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Journal Articles Economic Theory Year : 2024

Voluntary versus mandatory information disclosure in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma

Abstract

In sequential social dilemmas with stranger matching, initiating cooperation is inherently risky for the first mover. The disclosure of the second mover’s past actions may be necessary to instigate cooperation. We experimentally compare the effect of mandatory and voluntary disclosure with non-disclosure in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma situation. Our results confirm the positive effects of disclosure on cooperation. We also find that voluntary disclosure is as effective as mandatory disclosure, which runs counter to the results of existing literature on this topic. With voluntary disclosure, second movers who have a good track record chose to disclose, suggesting that they anticipate non-disclosure would signal non-cooperativeness. First movers interpret non-disclosure correctly as a signal of non-cooperativeness. Therefore, they cooperate less than half as often when the second mover decides not to disclose.
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Dates and versions

hal-04535784 , version 1 (07-04-2024)

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Georg Kirchsteiger, Tom Lenaerts, Rémi Suchon. Voluntary versus mandatory information disclosure in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Economic Theory, 2024, ⟨10.1007/s00199-024-01563-y⟩. ⟨hal-04535784⟩

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