Fault Attacks Sensitivity of Public Parameters in the Dilithium Verification - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2024

Fault Attacks Sensitivity of Public Parameters in the Dilithium Verification

Résumé

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the verification algorithm of the CRYSTALS-Dilithium, focusing on a C reference implementation. Limited research has been conducted on its susceptibility to fault attacks, despite its critical role in ensuring the scheme’s security. To fill this gap, we investigate three distinct fault models - randomizing faults, zeroizing faults, and skipping faults - to identify vulnerabilities within the verification process. Based on our analysis, we propose a methodology for forging CRYSTALS-Dilithium signatures without knowledge of the secret key. Instead, we leverage specific types of faults during the verification phase and some properties about public parameters to make these signatures accepted. Additionally, we compared different attack scenarios after identifying sensitive operations within the verification algorithm. The most effective requires potentially fewer fault injections than targeting the verification check itself. Finally, we introduce a set of countermeasures designed to thwart all the identified scenarios rendering the verification algorithm intrinsically resistant to the presented attacks.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-04606868 , version 1 (10-06-2024)

Identifiants

Citer

Andersson Calle Viera, Alexandre Berzati, Karine Heydemann. Fault Attacks Sensitivity of Public Parameters in the Dilithium Verification. Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications - CARDIS 2023, Nov 2023, Amsterdam, Netherlands. pp.62-83, ⟨10.1007/978-3-031-54409-5_4⟩. ⟨hal-04606868⟩
0 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More