Sybil Attack Strikes Again: Denying Content Access in IPFS with a Single Computer
Abstract
The Distributed Hash Table (DHT) architecture is known to be a very efficient way to implement peer-to-peer (P2P) computer networks. However, the scientific literature also proved that DHT functioning in P2P networks can be easily disrupted by a single entity controlling many peers, known as the Sybil Attack. Various defensive mechanisms are known to prevent such attacks, or at least hinder them. The current study evaluates the resiliency of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) P2P network to a legacy Sybil Attack. We show that, surprisingly, IPFS does not implement basic defense mechanisms, allowing the most simple attack from a single computer to easily take the control of any DHT entry. A practical use of this attack is to almost entirely deny access to a given content on the network. Thus we provide some recommendations to quickly remediate this vulnerability.
Domains
Computer Science [cs]
Fichier principal
sybil-attack-IPFS.pdf (493.47 Ko)
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pres_ARES_sybil_attack_IPFS.pdf (988.8 Ko)
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