

Positional Learning to reverse-engineer the camera processing pipeline and detect image forgeries

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Abstract

As conventional tools and generative-AI-based methods alike can alter images in visually convincing ways, image editing is no longer reserved to experts. However, this ease of manipulation has given rise to malicious manipulation of images, resulting in the creation and dissemination of realistic but fake content to spread **disinformation** online, wrongfully incriminate someone, or commit fraud. The **de**tection of such forgeries is paramount in exposing those deceitful acts. One approach involves **reverse-engineering** the image signal processing pipeline, to detect and localize inconsistencies. In this context, **positional learning** has emerged as a promising and explainable approach to **re**veal underlying traces of the signal processing pipeline. We show how it can be used to detect forgeries from inconsistencies in the image mosaic or compression history.



Positional Learning to reverse-engineer the camera processing pipeline and detect image forgeries

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Train a CNN to detect the modulo-(2, 2) position of each pixel



00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00

Sampling mosaic of an authentic im- Trained/expected output on an au- All pixels are estimated at their corthentic image age



mosaic is altered

00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00

01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 11 01 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00 10 00

On this forged image, the sampling

its estimation, so the positional information is dephased as well

- * Train the CNN on authentic images only, to estimate the modulo-(2, 2) position of each pixel.
- The network will need to learn to rely on **demosaicing artefacts** to extract the **positional information**.
- * At **inference**: image forgeries lead to inconsistencies in the mosaic, which lead to errors in the output.
- Detect errors in the output to know the image is forged!

Automatic *a contrario* detection to control the tolerated rate of false positives

- * Globally: ratio p_0 of pixels that have their position incorrectly detected
- In a given rectangle: k out of n pixels wrongly detected
- Is there a forgery in this rectangle?
- * Threshold on the expected **number of false alarms** to statistically control the tolerated rate of false positives:

* Threshold at $10^{-3} \Rightarrow$ expect one false detection every 1000 images







