Angola’s government has historically championed the revival of the agricultural sector as a national priority, though it has remained unclear what role the nation’s peasantry is intended to play. Looking to the future while fixated on the past, the first failed recipe for growth was initially based on nationalizing the colonial export model by incorporating the social and economic forces of the rural economy. The government’s early embrace of authoritarian modernization has since pursued an illiberal rural development model seeking to entrench the state’s control over rural areas and extend elite reproduction capacities, exercised principally through a series of state-owned enterprises. Upon the end of the civil war in Angola in 2002, the timely arrival of Chinese loans and technical assistance allowed the administration of President José Eduardo dos Santos to revitalize this strategy with a return to the establishment of a series of state agro-industrial farms a quarter century later. A historical presidential transition in 2017 upended these strategies of rural governance, leading to a vast privatization scheme of state assets built up over decades. This article reveals how the Angolan state has historically sought to engineer elite minority control over the agricultural sector while marginalizing the vast majority of the main rural economic actor, the peasantry. Likewise, the case study provides insight into the hidden costs of Chinese loans on Angola’s rural economy.