The aim of my contribution is at analysing the impact of a large-scale war of long duration on the monetary system and monetary thought. The case is that of England during and in the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars with France (1793-1815). These wars provoked a major shock in the English monetary system: the Bank of England note was made inconvertible during more than twenty years and in 1813 the pound sterling had depreciated by one-third in terms of gold. After Waterloo, it took the pound four years to regain its value in gold, in the midst of a severe economic depression. However, the pre-war monetary system was resumed in 1821: the quarter-of-a-century parenthesis was simply closed. This return to “money as usual” was not for want of intense debates: it was the time of the “Bullionist Controversy” featuring among others Henry Thornton and David Ricardo. This case thus leads to a rather pessimistic conclusion: even a major shock like a long-lasting war seems to have no significant impact on either the monetary system or monetary thought. My contribution intends to account for this paradox. Publication: Deleplace, G. (2024 a), “Storm in a Teacup? The Impact of War on the English Monetary System and Thought (1797-1821),” in Marcuzzo, M. C. and Rosselli, A. (eds.), Money in Times of Crisis. Pre-Classical, Classical and Contemporary Theories, Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei Proceedings, à paraître.