subjective. Another
23 challenge for the definition of counterfactuals stems from the complexity of the
24 possibly many interactions between drivers, exposure, vulnerability and
25 stressors. For example, climate change, elevated CO₂ and land use all
26 contribute to fuel changes. A way to proceed could be to define these
27 counterfactuals in partnership with involved stakeholders depending on which
28 levers of action they would like to explore. Defining pertinent counterfactuals
29 will be key to make the findings of studies using our framework policy-relevant
30 and help to build scientifically informed adaptation policies.

31

32 We acknowledge that the attribution of disasters is complex and that it has moral
33 and political consequences, as it may be used as a way to attribute
34 responsibilities (Lahsen and Ribot, 2022). There is no "one frame fits all" to
35 those problems, and the frame presented here might also participate in
36 inadvertently concealing some aspects leading to disasters, since we can only
37 explore a limited number of counterfactual worlds and focus on a limited number
38 of causes of the disasters. However, we believe that our proposed approach
39 would address the limitations of EEA pointed out by Lahsen and Ribot (2022),

1 Hulme et al. (2014; 2011), and Olsson et al. (2022), especially for studies that
2 are heavily publicised in general media, and picked up by decision-makers.

3
4 It is important to recognize that the type of scientific products we deploy as
5 scientists can serve multiple political agendas. Because EEA has been thought
6 of as a branch of science to inform society, it is paramount to acknowledge the
7 ethical and political ramifications of advertising this type of scientific product as
8 a key to provide climate justice. While climate-centric attribution might be helpful
9 in some contexts to unveil the changes in the distribution and intensity of
10 extreme hazards, and to highlight the inequalities between vulnerable countries
11 not responsible for the emissions and historical emitters, it might end up
12 hampering vulnerability reduction in others, which has been shown to be a
13 crucial driver to reduce impacts (e.g. Kreibich et al., 2017b for floods). EEA
14 cannot be thought of as a depoliticizing tool (Allen, 2003; Hulme et al., 2011;
15 Olsson et al., 2022), as it might be used as a political tool to shift the debate
16 towards hazard-driven disaster risk reduction. Paradoxically, by pushing for a
17 climate justice agenda, extreme event attribution might participate in
18 strengthening the focus on the hazard part of disasters and be blind to long time
19 social conflicts surrounding disaster reduction to focus disaster risk reduction
20 around social vulnerabilities (Grant et al., 2015; Hulme et al., 2011; Lahsen and
21 Ribot, 2022).

22
23 We hope that the framework proposed in this paper can help to start bridging
24 the gap between the EEA and the DRR communities. This will require
25 interdisciplinary work between experts in climate attribution and experts in
26 attribution of catastrophes to other human activities.

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