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Computational Differential Privacy for Encrypted Databases Supporting Linear Queries

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ABSTRACT

Differential privacy is a fundamental concept for protecting individual privacy in databases while enabling data analysis. Conceptually, it is assumed that the adversary has no direct access to the database, and therefore, encryption is not necessary. However, with the emergence of cloud computing and the «on-cloud» storage of vast databases potentially contributed by multiple parties, it is becoming increasingly necessary to consider the possibility of the adversary having (at least partial) access to sensitive databases. A consequence is that, to protect the on-line database, it is now necessary to employ encryption. At PoPETs'19, it was the first time that the notion of differential privacy was considered for encrypted databases, but only for a limited type of query, namely histograms. Subsequently, a new type of query, summation, was considered at CODASPY'22. These works achieve statistical differential privacy, *by still assuming that the adversary has no access to the encrypted database.*

In this paper, we take an essential step further by assuming that the adversary can eventually access the encrypted data, making it impossible to achieve statistical differential privacy because the security of encryption (beyond the one-time pad) relies on computational assumptions. Therefore, the appropriate privacy notion for encrypted databases that we target is computational differential privacy, which was introduced by Beimel et al. at CRYPTO '08. In our work, we focus on the case of functional encryption, which is an extensively studied primitive permitting some authorized computation over encrypted data.

Technically, we show that any randomized functional encryption scheme that satisfies simulation-based security and differential privacy of the output can achieve computational differential privacy for multiple queries to one database. Our work also extends the summation query to a much broader range of queries, specifically linear queries, by utilizing inner-product functional encryption. Hence, we provide an instantiation for inner-product functionalities by proving its simulation soundness and present a concrete randomized inner-product functional encryption with computational

differential privacy against multiple queries. In terms of efficiency, our protocol is almost as practical as the underlying inner product functional encryption scheme. As evidence, we provide a full benchmark, based on our concrete implementation for databases with up to 1 000 000 entries. Our work can be considered as a step towards achieving privacy-preserving encrypted databases for a wide range of query types and considering the involvement of multiple database owners.

KEYWORDS

Encrypted databases, Differential privacy, Functional encryption.

1 INTRODUCTION

Differential privacy is a data analysis paradigm proposed by Dwork *et al.* in [19, 21] to guarantee the privacy of individuals. In broad terms, the objective is to ensure that the presence or not of an individual's data in a database does not significantly impact the results of a data analysis. This is done by blurring the results with some noise, all the while having a precise notion of the trade-off between privacy of the individual and accuracy of the data analysis. To implement this, the concept of *privacy mechanism* is used: a randomized algorithm that takes as input a database and some query and outputs a string. The objective is for this output to be a noisy statistic, where some noise has been added to the real value such that the distributions of the output from the mechanism applied to two databases differing in only one individual are very close. The usefulness of this concept can be seen in the vast amount of academic literature written on the topic (according to the recent survey in [17] over 200 variants of the concept have been proposed so far). On top of that, it is also already deployed in real life applications: examples include the US Census Bureau [14] supporting analysis on travel patterns through their *OnTheMap* project [32], Google training next-word prediction models [42], or Microsoft collecting telemetry data privately [18]. Despite the obvious interest in the discipline, there are still some largely unexplored areas, e.g. its interaction with encryption, the potential limitation of an adversary's computational power or even a wider range of privacy mechanisms.

This paradigm was conceptualized to be used in a setting where a database owner who is storing a database wants to release some privacy preserving statistics to untrusted analysts. As such, it was

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defined as a *statistical* property, i.e., that holds even against a computationally unbounded adversary. However, due to the recent rise in popularity of cloud computing and especially cloud storage of vast databases, this model is today not sufficient to deal with all practical cases. What if the data owner wants to delegate the storage to an external cloud storage service (mainly for cost reasons) while permitting untrusted analysts to make queries?

Differential privacy and encrypted database. To better handle these situations, the concept of encrypted private databases has been introduced by Agarwal *et al.* in [4], where the database owner and the database holder (the cloud storage server) need not be the same entity. In this case, the first step consists, for the data owner, in encrypting its database before sending it to the storage server. Then, when an external analyst wants to ask a query to the database, it negotiates with the database owner for a token which can be used with the storage server to obtain a noisy (differentially private) response without further need of the database owner, as can be seen in the diagram of Fig. 1. As a concrete example of the utility of such a model, already highlighted in [4], the US Census Bureau could securely outsource the storage and management of its *On-The-Map* data to an external cloud (AWS, GoogleCloud, etc.), while maintaining the ability for analysts to perform private data analysis over it. More generically, this model is useful for entities looking to outsource their data to some external and untrusted clouds, like SMEs (small medium enterprises) or local/national authorities that do not have such a storage infrastructure.

However, Agarwal *et al.*, and the subsequent works on the subject [9], rely on standard (statistical) differential privacy arguments, needing to make the assumption that the untrusted analyst has no direct access to the encrypted database.

We take an essential step by assuming that a malicious adversary could potentially gain access to such an encrypted database, for instance, by colluding with the storage server. In fact, if the adversary is not allowed to access the encrypted data, then the encryption serves little purpose. In this scenario we consider that the privacy mechanism we need to evaluate through differential privacy must output all the information accessible by such a colluding adversary: the encrypted database, the access token and the noisy response. Coming back to the US Census Bureau use case, it would be inappropriate to assume that there cannot be an internal threat to the storage cloud, an attack on the cloud’s servers, or even an agreement between the cloud provider and an outside actor to obtain more information than what has been authorized by the US Census Bureau. This need is all the more important in the case of an SME which, by this means, has stored sensitive data that it does not wish to see divulged to a competitor.

However, encryption schemes (beyond the one-time pad) are only proven secure against computational adversaries. Therefore, when targeting adversaries with access to the encrypted database, the mechanism, whose output contains the encrypted database, cannot be differentially private in the statistical sense. To address this, our solution is to constrain us to the computational approach to differential privacy for our mechanism and use a noisy response that satisfies differential privacy as a building block to prove computational differential privacy of our mechanism.




Figure 1: Diagram of interactions.

A database owner wants to outsource a database to a (honest but curious) server so that private data analysis can still be performed on it. As such, an encrypted database is sent to the server (step 1), and when an analyst wants to perform a query over the database, some negotiation takes place with the database owner which results in a token being received by the analyst (step 2). This token enables the analyst in conjunction with the server to obtain a differentially private noisy response (step 3).

To ensure the security and privacy of this model, we rely on a two-party adversary composed of (1) the analyst who can choose which queries to ask and (2) the server who can answer requests from the analyst without having access to the database but only with access to the encrypted database and functional keys. This two-party adversary, rather than a single adversary integrating both functionalities, matches the real-world example given in Figure 1, while a single adversary may be relevant in cases where the delegation of the encrypted data does not appear.

Computational Differential Privacy. The concept of computational differential privacy, introduced by Beimel *et al.* in [10] and Mironov *et al.* in [35], has been extensively used in private multi-party computation, i.e., differentially private data analysis over a database owned by more than one entity. The main interest is that in such setting, it gives much more useful mechanisms than using statistical differential privacy. Indeed, the required noise scales at a much lower rate with the number of clients in the multi-party setting [33]. However, in the so-called “client-server” setting, where there is only one database owner, the situation has been less studied, and is not so clear. It was shown by Bun *et al.* in [13] that there exists a task for which there is a computationally differentially private mechanism but any statistically differentially private mechanism will forcibly be inefficient. More recently, Ghazi *et al.* showed in [24] that there exists a non-natural task using strong cryptographic assumptions for which a computationally differentially private mechanism exists but has no statistically differentially private mechanism.

In the domain of computation over encrypted data, three main paradigms exist: multi-party computation (MPC), fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and functional encryption. MPC addresses the most general form of computation, but it has the shortcoming of requiring a high level of interactions between the parties. This requirement is not practical for specific types of queries on a database. The problem with FHE is that decrypting a ciphertext provides “all or nothing” information. Consequently, when responding to queries from an analyst, the database owner must be the one to recover the encrypted database from the server, decrypt it and compute the corresponding noisy result for each query and send it to the analyst. Then there will need to be interaction between the server and database owner for every query while being no meaningful interaction between the server and the analyst. This violates the requirement to achieve independence for the database owner from interacting with the server for each query from the analyst. For a more detailed discussion see Appendix C. Hence, our idea is to study the case of (randomized) functional encryption, which seems to be the most appropriate in the setting given by Figure 1.

Randomized functional encryption. Functional encryption is a cryptographic concept in which any user in possession of a ciphertext, related to a plain message x , and a functional key sk_f for a function f , can obtain in clear the evaluation $f(x)$. In our context, we only need secret-key functional encryption as the database owner manages both the encryption and the key generation processes in contrast to public-key functional encryption where anyone can encrypt messages.

In the case of randomized functional encryption, the function f could be probabilistic, which permits us, in our setting, to manage the noise inherent to differential privacy. Such possibility was first defined by Alwen *et al.* in [8] and Goyal *et al.* in [26] to extend the concepts of functional encryption towards randomized functionalities. More specifically, a randomized functional encryption scheme takes a description of a randomized (probabilistic) function over a plaintext and randomness space, and generates a functional decryption key. When a ciphertext is decrypted with this functional key an evaluation of the probabilistic function is obtained, with different randomness for different ciphertexts. In the diagram in Fig. 1, what we propose is that the database is encrypted using randomized functional encryption (step 1), and the negotiation between the Database Owner and the Analyst involves the former computing a functional key for the latter (step 2). With this key and a query made to the Server, the Analyst can obtain statistical information of the database with some differential private noise, using the functional decryption procedure (step 3).

More specifically, Goyal *et al.* in [26] give an instantiation for randomized functional encryption for polynomial-sized circuits which was then used by Garg *et al.* in [23] to construct fully secure functional encryption for all circuits, based on multilinear maps. These works were furthered by Komargodski *et al.* in [30] and Agrawal and Wu in [7] where they give a generic transformation to transform any deterministic functional encryption to a randomized version, the former in the secret-key setting and the latter in the public-key setting. Those three works [7, 26, 30] mention that randomized functional encryption could be used to perform (computational) differentially private analysis on sensitive data, but

fail to give a formal analysis of this extension. In this work, we provide a formal analysis.

1.1 Our Contributions

Given the preceding context and motivations, we present four main contributions in this paper regarding randomized functional encryption and its relation to differential privacy.

1. *An efficient randomized inner product functional encryption scheme.* In Section 4, we give an instantiation for randomized inner product functional encryption, and we prove its simulation soundness for one ciphertext. Our construction is based on any generic (deterministic) inner product functional encryption scheme used as a black-box and uses any generic probability distribution.

2. *A generic transformation from randomized functional encryption to a differentially private mechanism.* In Section 3, we provide a differentially private mechanism in the context of an encrypted static database which uses a generic randomized functional encryption scheme. We give a reduction from the computational differential privacy of the randomized functional encryption scheme to the computational differential privacy of the output. The definition of the privacy mechanism allows us to prove this privacy against a possible collusion between the analyst and the server in contrast to previous proposals. This result formalizes and proves the intuition given in [26] about the relation between randomized functional encryption and computational differential privacy.

3. *A new formalization for private functional encryption.* In Section 2.4, we present a new formalization for differentially private encrypted databases based on functional encryption schemes. Focusing on static databases, we give formal correctness and security notions, taking into account the collusion between an honest-but-curious server and a malicious analyst.

4. *A computationally differential private encrypted database supporting linear queries.* We provide a solution for computationally differentially private encrypted database supporting linear queries, which is the main objective of this work. To achieve it, we apply the result from Section 3 (computational differential privacy for generic randomized functional encryption) and Section 4 (instantiation of randomized inner product functional encryption scheme) to obtain a private inner-product functional encryption scheme as formalized in Section 2.4. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal of an encrypted database supporting several inner product differentially private queries and collusion between a malicious analyst and server.

Finally, we provide an implementation of the scheme, proving its practical efficiency for databases with up to 1 000 000 entries.

1.2 Related Works and Comparisons

The first encrypted and private database was proposed by Agarwal *et al.* in [4]. They proposed a solution for histogram queries based on several differentially private encrypted counters under continuous observations, one per bin of the histogram. This result is based on the work by Chan *et al.* [15] which is instantiated making use of structured encryption. In general terms, a differentially private counter was instantiated for each of the bins of the histogram and

encrypted through homomorphic encryption while the structured encryption scheme is used by the database owner to be able to curate the database.

The second one is a proposal by Bakas *et al.* in [9] which instantiates a summation of vector coordinates for a database under continuous observation. For that, they use a private counter in each coordinate using homomorphic encryption, and for a subset of coordinates being added their corresponding keys are added to generate the access token. Regarding the privacy mechanism, they use similar methods to [4] but only encrypt a counting mechanism for each coefficient, without making use of structured encryption, which no longer allows the database owner to curate the database.

In comparison to those two works, we enhance the state of the art in this domain as follows. Firstly we give a concrete scheme for the larger family of linear queries. Linear queries and how to secure databases under them has been a well studied subject [31, 40]. The most notable cases are predicate counting queries (e.g. histograms, marginal queries and group-by queries) and weighted sum queries (e.g. weighted averages, differences and evaluation of linear regression models). Secondly, through our mechanism definition comprising the encrypted database and the use of computational differential privacy we are able to guarantee the privacy of the database even when the analyst colludes with a dishonest server and therefore has access to the database. Finally, we use the fact that our randomized inner product functional encryption scheme is constructed from a non-randomized encryption scheme to give the database owner the ability to curate the database.

A summary is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison with related works on differential privacy in encrypted databases.

Proposal	Query type	Access to DB (via collusion)	DP type
[4]	Histogram	✗	Statistical
[9]	Summation	✗	Statistical
Our work	Inner product	✓	Computational

1.3 Organisation

In Section 2, we provide the formalizations of the considered primitives. In Section 3 we give the generic result of computational differential privacy for randomized functional encryption. In Section 4 we present our randomized inner product instantiation and prove its correctness and security. In Section 5 we present our proposal for computationally differentially private encrypted database supporting linear queries. In Section 6 we give some more concrete results and the implementation of our proposals. Finally, in Section 7 we give some discussions for future works.

2 FORMALIZATIONS

In this section we will recall the classical definitions and introduce our new definitions.

2.1 Notations

One-dimensional elements (such as those in $\mathcal{X}, \mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{G} \dots$) will be noted as lower-case letters (x, y, \dots), while multi-dimensional elements (such as those in $\mathcal{X}^\ell, \mathbb{Z}^\ell, \mathbb{G}^\ell \dots$) will use bold lower-case letters ($\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \dots$). For a natural number $q > 0$ we denote as $[q]$ the set $\{1, \dots, q\}$. Let D be a probability distribution, $x \leftarrow D$ means the element x is sampled from the distribution D , while for any set \mathcal{Y} , $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{Y}$ means that y is sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{Y} . Finally, a function f is said to be *negligible* over n ($f = \text{negl}(n)$) if for all $k \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$, there exists $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ such that for any $n > n_0$, $|f(n)| < 1/n^k$.

2.2 Differential Privacy

Differential privacy is a private data mechanism property first proposed by Dwork *et al.* in [19, 21] as a way to guarantee in a precise manner the privacy for the data of an individual in a pool of data. In broad terms, the way this is ensured is by adding some noise to the statistic computed over the dataset in such a way that the probability of getting the same result with two different databases (one with the individual's data and one without) is essentially the same. This notion of privacy soon became the main paradigm, and more than 200 variants have been defined since then, as by the survey made by Desfontaines and Pejó in [17].

A basic concept needed to properly define differential privacy is that of neighbourhood between databases. This concept specifically delineates what is the difference in the database between adding an individual's data or not. In our case we will say that two databases are *neighbouring* if their ℓ_1 distance is at most one. The standard definition for this property is (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy for static databases as stated below. In this work we will constrain ourselves to the study of static databases. From this section onward we will consider \mathcal{X} to be a database space, \mathcal{R} to be a randomness space, \mathcal{S} to be an output space contained in the multidimensional real numbers and \mathcal{F} a family of deterministic functions $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ representing the queries to obtain the plain statistics.

The original definition is statistical, in the sense that it takes into account the distribution of all possible outputs, however, when trying to combine them with cryptographic concepts, we find that this would correspond to playing against computationally unbounded adversaries. As such, combination of these more statistical (and more standard) variants of differential privacy with well-known cryptographic primitives and methods proves to be sometimes unfeasible and/or unrealistic. Therefore it is natural to consider relaxations on the definition of differential privacy to allow for bounding the adversary to being computationally efficient. This is what Mironov *et al.* proposed in [35], which we adapt to our needs.

Definition 2.1 (Adapted from Definition 3, [35]). Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ be a security parameter, Q be an integer and $\mathcal{M} : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ a randomized algorithm. Then, for a stateful PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} the attack game works as follows. The challenger \mathcal{C} selects a bit $b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ and proceeds with experiment b (Figure 2) where the oracle $O(x_b, \cdot)$ denotes the evaluation of the mechanism $\mathcal{M}(x_b, \cdot; r)$ for some $r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$.

We say that \mathcal{M} provides (Q, ϵ_κ) -indistinguishable computational differential privacy $((Q, \epsilon_\kappa)$ -IND-CDP) if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}

Figure 2: Experiment b for (Q, ϵ_κ) -IND-CDP.**Experiment b :**

-
- 1: $(x_0, x_1, \text{st}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\kappa)$ with $x_0, x_1 \in \mathcal{X}$ neighbouring
 - 2: $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O(x_b, \cdot)}(\text{st})$

Output: \tilde{b}

limited to accessing $O(Q)$ times the following advantage is negligible

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{M, Q}(\mathcal{A}) = \left| \Pr \left[\tilde{b} = 1 \mid b = 0 \right] - e^{\epsilon_\kappa} \cdot \Pr \left[\tilde{b} = 1 \mid b = 1 \right] \right|.$$

There are several changes from Definition 3 in [35]. First of all, we have adapted the definition of randomized function to be in line with the standard in randomized functional encryption, and as such have added the specific randomness seed as an input. Secondly, we have explicitly added which query $f \in \mathcal{F}$ the mechanism \mathcal{M} is protecting. This is also for ease of notation further down the line, when considering several different queries and relating to the key generation in the randomized functional encryption scheme. Also, the inequality has been rewritten as an advantage to ease the connection with the advantages from encryption schemes. Apart from this, we also consider a PPT adversary instead of a Turing machine with polynomial sized advice string since, as mentioned before, the computational power of the adversary needs to be the same when considering privacy as when considering security. Finally, despite the fact that we could consider the query space as \mathcal{F}^Q to expand to handling Q queries, we are interested in allowing for adaptivity in the choice of query for the adversary. As such, we have considered a stateful adversary.

There is one important thing to note about this definition. Were the adversary \mathcal{A} allowed to be computationally unbounded, then this only says that for any fixed κ the mechanism \mathcal{M} is $(\epsilon_\kappa, \delta_\kappa)$ -DP for a negligible δ_κ and any set of Q queries. This means that any mechanism that satisfies $(\epsilon_\kappa, \delta_\kappa)$ -DP for all sets of Q queries and δ_κ negligible on κ , will also satisfy ϵ_κ -IND-CDP.

Note that to prove a one-query mechanism adaptive for several queries in statistical differential privacy, the property of sequential composition is required, which is claimed to hold for computational differential privacy [35]. In our case, since we will be reducing the computational differential privacy of the randomized functional encryption scheme to the statistical differential privacy of the output, the adaptivity of this output guarantees the adaptivity of the scheme.

2.3 Randomized Functional Encryption

Given that our objective is to mix functional encryption with differential privacy (which inherently uses randomness to blur the information) it is clear that we need to introduce some randomness into the functional encryption. To do so, we will follow the paradigm set by Goyal *et al.* in [26] for general randomized functional encryption. In this section we will consider \mathcal{X} to be a database space, \mathcal{R} to be a randomness space, \mathcal{S} to be an output space and \mathcal{F} a family of randomized (probabilistic) functions $f : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$, where $r \in \mathcal{R}$ is understood as the seed for the probabilistic sampling of the randomized function f and as such, as true randomness completely unknown to the adversary. The reason for this is to be

able to ensure that for any database $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $f(x; r)$ is computed always with the same random seed, otherwise the security could be compromised by sampling the random function with multiple different seeds using an averaging attack. We will focus on the secret key variant of randomized functional encryption, which is defined as follows.

Definition 2.2 (Adapted from Section 2, [26]). Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter. We define a *secret-key randomized functional encryption scheme* supporting the family of randomized functions \mathcal{F} the following tuple of PPT algorithms:

- $\text{SetUp}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$: given the security parameter and family of functions as an input, it outputs some public parameters param and a master secret key msk . We will assume the public parameters as inputs in all other algorithms.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$: given the master secret key msk and some plaintext $x \in \mathcal{X}$ as inputs, it outputs a ciphertext c_x .
- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f)$: given the master secret key msk and a description of the randomized function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ as inputs, it outputs a functional key sk_f .
- $\text{Dec}(c_x, sk_f)$: a deterministic algorithm that given a ciphertext c_x and a functional key sk_f as inputs, it outputs a string s .

There is a correctness notion linked to this definition of encryption scheme, however it is not as straightforward as in standard functional encryption due to the randomization of the output. Because of this, we need to assure the computational indistinguishability of the output string from the Dec algorithm with the functionality output. Our definition is as follows.

Definition 2.3. Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter and $\text{RFE} = (\text{SetUp}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$ be a secret-key randomized functional encryption scheme supporting the family of randomized functions \mathcal{F} . We say it is *correct* if for any plaintext x and any set of functions $f^1, \dots, f^Q \in \mathcal{F}$ the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

- $\mathbf{Real}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F}) := \{s^i \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_x, sk_{f^i})\}_{i \in [Q]}$, where $(\text{param}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}(1^\kappa)$, $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$, $sk_{f^i} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f^i)$ for all $i \in [Q]$.
- $\mathbf{Ideal}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F}) := \{f^i(x; r^i)\}_{i \in [Q]}$ where $r^i \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$.

This definition differs from the one in [26] because it is stated for only one plaintext instead of several. The difference lies in the fact that their constructions are both for several simultaneous plaintexts and in the public key setting so the adversary can obtain as many ciphertexts as it wants. By considering several plaintexts in the definition it ensures that the randomness in the output is independent for different ciphertexts and different functional keys. More specifically, it is required that for one same functional key, different ciphertexts give independent outputs and analogously for one functional key and several ciphertexts. Also note that simply having some randomness in both encryption and key generation does not satisfy the condition since they could simply not be used for the randomness in the output. The encryption scheme of our proposal in Section 4 is an example of this behaviour.

However, in this work we are interested in the case of randomized functional encryption as a means of constructing a differentially

private mechanism supporting several queries to one database and we are in the secret key setting. As such, it makes sense to consider this relaxation of the definition so as to allow solutions which do not have independent noise for different ciphertexts, since we will only be considering one.

In case of security definitions, the same distinction between selective and adaptive adversaries can be done in the randomized setting as in the deterministic one, as well as both the indistinguishability and simulation based security and their non-equivalence. For more detail on these distinctions see Appendix B. For the purpose of this work we have slightly changed the simulation-based security definition to add a condition on how the key generator simulator works. In our case we are interested in the particular case of randomized functional encryption schemes implementing differential private data analysis, and there are some schemes that satisfy the definition in [26] that very clearly will not be differentially private.

For example, let $FE = (\text{Setup}^{FE}, \text{Enc}^{FE}, \text{KeyGen}^{FE}, \text{Dec}^{FE})$ be a functional encryption scheme and D be a probability distribution. We define a simple randomized functional encryption scheme $RFE = (\text{Setup}^{RFE}, \text{Enc}^{RFE}, \text{KeyGen}^{RFE}, \text{Dec}^{RFE})$ as follows:

- **Setup^{RFE}(1^κ, \mathcal{F}) :**
 $(\text{msk}^{FE}, \text{param}^{FE}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}^{FE}(1^\kappa)$
Output $(\text{msk}^{RFE}, \text{param}^{RFE}) = (\text{msk}^{FE}, \text{param}^{FE})$
- **Enc^{RFE}(msk^{RFE}, x) :**
 $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{FE}(\text{msk}^{FE}, x)$
Output c_x
- **KeyGen^{RFE}(msk^{RFE}, f) :**
 $e(r_f) \leftarrow D$
 $sk_f \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^{FE}(\text{msk}^{FE}, f)$
Output $sk_f^{RFE} = (e(r_f), sk_f)$
- **Dec^{RFE}(c_x, sk_f^{RFE}) :**
 $f(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}^{FE}(c_x, sk_f)$
 $s \leftarrow f(x) + e(r_f)$
Output s

It is clear that this scheme cannot be differentially private since the noise is leaked in full through the functional key and thus can be extracted from $f(x) - e(r_f)$. However, if FE is simulation sound against one ciphertext, this scheme will also be simulation secure against one ciphertext following the definition in [26]. By substituting the FE algorithms for their respective simulators we get the simulators for the RFE scheme. More details can be found in Appendix D.

This situation means that the definition given in [26] is not enough to characterize randomized functional encryption for differential privacy: we need a stronger definition. To obtain it, we make use of a characteristic of the standard definition, where the key generation simulator algorithm has access to the ideal functionality KeyIdeal . This ideal functionality takes as input a randomized function g and for the challenge x it outputs $v^g = g(x; r_g)$ with some chosen randomness r_g from the randomness space.

For our new stronger definition, we will ask an extra requirement from the key generation simulator algorithm: the simulator to query the KeyIdeal and to output a simulated functional key sk_g^* which should satisfy that for the simulated ciphertext c_x^* the decryption algorithm's output is $\text{Dec}(c_x^*, sk_g^*) = v^g$. The importance

of this KeyIdeal is two-fold, since it models having access to the inherent leakage of the functionality to simulate the functional key. Firstly, it allows us to program the output in the simulation to prove differential privacy as a black-box reduction. Secondly, this is what allows us to ensure that no extra information about the noise is leaked other than what can be directly inferred from the output, since the ciphertext and functional key can be simulated only using the information from KeyIdeal and the description of the randomized function. Furthermore, we show that our instantiation for randomized inner product satisfies this requirement so it is not an unattainable condition. We have also adapted the definition to the secret key setting.

Definition 2.4. Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter and $RFE = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$ be a secret-key randomized functional encryption scheme for the randomized function family \mathcal{F} . For any PPT simulator $\text{Sim} = (\text{EncSim}, \text{KeyGenSim})$ and ant PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, we define the experiments in Figure 3, where the oracles are described as follows.

- (1) **Real Experiment:** $\mathcal{O}_1(\text{msk}, \cdot)$ refers to the non-simulated key generation oracle $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$.
- (2) **Ideal experiment:** $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}_1(\text{st}', \cdot)$ denotes the simulated key generation algorithm $\text{KeyGenSim}(\text{st}', \cdot)$ that has oracle access to the ideal functionality $\text{KeyIdeal}(x, \cdot)$. The functionality KeyIdeal accepts key queries f and returns $v^f = f(x; r_f)$ for some chosen randomness $r_f \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$. We require that for simulated ciphertext c_x^* and simulated key sk_f^* the decryption value is as such $\text{Dec}(c_x^*, sk_f^*) = v^f$.

We say RFE is *one selective simulation secure* (1-SEL-SIM) against Q functional key queries if there exists a simulator Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} limited to accessing \mathcal{O}_1 Q times the following advantage is negligible.

$$\text{Adv}_{RFE}^Q = \left| \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})] \right|.$$

In this definition we only consider the case for one challenge ciphertext, since that is all we need for our results. However, the “strengthening” of the definition is easily extendable to several ciphertexts. Also note that for our definition we do not consider a decryption oracle where the adversary can input a ciphertext and a function to obtain the function applied to the ciphertext. This is due to the fact that we focus in security against chosen plaintext attacks instead of chosen ciphertext attacks.

2.4 Private Functional Encryption

The end goal is to instantiate a private encrypted database supporting linear queries. Agarwal *et al.* gave in [4] a formalization as to what properties such an object should satisfy. In their formalization they consider them as private structured encryption schemes for dynamic databases, in this work we adapt their paradigm to private functional encryption scheme for static databases. Let us give the definition for which we take Definition 4.1 in [4] as a reference.

Definition 2.5. Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter, $\epsilon > 0$ a privacy parameter and $Q \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ a positive integer. We define a *private functional encryption scheme for static databases* supporting the family of queries \mathcal{F} with error distribution D_ϵ as the following tuple of polynomial time protocols:

Figure 3: Real and ideal experiments in 1-SEL-SIM security for RFE.

$$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$$

1: $(x, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$ where $x \in \mathcal{X}$
2: $(\text{param}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$
3: $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(x, \text{msk})$
4: $\gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O_1(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(c_x, \text{st}_1)$
Output: γ

- $\text{SetUp}_{DO, S, A}((1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon, x); \perp; (f^1, \dots, f^Q))$: is a three-party protocol involving the database owner DO , server S and analyst A . The database owner inputs the security and privacy parameter κ, ϵ as well as the database x , the server inputs nothing and the analyst inputs the set of Q queries they want to ask $f^1, \dots, f^Q \in \mathcal{F}$. As output, the database owner receives a master secret key msk , the server receives an encrypted database c_x and the analyst receives a set of functional keys $sk_{f^1}, \dots, sk_{f^Q}$. Everyone receives a set of parameters param .
- $\text{EQuery}_{DO, S}(\text{msk}, g; c_x)$: is a two-party protocol involving the databases owner DO and the server S . The database owner inputs the master secret key msk and a query $g \in \mathcal{F}$, while the server inputs the encrypted database c_x . As output, the database owner receives a response s and the server receives nothing.
- $\text{PQuery}_{A, S}(sk_{f^i}; c_x)$: is a two-party protocol between the analyst A and the server S . The analyst inputs a functional decryption key sk_{f^i} , while the server inputs the encrypted database c_x . As output, A receives the response s^i while S receives nothing.

Note that in this definition, to keep in line with the definition from [4] we have decided to put the queries asked as an input to the setup phase. This way the setup remains a three-party protocol between all the entities and the private query a two-party protocol between the analyst and the server. Despite this, the functional encryption paradigm offers us more flexibility and another way of conceiving the protocols may be considered. For example, by allowing the analyst adaptivity on their query requests the setup phase becomes a two-party protocol between the database owner and the analyst and the private query phase becomes a concatenation of two two-party protocols, one between the analyst and the database owner and one between the analyst and the server. This alternative definition may seem more appropriate for some cases and makes full use of the adaptivity for computational differential privacy in Definition 2.1.

As usual, this new object needs a correctness definition where, differently than in [4] we consider that both types of queries should be considered in this analysis. Our definition is based on Definition 4.2 in [4].

Definition 2.6. Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter, $\epsilon > 0$ a privacy parameter, $Q \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ a positive integer and $\text{PFE} = (\text{SetUp}, \text{EQuery}, \text{PQuery})$ be a private functional encryption scheme for static databases supporting the family of functions \mathcal{F} with error distribution D_ϵ . We say it is *correct* if for any database x and any

$$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$$

1: $(x, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$ where $x \in \mathcal{X}$
2: $(\text{param}, c_x^*, \text{st}') \leftarrow \text{EncSim}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$
3: $\gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\tilde{O}_1(\text{st}', \cdot)}(c_x^*, \text{st}_1)$
Output: γ

set of queries $f^1, \dots, f^Q \in \mathcal{F}$ the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

- $\text{Real}(1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon) := \{s^i \leftarrow \text{PQuery}_{A, S}(sk_{f^i}; c_x)\}_{i \in [Q]}$ where, $(\text{msk}; c_x; (sk_{f^1}, \dots, sk_{f^Q})) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}_{DO, S, A}((1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon, x); \perp; (f^1, \dots, f^Q))$.
- $\text{Ideal}(1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon) := \{f^i(x) + e^i\}_{i \in [Q]}$ where $e^i \leftarrow D_\epsilon$

and for any database x and query $g \in \mathcal{F}$ the following probability holds

$$\Pr [s \leftarrow \text{EQuery}_{DO, S}(\text{msk}, g; c_x) \neq g(x)] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$$

where the probability is taken over $(\text{msk}; c_x; (sk_{f^1}, \dots, sk_{f^Q})) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}((1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon, x); \perp; (f^1, \dots, f^Q))$.

Finally we need to discuss the security notion. In [4] they describe three types of adversary: persistent, statistical and snapshot. The first one refers to an adversary corrupting permanently the server, the second one refers to an adversary corrupting the analyst and the third one refers to an adversary corrupting the server at only one point in time. A security definition for each one of them is given, however, the possible collusions between these adversaries are not formally handled. In our case we give a single definition containing the two properties (security and privacy) where the collusion is handled by considering a privacy mechanism \mathcal{M} containing the ciphertext c_x , the functional keys sk_{f^i} and the noisy response s^i .

Definition 2.7. Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter, $\epsilon > 0$ a privacy parameter, $Q \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ a positive integer and $\text{PFE} = (\text{SetUp}, \text{EQuery}, \text{PQuery})$ a private functional encryption scheme for static databases supporting the family of queries \mathcal{F} with error distribution D_ϵ . We denote F as the set of $f^1, \dots, f^Q \in \mathcal{F}$. For any PPT simulator $\text{Sim} = (\text{SetUpSim}, \text{EQuerySim})$ and any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, we define the experiments in Figure 4, where the oracles are described as follows and can only be accessed sequentially.

- **Real Experiment:** $O_1(\cdot, \cdot)$, on inputs $g \in \mathcal{F}$ and c_x , executes the encrypted query protocol $\text{EQuery}_{DO, S}(\text{msk}, \cdot; \cdot)$ and outputs a response s to the challenger and nothing to the adversary. O_2 , on inputs sk_f and c_x , executes the private query protocol $\text{PQuery}_{A, S}(\cdot; \cdot)$ and outputs a response s to the adversary.
- **Ideal Experiment:** \tilde{O}_1 , on inputs $g \in \mathcal{F}$ and c_x^* , executes the simulated encrypted query protocol $\text{EQuerySim}_{DO, S}(\text{st}', \cdot; \cdot)$ and outputs a response s to the challenger and nothing to the adversary. \tilde{O}_2 , on inputs sk_f^* and c_x^* , executes the private

Figure 4: Real and ideal experiments in 1-database security for PFE.

$$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon)$$

1: $(x, F, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\kappa)$ where $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $F \in \mathcal{F}^Q$
 2: $(\text{msk}; c_x, sk_{f_1}, \dots, sk_{f_Q}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}_{C, \mathcal{A}}(1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon, x; F)$
 3: $\gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O_1(\text{msk}, \cdot), O_2(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_x, \text{st}_1)$
 Output: γ

$$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\kappa)$$

1: $(x, F, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\kappa)$ where $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $F \in \mathcal{F}^Q$
 2: $(\text{st}'; c_x^*, sk_{f_1}^*, \dots, sk_{f_Q}^*) \leftarrow \text{SetUpSim}_{C, \mathcal{A}}(1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon; F)$
 3: $\gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\tilde{O}_1(\text{st}', \cdot), \tilde{O}_2(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_x^*, \text{st}_1)$
 Output: γ

query protocol $\text{PQuery}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}(\cdot; \cdot)$ and outputs a response s to the adversary.

We say PFE is *1-database secure and (ϵ, Q) private* if the two following conditions are fulfilled.

- There exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} the following advantage is negligible,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PFE}}^Q = \left| \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon)] \right|,$$

- The mechanism \mathcal{M} defined as follows

$$\mathcal{M}(x, f^i) = \begin{cases} c_x, \\ sk_{f^i}, \\ s^i, \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where $(\text{msk}; c_x; (sk_{f_1}, \dots, sk_{f_Q})) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}_{DO, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}}((1^\kappa, 1^\epsilon, x); \perp; F)$ and $s^i \leftarrow \text{PQuery}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}(sk_{f^i}; c_x)$ for $i \in [\ell]$, satisfies (Q, ϵ) -IND-CDP (Definition 2.1).

3 CDP FOR RANDOMIZED FUNCTIONAL ENCRYPTION

In this section we provide our results for a differentially private mechanism supporting randomized functional encryption for the private queries in encrypted databases.

3.1 Overview

Following the notation of Fig. 1, we would have that the encrypted database is c_x in the form of a functional encryption ciphertext (step 1); the negotiation between the database owner and the analyst (step 2) consists in the analyst sending a function f and the database owner responding with the functional key $sk_{\hat{f}}$; and the noisy response (step 3) consists on a string of the form $f(x) + e_f$, computed by the server with c_x and $sk_{\hat{f}}$, using the decryption procedure of the functional encryption.

More precisely, let \mathcal{M}' be a classical differentially private mechanism such that for a plain database x and a function f it outputs the value $f(x) + e_f$ for e_f sampled from some distribution D_ϵ that renders the mechanism statistically differentially private. Our idea is to then obtain a randomized functional encryption RFE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) such that the output of the decryption algorithm $\text{Dec}(c_x, sk_{\hat{f}})$ is distributed as $\hat{f}(x) = f(x) + D_\epsilon$, where $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$, $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$ and $sk_{\hat{f}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \hat{f})$.

The next step is to properly define the privacy mechanism \mathcal{M} that most accurately represents our problem. It is clear that the mechanism must incorporate the noisy response and the functional key, since both are received by the analyst at some point during

the interaction. If the server was to be trusted, those two values would suffice as a DP mechanism. However, since the objective is to deal with an honest but curious server, the database encryption process should also be considered in the privacy mechanism. Therefore, when looking at all three steps, considering the three values (ciphertext, functional key and noisy plaintext) within the DP mechanism, we are capable to cover for a collusion between the server and the analyst. As such, our DP mechanism \mathcal{M} on input a database x and query f outputs $c_x, sk_{\hat{f}}$ and $\text{Dec}(c_x, sk_{\hat{f}})$. Note that the value $\text{Dec}(c_x, sk_{\hat{f}})$ is redundant since it can be computed from c_x and $sk_{\hat{f}}$. However, we put it in to keep coherence with the analysis given in Figure 1 and to emphasize the information available through both the analyst (the functional key) and the server (encrypted data).

Given this DP mechanism, it is obvious that the standard statistical definition of differential privacy is no longer adequate, since an adversary with unlimited power can always break the underlying encryption and get all the information about the database. Therefore our proof below is done using the above defined (Q, ϵ_κ) -IND-CDP (see Definition 2.1), hence using the simulators of our new security definition for randomized functional encryption (see Definition 2.4).

REMARK 1. *In this work, we focus on the setting where the server is honest but curious, while the analyst may be malicious. In addressing a malicious server, a layer with a zero-knowledge proof should be added to guarantee the verifiability, but it would reduce the efficiency of the scheme and we do not consider it particularly meaningful in our scenario. Additionally, in our scheme, even against a malicious server, confidentiality, i.e., the security of the database, still holds due to the security of the RFE scheme.*

3.2 Formal Analysis

Let \mathcal{F} be a family of deterministic functions such that $\forall f \in \mathcal{F}, f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$. Let \mathcal{R} be a randomness space and let $e : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ be a sample generation function over a pre-defined distribution D_ϵ with values in \mathcal{S} . From that, we define the family $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$ of randomized functions such that $\forall \hat{f} \in \hat{\mathcal{F}}, \hat{f} : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ and $\hat{f}(x; r) = f(x) + e(r)$, where $r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ is used as a seed to sample $e(r) \leftarrow D_\epsilon$. Such definition permits us to formally define mechanism $\mathcal{M}' : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ such that $\mathcal{M}'(x, f; r) = \hat{f}(x; r)$. This corresponds to a classical DP mechanism for a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$. Our purpose in this section is to generically transform it into an equivalent DP mechanism for an encrypted database.

For this purpose, we consider RFE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) a secure secret-key randomized functional encryption scheme for

the family of randomized functions $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$. Therefore, using the structure given in Figure 1, and based on the notions and notations given in Section 2, we define the following.

- (1) The encrypted database corresponds to $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$ where $x \in \mathcal{X}$ is a plain database, and where $(\text{param}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}})$ as previously been executed once for all by the database owner;
- (2) the negotiation is done for a set of queries represented as functions $\hat{f}^1, \dots, \hat{f}^Q \in \hat{\mathcal{F}}$ and gives, for all $i \in [Q]$, $sk_{\hat{f}^i} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \hat{f}^i)$;
- (3) the noisy response phase executes, for all $i \in [Q]$, $s^i \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_x, sk_{\hat{f}^i})$ which is obtained by the analyst.

From the correctness of the used RFE, we obtain that $\forall i \in [Q]$, s_i is computationally indistinguishable from the value $\hat{f}^i(x; r_i) = f^i(x) + e(r_i)$, where $r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$.

Let us now focus on our new DP mechanism \mathcal{M} for an encrypted database. As we consider that both the server and the analyst could be corrupted. Such a DP mechanism must include all the information available to both, namely $c_x, sk_{\hat{f}}$ and $\text{Dec}(c_x, sk_{\hat{f}})$ for one specific query. But we now need to take care of the used randomness, and be more precise on where it comes from. To be as generic as possible, we consider that the randomness space is divided into two parts. Hence, $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_x \times \mathcal{R}_f$ and $\forall r \in \mathcal{R}$, r can be written as $r = (r_x, r_f)$, where $r_x \in \mathcal{R}_x$ (resp. $r_f \in \mathcal{R}_f$) is the seed for the randomness sampled in the encryption (resp. key generation) algorithm to compute c_x (resp. $sk_{\hat{f}}$). Then our DP mechanism for encrypted database $\mathcal{M} : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ is defined as follows.

$$\mathcal{M}(x, f; (r_x, r_f)) = \begin{cases} c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x; r_x) \\ sk_{\hat{f}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \hat{f}; r_f) \\ s \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_x, sk_{\hat{f}}) \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

for $(r_x, r_f) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$, where Enc and KeyGen denote the algorithms taking r_x and r_f as seeds for their randomness respectively.

From all that, we can now proceed to our main result of this section.

THEOREM 3.1. *Let RFE be a 1-SEL-SIM secure randomized functional encryption scheme against Q functional key queries and \mathcal{M}' be a (Q, ϵ_κ) -IND-CDP mechanism. Then the mechanism \mathcal{M} defined in Equation 2 is (Q, ϵ_κ) -IND-CDP.*

In other words, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we can construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} playing the 1-SEL-SIM security game for RFE and a PPT adversary \mathcal{C} playing the IND – CDP game for \mathcal{M}' such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{\mathcal{M}, Q}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{\mathcal{M}', Q}(\mathcal{C}) + \text{Adv}_{\text{RFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B}).$$

For the proof of this theorem, we refer to Appendix E.

REMARK 2. *Note that only computational differential privacy of the output is required but, as said in Section 2.2, statistical differential privacy implies its computational counterpart. Therefore, we can build our mechanism \mathcal{M} in equation 2 using a statistically differentially private output \mathcal{M}' as a building block.*

REMARK 3. *Theoretically, we can obtain an RFE scheme from a FE scheme in a generic manner [7]. However, this approach results in inefficient constructions. In the following section, we show that an*

efficient construction can be achieved for the class of inner-product functions.

4 RANDOMIZED INNER-PRODUCT SCHEME

In this section we present our instantiation of a randomized inner-product functional encryption scheme using an arbitrary IPFE scheme and prove its security.

The most important concept to take a hold of is the fact that the noise must be sampled during the key generation phase since it must be different for every query while at the same time it must be hidden to satisfy differential privacy. The naive idea is then to use function-hiding inner product functional encryption [11] to hide the noise. However, it would need to be used as a building block towards constructing a RIPFE scheme, and would only result in a pairing-based scheme (very expensive with respect to exponentiations), since achieving function-hiding for inner products without pairings is a well-known open problem. To circumvent that, we expand on the ideas by Hamdi in [27], using the concept and the construction of a multi-input functional encryption scheme for inner product introduced in [2]. More precisely, the function we want to implement is seen as a two-input function:

- one is the message x padded during the encryption phase with a long-term key u , as $d = x + u$. To manage the fact that a ciphertext can be used several times with several different functional key queries, we then encrypt such one-time ciphertext using a standard IPFE ; and
- one is a DP noise e_y padded during the key generation phase with an ephemeral key u'_y , as $d'_y \leftarrow e_y + u'_y$.

Next, our functional key generation generates (i) one functional secret for the vector y using the master secret key of the basic IPFE, and (ii) one functional key related to the two-input functional encryption of [2], as $zk_y \leftarrow \langle u, y \rangle + u'_y$. Finally, using the IPFE decryption and the property of the two-input functional encryption, we can easily recover $\langle x, y \rangle + e_y$.

The final detail we must be careful with is the use of one-time pads and which finite group we are using them in. To be able to apply exactly our previous description, the base IPFE scheme would need to take inputs from a finite group, and have its outputs on the exact same finite group so as to be able to subtract the one-time pads out. There exist some instantiations that satisfy this, for example the ones in sections 4.2 and 5.2 in [6]. However, most efficient instantiations take bounded inputs inside \mathbb{Z} which makes the use of the one-time pad non-trivial to implement. Despite that, by using a property which most of current instantiations of IPFE satisfy called two-step decryption (first defined in [2]) we can overcome this issue. The basic idea is that the bounded integer inputs are encoded into finite group where the operations of the scheme are performed and then the results are decoded back into \mathbb{Z} . It is in this intermediate finite group where the one-time pad is performed.

REMARK 4. *To construct a RIPFE scheme from a deterministic IPFE, one could hard-wire the noise as an extra input for any function y . This method would then require the function-hiding property, since knowledge of the functional key in standard functional encryption does not protect the function, thus leaking the noise and breaking privacy. However, function-hiding is a very strong security notion. We will show that we do not need its full functionality. Instead, we only*

need a different form of hiding: only the noise $e_{\mathbf{y}}$ should be hidden. As a result, we can achieve a much more efficient construction without pairings, while in contrast, all existing group-based function-hiding functional encryption requires the use of pairings.

4.1 Formal Description of the Scheme

Now we can give the formal description. Let $\ell, X, Y \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ and $\mathcal{F}^{\ell, X, Y}$ be the family of inner products such that $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{F}^{\ell, X, Y}$ means that $\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{x}) = \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle$ for any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^{\ell}$ with $\|\mathbf{x}\|_{\infty} < X$ and $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}^{\ell}$ with $\|\mathbf{y}\|_{\infty} < Y$. As in the previous section, we define the family $\hat{\mathcal{Y}}$ of randomized functions such that $\forall \hat{y} \in \hat{\mathcal{Y}}, \hat{y}(\mathbf{x}; r) = \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + e(r)$, where $r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ is used as a seed to sample $e(r) \leftarrow D_{\epsilon}$. Let $\text{IPFE} = (\text{SetUp}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{Enc}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{KeyGen}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{Dec}^{\text{IPFE}})$ be an inner-product functional encryption scheme for the family of functions $\mathcal{F}^{\ell, X, Y}$ that satisfies the following property: two-step decryption.

PROPERTY 1 (ADAPTED FROM PROPERTY 1, [2]). *An inner-product functional encryption scheme $\text{IPFE} = (\text{SetUp}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$ satisfies the two-step decryption property if there exist PPT algorithms SetUp' , Dec1 , Dec2 and a function \mathcal{E} such that:*

- (1) For all $\kappa, \ell, X, Y \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$, the algorithm $\text{SetUp}'(1^{\kappa}, \mathcal{F}^{\ell, X, Y})$ outputs $(\text{param}, \text{msk})$ where param contains a bound $B \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ and a description of a commutative group \mathbb{G} (with operation \circ) of order $L > \ell \cdot X \cdot Y$, defining the function $\mathcal{E} : \mathbb{Z}_L \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$.
- (2) For all $(\text{param}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}'(1^{\kappa}, \mathcal{F}^{\ell, X, Y})$, $c_{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, \mathbf{x})$ and $sk_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \mathbf{y})$ we have

$$\text{Dec1}(c_{\mathbf{x}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}}) = \mathcal{E}(\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle, \text{noise}(c_{\mathbf{x}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}}))$$

for some noise function. Furthermore, it holds for all \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} , $\Pr[\text{noise}(c_{\mathbf{x}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}}) > B] < \text{negl}(\kappa)$. Note that we are assuming that the encryption algorithm works for inputs greater than the bound.

- (3) Given any $\gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_L$ and param , $\mathcal{E}(\gamma, 0)$ can be efficiently computed.
- (4) The function \mathcal{E} is linear, more specifically for any $\gamma, \gamma' \in \mathbb{Z}_L$ and any noise, $\text{noise}' \in \mathbb{Z}$, we have

$$\mathcal{E}(\gamma, \text{noise}) \circ \mathcal{E}(\gamma', \text{noise}') = \mathcal{E}(\gamma + \gamma', \text{noise} + \text{noise}').$$

- (5) For all $\gamma < \ell \cdot X \cdot Y$, and $\text{noise} < \ell \cdot B$, $\text{Dec2}(\mathcal{E}(\gamma, \text{noise})) = \gamma$.

In other words, the decryption is done in two steps, where only the second one is affected by the bound on the inputs and its inverse can be computed efficiently only knowing the public parameters. The basic example are schemes based on the DDH assumption (Section 3 in [5]), where the function $\mathcal{E}(\gamma, \text{noise}) = g^{\gamma}$ with g being the generator of the cyclic group \mathbb{G} stated in the public parameters. It is proven in [2] that LWE and DCR based constructions also satisfy this property (for example Section 4 in [6] and Section 4 in [5]). It is for the inclusion of instantiations based on approximate encryption like LWE that the noise is incorporated to the function \mathcal{E} .

With this property defined, we proceed to describe our randomized scheme. Let D_{ϵ} be a probability distribution over \mathbb{Z} and $\hat{\mathcal{F}}_{\epsilon}^{\ell, X, Y}$ as defined in Section 3. Then we define our randomized inner product functional encryption scheme $\text{RIPFE} = (\text{SetUp}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{Enc}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{KeyGen}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{Dec}^{\text{RIPFE}})$ for the family of functions $\hat{\mathcal{F}}_{\epsilon}^{\ell, X, Y}$ as presented in Figure 5.

<p>SetUp^{RIPFE}($1^{\kappa}, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_{\epsilon}^{\ell, X, Y}$) :</p> <p>Choose distribution D_{ϵ} over \mathbb{Z} Choose α such that $\Pr[D_{\epsilon} \geq \alpha] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$ Choose $L > \ell \cdot X \cdot Y + \alpha$, $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\\$} \mathbb{Z}_L^{\ell}$ $(\text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}^{\text{IPFE}}(1^{\kappa}, \mathcal{F}^{\ell, X + \alpha / (\ell \cdot Y), Y})$ Output $(\text{param}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}) =$ $= ((L, D_{\epsilon}, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}), (\mathbf{u}, \text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}))$</p> <p>Enc^{RIPFE}($\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \mathbf{x}$) :</p> <p>$\mathbf{d} \leftarrow \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{u} \pmod{L}$, $c_{\mathbf{d}} \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, \mathbf{d})$ Output $c_{\mathbf{d}}$</p> <p>KeyGen^{RIPFE}($\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \mathbf{y}$) :</p> <p>$e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) \leftarrow D_{\epsilon}$, $u'_{\mathbf{y}} \xleftarrow{\\$} \mathbb{Z}_L$, $d'_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) + u'_{\mathbf{y}} \pmod{L}$ $sk_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, \mathbf{y})$ $zk_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + u'_{\mathbf{y}} \pmod{L}$ Output $sk_{\mathbf{y}}^{\text{RIPFE}} = (d'_{\mathbf{y}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}}, zk_{\mathbf{y}})$</p> <p>Dec^{RIPFE}($c_{\mathbf{d}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}}^{\text{RIPFE}}$) :</p> <p>$\mathcal{E}(\langle \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{y} \rangle, \text{noise}(c_{\mathbf{x}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}})) \leftarrow \text{Dec1}^{\text{IPFE}}(c_{\mathbf{d}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}})$ $s \leftarrow \text{Dec2}(\mathcal{E}(\langle \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{y} \rangle, \text{noise}(c_{\mathbf{x}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}})) \circ \mathcal{E}(d'_{\mathbf{y}} - zk_{\mathbf{y}}, 0))$ Output s</p>
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Figure 5: Randomized inner-product functional encryption scheme RIPFE. The IPFE scheme has a bigger input bound ($X + \alpha / (\ell \cdot Y)$ instead of X) to account for the extra space needed for the noise in RIPFE.

REMARK 5. Note that in our RIPFE construction from Figure 5, when one sets the distribution D_{ϵ} as the zero distribution, our construction reduces exactly to the multi-input construction from [2, Section 3.1 Figure 4] for the parameter $n = 1$. Giving the adversary access to $\langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) \pmod{L}$, at a first glance, seems to harm the confidentiality of the secret key \mathbf{u} and therefore the database \mathbf{x} . However, due to the fact that \mathbf{u} is used as a one-time pad for \mathbf{x} , any information gleamed from $\langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) \pmod{L}$ translates to information gained about $\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) \pmod{L}$. Since outputting $\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) \pmod{L}$ is the intended functionality, the confidentiality of the database \mathbf{x} is not harmed.

4.2 Correctness and Security

First we need to verify that this is a correct randomized functional encryption scheme for $\hat{\mathcal{F}}_{\epsilon}^{\ell, X, Y}$.

PROPOSITION 4.1. *The RIPFE scheme defined in Figure 5 is a correct randomized functional encryption scheme for $\hat{\mathcal{F}}_{\epsilon}^{\ell, X, Y}$.*

For the proof of this Proposition we refer to Appendix F.

We will now prove the simulation soundness of our scheme by lifting the security guarantee from the base IPFE scheme to the randomized version.

THEOREM 4.2. *Let IPFE be a 1-SEL-SIM-secure inner product functional encryption scheme against Q functional key queries, then our*

Table 2: Generic efficiency estimates for RIPFE.

	msk	c_x	sk_y	
Size	$IPFE_{\text{msk}}^\ell + \text{seed} $	$IPFE_{c_x}^\ell$	$IPFE_{sk_y}^\ell + 2 \log(L)$	
	SetUp	Enc	KeyGen	Dec
Comp. time	$IPFE_{\text{SetUp}}^\ell + \ell \cdot t_{U\text{sampl}}$	$IPFE_{\text{Enc}}^\ell + \ell \cdot t_{\text{add}}$	$IPFE_{\text{KeyGen}}^\ell + t_{D\text{sampl}} + t_{U\text{sampl}} + \ell \cdot t_{\text{prod}} + (\ell + 1) \cdot t_{\text{add}}$	$IPFE_{\text{Dec}}^\ell + t_{\text{add}} + t_{\text{subs}}$

construction RIPFE in Figure 5 is a 1-SEL-SIM-secure randomized functional encryption scheme against Q functional queries.

In other words, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we can construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{RIPFE}}^Q(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{IPFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B}).$$

For the proof of this theorem, we refer to Appendix F.

REMARK 6. Note that our proof is a blackbox reduction from RIPFE to IPFE with the same amount of functional key queries. This means that we inherit from IPFE the restriction of the number of queries $Q < \ell$, otherwise the inherent leakage of the functionality gives out the whole database by solving the determined linear system of equations.

4.3 Efficiency Considerations

For a generic IPFE, our RIPFE scheme needs no extra inner-product slot to handle the noise, in other words, it is constructed with little overcost (both in storage and computation time) in respect to the base IPFE scheme. More in detail, in storage this overcost consists in the extra one-time pad key \mathbf{u} in the master secret key, which since it is generated uniformly we only need to store the randomness seed for a suitable pseud-random generator, and two extra integers (namely d'_y and zk_y) in the functional decryption key. This means that the storage overcost does not depend on ℓ .

In computation time the overcost consists: during the SetUp the sampling of \mathbf{u} , in Enc an extra ℓ additions and the sampling of \mathbf{u} from the seed, in KeyGen sampling \mathbf{u} from the seed, e_y and u'_y and \mathbf{u} together with an inner product and two extra additions and in Dec there is an extra addition and subtraction as well as the computation of the function \mathcal{E} . All those elements are summarized in Table 2. In regards to the notation on this table, the integer κ is the security parameter, and we denote as $IPFE_s^\ell$ the size or computation time (depending on what the string s makes reference to) of the base IPFE scheme for ℓ coefficients.

5 PRIVATE ENCRYPTED DATABASE

In this section we describe our full system for a computationally differentially private encrypted database supporting linear queries, following the model given in Section 2.4. Our system is based on the randomized inner product functional encryption scheme given in the previous section, and the generic DP mechanism described in Section 3. We prove that such system is secure and private even against a collusion between the analyst and the server, using the security results of the two previous sections. We finally give some words about a practical deployment of such system.

<p>SetUp$_{DO,S,A}((1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell,X,Y}, x); \perp; (\mathbf{y}^1 \dots \mathbf{y}^Q)) :$</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> DO computes the following <ol style="list-style-type: none"> $(\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{param}^{\text{RIPFE}}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}^{\text{RIPFE}}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell,X,Y})$. $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\text{RIPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, x)$. $sk_{y^i}^{\text{RIPFE}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^{\text{RIPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, y^i)$ for $i \in [Q]$. DO keeps $\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}$ secret. S receives c_x. A receives $sk_{y^1}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \dots, sk_{y^Q}^{\text{RIPFE}}$.
<p>EQuery$_{DO,S}((\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, g); c_x) :$</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> DO computes $sk_y^{\text{IPFE}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, g)$. DO receives c_x from S. DO computes $r \leftarrow \text{Dec}^{\text{IPFE}}(c_x, sk_y^{\text{IPFE}}) - \langle \mathbf{u}, g \rangle$.
<p>PQuery$_{A,S}(sk_{y^i}^{\text{RIPFE}}, c_x) :$</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> S receives $sk_{y^i}^{\text{RIPFE}}$ from A. S computes $\mathcal{E}(\langle d, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle, \text{noise}(c_x, sk_{y^i})) \leftarrow \text{Dec}^{\text{IPFE}}(c_d, sk_{y^i})$. A receives $\mathcal{E}(\langle d, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle, \text{noise}(c_x, sk_{y^i}))$ from S. A computes $s \leftarrow \text{Dec}2(\mathcal{E}(\langle d, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle, \text{noise}(c_x, sk_{y^i})) \circ \mathcal{E}(d'_y - zk_{y^i}, 0)).$

Figure 6: Private functional encryption scheme supporting inner product queries PIPFE

5.1 Description of the System

Let DO be a Database Owner, S be an external server that stores sensitive databases, and let A be an analyst wanting to make requests on the stored databases. The overall idea of our system is to use the randomized inner product scheme to cover the private queries from the analyst, and to get advantage of the non-noisy IPFE scheme embedded into the randomized version (see the previous section for details) to answer the queries from the database owner, thanks to some non-noisy keys. Indeed, following the formalization given in Section 2.4, the **EQuery** from DO are only based on the IPFE, while the **PQuery** from A are based on the RIPFE. The latter is divided into two parts: the **SetUp** and the **KeyGen** are executed during the system setup and the **Dec** is done during the query part.

Let us now formally describe the private encrypted database. Let D_ϵ be a distribution over \mathbb{Z} , let $\text{IPFE} = (\text{SetUp}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{Enc}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{KeyGen}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{Dec}^{\text{IPFE}})$ be a generic inner product functional encryption scheme for the family of functions $\mathcal{F}^{\ell,X,Y}$ satisfying two-step decryption and let $\text{RIPFE} = (\text{SetUp}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{Enc}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{KeyGen}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{Dec}^{\text{RIPFE}})$ be the randomized inner product functional encryption

scheme described in Figure 5, defined using the same IPFE. This is essentially that the same IPFE scheme is used both alone for the **EQuery** from *DO* and as the underlying primitive for the RIPFE scheme used for the **PQuery**.

Our private encrypted database supporting inner product queries over a static database $\text{PIPFE} = (\text{SetUp}, \text{EQuery}, \text{PQuery})$ is then given in Figure 6.

REMARK 7. *In our PIPFE construction (Figure 6), the noise is added during the key generation phase, while this was during encryption in related work [4, 9]. This permits us to manage EQuery requests in a more efficient way. Indeed, such requests by the Data Owner do not need any noise for the answer (as opposed to the response to the PQuery from Analysts). Hence, with our proposal, a unique version of the encrypted database is necessary to manage both kinds of queries, since it does not contain any noise. If the request comes from an external Analyst, the noise is simply added in the functional key.*

In contrast, the constructions in [4, 9] add the differentially private noise to the database before encrypting while leaving the access keys without noise. As such, they are not able to provide an EQuery protocol without duplicating the encrypted database, once without noise to perform the EQuery protocol and once with differentially private noise to perform the PQuery protocol.

5.2 Correctness, Security and Privacy

We need to prove the full security of our PIPFE scheme.

THEOREM 5.1. *Let IPFE be a correct inner product functional encryption scheme and let RIPFE be as described in Figure 5. Then the PIPFE described in Figure 6 is a correct private functional encryption scheme for static databases supporting the inner product family of queries with distribution D_ϵ .*

For the proof of this theorem, we refer to Appendix G.

THEOREM 5.2. *Let IPFE be a 1-SEL-SIM-secure inner product functional encryption scheme and let RIPFE be as described in Figure 5. Then our construction PIPFE described in Figure 6 is a 1-database secure and private functional encryption scheme for static databases supporting the inner product family of queries with distribution D_ϵ .*

For the proof of this theorem, we refer to Appendix G.

6 IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

6.1 Differential Privacy Considerations

The first choice is what distribution will be used for the privacy mechanism. Since the distribution D_ϵ must be over \mathbb{Z} , we take for the DP mechanism \mathcal{M}' the geometric distribution, as described in [25]. More specifically, the mechanism \mathcal{M}' with error distribution sampled from $D \sim \text{Geo}(\exp(-\epsilon/\Delta))$ is a $(\epsilon, 0)$ -DP mechanism, where Δ is the ℓ_1 -sensitivity of the family of functions \mathcal{F} and $\text{Geo}(\cdot)$ refers to the two-sided geometric distribution. We refer to Appendix H for the proof. For the sampling of this two-sided geometric we use the fact that a two-sided geometric distribution is the subtraction of two one-sided geometric distributions as shown in Proposition 3.1 in [29], while the one-sided geometric is sampled through the same algorithm as the NumPy library [37] rewritten in C. Having the precise distribution allows us also to make estimates about utility,

which in broad terms measures how close the noisy response is to the actual value.

It follows that the utility of our mechanism is $O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right) \cdot \Delta \cdot \log\left(\frac{2}{\delta}\right)$ for any fixed δ (for the proof we refer to Appendix H). This means that there is a linear relation between the sensitivity of our family of queries and the size of the noise. As such it would be ideal to control this sensitivity. In the case of the inner product functionality, the sensitivity of any query is bounded by the maximum coefficient Y . Therefore, taking $\Delta = Q \cdot Y$ ensures through the property of sequential composition (see Appendix A) ensures that our adaptive mechanism is $(\epsilon, 0)$ -DP. So, in general the bigger the coefficient the bigger the noise, which makes sense since the purpose of this noise is to blur the statistic, and bigger coefficient generally means bigger difference between neighbouring databases. In comparison to the work by Bakas *et al.* [9], given that they add noise to each coefficient, their utility depends on the size of the database ℓ instead¹.

6.2 Implementation Specifics

For a concrete implementation we have opted for the IPFE scheme over the ring \mathbb{Z} from [6] (the scheme is shown in Appendix I), which is proven to be simulation sound under the DDH assumption [5]. The DDH-based constructions are actually the most efficient currently known for IPFE schemes. Note that the decryption algorithm will only be able to recover the value when computing the discrete logarithm is efficient, therefore the response needs to be smaller than some bound $B = \text{poly}(\kappa)$. Then, by using the baby-giant steps algorithm presented in [39] we can recover the discrete logarithm in $\tilde{O}(B^{1/2})$. For the practical implementation we will consider B to be $\approx 2^{40}$, so that the discrete logarithm is computed in $\approx 0.4s$.

Using our notation, the query result will be at most $\ell \cdot X \cdot Y + \alpha$ with probability δ where α represents the noise size and is computed as in Proposition H.2 in Appendix H, so we can take $\alpha = (Q \cdot Y)/\epsilon \cdot \log(2/\delta)$. We will assume the number of queries asked $Q = 16$, the bound for these queries $Y = 2^7$ and the parameters $\epsilon = 0.1$ and $\delta = 2^{-100}$ all constant, and variate the amount of database entries ℓ with the bound these entries X , while putting a lower bound of 16 bits to X . Note that these values can be changed while keeping $\ell \cdot X \cdot Y + \alpha \approx 2^{40}$ or increased if we can assume a longer computation time for the discrete logarithm and therefore decryption time. In the case of very large number of entries, the discrete logarithm computation time is no longer the dominating factor so the bound B could be increased without notable effects on the decryption computation time, this is the reason why the lower bound to $|X|$ makes sense. With the objective of being as generic as possible we will consider no specific structure for the database.

The implementation was written in C and using the library CiFER [16]. Some optimization was done, given the fact that we use a secret-key scheme instead of a public-key one, which allows us to reduce computations during setup given that the secret key can be used in the encryption and the adversary has no access to this encryption key, therefore, precomputations for fast exponentiations can be performed during set up. More concretely, we apply the fixed-base comb method for fast exponentiations [34, Chapter 14, Section 14.6.3 iii] in the exponentiations used during the encryption (with precomputations done during set up) and the wNAF-based

¹Note that the sensitivity of the summation query is 1.

Table 3: Efficiency values for RIPFE instantiation based in [5].

	ℓ	$ X $	msk	c_x	sk_y
Sizes	100	21	96 B	38 KB	1 KB
	1 000	18	96 B	375 KB	1 KB
	10 000	16	96 B	3 MB	1 KB
	100 000	16	96 B	36 MB	1 KB
	1 000 000	16	96 B	366 MB	1 KB

	ℓ	SetUp	Encrypt	KeyGen	Decrypt
Comp. time	100	2.0431 s	0.1461 s	0.0010 s	0.4177 s
	1 000	2.0464 s	1.4362 s	0.0017 s	0.4784 s
	10 000	2.0367 s	14.3370 s	0.0099 s	0.8420 s
	100 000	2.0354 s	143.1491 s	0.1090 s	3.4425 s
	1 000 000	2.0956 s	1421.3589 s	1.0733 s	18.3102 s

interleaving exponentiation method for fast simultaneous multiple exponentiation [36, Section 3.2] for the multiple exponentiations during the decryption algorithm.

We give in Table 3 the resulting values when run for different values of ℓ for 128-bit security (assuming a 3072 bit RSA modulus, as recommended by the NIST). The code was executed with Intel® Core™ i7-1365U (3.9GHz). Note that due to the form of the construction (see Appendix I) the encryption algorithm is easily parallelisable, so the timings could be easily reduced by using more cores. The timings grow linearly with the number of entries of the database ℓ for all algorithms, which is a lower bound for inner-product functional encryption schemes, so the overcost to obtain computational DP is quite low. In the case of the decryption and the set up algorithms the linear growth is overshadowed for small ℓ by computations that are constant by choice of the parameters. In case of the decryption algorithm this is the discrete logarithm computation for $\ell < 100\,000$ while in case of the set up it is the pre-computations for the fixed-base comb algorithm for $\ell < 1\,000\,000$. With these values we show the practical utility of our construction.

7 CONCLUSIONS

Our results may inspire follow-up works on the subject.

Reducing the requirements for the reductions from simulation-based security to indistinguishability-based security would be an intriguing challenge. Moreover, it would tackle the issue of multiple ciphertexts, as in the indistinguishability setting, security for one ciphertext usually implies security for multiple ciphertexts.

Another direction is to extend these results to the dynamic database setting, which would vastly open the implementation possibilities. However, due to the nature of dynamic databases, where the analyst can reuse the functional key to retrieve the noisy response from the updated database, adaptive simulation security for an unbounded number of ciphertexts might be required. In the case of inner product functional encryption, this is not possible, as mentioned in [5]. Furthermore, most efficient privacy mechanisms for dynamic databases rely on adding noise for each change to the database. As a result, some form of homomorphism must be implemented in conjunction with our design.

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A DEFINITIONS FOR STANDARD DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

For the purpose of this section, we will consider \mathcal{X} to be a database space, \mathcal{R} to be a randomness space, \mathcal{S} to be an output space contained in the multidimensional real numbers and \mathcal{F} a family of deterministic functions $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ representing the queries to obtain the plain statistics.

Definition A.1 (Adapted from Definition 2.4, [22]). Let ϵ, δ be two real numbers. A randomized algorithm for $f \in \mathcal{F}$, $\mathcal{M}_f : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ is (ϵ, δ) -differential private $((\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP) if for all $S \subseteq \mathcal{S}$, every pair of neighbouring databases $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$ and $r, r' \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$

$$\Pr [\mathcal{M}_f(x; r) \in S] \leq e^\epsilon \cdot \Pr [\mathcal{M}_f(x'; r') \in S] + \delta.$$

There are two slight changes from Definition 2.4 in [22]. First of all, we have adapted the definition of randomized function to be in line with the standard in randomized functional encryption, and as such have added the specific randomness seed as an input. Secondly, we have explicitly added which query $f \in \mathcal{F}$ the mechanism \mathcal{M} is protecting. This is also for ease of notation further down the line, when considering several different queries and relating to the key generation in the randomized functional encryption scheme.

Note that this definition handles only one query at a time, and we would be interested in the property for Q queries. However, since the output space \mathcal{S} must be contained on the multidimensional reals, one can consider the query space as \mathcal{F}^Q and each query for the mechanism as the conjunction of Q queries. That way this definition allows for analysis for multiple queries.

Two additional key concepts, that we recall below, need to be taken into account when considering the efficiency of concrete constructions for differential privacy: the sensitivity, which is used to measure accurately the size of the noise needed to privatize a

specific query; and the utility of a given mechanism, which essentially tells how close the noisy response will be to the expected non-noisy value.

Definition A.2 (Adapted from Definition 3.1, [22]). Let $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$ be two neighbouring databases. The ℓ_1 -sensitivity of a function f is

$$\Delta_f := \max_{\|x-x'\|_1=1} \|f(x) - f(x')\|_1.$$

This can be naturally extended to the ℓ_1 -sensitivity of a family of queries by taking the maximum over the family of queries.

Definition A.3 (Adapted from Definition 2.4, [15]). Let $\mathcal{M} : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$, $\mathcal{M}(x, f; r) = f(x) + e(r)$ for some database space \mathcal{X} , response space \mathcal{S} , function space $\mathcal{F} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ and randomness space \mathcal{R} be a differentially private mechanism. We say \mathcal{M} is (α, δ) -useful if

$$\Pr[|\mathcal{M}(x, f; r) - f(x)| \leq \alpha] \geq 1 - \delta$$

for any $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and $r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$.

Finally, a very useful property of differential privacy to handle adaptive queries is that of sequential composition, which we recall below.

PROPOSITION A.4 (THEOREM 1, [20]). *Let \mathcal{M} be a mechanism allowing Q adaptive queries to a mechanism $\mathcal{M}' : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ satisfying (ϵ, δ) -DP. Then \mathcal{M} satisfies $(Q \cdot \epsilon, Q \cdot \delta)$ -DP.*

B DEFINITIONS FOR FUNCTIONAL ENCRYPTION

Generic functional encryption schemes can be defined as private key or public key. We will use the private key version to better conform with the model presented in Figure 1. Since we are considering a sole database owner protecting their database outsourced to the server, it makes little sense to allow for other entities to encrypt over the database. For the purpose of this section we will consider \mathcal{X} to be a database space, \mathcal{S} an output space and \mathcal{F} a family of deterministic functions $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$.

Definition B.1 (Adapted from Definition 2.3, [1]). Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter. We define a *secret-key functional encryption scheme* supporting the family of functions \mathcal{F} the following tuple of PPT algorithms:

- $\text{SetUp}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$: given the security parameter as input, it outputs some public parameters param and a master secret key msk . We will assume the public parameters as inputs in all other algorithms.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$: given the master secret key msk and a plaintext $x \in \mathcal{X}$ as inputs, it outputs a ciphertext c_x .
- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f)$: given the master secret key msk and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ as inputs, it outputs a functional key sk_f .
- $\text{Dec}(c_x, sk_f)$: given a ciphertext c_x and a functional key sk_f as inputs, it outputs a string s .

As usual with encryption schemes, there is a correctness notion, which follows the standard definitions of correctness for encryption: for any plaintext x and function $f \in \mathcal{F}$, then $\Pr[s \leftarrow \text{Enc}(c_x, sk_f) \neq f(x)] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$ where the probability is taken over

$(\text{param}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})$, $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$ and $sk_f \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f)$.

Also, as with correctness, there are two main security definitions analogous to those for encryption: indistinguishability and simulation security. However, unlike in public key encryption, these two definitions are not equivalent, specifically, indistinguishability-based security does not imply simulation-based security. This was already discussed by Boneh, Sahai and Waters in [12] and O'Neill in [38] which leads to a plethora of different security definitions.

Another notable difference in the definitions is due to the appearance of the functional keys which are independent to the ciphertexts. As such there is a distinction in when the adversary is allowed to ask for functional keys. We say an adversary \mathcal{A} is *selective* if it is only allowed to ask for functional keys after setting the challenge, while we say \mathcal{A} is *adaptive* if, on top of that, it can also ask for functional keys before setting the challenge. There has been plenty of study about possibility and impossibility of each type of security (selective or adaptive, indistinguishability or simulation based) for generic functional encryption with positive and negative results. Therefore, it must be evaluated in a case by case basis for each type of functionality. In the case of inner product functional encryption it is well-known (as mentioned in [5]) that adaptive simulation security for an unbounded number of ciphertexts is not possible.

In this work we focus on selective simulation security against one challenge ciphertext for secret key functional encryption, so let us give its definition.

Definition B.2 (Adapted from Section 2.3, [5]). Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ be a security parameter and let $\text{FE} = (\text{SetUp}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$ be a functional encryption scheme for the function family \mathcal{F} . For any PPT simulator $\text{Sim} = (\text{EncSim}, \text{KeyGenSim})$ and any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, we define the experiments in Figure 7, where the oracles are described as follows.

- (1) **Real Experiment:** $\mathcal{O}_1(\text{msk}, \cdot)$ refers to the non-simulated key generation oracle $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$.
 $\mathcal{O}_2(\cdot, \cdot)$ refers to the decryption oracle $\text{Dec}(\cdot, \cdot)$.
- (2) **Ideal Experiment:** $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}_1(st', \cdot)$ refers to the simulated key generation oracle $\text{KeyGenSim}(st', \cdot)$.
 $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}_2(\cdot, \cdot)$ refers to the decryption oracle $\text{Dec}(\cdot, \cdot)$.

We say FE is *one selective simulation secure* (1-SEL-SIM) against Q functional key queries if there exists a simulator Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} limited to accessing \mathcal{O}_1 Q times the following advantage is negligible.

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{FE}}^Q = \left| \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\kappa, \mathcal{F})] \right|.$$

C DISCUSSION ABOUT OTHER PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES

Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) are a compendium of technologies including both functional encryption as well as differential privacy, so it begs the question whether other of these technologies could be used to fulfill the model at discussion, more specifically fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and multi-party computation (MPC).

FHE encompasses encryption schemes with the property that one can operate on the ciphertexts with a ring structure while maintaining the structure of the underlying plaintexts (i.e. the addition

Figure 7: Real and ideal experiments in 1-SEL-SIM security for FE.

$$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(1^\kappa)$$

1: $(x, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1$ where $x \in \mathcal{X}$
 2: $(\text{param}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}(1^\kappa)$
 3: $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(x, \text{msk})$
 4: $\gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}_1(\text{msk}, \cdot), \mathcal{O}_2(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_x, st_1)$
Output: γ

$$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\kappa)$$

1: $(x, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1$ where $x \in \mathcal{X}$
 2: $(\text{param}, c_x^*, st') \leftarrow \text{EncSim}(1^\kappa)$
 3: $\gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\tilde{\mathcal{O}}_1(st', \cdot), \tilde{\mathcal{O}}_2(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_x^*, st_1)$
Output: γ

or multiplication of ciphertexts is a ciphertext of the corresponding operation over the plaintexts). As most encryption schemes, let them be public key or secret key, only the (private) secret key can be used for decrypting any ciphertext (either pre or post computation) and this leads to an issue in our model from Figure 1, since the decryption will need to be done by the database owner. The scheme would be as follows for a database $x = (x^1, \dots, x^\ell)$ and linear query $y = (y^1, \dots, y^\ell)$, the database owner sends the encrypted database to the server (note that in this case the ciphertext will need to be cut into pieces $c_{x^1}, \dots, c_{x^\ell}$). Then whenever an analyst has a query they send it to the database owner who encrypts to get $c_{y^1}, \dots, c_{y^\ell}$. The database owner sends the ciphertexts to the server who computes $c_{\langle x, y \rangle} = \sum c_{x^i} \cdot c_{y^i}$ and returns it to the database owner. The database owner decrypts the ciphertext and samples some noise before sending the noisy response to the analyst, as it is shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Diagram of interactions for the FHE based solution.

Note that in this case there is no interaction between the server and the analyst, thus defeating the purpose of FHE, since the database owner could send an encrypted database through a regular

encryption scheme and for each query retrieve and decrypt the ciphertext, to then compute the query and the noise for answering the analyst.

MPC includes very general forms of computation, usually revolving around secret sharing and the computation of those secrets under specific circumstances. The drawback of using MPC is usually the high level of interaction between the several parties to allow for the recovery of the secret. In this case, a 2PC protocol could be conceived where one same secret share could be used to recover different functions of the database when interacting with different shares from the other party. In such position then, referencing Figure 1, step 1 would be sending this “privileged” share related to the database, while step 2 would entail the computation of a share corresponding to the query. Finally step 3 would be the 2PC protocol mentioned before.

D A TRIVIAL SCHEME

In this appendix we give a trivial scheme that satisfies simulation security by the definition in [26] but does not satisfy our definition. This is due to the fact that the randomness is given out with the functional key. Let \mathcal{F} and $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$ be defined as in Section 3 for some distribution D and $\text{FE} = (\text{SetUp}^{\text{FE}}, \text{Enc}^{\text{FE}}, \text{KeyGen}^{\text{FE}}, \text{Dec}^{\text{FE}})$ be a functional encryption scheme for the family of functions \mathcal{F} . We define the following randomized functional encryption scheme $\text{RFE} = (\text{SetUp}^{\text{RFE}}, \text{Enc}^{\text{RFE}}, \text{KeyGen}^{\text{RFE}}, \text{Dec}^{\text{RFE}})$ for the family of randomized functions $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$. See Figure 9.

It is straight-forward to see that as long as FE is 1-SEL-SIM secure, RFE will also be 1-SEL-SIM under the definition in [26]. The simulators are obtained by substituting the FE algorithms by their simulators and, since the master secret key is only used in those algorithms, the simulators will hold for RFE. Let $\text{Sim}^{\text{FE}} = (\text{EncSim}^{\text{FE}}, \text{KeyGenSim}^{\text{FE}})$ be the simulators for the FE scheme, we construct the following RFE simulators $\text{Sim}^{\text{RFE}} = (\text{EncSim}^{\text{RFE}}, \text{KeyGenSim}^{\text{RFE}})$.

$$\text{EncSim}^{\text{RFE}}(1^\kappa) :$$

$(\text{param}, c_x^*, st') \leftarrow \text{EncSim}^{\text{FE}}(1^\kappa)$
Output $(\text{param}, c_x^*, st')$

$$\text{KeyGen}^{\text{RFE}}(st', f) :$$

$e(r_f) \leftarrow D$
 $sk_f^* \leftarrow \text{KeyGenSim}^{\text{FE}}(st', f)$
Output $sk_f^{*\text{RFE}} = \left(e(r_f), sk_f^* \right)$

This counter-example is for 1-SEL-SIM security so that the randomized function \hat{f} complies with the definition of randomized

<p>Setup^{RFE}(1^κ) : (msk^{FE}, param^{FE}) ← Setup^{FE}(1^κ) Output (msk^{RFE}, param^{RFE}) = (msk^{FE}, param^{FE})</p> <p>Enc^{RFE}(msk^{RFE}, x) : c_x ← Enc^{FE}(msk^{FE}, x) Output c_x</p> <p>KeyGen^{RFE}(msk^{RFE}, f̂) : e(r_f) ← D sk_f ← KeyGen^{FE}(msk^{FE}, f) Output sk^{RFE}_{f̂} = (e_f, sk_f)</p> <p>Dec^{RFE}(c_x, sk^{RFE}_{f̂}) : f(x) ← Dec^{FE}(c_x, sk_f) s ← f(x) + e(r_f) Output s</p>

Figure 9: Trivial RFE scheme

function. It can be extended to N -SEL-SIM security by adding noise to the encryption too.

However, this scheme is not 1-SEL-SIM under our definition since the key generation simulator is unable to “extract” e_f from a value v^f received from KeyIdeal given the information it has access to. The only way to obtain e_f from v^f would be to know the challenge plaintexts, but from Definition 2.4 it is clear that the key generation simulator has no access to the challenges. Therefore, any scheme which gives out the randomness in the functional key will not satisfy simulation security under our definition, which is desirable for our use-case. This means that no randomized functional encryption scheme giving out the noise in the functional key will be 1-SEL-SIM under our definition as we wanted.

E PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1

THEOREM E.1. *Let RFE be a 1-SEL-SIM secure randomized functional encryption scheme against Q functional key queries and M' be a (Q, ϵ_κ) -IND-CDP mechanism. Then the mechanism M defined in Equation 2 is (Q, ϵ_κ) -IND-CDP.*

In other words, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we can construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} playing the 1-SEL-SIM security game for RFE and a PPT adversary \mathcal{C} playing the IND – CDP game for M' such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{\mathcal{M}, Q}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{\mathcal{M}', Q}(\mathcal{C}) + \text{Adv}_{\text{RFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B}).$$

PROOF. We will prove this through a series of Games. Let \mathcal{A} be a PPT adversary playing the (Q, \cdot) -IND-CDP attack game for mechanism M , let Sim = (EncSim, KeyGenSim) be the simulator algorithms for the RFE scheme and let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ be a security parameter. Changes on Game i are made over Game $i - 1$.

Game 0. This is the attack game for (Q, \cdot) -IND-CDP and mechanism M as seen in its definition, and we will refer to the challenger as \mathcal{C} .

Game 1. In this game we change the value obtained from the decryption algorithm for an evaluation of the randomized function. As such, for the oracle \mathcal{O} when receiving f^i , \mathcal{B} samples $r_i = (r_{x_i}, r_{f_i}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ and computes $s^i = f^i(x_b) + e(r_i)$. Finally, it sends to \mathcal{A} the following response

$$\mathcal{O}^1(x_b, f^i, r_i) = \begin{cases} c_{x_b} \\ sk_{\hat{f}^i} \\ s^i. \end{cases}$$

Game 2. In this game we simulate the ciphertext and functional keys using the RFE scheme simulator. As such, after choosing the bit b , and receiving x_0, x_1 from \mathcal{A} , the challenger \mathcal{C} uses EncSim($1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}; r_x$) and obtains the simulated ciphertext $c_{x_b}^*$ and the state st' . It then simulates the the oracle as follows. When receiving the function f^i , \mathcal{C} executes the algorithm KeyGenSim($st', \hat{f}^i; r_{f_i}$) substituting the call to KeyIdeal for s^i and receives the simulated functional key $sk_{\hat{f}^i}^*$. Finally, it sends to \mathcal{A} the following response

$$\mathcal{O}^2(x_b, f^i, r_i) = \begin{cases} c_{x_b}^* \\ sk_{\hat{f}^i}^* \\ s^i. \end{cases}$$

Game 3. In this game, \mathcal{C} will act as a challenger for the adversary \mathcal{A} in the (Q, \cdot) -IND-CDP attack game for mechanism M while acting as an adversary for the challenger \mathcal{D} in the (Q, \cdot) -IND-CDP attack game for mechanism M' . More concretely, when \mathcal{C} receives x_0, x_1 from \mathcal{A} it forwards them to \mathcal{D} . Then, for challenge queries, when receiving function f^i , \mathcal{B} queries oracle \mathcal{O}' to \mathcal{D} and receives $v^i = M'(x_b, f^i, r^i)$ for some $r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$. It substitutes s^i in Game 1 for v^i and sends to \mathcal{A} the following response.

$$\mathcal{O}^3(x_b, f^i, r_i) = \begin{cases} c_{x_b}^* \\ sk_{\hat{f}^i}^* \\ v^i. \end{cases}$$

Analysis. The main idea is to demonstrate that subsequent games are computationally indistinguishable, and in the final game, the mechanism is secure. To prove that Game i and Game $i + 1$ are indistinguishable for any adversary \mathcal{A}' . Let \mathcal{C}' be a PPT challenger that chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random. If $b = 0$ it interacts with the PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' as in Game i , otherwise it interacts as in Game $i + 1$. At the end of the interaction, \mathcal{A}' will make its guess $\tilde{b} \in \{0, 1\}$. We define the advantage on distinguishing games Game i and Game $i + 1$:

$$\text{Adv}_{i(i+1)}(\mathcal{A}') := \left| \Pr \left[\tilde{b} = 1 | b = 0 \right] - \Pr \left[\tilde{b} = 1 | b = 1 \right] \right|.$$

We say the two games are indistinguishable if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{i(i+1)}(\mathcal{A}')$ is negligible over κ . We also denote by $\text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^i(\mathcal{A})$ the advantage of the adversary \mathcal{A} in Game i .

From Game 0 to Game 1. Both Dec(c_{x_b}, sk_{f_i}) and $f^i(x_b) + e(r_i)$ are computationally indistinguishable due to the correctness of the RFE scheme, which means that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{01}(\mathcal{A}') = 0$.

From Game 1 to Game 2. The only change is swapping all the non-simulated algorithms from RFE for their simulators. It is clear that if a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' could distinguish between Game 1 and Game 2 we can construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} able to distinguish the real and ideal experiments for the 1-SEL-SIM security game for RFE with Q functional key queries. As such we get that

$$\text{Adv}_{12}(\mathcal{A}') \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{RFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B})$$

for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' .

From Game 2 to Game 3. The view for adversary \mathcal{A} does not change, since s^i and v^i are identically distributed by definition. This means that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{23}(\mathcal{A}') = 0$. Furthermore, given that C (as an adversary to \mathcal{D}) has the same output as \mathcal{A} we get

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^3(\mathcal{A}) = \text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{M', Q}(C).$$

To conclude the proof, we note that the indistinguishability advantages are for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , so we get

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{M, Q} &= \text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^0(\mathcal{A}) \\ &\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^3(\mathcal{A}) + \sum_{i=0}^2 \text{Adv}_{v_{i+1}}(\mathcal{A}) \\ &= \text{Adv}_{\text{DP}, \epsilon_\kappa}^{M', Q}(C) + \text{Adv}_{\text{RFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B}). \end{aligned}$$

□

F PROOFS OF SECTION 4

PROPOSITION F.1. *The RIPFE scheme defined in Figure 5 is a correct randomized functional encryption scheme for $\hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}$.*

PROOF. Let $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell$ with $\|\mathbf{x}\|_\infty$ be any plaintext and $\hat{\mathbf{y}}^1, \dots, \hat{\mathbf{y}}^Q \in \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}$ any set of randomized functions. Then for any $i \in [Q]$ we get that $s^i \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_{\mathcal{d}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}_i}^{\text{IPFE}})$ satisfies the following.

$$\begin{aligned} s^i &= \langle \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle + d'_{\mathbf{y}_i} - zk_{\mathbf{y}_i} \\ &= \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle + \langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle + e(r_{\mathbf{y}_i}) + u'_{\mathbf{y}_i} - (\langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle + u'_{\mathbf{y}_i}) \\ &= \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}^i \rangle + e(r_{\mathbf{y}_i}). \end{aligned}$$

This is clearly the same distribution as $\hat{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{x}; r)$ for $r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ since $e_{\mathbf{y}}$ is sampled from D_ϵ independently for every query \mathbf{y} . □

THEOREM F.2. *Let IPFE be a 1-SEL-SIM-secure inner product functional encryption scheme against Q functional key queries, then our construction RIPFE in Figure 5 is a 1-SEL-SIM-secure randomized functional encryption scheme against Q functional queries.*

In other words, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we can construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{RIPFE}}^Q(\mathcal{A}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{IPFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B}).$$

PROOF. We will prove the result through a series of Games. Let \mathcal{A} be a PPT adversary playing the 1-SEL-SIM security game for RIPFE, and let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ be a security parameter. Changes on Game i are made over Game $i - 1$. Let also $\text{Sim}^{\text{IPFE}} = (\text{EncSim}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{KeyGenSim}^{\text{IPFE}})$ be the simulator for the IPFE scheme.

Game 0. This is the 1-SEL-SIM security real experiment for RIPFE as described below

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}) \\ &\text{1: } (\mathbf{x}, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ where } \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell, \|\mathbf{x}\|_\infty < X \\ &\text{2: } (\text{param}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}^0(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}) \\ &\text{3: } c_{\mathcal{d}} \leftarrow \text{Enc}^0(\mathbf{x}, \text{msk}) \\ &\text{4: } \gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O_1^0(\cdot), O_2^0(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_{\mathcal{d}}, st_1) \\ &\text{Output: } \gamma \end{aligned}$$

where SetUp^0 , Enc^0 , O_1^0 , O_2^0 are the regular RIPFE algorithms and oracles.

Game 1. In this game we simulate the ciphertext. The experiment develops into the following.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}) \\ &\text{1: } (\mathbf{x}, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ where } \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell, \|\mathbf{x}\|_\infty < X \\ &\text{2: } (L, D_\epsilon, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}^1(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}) \\ &\text{3: } (c_{\mathcal{d}}^*, st') \leftarrow \text{Enc}^1(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}) \\ &\text{4: } \gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O_1^1(\text{msk}, st', \mathbf{x}, \cdot), O_2^1(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_{\mathcal{d}}^*, st_1) \\ &\text{Output: } \gamma \end{aligned}$$

Where the Enc^1 and O_1^1 algorithms are described below and SetUp^1 , O_2^1 are the same as in Game 0.

SetUp¹(1^κ, $\hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}$):

Choose distribution D_ϵ over \mathbb{Z}

Choose α such that $\Pr[|D_\epsilon| \geq \alpha] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Choose $L > \ell \cdot X \cdot Y + \alpha$, $\mathbf{u} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_L^\ell$

$(\text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}^{\text{IPFE}}(1^\kappa, 1^\ell, X + \alpha/(\ell \cdot Y), Y)$

Output $(L, D_\epsilon, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}})$

Enc¹(msk):

$\mathbf{d}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_L^\ell$

$st' \leftarrow \mathbf{d}^*$

$c_{\mathcal{d}^*} \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, \mathbf{d}^*)$

Output $(c_{\mathcal{d}^*}, st')$

O₁¹(msk, st', x, $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$):

$e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) \leftarrow D_\epsilon$

$u'_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_L$

$d'_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow e(r_{\mathbf{y}}) + u'_{\mathbf{y}} \pmod{L}$

$sk_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, \mathbf{y})$

$zk_{\mathbf{y}}^* \leftarrow \langle \mathbf{d}^*, \mathbf{y} \rangle + u'_{\mathbf{y}} - \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle \pmod{L}$

Output $sk_{\hat{\mathbf{y}}}^1 = (d'_{\mathbf{y}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}}, zk_{\mathbf{y}}^*)$

Game 2. In this game we simulate the noise using the KeyIdeal functionality described in Definition 2.4. The experiment changes into the following.

$$\frac{\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})}{1: (x, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ where } x \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell, \|x\|_\infty < X$$

$$2: (L, D_\epsilon, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}) \leftarrow \text{SetUp}^2(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})$$

$$3: (c_d^*, st') \leftarrow \text{Enc}^2(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}})$$

$$4: \gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O_1^2(\text{msk}, st', \cdot), O_2^2(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_d^*, st_1)$$

Output: γ

Where the O_1^2 algorithm is described below and SetUp^2 , Enc^2 and O_2^2 are the same as in Game 1.

$O_1^2(\text{msk}, st', \hat{y})$:

$$d_y^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_L$$

$$v \leftarrow \text{KeyIdeal}(x, \hat{y})$$

$$sk_y \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, y)$$

$$zk_y^* \leftarrow \langle d^*, y \rangle + d_y^* - v \pmod{L}$$

Output $sk_y^2 = (d_y^*, sk_y, zk_y^*)$

Game 3. In this Game we add a challenger C^* playing the 1-SEL-SIM security game for the IPFE scheme in the real world, with the added change that in the decryption oracle, were it to fail to compute the response due to the inputs being outside the bounds, it returns $\text{Dec1}(c_x, sk_y)$ instead of nothing. As such, the experiment changes into the following.

$$\frac{\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^3(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})}{1: (x, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ where } x \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell, \|x\|_\infty < X$$

$$2: (L, D_\epsilon, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, c_d^*, st') \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{3, C^*}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})$$

$$4: \gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O_1^{3, C^*}(st', \cdot), O_2^{3, C^*}(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_d^*, st_1)$$

Output: γ

Where the Enc^3 , O_1^{3, C^*} and O_2^{3, C^*} algorithms are described below.

$\text{Enc}^{3, C^*}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})$:

Choose distribution D_ϵ over \mathbb{Z}

Choose α such that $\Pr[|D_\epsilon| \geq \alpha] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Choose $L > \ell \cdot X \cdot Y + \alpha$

$$d^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_L^\ell$$

$$st' \leftarrow d^*$$

$$(\text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, c_{d^*}) \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\text{IPFE}}^{\text{real}}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X + \alpha / (\ell \cdot Y), Y}, d^*)$$

Output: $(L, D_\epsilon, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, c_{d^*}, st')$

$O_1^{3, C^*}(st', y)$:

$$d_y^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_L$$

$$v \leftarrow \text{KeyIdeal}(x, \hat{y})$$

$$zk_y^* \leftarrow \langle d^*, y \rangle + d_y^* - v \pmod{L}$$

$$sk_y \leftarrow O_1^{C^*}(y)$$

Output $sk_y^3 = (d_y^*, sk_y, zk_y^*)$

$O_2^{3, C^*}(c_x, sk_y^3)$:

If Dec^{IPFE} works

$$s \leftarrow O_2^{C^*}(c_x, sk_y)$$

Output: $s + d_y^* - zk_y^*$

Else

$$s \leftarrow O_2^{C^*}(c_x, sk_y)$$

Output: $\text{Dec2}(s \circ \mathcal{E}(d_y^* - zk_y^*, 0))$

Game 4. In this Game we add the simulators from the base IPFE. The experiment develops into the following.

$$\frac{\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^4(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})}{1: (x, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ where } x \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell, \|x\|_\infty < X$$

$$2: (L, D_\epsilon, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, c_d^*, st') \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{4, C^*}(1^\kappa, 1^\ell, 1^\epsilon, X, Y)$$

$$4: \gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{O_1^{4, C^*}(st', \cdot), O_2^{4, C^*}(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_d^*, st_1)$$

Output: γ

Where the Enc^4 , O_1^4 and O_2^4 algorithms are described below.

$\text{Enc}^{4, C^*}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})$:

Choose distribution D_ϵ over \mathbb{Z}

Choose α such that $\Pr[|D_\epsilon| \geq \alpha] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Choose $L > \ell \cdot X \cdot Y + \alpha$

$$d^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_L^\ell$$

$$st' \leftarrow d^*$$

$$(\text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, c_{d^*}) \leftarrow \text{Exp}_{\text{IPFE}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X + \alpha / (\ell \cdot Y), Y}, d^*)$$

Output: $(L, D_\epsilon, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}, c_{d^*}, st')$

$O_1^{4, C^*}(st', y)$:

$$d_y^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_L$$

$$v \leftarrow \text{KeyIdeal}(x, \hat{y})$$

$$zk_y^* \leftarrow \langle d^*, y \rangle + d_y^* - v \pmod{L}$$

$$sk_y \leftarrow \tilde{O}_1^{C^*}(y)$$

Output $sk_y^2 = (d_y^*, sk_y, zk_y^*)$

$O_2^{4, C^*}(c_x, sk_y^3)$:

If Dec^{IPFE} works

$$s \leftarrow \tilde{O}_2^{C^*}(c_x, sk_y)$$

Output: $s + d_y^* - zk_y^*$

Else

$$s \leftarrow \tilde{O}_2^{C^*}(c_x, sk_y)$$

Output: $\text{Dec2}(s \circ \mathcal{E}(d_y^* - zk_y^*, 0))$

Game 5. In this game we finalize the simulation. As such, the experiment remains as follows.

$$\frac{\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^5(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})}{1: (x, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ where } x \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell, \|x\|_\infty < X$$

$$2: (c_d^*, st') \leftarrow \text{EncSim}^{C^*}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y})$$

$$3: \gamma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\tilde{O}_1^{C^*}(st', \cdot), \tilde{O}_2^{C^*}(\cdot, \cdot)}(c_d^*, st_1)$$

Output: γ

Where EncSim^{C^*} corresponds to Enc^{4, C^*} , $\tilde{O}_1^{C^*}(st', \cdot)$ immediately calls $O_1^{4, C^*}(st', \cdot)$, and $\tilde{O}_2^{C^*}(\cdot, \cdot)$ immediately calls $O_2^{4, C^*}(\cdot, \cdot)$.

Analysis. Let C' be a challenger that chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random. If $b = 0$ it interacts with a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' as in Game i , otherwise it interacts as in Game j . At the end of the interaction, \mathcal{A}' will make its guess $\tilde{b} \in \{0, 1\}$. We define

$$\text{Adv}_{i(i+1)}(\mathcal{A}') := \left| \Pr \left[\tilde{b} = 1 | b = 0 \right] - \Pr \left[\tilde{b} = 1 | b = 1 \right] \right|$$

for $i = 0, 1$.

From Game 0 to Game 1. In this change, we have swapped $\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{x}$ for \mathbf{d}^* in encryption (since in key generation $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{d}^* - \mathbf{x}$). As such, given that the secret key \mathbf{u} and the challenge \mathbf{x} are chosen independently, $\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{x}$ and \mathbf{d}^* are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{01}(\mathcal{A}') = 0$.

From Game 1 to Game 2. Analogously to the previous step, u'_y and e_y are chosen independently, so both $u'_y + e_y$ and d_{y^*} are computationally indistinguishable (and $u'_y = d_{y^*} - e_y$). As such for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{12}(\mathcal{A}') = 0$.

From Game 2 to Game 3. Game 3 is a rewriting of Game 2 but using the real experiment for the base IPFE with challenger C^* , where the view of the adversary is not modified in any way. Therefore for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{23}(\mathcal{A}') = 0$.

From Game 3 to Game 4. In this change we have swapped from the real to the ideal experiment in the base IPFE scheme. As such, the distinguishing game between Game 2 and Game 3 is the 1-SEL-SIM game for the IPFE scheme with challenger C^* and the same number of functional key queries in both cases. Therefore, we can construct an adversary \mathcal{B} against IPFE which if \mathcal{A} distinguishes between Game 3 and Game 4, \mathcal{B} can distinguish between the real and ideal experiment for IPFE. As such for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{34}(\mathcal{A}') \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{IPFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B})$.

From Game 4 to Game 5. Game 5 is a rewriting of Game 4, where the view of the adversary is not modified in any way. Therefore for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' , $\text{Adv}_{45}(\mathcal{A}') = 0$.

Finally, adding it all up and considering that Game 0 is the real experiment and Game 5 is the ideal experiment we get that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{RIPFE}}^Q(\mathcal{A}) &= \sum_{i=0}^4 \text{Adv}_{i(i+1)}(\mathcal{A}) \\ &\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{IPFE}}^Q(\mathcal{B}). \end{aligned}$$

□

REMARK 8. *Note that the simulation soundness in which we base our result is against a challenger C^* for the IPFE scheme who in case of failure of the decryption algorithm outputs $\text{Dec}^{\text{IPFE}}(c_d, sk_y)$ instead of returning nothing which is the response for the challenger C in standard simulation soundness for IPFE schemes. However, we argue that given the fact that our security model does not contemplate a decryption oracle with inputs a ciphertext and a function (instead of ciphertext and functional key) both challengers are equivalent.*

REMARK 9. *From the KeyIdeal functionality, the simulator is given the result of the decryption algorithm. Subsequently, we can simulate the functional decryption key from the description of the randomized function and the expected output, which is the inherent leakage of the*

scheme. This means in particular that no extra information is leaked about the noise than what can be inferred by knowing its distribution and the noisy inner product, since they are the only inputs for the KeyGenSim

G PROOFS OF SECTION 5

THEOREM G.1. *Let IPFE be a correct inner product functional encryption scheme and let RIPFE be as described in Figure 5. Then the PIPFE described in Figure 6 is a correct private functional encryption scheme for static databases supporting the inner product family of queries with distribution D_ϵ .*

PROOF. For EQuery, the correctness of the base IPFE gives us that $\Pr[s \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_x, sk_g) \neq \langle x + u, g \rangle] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$ as long as these are distributed as follows (param, msk) $\leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$, $c_x \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$ and $sk_g \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, g)$, conditions satisfied by the protocols Setup and EQuery from PIPFE, which gives us the expected equality between the output of EQuery and $\langle x, g \rangle$.

For PQuery, we need to prove that the output of PQuery($sk_{y^i}^{\text{RIPFE}}$, c_x) is computationally indistinguishable from $\langle x, y \rangle + e^i$ with $e^i \leftarrow D$ for all $i \in [Q]$, when c_x and $sk_{y^i}^{\text{RIPFE}}$ are generated in Setup. From the Setup defined in PIPFE, this comes from Proposition 4.1. □

THEOREM G.2. *Let IPFE be a 1-SEL-SIM-secure inner product functional encryption scheme and let RIPFE be as described in Figure 5. Then our construction PIPFE described in Figure 6 is a 1-database secure and private functional encryption scheme for static databases supporting the inner product family of queries with distribution D_ϵ .*

PROOF. First, for the simulation part of Definition 2.7 (Figure 4), let us define the PPT simulator $\text{Sim} = (\text{SetupSim}, \text{EQuerySim})$ as follows where Y denotes the set of Q queries $y^1, \dots, y^Q \in \mathcal{F}$ and EncSim, KeyGenSim are the simulators for the RIPFE scheme. For the exact formulation of these simulators we refer to the proof of Theorem 4.2.

SetupSim $_{C, \mathcal{A}}(1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}_\epsilon^{\ell, X, Y}; Y) :$

1. C computes the following
 - a. $(c_x^*, st') \leftarrow \text{EncSim}(1^\kappa)$
 - b. $sk_{y^i}^* \leftarrow \text{KeyGenSim}(st', y^i)$ for $i \in [Q]$
2. C receives st'
3. \mathcal{A} receives c_x^* and $sk_{y^1}^* \dots sk_{y^Q}^*$.

EQuerySim $_{D, O, S}((st', g); c_x^*) :$

1. C retrieves c_x^* from \mathcal{A}

The indistinguishability between Setup and SetupSim comes directly from the indistinguishability of the EncSim and KeyGenSim simulators, which is proven in Theorem 4.2, while EQuery and EQuerySim are indistinguishable to the adversary since its view of the protocol does not change.

Finally, for the privacy mechanism part of Definition 2.7, from the definition of PIPFE, the mechanism in Equation 1 is the same as the mechanism in Equation 2. Consequently, the privacy comes directly from Theorem 3.1. □

REMARK 10. *Multiple queries in the context of differential private mechanism has been studied in the literature, for the non-encrypted case. Such existing work consider either adding noise proportional to a query index [41], or managing the noise accordingly [28]. In any case, our work does not introduce any new issue regarding this multiple queries case, and any of the above method can obviously be adapted to our result.*

H PRIVACY AND UTILITY OF THE GEOMETRIC MECHANISM

PROPOSITION H.1. *Let \mathcal{X} be a database space, $\mathcal{S} = \mathbb{Z}^Q$, \mathcal{F} be a family of queries and let $f \in \mathcal{F}^Q$. Let D be a random variable, $D \sim \text{Geo}(\exp(-\epsilon/\Delta_f))$, where Δ_f is as in Definition A.2. Then the geometric mechanism defined as*

$$\mathcal{M}_f(x; r) := f_i(x) + e(r_i), \text{ for } i \in [Q]$$

where $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $e(r_i) \leftarrow D$ is $(\epsilon, 0)$ -DP.

PROOF. Let $t \in \mathbb{Z}^Q$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x) = t]}{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x') = t]} &= \prod_{i=1}^Q \frac{\Pr[f_i(x) + e(r_i) = t_i]}{\Pr[f_i(x') + e(r_i) = t_i]} \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^Q \frac{\exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon \cdot |t_i - f_i(x)|}{\Delta_f}\right)}{\exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon \cdot |t_i - f_i(x')|}{\Delta_f}\right)} \\ &\leq \prod_{i=1}^Q \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{\Delta_f} |f_i(x') - f_i(x)|\right) \\ &= \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{\Delta_f} \|f(x') - f(x)\|_1\right) \\ &\leq \exp(\epsilon). \end{aligned}$$

Now adding for all $t \in \mathcal{S}$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x) \in \mathcal{S}]}{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x') \in \mathcal{S}]} &= \frac{\sum_{t \in \mathcal{S}} \Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x) = t]}{\sum_{t \in \mathcal{S}} \Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x') = t]} \\ &\leq \frac{\sum_{t \in \mathcal{S}} e^\epsilon \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x') = t]}{\sum_{t \in \mathcal{S}} \Pr[\mathcal{M}_f(x') = t]} \\ &= e^\epsilon \end{aligned}$$

as we wanted. \square

Note that Δ_f can be changed by any bigger constant, so by using Δ we eliminate the dependance on f .

PROPOSITION H.2. *The Geometric mechanism as described in Proposition H.1 is $\left(O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right) \cdot \Delta \cdot \log\left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right), \delta\right)$ -useful.*

PROOF. We want to find for any given δ , the corresponding minimum α in regards to utility. As such we need to solve the inequation for an $1 - \delta$, which is the same as inverting the inequality inside the probability and compare to δ inverting the equality outside too. Note that subtracting $f(x)$ to the mechanism will always leave us just a sample of the geometric distribution $D \sim \text{Geo}(\epsilon/\Delta)$.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[|D| \geq \alpha] &= 2 \cdot \sum_{k=\alpha}^{\infty} \Pr[D = k] \\ &= 2 \cdot \frac{1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)}{1 + \exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)} \sum_{k=\alpha}^{\infty} \exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)^k \\ &= 2 \cdot \frac{1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)}{1 + \exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)} \cdot \frac{\exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)^\alpha}{1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)} \\ &\leq \delta \end{aligned}$$

Which in turn gives us

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha &\geq \frac{\Delta}{\epsilon} \cdot \left(\log\left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right) + \log\left(1 + \exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{\Delta}\right)\right) \right) \\ &\approx O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right) \cdot \Delta \cdot \log\left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right) \end{aligned}$$

as we wanted to see. \square

I IMPLEMENTED SCHEME

We present the DDH-based scheme first proposed in [6] and proven simulation sound against selective adversaries in [3] and against adaptive adversaries in [5]. This scheme is public-key, but we transform it into secret-key by incorporating the master public key into the master private key.

ENCRYPTION SCHEME 1 (ADAPTED FROM SECTION 3, [5]).

- **SetUp**($1^\kappa, \mathcal{F}^{\ell, X, Y}$): Choose a cyclic group \mathbb{G} of prime order $q > 2^\kappa$ and two generators $g, h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$. Then for all $i \in [\ell]$ sample $s_i, t_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and compute $h_i = g^{s_i} \cdot h^{t_i}$. Define

$$\begin{aligned} \text{param} &= (X, Y, \ell, \mathbb{G}, g, h) \\ \text{msk} &= \{s_i, t_i, h_i\}_{i \in [\ell]} \end{aligned}$$
- **Enc**(msk, x): To encrypt a vector $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell$ with $\|x\|_\infty < X$, sample $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and compute

$$C = g^r, \quad D = h^r, \quad \{E_i = g^{x_i} \cdot h_i^{r_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]}.$$
 Output $c_x = (C, D, E_1, \dots, E_\ell)$.
- **KeyGen**(msk, y): To compute a functional decryption key for the vector y with $\|y\|_\infty < Y$ compute $s_y = \langle s, y \rangle$ and $t_y = \langle t, y \rangle$. Output $sk_y = (s_y, t_y)$.
- **Dec**(c_x, sk_y): Given a ciphertext $c_x = (C, D, E_1, \dots, E_\ell)$ and a functional decryption key $sk_y = (s_y, t_y)$ compute

$$E_y = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i^{y_i}}{C^{s_y} \cdot D^{t_y}}.$$

Finally compute $s = \log_q(E_y)$ and output s .

This scheme is proven correct and secure in [5] (Section 3, Theorem 1), and satisfies the two-step decryption property (Property 1). More in particular, the function \mathcal{E} is computing the power of the generator $\mathcal{E}(\gamma, \text{noise}) = g^\gamma$, therefore the PPT algorithm Dec_2 is the baby-giant steps algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm and the PPT algorithm $\text{Dec}_1^{\text{IPFE}}$ is computing the value E_y .

However, it is a public key scheme and for our construction only a secret key scheme is needed. Therefore we can slightly change it to reduce the amount of computations needed by using

the master secret key in the encryption algorithm. On top of that, we implemented the fixed-base comb method for fast exponentiation, and we consider the precomputations needed F_g, F_h part of the public parameters.

Finally, we take note that the master secret key is comprised of three vectors in \mathbb{Z}_q with as many coefficients as entries in the database, which would mean that we are storing something heavier than the original database. However, these three vectors are uniformly sampled, as such instead of storing the whole vector it suffices to store the secure seed for the pseudo-randomness generator and then reconstruct the vectors whenever we need them. Given that the sampling is very efficient, the gain in storage is vastly superior to the loss in efficiency. In the case of a database with 1 000 000 entries the size goes down from 1 GB to 96 B while the loss in efficiency is around 0.6 s during encryption and key generation. As such, the randomized encryption scheme we have implemented is as follows.

ENCRYPTION SCHEME 2.

- **SetUp**($1^\kappa, \hat{\mathcal{F}}^{\ell, X, Y}$) : Define D_ϵ as $\text{Geo}(-\epsilon/\Delta)$, and as such $\alpha = (\kappa \cdot \Delta)/\epsilon$. Choose a cyclic group \mathbb{G} of prime order $q > 2^\kappa$ with operation \circ and two generators $g, h \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$ and compute F_g, F_h the precomputations for the fixed-base com method for fast exponentiation. Choose a pseudo-random generator $\Phi(\cdot)$ that takes as input a seed and outputs a value in \mathbb{Z}_q^ℓ . Set $L = q$ and sample $\text{seed}_u, \text{seed}_s, \text{seed}_t$ secure seeds for Φ . Define

$$\text{param} = (X, Y, \ell, \mathbb{G}, g, h, F_g, F_h, \Phi)$$

$$\text{msk} = (\text{seed}_u, \text{seed}_s, \text{seed}_t)$$

- **Enc**(msk, \mathbf{x}) : To encrypt a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell$ with $\|\mathbf{x}\|_\infty < X$, reconstruct $\mathbf{u} \leftarrow \Phi(\text{seed}_u)$, $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \Phi(\text{seed}_s)$, $\mathbf{t} \leftarrow \Phi(\text{seed}_t)$ and compute $\mathbf{d} = \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{u} \pmod{q}$. Then sample $r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and compute,

$$C = g^r, \quad D = h^r, \quad \{E_i = g^{d_i + s_i \cdot r} \cdot h^{t_i \cdot r}\}_{i \in [\ell]}.$$

Output $c_{\mathbf{d}} = (C, D, E_1, \dots, E_\ell)$.

- **KeyGen**(msk, \mathbf{y}) : To compute a functional decryption key for a vector \mathbf{y} with $\|\mathbf{y}\|_\infty < Y$, first reconstruct $\mathbf{u} \leftarrow \Phi(\text{seed}_u)$, $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \Phi(\text{seed}_s)$, $\mathbf{t} \leftarrow \Phi(\text{seed}_t)$ and sample $e_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \text{Geo}(-\epsilon/\Delta)$, $u'_{\mathbf{y}} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q$. Then compute $d'_{\mathbf{y}} = e_{\mathbf{y}} + u'_{\mathbf{y}} \pmod{q}$ and $zk_{\mathbf{y}} = \langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + u'_{\mathbf{y}} \pmod{q}$. Finally, compute $s_{\mathbf{y}} = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y} \rangle$ and $t_{\mathbf{y}} = \langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{y} \rangle$ and output $sk_{\mathbf{y}} = (d'_{\mathbf{y}}, s_{\mathbf{y}}, t_{\mathbf{y}}, zk_{\mathbf{y}})$.

- **Dec**($c_{\mathbf{d}}, sk_{\mathbf{y}}$) : Given a ciphertext $c_{\mathbf{d}} = (C, D, E_1, \dots, E_\ell)$ and a functional decryption key $sk_{\mathbf{y}} = (s_{\mathbf{y}}, t_{\mathbf{y}})$ compute

$$E_{\mathbf{y}} = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i^{y_i}}{C^{s_{\mathbf{y}}} \cdot D^{t_{\mathbf{y}}}}.$$

Finally compute $s = \log_q(E_{\mathbf{y}} \cdot g^{d'_{\mathbf{y}} - zk_{\mathbf{y}}})$ and output s .