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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Public Economics Année : 2019

Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization

Damien Bol
Konstantinos Matakos
Orestis Troumpounis
  • Fonction : Auteur
Dimitrios Xefteris
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.

Dates et versions

hal-04564048 , version 1 (30-04-2024)

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Citer

Damien Bol, Konstantinos Matakos, Orestis Troumpounis, Dimitrios Xefteris. Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization. Journal of Public Economics, 2019, 178, pp.104065. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065⟩. ⟨hal-04564048⟩

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