

Extreme digital content: study of radical conversations by ultra-right groups in France

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This study analyzes the radical discourses of the ultra-right online, using a corpus of 5,215 sentences from various digital platforms. It examines methods of recruitment and propagation of extremist ideas, highlighting the use of emotional manipulation strategies. The study's methodology is based on the analysis of a corpus of 5,215 sentences from radical online groups, collected on various platforms. It uses text mining and semantic analysis techniques to identify and categorize themes and strategies in ultra-right discourse, enabling an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms of online radicalization. The research details the influence of digital technology on radicalization, noting the ease with which extremist hate speech can be disseminated. Three "galaxies" of discourse are identified: distrust, defense and attack, reflecting different facets of ultra-right ideology. The study addresses the transformations of hate targets, from anti-Semitism to Islamophobia, and analyzes the complexity and dynamics of radical discourses, highlighting their impact on society and the importance of monitoring them to prevent radicalization.

Introduction

The Internet today is a place of extreme discourse and content, enabled by a democratization of information (Alava et al., 2017; Benson, 2014). Online violence, such as humiliation, cyberstalking and hate speech, is exploited by extremist groups via various platforms (Dilmaç, 2017; Blaya, 2018; Monnier et al., 2021). In response, France has passed laws and set up observatories to combat cyber-hate (National Assembly, 2019; law of June 24, 2020). This violent online content, often targeting young people, uses emotionally manipulative strategies (Sageman, 2014). Our study examines how digital technology fosters radical recruitment. We will analyze 5,215 phrases from radical groups to understand their recruitment methods, from indoctrination to target attraction. Finally, we'll discuss the spread

of right-wing extremist ideology in the Francophone context (Rességuier, 2019; Bouchard, 2015)."

We are, in the sense of Anderson and colleagues (2014), in a post-digital communication society. According to this approach, the digital is not simply an extension of the real world, but constitutes a new paradigm that radically transforms the way we live, think and communicate. Radical discourses on the Internet are characterized by their ability to exploit the specificities of the digital. These discourses are often designed to be viral, i.e. to spread quickly and efficiently. They also use emotional manipulation techniques, such as fear or hatred, to engage users. This chapter is part of an effort to enrich Anglo-Saxon and American approaches to the study of extreme online discourse, while offering a significant contribution to the Quebec and French contexts. How do the specific characteristics of the digital world - such as anonymity, interactivity, algorithms and the mutation of online media and information processes - foster radical extremist recruitment?

First, we will present our methodological approach based on an analysis of online content published by radical groups from a corpus of 5,215 sentences collected on various platforms. We will first detail the different methods used by online extremists to recruit. This begins with indoctrination techniques, then follows a process of hooking targets individually, and includes the seductive rhetoric used to draw people in. This analysis will be underpinned by an understanding of how readers and viewers seek out and consume this information. This will help us to better explain how radical conversations and content develop and take shape online. Finally, we will present our findings according to three galaxies: distrust, defense and attack.

Methodological approach: Analysis of a corpus of 5,215 radical sentences

Our study of radical conversations by ultra-right-wing groups looks at a corpus of 5,215 radical phrases posted online over two years, between January 2021 and December 2022 and collected in France, Belgium, Switzerland and Quebec. Radical right-wing phrases were collected from a variety of online platforms (websites, forums, social media and messaging apps). But to guarantee the reliability of the data, the selected phrases come from clearly identified sources, thus ensuring that the phrases have been published by individuals or groups who identify themselves as belonging to the ultra-right. Our methodology is also based on the level of appropriation of radical discourses. Meaning-instituting discourses are those

produced by extreme right-wing leaders and ideologues. Discourses disseminated by mediators are those taken up and disseminated by individuals or groups not directly affiliated with the far right. Rhetoric integrated by radicalized people is that adopted by individuals who have already adhered to radical ideology. Finally, the content collected is classified according to its nature: offensive or violent content, including insults, calls to violence, racism, anti-Semitism and sexism.

We carried out a semantic analysis using Iramuteq, a free, *open-source software package* for statistical and textual data analysis. Iramuteq enabled us to carry out text classifications and analyze networks of themes and occurrences. Our analysis is based on identifying recurring themes and understanding the motivations underlying these conversations, in order to study the main drivers of online radicalization. The methodology used is based on "*text mining*", in collaboration with a multidisciplinary team (computer science, information and communication science, education science, political science, language science (Berger et Morgan, 2023). This method aims to extract significant information and specific themes from unstructured texts. We use statistical analysis, natural language processing and machine learning techniques. Complementing the technical results, we conducted an analysis of emotions and discursive strategies to better understand the persuasion mechanisms used by these groups (Morin, Aoun, and Douaihy, 2021). Finally, all these results enabled us to test our data through an online ethnographic analysis using the method of participant observation, which involves immersion in the field of study (Emerson, 2003; Soulé, 2007), i.e. the online spaces where the most extremist discourses occur. This phase of observation and participation in discussions enabled us to identify and understand the online culture, social dynamics and interactions that foster radicalization within these groups (A lava and Hassan, 2017; Sageman, 2014; Berger, 2011; Neumann, 200 9).

We use the term "discourse" in its broadest sense, i.e., encompassing all linguistic productions, whether written or oral, through the prism of contextual elements allowing for adequate interpretation (Vincent, 2005). Linguistic productions form a coherent whole, which can be interpreted by superimposing multiple layers of analysis (Vincent, 2005). Right-wing extremist online discourses must be identified not only in terms of their explicit or implicit content, but also in terms of their strategic intentions, rhetorical qualities and specific typologies. Thus, the identification, collection and characterization of online ultra-right discourses requires a three-pronged approach: understanding content, recognizing discursive

typologies, and analyzing rhetorical qualities. This approach takes into account strategic intentions, rhetorical qualities and specific discourse typologies.

Categorizing speeches according to their radical intensity

To clarify our field of research, it is important to define the notions of radicality and extremism. Radicality is a complex concept that can be defined in different ways. Radicality refers to a position or opinion that departs from established norms or conventions in an affirmative, non-negotiable way. It can be associated with ideas or actions that are considered extreme or that advocate the use of violence. Radicality differs from opinion in that it forbids contestation and does not allow for exchange. Most of the time, it produces an idealized "us" and a negative, dangerous "them". Extremism designates a position or opinion that deviates excessively from established norms or conventions, and proposes violent forms of rupture. It is always associated with ideas or actions that are violent or dangerous (Nadeau, F., 2023).

Radical discourse can be categorized according to its radical intensity, which depends on the nature and emphasis of its constituent elements. This categorization can include levels such as disinformation, hate speech and calls for violence. The thematization of these discourses will also enable us to understand the intersections of radical logics and ideological movements in the tectonics of the ultra-right.

To characterize ultra-right-wing discourse online, it is also essential to make a triple identification, focusing on discourse content, discursive typologies and underlying rhetoric. This complex methodology enables us to better understand how these discourses contribute to individual radicalization within these groups.

Online radicalization presents specificities compared to offline radicalization for ultra-right groups. Firstly, the history of the digitization of ultra-right engagement is marked by the rapid adoption of digital technologies for the dissemination of their ideologies (Ducol, 2019). This digitization has enabled a wider reach and faster dissemination of extremist messages.

What's more, the diversification of themes addressed online is notable. Whereas offline radicalization may have focused on specific national issues, the Internet has widened the scope of action, enabling ultra-right-wing groups to engage in discussions and actions linked to global issues. Iconography, video, music and memes are increasingly used as propaganda tools. They are part of the drive for message aesthetics and the closure of a cognitive

radicalization leading to a desensitization phenomenon in relation to violence (Colin, Lefebvre and Casoni 2022). Finally, new modes of online action include coordinating activities, disseminating tutorials, planning (violent) actions and participatory funding to support radical operations (Sageman, 2014).

Extremist forms of action online :indoctrination processes and discourse

The forms of extremist action are diverse and can vary according to the ideology, motivation, internal organization, external support, objectives and resources of the entities, groups or individuals involved, sometimes in isolation [Reference]. In this chapter, we take a particular interest in the organization of ultra-right-wing groups on the web, and in particular on social media. Online violent discourse and forms of action represent a complex, multi-factor (Neumann, 2015; Bouchard, 2015) and constantly evolving phenomenon. We now know that massive use of social media has an amplifying effect on the proliferation of violent content (Conway, 2006; 2007; 2011), particularly for isolated individuals (Ravndal, 2013) and notably through the spread of extremist ideas (Conway, 2006, 2007). This can be explained by the widespread use of pseudonyms, anonymity and the growing availability of encrypted platforms (Telegram, Discord or Signal). The Internet offers radical ideologies a global reach (Conway, 2006) through sophisticated online marketing techniques and persuasion efforts enabling radical groups to attract new followers. Social media, online forums and instant messaging applications have become essential channels for their communication, especially as they offer attractive graphic formats to embellish violent messages (Colin, Lefebvre and Casoni 2022). This rapid evolution in usage forces researchers to constantly adapt to new technologies and new online communication modalities (Settoul, 2022; Turpin, 2022).

Results

To properly understand the analysis of ultra-right-wing digital discourse, we need to think of nebulae, moving galaxies, each with its own evolving gravitational forces. The discourse of the French-speaking ultra-right can be compared to a complex galaxy, where different ideologies and actors gravitate in constant motion. Interestingly, this discourse undergoes transformations and even hateful transpositions over time. For example, anti-Semitism, which was once predominant, seems to be gradually giving way to a hatred directed at Muslims (corresponding to the first item in our ranking with 945 sentences out of the 5,215 analyzed, i.e. 18% of the corpus (*cf.* table below). This evolution reflects a change in the targets

perceived as threatening by these groups. Similarly, the idealized defense of the homeland is being transformed into hostility towards migrants, particularly non-Western foreigners. This evolution highlights a drift towards xenophobia and fear of foreigners within the ultra-right. The denunciation of the alleged end of Europe or white Quebec is fueled by a radical supremacism in which the idea of the superiority of one race or culture is used to justify hatred of others. This extreme ideology reinforces the conviction that violence is necessary to preserve this supremacy. The discourse of the ultra-right also draws on fear of the other to justify courage, strength and even violence. This fear is exacerbated by elements such as desperate survivalism, where people prepare to face apocalyptic scenarios, and anti-science conspiracism, which questions the validity of established science.

3.1 Data analysis and speech classification

The ultra-right is not a homogeneous bloc. It encompasses a diversity of ideologies and objectives, from identitarian movements to white supremacist groups. This diversity makes the analysis of radical discourse more complex, as the specificities of each group must be taken into account. Also, there is a strong ramification across digital content and different platforms (sites, blogs, social media...) so that it is sometimes difficult to detect links between groups (Alava, Chaouni and Charles 2020). Data extraction involved regular (weekly) visits to identified sites belonging to the ultra-right: Facebook groups, Telegram loops, Twitter, the newly named X and various sharing spaces such as forums. 446 keywords were identified from a corpus of 5,215 analyzable phrases¹. We kept sentences that were not short responses to a previous post and did not contain new elements. We have removed sentences that reiterate ideas already expressed, and we have removed sentences of less than 4 words with little meaning. This has been done to concentrate ideas and make analysis easier.

The first analysis shows that ultra-right discourse is predominantly negative and defensive.

		Positive	negative
Self-esteem	1001	800	201
Denouncing conspiracies	1113	252	861

¹ To create the targets for analysis, we used 446 keywords in French and English to identify sites, forums, twitter conversations and telegram loops. Where possible, we then found the names, pseudonyms or anchors of the authors. Finally, we looked for back links to expand the database. In the end, the database is made up of 55% English phrases and 45% French phrases.

Hatred of others	1743		1743
Masculinists and antifeminists	1358	352	1006
		1404	3811

Table 1: Emotional ranking of themes

The corpus was categorized into 11 items, listed below in ascending order.

	Number of sentences	% by category	Example sentences
Hatred of Muslims	945	18%	<p>Your daughter will wear a headscarf (Hijab), your son will wear a beard and your daughter will marry a man with a beard. They reproduce faster and faster (Negative/Hate).</p> <p>A practicing Muslim who believes in the teachings of the Koran cannot be a loyal citizen in France (Hate/Negative)</p> <p>No one minds Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, Jehovahs or anyone else of any other faith. Racist Muslims are not here to integrate and get along with others, they want to dominate, kill infidels and think that raping white children is their spoils of war in a conquered country. Islam is evil!(Hate / Negative)</p>
Incel or antifeminist remarks	714	14%	<p>I suffer from depression, anxiety, disorders and I'm not sure what gender I am anymore. I'm unemployed and in debt. I waste all my money on weed and Star Wars memorabilia. I have virtually no control over my impulses. Now, here's how I'm going to fix this country (Denunciation / Negative / Positive)</p> <p>You like men because you're gay. I like men because I consider women inferior. We're not the same (Hate / Positive)</p>
Hate for feminists	644	12%	<p>When a man can't possess a woman, he's bitter. When a man can use a woman, he's delighted (Masculinist/Human/positive)</p> <p>Feminism is a cancer. Repeat after me *fuck feminism* men are not slaves (Masculinist / Negative)</p>
Antisciences	574	11%	<p>Remember when they told you to wear your m@sk and that it would protect you from COVID? They lied!!! (antisciences / negative)</p>

Defending the race	483	9%	Beating a mud [a non-white person] when he tries to poison one of our own or when he tries to seduce one of our daughters may not be inspired by God, but rather a virtuous act of collective self-preservation (Valuing / Hating / Positive)
Jew hatred	434	8%	I saw Jews as white people with bad ideas, didn't I? I had no idea that Karl Marx was Jewish. I'd never associated Jews with Communism. And the second I made that connection, I thought they all had to die (Hate / Negative). Auschwitz was financed by Big Pharma... France, wake up!!(denunciation / positive)
Grand remplacement or euroabia conspiracy	364	7%	Our mission is to provide information that is not available in the controlled media and to build a community of white activists working for the survival of our people (positive / denunciation).
Plots or Qanon	315	6%	We are Anonymous, we are legion, we do not forgive, we do not forget, we are the storm.
Defending the nation	294	6%	Our homeland is in danger. The presence of rotten apples here cannot be desired. The country is currently home to 18% of its population who identify themselves as rotten apples. Even more worrying is the presence of rotten apples even among government officials.
Deep powers états profonds	224	4%	Monkeypox, like Covid-19, is the game of the Deep State (Denunciation / positive)
Survivalist discourse	224	4%	No matter how proud you are, no matter how hard you try, the leftists, the Marxists and the international organization They'll never be our friends, they'll do anything to destroy us (Hate / Pride / Negative)
TOTAL	5215	100%	

Table 2: Breakdown of themes and typical sentences

3.2 Classification of radical discourse elements

The themes addressed by ultra-right-wing groups evolve over time. New concerns and ideas emerge, while others are abandoned. This analysis focuses on the semantic, thematic, emotional and conceptual aspects of the discourses to better understand their natures and influences.

From a semantic point of view, the discourse of ultra-right-wing groups in the French-speaking world is often characterized by the use of an aggressive and hateful vocabulary.

They use denigrating and offensive terms to stigmatize certain communities, ethnic or religious groups. Numerous war metaphors are used to convey the idea of a conflict between "us" (group members) and "them" (enemies). This reinforces the image of a violent, implacable struggle. Discourse often dehumanizes individuals belonging to groups perceived as different or threatening. In particular, these discursive devices justify violence against them, in a constant process of dehumanizing the scapegoat (Kasper, A. 2023).

The discourse of ultra-right-wing groups in France frequently touches on themes of exclusion, ethnic purity, racial supremacy and the defense of national identity. They generally oppose immigration, multiculturalism and values perceived as foreign. Some discourses, such as those of supremacists or anti-scientists, incorporate conspiracy theories to explain social and political problems. Ultra-right groups may attribute these problems to occult actors or specific groups, as Qanon activists or anti-Semitic currents constantly do. Generally speaking, these discourses convey an anti-system rhetoric, criticizing established political, economic and media institutions. They advocate the overthrow of what they see as an established, corrupt order, and construct alternative realities (conspiracy, manipulation, poisoning, paranoia).

On an emotional level, the rhetoric emanating from ultra-right-wing groups strives to arouse reactions of fear and anxiety in their audiences. They skilfully exploit apprehensions linked to insecurity, loss of cultural identity and perceived threat from foreigners or outsiders. These speeches often appeal to emotions of anger and hatred to reinforce group cohesion and encourage radical commitment. They promote revenge and violence, seeking to fan the flames of confrontation.

Conceptually, these discourses are marked by perpetually conflicting dualities, oscillating between discourses of victory and victimhood narratives. To analyze these discourses, it is necessary to follow an appropriate methodology, from the collection of representative sentences to their analysis using different approaches. The following is a summary of the discursive, thematic and performative components recurrent in radical discourses, to underpin our methodology of collection and analysis.

Discursive components :

Specific vocabulary: Radical discourse often uses specific vocabulary, sometimes designed to create a sense of exclusion or reinforce group identity.

Figures of speech: Radical speeches frequently employ figures of speech such as hyperbole, personification or metonymy to reinforce their emotional and persuasive impact.

Use of Symbols: Radical discourse often makes use of symbols such as flags, slogans or images to convey its messages symbolically.

Thematic Components :

Enemy construction: Radical discourse generally constructs an enemy, whether real or imagined, often presented as a threat to the group's security or prosperity.

Promoting an Alternative Social Order: These discourses frequently advocate an alternative social order, presented as fairer or more equitable than the existing social order.

Legitimizing violence: Radical discourse can legitimize violence by presenting it as a necessary means to achieve its aims.

Performance components :

Mobilizing Emotions: Radical speeches often seek to mobilize emotions, including fear, anger or hatred, to elicit an intense emotional response from their audience.

Manipulation of Public Opinion: They also aim to manipulate public opinion by using propaganda or disinformation techniques to influence perceptions and beliefs.

Conceptual, emotional and semantic mapping of the French ultra-right

Conceptual and semantic mapping of the French-speaking ultra-right is crucial to understanding the radical discourse emanating from these groups in France. This exploration aims to highlight the recurring themes present in their discourse, and to compare these themes between different ultra-right groups.

In the discourses of the French-speaking ultra-right (Nadeau, 2023), we observe recurring themes such as nationalism, xenophobia, supremacism and other far-right ideologies. Nationalism is often highlighted, with an emphasis on preserving cultural identity, language and national sovereignty. Traditionalism is an ideological pillar of the ultra-right. These

groups often defend the preservation of cultural values and traditions, opposing social change and progressive movements. Xenophobia is also common, manifesting itself in distrust of foreigners, immigration and the propagation of negative stereotypes. Racial or ethnic supremacism is a major theme, promoting the belief in the superiority of one ethnic or racial group over others. The fight against multiculturalism and radical Islam is a frequent theme, with calls for the defense of Western values.

Other themes, such as the conspiracy movement, have also found their way into the ultra-right, fed by QAnon ideas (Farhamand, Piraud, and Rouiller, 2023). The QAnon movement, which originated in the United States, has also found an echo among some ultra-right-wing followers in France. They endorse conspiracy theories and allegations without proof. Conspiracy is a recurring theme among ultra-right groups in France. Conspiracy theorists reject the commonly accepted version of an event and seek to demonstrate that it is the result of a plot hatched by an active minority. The aim is to propagate the idea that conspiracies are being orchestrated by the highest authorities. This phenomenon interprets real facts as being attributable to groups acting secretly, for their own benefit and against the general interest, with the media and institutions as accomplices. Ultra-right-wing groups often adhere to conspiracy theories, particularly those implicating government, elites or minority groups. Some ultra-right discourses attack technocrats and experts, denouncing their influence on society and public policy. Homophobia and transphobia are unfortunately commonplace in ultra-right radical discourse, with attacks on LGBTQ+ rights and sexual minority movements. Some ultra-right groups are strongly opposed to abortion (anti-IVG) and advocate increased restrictions or total bans on abortion. Anti-feminism is a major component of the ultra-right. These groups oppose feminist movements and advances in gender equality in conjunction with masculinist ideas, questioning changes in gender roles and accusing women of threatening masculinity.

It is essential to note that ultra-right discourses can vary considerably from group to group, depending on their ideology, objectives and history. Some ultra-right groups may place greater emphasis on white supremacy (Salazar, 2020), while others focus on anti-immigration. The themes chosen by each group are often influenced by France's specific political and social contexts. The themes addressed in ultra-right discourse have a significant impact on their followers and target audiences, and their dissemination results from the classic media effects of "buzz" and ratings. These discourses can reinforce the convictions of group members, thereby strengthening their radical commitment, but above all they serve to recruit

new members by exploiting the fears and concerns of certain bangs of society (Camus and Loch, 2022).

The galaxy of mistrust

The "galaxy of distrust" is a set of discourses, arguments and references that contribute to creating a feeling of distrust and suspicion towards institutions, elites and minorities. This feeling of mistrust is often used by the ultraright to recruit new members and justify its actions. Consider this example:

"Men of power meeting behind closed doors, that's an idea that worries many. We need to develop that inherent distrust of the powerful plotting to influence the world and reshape it to their benefit, which could also mean at the expense of the rest of us, the 99% that we're being fleeced."

Conspiracy theories, often used by the far right, aim to discredit institutions and elites. The "Great Replacement" theory claims that immigrants are replacing native populations. QAnon supports the idea of a global pedo-satanist cabal, and theories against the Deep State accuse occult forces of controlling democratic institutions. These ideas, fuelled by fear, encourage anti-science, characterized by the rejection of established scientific findings. The far right often questions the validity of scientific research and challenges the evidence of the scientific community.

This doubt can be fuelled by conspiracy theories and biased sources of information. Anti-science is often accompanied by a general contempt for intellectualism and expertise. Individuals distrust experts and scientists, accusing them of manipulation or bias. This attitude contributes to a growing distrust of scientific institutions, to the point of categorically rejecting entire fields of science, such as climatology, evolution or medicine. Some groups do not accept established scientific conclusions in these fields, and support opinions to the contrary, even if they are not backed up by scientific data. This denunciation goes beyond anti-science when it becomes a revelation of a conspiracy within industrial and scientific circles aimed at concealing a desire for population control, multiculturalist eugenics and the genocide of traditional and Western values.

3.4 The defense galaxy

The "defense galaxy" is an essential component of the universe of the French-speaking ultra-right, characterized by a set of discourses, movements and personalities sharing similar concerns and characteristics. This galaxy encompasses several sub-categories or areas of interest that converge on an ideology of defense and protection.

Example sentences:

"In a very near future, none of us will survive zombification: Even though we are very well prepared in our developed countries, none of us has ever had to live with a subsistence level. We have no idea what it's really like. But there are people who are already living this way and surviving. They're the ones who'll make it. They're the ones we need to follow."

The survivalist planet occupies a prominent place in the "defense galaxy". Within this planet of survivalism, ultra-right-wing *preppers* share many common characteristics. They are convinced that modern society is fragile, so they develop survival skills such as hunting, fishing and shelter building. Preppers often distrust governments and institutions, believing that they are unable to guarantee their safety and well-being. This mistrust makes them particularly receptive to extremist ideas. The discourses of the "defense galaxy" also resonate with those of xenophobic, gun-toting libertarians. This sub-category advocates a radical form of libertarianism, questioning the role of the state and institutions in the lives of citizens. Extremist libertarians often adopt a xenophobic, anti-immigration stance, fearing that immigration threatens their cultural and national identity. They believe that arming themselves is necessary to protect their values and individual freedoms, and this can sometimes include hostile rhetoric towards minorities and elites. Finally, in the orbit of the "defense galaxy", Alt-right communitarianism plays a significant role. We import the term from the USA to specify and identify post-digital forms of radical action on the Internet and the alternative culture promoted there (memes, buzz, digital packs). It promotes identitarianism and the ultra-right by creating a sense of belonging to a community. Alt-right aims to restore a white, Christian national identity, while identitarianism emphasizes national identity and traditional values in opposition to foreign influences. These movements seek to preserve their exclusive vision of society by resisting demographic and cultural change.

The "defense galaxy" unites discourses around an ideology of protection, distrust of established institutions, and a desire to preserve values and identities perceived as threatened.

Discourses within this galaxy often fuel extremist beliefs and can contribute to the radicalization of certain individuals. Understanding these dynamics is essential for tackling issues related to extremism and security.

The attack galaxy

The "attack galaxy" is one of the most violent discourses of the ultra-right, and is a complex constellation of ever-changing ideological themes. Within this galaxy, the stars of anti-Semitism are slowly fading, giving way to a new constellation of hatred directed this time at Muslims. The idealized defense of the homeland that once united far-right activists is gradually being transformed into a hatred directed not only at migrants, but above all at all non-Western foreigners. Refugees, migrants and anyone born in the West but from families of foreign origin become scapegoats in this galaxy of hatred, accused of threatening cultural stability and national security.

This ideological mutation is fueled by radical supremacism, an ideology that preaches the supremacy of one race over all others. In this galaxy, courage, strength and sometimes even violence find their justification in the fear of the other, whether migrant, Muslim or perceived as a threat to ethnic purity. This fear also manifests itself in a desperate survivalism, where preparation for survival becomes a response to the apprehension of society's collapse.

Example sentences:

Let's defend ourselves, because immigrants are going to replace native Europeans with groups who hate us and everything we stand for. There's only one solution: fight back.

In this ideological tumult, it is difficult to discern whether the ultra-right is announcing the victory of the powers of the blood, i.e., the predominance of a race, or prophesying the end of the world in a triumph tinged with fear, particularly in reaction to "*cancel culture*"², a trend that is causing great concern among these radical groups. The ever-changing attack galaxy remains a complex field of research, requiring in-depth analysis to better understand the dynamics that shape it. Often traversed by millenarian or accelerationist ideologies (Kaplan, 2028), the accelerationist ultra-right wishes to accelerate a collapse of the current system by rejecting the legitimacy of states and supporting free markets and deregulation, as they

² "Cancel culture" refers to a social phenomenon in which individuals or groups seek to exclude or discredit people, brands or organizations whose actions or statements are deemed offensive or unacceptable.

believe these policies will lead to a more competitive society capable of making the strong win.

Conclusion

Ultra-right-wing discourse online has multiple objectives, such as the dissemination of extreme ideology, the provision of resources and arguments for followers, the spread of disinformation, the isolation of individuals and the strategic use of conspiracy theories. The ultra-right cannot be seen as a homogeneous bloc, but rather as a complex universe of constantly evolving discourses, ideologies and themes.

This diversity makes the analysis of radical discourse particularly complex. Nevertheless, we can understand it on three levels, from the formulation of ideologies to their propagation and reception by individuals. The rapid digitization of ultra-right involvement has amplified the reach of these discourses, while broadening the themes addressed online from specific national problems to global issues. New online communication strategies, including the coordination of activities and the publication of tutorials, have also contributed to the spread of these ideologies. The conceptual and semantic mapping of the discourses of the French-speaking ultra-right reveals recurring themes such as nationalism, xenophobia, supremacism, conspiracy, anti-science and homophobia. These themes, though different from one group to another, have a significant impact on followers and target audiences. Distrust of institutions, elites and minorities, and the desire to preserve values and identities perceived as under threat, are central elements in both the "distrust galaxy" and the "defense galaxy". These discourses often fuel extremist beliefs and can contribute to radicalization. Finally, the "galaxy of attack" shows an ideological shift from anti-Semitism to hatred of Muslims. These discourses are becoming increasingly violent, which underlines the importance of closely monitoring this trend to prevent potential threats to society. Ultimately, a thorough understanding of these radical discourses is essential to counter their spread and promote social cohesion and tolerance. Ongoing research and careful monitoring are needed to better understand and address this growing threat.

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