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# UPCARE: User Privacy-preserving Cancer Research Platform

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**Keywords:** distributed analytics, medical data management, privacy-preserving computation, cryptography, homomorphic cryptography, attribute based cryptography.

**Abstract:** Cancer research has entered a new era with the advent of big data and advanced computational analytics. However, the utilization of such medical data poses significant privacy and security challenges. This paper presents a comprehensive examination of User Privacy-preserving Cancer Research Platform (UPCARE), a research platform that enables the secure and ethical sharing of sensitive medical cancer data for collaborative researchers, while safeguarding patient privacy. To our knowledge, only a few approaches have been pursued so far in building a uniform cancer research platform protected by modern cryptography. We try to provide a uniform platform for research UPCARE leverages cutting-edge cryptographic access methods, like attribute-based encryption, as well as data anonymization techniques, like multiparty homomorphic encryption, to allow secure data sharing with researchers, ensuring compliance with stringent regulatory requirements. This paper discusses the architecture, methodologies, and applications of UPCARE, highlighting its potential to improve cancer research and accelerate advancements in precision medicine while preserving user privacy.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Cancer research has made remarkable strides in recent years, driven by recent advancements in genomics, computational biology, and data analytics. However, these exciting developments come with a unique set of challenges, particularly concerning the privacy and security of sensitive medical data, especially in the case of cancer data. Up until now, the data silos in the different cancer registries are very heterogeneous in nearly all aspects, for example like the utilized software, and are therefore nearly impossible to combine. The critical need to balance data sharing for collaborative research and patient privacy protection has never been more evident.


The conventional methods of data sharing and col-


laboration in the medical and research community are often fraught with privacy risks, compliance issues, and ethical dilemmas. Striking the right balance between unlocking the full potential of data-driven cancer research and safeguarding the privacy and rights of individuals is a complex and pressing challenge.


Furthermore, the failure to address privacy and security concerns can lead to data breaches, reputational damage, and legal consequences for research institutions. In an interconnected world, where data breaches are a constant threat, safeguarding sensitive health data is paramount.


### 1.1 Regulatory context

The significance of privacy in cancer research extends far beyond legal and ethical obligations. While strict regulatory frameworks such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) enforce the protection of patients' privacy, the ethical and so-

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cietal implications are equally profound. Additionally, use cases need to respect national regulations, which specifies what kind of information needs to be collected, how it should be made available to the public for allowing cross-sectoral impact of the cancer research as well as safeguarding the work split and responsibilities between different cancer registries as well as the entities communicating with the registries.

## 1.2 Research Objectives

The primary objective of this paper is to present a holistic examination of UPCARE, which was designed to address the privacy and security challenges associated with cancer research. This platform aims to facilitate the secure and ethical sharing of sensitive cancer data among researchers while ensuring compliance with stringent regulatory requirements. Specifically, the research objectives include:

- Exploring the challenges and privacy risks in cancer research data sharing and computing.
- Assessing the potential use cases and applications of the platform.
- Describing the architecture and functionalities of UPCARE.
- Evaluating the cryptographic security and privacy measurements taken, to ensure compliance with stringent regulatory requirements .
- Outlining some future directions and challenges in the field of privacy-preserving computation in the area of cancer research.

The goal of UPCARE is to break down the restrictive data silos within the cancer registry landscape and enable the combined usage of existing data sets while preserving patient privacy. A user-centered access decision and consent process should also allow patients to make purpose-specific decisions and avoid giving blanket data access. Instead of reinventing the concept of a cancer registry from the ground up or making unrealistic assumptions during the restructuring of current processes and organizations, UPCARE adopts a pragmatic perspective and respects the existing standards and processes. The focus is on researching, developing, and demonstrating novel cryptographic technologies that make personal data usable while simultaneously protecting individuals' privacy. We support two different research scenarios, which will be described in Section 3 in particular.

## 2 Related Work

Projects related to the efforts undertaken in UPCARE include the national Network Genomic Medicine (nNGM) Lung Cancer, a collaborative research alliance of the German Oncology Centers<sup>1</sup>, and the German Biobank Node (BBMRI)<sup>2</sup>. Such medical research platforms usually face the same problem as UPCARE: Heterogeneous data silos must be integrated and a consolidated data pool must be provided to researchers that want to perform any kind of data analysis as part of their investigations. All platforms fall under one or the other data protection regulation whenever they are actually operated in the real world. And while there exist tool boxes to support data protection<sup>3</sup>, such efforts primarily address regulatory compliance and consent management. What makes UPCARE unique is its use of state-of-the-art cryptographic mechanisms to ensure data privacy for patients, which also minimizes the attack surfaces.

One of the foundational works that introduced the concept of privacy-preserving data mining and discussed methods for protecting individual privacy in the context of data analysis was written by Agrawal et al. (Agrawal and Srikant, 2000). Academic approaches in the literature are often based on the use of a blockchain, like the general architecture that was introduced by Yue et al. (Yue et al., 2016). It utilizes a blockchain to enable patients to own, control and share their data easily and securely without violating privacy, which provides a new potential way to improve the intelligence of healthcare systems while keeping patient data private. Some approaches try to combine blockchain usage with attribute based encryption (Pournaghi et al., 2020). Other approaches only seem to be based on attribute based encryption (Barua et al., 2011; Narayan et al., 2010).

Geva et al. (Geva et al., 2023) tried to access cancer registry data in a privacy preserving manner through the use of Homomorphic Encryption (HE). The authors present a tool set for collaborative privacy-preserving analysis of oncological data using multiparty fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), although most of the available solutions in literature describe very detailed and specific use cases (Son et al., 2021). We designed UPCARE from the ground up in such a way, that the utilized ABE scheme could be easily swapped, in order to test different candidates regarding performance and efficiency, like Bethencourt et al, (Bethencourt et al., 2007), Sahai et al. (Sahai and Waters, 2008), Lewko et al. (Lewko and

<sup>1</sup><https://nngm.de/en/>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.bbMRI.de/>

<sup>3</sup><https://www.tmf-ev.de/unsere-arbeit/projekte/magic>

Waters, 2011), Müller et al. (Müller et al., 2009) and Bramm et al. (Bramm et al., 2018). Because of its stable performance and specific design decisions, like its open world attribute setup, FAME in the KP-ABE version by Agrawal et al. (Agrawal and Chase, 2017) was chosen to be integrated into the platform. Thanks to the foundational work of Gentry et al. (Gentry, 2009) and others (Van Dijk et al., 2010) schemes like CKKS could be developed. This project vastly employs Lattigo to do HE computations, which implements a multi-party variant of the CKKS scheme by Cheon et al. (Cheon et al., 2017).

Compared to all the other mentioned approaches above, UPCARE tries to unify and simplify both privacy preserving cryptographic techniques, namely Attributed Based Encryption (ABE) and Homomorphic Encryption (HE) in an overall architecture. This further improves privacy preserving data access to cancer registries for eligible researchers.

### 3 USE CASES

The following two use cases exemplify UPCARE's commitment to cutting-edge privacy-preserving technologies and show how privacy friendly access to cancer registry data is possible. In the first scenario, UPCARE employs Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption (HE) to enable secure collaboration among multiple cancer research institutions. This approach allows researchers to analyze encrypted data without compromising individual patient details, fostering collective insights while preserving confidentiality. In the second use case, Attributed Based Encryption (ABE), coupled with a distinct "patient disagreement" attribute, empowers patients to exercise granular control over the sharing of their personal cancer data. This user-centric approach allows patients to make purpose-specific decisions by attaching conditions to their data. This ensures that the access, which was granted by implicit patient consent in the beginning can be withdrawn by any patient on request. Together, these use cases demonstrate UPCARE's pragmatic yet innovative approach to unlocking the potential of cancer registry data without compromising individual privacy.

#### 3.1 Use-Case 1 (UC-1): Secure Multi-Institutional Data Collaboration

This use case ensures that sensitive patient information remains confidential throughout the collaborative

research process, allowing institutions to glean valuable insights collectively without compromising individual privacy.

**Data Collaboration Setup** Each participating institution encrypts its cancer registry data using some customized public key. The encrypted data is shared with a processing entity responsible for performing aggregated analyses, the query platform.

**Secure Data Analysis** The query platform can perform computations on the encrypted data without decrypting it, thanks to HE. By leveraging HE, it can perform computations directly on the encrypted data, eliminating the need for decryption and safeguarding individual patient details. This approach enables aggregated statistical analyses and patterns to be derived without ever exposing sensitive information. Consequently, the platform remains completely data-blind, upholding both patients' rights as data subjects and cancer registry managers' confidentiality obligations. Aggregated statistical analyses and patterns can be derived without exposing individual patients' details.

**Privacy-Preserving Results** The final results are sent back to the requesting researchers in an encrypted form. Only authorized researchers with the necessary decryption keys can access the detailed results and decrypt them.

#### 3.2 Use-Case 2 (UC-2): Patient-Driven Data Sharing Control

This use case empowers patients to actively participate in and control the sharing of their health data for research purposes, contributing to a more transparent and patient-centric approach within the cancer research ecosystem.

**Attribute-Based Encryption Setup** Patient data is encrypted using attribute-based encryption. Attributes include medical information, research categories, and a specific "patient agreement" attribute.

**User-Centric Data Sharing Decision** Patients are presented with requests for data access, specifying the intended purpose (e.g., research study, clinical trial). Patients can attach conditions to their data, such as time limitations or restricted access to specific set of attributes.

**Selective Data Disclosure** The encrypted data may only be decrypted by researchers that meet the specified, policy based conditions, i.e. where the attributes match the policy. A Patient disagreement attribute acts as an additional layer of patient access control,




Figure 1: The UPCARE platform components, composed of an authorization layer with a KS, a central QP and one or more PP's attached to existing cancer registries.

ensuring data is accessed only with implicit patient consent, and not with explicit patient dis-consent.

**Audit Trail and Transparency** A transparent audit trail is maintained, detailing when and how patient data is accessed. Patients have visibility into who accessed their data and for what purpose.

## 4 UPCARE Platform

The success of the UPCARE platform hinges on the synergy of multiple pivotal components: the Query Platform (QP), Key Server (KS), and Privacy Proxies (PP). The QP serves as central point for researchers and institutions, providing a secure interface for querying and analyzing cancer registry data without compromising individual privacy. Complementing this, the KS acts as the guardian of Attributed Based Encryption (ABE) key material, ensuring secure and authorized access to encrypted data. Meanwhile, the PP are the owners of the data requested by the researchers. In specific applications like those explored in UPCARE, these privacy proxies (Privacy Proxies (PP)s) would be deployed by cancer registries, at either national or regional level, within their data infrastructure. Functioning as vigilant intermediaries, they act as safe gates to the registries' data management systems, as illustrated in Figure 1. Together, these components form a robust and interconnected framework, embodying UPCARE's commitment to fostering collaborative research while safeguarding the sensitive health information that propels advancements in cancer research. A graphical representation of the foundational architecture can be seen in Figure 1.

## 4.1 Components

The UPCARE platform is composed of three main components, namely a Query Platform (QP), a Key Server (KS) and two or more Privacy Proxies (PP).

### 4.1.1 Query Platform (QP)

The central QP is responsible for accepting UC-1 or UC-2 query requests by authorized researchers via a web interface. It is also responsible for presenting the query result to the researcher. Its web interface needs to be able to run the required cryptographic algorithms and protocols required for each use case. UC-1 requires the web interface to be able to decrypt ABE ciphertexts with a given secret key. In comparison, UC-2 requires the web interface to be able to generate HE key material, as well as decrypt HE ciphertexts.

**UC-1 queries** are accompanied by ABE policies. An ABE policy is dynamically generated and fetched from the KS, in form of a secret key, on each reload of or interaction with the web interface. The secret key is used to decrypt the results of the UC-1 query request. The request itself is based on plaintext JSON and is defined by a selection, a projection, an upper limit and a choice of PPs. On the left side of the UI the selection, projection and choice of PP can be configured for each query. On the bottom of the UI the temporary generated key material is seamlessly integrated into the web interface.

**UC-2 queries** are based on Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption (MHE) (Mouchet et al., 2021). A temporary researcher key pair, composed of public and private keys, is first generated by deriving it from a common random polynomial, given as reference string. The common random polynomial is pro-

vided by the QP. The public key is used to re-encrypt (through so called key-switching) the final result of the UC-2 query request to the researcher, so that he can, later on, decrypt the data with the corresponding private key. The request itself is based on plain-text JSON and is defined by a selection, a projection, a computation method, and an upper limit of results. As we want to protect the privacy of the patients, the researcher has no information and no choice on which PPs are going to be used in a UC-2 query. Again, on the bottom of the UI the temporary generated key material is seaming-less integrated into the web interface.

#### 4.1.2 Key Server (KS)

The central KS is responsible for creating, editing and holding access policies, as well as deriving ABE secret keys from those stored policies. Since we regenerate the key material before each query dynamically, it is in our interest to create the policy at the time the query is formulated on the QP. This approach also allows short-term changes to patient consent to be included in the key material. Therefore the decision was made to integrate a Key Policy Attributed Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme in our platform. The corresponding derived secret keys give the researchers the right to decrypt those ciphertexts, where the attributes exactly match the policy. The component is part of the authorization layer, which allows internal or external Identity providers to be attached to the system, via OpenID Connect. This allows researchers to identify themselves via foreign institutions.

**ABE attribute universe** The attribute universe is defined by all PPs in the network during the initialization phase. In this phase all  $i$  PPs query their external cancer registry database for all available field descriptors  $d_j$ . The field descriptors are collected on the QP, where their union  $U = \bigcup_{j=0}^{j=i} d_j$  is computed.

The set of all descriptors  $U$ , together with a special additional patient-centric disagreement attribute  $d_{dis}$  form the attribute universe  $U$ .

**Patient disagreement** Based on legal decisions made in Germany, each German cancer patient gives implicit agreement for the usage of the available medical data. A patient can afterwards opt-out by giving explicit disagreement. This workflow is now integrated into the UPCARE platform by storing the attribute  $d_{dis}$  in the context of a registered patient, on his disagreement. The central KS allows a patient to store  $d_{dis}$  for a specific research project or researcher in an additional web front-end. The complete workflow can be seen in Figure 2.

#### 4.1.3 Privacy Proxies (PP)

Two or more distributed PP are responsible for giving access to the underlying cancer register DBMS in a privacy preserving manner, according to the given use cases UC-1 and UC-2. Each PP is composed of three internal modules, an ABE module, a Privacy Preserving Aggregation (PPAG) module and a data module. The data module is responsible for importing and converting all external data sources, provided by the cancer registries, into a uniform JSON data format. The data is not imported in a bulk, but rather is accessed dynamically, on request by the ABE module or the PPAG module.

**The ABE module** The abe module is responsible for encrypting the plain-text input data from the data module using ABE. It does so by first parsing the key-value data sets for a specific patient, defined by the selection criteria of the query. Followed by the parsing is the encryption of all values with the key as corresponding attribute. The ABE module therefore uses the master key (downloaded from the key server on initialization) to calculate ciphertext values for all given keys. The attribute set is extended by  $d_{dis}$ , if and only if the patient has expressed his disagreement on the key server interface via opting out. More details on the flow of data in the overall architecture is given in section 4.4.1.

**The PPAG module** is responsible for encrypting the plain-text input data from the data module using a particular HE scheme named multi-party homomorphic encryption (MHE) (Mouchet et al., 2021) which allows the secure computation of their sum and a collaborative decryption of this result encrypted with a public key generated from multiple secret keys. Thanks to the use of MHE, neither the researcher nor any single privacy proxy can access the individual encrypted inputs before their aggregation. The aggregation is performed collaboratively through the query platform. Hence, the module allows a researcher the dynamically generate a key pair in the browser and use this key pair to generate the overall encryption key and further aggregate encrypted data from the PPs in a privacy preserving manner. More details on the flow of data in the overall architecture is given in section 4.4.2.

## 4.2 Threat Model

The main threat model in the whole query process is an honest-but-curious (HBC) QP who follows the protocol, but carries out an insider attack on the data flowing through itself. A successful insider attack on the QP would compromise the data of all connected




Figure 2: UC-1 in the Query phase. White boxes are coded in WebAssembly. Blue boxes are coded in Rust. Purple boxes are coded in Go.

cancer registries, and thus would be the worst case. PPs are responsible for ensuring the privacy protection of the cancer patients whose data they own. Because of this, they have no reason to deviate from the protocol or exchange information with other actors. Consequently, PPs are also considered HBC. The researchers use the platform to perform some research over the cancer data. We assume that researchers always act according to their best self-interest. This means that researchers can deviate from the protocol if this allows them to have access to more information. For this reason, the researcher is considered malicious. In addition to this setting, we consider that PPs can not communicate with each other, privately, and that the query platform can collude with the Researcher.

### 4.3 Implementation

Our envisioned architecture ensures a secure, efficient, and privacy-preserving environment for cancer research, aligning with the goals of UPCARE. The architecture leverages Rust’s performance, memory safety, and concurrency features while incorporating state of the art cryptographic techniques to protect sensitive patient data. Its main features are:

**Front-end** The user interface where researchers and authorized patients interact with the system. The UI was built using sveltekit, HTML, CSS, and JavaScript, with additional Rust-generated (ABE) and Go-generated (HE) browser-capable cryptographic code (each compiled using WebAssembly).

**Rocket Servers** The core back-end APIs (of KS, QP and PP) are implemented in Rust using the Rocket web framework. Each back-end API manages incoming HTTP requests and orchestrates

communication from the front-end up until the PPs. Every API handles a different, specific action from authentication and query processing to response generation.

**Query Platform** A module within the Rocket server responsible for processing and executing queries on the cancer registry data. It allows either personal ABE or statistical HE queries. The QP utilizes secure multiparty homomorphic encryption to perform computations on encrypted data or attribute based encryption to allow encrypted data access. The PPAG module implements privacy-preserving algorithms for data analysis, currently sum, average and count are available as options.

**Key Server** The KS manages ABE keys used for the decryption of sensitive, i.e. personal patient data. It ensures the secure key distribution and thus allows access control. The KS implements OAuth 2.0 for secure authorization and data access.

**Privacy Proxies** The PPs are intermediate components between the cancer registry data sources and the QP. They implement cryptographic techniques to preserve individual patient privacy during data analysis or in the case of personal data access request by a researcher. The ABE module was implemented in Rust, while the HE module was implemented in Go. They both act as guardians of sensitive information, ensuring that only aggregated and privacy-preserving HE encrypted statistical results or either attribute based encrypted patient record data sets are exposed to the query platform.

**Logging and Auditing** The platform implements logging and auditing mechanisms to track researcher activities and data access on each of its components. This facilitates transparency and compliance with






Figure 3: UC-2 in the Query phase. White boxes are coded in WebAssembly. Blue boxes are coded in Rust. Purple boxes are coded in Go.

privacy regulations.

**External Interfaces** Each component provides an API for integration with external systems or research applications. This procedure adheres to industry standards and interoperability protocols.

**Adaptability** The data import module allows to import data from various sources like NoSQL, SQL, CSV and so on. Therefore the system can be adopted to various cancer databases, as long as a mapping between input data format and the format standard, based on FHIR, can be built. More details on FHIR usage can be found in Section 5.1.

## 4.4 Integration

Both privacy-preserving components, the ABE and PPAG modules, are seamlessly integrated into both the individual PPs and the overall system architecture through a standardized query protocol based on JSON. Before responding to user queries, both modules require an initialization phase upon system startup, followed by a dedicated query phase where they actively process queries.

### 4.4.1 ABE flow

**Initialization phase** A master secret key and a public key are generated on the KS based on all FHIR data types available on the connected cancer registry databases, which are queried using the corresponding PP's. In addition to the FHIR attributes, an attribute

”disagreement” is added to the set of attributes, in order to represent patient disagreement. The public key is distributed via a secure channel<sup>4</sup> to the PP's, where they are used to encrypt patient data from the connected cancer registry database. A local database is flushed and initialized on the KS, where user disagreement can be stored permanently.

**Query phase** Once the key generation is finished, the researcher sends a query to the query platform, which forwards it to each of the PP's. Each proxy  $pp_i$  queries the corresponding data from the connected cancer registry dbms and then encrypts the result using the public key  $PK$ , obtained from the KS and the value of the current key as the current attribute. The encrypted results are collected and combined on the query platform before they are handed back to the UI query interface, where a eligible researcher is able the decrypt the results directly inside his browser, with the help of his secret key  $SK$  and the decryption algorithm compiled in Wasm. This exact flow can be seen in figure 2.

### 4.4.2 PPAG flow

In this section, we describe the PPAG flow which makes use of a dedicated multi-party homomorphic encryption (MHE) scheme (Mouchet et al., 2021) inspired by the work in (Bozdemir et al., 2023).

<sup>4</sup>protected by the standard https protocol



**Initialization** This phase consists of the generation of the common public key used for encryption by all privacy proxies participating in the actual aggregation operation. To collaboratively generate the public key derived from MHE (Mouchet et al., 2021), each party generates a public key from their secret key (by encrypting a zero-message) and an initially distributed/agreed common reference string. The query platform performs the aggregation of these public keys (a simple sum) in order to obtain the common public key which is then distributed to privacy proxies.

**Query phase** Once the key generation is finished, the researcher sends the query to the query platform which forwards it to the privacy proxies. Each proxy  $pp_i$  first determines how many instances of its database it is gonna respond with. This number  $c_i$  is encrypted with the public key and sent to the query platform. The query platform aggregates these numbers and the obtained total number is  $j$  decrypted and compared with a threshold value  $k$ . Only if this threshold is exceeded, then the actual aggregation phase can start. Each proxy encrypts its data with the common public key and sends it to the query platform which aggregates these data similar to the previous aggregation operation. This sum is further resent to the proxies for collaborative key switching so that the result is encrypted with the researcher’s public key at the end. This exact flow can be seen in figure 3.

#### 4.4.3 Common query protocol

The queries of both uses cases are covered by a common, JSON-based query language. At first, a request is generated on the UI, which is then added to either a personal or a statistical query. Each request is transformed into a Job on the QP and is stored locally in a database for further procession by the QPs. As soon as there is a new entry in the local database, the PP’s start to work on the request. In a UC-1 query the PP’s encrypt the corresponding query results using the ABE key material. In a UC-2 query the PP’s encrypt the corresponding query results using the HE key material. After finishing their work, they write back the result into the Job database. As soon as the job is finished, the results are streamed back to the researcher.

## 5 Evaluation

The evaluation of the Privacy-Preserving Cancer Research Platform (UPCARE) is paramount to ascertain

its effectiveness in addressing the complex challenges inherent in collaborative medical research while safeguarding patient privacy. In this section, we present a comprehensive evaluation of UPCARE, focusing on its utilized dataset, its query performance, the system scalability, a security analysis and additionally compliance with regulatory frameworks. By scrutinizing the platform’s capabilities and limitations, we aim to provide insights into its real-world applicability, resilience to potential threats, and ability to meet the evolving needs of cancer research stakeholders. Through rigorous testing and analysis, we endeavor to validate the integrity of UPCARE as a robust and privacy-conscious solution poised to drive innovation in the field of cancer research while maintaining the highest standards of data privacy and security.

### 5.1 Dataset description

To address a future compatibility question a Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resource (FHIR) (Ayaz et al., 2021) format of Health Level 7 Standards Organization (HL7) was used to store and request the patient data. The Format is supported by FHIR Data Storage module based on the FIDES System (Bundesdruckerei, 2018) as a native format such that no additional conversion for data processing is required. The patient data are high sensitive data. For a purpose of test and proof of concept a generated patient dataset of Synthea (Walonoski et al., 2018) was used in the project. The dataset contains one million synthetic patient medical records, encoded in HL7 FHIR including demographic information, medical history, medications, and lab results.

### 5.2 Security Analysis

Our purposed UPCARE solution solves the problem of an (hbc) QP, by encrypting all plaintext data on each PP, before arriving at the QP. Even when calculations are done on the QP, as in UC-2, QP is not able to leak the corresponding, underlying plaintext data. Both personal as well as statistical data are protected from leaking at a central platform through means of encryption. Indeed, in UC-2, thanks to MHE, neither the QP and the researcher nor any single PP can access the encrypted data before aggregation. The aggregation is performed collaboratively between PPs through the QP. At the end of the protocol, a collaborative key switching is performed on the aggregated data to enable its decryption by the actual researcher, only. Regarding malicious insider attacks on the local PP at the cancer registries, our proposed solution does unfortunately not protect from data leakage, as

the medical plaintext data must be readable by the PP for encryption. As previously mentioned these PP are considered HBC, only.

### 5.3 Performance

In this section we evaluate the performance of both Queries, i.e. UC-1 which involves secure data retrieval based on specific patient attributes and UC-2 which involves aggregated data analysis and statistical computations on encrypted data.

#### 5.3.1 Methodology

The following methodology was used to measure performance Initially, execute multiple UC-1 queries across a range of test scenarios, varying the number of attributes and the complexity of search criteria. Then measure the query response time from the initiation of the query to the retrieval of results, capturing the time taken for data processing, encryption/decryption, and transmission. Execute multiple UC-2 queries using sample datasets of varying sizes, encompassing diverse research categories and demographic attributes. Finally, Measure the query response time for the integrated statistical operations.

#### 5.3.2 Results

The following results were thereby gathered regarding UC-1 queries: The performance of a UC-1 query exhibits a positive correlation with the number of attributes and the complexity of search criteria. On average, queries with fewer attributes and simpler search criteria demonstrate faster response times, typically ranging from 5 seconds to 25 seconds. This behaviour can be seen in figure 4 However, as the number of attributes and search complexity increases, the query response time may exceed 25 seconds, particularly in scenarios involving large datasets or complex attribute-based access policies. The response time can be optimized by an additional ABE ciphertext cache on the QP.

Regarding UC-2 queries, the following results were collected: This query demonstrates competitive performance in conducting aggregated data analysis, with response times typically ranging from 2000 milliseconds to 15000 milliseconds. The query response time exhibits scalability with dataset size, as larger datasets incur marginally longer processing times due to increased computational complexity. Complex statistical computations, such as correlation analysis across multiple attributes, may result in slightly longer response times, particularly in datasets with extensive attribute diversity.

Factors such as encryption/decryption overhead and data transmission latency contribute to fluctuations in query response time across different scenarios. Optimization strategies, such as indexing, caching, and parallel processing, may be explored to mitigate latency and enhance the efficiency of secure data retrieval operations.

#### 5.3.3 Conclusion

The performance of UC-2 queries underscores the need for efficiency in homomorphic encryption operations. Despite the computational overhead associated with encrypted data processing, UC-2 queries maintain satisfactory response times, facilitating timely insights and decision-making in cancer research. Further optimization opportunities, such as algorithmic refinement and distributed computing strategies, may be explored to enhance the scalability and efficiency of aggregated data analysis operations. The evaluation of query performance in UPCARE highlights the platform's capability to deliver secure and efficient data retrieval and analysis functionalities. By systematically analyzing the response times of UC-1 and UC-2 queries across diverse scenarios, we gain valuable insights into the platform's performance characteristics and identify opportunities for optimization. Moving forward, continued refinement and optimization efforts will be essential to ensure that UPCARE maintains high-performance standards while fulfilling the evolving demands of privacy-preserving cancer research.

## 6 Use Case Evaluation

Cancer registration is an essential component of the health care system and provides valuable insights into the prevalence, treatment and outcomes of oncological diseases. The comprehensive understanding of cancer epidemiology and the evaluation of oncological care heavily rely on the systematic collection and analysis of data. In Germany, the data on oncological care is reported to the German state cancer registries by the medical facilities involved in the treatment according to the standardized oncological basic data set (Tumorzentren eV, 2015). Various essential pieces of information are recorded, including patient details, diagnosis, surgical interventions, radiotherapy, systemic therapy, and the course of the disease leading to death (oBDS2021, 2021). Consequently, the cancer registry is a systematic collection of information in the form of a database on tumor diseases. The evaluation of the use cases




Figure 4: Performance, measured as query response time in seconds.

for the platform is essentially based on the expertise of the Cancer Registry Rhineland-Palatinate and the Rhineland-Palatinate legal framework for the provision of personal patient data from the cancer registry for research purposes.

## 6.1 Current Situation

Cancer registries offer epidemiological and clinical evaluations for all tumor entities, facility-related evaluations as well as individual evaluations for specific inquiries. For research purposes, aggregated, pseudonymized or personal data can be provided for precisely defined scientific oncological questions relating to cancer prevention, cancer care and research into the causes of cancer (KRRLP, 2012). Requesting and providing data for research purposes is a manual process, as there is currently no standardized, secure request platform for cancer registry data for researchers. The application is subject to an internal formal and content-related review. In the case of a request for personal data, additional authorisations from the Ministry of Science and Health, an ethics vote and, if necessary, a hearing of the State Commissioner for Data Protection and Information Security are required (LKR215, 2015).

The possibility of requesting personal patient data for research purposes has rarely been utilized to date. The requested data is provided in a secure way. If personal patient data is requested from several German cancer registries, each registry enables data access via its own channel. A separate application must be submitted to the respective registry for each cancer registry from which data is requested. In such cases, several ethics committees are involved, each overseeing the ethical considerations for the registry in question.

As can be seen above, obtaining personal patient data for a research project is a time-consuming process for the applicant. Especially when data is requested from several cancer registries.

## 6.2 Data Query via UPCARE

The use cases were evaluated from the perspective of the cancer registry with regard to the following aspects:

**Data Privacy and Security** Even with aggregated data, there is a certain risk of drawing conclusions about individual patients. Numerous factors contribute to the creation of a high re-identification potential. These factors may relate to data characteristics, such as the uniqueness of feature expressions and their combinations, as well as temporal and spatial information. However, the likelihood of successful re-identification depends on external knowledge, whether publicly or non-publicly available, along with other influencing factors (Drechsler and Pauly, 2024). By using HE, it is possible to securely aggregate data without exposing individual patient details. The encrypted aggregated data can be analyzed to derive general patterns or statistics, reducing the risk of re-identification of specific cases based on unique characteristics. From a cancer registry perspective, this is a big step towards patient privacy. ABE leads the cancer registry to a standardized data protection and data security concept for the provision of personal patient data for research purposes.

**Accessibility** UPCARE provides researchers with easy and secure access to a diverse range of cancer data. The platform can be accessed at any time via a web interface and enables secure data queries from the connected cancer registries at a central hub.

**Feasibility** The platform makes it possible to query whether there is enough patient data for a study. The applicant formulates the characteristics of the enquiry and receives an aggregated result, for example the number of patients, their gender and age. If the result is sufficient for a cohort, the applicant can request the patient data from the selected cancer registries via the platform. In addition, by combining the cancer

registries via the platform, there is a good chance of collecting sufficient data on rare tumors.

**Interoperability** HL7 FHIR<sup>5</sup> is the chosen standard for communication between the platform and the cancer registries. The FHIR implementation is currently based on FHIR resources generated by Synthea (Walonoski et al., 2018). This is a synthetic patient generator that produces realistic but completely fictitious health data.

## 7 Conclusions

In conclusion, the Privacy-Preserving Cancer Research Platform (UPCARE) represents a significant advancement in the field of cancer research, emphasizing the paramount importance of preserving patient privacy while fostering collaborative data analysis. Through the integration of advanced cryptographic techniques such as ABE and HE, UPCARE ensures that sensitive health data remains confidential and secure throughout the research process. The fine-grained access control facilitated by ABE empowers patients to maintain control over their data, while HE enables secure and private computations on encrypted data, safeguarding individual privacy. Moreover, the automation of data processing and the use of cryptography not only enhance privacy but also expedite the speed of data requests and analysis, facilitating faster insights and discoveries in cancer research. In this way, data privacy-friendly analysis methods are developed and integrated into the architecture of cancer registries, which, on the one hand, maintain a high level of data protection and, on the other hand, provide meaningful findings for cancer research.

### 7.1 Future Work

Identifying avenues for future work is crucial for advancing the Privacy-Preserving Cancer Research Platform (UPCARE) and addressing emerging challenges in the field. Some potential directions for future work include: Exploring advanced privacy-preserving techniques, such as differential privacy or secure multi-party computation, to further fortify data protection and confidentiality mechanisms within UPCARE. Investigate ways to integrate these techniques seamlessly into the existing UPCARE architecture without compromising performance. Embrace emerging technologies such as blockchain and federated learning to augment data security, transparency, and collaboration within the UPCARE cancer research ecosystem. Investigate opportunities to leverage these tech-

<sup>5</sup><https://www.hl7.org/fhir/>

nologies to enhance data provenance, traceability, and verifiability while preserving patient privacy. Continuously optimize UPCARE’s scalability and performance to accommodate the growing volume and complexity of cancer registry data. Explore methods to streamline data processing, improve query response times, and reduce computational overhead while maintaining privacy guarantees.

By embarking on these future work initiatives, UPCARE can evolve into a dynamic and adaptive platform that not only advances cancer research but also serves as a model for privacy-preserving data sharing and collaborative innovation in healthcare.

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## Acronyms

- ABE** Attributed Based Encryption. 2–7, 10, 11
- GDPR** General Data Protection Regulation. 1
- HE** Homomorphic Encryption. 2–6, 10, 11
- HIPAA** Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 1
- KP-ABE** Key Policy Attributed Based Encryption. 5
- KS** Key Server. 4–7
- MHE** Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption. 4
- PP** Privacy Proxies. 4–9
- PPAG** Privacy Preserving Aggregation. 5–7
- QP** Query Platform. 4–6, 8, 9
- UC-1** Use-Case 1. 3, 4, 6, 9, 10
- UC-2** Use-Case 2. 3–5, 7, 9, 10
- UPCARE** User Privacy-preserving Cancer Research Platform. 1–5, 8–11