This article analyzes the operations of the French group Lafarge in Syria during the civil war between 2011 and 2014, to understand the conflict-sensitive practices of a multinational company (MNC) in an area of limited statehood (ALS). We examine how and why the company decided to continue operating its plant in Syria during this intrastate conflict, resulting in financing terrorist groups like ISIS. We highlight the key operational and managerial decisions made by headquarters and local operations and relate them to the conflict situation in the ALS in question. We contribute, with the idea of the firm’s “organization of short-sightedness,” to the understanding of how strategic decisions may lead to a structural inability to fully comprehend the local dangers and the implications for the employees, and how this may lead to a redefinition of legitimate and illegitimate stakeholders in conflict zones. A drawn-out process, stemming from a willingness to stay at all cost in an ALS environment, leads to misinterpretation of the danger and an acute dependency on local stakeholders.