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Ramadan fasting increases leniency in judges from Pakistan and India

By Sultan Mehmood^{1*}, Avner Seror² and Daniel L. Chen³

ABSTRACT: We estimate the impact of the Ramadan fasting ritual on criminal sentencing decisions for Pakistan and India from half a century of daily data. We use random case assignment and exogenous variation in fasting intensity within Ramadan due to the rotating Islamic calendar and the geographical latitude of the district courts to document the large effects of Ramadan fasting on decision-making. Our sample comprises roughly a half million cases and 10,000 judges from Pakistan and India. Ritual intensity increases Muslim judges' acquittal rates, lowers their appeal and reversal rates, and does not come at the cost of increased recidivism or heightened outgroup bias. Overall, our results indicate that the Ramadan fasting ritual followed by a billion Muslims worldwide induces more lenient decisions.

ONE-SENTENCE SUMMARY: Muslim judges in Ramadan issue more lenient decisions in India and Pakistan.

KEYWORDS: religious rituals, Ramadan, decision-making.

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INTRODUCTION

Rituals are a feature of all known human societies. Through religion, culture, traditions, or daily routines, rituals give symbolic meaning to specific gestures, words, or actions. The social functions of rituals have been extensively studied in the social sciences since [Durkheim](#)¹. Rituals can impact decision-making through adverse physiological side effects or they can even motivate better decision-making.

This paper studies the Ramadan fasting ritual, one of the most observed religious rituals in the world, followed by a billion Muslims worldwide every year². Made obligatory in the Quran (Chapter 2, Verse 183), the Ramadan fasting ritual has a clear rule: all adult Muslims must fast from dawn to sunset, with no ingesting of food and liquids during the observance of the ritual. Moreover, the ritual also requires prayer, reflection, and self-control demonstrated in moral decision-making. The word for the Ramadan fasting ritual in Muslim holy texts is “*sawm*”, literally, restraint. We examine the impact of Ramadan fasting on criminal sentencing for half a century in India and Pakistan, which together comprise a quarter of the world’s population.

Criminal acquittals provide a high-stakes setting where the impact of rituals on judicial decision-making can substantially affect lives. Theoretically, the jury is out on whether fasting increases or decreases acquittals. A large body of literature finds that physiological deprivation induces judges to make harsh decisions^{3 4 5}. Negative physiological effects can arise from disrupted sleep⁶, nutrient deprivation⁷ or even lack of attention⁸. However, when physiological deprivation is combined with the fasting ritual, the effect may actually be countered by greater leniency (or reduction in harshness), whether due to religious restraint or forgiveness, or some form of leniency bias. Judges may indeed also exert more effort to issue better decisions if fasting improves memory and cognition⁹. Recent literature has found that fasting may lead to elevated cognition via a reduction in cholesterol¹⁰ and fat mass¹¹, and Ramadan fasting in particular is associated with enhanced global cognition via increased production of wake-promoting neurotransmitter orexin-A¹². For some judicial cases, the harshness effect of the Ramadan fasting ritual may dominate, while the leniency effect may dominate in others. Criminal sentencing decisions in Ramadan provide a close-to-ideal setting to observe 1) this leniency effect and 2) study any potential impact on decision-making observed through the lens of errors (reversals) and downstream consequences (recidivism).

This paper contributes to several additional strands of literature. Primarily, we complement a study¹³ of the impact of Ramadan hours on economic growth by exploring the impact of Ramadan hours on individual decision-making. We also extend the literature on non-Ramadan rituals and economic development, particularly regarding the role of religious festivals and their associated rituals in building social capital, which can be detrimental to long-run development, especially during the crop-growing season^{14 15 16 17}. We show how Ramadan fasting can impact judicial decision-making in criminal trials.

METHOD

Empirical Challenges

The Ramadan calendar and micro-data available in court settings offer a unique combination of features to address three identification challenges that preclude the systematic empirical investigation of the impact of religious rituals on decision-making. First, the varying daily length of Ramadan fasting according to geographic latitude provides us with a source of variation in ritual intensity at the spatial level, with fasting intensity varying up to two hours on the same day. Second, the yearly changes of the month for Ramadan based on the lunar calendar enable us to separate variation in ritual intensity from seasonality (the calendar season), and thus to study the effect of fasting intensity within Ramadan (Figures S1 and S2). Third, the random assignment of cases among Muslim and non-Muslim judges provides us with similar decisions made by different individuals during the fasting period (the decisions of non-Muslim judges serve as a placebo group to compare with those of Muslim judges within Ramadan). Last, we can study the impact of Ramadan in both a Muslim majority (Pakistan) and a Muslim minority (India) country. Our sample consists of judges from 65.1% Muslim judges in Pakistan and 5.2% Muslim judges in India. Studying both India and Pakistan affords us complementary identification strategies. One is used to help distinguish the intensity of ritual from the Ramadan season itself by virtue of data spanning almost 70 years, moving from almost all non-Muslim judges when British Colonial rule ended to very few in recent years, and the other to link lower court verdicts to resolution in the higher court and to link the litigant to a future criminal case. Note that since we include year-fixed effects, our results are unlikely to be driven by the changing composition of the judiciary.

We can disentangle the extensive margin effect of general societal shifts around the ritual season from the intensive margin effect of the religious ritual within the month of Ramadan by including the month of Ramadan and calendar season fixed effects. To give a concrete example,

when Ramadan falls in winter, the daily fasting will be longer in district Tirunelveli than in Kupwara because Tirunelveli is closer to the equator. Nevertheless, when Ramadan falls in summer, the daily fasting will be longer in the district court of Tirunelveli than in Kupwara. On the same day, Ramadan fasting can vary up to two hours across the districts of Tirunelveli and Kupwara (Figure S2). This interaction of latitude and the fact that the Islamic calendar is not synchronized with the solar cycle provides us with a source of variation in the prescribed intensity of ritual. This, in turn, allows us to address the aforementioned three empirical challenges—different types of cases, direct effects of seasons, and the direct effect of Ramadan—that have hitherto prevented systematic empirical analysis of rituals and decision-making in naturally occurring settings.

Case Assignment To Judges. — Cases in both Pakistan and India are randomly assigned to judges subject to a workload constraint. First, a courthouse is determined based on territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases (the focus of our study). Then, the cases are randomly assigned. For instance, if there is just one judge adjudicating, that judge will be allocated the case, but if there are multiple judges, the judge assignment process is fully random, subject to a workload constraint. Moreover, the judiciary explicitly condemns and punishes attempts at “forum shopping,” where litigants select particular judges in the hope of a favorable outcome (for more details see recent work¹⁸). In our robustness section, we present evidence in favor of the random assignment of judges via a series of balance tests.

Empirical Specification

We use cross-district and over-time daily variation in the length of fasting hours to estimate the effect of Ramadan fasting on acquittal verdicts. Specifically, we estimate the following equation on Muslim and non-Muslim judge samples:

$$Y_{cjd,t} = \beta_0 + \eta \text{Ramadan Hours}_{d,t} + \mathbf{X}_{cjd,t} \boldsymbol{\gamma}' + \mu_t + \delta_d + \epsilon_{cjd,t} \quad (1)$$

The subscripts c, j, d, t index cases, judges, districts, and time respectively. Y denotes *Acquittals*, an indicator variable that switches on for acquittal verdicts. Ramadan Hours represent the average daily number of prescribed fasting hours in Ramadan. We also control for Ramadan month fixed effects, daylight hours, case, and judge characteristics, \mathbf{X} , while μ_t and δ_d denote time and district fixed effects, respectively. Our specification is hence close to that of a recent study¹⁹ investigating the impact of Ramadan hours on economic growth. The

summary statistics of the data used in the paper are reported in Supplementary Material Table S1. Further details on data construction and sources can be found in Supplementary Material Texts. Importantly, the above specification with our daily judicial decision data frame allows us to account for both the independent effect of Ramadan (extensive margin) and daylight hours (length of day effects), unlike this important previous work, which was based on cross-country yearly data. In particular, we know the month and year of decisions for Pakistan and the exact date of decisions for India. Because we expect Ramadan fasting ritual to meaningfully affect decision-making only for Muslim judges, we estimate equation (1) in the subsamples of Muslim and non-Muslim judges separately, where the effect of Ramadan fasting on non-Muslim judges serves as an important placebo check, since cases are randomly assigned across Muslim and non-Muslim judges. We report whether the estimates are significantly different at the bottom of Table [1](#).

RESULTS

Impact of Ramadan Fasting on Acquittals

Our main result is that Muslim judges are about 10% more likely to acquit with each additional hour of fasting relative to the baseline minimum hours of fasting during Ramadan. This holds for both Pakistan and India (Table [1](#)). In Pakistan, another hour of fasting is associated with acquittals being 4 percentage points more likely, while in India, another hour of fasting is associated with acquittals being 7 percentage points more likely. Figure [1](#) reports a stark jump in acquittals for Muslim judges in Pakistan with increasing Ramadan fasting intensity. The association between daylight hours and acquittals is only present in the month of Ramadan, not in other months. Moreover, from Figure [1](#), we also observe no effect of fasting intensity on rulings by non-Muslim judges, our placebo group. We present the corresponding figure for India in the appendix (Figure S4 in Supplementary Material), where we find that the Ramadan effect for Muslim judges persists for several months after Ramadan. Note that these results include the full dynamics of pre-and post-Ramadan hour effects, although the results are slightly less precise than those in Table 1, which only shows the specific effect of Ramadan hours without the dynamics. Interested readers wishing to compare results in Figure 1 and Figure S4 should refer to results in Table S14 in Supplementary Material, where Columns 1 and 2 report Pakistani samples of Muslim and non-Muslim judges, respectively, and Columns 3 and 4 report corresponding results for India. We also find that Ramadan effects are

particularly pronounced for violent crimes, where the accused faces life imprisonment (Supplementary Material Table S2).

Our evidence is consistent with Ramadan fasting leading to fewer case reversals in higher courts. To understand whether the rise in acquittals comes at the cost of worse decisions along the dimension of reversals (errors) and recidivism (downstream consequences), we make two novel linkages in the data: one is a linkage between lower court cases and their appeals and reversals in higher courts and the second is a linkage across lower court cases for recidivism.

Through these two linkages, we observe evidence consistent with fewer appeals and reversals of decisions in the higher courts. In particular, a one-hour increase in Ramadan fasting intensity *reduces* the likelihood that decisions will be appealed in higher courts by 4% over the sample mean (Supplementary Material Table S3). Conditional on appeal, these cases affected by each additional hour are about 1 percentage point or 5% less likely to be reversed (Table 2).

The interested reader can also see the effect of the Ramadan season (i.e., the extensive margin effect) in Figure 2. Panel A presents this *extensive* margin effect of Ramadan month, reporting average acquittals in Ramadan versus non-Ramadan months for Muslim and non-Muslim judges in India. We observe a sharp and statistically significant increase in acquittals for Muslim judges in Ramadan, while no corresponding change during Ramadan is observed for non-Muslim judges. The estimates imply that acquittal verdicts are about 20 percentage points higher for Muslim judges in the month of Ramadan. This is qualitatively significant and represents a 40% increase over the sample mean. Panel B of Figure 2 reports estimates for decision reversals at the extensive margin for India: difference-in-differences estimates indicate that reversed decisions are about 10 percentage points lower for Muslim judges in the month of Ramadan. Alternatively, leveraging the random allocation of cases within Ramadan, we observe that Muslim judges have about 4 percentage points fewer decision reversals in Ramadan relative to non-Muslim judges in Ramadan (Figure 2, Panel B).

The cases that are reversed, however, may not be a random draw from the population of all criminal cases. Cases decided at times of high Ramadan fasting intensity may be less likely to be appealed or reversed relative to those decided in times of shorter Ramadan fasts. Therefore, instead of the Ramadan fasting ritual effect, it may be the unobservable case characteristics due to the selected sample of cases going to appeal that explain part of our results. To speak to this challenge, we directly model the progression of cases as they move from lower to appellate

courts with the standard Heckman selection framework. This instrumental variable strategy builds on recent work²⁰, and uses judge leniency as an instrument. In our application, we use the leave-out appeal rate of a judge as the instrument leveraging the tendency of some judges to be lenient regardless of case characteristics²¹. This allows us to jointly estimate (1) the impact of Ramadan fasting on individuals' progression from lower court acquittal to higher court appeal and (2) the impact of Ramadan fasting on overturned decisions, conditional on the case progressing to the appellate court. Supplementary Material Table S4 shows results from the first stage (selection equation) and second stage (outcome equation). We find the instrument is a strong predictor of appeals at the case level i.e., historically lenient judges are more likely to allow appeals and reversals regardless of the case facts. The second stage results, taking into account case progression, imply that an additional hour of Ramadan fasting leads to about a 2-percentage point decrease in decision reversals; if anything, the point estimates on the impact of Ramadan fasting on reversed decisions are slightly larger, i.e., even when we account for selection, Muslim judges observing longer fasts make decisions that are less likely to be reversed in higher courts.

Impact of Fasting on Recidivism, In-Group Bias, Physiological Deprivation, and Crop Season

The higher acquittal rates in lower courts as Ramadan fasting becomes more intense may also lead to higher rates of reoffense or recidivism, especially if, for instance, physiological deprivation causes judges to acquit dangerous criminals with increasing Ramadan fasting intensity. To test for this channel, we exploit the full names of the litigant in our court data and assess whether, upon closure of the case, she is again involved in a new criminal case. Table 3's Panel A reports these findings. The increase in acquittal rates does not come at the expense of higher recidivism. If anything, the coefficient estimates are negative. This pattern also holds when we look specifically at violent crimes: murder and armed robbery. In fact, the point estimates suggest a slight reduction in recidivism for murder defendants whose cases are decided during Ramadan intense fasting periods (Table S13 reports this result).

We also examine whether Ramadan increases ingroup bias by making judge-litigant identity more salient. We examine heterogeneity by the saliency of litigant identity e.g., ingroup and outgroup bias²². That is, whether the Ramadan fasting ritual differentially impacts decisions involving Muslim versus non-Muslim litigants. We do not find much evidence of Ramadan fasting intensity making religious identity more salient for either Muslim or non-

Muslim judges. Panel B of Table 3 reports these results, which suggest that Ramadan ritual intensity is not accompanied by increased antipathy towards non-Muslim litigants (which is also consistent with the evidence presented for the Muslim holy pilgrimage or *Hajj*²³. Put differently, Ramadan fasting increases acquittals but does not appear to induce harshness towards non-Muslim litigants.

The increase in acquittals could also have been entirely explained by physiological effects from disturbed sleep²⁴ or nutrient deprivation²⁵ or even lack of attention²⁶. These effects are certainly important, but our evidence suggests they may be outweighed by the positive mechanisms documented in established literature: fasting can lead to an elevation in mood²⁷, cognition, verbal, and working memory²⁸. We, nevertheless, find that judges do not reduce their caseload as a result of more intense ritual fasting (and the potential accompanying physical deprivation).

We also observe that the caseload of a given judge is unaffected by Ramadan fasting, suggesting that judges are not exerting noticeably less effort and taking fewer cases. Likewise, we find that case delays and days to the first hearing of the case are unaffected, suggesting that judges are not paying less attention to cases nor ruling without much deliberation as fasting becomes more intense (Tables S5 and S6). Taken together, this evidence suggests that Ramadan fasting does not deteriorate decision-making in terms of reversals, recidivism, and ingroup bias, as shown by Muslim judges' lower decision reversals in Table 2, no increase in recidivism in Table 3 (Panel A), and no heightening of outgroup bias in Table 3 (Panel B). We also find, in both India and Pakistan, that crop-related activities do not appear to mediate the impact of Ramadan fasting on judicial decision-making. For instance, Table S11 shows that in both India and Pakistan, agricultural activities like the wheat harvest (one of the largest crops in both nations) have no disproportionate impact on the effect of fasting rituals.

DISCUSSION

In this paper, we provide evidence on how ritual Ramadan fasting impacts judicial decision-making. Using case-level microdata from Pakistan and India, which together comprise 25% of the world's population, we show that Muslim (but not non-Muslim) judges are more likely to acquit when the intensity of Ramadan fasting increases, and that these acquittals are less likely to be appealed and reversed in higher courts. Moreover, Muslim judges' increased rate of

acquittals during Ramadan is no more likely to lead to a rise in recidivism or exacerbate outgroup bias for non-Muslim litigants. We isolate the causal effects of fasting intensity from ritual festival and seasonality effects by leveraging the rotating Ramadan calendar and the granular temporal and geographic nature of our data obtained from including month-of-Ramadan and calendar season fixed effects. The length of daily fasting varies by up to two hours in South Asia, with the intensity of fasting reversing from the northern to the southern hemisphere roughly every decade. The random case assignment to decision-makers allows a *ceteris paribus* comparison of cases across Muslim versus non-Muslim judges. The results are meaningful: 10% higher acquittals and a 3% reduction in appeals are associated with each additional hour of fasting relative to the baseline minimum hours of fasting during Ramadan. Conditional on appeal, each additional hour is associated with a 5% reduction in decision reversals. We interpret these acquittal results as Ramadan fasting leading to greater leniency or reduced harshness. These results provide evidence that a religious ritual observed by one billion people worldwide can impact contemporary high-stakes decisions and that extrajudicial factors need not increase harshness in decisions. We investigated the association between daylight hours and judicial decisions during Ramadan and interpret this association as the effect of Ramadan or fasting intensity. Exploring different behavioral or biological mechanisms to explain the association between fasting intensity and decision-making remains an area for future research. To the extent that it is generally perceived negatively for extraneous factors to impact judicial decision-making, our study shows, in contrast, that extraneous factors need not deteriorate decision-making. This points to a potentially new direction for the study of ritualistic decision-making.

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Materials and Methods Supplementary Text and Figs. S1 to S10

Reference (29)

Table 1: Impact of Ramadan Fasting on Acquittals by Religion - Pakistan and India

<i>Panel A: Pakistan</i>				
	Muslim Judges		Non-Muslim Judges	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Acquittal Verdicts</i>				
Ramadan Hours	0.0422**	0.0421**	0.0123	0.0137
Standard error	(0.0192)	(0.0189)	(0.0257)	(0.0259)
95% two-sided CI	0.00136 -	0.00185 -	-0.0425 -	-0.0415 -
	0.0831	0.0824	0.0672	0.0690
P value	(0.0437)	(0.0415)	(0.638)	(0.603)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3849	3849	1997	1997
R-squared	0.055	0.058	0.069	0.078
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.529	0.529	0.498	0.498
Number of Judges	597	597	320	320
<i>Panel B: India</i>				
	Muslim Judges		Non-Muslim Judges	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Acquittal Verdicts</i>				
Ramadan Hours	0.0674*	0.0657*	0.0324	0.0331
Standard error	(0.0369)	(0.0370)	(0.0226)	(0.0230)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00549 -	-0.00723 -	-0.0121 -	-0.0121 -
	0.140	0.139	0.0769	0.0783
P value	(0.0697)	(0.0772)	(0.153)	(0.150)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	19,995	19,995	352,057	352,057
R-squared	0.230	0.234	0.293	0.295
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.719	0.719	0.523	0.523
Number of Judges	400	400	7243	7243

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-level). The dependent variable is Acquittal Verdict, a dummy variable that switches on for acquittal decisions. Ramadan Hours are the number of daylight hours in Ramadan. The Ramadan month dummy and Daylight Hours individually are also always included. Panel A reports results on Pakistan with controls including case characteristics: number of pages in the judgment order, presence of chief justice on the bench, number of judges in a case, number of lawyers in a case, and judge characteristics such as dummies for judge's gender and prior employment (lawyer or former judge). Fixed effects include district and year fixed effects. Panel B reports results on India with controls including judge experience, indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator of judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). Fixed effects include district, year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is at the case level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2: Impact of Ramadan Ritual on Decision Reversals in High Courts - India

	(1)	(2)	(3)
		<i>Overtured</i>	
Muslim X Ramadan Hours	-0.00975**	-0.00973**	-0.00987**
Standard error	(0.00401)	(0.00402)	(0.00398)
95% two-sided CI	-0.0176 - -	-0.0176 - -	-0.0177 - -
	0.00186	0.00181	0.00204
P value	(0.0156)	(0.0162)	(0.0137)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	19,914	19,914	19,914
R-squared	0.182	0.194	0.196
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.219	0.219	0.219
Number of Judges	2783	2783	2783

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variable is *Overtured*, a dummy variable that switches on for lower court verdict reversed in the High Court. Controls include indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator for judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours, their corresponding interactions as controls in all columns of the table. Time fixed effects are dummy indicators for the year, month, week and day corresponding to the date of decision. The unit of observation is at the case level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3: Impact of Ramadan Ritual on Recidivism and Bias - India

<i>Panel A: Impact on Recidivism</i>				
	Acquitted in lower Court		Convicted in lower Court	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Reoffense</i>			
Muslim Judge X Ramadan Hours	-0.000112	-0.000124	-0.002700	-0.002653
Standard error	(0.001480)	(0.001484)	(0.002025)	(0.002010)
95% two-sided CI	-0.003022 -	-0.003041 -	-0.006683 -	-0.006608 -
	0.002799	0.002794	0.001284	0.001301
P value	(0.939)	(0.933)	(0.183)	(0.187)
District & Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	192,891	192,891	169,629	169,629
R-squared	0.172	0.173	0.205	0.205
Number of Judges	5533	5533	4276	4276
<i>Panel B: Impact on Bias by Litigant Religion</i>				
	Muslim Litigant		Non-Muslim Litigant	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Acquittal Verdict</i>			
Muslim Judge X Ramadan Hours	-0.000104	-0.000140	0.000197	0.000197
Standard error	(0.00220)	(0.00220)	(0.00278)	(0.00279)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00443 -	-0.00446 -	-0.00526 -	-0.00529 -
	0.00422	0.00418	0.00566	0.00568
P value	(0.962)	(0.949)	(0.943)	(0.944)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	86,428	86,428	280,331	280,331
R-squared	0.310	0.311	0.285	0.286
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.516	0.516	0.541	0.541
Number of Judges	4486	4486	7139	7139

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-level). In Panel A, the dependent variable is Recidivism, a dummy variable that switches on if a defendant is charged with a new crime in the court following his or her acquittal. Muslim X Ramadan Hours is the interaction between the dummy for Muslim and average daylight hours in Ramadan. We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours, their corresponding interactions individually as controls. In Panel B, the dependent variable is Acquittals, a dummy variable that switches on for acquittal verdicts. Fixed effects include district, year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is an individual case, and each column considers a subsample of cases for judges and litigants with different religious identities. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.






Fig. 1 | The Impact of Ramadan Hours in Pakistan. This Figure is presenting the daylight hours effect for Ramadan month and for the months before and after Ramadan. It plots the coefficients in our baseline regression using Pakistan case data with Ramadan Hours (t), and coefficients on daylight hours during preceding and subsequent Islamic calendar months. Specifically, we also plot coefficients on Jumada al Akhirah Hours ($t-3$), Rajab Hours ($t-2$), Shaban Hours ($t-1$), Shawwal Hours ($t+1$), Dhul Kada Hours ($t+2$), Dhul Hijja Hours ($t+3$). A similar Figure for India is provided in Figure S4 of the Supplementary Material. 95% Confidence intervals are also reported.



Panel A: Impact on Acquittal Verdicts



Panel B: Impact on Decision Reversals

Fig. 2 | Impact of Ramadan by Muslim versus Non-Muslim judges in India- Extensive Margin The figures above in Panel A display Acquittal decisions that were decided in the month of Ramadan relative to those that were decided in non-Ramadan months by Muslim (left) and non-Muslim (right) judges. Panel B shows the average reversal rates of decisions in the Indian High Courts. These are the cases previously decided in lower courts in the month of Ramadan by Muslim (left) and non-Muslim (right) judges.

Supplementary Materials for

Religious Rituals: Evidence from Ramadan

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This PDF file includes:

Text, Methods, Theoretical Framework, Supplementary Figs. S1 to S10

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- S2. Variable Definitions and sources
- S3. Details on Data Construction
- S4. Details on Method and Identification Strategy
- S5. Theoretical Framework
- S6. Supplementary Figures and Tables
- S7. Unabridged Version of the Paper: [HERE](#)

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S1. Data Description

Our empirical analysis uses data on the courts of India and Pakistan. For Pakistan we have data for district high courts, while for India, we have data for both lower district courts and high courts. The cases for Pakistan are drawn from the Central Repository of cases in Pakistan, used by lawyers to prepare their cases. We obtained access to a random sample of cases from 1950–2016 from all 16 district high court benches in Pakistan (from the universe of all cases decided in this period).⁷ This case-level data is combined with judge characteristics from judicial administrative data. We successfully matched judicial administrative information for 22,126 out of the total 22,512 cases. Since the focus of our research is on rulings in criminal cases, our sample is composed of all criminal cases in this data. This is about 26% of the total available cases.⁸

For India, we obtain cases from the Indian eCourts platform—a semi-public system put in place by the Indian government as a “national data warehouse for case data” (Indian eCourts Portal, 2021). This publicly available information includes the filing, registration, hearing, and decision dates for each case, the name and position of the presiding judge, and the final judicial decision. The eCourts platform covers the universe of criminal cases in Indian lower courts, which is combined with judge information from judicial administrative data. The key advantage of Indian eCourts data is not just the larger sample size but also the link-up of lower court decisions to high court appeals and decision reversals. That is, for India we also have cases appealed or overturned in the high courts *linked* to lower court decisions. The high court data is scraped from websites of high courts and we use common case identifiers across lower and high courts to match cases. The Indian data spans across 436 districts from 1997–2018 and contains information on 372,089 cases. This complements the Pakistani data that only spans across 16 district or “divisional” courts. However, the Pakistan data has the advantage of spanning about 70 years (1950–2016), allowing us to exploit variation for many Ramadan months—falling in both summers and winters in the same district. Table S1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the study for India and Pakistan at different levels of the court hierarchy. Below, we detail the key outcome and explanatory variables. Further information on the variables, their sources, and data construction can be found in Section S2 and S3.

⁷ These benches are called “divisional high court benches” in Pakistan’s legal nomenclature.

⁸ The remaining cases are constitutional or writ petitions pertaining to government abuse of power against the citizenry.

Outcome Variables. — The key outcome variable is the *acquittal verdict*. For Pakistan, it is a case-level measure constructed from the text of the judgment orders where legal experts at a law firm coded this variable. The law firm was divided into two independent teams that coded the acquittal dummy variable as 1 if the defendant obtained an acquittal in the case and 0 if the prosecution obtained conviction. For the case of India, the eCourts platform contains the exact decision made on every case. We parse through the strings of this decision variable and also construct an *Acquittal verdict dummy* that takes the value 1 when the decision equals the string “acquittal” and 0 if it equals “conviction.” *Appeals in the high court* is a dummy variable that switches on if a lower court decision is appealed in the High Court of India, and 0 otherwise. *Overtured* too is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the appeal is “allowed” and 0 if it is “rejected” in the high court. This is our measure of decision reversals. Finally, we have a recidivism outcome variable. Although, to the best of our knowledge, no data exists on rearrests and criminal charges pressed in both India and Pakistan, nor are there criminal databases that are publicly available for linking to future crimes. Nevertheless, for the case of India, our data contains information on full names of defendants. We therefore exploit this information in court data and assess, if upon acquittal, the defendant ends up in court again in a new criminal case. That is, our dummy for recidivism switches on if the defendant reappears in another case after the conclusion of the first case. This allows us to assess a potential downstream consequence of the judicial decision.

Main Explanatory Variable. — The key explanatory variable used in the analysis is *Ramadan Hours*. This is the average daily number of prescribed fasting hours during the month of Ramadan. Figure S1 in Supplementary Material depicts the variation in this variable from 1950 to 2016 for the Pakistani data and Figure S2 presents the corresponding figure for India. It shows how our explanatory variable varies by district and through time. For instance, from the figures, we can observe that at the *same time*, intensity of Ramadan fasting can differ up to 2 hours across districts. We collect this data from the US Naval Observatory, which provides sunrise and sunset times for any geographic coordinate on earth at any given date in the Gregorian calendar. We map the historical dates to the Islamic calendar dates, using data from Islamic Philosophy Online Calendar. We calculate the average daily number of daylight hours during Ramadan for every district court and month for Pakistan. Since we have the exact

decision date in the case of India, we compute the average daily number of daylight hours based on district court and day in India.⁹

Control Variables. — As controls, we always add daylight hours and month of Ramadan in all specifications to account for the independent effects of length of day and month of Ramadan. We also add several additional control variables specific to case and judge characteristics that are obtained from judicial administrative data for both Pakistan and India. For Pakistan, these include number of pages in the judgment order, presence of chief justice on the bench, number of judges in a case, number of lawyers in a case, and judge characteristics such as dummies for judge’s gender, prior employment (lawyer or former judge), and political activity prior to judicial appointment. For India, these include indicator for criminal case type (i.e., whether the case involved sexual assault, robbery, rape, kidnapping, theft or fraud), indicator for judgement type, and indicator for judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge).

Assigning Religion to Judges and Litigants. — The judges in Pakistan are substantially fewer in number, hence we are able to hand code the religion of the judge based on judge names. The Indian eCourts platform does not provide demographic metadata on judges and the large number of judges makes hand coding infeasible. However, religious identity can be determined accurately in India based on individuals’ names using a machine learning algorithm. We train a machine classifier on a large database of labeled names and then use it to assign these characteristics in the legal data. The classifier is a two-label specification: Muslim or non-Muslim. In particular, we apply a neural net classifier to predict the identity label based on the name string using a bidirectional long short-term memory (LSTM) model that is implemented directly on the sequence of name-string characters within the judge name¹ (see [Ash et al., 2021](#) for further elaboration on LSTM algorithms). We choose this classifier due to its accuracy of about 99% when matched with hand coded religion clarification in Pakistan data. We do not differentiate within the non-Muslim religion categories because their names are not as distinctive as Muslim names and our research question concerns examining the effect of the Ramadan ritual that is only observed by Muslims.¹⁰ Each name record is therefore assigned to a dummy that switches on for Muslim judge and Muslim litigant.

⁹ The daylight hours data for India are precise to a one-minute range using <https://www.esrl.noaa.gov>.

¹⁰ Fasting is also observed in other religions (e.g. Lent in Christianity), but it does not vary with length of day in Ramadan month.

S2. Variable Definitions and sources

Acquittals = This is a case-level dummy variable for Acquittals. For the case of Pakistan, a law firm coded this variable as 1 when State Prosecution obtained a victory and 0 otherwise based on reading the judgment orders. In the case of India, given the large number of observations and public access to data, we constructed the variable using text in the variable decision in Indian eCourts Database: it switches on when the string in judicial decision takes the value “acquittal” and switches off in case of “conviction”.

Ramadan Hours = This is the average daily number of daylight hours in the month of Ramadan. It is collected from the US Naval Observatory, which provides sunrise and sunset times for any geographic coordinate on Earth at any given date in the Gregorian calendar. This is in turn mapped to the historical dates in the Islamic calendar dates, using data from Islamic Philosophy Online Calendar.

Daylight Hours = This is the average daily number of daylight hours averaged over a course of a month. It is collected from the US Naval Observatory, which provides sunrise and sunset times for any geographic coordinate on Earth at any given date in the Gregorian calendar.

Ramadan Month = This a dummy variable that switches on for the month of Ramadan. It is computed based on matching dates from the US Naval Observatory that gives Gregorian calendar dates as in our judgment texts with corresponding Islamic calendar dates from Islamic Philosophy Online Calendar.

Muslim = The judges in Pakistan are assigned through hand-coding them through the law firm based on judges’ full names. The Indian eCourts platform does not provide demographic metadata on judges and the large number of judges makes hand coding infeasible. However, religious identity is determined accurately in India based on individuals’ names using a Machine Learning algorithm. Applying a neural net classifier to predict the identity label based on the name string using a bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory Model (LSTM) allows us to accurately predict religion with about 99% accuracy. Each name record is assigned to a dummy that switches on for Muslim judge.

Appealed = This is a dummy variable that switches on if a lower court decision is appealed in the High Court, and zero otherwise. This is obtained from scrapping cases of High Court websites across India.

Overtured = This is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the decision is reversed and zero otherwise.

Criminal Case = A dummy for criminal cases. This is indicated in the text of the judgment order.

Bench Chief Justice = A dummy variable for the Chief Justice adjudicating in the case. This is also indicated in the text of the judgment order.

Number of Pages of Judgment Orders = A count variable for the number of pages of the judgment order in the particular case. This is also indicated in the text of the judgment order.

Age at appointment = The difference between date of birth and age at appointment. This data is obtained from Judicial Administrative Data Records at the High Court Registrar Offices.

S3. Details on Data Construction

We randomly sample 336 cases every year from 1950 to 2016 to obtain data on 22,512 cases in the High Courts of Pakistan. This is about 0.1% of the total cases decided in this sample period. These cases were divided into constitutional petitions, 74% (cases against the executive e.g. office of Prime Minister, government agencies etc.) and criminal cases, 26% of the total cases. Since we focus on the effect of Ramadan on criminal judicial decision-making, we draw on all available criminal cases, i.e. 26% of the available sample. The outcome variable and case characteristics in the dataset are coded based on the reading of the judgment orders by a law firm. The law firm was divided into two teams of 5 paralegals each, with two senior lawyers overseeing each team, which independently coded the same 22,512 cases. Data coded by Team 1 is used in this study, although identical results are obtained with the codings from Team 2 (results available on request). For Indian Data, we use the eCourts platform. A semi-public portal that collected key information on Indian lower courts. This includes information on the judge, litigant, lawyer, case decision and law or section under which the case was adjudicated.

S4. Details on Method and Identification Strategy

Our empirical strategy relies on three sources of variation. The first identifying variation comes from the fact that cases are randomly assigned across Muslim and non-Muslim judges. This implies similar decisions are made by Muslim and non-Muslim judges. The second identifying variation comes from the fact that the Islamic calendar corresponds to the lunar cycle and months rotate over the seasons in cycles. This implies that the intensity of the fasting ritual varies according to which month in the Gregorian calendar Ramadan happens to fall in any given year. The third identifying variation for the number of hours of fasting comes from geographical location (latitude in particular), which determines the hours of daylight and, in interaction with the rotating seasonal calendar, leads to variation in ritual intensity across the north and south depending on whether Ramadan falls in the summer, fall, winter, or spring. These sources of variation allow us to overcome three sources of endogeneity—different types of cases, direct effect of seasonality, and direct effect of Ramadan—that would otherwise confound the effect that Ramadan fasting has on decision-making.

Balance Checks. — It may be argued that the de jure random assignment of cases in South Asia is not observed in practice and that our results are driven by non-random case assignment of Muslim versus non-Muslim judges. We test for and find no evidence for this hypothesis, consistent with prior accounts² ([Ash et al., 2021](#)). Table S7 presents these balance test results where we observe Muslim and non-Muslim judges are equally likely to be assigned different types of cases pertaining to rape, child sexual abuse, robbery, assault, kidnapping, theft, and fraud. This strongly suggests that the type of cases are balanced and consistent with random assignment across Muslim and non-Muslim judges. Second, we also test whether changes in length of day within Ramadan affects the type of cases that show up in court. These results are presented in Table S8. We observe that Ramadan hours are uncorrelated with a long list of criminal case types, indicating the intensity of fasting rituals is also unlikely to change the type of cases that show up in court. These two balance tests strongly indicate that Muslim judges are not assigned specific types of cases nor the intensity of fasting ritual impact the type of cases adjudicated upon. Essentially identical evidence is found for Pakistan, which we present in Table S9 of Supplementary Material. In addition, we run regressions where the interaction of Muslim and Ramadan or Muslim and Ramadan Hours are the dependent variable and all the other variables are on the right-hand side and we check for joint significance of the case characteristics in Table S10.

S5. Theoretical Framework

This section consists of four short subsections. First, we introduce the model setup and derive the equilibrium. Then, we distinguish between two mechanisms, Ramadan Spirit (RS) versus Do the Right Thing (DRT) effect, that may explain the observed pattern of a decrease in acquittals as intensity of the Ramadan ritual increases. Last, we use our model to formulate a simple procedure that allows us to separate these two key mechanisms.

Setup of the Model. — We model a two-stage judge j choice about a judicial case c ruled at time t in district d . In the first stage, the judge commits to a cognitive effort $e_{cjd t} > 0$ when case c is heard. In the second stage, judge j observes the characteristics of the case and adjudicates. To ease the notations, the indices will be dropped when unnecessary.

For the judge, the relative payoff from acquitting the defendant, $\Delta D_{cjd t}$, consists of three components,

$$\Delta D_{cjd t} = D_{cjd t} - P_{cjd t} + R(e_{cjd t}), \quad (1)$$

where $D_{cjd t}$ is the unknown legal score of the defendant, which depends on the legal evidence brought by the defendant before the court. We assume that according to judge j , $D_{cjd t}$ is drawn from a normal distribution $N(D_0, \sigma_D^2)$ with D_0 corresponding to judges' common prior on any defendant's score. Similarly, $P_{cjd t}$ is the unknown legal score of the prosecution, also drawn from a normal distribution $N(P_0, \sigma_P^2)$ with P_0 corresponding to judges' common prior on the prosecution's score. Finally, $R(e_{cjd t})$ corresponds to the unknown additional legal facts that the judge will observe depending on his cognitive effort $e_{cjd t}$ and that will affect the defendant's relative score. We also assume that $R(e_{cjd t})$ is drawn from a normal distribution $N(0, e_{cjd t}^2)$. Hence, when the judge exerts higher cognitive effort $e_{cjd t}$ in the first stage, he realizes a payoff $\Delta D_{cjd t}$ in the second stage that can be farther from his prior scores issued for the defendant and the prosecution. That is, higher cognitive effort reduces the effect of initial priors on judicial decision-making.

The judge cares about doing the right thing. Hence, in the second stage of the game, he acquits the defendant when $\Delta D_{cjd t} > 0$ and convicts otherwise. In the first stage, the judge invests effort $e_{cjd t}$ so as to be able to distinguish as much as possible the defendant's score

from the prosecution's score. Hence, the judge chooses a positive cognitive effort e_{cjd} that maximizes the following utility function:

$$u_j = E |\Delta D_{cjd}| - \gamma e_{cjd}, \quad (2)$$

where $\gamma > 0$ corresponds to the marginal cost of effort and $E |\Delta D_{cjd}|$ represents the expected distance between the defendant's score and the prosecution's score.

Equilibrium. — Solving the optimization problem (2), we find the following result.

PROPOSITION 1. The optimal cognitive effort of the judge e^* is uniquely determined. It decreases with $|\Delta D_0|$ and γ .

Judicial bias is captured in our model by parameter $|\Delta D_0| = |D_0 - P_0|$. We show that when the judge has no clear-cut prior on whether the defendant is guilty or innocent (i.e., $|\Delta D_0|$ is low), he will invest more cognitive effort e_{cjd} . The reason is that higher cognitive effort is useful when it enables the judge to better distinguish the scores of the prosecution and the defendant. If the judge initially has a strong prior about the case (i.e., $|\Delta D_0|$ is high), he does not need to exert much cognitive effort, as he distinguishes well the evidence brought before the court. Next, we consider the effect of a higher incentive to make better decisions. In our model, this channel is represented by parameter γ . When the marginal cost of effort γ is lower, the judge invests more cognitive effort in order to better distinguish the scores of the prosecution and the defendant.¹¹

Ramadan Fasting Ritual and Judicial Decision-Making: Two Competing Mechanisms.

— The Ramadan fasting ritual has specific characteristics. For a month, healthy adult Muslims are required to observe *Sawn* (or the fast) from dawn to sunset, abstaining from food, drink, sexual activities, and to implement in their daily lives the values of reflection, self-control and restraint.¹² Ramadan, as other rituals, therefore, has a theoretically ambiguous effect. On the one hand, it may deteriorate decision-making by introducing bias. On the other hand, it may improve the decision quality through psychological mechanisms of self-control and reflection³⁴ ([Hobson et al., 2017](#); [Tian et al., 2018](#)). In the context of our model and empirical application,

¹¹ All mathematical proofs are relegated to Appendix D.

¹² Quran, Chapter 2, Verse, 183⁶; [Osanloo \(2006\)](#).

we hypothesize that the Ramadan ritual can have two effects on judges' decision-making processes.

Ramadan fasting ritual reduces bias against the defendant. During Ramadan, Muslim judges may be imbued with a Ramadan Spirit (RS) of *taqwa* (literally, God-consciousness and self-restraint) that makes them more lenient. In the context of the model, the Ramadan Spirit (RS) would increase the prior of the judge that the defendant is innocent without regard to the facts of the case, i.e., we expect ΔD_0 to increase.

Ramadan fasting ritual increases judges' incentives to do the right thing. During Ramadan, Muslim judges may wish to “do the right thing” and make “better” decisions, paying more attention to the facts of the case. This would also be consistent with anthropological literature arguing that Ramadan fasting is associated with greater reflection and self-control (see for instance⁵, [Osanloo, 2006](#)). Therefore, judges might have a higher incentive to parse the evidence brought to court during the Ramadan fasting ritual. We call this potential effect of the Ramadan ritual the “Do the Right Thing” (DRT) effect. In the context of our model, the DRT effect arises by decreasing the marginal cost of effort during the Ramadan fasting ritual. The compounded effect of these two effects on judicial decision-making is summarized below in Proposition 2:

PROPOSITION 2. The RS effect necessarily increases the likelihood of the defendant winning. The DRT effect increases the likelihood of the defendant winning if and only if $\Delta D_0 \leq 0$.

Figure S3 represents the potential mechanisms explaining the decrease in acquittals as the intensity of the Ramadan ritual increases, which we highlighted in Proposition 2. The figure presents the probability density distribution of the defendant's relative score ΔD , which is drawn from a normal distribution $N(D_0 - P_0, \sigma_D^2 + \sigma_P^2 + e^2)$. As represented in Figure S3, the defendant wins if and only if $\Delta D > 0$. If the Ramadan ritual induces a RS effect, this will increase ΔD_0 and the distribution of ΔD would be shifted on the right, as represented in Panel (a). As a result, the likelihood of the defendant winning (i.e., when $\Delta D > 0$) would increase by an amount equal to the shaded region in Panel (a) of Figure S3. In contrast, if the Ramadan fasting ritual increases the judge's incentive to Do the Right Thing (DRT), then the standard deviation of the distribution of ΔD would increase. As a result, if the judge initially had a prior against the defendant (i.e., $\Delta D_0 < 0$) and wants to DRT, the likelihood of him finding legal

facts that contradict his initial prior increases. That is, in light of the DRT effect, the judge will face a smaller cost from exerting effort and might consider additional legal facts in favor of the defendant that he would have missed otherwise. The likelihood of the judge finding the defendant innocent increases by the shaded region in Panel (b) of Figure S3.

Disentangling the Ramadan Spirit Effect from Do the Right Thing Effect. — The RS and DRT effects have different implications on the fairness of judicial decisions. In our framework, the RS effect introduces a judicial bias that is independent of the legal facts of the case. The DRT effect by contrast can allow judges to overcome their initial biases about both the defendant and the prosecution and make better decisions as a result.

These two effects can be disentangled through two distinct methodologies. The first is based on the characteristics of the litigants and reoffense rate. If the RS effect dominates, then we should expect a higher reoffense rate by litigants acquitted during Ramadan by Muslim judges. Indeed, these acquitted litigants are more likely to be criminals than those acquitted by non-Muslim judges, or by Muslim judges outside Ramadan. By contrast, if the DRT effect dominates, then we should not expect a higher reoffense rate by litigants acquitted during Ramadan by Muslim judges. Indeed, these acquitted litigants are less likely to be criminals than those acquitted by non-Muslim judges, or by Muslim judges outside Ramadan.

The second methodology is based on the analysis of cases ruled in both lower Courts and appellate Courts. If the RS effect dominates, then we should expect judicial decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan to be appealed and reverted more often. This might not be true when the DRT effect dominates, since Muslim judges during Ramadan might be making better decisions. The precise impact of both the DRT and the RS effects on the likelihood of appeal and reversal rate would also depend on the relative bias of appellate Court judges relative to lower Court judges. To understand this mechanism more precisely, we formalize it in the rest of this Section.

Consider a judicial case c , ruled by a lower court judge j in district d and time t . This case is subject to an appeal and is ruled again in an appeal court by judge j' in district d' at time t' . We denote $D_{cd'jt'}^H > 0$ the unknown score of the defendant, while $P_{cd'jt'}^H > 0$ is the unknown score of the prosecution in the appellate court. We assume that $D_{cd'jt'}^H$ is drawn from a normal distribution $N(D_0^H, \sigma_D^2)$, while $P_{cd'jt'}$ is also drawn from a normal distribution $N(P_0^H, \sigma_P^2)$. We denote $\Delta D_0^H = D_0^H - P_0^H$ the prior of a high court judge on the defendant's score. Since the legal

facts established in the lower court are retained, the high court judge j' will rule the defendant innocent when $\Delta D_{cd'jt'} + q(e_{cjd't}) > 0$ and will convict the defendant otherwise. We establish the following result:

PROPOSITION 3. If the RS effect dominates, acquittal decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are more likely to be reversed in appellate courts. If the DRT effect dominates, acquittal decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are less likely to be reversed in appeal courts if and only if $\Delta D_0 < \Delta D_0^H$.

Our statement that the RS effect necessarily leads to more decision reversals in appellate courts is intuitive. Appeal judges are not affected by the RS effect since they are seldom ruling during Ramadan. Hence, they would be more likely to disagree with the lower court decisions of judges when these judges are imbued with the unjustified leniency of the RS. By contrast, the impact of the DRT effect on appeal decisions depends on judges' priors in both the lower court and the appellate court. Consider, for example, the case where $\Delta D_0 < 0$ and $\Delta D_0^H < 0$, so that both lower court and appellate court judges are initially biased against defendants. A higher cognitive effort from lower court judges enables both lower court and high court judges to acquit more. However, the effect is stronger for high court judges when they are less biased against defendants than their peers in lower courts (i.e., $\Delta D_0 < \Delta D_0^H$). Hence, the likelihood of lower court judges' acquittal decisions being overturned is reduced. By contrast, a higher cognitive effort from lower court judges makes them more likely to acquit than their peers in high courts when $\Delta D_0 > \Delta D_0^H$. In this case, the likelihood of lower court judges' acquittal decisions being overturned is higher when the DRT effect dominates. The intuitions are similar in the cases where $\Delta D_0 \geq 0$ and/or $\Delta D_0^H \geq 0$.

Turning to the influence of the RS and the DRT effects on the reversal of conviction verdicts in lower court, we establish the following result:

PROPOSITION 4. If the RS effect dominates, conviction decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are less likely to be reversed in appellate courts. If the DRT effect dominates, conviction decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are less likely to be reversed in appellate courts if and only if $\Delta D_0 > \Delta D_0^H$.

When the RS effect dominates, given their leniency bias, Muslim judges imbued with a RS only convict when the defendant's relative score is very low. As a result, they are less

likely to disagree with high court judges when they convict defendants. Hence, if the RS effect dominates, conviction decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are less likely to be reversed in appellate courts. By contrast, the impact of the DRT effect on appeal decisions depends on judges' priors in both the lower court and the appellate court. Consider again the case where $\Delta D_0 < 0$ and $\Delta D_0^H < 0$, so that both lower court and appeal court judges are initially biased against defendants. A higher cognitive effort from lower court judges enables both lower court and high court judges to convict less. However, the effect is stronger for high court judges when they are less biased against defendants than their peers in lower courts (i.e. $\Delta D_0 < \Delta D_0^H$). Hence, the likelihood of lower court judges' conviction verdicts being overturned is increased. However, a higher cognitive effort from lower court judges makes lower court judges less likely to convict than their peers in high courts when $\Delta D_0 > \Delta D_0^H$. In this case, the likelihood of lower court judges' conviction decisions being overturned is lower when the DRT effect dominates.

Propositions 3 and 4 are about decision reversals in high courts conditional on lower court cases being appealed. However, when litigants rationally expect judicial outcomes in high courts, these results can easily be extended to predict appeal decisions by litigants conditional on lower court cases being ruled during Ramadan by Muslim judges.¹³

In summary, this conceptual framework provides the micro-foundations for our empirical analysis of the influence of Ramadan fasting on judicial decision-making and helps us better understand the mechanisms. Importantly, our framework also allows us to separate different plausible yet counterintuitive channels that may be operating to explain the increased acquittals in lower courts as a result of Ramadan fasting. On one hand, Ramadan fasting may incentivize judges to be incorrectly more lenient. This effect may be due to what we labeled the Ramadan Spirit, a general tendency to see defendants more favorably. On the other hand, the Ramadan ritual can motivate judges to do the right thing. When lower court decisions are biased against defendants, these two mechanisms are confounded and lead to more acquittal verdicts in lower courts. We found that ascertaining the impact of Ramadan fasting necessitates the study of appeals and decision reversals. If the RS effect dominates, our model predicts that

¹³ Proposition 3 extends as follows: If the RS effect dominates, acquittal decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are more likely to be appealed. If the DRT effect dominates, acquittal decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are less likely to be appealed if and only if $D_0 < D_0^H$. Similarly, Proposition 4 extends as follows: If the RS effect dominates, conviction decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are less likely to be appealed. If the DRT effect dominates, conviction decisions made by Muslim judges during Ramadan are less likely to be appealed if and only if $D_0 > D_0^H$.

their decisions should be appealed and overturned more often in appellate courts. In contrast, if it is the effect of Ramadan on judges' incentive to DRT that dominates, then judges would invest more cognitive effort in overcoming their initial biases against defendants. Their acquittal verdicts should be appealed and reversed less, while the opposite is true for conviction verdicts.

Supplementary Material S6. Supplementary Figures and Tables




Figure S1: Daily Ramadan Fasting Hours – Pakistan (1950-2016) Each line represents the average daily number of sunrise-to-sunset hours during the month of Ramadan for each year, measured at the location of the district court in Pakistan.




Figure S2: Daily Ramadan Fasting Hours – India (1997-2018) Each line represents the average daily number of sunrise-to-sunset hours during the month of Ramadan for each year, measured at the location of the district court in India.




Figure S3: Ramadan Spirit and Do the Right Thing Effect. the figure above presents the distributions of the defendant’s relative score D and how it is affected by the leniency effect of the “Ramadan spirit” (panel a) and “Do the Right Thing” effect (panel b). Dark line represents the prior distributions. The shaded regions in both panels represent the increase in the likelihood of a judge finding the defendant innocent.




Fig. S4 | The Impact of Ramadan Hours in India. This Figure is presenting the daylight hours effect for Ramadan month and for the months before and after Ramadan. It plots the coefficients in our baseline regression using Pakistan case data with Ramadan Hours (t), and coefficients on daylight hours during preceding and subsequent Islamic calendar months. Specifically, we also plot coefficients on Jumada al Akhirah Hours ($t-3$), Rajab Hours ($t-2$), Shaban Hours ($t-1$), Shawwal Hours ($t+1$), Dhul Kada Hours ($t+2$), Dhul Hijja Hours ($t+3$). A similar 95% Confidence intervals are also reported.

Table S1: Descriptive Statistics – Pakistan and India

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Panel A: Outcome variables and case characteristics (variation by cases) – Pakistan</i>					
Acquittals	5,848	0.518	0.499	0	1
Pages Judgment Order	5,848	8.937	8.135	1	81
Chief Justice on Bench	5,848	0.062	0.241	0	1
Number of Lawyers	5,848	4.030	3.715	1	30
Number of Judges	5,848	1.733	0.817	1	4
<i>Panel B: Main Explanatory Variable (variation by district-month) – Pakistan</i>					
Ramadan Hours	5848	1.083	3.478	0	14.4
<i>Panel C: Judge Characteristics (variation by judges) - Pakistan</i>					
Muslim	917	0.658	0.474	0	1
Gender	917	0.944	0.229	0	1
Promoted to SC	917	0.064	0.245	0	1
Former Lower Court Judge	917	0.101	0.301	0	1
Fr. Office holder of Bar Ass.	917	0.621	0.484	0	1
<i>Panel D: Outcome variables and case characteristics (variation by cases) – India – Lower court</i>					
Acquittal	372,089	0.533	0.498	0	1
Criminal Miscellaneous	372,089	0.042	0.202	0	1
Judgment Type	372,089	0.022	0.149	0	1
<i>Panel E: Explanatory Variables (variation by district-day) – India – Lower court</i>					
Ramadan Hours	372,089	0.978	3.510	0	14.46
<i>Panel F: Judge Characteristics (variation by judges) – India – Lower court</i>					
Muslim	7,668	0.053	0.225	0	1
Session Judge	7,668	0.131	0.337	0	1
<i>Panel G: Outcome variables and case characteristics (variation by cases) – India – High court</i>					
Appealed	372,089	0.003	0.059	0	1
Overtured	19,914	0.219	0.413	0	1
Criminal Miscellaneous	372,089	0.042	0.202	0	1
Judgment Type	372,089	0.022	0.149	0	1
<i>Panel H: Explanatory Variables (variation by district- day) – India – High court</i>					
Ramadan Hours	372,089	0.978	3.510	0	14.46
<i>Panel I: Judge Characteristics (variation by judges) – India – High court</i>					
Muslim	7,668	0.053	0.225	0	1
Session Judge	7,668	0.131	0.337	0	1

Note: Panels A, B and C of the table reports the summary statistics for the Pakistani baseline sample of 5848 judicial cases, 917 judges covering the 16 divisional or district courts of Pakistan over the 1950-2016 period. Panel D, E, F, G, H and I report the summary statistics for the Indian baseline sample of 372,089 judicial cases, 7,668 judges covering the 436 Indian district courts and 25 High Courts of India over the 1997-2018 period.

Table S2: Impact of Rituals on Acquittals and Appeals on Violent Crimes vs Non-Violent Crimes- India

	Violent Crimes		Non-Violent Crimes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Acquittal Verdicts in Lower Court</i>				
Muslim X Ramadan Hours	0.00903*	0.00907*	0.000111	0.000119
Standard error	(0.00531)	(0.00531)	(0.00238)	(0.00239)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00148 -	-0.00142 -	-0.00457 -	-0.00458 -
	0.0195	0.0196	0.00479	0.00481
P value	(0.0917)	(0.0896)	(0.963)	(0.960)
Anderson q-values	{0.18}	{0.17}	{0.62}	{0.62}
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5,215	5,215	366,828	366,828
R-squared	0.481	0.494	0.289	0.290
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.575	0.575	0.533	0.533
Number of Judges	890	890	7634	7634
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel B: Appealed Verdicts in High Court</i>				
Muslim X Ramadan Hours	-0.000938**	-0.000889**	-2.99e-05	-3.09e-05
Standard error	(0.000402)	(0.000386)	(0.000124)	(0.000124)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00173 - -	-0.00165 - -	-0.000275 -	-0.000275 -
	0.000143	0.000125	0.000215	0.000214
P value	(0.0211)	(0.0229)	(0.810)	(0.804)
Anderson q-values	{0.14}	{0.15}	{0.62}	{0.61}
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5,215	5,215	366,828	366,828
R-squared	0.065	0.066	0.045	0.045
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003
Number of Judges	890	890	7634	7634

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variable is Acquittals in Panel A and Appeals in Panel B, a dummy variable for acquittals and appeals respectively. The cases are considered Violent if it is armed robbery, homicide or assault. Controls include indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator for judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours and their interactions individually as controls. Fixed effects include district fixed effects and year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is at the case level. Anderson sharpened q-values are also reported, in curly brackets. The sharpened q-values can, theoretically, also be less than unadjusted p-values when many hypotheses are rejected, because if there are many true rejections, you can tolerate several false rejections too and still maintain a low false discovery rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S3: Impact of Ramadan Ritual on Appeals in High Courts - India

	Acquitted in lower Court		Convicted in lower Court	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Appealed</i>			
Muslim X Ramadan Hours	-0.00013**	-0.00013**	-0.00007	-0.00007
Standard error	(0.00006)	(0.00005)	(0.00029)	(0.00029)
95% two-sided CI	-0.0003- -	-0.0003- -	-0.0007-	-0.0006-
	0.000004	0.000005	0.0005	0.0005
P value	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.789)	(0.800)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	198,589	198,589	173,472	173,472
R-squared	0.046	0.046	0.059	0.060
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004
Number of Judges	6394	6394	4889	4889

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variable is *Appealed*, a dummy variable that switches on if the court verdict is appealed in the High Court. Muslim X Ramadan Hours is the interaction between the dummy for Muslim and average daylight hours in Ramadan. Controls include indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator for judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours, their corresponding interactions as controls in all columns of this table. Fixed effects include district fixed effects and year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is at the case level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S4: Modeling Selection of Cases using Leave Out Instrument - India

	First Stage		Second Stage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Appealed</i>		<i>Overtuned</i>	
Muslim X Ramadan Hours			-0.0087** (0.0036)	-0.0079** (0.0036)
Appeal Leniency IV	8.7618*** (0.4159)	8.8412*** (0.4094)		
District and Time FE Controls	Yes No	Yes Yes	Yes No	Yes Yes
athrho	0.1305 (0.0489)	0.1179 (0.0504)	0.1305 (0.0489)	0.1179 (0.0504)
Insigma	0.6995 (0.0026)	-0.8984 (0.0358)	0.6995 (0.0026)	-0.8984 (0.0358)
Observations	6,739,667	6,739,667	6,739,667	6,739,667
Selected Observations	19928	19928	19928	19928
Non-selected Observations	6,719,739	6,719,739	6,719,739	6,719,739
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Number of Judges	15778	15778	15778	15778

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is *Appealed*, a dummy variable that switches on if the court verdict is appealed in the high court. The dependent variables in column (3) and (4) is *Overtuned* in column 3 and 4, a dummy variable that switches on for lower court verdict reversed in the high court. The equations are estimated via full information maximum likelihood using Chiburis and Lokshin (2007) Stata command *heckman* the extends the standard Heckman selection equation from probit to an ordered probit. The leave-out leniency of a judge is used as an instrumental variable (similar to Norris et al., 2021). Muslim X Ramadan Hours is the interaction between the dummy for Muslim and average daylight hours in Ramadan. Controls include indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator for judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours, their corresponding interactions individually as controls in all specifications. Fixed effects include district fixed effects and year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is an individual case. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S5: Evaluating the Physiological Deprivation Channel by religion – India

	Muslim Judges			Non-Muslim Judges		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Caseload</i>	<i>Days to First Hearing</i>	<i>Days Delay</i>	<i>Caseload</i>	<i>Days to First Hearing</i>	<i>Days Delay</i>
Ramadan Hours	-0.0350	143.5	103.9	-0.874	138.7	-111.5
Standard error	(0.673)	(125.0)	(78.55)	(0.690)	(121.3)	(120.5)
95% two-sided CI	-1.364 -	-103.1 -	-51.14 -	-2.231 -	-99.72 -	-348.4 -
	1.294	390.2	258.9	0.482	377.1	125.5
P value	(0.959)	(0.252)	(0.188)	(0.206)	(0.253)	(0.356)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,295	12,295	12,295	183,141	183,141	183,141
R-squared	0.103	0.066	0.052	0.030	0.017	0.012
Number of Judges	395	395	395	7167	7167	7167

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variables in Columns (1) and (4) is Caseload, that denotes the number of cases decided per day by the judge, for cases decided by Muslim and non-Muslim judges, respectively. The dependent variables in Columns (2) and (5) is Days to First Hearing which denotes the days the case is pending before the judge schedules the first hearing, by Muslim and non-Muslim judges, respectively. Likewise, dependent variable is Case Delay for Columns (3) and (6) and represent the time the case in pending in court until decision for Muslim and non-Muslim judges, respectively. Controls include indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator for judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours and Ramadan Hours individually as controls. Fixed effects include district fixed effects and year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation in this table is at the judge-day level since the variation in dependent variables is at this level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S6: Evaluating the Physiological Deprivation Channel by religion - Pakistan

	Muslim Judges		Non-Muslim Judges	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Caseload</i>	<i>Case Delay</i>	<i>Caseload</i>	<i>Case Delay</i>
Ramadan Hours	0.00843	0.100	0.0263	0.259
Standard error	(0.00955)	(0.138)	(0.0156)	(0.194)
95% two-sided CI	-0.0119 - 0.0288	-0.194 - 0.395	-0.00683 - 0.0595	-0.153 - 0.672
P value	(0.391)	(0.478)	(0.111)	(0.201)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,964	2,964	1,453	1,453
R-squared	0.050	0.063	0.071	0.086
Number of Judges	587	587	314	314

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variables are Caseload, a variable for number of cases decided per day by judge and Case Delay difference between filing and decision year. Ramadan Hours are the number of daylight hours in Ramadan. The controls include case characteristics like, presence of chief justice on the bench, and judge characteristics such as dummies for judge's gender, prior employment (lawyer or former judge), and political activity prior to judicial appointment. We also include Ramadan Hours and Daylight Hours individually as controls in all specifications. Fixed effects include district fixed effects and year fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observations is at the level of variation in dependent variable i.e. judge-time level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S7: Random Case Assignment Check - India

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Muslim Judge</i>								
Rape	-0.0355 (0.0328)							-0.0230 (0.0282)
Children Sexual Assault		-0.000775 (0.105)						-0.00199 (0.106)
Robbery			-0.00372 (0.0043)					-0.00385 (0.0043)
Assault				0.0626 (0.0569)				0.0633 (0.0568)
Kidnapping					-0.0405 (0.0290)			-0.0273* (0.0148)
Theft						0.0164 (0.0242)		0.0160 (0.0240)
Fraud							0.00308 (0.0361)	0.00243 (0.0366)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	372,089	372,089	372,089	372,089	372,089	372,089	372,089	372,089
R-squared	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154
Number of Judges	7668	7668	7668	7668	7668	7668	7668	7668
F-Statistics [P-values]	1.17[0.28]	0.001[0.99]	0.74[0.3]	1.21[0.27]	1.94[0.16]	0.46[0.4]	0.01[0.93]	1.17[0.3]

Note: Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district level). Dependent variable is a dummy variable that switches on when the case is adjudicated by a Muslim judge. Independent variables are indicator variables that switch on when the case involved rape, child sexual abuse, robbery, assault, kidnapping or theft. F-statistics and corresponding p-values are also reported in the last row to test for joint significance. Fixed effects include district, year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is at the case level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S8: Impact of Ramadan Ritual on Case Composition – Muslim and Non-Muslim Judges - India*Panel A: Muslim Judges*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	<i>Rape</i>	<i>Child Sexual Assault</i>	<i>Robbery</i>	<i>Assault</i>	<i>Kidnapping</i>	<i>Theft</i>	<i>Fraud</i>
Ramadan Hours	-0.00170	-0.00209	0.00742*	-4.93e-05	-0.00117	0.00180	-0.00074
Standard error	(0.00327)	(0.00150)	(0.00410)	(0.00011)	(0.00118)	(0.0014)	(0.0007)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,995	19,995	19,995	19,995	19,995	19,995	19,995
R-squared	0.090	0.839	0.016	0.006	0.086	0.120	0.007
Number of Judges	400	400	400	400	400	400	400

Panel B: Non-Muslim Judges

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ramadan Hours	-0.0011	0.0002	0.0023	-0.0001	-0.0007	-0.0001	0.0001
Standard error	(0.00195)	(0.000557)	(0.00160)	(0.0001)	(0.00112)	(0.0008)	(0.0002)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	352,057	352,057	352,057	352,057	352,057	352,057	352,057
R-squared	0.306	0.075	0.106	0.003	0.289	0.027	0.004
Number of Judges	7243	7243	7243	7243	7243	7243	7243

Note: Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district level). Dependent variables are indicator variables that switch on when the case involved rape, child sexual abuse, robbery, assault, kidnapping or theft, respectively, for each column. Ramadan Hours are number of daylight hours in Ramadan. We also include dummies for the month of Ramadan and average Daylight Hours as controls in all specifications. Fixed effects include district fixed effects and year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The controls include all remaining columns in the dependent variable except the dependent variable used in the respective column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S9: Balance Check on Case Characteristics – Muslim and Non-Muslim Judges - Pakistan

<i>Panel A: Muslim Judges</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	# Pg. Judg.	Bench CJ	# Lawyer	# Judge	# Appeals
Ramadan Hours	0.508	-0.0172*	0.280	-0.0544*	0.0313
Standard error	(0.425)	(0.00830)	(0.177)	(0.0279)	(0.0366)
95% two-sided CI	-0.397 - 1.414	-0.0348 - 0.000527	-0.0975 - 0.657	-0.114 - 0.00501	-0.0466 - 0.109
P value	(0.250)	(0.0563)	(0.135)	(0.0699)	(0.405)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,849	3,849	3,849	3,849	3,849
R-squared	0.213	0.060	0.106	0.115	0.072
Mean of dep. variable	9.077	0.063	4.161	1.758	1.145
<i>Panel B: Non-Muslim Judges</i>					
	# Pg. Judg.	Bench CJ	# Lawyer	# Judge	# Appeals
Ramadan Hours	-0.616	-0.0107	0.0983	-0.0436	-0.0254
Standard error	(0.553)	(0.0116)	(0.165)	(0.0622)	(0.0509)
95% two-sided CI	-1.795 - 0.564	-0.0354 - 0.0140	-0.254 - 0.450	-0.176 - 0.0890	-0.134 - 0.0832
P value	(0.283)	(0.369)	(0.561)	(0.494)	(0.626)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,997	1,997	1,997	1,997	1,997
R-squared	0.192	0.092	0.151	0.127	0.109
Mean of dep. variable	8.667	0.059	3.777	1.685	1.103

Robust standard errors clustered at district level appear in brackets. The dependent variables are Number of Pages of judgment order (column 1), dummy for Chief Justice on bench (column 2), number of lawyers on the case (column 3), number of judges on the case (column 4), number of criminal appeals decided (column 5). Ramadan Hours is the average sunlight hours during Ramadan. Fixed effects include district, month and year fixed effects and controls include all available judge and case controls. We also include Ramadan Month and Daylight Hours individually as controls in all specifications. Panel A covers cases decided by Muslim judges, while Panel B covers cases decided by non-Muslim judges. The unit of observation is an individual case. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S10: Additional Balance Check - Joint Orthogonality Test

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Indian Courts</i>		<i>Pakistani Courts</i>	
	<i>Muslim X Ramadan</i>	<i>Muslim X Ramadan Hours</i>	<i>Muslim X Ramadan</i>	<i>Muslim X Ramadan Hours</i>
Rape	0.00186 (0.00196)	0.0270 (0.0267)		
Assault	-0.00168 (0.00470)	-0.0219 (0.0639)		
Robbery	0.000214 (0.00100)	0.00291 (0.0137)		
Children Sexual Assault	0.00679** (0.00285)	0.0936** (0.0370)		
Theft	-0.00239 (0.00230)	-0.0313 (0.0308)		
Fraud	-0.00966 (0.00607)	-0.131 (0.0833)		
Kidnapping	-0.00208 (0.00174)	-0.0285 (0.0240)		
# Pg. Judg.			-0.00003 (0.000229)	0.000267 (0.00280)
Bench CJ			0.000376 (0.00714)	-0.00005 (0.0894)
# Lawyer			0.00005 (0.000435)	0.00162 (0.00584)
# Judge			-0.000409 (0.00182)	-0.00749 (0.0212)
# Appeals			-0.00277 (0.00210)	-0.0319 (0.0247)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	372,089	372,089	5,848	5,848
R-squared	0.129	0.130	0.688	0.685
F-Stats (Joint Significance)	1.53	1.67	0.74	0.64
p-values (Joint Significance)	0.155	0.114	0.605	0.669

Note: Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-level). The dependent variables are either Muslim X Ramadan (Columns 1 and 3) or Muslim X Ramadan Hours (Columns 2 and 4). Controls include indicators for judge type (whether the judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge) and judge characteristics such as dummies for judge's gender and prior employment (lawyer or former judge). Fixed effects include district and time fixed effects as in baseline regressions. F-Statistics in each column correspond to joint significance tests on the displayed case characteristics in the table. Level terms for Ramadan, Ramadan Hours and Muslim are always controlled for. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S11: No Differential Impact by Crop Season

<i>Panel A: Pakistan</i>				
	Muslim Judges		Non-Muslim Judges	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Acquittals</i>			
Crop Season X Ramadan Hours	-0.00402 (0.00393)	-0.00460 (0.00359)	-0.00846 (0.00943)	-0.00934 (0.00913)
Ramadan Hours	0.0545** (0.0227)	0.0560** (0.0228)	0.0380 (0.0428)	0.0426 (0.0408)
Crop Season	-0.0449 (0.0287)	-0.0427 (0.0279)	0.00432 (0.0326)	0.00224 (0.0330)
District and time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3,849	3,849	1,997	1,997
R-squared	0.052	0.055	0.064	0.072
<i>Panel B: India</i>				
	Muslim Judges		Non-Muslim Judges	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Acquittals</i>			
Crop Season X Ramadan Hours	0.00129 (0.00351)	0.00161 (0.00357)	-0.000526 (0.00157)	-0.000579 (0.00158)
Ramadan Hours	0.0639* (0.0385)	0.0614 (0.0385)	0.0352 (0.0234)	0.0363 (0.0240)
Crop Season	-0.0122 (0.0471)	-0.00556 (0.0463)	0.00547 (0.0241)	0.00642 (0.0241)
District and time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	19,995	19,995	352,057	352,057
R-squared	0.230	0.233	0.293	0.294

Note: Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-level). The dependent variable is Acquittal Verdict, a dummy variable that switches on for acquittal decisions. Crop Season X Ramadan Hours is the interaction between the dummy for crop harvesting season in Pakistan and India (for months April to June) and average daylight hours in Ramadan. The Crop season Dummy, Ramadan month dummy and Daylight Hours individually are also always included. Panel A reports results on Pakistan with controls including case characteristics: number of pages in the judgment order, presence of chief justice on the bench, number of judges in a case, number of lawyers in a case, and judge characteristics such as dummies for judge's gender and prior employment (lawyer or former judge). Fixed effects include district and year fixed effects. Panel B reports results on India with controls including judge experience, indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator of judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). Fixed effects include district, year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is at the case level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S12: Robustness to Including State-by-Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Overtured</i>			
Muslim X Ramadan Hours	-0.00977**	-0.00973**	-0.00987**	-0.00851**
Standard error	(0.00401)	(0.00403)	(0.00398)	(0.00409)
95% two-sided CI	-0.0177 - -	-0.0177 - -	-0.0177 - -	-0.0166 - -
P value	0.00187 (0.0155)	0.00180 (0.0163)	0.00203 (0.0138)	0.000466 (0.0382)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control	No	No	Yes	Yes
State X Year FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	19,901	19,901	19,901	19,901
R-squared	0.182	0.194	0.196	0.208
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.219	0.219	0.219	0.219
Number of Judges	2777	2777	2777	2777

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variable is *Overtured*, a dummy variable that switches on for lower court verdict reversed in the High Court. Controls include indicator for case type (rape, assault, robbery, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, fraud and theft), indicator for judge type (whether judge is a specialist criminal judge or part-time criminal judge). We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours, their corresponding interactions as controls in all columns of the table. Fixed effects include district, year, month, week, day and in Column 4, we also include State by Year fixed effects. The unit of observation is at the case level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S13: No Differential Impact on Recidivism by Murder and Armed Robbery

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>Recidivism</i>		
Robbery X Muslim X Ramadan Hours		0.0102 (0.0129)	
Murder X Muslim X Ramadan Hours			-0.000633 (0.00668)
Robbery X Ramadan Hours		0.000254 (0.00200)	
Murder X Ramadan Hours			-0.0126*** (0.00402)
Muslim X Ramadan Hours	-0.000480 (0.00119)	-0.000522 (0.00120)	-0.000486 (0.00119)
Ramadan Hours	-0.00721 (0.0122)	-0.00727 (0.0121)	-0.00804 (0.0122)
Robbery X Muslim		-0.0664 (0.0777)	
Murder X Muslim			-0.00483 (0.0714)
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	362,562	362,562	362,562
R-squared	0.202	0.202	0.202

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-level). The dependent variable is Recidivism, a dummy variable that switches on if a defendant is charged with a new crime in the court following his or her acquittal. Muslim X Ramadan Hours is the interaction between the dummy for Muslim and average daylight hours in Ramadan. We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours, their corresponding interactions individually as controls. Robbery and Murder are dummy variables when the case involved armed robbery and murder, respectively. The unit of observation is an individual case.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S14: Impact of Ramadan over Time

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pakistani Courts		Indian Courts	
	<i>Muslim Judge</i>	<i>Non-Muslim Judge</i>	<i>Muslim Judge</i>	<i>Non-Muslim Judge</i>
Muslim X Jumada Hours (t-3)	-0.000838	-0.00427	0.0156	-0.0431
Standard error	(0.00184)	(0.00316)	(0.0381)	(0.0264)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00476 - 0.00308	-0.0110 - 0.00246	-0.0596 - 0.0908	-0.0951 - 0.00886
P value	(0.655)	(0.196)	(0.683)	(0.104)
Muslim X Rajab Hours (t-2)	-0.000437	0.00272	-0.0145	0.00134
Standard error	(0.00199)	(0.00293)	(0.0368)	(0.0222)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00468 - 0.00380	-0.00351 - 0.00896	-0.0871 - 0.0582	-0.0424 - 0.0450
P value	(0.829)	(0.367)	(0.694)	(0.952)
Muslim X Shaban Hours (t-1)	-0.00463**	-0.00171	0.0635	0.0418
Standard error	(0.00187)	(0.00299)	(0.0461)	(0.0279)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00861 - -0.000644	-0.00807 - 0.00466	-0.0275 - 0.154	-0.0130 - 0.0966
P value	(0.0257)	(0.576)	(0.170)	(0.135)
Muslim X Ramadan Hours (t)	0.0178***	-0.000703	0.104*	0.0232
Standard error	(0.00190)	(0.00381)	(0.0553)	(0.0293)
95% two-sided CI	0.0137 - 0.0218	-0.00882 - 0.00742	-0.00481 - 0.213	-0.0344 - 0.0808
P value	(0.000001)	(0.856)	(0.0609)	(0.428)
Muslim X Shawal Hours (t+1)	0.00470	0.00554	0.0443	-0.0252
Standard error	(0.00279)	(0.00352)	(0.0485)	(0.0273)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00125 - 0.0106	-0.00196 - 0.0130	-0.0513 - 0.140	-0.0789 - 0.0285
P value	(0.113)	(0.136)	(0.361)	(0.357)
Muslim X Dhulqada Hours (t+2)	-0.00341	0.00155	0.110***	-0.0183
Standard error	(0.00287)	(0.00297)	(0.0421)	(0.0242)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00954 - 0.00272	-0.00477 - 0.00788	0.0270 - 0.193	-0.0659 - 0.0293
P value	(0.254)	(0.609)	(0.00969)	(0.450)
Muslim X Dhulhijja Hours (t+3)	-0.00233	-0.000949	0.0469	-0.0610***
Standard error	(0.00307)	(0.00267)	(0.0350)	(0.0205)
95% two-sided CI	-0.00887 - 0.00422	-0.00665 - 0.00475	-0.0222 - 0.116	-0.101 - -0.0208
P value	(0.460)	(0.728)	(0.182)	(0.00305)
Observations	3,849	1,997	19,995	352,057
R-squared	0.060	0.079	0.235	0.295

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-level). The dependent variable Acquittals, a dummy variable that switches on if the defendant is acquitted. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates with leads and lags for Pakistan, for Muslim and non-Muslim judges respectively, while Columns 3 and 4 provide the corresponding estimates for India. Muslim X Ramadan Hours is the interaction between the dummy for Muslim and average daylight hours in Ramadan. We also include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours, their corresponding interactions individually as controls. Pre and post-Ramadan sunlight hours are also included along with their components. The remaining controls such as case characteristics and time fixed effects are identical to that in Table 1. The unit of observation is an individual case. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S15: Main Results Correcting for Multiple Hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Acquittals</i>				<i>Overtuned</i>
	<i>Muslim Judge</i>	<i>Non-Muslim Judge</i>	<i>Muslim Judge</i>	<i>Non-Muslim Judge</i>	-
	<i>Pakistani Courts</i>	<i>Pakistani Courts</i>	<i>Indian Courts</i>	<i>Indian Courts</i>	<i>Indian Courts</i>
Muslim X Ramadan Hours					-0.010
p-value					(0.016)**
Sharpened q-value					{0.089}*
Ramadan Hours	0.042	0.014	0.066	0.033	0.073
p-value	(0.042)**	(0.603)	(0.077)*	(0.150)	(0.071)*
Sharpened q-value	{0.332}	{0.999}	{0.292}	{0.292}	{0.105}
District and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,849	1,997	19,995	352,057	19,914

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-level). The dependent variable is Acquittals, a dummy variable for acquittals and zero if convictions. We include Ramadan month dummy, Muslim dummy, Daylight Hours, Ramadan Hours and their interactions individually as controls. Fixed effects include district fixed effects and year, month, week and day fixed effects where time corresponds to date of decision. The unit of observation is at the case level. The sharpened q-values can, theoretically, also be less than unadjusted p-values when many hypotheses are rejected, because if there are many true rejections, you can tolerate several false rejections too and still maintain a low false discovery rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.