

Error Correction Codes, from Communication to Cryptography... Two sides of one *chip*

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Agenda

- 1 A brief history of ECC & Cryptography
- 2 Face of the chip - Error Correction Codes
- 3 Tails side of chip - Cryptographic algorithms
- 4 Conclusion

Once upon a time...



- Efforts to create a secure voice system had existed since the 1920s
- During World War II, C. Shannon works on SIGSALY, the first Secure Digital Voice Communications
- Mathematical definition of information and encrypted transmission over a noisy channel
- Shannon's paper "*A Mathematical Theory of Communication*"¹ is considered as the founding work of information theory
- Error Correction Codes are an integral part of encryption

Once upon a time...



SIGSALY² was a digital speech encryption system, developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories

¹ Shannon, C. E. (1948). *A mathematical theory of communication*, *The Bell System Technical Journal*, 27(3), 379-423; and the second part, in *The Bell System Technical Journal*, 27(4), 623-656.


²Source: National Cryptologic Museum

In our everyday lives

- The world's most important asset is information
- Protecting information is crucial to ensure a trusted global economy (E-commerce, online banking, social networking or emailing, online medical results, mobile phone communications, stock exchange...)
- These constraints generate two huge challenges:
 - Ensuring the same quality of information for any communication channel \Rightarrow **Error Correction Codes**
 - Ensuring the security of information for any communication channel \Rightarrow **Cryptography**
 - For a "reasonable" cost

Error Correction Codes Principles

- Error detection/correction on digital communications channels
- Two types of encoding methods
 - **Block encoding** - Each codeword is generated from one block of k message symbols
 - **Convolutional encoding** - Each codeword is generated from several consecutive message blocks




Some typical Error Correction Codes

- Hamming
- Reed-Salomon
- Goppa
- McEliece
- LDPC
- Turbo-Codes
- NB-LDPC
- Polar codes
- ...

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$$\mathbf{H} = \begin{matrix}
 \begin{matrix} v_1 & v_2 & v_3 & v_4 & v_5 & v_6 & v_7 \end{matrix} \\
 \begin{bmatrix}
 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1
 \end{bmatrix}
 \begin{matrix} c_1 \\ c_2 \\ c_3 \\ c_4 \end{matrix}
 \end{matrix}$$



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
SW LDPC - Intel XEON GOLD 6148						
LDPC code	Rows	Freq	Throughput	Latency	Power	
(16384, 4096)	1	3403 MHz	0.48 Gbps	34 μ s	169 W	
(16384, 4096)	40	2194 MHz	11.25 Gbps	60 μ s	343 W	
(64800, 20160)	1	3484 MHz	0.32 Gbps	201 μ s	173 W	
(64800, 20160)	40	2194 MHz	7.60 Gbps	345 μ s	370 W	
(22528, 6144)	1	3485 MHz	0.35 Gbps	64 μ s	173 W	
(22528, 6144)	40	2194 MHz	7.55 Gbps	122 μ s	345 W	

HW LDPC - Xilinx Ultrascale+ XCZU9EG-3FFVB1156E						
LDPC code	Rows	FPGA usage	Fmax	Throughput	Latency	Power
(16384, 4096)	1	17%	274 MHz	2.34 Gbps	7.2 μ s	3.29 W
(16384, 4096)	5	78%	274 MHz	11.65 Gbps	7.2 μ s	13.80 W
(64800, 20160)	1	22%	271 MHz	1.36 Gbps	47.5 μ s	4.74 W
(64800, 20160)	3	68%	270 MHz	4.08 Gbps	47.7 μ s	12.92 W
(22528, 6144)	1	31%	273 MHz	4.02 Gbps	6.1 μ s	3.63 W
(22528, 6144)	2	61%	273 MHz	8.04 Gbps	6.1 μ s	6.62 W

^aV. Pignoly et al., "Fair comparison of hardware and software LDPC decoder implementations for SDR space links", Int. Conf. ECS, 2020

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Performance Comparison of the Proposed GPU-Like Decoder Vs GPU-Based Decoders


Code	It.	Work	Device	#PU	Freq.	Mbps	T/S/DC
2384 × 1152	10	(Wang et al. 2011a)	GTN-470	448	1213	48.74	0.680
	5	our work	GPU-like	64	100	307.4	47.97
4096 × 2096	30	(Chang et al. 2011)	Tesla C1060	240	1300	1.30	0.064
	10	our work	GPU-like	64	100	178.1	27.83
4896 × 2448	50	(Paleo et al. 2011H)	8800-GTX	128	1350	7.70	0.045
	95	our work	GPU-like	64	100	70.94	11.55
8096 × 4096	30	(Chang et al. 2011)	Tesla C1060	240	1300	2.37	0.097
	10	our work	GPU-like	64	100	181.1	28.28
8096 × 4096	50	(Paleo et al. 2011H)	8800-GTX	128	1350	10.10	0.058
	95	our work	GPU-like	64	100	73.71	11.51
206 × 104	95	(Paleo et al. 2011H)	8800-GTX	128	1350	9.50	0.055
	25	our work	GPU-like	64	100	75.71	11.83
648 × 324	30	(Paleo et al. 2011a)	Ferret C2050	448	1150	107.8	0.209
	10	our work	GPU-like	64	100	158.8	24.97

^aV. Pignoly et al., "Fair comparison of hardware and software LDPC decoder implementations for SDR space links", Int. Conf. ECS, 2020

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Platform	Cores on SoC	Prog C/C++	F Mbits	Δ μs	NThr. Mbits	TNDC	E_r dB
[22] GTX-500E	6	1.80	85	72 [*]	47	1.3	227
[23] GTX-500	16	1.54	4	1660	1	0.0	10901
[24] GTX-400	15	1.40	123	50 [*]	35	1.3	339
[25] GTX-680	8	1.01	37	2657	27	0.1	878
[26] GTX-500	16	1.54	107	230 [*]	22	0.7	458
[27] I7-9778E	4	3.50	76	323	33	4.1	166
[27] I7-4960HQ	4	3.20	143	2731	67	4.2	41
[27] 2.E5-2680v3	24	2.50	716	3293	67	4.2	41
[27] I7-4960HQ	4	3.20	51	7693	24	1.5	114
[27] 2.E5-2680v3	24	2.50	237	9911	24	1.5	169
[27] I7-4960HQ	4	3.20	51	7693	24	0.7	114
[27] 2.E5-2680v3	24	2.50	457	10312	46	1.4	87
LeG I7-4960HQ	4	3.20	238	103	112	7.0	25
LeG 2.E5-2680v3	24	2.50	908	182	91	5.7	44
LeG I7-4960HQ	4	3.20	225	108	105	6.6	26
LeG 2.E5-2680v3	24	2.50	104	165	89	5.6	45
LeG I7-4960HQ	4	3.20	466	52	218	6.8	13
LeG 2.E5-2680v3	24	2.50	1755	84	174	5.4	23

^a Authors do not include CPU to/from GPU data transfer
 NThr. = (Thr. × Insn) / (Prog. × Cores)
 TNDC = (Thr. × Insn) / (Cores × Prog. × SIMD)
 $E_r = (TDFF / (Thr. × Insn)) × 10^3$


^a B. Le Gal and C. Migo, "Low-latency and high-throughput software turbo decoders on multi-core architectures", *Annals of Telecommunications*, 2019

PhD thesis of Mael Tourres³(2019-2024)

- Director: Pr. P. Coussy
- Advisors: C. Chavet and B. Le Gal
- Propose an approach to generate processor ISA extension dedicated to ECC
- Selected ECC for experiences : *LDPC, Turbo-Codes, NB-LDPC and Polar Codes*
- Objectives
 - Taking advantage of both worlds ASIC for speed and consumption, and CPU/GPU for adaptability
 - Taking advantage of data parallelism, to further enhance performance
 - Preserve the clock frequency
 - Do not degrade final chip area and power consumption


³ M. Tourres et al., "Extended RISC-V hardware architecture for future digital communication systems", 2021 IEEE 4th 5G World Forum (5GWF)

Architectural target



- Selected RISC-V cores: *PicoRV32, RISCY, IBEX and SCR1 (and CVA6 from OHG)*

New Instruction Design Flow




Last Experimental Results to be published⁴

	Mécanisme	Mode SIMD		Mode SIMD		Mode SIMD	
		2R	3R	2R	3R	2R	3R
Instr. à 2 reg.	IS_madd_p88	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_scale_p48	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sign_p48	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sadd_p88	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sub_p88	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_subrel_p88	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Instr. à 3 reg.	IS_shadd_p48	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sadd_shl2_p88	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sadd_shr2_p48	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sadd_sadd_p88	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sadd_sadd_p48	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IS_sadd_sadd_p88	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Total (2R/3R)		2	6(2/4)	7	11(7/4)	8	11(8/3)

Inter-tranzen		LDPG	Pulse		LDPG-NB	Turbo	
			SR	FC			SR
1a08	●	32 bits	2.1	6.2	5.7	7.1	7.9
1a08_1x4 (32 bits)	●	32 bits	2.1	6.2	5.7	7.1	7.9
	●	64 bits	1.6	5.8	5.8	7.5	12.2
	●	32 → 64 bits	2.1	5.7	1.6	1.9	1.6

Classical Cyphers

- Symmetric cyphering: DES, AES
- Asymmetric cyphering: PGP, SSL, RSA
- Elliptic Curve cyphering: ECDSA
- Signature: MD5/SHA1, SHA2, SHA3-Keccak



⁴ M. Tourres et al., "Specialized Scalar and SIMD instructions for Error Correction Codes Decoding on RISC-V processor", journal paper in progress

Standardization of RISC-V Cryptographic Extensions⁵


Scalar Cryptography

- Bit manipulation, Data independent execution, AES encryption/decryption, SHA2...
- Public review ended in Oct.17th, 2021
- **Ratified**

Vector Cryptography

- Same algorithms, but for element that are group of scalars
- Public review ended last year
- **Ratified**

Example of an AES extension on a RISC-V⁶



Source: J Savard, wikipedia

- Hardware assisted T-table approach for 32 and 64-bit architectures
- 32-bit architectures
 - Byte-wise round instructions
- Results on SCARV and Rocket
 - Limited area increase - x1,03 vs SCARV and 1,001 vs Rocket
 - SW memory footprint divided by a factor 2,8
 - Speedup upto x3,6 on SCARV and x2,5 on Rocket

⁵ see <https://github.com/riscv/riscv-crypto>

⁶ B. Marshall et al., "The design of scalar AES Instruction Set Extensions for RISC-V", <https://doi.org/10.46586/ches.v2021.11.109-136>

Hypothetical (?) weaknesses

- Mathematical problem that are really complex to solve (prime factorization, log computation...)
- The computing power required to crack them is titanic
- However, the literature is full of side-channel attacks... and ways of countering them
 - CPA, DPA, clock glitching...
 - Masking⁷, randomization...

All this could collapse the day a real quantum computer arrives in the laboratories

⁷ F. Lozachmeur and A. Tisserand, "A RISC-V Instruction Set Extension for Flexible Hardware/Software Protection of Cryptosystems Masked at High Orders", 66th IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS 2023)

A solution - Post-Quantum Cryptography

- The advent of post-quantum encryption has seen the return of ECC to favour
 - McEliece
 - NTRU MDPC
 - Bike
 - **Crystal Kyber/Dilithium**
- Expensive and complex algorithms
- For small system, a hardware accelerator could be a good option

Recent works

- Many studies explore these aspects
 - Processor that are able to change between classical and post-quantum cryptography
 - Dedicated PQC coprocessors design
 - Definition of PQC extension of ISA (cf. *PhD thesis of M. Tourres*)

PhD Thesis of Rémy Fumeron (2019-xx)



- Founded by PEC Cyber
- Director: Pr. Philippe Coussy
- Advisors: C. Chavet and K. Martin
- Subject: *Exploring an agile CPU that could handle both generic computation and PQC algorithm - Study of ECC code from the NIST on the Pulp platform*
- Research abandoned by the PhD student at the end of 2020




- Founded by PEPR - ARSENNE
- Thesis director: Dr Arnaud Tisserand (DR CNRS)
- Subject: *Exploring the design of an architecture that could handle both classical and PQC*

CRYPTTOR⁸ (CRYstals Polynomial HW acceleraTOR)

- This work proposes a coprocessor to handle Crystal PQC algorithms
- Integration on a RISC-V target

Collaboration with TIMA

A PhD thesis founded by CEA will start



⁸S. Di Matteo et al., "CRYPTTOR: A Memory-Unified NTT-Based Hardware Accelerator for Post-Quantum CRYSTALS Algorithms", IEEE Access, 2024, DOI:10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3367109

- Supervisor: Dr. C. Chavet
- Exploring RISC-V ISA extension for Post-Quantum Cryptography
- Target architecture: PicoRV32
- Test case: AES for classical cryptography and Crystal and McEliece for PQC
- The idea is to show that it is possible to extract some complex parts of a PQC algorithm, and to replace it by some dedicated new RISC-V instruction

- Current results
 - For AES, the PicoRV32 with custom instruction is upto twice as faster compared to the reference
 - For CRYSTAL Kyber 1024:
 - ~ 8.5% and ~ 18.5% of latency improvement in PQC encryption and decryption resp.
 - FMAX legacy: 58,27MHz, FMAX custom ext.: 82,85 MHz
 - Area overcost: 6,5% for our enriched PicoRV32
- Paper is coming...


Conclusion

- The worlds of error-correcting codes and cryptography are part and parcel of each other
- But, currently 'simple' mathematical problems (compared to ECC) made it possible to guarantee, a level of security that make encryption algorithms virtually unbreakable
- However, it is possible that in the medium/long term the emergence of quantum machines will disrupt all this
- As part of the NIST competition, ECC have made a comeback in the field of cryptography (McEliece, NTRU MDPC, Bike...)
- As it was the case when LDPCs were first discovered, these algorithms offer excellent performance, but at prohibitive cost
- To solve these problems, the solution may once again come from computer engineering...

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<https://xkcd.com/538> - Security