



# Verrouillage de lignes de cache pour la lutte contre les attaques par canaux auxillaires exploitant les mémoires caches

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5 mars 2024





# Motivations



👤 and 🏠 processes are concurrently executing the processor.  
🏠 only considers timing side channel.

# Motivations




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Ensure **efficient** and **on-demand** constant-time execution

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Sources of leakages :

*Branching*

*if (condition(secret))*

*Operation with variable execution time*  
*dividend/secret ;*

*Index for Memory access*  
*array[secret] ;*

# Some Cache Architectures Thwarting Cache-based SCAs

❖ **RPcache**<sup>1</sup>, **ScatterCache**<sup>2</sup> and **Ceaser**<sup>3</sup> propose cache designs based on randomization.

⚠ **Prime+Prune+Probe**<sup>4</sup> find eviction sets in randomized caches from only hundred accesses.

≡ **NoMo-cache**<sup>5</sup>, **SecDCP**<sup>6</sup>, **PLcache**<sup>1</sup> partition the cache.

⚠ Partitioning-based caches imply a performance decrease depending the partitioning granularity.

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1. Wang et Lee, "New Cache Designs for Thwarting Software Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks", 2007

2. Werner et al., "ScatterCache : Thwarting Cache Attacks via Cache Set Randomization", 2019


3. Qureshi, "CEASER : Mitigating Conflict-Based Cache Attacks via Encrypted-Address and Remapping", 2018

4. Purnal et al., "Systematic Analysis of Randomization-based Protected Cache Architectures", 2021


5. Domnitser et al., "Non-Monopolizable Caches : Low-Complexity Mitigation of Cache Side Channel Attacks", 2012

6. Wang et al., "SecDCP : Secure dynamic cache partitioning for efficient timing channel protection", 2016


# Our lock mechanism



- ▶ Extend the Instruction Set Architecture
  - ▶ `lock` and `unlock` instructions


 `lock` instr. keeps data cache line in cache

- ▶ guarantee constant time access
- ▶ locked cache line cannot be evicted

 `unlock` instr. releases locked cache line


- ▶ data can be evicted from now

## Security wise



Unprotected execution

Prime+Probe on AES-128 (1st round only, 1st plaintext byte settled, 300 executions, key = 0x42)



lock execution

## Performance wise

🏠 hardware overhead < 3%

📄 binary size overhead < 0.5%

🏃 performance overhead

- ▶ < 3% for AES encr.
- ▶ < 1% for 4 consecutive AES encr.

🏠 degradation on concurrent processes

- ▶ negligible for AES

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-  Purnal, Antoon et al. “Systematic Analysis of Randomization-based Protected Cache Architectures”. In : *Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. Mai 2021. doi : 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00011.
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-  Wang, Yao et al. “SecDCP : Secure dynamic cache partitioning for efficient timing channel protection”. In : *53rd Design Automation Conference (DAC)*. 2016. doi : 10.1145/2897937.2898086.

-  Wang, Zhenghong et Ruby B. Lee. “New Cache Designs for Thwarting Software Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks”. In : *Proc. International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)*. 2007. doi : 10.1145/1250662.1250723.
-  Werner, Mario et al. “ScatterCache : Thwarting Cache Attacks via Cache Set Randomization”. In : *Proc. 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security)*. 2019. url : <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/werner>.