Is There a versio vulgata of Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifāʾ? On the Hypothesis of a Double Recension of Kitāb al-Madhal

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Introduction

Still too little is known of the process of redaction of Avicenna's major work concerning philosophy, namely the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*. In particular, it is still a matter of investigation to determine whether the work might have undergone one or more revisions after its first composition or not. The possibility of the existence of more recensions of Avicenna's works was firstly suggested by D. Gutas for the brief treatise 'On the supernal bodies'[1], whereas the same issue was raised for the first time with regard to the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* by A. Bertolacci, as a result of a survey of the manuscript tradition of the section of *Metaphysics* of the work (*Kitāb al-Ilāhiyyāt*)[2]. More in detail, the case-study considered by A. Bertolacci concerns some differences in the arrangement of the chapters of the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysics* detected in part of the manuscript tradition and in the medieval Latin translation of the work. This observation led to the formulation of the hypothesis that two versions of the text might have existed, one of which would have been far more widespread and attested by a larger number of manuscripts (therefore named '*versio vulgata*')[3].

In the present paper, I will raise the question whether Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* underwent a process of reworking after its first composition — either by the author

* *Acknowledgements*: The present paper is the provisional result of a research on the manuscripts of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* conducted in collaboration with the ERC Project '*PhiBor* – Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations. Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics of Avicenna' (http://www.avicennaproject.eu/). I wish to thank the principal investigator of the *PhiBor* Project, Prof. A. Bertolacci, both for giving me access to the manuscripts' reproductions and for giving me precious comments on a previous version of this paper. I wish to thank Prof. M. Aouad as well, from whose useful comments on this paper I benefited. I also wish to thank the anonymous referees: I am really grateful for all the suggestions and the remarks I got; every shortcoming is, of course, solely my responsibility.

[1] See D. Gutas, *The Study of Avicenna. Status Quaestionis atque Agenda*, « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale », 21, 2010, pp. 45-69, esp. pp. 60-61.

[2] A. Bertolacci, *How Many Recensions of Avicenna's* Kitāb al-Šifāʾ *?*, « Oriens », 40, 2012, pp. 275-303.

[3] On more recent developments of this inquiry, see the article of A. Bertolacci in the present volume.

« Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale » XXVIII (2017)
ISSN 1122-5750 — ISBN 978-88-8450-812-6

or by the circle of his direct disciples — by taking into examination as a case-study the textual tradition of Avicenna's work concerning Porphyry's *Isagoge* (*Kitāb al-Madḫal*), which opens the section of *Logic* of the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*. Such a question arises from the observation that the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work, together with a small group of Arabic manuscripts and part of the early indirect tradition of the text, seemingly attest, concurrently to the longer version of the text preserved by the rest of the tradition, the existence of a shorter version of the text in some passages that can hardly be due to mere accidents of transmission.

In what follows, I will firstly offer an overview of the tradition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḫal* (section I), then I will focus, more in particular, on the part of the tradition witnessing a shorter version of certain passages of the work (section II). A section of the present paper shall be, then, devoted to a more in-depth analysis of the passages at stake (section III), in order to make some hypothetical suggestions concerning the possibility that they might attest the existence of a double recension of the work, and that other parts of the *summa* might hint at a similar scenario (section IV).

I. The tradition of Avicenna's *Madḫal*

I.1. *The Cairo edition and the Arabic manuscript tradition of Avicenna's* Madḫal

So far, the only existing edition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḫal* is the one printed in Cairo in 1952 to celebrate Avicenna's millenary, which has the great merit of publishing this work of Avicenna's for the first time[4]. The edition is based on ten manuscripts (see Appendix A), whose selection could not be based on a critical comparison of the witnesses[5]. Four out of ten manuscripts employed for the Cairo edition are among the earliest witnesses of the work, dating to the XIIIth century, and two of these earliest witnesses are among the manuscripts that may preserve a trace of a different version of the text[6]. Unfortunately, the

[4] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Šifāʾ*, *al-Manṭiq*, 1. *al-Madḫal*, edd. I. Madkūr, Ǧ. Š. Qanawātī, M. al-Ḫuḍayrī, F. al-Ahwānī, al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, Cairo 1952 (henceforth : Cairo edition). On the main features of this edition, see the general introduction to the edition ('Introduction générale' / '*Muqaddimat al-Šifāʾ*') by I. Madkūr (both in French and Arabic) and A. Bertolacci, *The Manuscript Tradition of Avicenna's* Kitāb al-Šifāʾ *: The Current State of Research and Future Prospects*, « Oriens », 40, 2012, pp. 198-195. The same edition was, then, reprinted in Tehran in 1983 and in Beirut in 1993. Tehran lithograph edition, which antedates the Cairo edition of the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*, does not preserve the section of Logic of the *summa*, of which the Cairo edition is, therefore, the first printed edition at our disposal.

[5] See on this point Madkūr, *Introduction générale* cit., pp. 39-42, esp. p. 40.

[6] To my knowledge, the possible existence of two different versions of the text is not taken into consideration in the Cairo edition, and the shorter version of certain passages is recorded in the apparatus as the result of an erroneous omission.

number of the manuscripts taken into account for the Cairo edition cannot be considered as entirely representative of the actual state of the textual tradition of the work, due to the huge proportions of the work's tradition.

Generally speaking, Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* can be enumerated among the works that had a huge diffusion and, consequently, a massive manuscript tradition, and the first work of the *summa*, namely the *Kitāb al-Madḫal*, is no exception. In fact, according to the provisional results of a still ongoing bibliographical research, the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Madḫal* amounts to at least 119 manuscripts[7]. The present survey shall take into account 59 manuscripts[8], namely around a half of the whole estimated manuscript tradition of the work (cf. Appendix B, Fig. 1). Overall, the manuscripts taken into account range from the twelfth to the twentieth century, with a noteworthy peak of extant witnesses dating to the seventeenth century (cf. Appendix B, Fig. 2). So far, the earliest witnesses of the work at our disposal are a manuscript dating to the twelfth century (ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276, dating to 536H/1142) and the twelfth-century Latin translation of the text.

I.2. *The Latin translation of Avicenna's* Madḫal

In the frame of the present inquiry, also the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work will be taken into account. This translation, that circulated under the name of *Logica Avicennae*, is seemingly the first of a larger project of translations of the *Šifāʾ* started in Toledo by the Jewish translator Avendauth (d. ca. 1180) and

[7] A thorough bibliographical survey of Avicenna's works is still among the *desiderata* in Avicennan studies (cf. Gutas, *The Study of Avicenna. Status Quaestionis atque Agenda* cit., pp. 48-49). The present bibliographical research has been conducted within the frame of the ERC Project: '*PhiBor* - Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations and Intellectual Endeavours: Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics (*Ilāhiyyāt* of *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*) of Avicenna (*Ibn Sīnā*)' (http://www.avicennaproject.eu/). The starting point of the present survey was offered by the following inventories: G. C. Anawati, *Essai de bibliographie avicennienne*, Dār Al-Maʿārif, Cairo 1950; C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur (GAL)*, voll. I-II, Brill, Leiden 1943-1949²; suppl. voll. I-III, Brill, Leiden 1937-1942 (vol. I, p. 592, suppl. Vol. I, p. 815); *Fihristvārah-i Dastnivisthā-yi Īrān (Dinā), The Abridged Catalogue of Iran Manuscripts*, ed. M. Dirāyatī, Kitābḫānah, Mūzih va Markaz-i Asnād-i Mağlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, vol. VI, Tehran 1389Hš/2010; *Fihristgān: nusḫahʾhā-yi ḫaṭṭī-i Īrān (Fanḫā)*, *Union Catalog of Iranian Manuscripts*, ed. M. Dirāyatī, Sāzmān-i Asnād va Kitābḫānah-i Millī-i Ğumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān, vol. XXI, Tehran 1390Hš/2011; O. Ergin, *Ibni Sina Bibliografyasi*, in *Büyük Türk Filozof ve Tıb Üstadı İbn Sina*, Şahsiyeti ve Eserleri Hakkında Tetkikler, İstanbul 1937, pp. 3-80; O. Ergin, *İbn-i Sina Bibliografyası*, Yalçın Matbaası, İstanbul 1956 and Y. Mahdavī, *Fihrist-i nusḫahā-yi muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, Tehran 1333/1954. Then, the information provided by these inventories has been, when possible, updated, specified or even sometimes corrected after the inspection of the manuscripts' reproductions.

[8] A complete list of the witnesses taken into account, in chronological order, is provided in the Appendix A.

the philosopher Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. after 1181) in the second half of the twelfth century[9]. The importance of this translation as a witness for Avicenna's text lies in the fact that it reproduces the readings of an Arabic exemplar that, if extant, would be among the earliest witnesses of the work. Currently, the Latin translation is one of the two only witnesses dating to the twelfth century that could be taken into account for the present survey[10].

The possibility itself of employing this translation as a witness for the Arabic text is due to its quite literal rendering of the Arabic wording[11]. The Latin translation of Avicenna's *Madḫal,* which still awaits a critical edition[12], is preserved in 13 manuscripts, 7 of which preserve the passages that are taken into exam in the present paper[13]; the text of the Latin passages offered in this

[9] On the translation movement in twelfth-century Toledo, see, among the recent contributions, C. Burnett, *Communities of Learning in Twelfth-Century Toledo* (pp. 9-18), A. Fidora, *Religious Diversity and the Philosophical Translations of Twelfth-Century Toledo*, (pp. 19-36), and A. Bertolacci, *A Community of Translators: The Latin Medieval Versions of Avicenna's* Book of the Cure (pp. 37-54), all in C. J. Mews, J. N. Crossley eds., *Communities of Learning - Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100–1500*, Brepols, Turnhout 2011. On the Latin translations of Avicenna's works, see J. Janssens, *Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), The Latin Translations of*, in H. Lagerlund ed., *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, Springer, Berlin 2011, Part 9, pp. 522-527. On Avendauth and Gundissalinus, see M.-T. d'Alverny, *Notes sur les traductions médiévales d'Avicenne*, « Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge », 19, 1952, pp. 341–344 and Ead. *Avendauth?*, in *Homenaje a Millas Vallicrosa* I, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Barcelona 1954, pp. 35-37; M. Alonso Alonso, *Notas sobre los traductores toledanos Domingo Gundisalvo y Juan Hispano*, « Al-Andalus », 8, 1943, pp. 155-188; Id., *Traducciones del arcediano Domingo Gundisalvo*, « Al-Andalus », 12, 1947, pp. 295-338 and G. Freudenthal, *Abraham Ibn Daud, Avendauth, Dominicus Gundissalinus and Practical Mathematics in Mid-Twelfth Century Toledo*, « Aleph », 16, 2016, pp. 61-106. Specifically on some features of the Latin translation of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḫal*, see also S. Di Vincenzo, *Avicenna's* Isagoge*, Chap. I.12,* De Universalibus*: Some Observations on the Latin Translation*, « Oriens », 40, 2012, pp. 437-476.

[10] To my knowledge, the only earlier extant witness of the text is the aforementioned ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276 (see also Mahdavī, *Fihrist-i nusḫahā-yi muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, p. 171).

[11] On the value of the Latin translations of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* as witnesses of the text, cf. Gutas, *The study of Avicenna. Status Quaestionis atque Agenda* cit., pp. 49-50.

[12] An edition is in preparation by Françoise Hudry (CNRS, UPR 76, Emeritus fellow).

[13] Namely manuscripts: Bruges, Sted. Openb. Bibl. 510 (XIII-XIV) [henceforth: B]; Graz, Universitätsbibl., 482 (XIII$^{ex.}$) [henceforth: G]; Oxford, Merton Coll. 282 (XIV$^{in.}$) [henceforth: M]; Napoli, Bibl. Nazionale VIII.E.33 (XIII^{2}) [henceforth: N]; Paris, BnF lat. 6443 (XIII$^{ex.}$) [henceforth: P]; Vat. lat. 4428 (XIII^{2}) [henceforth: U]; Vat. lat. 2186 (XIII-XIV c.) [henceforth: V]. See also A. Chemin, *La traduction latine médiévale de l'Isagoge d'Avicenne: notes pour une édition critique*, in *Proceedings of the World Congress on Aristotle, Thessaloniki, August 7–14, 1978*, 4 vols., Publications of the Ministry of Culture and Sciences, Athens, 1981-1983, vol. II. pp. 304-307. For a detailed description of the witnesses that preserve the passages an edition of which is provided in section III, see Avicenna Latinus*, Codices*, descripsit M.-T. d'Alverny; Addenda collegerunt S. Van Riet, P. Jodogne, Brill, Leiden 1995, pp. 30-34 (on ms. P); p. 75 (on ms. N); pp. 91-94 (on ms. V); pp. 99-101 (on ms. U); pp. 124-125 (on ms. B); pp. 151-153 (on ms. M); pp. 173-180 (on ms. G). On ms. V, see also J. Bignami-Odier, *Le manuscrit Vatican Latin 2186*, « Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge », 11, 1938, pp. 133-166.

paper is reconstructed on the basis of all these *testimonia*[14].

I.3. *The early indirect tradition*

The present inquiry also takes into account, as far as possible, the early indirect tradition of Avicenna's *Madḫal*; more in detail, it employs as a witness of this work the literal quotations by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (d. ca. 517H/1123[15]), reportedly a disciple of the first-generation disciple of Avicenna Bahmanyār[16]. According to the historiographical sources, al-Lawkarī gave impulse to the diffusion of the study of philosophy in the provinces of Khūrāsān[17]. Although the date reconstructed for his death is uncertain, we know from the oldest manuscript of Avicenna's *Taʿlīqāt* that Lawkarī wrote the *Fihrist* (*Index*) of *al-Taʿlīqāt* in 503H/1109, which leads to chronologically contextualise his activity between the second half of the eleventh and the first half of the twelfth century of the Christian Era[18]. One of his major works, namely the *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq* ('Explanation of the Reality with the Assurance of Truth'), is a still partially-unedited philosophical *summa* probably employed as a teaching manual, which draws its material from Avicenna's philosophical *summae*. The section concerning Porphyry's *Isagoge*, which preserves several literal quotations

[14] The translation is also preserved in an edition printed in Venice in 1508 (*Avicenne Perhypatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendate*, Venetiis 1508), but this print is not, taken alone, an entirely reliable witness of the text, since it presents, as any other witness of the text, its own mistakes and alterations. Each time a reconstruction of the Latin text based on the manuscripts is provided in section III, the reference corresponding to the passage in the printed edition is also provided.

[15] The date usually reported for Lawkarī's death, i.e. 517H/1123, was actually provided by C. Brockelmann (C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 602) on unknown basis; for all the problems regarding Lawkarī's chronology, see R. Marcotte, *Preliminary Notes on the Life and Work of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (d. ca. 517H/1123)*, « Anaquel de Estudios Árabes », 17, 2006, pp. 157-133.

[16] This piece of information is reported by Al-Bayhaqī (d. 565H/1169-1170), *Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, p. 120 Šafīʿ; there is, however, a chronological problem, since Bahmanyār died in 1066, so that it is difficult to imagine Lawkarī as his student: see J. Janssens, *Al-Lawkarī's Reception of Ibn Sīnā's* Ilāhiyyāt, in D. N. Hasse, A. Bertolacci eds., *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2008, pp. 7-26. On Bahmanyār, see D. C. Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition*, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 2002, pp. 185-195; J. Janssens, *Bahmanyār Ibn Marzubān: A Faithful Disciple of Ibn Sīnā?,* in D. C. Reisman, A. H. Al-Rahim eds., *Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, Brill, Leiden 2003, pp. 177-197 and A. H. Al-Rahim, *Avicenna's Immediate Disciples: Their Lives and Works*, in Y. Tzvi Langermann ed., *Avicenna and his Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy*, Brepols, Turnhout 2009, pp. 1-25.

[17] Al-Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, p. 120.11 Šafīʿ.

[18] See Marcotte, *Preliminary Notes on the Life and Work of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (d. ca. 517H/1123)* cit., pp. 134-138.

of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḫal*, was edited by Ibrāhīm Dībāǧī in 1986[19]. As it was already noticed, Lawkarī's *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq* often reproduces *verbatim* passages drawn both from Avicenna's own works and Bahmanyār's *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl*[20]. More in detail, the passages that will be taken into exam are all part of the second treatise of Avicenna's *Madḫal* (dealing with the similarities and divergences between the five universal predicables), of which Lawkarī quotes large portions directly, i.e. without drawing them from Bahmanyār's *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl*, where they cannot be found. A comparison between the passages of Avicenna's *Madḫal* with their literal quotations in Lawkarī's work will allow us to have a clue of the readings preserved in the manuscript(s) of Avicenna's *Madḫal* that Lawkarī had at his disposal, namely a witness of Avicenna's text possibly anterior to the twelfth-century[21].

II. Is there a short version of Avicenna's *Madḫal*?

II.1. *Preliminary considerations on two possible versions of Avicenna's* Madḫal

There are several passages in Avicenna's *Madḫal* (presented in section III) with regard to which the manuscript tradition is divided. More specifically, the divergence consists in the fact that a small bunch of manuscripts preserves, against the rest of the tradition, a shorter version of the same text. Among the 59 Arabic manuscripts that are the basis for this inquiry, 48 preserve a longer version of the text, against only 11 manuscripts that attest a short version of all or part of the passages here considered (see Appendix B, Fig. 3).

Basically, two working hypotheses can be made to explain the phenomenon: the passages with regard to which the manuscript tradition diverges can either be considered as omitted in certain manuscripts (I) or as added in others (II).

(I) According to the first hypothesis, the short version could be the result of a series of omissions, which can either be (I.1) accidental or (I.2) intentional.

(II) According to the second hypothesis, the short version could be an earlier

[19] Al-Lawkarī, *Bayānu al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimāni al-ṣidq*, *Logic, Part One*, ed. I. Dībāčī, Muʾassasa-i Intišārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, Tehran 1364H/1986.

[20] As J. Janssens pointed out, « the quotations are so literal that Lawkarī's text may be used as an independent testimony, besides available manuscripts, for the establishment of the critical edition of the respective works » (Janssens, *Al-Lawkarī's Reception of Ibn Sīnā's* Ilāhiyyāt cit., p. 23).

[21] It is important to be aware that the section on Logic of Lawkarī's *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq* is, seemingly, transmitted by a unique manuscript (ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 108). The critical edition is, therefore, based on one witness only, and emendations of the text had often to be made by comparing it with the sources of Lawkarī's quotations in the work (see the introduction to the edition by I. Dībāǧī, pp. 105-108). Our knowledge of the text of the section of Logic of Lawkarī's work is, therefore, quite limited and imperfect.

version, anterior to the long one which includes some textual additions and represents a '*versio vulgata*' of the text, attested by a much larger number of witnesses. The textual additions in the long version can either be the result of (II.1) the author's own reworking of the text at a second moment, or of (II.2) some later modifications of the text.

These interpretations point to two possible scenarios: (i) the divergence of the manuscript tradition is due to some accidents of transmission (hypothesis I.1), or (ii) it is due to a conscious intervention on the text, made by abridging the text (hypothesis I.2) or by developing it with the addition of further remarks and clarifications (hypothesis II).

A way to try to account for this kind of phenomenon could be supposing an accidental omission of the passages that occurred in a small part of the manuscript tradition; in this frame, the majority of the manuscript tradition would agree in preserving the complete and correct version of the text (hypothesis I.1). However, it should be noticed that an accidental omission of the passages discussed in section III is quite difficult to admit, for there are no conditions that could easily explain mechanical omissions affecting these passages[22]. Apparently, then, hypothesis I.1 is not a completely satisfying answer to the issue at stake.

On the other hand, the omission of these passages could be voluntary (hypothesis I.2): since the understanding of text is seemingly not affected by their omission, it could be supposed that the 'short version' is a sort of abridgement of the text, attained by trimming some non-fundamental parts off. The reason why, besides the hypothesis I.2, also the opposite and stronger hypothesis II — which considers the passages in question as added in most part of the tradition — was made is that some of these passages are quite problematic from a syntactical and doctrinal point of view. Hence, these passages could be suspected not to be included in Avicenna's text from the very first stage of composition, therefore being added in the text at a later stage of the tradition. If this were the case, then we would have a short version of the text and a long version, which is much more

[22] I mean that in none of the cases that shall be displayed there are the conditions for supposing that omissions occurred because of a homoioteleuton or a *saut du même au même*, or by accidentally skipping a line during the process of copy (the dimensions of the clauses lacking in the short version cannot, in most cases, be reconducted to that of a single line). The hypothesis of a material damage of a common antigraph of the manuscripts attesting the short version is also quite unlikely. In the case of merely accidental omissions or material losses of a portion of text, in fact, we should expect that, at least in some cases, the intelligibility of the text is affected. In all the cases that shall be displayed, on the contrary, not only the short version of the text is perfectly intelligible, but it is sometimes even superior, from a syntactical and doctrinal point of view, to the long one.

widespread than the first one (therefore called *versio vulgata*[23]) and which would actually be a revised version of the text, including several textual additions.

In what follows, I shall try to argue that there are some elements which point to the fact that the possibility (I.1) is quite unlikely, and that the idea that the textual cases that shall be displayed can be explained as the results of some accidents of transmission (i) should be perhaps left aside. I shall rather try to suggest that there was a *conscious* intervention on the text (ii), either by abridgement (I.2), or by textual addition (II); on account of the greater persuasiveness of this second possibility (ii), the short and the long versions might be considered as two different *recensions* of Avicenna's text.

II.2. *The manuscripts attesting the existence of a short version*

The Arabic manuscripts that seemingly attest the existence of a short version of the text can be classified at first according to whether they preserve a text completely lacking the passages at stake (version A), i.e. 1 extant manuscript and the model of the Latin translation, or a text only partially lacking the aforementioned passages (version B), i.e. 10 out of the 11 Arabic manuscripts. More in detail, within the witnesses of version B, it is possible to operate some further distinction, and to single out four groups of manuscripts (B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4), characterised by the fact of sharing a selective addition or omission of the same passages.

Tab. 1. A classification of the witnesses attesting the short version[24]

Text A (the short version)		
Latin translation by Avendauth, '*Logica Avicennae*'	dat. second half of the XIIth c.	---
Ms. Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Golius Or. 4 [= former 1444]	dat. before Xth c. H/ XVIth c.	ms. (22) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. G]
Text B (a hybrid version between the short and the long versions)		
Text type (B.1): short version of cases 1-2, 5		
Ms. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 772	dat. Šaʿbān 628H / June-July 1231	ms. (2) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. J]

[23] Adapting to this context the expression employed in Bertolacci, *How Many Recensions of Avicenna's* Kitāb al-Šifāʾ *?* cit., p. 294.

[24] The witnesses are listed for each textual typology in chronological order; the non-extant reconstructed witnesses are marked by the sign: °.

Ms. İstanbul, Millet Kütüphanesi (now: Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi), ʿAlī Emiri 1504	dat. 674H/1275-6	ms. (6) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. E]
Ms. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 773	dat. 26 Šaʿbān 1041H/18th March 1632	ms. (34) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. C]
° The (unknown) manuscript with which ms. G was collated	unknown dat.	[henceforth: $G^{mg.}$]
Text type (B.2): short version of cases 3-4		
Ms. İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261	dat. 10 Rabīʿ l-awwal 677H/8th August 1278	ms. (7) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. T]
Ms. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Āşir Efendi 207	dat. 680H/1281-2	ms. (8) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. A]
° Ms. with which a lacuna in ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1326 (dat. X/XVI c.) was corrected	unknown dat.	[henceforth: ms. $M^{mg.}$]
Text type (B.3): short version of case 3		
° The ms. owned by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (?)	dat. before XIIth c.	---
° Ms. with which ms. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 770 (dat. 888H/1483) was collated	unknown dat.	[henceforth: ms. $Y^{i.l.}$]
Ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 1057	dat. IXth H/XVth c.	ms. (13) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. K]
Ms. Mašhad, Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 1119	dat. XIth/XVIIth c.	ms. (28) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. Q]
Text type (B.4): short version of case 5		
Ms. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi, Hatice Sultan 208	unknown dat.	ms. (58) in Appendix A [henceforth: ms. H]

Text A. Ms. G and the Latin translation are the only witnesses that attest a short version of all the passages listed in section III (cases 1-5). Ms. G is an undated manuscript, very likely considerably earlier than the sixteenth-century

ownership statements that can be found on its title page[25]. Besides the section of Logic of the *Šifāʾ*, it also preserves the Natural Philosophy and the Metaphysics. The Latin translation, on the other hand, is based on an unknown Arabic exemplar that must have been at least earlier than the second half of the twelfth century.

Text B. A first group of witnesses of text B (**text type B.1**) is composed by two thirteenth-century manuscripts (mss. JE) and by a seventh-century one (ms. C) that agree in preserving a short version of the same selected passages (section III, cases 1-2, 5). To these extant manuscripts, a reconstructed witness can be added, namely the manuscript with which ms. G was collated: in fact, a second handwriting integrates in the margins of ms. G only those passages that are also preserved by the witnesses attesting a B.1 type text (i.e. cases 3-4), apparently because the manuscript it was collated with omitted the others (cases 1-2, 5) like mss. JEC. Arguably, mss. EC are stemmatically related: more in particular, ms. C is very likely a *descriptus* of ms. E[26]. Ms. J is a quite interesting witness, among the earliest at our disposal for Avicenna's *Madḫal*, that presents on its title page, among several other possession notes, the one allegedly written by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī[27].

Text type B.2, namely a text attesting a short version of cases 3-4 only, has as its extant witnesses two thirteenth-century manuscripts preserved in İstanbul, namely mss. T[28] and A. To these two *testimonia* we can also add the manuscript with which ms. M was collated: a huge portion of text was evidently omitted in the antigraph of the manuscript (probably because of a major material damage, like the loss of a folio), then the portion omitted was reintegrated in the margins, supposedly by collation. The manuscript with which ms. M was collated, however, supposedly omitted the same portions of text omitted by mss. TA.

[25] For a complete codicological description of ms. G, see J. J. Witkam, *Avicenna's Copyists at Work: Codicological Features of the Two Leiden Manuscripts of the* Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, « Oriens », 40, 2012, pp. 223-255, esp. pp. 225-233.

[26] Just to provide a few examples in support of this claim, the two manuscripts share the omission of the clause *allatī hiya iḥdà al-ḫamsa hiya* in *K. al-Madḫal*, I.14, p. 84.2-3 Cairo ed., and both manuscripts leave a blank space instead of the word *mudāwima* in *K. al-Madḫal*, I.14, p. 84.21-22 Cairo ed. Moreover, in *K. al-Madḫal*, II.4, p. 111.12-16 Cairo ed., they both have a misunderstanding of *wa-l-ʿaraḍ al-ʿāmm* as *lā ka-l-ʿaraḍ al-ʿāmm*. Ms. C, then, shows some mistakes of its own that cannot be found in ms. E, which means that ms. C is arguably a copy derived — directly or not — from ms. E.

[27] The ownership statement is also accompanied by a certificate claiming that the statement is really by the hand of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; see also Mahdavī, *Fihrist-i nusḫahā-yi muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā* cit., p. 171. It can be reconstructed from the ownership statements it preserves that ms. J was later owned by ʿAbd al-Raḥman Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Muʾayyad (who wrote his note, dated to the 8 Šaʿbān 901H/1st May 1496, in Constantinople) and, together with a second volume reportedly completing ms. J, by a Muṣṭafà Ibn ʿAbd al-Dīn Ilyās Ibn Muḥammad (on D̲ū l-Qaʿda 960H/October-November 1553).

[28] Ms. T preserves the section of Logic and the first *fann* of the section of Natural Philosophy of the *Šifāʾ*, but the two sections were evidently copied by two different copyists. The colophon at the end of the section of Logic reports that the manuscript was copied in Baghdad in 677H/1278-9.

Finally, I call **text type B.3** the text of the manuscripts attesting a shorter version of the text for case 3 only, like mss. K and Q. Ms. K and Q are, respectively, a fifteenth-century and a seventeenth-century witnesses only preserving the section of Logic of the *Šifā'*. Ms. Y, a complete fifteenth-century copy of the *Šifā'*, preserves all the crucial passages that are here taken into consideration, but shows nonetheless a piece of evidence that a manuscript with which it was collated did not preserve the clause at case 3, whose beginning and end are marked in ms. Y by two interlinear signs delimiting the clause that was found absent in the manuscript employed for the collation. It can be questioned whether the manuscript that al-Lawkarī had at his disposal attested a similar text or not, for we are sure that it must have at least preserved a short version of the case 3, but whether it attested a short version of the cases 2, 4-5 as well cannot be determined.

Finally, ms. H attests a short version of the passage at case 5 **(text type B.4)**, even though a marginal correction restores the long version of the text. Unfortunately, we have little information on this manuscript, which is an undated copy that only preserves the section of Logic of the *Šifā'*.

***

This classification of the witnesses allows some preliminary considerations. Given that the hypothesis I.1 of an accident of transmission affecting the passages can be judged less likely than the others (as it will be better argued in section III), it remains the possibility of considering this division of the witnesses in the light of hypotheses I.2 and II. Assuming hypothesis I.2, text type A should be considered as the final step of a process of abridgement of the text only partially achieved in text type B. In this case, then, the short version of the work would have originated later than the long version. Assuming, on the other hand, hypothesis II, then the short version (in the form of text A) should be considered as the starting point of a process of revision of the text that ultimately resulted in the long version of the text, and of which text type B attests an intermediate stage[29].

[29] It can be suggested that the manuscripts classified as preserving a text type B in Tab. 1 attest a stage of partial integration of the textual additions within the text. This might have occurred in several ways: they could all derive from a copy attesting the short version of the text, then they could have been collated with witnesses of the long recension and, consequently, have accomplished at least a partial integration of the clauses that lacked in their antigraphs. This process is visible in ms. G, where a second handwriting adds in the margins a part of the lacking passages, arguably comparing ms. G with an exemplar that preserved a text type B.1; a copy drawn from ms. G could well incorporate in the main text the marginal addition and, therefore, presenting a text type B.1. Another possibility is that of supposing that the short and the long versions of the text both originate from a manuscript in which the textual additions characterising the long version were in the margins, and that the manuscripts of type B descend from exemplars that failed for some reasons to integrate all the additions within the text. A possible reason for such an imperfect integration could be that the additions were gradually written in the margins of the manuscript at different stages, and that copies drawn before their creation could not copy them. In the present paper, I shall not try to provide a definite answer to this problem, confining myself to ponder these possibilities.

III. The cases of divergence between the short and the long versions

In what follows, some cases of divergence between the short and the long versions are examined more in detail. Given that in some of the cases displayed below both the short and the long versions of the passages do, apparently, perfectly fit within the context, whereas in others the clauses exclusively preserved in the long recension entail some stylistic, syntactical, or doctrinal issues, I will start by discussing the less problematic cases, to conclude with the most puzzling ones.

III.1. *Unproblematic cases (cases 1-2)*

[Case 1] *Kitāb al-Madḫal,* II.1, p. 93.1-5 Cairo ed.: « As to the properties in virtue of which the genus differs from the rest, the first of the widespread ones is that the genus is predicated of more [items] than those of which differentia, species, proprium and accident are predicated. As to the fact that the genus is more comprehensive than differentia, species and proprium, it is something evident: the proprium belongs specifically to [its] species, and so does the differentia, but according to a condition he [*scil.* Porphyry] didn't posit, namely that the comparison is made between the genus and the differentia ranged under it and the proprium ranged under it. As to what concerns the accident, [on the contrary], it is not self-evident [...] ».

Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Madḫal*, II.1, p. 93.1-5	Latin translation (cf. Ven. 1508 f. 10ra)	Lawkarī, p. 169.10-13
وأما الخواص التي يباين بها الجنس غيره، فأول المشهورات منها هو أنّ الجنسَ يحمل على أكثر مما يحمل عليه الفصل والنوع والخاصة والعرض. أمّا أنّ الجنس أكثر حُويا من الفصل والنوع والخاصة، فهو أمرٌ ظاهر؛ فإنَّ الخاصةَ تخص النوع؛ وكذلك الفصل، ولكن بشرط لم يشرطه، وهو أن يقايس بين الجنس وبين فصلٍ تحته وخاصةٍ تحته[1]. وأما العرض فليس بينا بنفسه [...]	Proprietatum vero quibus differt genus[1] ab aliis, prima divulgata haec est[2], quia[3] genus praedicatur de pluribus quam differentia et species et proprium et accidens, sed hoc quod praedicatur de pluribus quam species et differentia et proprium[4] manifestum est: proprietas enim propria est unius speciei tantum. Similiter et differentia. De accidente autem[5] non ita patet per se [...]	وأما الخواص التي بها يباين الجنس غيره، فأول المشهورات منها هو أنّ الجنسَ يحمل على أكثر مما يحمل عليه الفصل والخاصة[a] فأمرٌ ظاهر؛ فإنّ الخاصةَ تخص النوع؛ وكذلك الفصل، ولكن بشرط لم يشرطه، وهو أن يقايس بين الجنس وبين فصلٍ تحته وخاصةٍ تحته. وأما العرض فليس بينا بنفسه [...]

1. وأما الخواص التي يباين بها الجنس غيره، فأول المشهورات منها هو أنّ الجنسَ يحمل على أكثر مما يحمل عليه الفصل والنوع والخاصة والعرض. أمّا أنّ الجنس أكثر حُويا من الفصل والنوع والخاصة، فهو أمرٌ ظاهر؛ فإنَّ الخاصةَ تخص النوع؛ وكذلك الفصل، ولكن بشرط لم يشرطه، وهو أن يقايس بين الجنس وبين فصلٍ تحته وخاصةٍ تحته — ولكن بشرط لم يشرطه، وهو أن يقايس بين الجنس وبين فصلٍ تحته وخاصةٍ تحته *om.* EGJC (*add. in mg.* J)

1. differt genus *inv.* U : genus *om.* B || 2. haec est] est hic BU || 3. quia] cum *add.* BU || 4. species — proprium] differentia proprium et species in quantum BU || 5. de accidente autem] de accidente vero BU

[a] Seemingly, a *saut du même au même* due to the repetition of *al-ḫāṣṣa* affected Lawkarī's text.

[Case 2] *Kitāb al-Madḫal*, II.2, p. 99.3-7 Cairo ed.: « But in this divergence another feature is negated from the species, namely that it is not univocally [and] universally predicated of the genus, and this [feature] negated doesn't correspond to that [feature] affirmed, but the form of this divergence is that the species is not compared with the genus in what the genus [has] with respect to the species, and this is only possible between different [things]. Then, another divergence [...] ».

Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Madḫal*, II.2, p. 99.3-7	Latin translation (cf. Ven. 1508 f. 10^{vb})
بل إنما تسلب عن النوع في هذه المباينة صفة أخرى، وهي أنه لا يحمل على الجنس بالتواطؤ حملا كليا، وليس هذا المسلوب هو ذلك الموجب، لكن صورة هذه المباينة أن النوع لا يكافئ الجنس فيما للجنس عند النوع، وهذا لا يتأتى إلا بين مختلفين[1]. ومباينة أخرى [. . .]	[Hoc autem non negatur a specie secundum hunc modum] sed aliter, scilicet[1] quia non praedicatur de genere[2] univoce et universaliter[3], hoc autem[4] negatum non est illud[5] affirmatum. Forma vero huius differentiae[6] haec est, quod species non est par generi[7] in eo quod habet genus erga species. Item alia differentia [...]
1. وهذا — مختلفين *om.* EGJC	1. scilicet *om.* BU ‖ 2. scilicet *add.* BU ‖ 3. univoce et universaliter *inv.* BU ‖ 4. hoc autem] si autem M : autem *om.* BU ‖ 5. non est illud] ad BU ‖ 6. huius differentiae *om.* BU ‖ 7. est par generi] pars generis BU

Cases 1-2. Among the cases of divergence between the short and the long versions of Avicenna's *Madḫal* here presented, there are at least two (cases 1-2) in which the two versions both produce two unproblematic texts, with the only difference that the long version preserves some further remarks that are absent in the short one. In both cases, the short version is represented by four extant Arabic manuscripts (mss. EGJC) and the twelfth-century Latin translation; in the only case in which a comparison with Lawkarī's *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq* is possible (namely case 1), Lawkarī's text sides with the long version.

In case 1, the long version adds a condition that is not explicit in the text of the short version, namely that the comparison between the genus and the other predicables regarding their extension in predication is made by taking into account only the predicables that are ranged under the genus in Porphyry's tree (i.e. the predicables that are not more general than it). This idea, which is implicitly acknowledged in the short version, is overtly stated in the long one. In case 2, the long version adds the specification that a comparison of the kind proposed in the text is only possible between two different things.

The absence in the short version of the clauses preserved in the long version can hardly be explained as the result of a mere accident of transmission (hypothesis I.1): as omissions, in fact, they are quite macroscopic, and there are not the conditions to suppose that they could have been easily accidentally omitted during the copy (for instance, because of a homoioteleuton or a *saut du même au même*, or by accidentally skipping a line during the process of copy). Noteworthy, neither the syntax nor the content of the text are affected by these omissions.

Seemingly, there are not compelling reasons that might have led to the voluntary suppression of the clauses in cases 1 and 2 (hypothesis I.2), since apparently there is no problem in keeping the two clauses as part of the text, and it is a bit difficult to imagine why one could have wanted to cut off some further clarifications he found in Avicenna's text. On the other hand, there are no specific reasons to suspect that the clauses that are absent in the short version could be the result of a later addition in the long version (hypothesis II).

Given that the presence or absence of these clauses does not affect the text neither from a syntactical, nor from a doctrinal point of view, the nature of the divergence between the short and the long version can hardly be judged on the basis of these first two cases.

III.2. *A slightly problematic case (case 3)*

[Case 3] ***Kitāb al-Madḫal,*** **II.1, p. 91.8-12 Cairo ed.**: «Let's start with the common features, and say that the one that is common to [all] the five [predicables] is that they are universal, i.e. predicated of many [items]. If the author of *al-Madḫal* [*Isagoge*?] acknowledged this [point], then he already acknowledged the defect of the descriptions belonging to differentia, proprium and accident, since he forgot to mention universality in them. All of them [i.e. the predicables] share something else too [...]».

Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Madḫal* II.1, p. 91.8-12	Latin translation (cf. Ven. 1508 ff. 9^{vb}-10^{ra})	Lawkarī, p. 167.3-4
[. . .] ولنبدأ بالمشاركات، فنقول إنّ المشاركة التي تعم الخمسة هي أنها كلية أي مقولة على كثيرين. وإذا اعترف بهذا مُصَنِّف المدخل، فقد اعترف بنقص الرسوم التي للفصل والخاصة والعرض، إذْ أغفل فيها ذكر الكلية[1]. وتشترك جميعها في شيء آخر [. . .]	[...] Et[1] incipiemus a communitatibus, dicentes quod communitas in qua conveniunt haec quinque[2] est haec, scilicet quod universalia sunt, id est[3] praedicabilia de pluribus. Sed omnia conveniunt alio [...].	نقول إنّ المشاركة التي تعم الخمسة هي أنها كلية أي مقولة على كثيرين. وتشترك جميعها في شيء آخر [. . .]

1. وإذا — الكلية *om.* TGQAKHY$^{i.l.}$ *add. in mg.* G^{2}

1. et *om.* BU || **2.** haec quinque *om.* BU || **3.** id est *om.* BU

Case 3: a critical reference to Porphyry. A bit more revealing, though still not an extremely problematic one, is case 3. More precisely, the sources for the short version are, in this case, five preserved Arabic manuscripts (mss. TGQAK), a reconstructed Arabic manuscript (the one with which ms. Y was collated), the twelfth-century Latin translation and the early indirect tradition (a literal quotation in Lawkarī's *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq*), whereas the rest of the tradition attest the long version of the passage. Again, hypothesis I.1 appears as the less attractive: in this case, the short version would have accidentally omitted a quite long passage, but it is difficult to find a convincing explanation of the genesis of such an omission.

The clause lacking in the short version comments upon the first feature shared by all the five universal utterances introduced by Porphyry, namely that, insofar as they are universal, they are all predicated of many items[30]. The clause at stake, more in particular, claims that since 'the author of *Madḫal*' (*muṣannif al-Madḫal*) admits this point, then he also admits that the descriptions of the five universals provided before are defective, since they omit the mention of universality. The mention of a *muṣannif al-Madḫal* in the passage (p. 91.8-12 Cairo ed.) is quite odd for two main reasons: (i) first, the clause *muṣannif al-Madḫal* is, in itself, peculiar, if compared to the *usus scribendi* of Avicenna. (i.a) This occurrence of the term *muṣannif* would be the only one that could be found in Avicenna's works, for it is never employed elsewhere by Avicenna, and (i.b) if we take this expression as referring to Porphyry, the mention of Porphyry's *Isagoge* as '*al-Madḫal*' would be quite unusual for Avicenna, who usually refers to that work as *Īsāġūǧī*[31]. Although it cannot be definitely excluded that Avicenna might have chosen to refer once to Porphyry's *Isagoge* as *Madḫal*, it is nonetheless quite a remarkable exception. (i.c) Generally speaking, Porphyry is rarely referred to in such an explicit manner by Avicenna's part, especially in *Madḫal*; in fact, he is explicitly mentioned as *ṣāḥib Īsāġūǧī* ('the author of the *Isagoge*') in *Madḫal*, I.13 (p. 80.12 Cairo ed.) and in *Išārāt*, II.11 (p. 220.11 ed. Dunya) but, more often, he is simply referred to as *al-raǧul* ('[this] man')[32] or by means of periphrases[33].

[30] Porph., *Isag*., p. 13.10-21 Busse.

[31] Probably, also to distinguish Porphyry's work from his own reworking of it (preferably named *Madḫal*); for Porphyry's *Isagoge* referred to as *Īsāġūǧī*, see *Nafs*, I.1, p. 9.9; V.6, p. 213.2 ed. Madkūr; *Ǧadal*, I.6, p. 57.8; p. 62.13 ed. Madkūr; as *Kitāb Īsāġūǧī*: *Burhān*, II.2, p. 130.18 ed. ʿAfīfī; *Ǧadal*, I.6, p. 62.3-4; 14-15 ed. Madkūr.

[32] Cf. *Madḫal*, II.2, p. 100.7, 11; p. 102.11; p. 103.4 Cairo ed. and *Madḫal*, II.3, p. 106.7 Cairo ed.

[33] Porphyry is referred to as *awwalu man qaddama maʿrifata hāḏihi l-ḫamsati ʿalà l-manṭiqi* ('the first who made the knowledge of these five [universal utterances] precede the Logic') in *Madḫal*, I.14 (p. 86.5 Cairo ed.); as *awwalu man afrada li-hāḏihi l-ḫamsati l-kulliyyāti kitāban* ('the first who devoted a book to these five universals') in *Madḫal*, II.3 (p. 109.5-6 Cairo ed.) and as *man qaṣada taqdīm hāḏā l-kitāb* ('who aimed at making this book precede [Aristotle's Logic]') in *Madḫal*, I.13 (p. 77.9 Cairo ed.).

Hence, a reference to Porphyry as *muṣannif al-Madḫal* seems quite unusual for Avicenna, if compared to the usual lexicon employed by the author (i.a-b) and to the usually indirect way in which he mostly refers to Porphyry (i.c).

(ii) Secondly, it is true that Avicenna must be referring to Porphyry when presenting the first feature shared by the five universal utterances, though not explicitly ascribing it to him; it should be noticed, however, that he speaks in a quite general way of a plurality of philosophers, claiming that he will confine himself to what *they mentioned* (p. 91.8: *wa-l-naqtaṣir ʿalà mā awradūhu minhu*). The abrupt shifting between a plural and generic reference (*awradū*, 'they mentioned') to a very specific singular one (*wa-iḏā ʿtarafa bi-hāḏā muṣannif al-Madḫal*, « and since the author of *Madḫal* admitted this... ») that we find in the passage seems quite out of place from a stylistic point of view, especially given that *all* the other critical references in the chapter, though evidently referred to Porphyry, are expressed by means of generic plural references[34].

In spite of these minor stylistic difficulties, however, the presence of the clause at stake does not entail any major syntactical or doctrinal problem within the context. So far, then, there is too scarce evidence to tell whether the clause was part of the text from its first redaction (and then intentionally omitted, according to hypothesis I.2) or it was rather added to it at a second moment (hypothesis II). In what follows, on the other hand, two more problematic cases shall be presented, in which syntactical and doctrinal issues arise in the attempt of verifying the consistency of the clauses absent in the short version with the context.

III.3. *Problematic cases (cases 4-5)*

[Case 4] ***Kitāb al-Madḫal,*** **II.2, p. 101.7-9 Cairo ed.**: « And this divergence subsists between the genus and the permanent and common proprium, or between the two natures of genus and proprium unrestrictedly, since that [nature] is not a subject of predication, whereas this one is, I mean this convertibility. [Another] divergence encompassed [in it] follows this one [...] ».

[34] Just to provide a few examples closely following the passage at stake, cf. p. 92.4: *wa-qad maṯṯalū* (« they already exemplified ») ; p. 92.5 : *fa-lam yuḥsinū fī īrādihim hāḏā l-miṯāl* (« they weren't right in introducing this example ») ; p. 92.7 : *ʿindahum* (« according to them ») and *lam yaʿnū* (« they didn't mean »).

Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Madḫal*, II.2, p. 101.7-9	Latin translation (cf. Ven. 1508 f. 11[ra])
وهـذه المباينـة بـين الجنـس والخاصـة الدائمـة العامـة، أو بـين طبيعتـي الجنـس والخاصـة مطلقـا؛ إذ تلـك لا تحتمـل وهـذه تحتمـل[1]، أعنـي هـذا العكـس[2]. ويتبـع هـذه مباينـة هـي فـي ضمـن تلـك [...]	Haec autem differentia est inter genus et proprium commune substantiale*. Post hanc autem sequitur[1] alia differentia quae continetur in ea [...]

1. sequitur] sequetur BU

* Substantiale] *fort. legit* d̲ātiyya *pro* dāʾima

1. تحتمـل] قـد تحتمـل JCE[s.l]G[2] || **2.** — أو بـين العكـس *om.* TM[mg]GA *add. in mg.* G[2]

Case 4 : the counterpredication of propria. In this case, the clause with regard to which the two versions diverge is omitted by the Latin translation and by the manuscripts of type A and B.2 (see Tab. 1 above), against the rest of the tradition. The context in which the possibly suspected passage is located is Avicenna's commentary to Porphyry's statement that « a proprium is counterpredicated of that of which it is a proprium, a genus is not counterpredicated of anything »[35]. Porphyry's statement means that the proprium applies to what the species of which it is predicated applies to and conversely, whereas the case of the genus with respect to its species is different[36]. Avicenna seems to propose, at a first stage, a restriction of the validity of the statement to those propria that are permanent and common to all of their subjects. The reason for such a restriction lies in Porphyry's individuation of four kinds of proprium, of which only the last one — namely the proprium always and commonly belonging to its species — is finally said to be 'proprium' in the proper sense meant in logic[37]. Arguably, Avicenna wanted to prevent the inference that the kind of proprium that doesn't always belong to its species, or not to all of it, can be counterpredicated as well, because this holds true only if it belongs to the species and only for the members of the species to which it belongs.

[35] Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.11-14 Busse.

[36] Two things are said to 'counterpredicate' (gr. ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι) when the one applies to everything the other applies to and conversely. Two examples of counterpredication are that of the thing and its definition (e.g. 'human' and 'rational animal', since every human is a rational animal and every rational animal is a human) and that of the thing and its proprium (e.g. 'human' and 'capable of laughing', since every human is capable of laughing and every being capable of laughing is a human). The genus and each one of its species do not counterpredicate, because the genus applies to more items than those each one of its species applies to (e.g. 'animal' and its species 'human', since every human is an animal, but not every animal is a human).

[37] Porph., *Isag.*, p. 12.13-22 Busse.

Interestingly, the suspected clause is a sort of correction to Avicenna's own restriction, stating that Porphyry's statement might be considered as valid for the natures of proprium and genus in general (*muṭlaqan*), i.e. without any further specification, since the proprium can be counterpredicated (in case it permanently belongs to all the individuals of the species of which it is predicated), whereas the genus never can[38]. From a doctrinal point of view, the suspected passage seemingly represents a shift within Avicenna's first intention to confine the validity of Porphyry's statement to a certain kind of proprium. From a syntactic point of view, the last part of the relevant passage is rather problematic: in fact, it is quite difficult to understand the passage *aʿnī hāḏā l-ʿaks* (« I mean this convertibility ») within the structure of the clause, from which it appears to be detached.

[Case 5] ***Kitāb al-Madḫal,*** **II.1, p. 93.5-11 Cairo ed.**: « As to what concerns the accident, it is not in itself evident that it is necessary [for it] to have a minor extension than the genus; this because the properties of the ten categories, that we will mention later, are common accidents to the categories' species, therefore being not minor in extension than the genus, on the contrary, among them there is what is more common and greater [in extension], like the fact that substance is established according to a unique definition in a way that it doesn't undergo more and less, is more common than substance. If someone says that this is a negation, and that no meaning is under it, it is still possible for us to find concomitants and accidents that are more common than each category, as one and existent, or as created, or like motion, for it is greater [in extension] than the rational animal which is, according to him (*scil.* Porphyry), a genus for 'man'. The second divergence [...] ».

[38] Certain manuscripts preserve a *qad* before the verb *taḥtamilu* ('is predicated') referring to the nature of the proprium: the *qad* conveys, in this context, a potential meaning, so that it should be understood: « whereas this one [namely the nature of the proprium] *could be/sometimes is* counterpredicated ».

Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Madḫal* II.1, p. 93.5-11	Latin translation (cf. Ven. 1508 f. 10ra)

وأما العرض فليس بيِّنًا بنفسه أنه يجب أن يكون أقلّ من الجنس، وذلك أنّ خواص المقولات العشر التي نذكرها بعد هي أعراض عامة لأنواعها، وليست أقلّ من الجنس في عمومها، بل منها ما هو أعمّ وأكثر، كما أنَّ كون الجوهر ثابتا على حدٍّ واحد فلا يقبل الأشد والأضعف هو أعمّ من الجوهر. فإنْ قال قائل : إنَّ هذا سلبٌ، وليس تحته معنى، فقد يمكننا أن نجد لوازم وعوارض أعمّ من مقولةٍ مقولةٍ، كالواحد وكالموجود، بل كالمحدث، بل مثل الحركة فإنها أكثر من الحيوان الناطق، وهو جنس عنده للإنسان. والمباينة الثانية [. . .]

De accidente autem[1] non[2] ita patet per se an debeat esse minus genere. Proprietates enim decem praedicamentorum de quibus postea loquemur[3] sunt accidentia communia[4] speciebus eorum, et non sunt inferiores generibus[5] in sua communitate. Est autem quaedam ex illis[6] communior et maior[7], sicut hoc[8] quod substantia est ita[9] fixa quod non recipit magis et minus : hoc enim communior est[10] quam substantia. Si autem quis[11] dixerit quod haec negatio est[12], quae non continet intentionem aliquam[13], possumus invenire comitantia et accidentia quae sunt communiora unoquoque praedicamentorum, sicut est unum et[14] ens, et sicut incipere vel[15] fieri*. Differentia autem secunda [...]

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1. بل — الإنسان om. EGJC om. et add. in mg. H

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1. de accidente autem] de accidente vero BU : autem *om.* V || 2. non] quod G || 3. de quibus — loquemur *om.* BU || 4. de quibus postea loquemur *add.* BU || 5. generibus] genere BU || 6. ex illis] ex istis BU || 7. communior et maior] maior et communior BU || 8. sicut hoc *om.* BU || 9. est ita *inv.* MNPG || 10. est *om.* BUM || 11. quis *om.* BU || 12. est *om.* BUMNP || 13. aliquam] quicquam BU || 14. et *om.* BU || 15. vel] et BU

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* sicut incipere vel fieri] *duplex translatio* : ar. *ka-l-muḥdaṯ*

Case 5 : the example of 'motion'. The passage aims at demonstrating that the accident has not always a minor extension in predication than the genus ; the first instance mentioned is that of a feature such as the fact of not undergoing more and less, which belongs to more than just one of the highest genera (for it belongs to the category of substance as well as, for instance, to the category of quantity), therefore having a wider extension of predication than a genus. Then, Avicenna imagines a possible objection to the example he provided, namely that the feature mentioned ('not undergoing more and less') is, actually, the negation (*salb*) of a feature rather than a feature. In order to avoid such an objection,

Avicenna mentions the case of some concomitants and accidents that are more general than each category, like 'one' (*al-wāḥid*), 'existent' (*al-mawǧūd*) and 'created' (*al-muḥdaṯ*). As to 'one' and 'existent', they are the two transcendental notions predicated of all the categories[39]; as to the term 'created', it is arguably a notion that can be applied to all the items that are classified in the categories as well. In fact, it should not be taken as if it just applied to non-eternal items (to the exclusion, therefore, of the eternal substances): in fact, by the term *muḥdaṯ*, Avicenna qualifies any item that is *essentially* — not temporally — posterior to the Necessary Existent[40], hence the term can be predicated of all items other than the Necessary Existent himself[41]. As is evident, the whole argumentation is set at the level of the highest genera, since once it is demonstrated that a certain accident is more common than a single summum genus, no other genus with a wider extension of predication can be found to object that the accident has, however, a smaller extension of predication than that other superior genus.

Problems arise when one tries to explain the mention of 'motion' (*al-ḥaraka*) that is brought in by the suspect passage within this frame. In fact, 'motion' seemingly doesn't fit well in this list of examples both for linguistic and doctrinal reasons: (i) first of all, it is the only name within a list of adjectival attributes, which is quite strange; (ii) secondly, it is doubtful how to understand the term '*ḥaraka*' in this context.

(i) As to the linguistic peculiarity of the mention of 'motion' within the passage, it won't be taken as a decisive argument to rule out the possibility that

[39] Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt*, III.2, p. 103.7-9 Cairo ed.: « The one may correspond with the existent in that the one, like the existent, is said of each one of the categories. But the meaning of the two differs, as you have known. They agree in that neither of them designates the substance of anyone thing. This you have known » (Transl. M. E. Marmura, *Avicenna, The* Metaphysics *of* the Healing, Brigham Young University Press, Provo, Utah 2005, p. 79).

[40] Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt*, VIII.3, pp. 342.17-343.6 Cairo ed.: « Everything is originated (*ḥādiṯ*) from that One, that One being the originator (*muḥdiṯ*) of it, since the originated (*al-muḥdaṯ*) is that which comes into being after not having been. If this posteriority were temporal, then the antecedent precedes it and ceases to exist with its origination. The [antecedent] would, hence, be described as something that was before and is now no more. Hence, nothing would have become disposed to become originated unless there had been something before it that ceases to exist by its coming into existence. Thus, origination from absolute nonexistence — which is creation — becomes false and meaningless. Rather, the posteriority here is essential posteriority. For, the state of affairs that a thing possesses from itself precedes that which it has from another. If it has existence and necessity from another, then from itself it has nonexistence and possibility. Its nonexistence was prior to its existence, and its existence is posterior to nonexistence, [involving] a priority and posteriority in essence. Hence, everything except the First One, comes to exist after not having been, in virtue of what it itself deserves » (Transl. Marmura, *Avicenna, The* Metaphysics *of* the Healing cit., pp. 272-273, slightly modified).

[41] It is worth recalling that, for the mature Avicenna, God is neither a substance nor an accident and, therefore, exceeds the ten categories.

it is actually part of the text, since it could also be admitted as a loose way to mean *al-mutaḥarrik*.

(ii) More challenging is the doctrinal issue. We should expect, in the passage, another example of a concomitant more general than each category (which is indeed the case of 'one', 'existent' and 'created', as previously argued); 'motion', however, seemingly doesn't satisfy this requirement, in Avicenna's view.

Avicenna provides a definition of 'motion' in the first chapter of the second treatise of the *Physics* of the *Šifāʾ*[42], and a discussion of its categorial status in the second chapter of the same treatise[43], to which I will come back shortly. In the section corresponding to the *Categories*, Avicenna criticizes a group of philosophers who believe that motion is a genus external to the ten categories, encompassing the categories of quality, quantity and place (T1).

T1. Ibn Sīnā, *Maqūlāt*, II.4, p. 70.5-13 Cairo ed.

> « Here there occur some doubts concerning some things that are said to exist out of these ten [categories], without being included in them, among which there are things that are more common than a number of them, like motion, for it encompasses the [categories of] quality, quantity and place in a way. [...] Let's say : as to motion, [(a)] if it coincides with the category of passion, then it doesn't add a genus [to the ten categories] ; [(b)] if, [on the contrary], it doesn't coincide with the category of passion, it is not necessary for it to be a genus ; rather, it is necessary for it to be predicated of its kinds by ambiguity (*bi-l-taškīk*), and that this [element] is what prevents to consider motion as the category of passion itself, in case it is impossible. Otherwise, if there isn't anything of this sort preventing [it], then the category of passion is motion itself, but [our] discourse will come back to it in its [proper] place ».

In the passage, Avicenna refutes the idea, endorsed by a group of philosophers, that motion could be considered as a genus encompassing more

[42] See A. Hasnawi, *La définition du mouvement dans la* Physique *du* Šifāʾ *d'Avicenne*, « Arabic Sciences and Philosophy », 11, 2001, pp. 219-255. As well underlined by Hasnawi, two senses of 'motion' are distinguished by Avicenna in this chapter, namely a motion that is the conceived continuity of the process of motion, from the very beginning to the end (the 'mouvement-1' described by Hasnawi) and a motion which is the intermediary state of the mobile subject between the beginning and the end of the process ('mouvement-2' in Hasnawi's article). The most proper sense of 'motion' is, according to Avicenna, the second one, which is also the only one having an extra-mental existence (whereas the first one is just the mental conception of the whole process of motion, and does not exist in the external reality).

[43] See A. Hasnawi, *Le statut catégorial du mouvement chez Avicenne : contexte grec et postérité médiévale latine*, in R. Morelon, A. Hasnawi eds., *De Zénon d'Élée à Poincaré - Recueil d'études en hommage à Roshdi Rashed*, Éditions Peeters, Louvain - Paris 2004, pp. 607-622.

than one category by prospecting two alternatives, namely that (a) motion coincides, in fact, with the category of passion, and (b) that it doesn't coincide with that category, though without being a genus, since in that case it would be predicated of its kinds by ambiguity (*bi-l-taškīk*). The whole argument does not deal extensively with the categorial status of motion (which, in fact, is postponed to the pertinent section of *Physics*); its purpose is rather that of rejecting the idea that motion could be an additional genus to the ten categories. Nonetheless, Avicenna already hints in the passage at what he more extensively explains in the section of *Physics*, namely that motion coincides with the category of passion, which is the only possibility he takes into account for the hypothesis (a), according to which motion fits within the system of the categories. In fact, in *Al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿī*, II.2 (T2), Avicenna introduces three views concerning the problem of how motion fits within the categories.

T2. Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿī*, II.2, p. 93.4-8 ed. Zayed[44]

> « There has been a disagreement about motion's relation to the categories. Some said (i) that motion is the category of passion, while others said (ii) that the term 'motion' applies purely equivocally to the kinds that fall under it. Still others said (iii) that the term 'motion' is an analogical term like the term 'existence', which includes many things neither univocally nor purely equivocally, but analogically; however, the kinds primarily included under the terms 'existence' and 'accident' are the categories [themselves], whereas the kinds included under the term 'motion' are certain species or kinds of the categories ».

The whole chapter is basically devoted to the refutation of the second and the third views, in favour of the first one[45]. Hence, if we took 'motion' in case 5 as an adequate example of something more general than a single category like 'existence' and 'oneness', then, we should admit within this text a non-Avicennan view.

There are some further elements pointing at the fact that 'motion' is not taken as something which exceeds a single category in the context of the passage in case 5. In fact, the reason provided in the clause mentioning 'motion' is, actually, that it is more general than the rational animal, which is a genus of man, which seems to definitely rule out the possibility that this clause is

[44] Translation in J. McGinnis, *Avicenna, The* Physics *of the* Healing, *Books I and II*, Brigham Young University Press, Provo, Utah 2009, p. 128, modified. See also the French translation of the passage in the aforementioned Hasnawi, *Le statut catégorial du mouvement chez Avicenne*, p. 615.

[45] Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿī*, II.2, p. 97.13-15 ed. Zayed: « Since the theories that we have displayed [so far], but not accepted, have been invalidated, there remains the truth uniquely, namely the first theory ».

referring to 'motion' as something more general than a single category. It is very likely that 'motion' has to be intended, in this context, as a quite sloppy way to mean 'moving voluntarily' (*mutaḥarrik bi-l-irāda*). In this sense, the example could somehow have a relation to the general context of the passage, inasmuch as 'capable of moving' is an instance of a concomitant feature that is more general than a genus, though not a highest one (i.e. not a category): it is an example of common accident already provided by Porphyry in the *Isagoge*[46] and elsewhere recalled by Avicenna himself[47]. In this sense, though, the example of 'motion' provided in the suspect clause seems to be out of place, since the list of examples formed by 'existent', 'one' and 'created' is meant to exemplify the case of accidents and concomitants that are more universal than the highest genera. Moreover, not only these examples, but the whole argumentation is built around the highest genera: one of the first examples provided is that of 'not undergoing more or less' (p. 93.8), which is a feature common to more than one category[48]. The argument of the suspect passage, on the other hand, being built on an intermediate genus placed at a lower level of an ideal Porphyry's tree, is less convincing and definitive than Avicenna's previous argument, because one could still object to it that there are higher genera that have a greater extension in predication than that concomitant feature, whereas it is impossible to move such an objection if the whole argument is brought at the level of the highest genera.

To conclude, no matter in which sense we understand the term *ḥaraka* — i.e. as motion in general or, as the suspect passage itself suggests, as the capability of moving voluntarily —, the example turns out to be quite out of place in the specific argumentation, although possibly somehow related to the general subject of the passage.

[46] Porph., *Isag.*, p. 13.18-21 Busse: « Black [is predicated] both of the species of ravens and of the particulars, being an inseparable accident, moving (τὸ κινεῖσθαι) of man and horse, being a separable accident — but principally of the individuals and also, on a second account, of the items which contain the individuals » (Tr. J. Barnes [tr. and comm.], *Porphyry, Introduction*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003, pp. 12-13).

[47] It can be found as an example for common accidents in the early work *K. al-Hidāya* and in the *Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlayʾi*: Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Hidāya*, p. 67 ed. ʿAbduh: « As to the common accident, it is an accidental [feature] either encompassing [several] species, like 'white' for 'snow' and 'gypsum', or the individuals of [several] species, like 'moving' (*ka-l-mutaḥarrik*) »; Ibn Sīnā, *Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlayʾi*, pp. 24-25 ed. Moʿīn-Meshkāt: « [As to the accidental universal, either it belongs to one universal] or it belongs to more than one universal, like motion [belongs] both to man and to something else, and like blackness [belongs] both to raven and to something else. They call this: 'common accident' ».

[48] Substance and quantity, for instance.

IV. How many recensions of the *Šifā'*?

IV.1. *Some observations on the double recension of* Madḫal

To sum up, it can be stated that the passages regarding which the manuscript tradition is divided cannot be easily dismissed as accidental omissions affecting the short version (hypothesis I.1). In some of the cases presented (cases 1-2), it can hardly be established whether the divergences between the short and the long versions are due to an intentional omission of the passages in the short version (hypothesis I.2) or to additions in the long version (hypothesis II), for the passages at stake are apparently both syntactically and doctrinally consistent with the context.

Although it is still possible to claim that the text might have undergone a process of abridgement, this hypothesis is, however, insufficient to explain the stylistic, syntactical and doctrinal issues raised by part of the passages taken into account (cases 3-5). In trying to analyse these cases in the light of hypothesis I.2, in fact, a major difficulty appears, namely that of accounting for the lack of syntactical and doctrinal homogeneity of the first version of the text. In other terms, it is difficult to explain how the problematic passages could fit within the context, if they were meant to be part of the text in the first place. Such difficulties would be, on the contrary, more easily solved by considering the passages at stake as absent at a first stage of the composition and added at a second moment (hypothesis II). In such a frame, the passages were not originally meant as parts of the text, but rather as marginal remarks, that then became fully part of a *versio vulgata* of Avicenna's text, being copied within the text at a quite early stage of the tradition. A *terminus ante quem* for at least a partial inclusion of the textual additions within the text is provided by Lawkarī's quotations, which grant that at least a part of these textual additions could already be read in his copy of the *Šifā'* (cf. case 1). It can be claimed that the process of revision and enlargement of the text antedates all the extant Arabic manuscripts preserving Avicenna's *Madḫal* of which we have knowledge so far: it appears to be completely achieved in the earliest extant Arabic manuscript of the text at our disposal, namely ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276, dating to the first decade of Ḏū l-Ḥiğğa 536H/4th-13th July 1142. The incorporation of these passages within Avicenna's text was, therefore, already active at a very early stage of the transmission, which could explain why more than the 80% of the extant manuscript tradition agree in preserving the textual additions.

The possibility of considering these passages as the result of some textual additions raises the question concerning the author of the textual additions. Virtually, there are three possible answers: (II.1) first, these additions might

result from Avicenna's own afterthoughts on his own text; (II.2.a) secondly, they might be modifications of Avicenna's text made by some of his early disciples: in these two first cases, the interpolations would reveal some precious information about the *compositional* and *editorial* process of the text. (II.2.b) Thirdly, they might be a copyist's addition: in the latter case, they would tell us something about the *transmission* of the text. I would suggest that the third hypothesis (II.2.b) is less likely, because of the nature of such interpolations and because of their huge and quite early diffusion. Once put aside the possibility that the interpolations are the result of a scribal intervention, there remains the possibility that they are either later interventions by Avicenna (II.1) or further remarks by his disciples (II.2.a).

IV.2. *Is there a double recension of other sections of the* Šifāʾ *?*

As to what concerns Avicenna's method of composition and preservation of his works, we dispose of some coeval testimonies that might be put in relation to the textual evidence provided by the manuscript tradition. Avicenna's disciple and secretary Abū ʿUbayd al-Ǧūzǧānī[49] offers us, in his prologue to the *Šifāʾ* (T3), an insight into the starting point of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's works, namely the moment in which a first clean copy is drawn from the author's one.

> **T3.** Abū ʿUbayd al-Ǧūzǧānī, *Prologue to the* Šifāʾ, p. 2.5-7 Cairo ed.[50]
>
> « As to him [i.e. Avicenna], he was not used to keep a copy (*an yaḫzuna nusḫatan*) for himself, as well as he was not used to write down a copy from the holograph (*an yuḥarrira min al-dustūr*) or to draw a copy from the draft (*aw an yuḫriǧa min al-sawād*), but he would just dictate or make [someone else] write the copy (*al-nusḫa*) and give it to the one who had requested it from him ».

The importance of this passage should not be underestimated, since it allows us to determine a precise turning-point within Avicenna's production, coinciding with his encounter with al-Ǧūzǧānī in Ǧurǧān (403-4H/1013-4). Al-Ǧūzǧānī reports in T3 that, before he became Avicenna's secretary, Avicenna did not retain copies of his own works for himself, but he usually gave the single copy of the work to the people who commissioned it. This means that the manuscript tradition of the works composed before a certain phase of Avicenna's career very likely depends on a unique copy that must have not undergone any other

[49] See Al-Rahim, *Avicenna's Immediate Disciples: Their Lives and Works* cit., pp. 4-8.

[50] On the technical terms employed in this passage, see D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 2nd ed., Brill, Leiden 2014, p. 31, n. g.

editorial intervention after it was licenced and given to the commissioner of the work. Things changed from the moment al-Ǧūzǧānī met Avicenna, since, as it can be inferred from T3, he undertook the task of drawing a clean copy from the author's draft, in order to make sure that at least a copy of the work was kept. Within such a scenario, there is no more certainty that all the manuscripts of the works produced after al-Ǧūzǧānī's encounter with Avicenna (the *Šifā'* included) ultimately derive from a unique archetype, for *a priori* there exists the possibility that copies were drawn either from a clean copy or directly from the author's draft.

If the examples taken from Avicenna's *Madḫal* discussed so far can possibly attest that a first short version of the work underwent several textual additions, one could wonder how this could relate to what al-Ǧūzǧānī claims in T3. If the short version reflects the text at an earlier stage of composition, then the few manuscripts that bear traces of this version might preserve a text closer to that supposedly preserved in the author's draft. On the other hand, one could wonder if the long version, which had by far a larger diffusion than the short one, owes this fortune to the fact that it was conceived as a sort of 'official version', an improved edition of the work from which all the copies were preferably drawn. As a purely hypothetical suggestion, I wonder if it could have coincided with a clean copy made under al-Ǧūzǧānī's impulse that incorporated several textual additions and derived (either directly or by the mediation of other copies) from the author's draft.

There is some further evidence in the manuscript tradition of other parts of Avicenna's *Šifā'* which might point at the possibility that the concurrent circulation of a short and a long versions mirrors the coexistence, within Avicenna's school, of the author's draft and of a clean copy attesting the long version of the text. In the section preserving Avicenna's reworking on Aristotle's *Topics* (*K. al-Ǧadal*), for instance, some of the manuscripts that preserved a short version of the passages displayed so far preserve once again a short version of a passage of chap. I.6 (T4), concerning the distinction of the predicables genus and differentia. More in detail, the 'short version' of the text is preserved in the already mentioned mss. JTM[51] and, to my knowledge, in other 9 manuscripts only against the rest of the tradition[52].

[51] Among the witnesses of the short version of *K. al-Madḫal*, mss. ACE do not preserve the *K. al-Ǧadal*, for they only preserve the first half of the Logic of the *Šifā'*.

[52] The nine witnesses of the short version that resulted from this provisional survey of the manuscript tradition are: mss. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 910; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damat İbrahim Paşa 824; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748; İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262; İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3445; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi, Hatice Sultan 208; Benares, Ǧāmiʿa Ǧawādiyya 95; Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1801.

T4. Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Ǧadal* I.6, p. 55.11-14 Cairo ed.

The long version of the passage	The short version of the passage
وأنت تعلم أن الفصل لم يكن في حدودهم يخالف الجنس من جهة المقول على أنواع مختلفة، بل أنه من جهة أنه كان من طريق ما هو، فإذا كان من شأن الفصل، **وأنه** كما صرح به في التعليم الأول حين علم البرهان صالح أن يكون في جواب ما هو، فقد شارك الجنس في هذا الحد.	وأنت تعلم أن الفصل لم يكن في حدودهم يخالف الجنس من جهة المقول على أنواع مختلفة وأنه كما صرح به في التعليم الأول حين علم البرهان صالح أن يكون في جواب ما هو، فقد شارك الجنس في هذا الحد.
You know that the differentia, according to their definitions[a], did not differ from the genus in virtue of [its] being predicated of different species, but [rather] in virtue of [the genus'] being [predicated] in the 'what is it?'; thus, if it were in differentia's nature — as it was explained in the First Teaching, when [Aristotle] taught about the *Demonstration* — to be apt[b] to be [given] in answer to 'what is it?', then [the differentia] would share with the genus this definition.	You know that the differentia, according to their definitions, did not differ from the genus in virtue of [its] being predicated of different species, and that — as it was explained in the First Teaching, when [Aristotle] taught about of the *Demonstration* — differentia is apt to be [given] in answer to 'what is it?', so that [the differentia] might share with the genus this definition.

[a] Avicenna refers to the traditional definitions of differentia, namely that provided by Porphyry and the rest of the philosophical tradition following in his path.

[b] In order to translate the passage as it is presented in the Cairo edition, a small correction was made: instead of *wa-annahu* in p. 55.13, one has to read *annahu*. Cf. *infra* for a discussion of the problem.

Once again, the divergence between the long and the short version cannot be explained in a satisfying manner as the result of a merely accidental omission of a clause in the short version (hypothesis I.1). Moreover, the passage in its long version, as it is preserved in the Cairo edition and in most of the manuscript tradition, is a bit problematic from a syntactical point of view. The problem lies in the point of conjunction between the clause absent in the short version and the rest of the passage: in fact, the presence of the preceding hypothetical clause prevents from understanding the *wa-annahu* (« and that it [*scil.* the differentia] ») in the long version in the same way as in the short version, namely

as depending on the opening clause *wa-anta taʿlamu anna al-faṣla* (« you know that the differentia... »). A way to understand the passage in its long version would be that of emending the *wa-annahu* in *annahu*, which should be understood in relation to the hypothetical clause (« if it were in differentia's nature [...] *that it* [...] »). A small amount of manuscripts preserving the long version reacts to the syntactical issue by emending in three different ways: some adopt the aforementioned correction of *wa-annahu* in *annahu*[53]; some others omit *annahu*[54] and others entirely omit *wa-annahu*[55]. The diffraction of the solutions adopted and the fact that the corrections are in a very small number of witnesses is somehow revealing of the fact that these corrections are *a posteriori* attempts to make sense of a corrupted text.

The fact that the long version of the passage, as it is preserved in most of the manuscript tradition, presents a syntactical issue that the short version avoids, could either mean that the short version is the result of an intentional abridgement, made to avoid the syntactical problem (hypothesis I.2), or the long version is the result of an interpolation, and the syntactical issues would be a sign of the absence in a previous version of the text of the clause only preserved in the long version (hypothesis II).

In this case, however, the manuscript tradition offers an additional element that leads to incline towards hypothesis II rather than to hypothesis I.2. More in detail, six manuscripts include the clause at stake between two marks, and preserve a marginal scribal note, attested in the manuscript tradition in two slightly different versions (A and B), which claims that the passage at stake was absent from the manuscript of the author.

More in detail, a first version of the note (a) is witnessed by three stemmatically-related witnesses[56], namely ms. İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710[57], ms. Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt Collection

[53] Ms. K before a later intervention in a different ink restoring the reading *wa-annahu* by collation.

[54] Mss. G, Y and ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār 8331 (n. 36 in Appendix A).

[55] Ms. İstanbul, Köprülü Halk Kütüphanesi, Fazil Ahmet Paşa 894 (n. 56 in Appendix A); the text in this form is, however, nonetheless problematic.

[56] The three manuscripts are very likely copies descending from the same antigraph, which arguably circulated within the school of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; see S. Di Vincenzo, *Early Exegetical Practice on Avicenna's* Šifāʾ *: Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's* Marginalia *to Logic*, « Arabic Sciences and Philosophy » (forthcoming).

[57] A complete copy of the *Šifāʾ*, dated 25 Rabīʿ al-Awwal-25 Šawwāl 666H/21st December 1267-15th July 1268 and realized by ʿAbd al-Kāfī Ibn ʿAbd al-Maǧīd Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī.

44988, 331 *falsafa*[58] and ms. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909[59]; the second version of the same note (b) is attested by the thirteenth-century ms. İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424[60] (stemmatically related to the manuscripts preserving the version A of the note)[61], and by two seventeenth-century manuscripts, namely ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 243[62] and ms. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 6596[63] (in the latter, the note is erroneously interpolated in the main text).

T5. *Marginal scribal note preserved in the long version*

(a) Ms. Nuruosmaniye 2710, f. 101^{v}; ms. Maktabat al-Azhar, Beḫīt 331, f. 161^{v}; ms. Ragıp Paşa 909, f. 302^{v}	**(b)** Ms. Carullah 1424, f. 137^{v}; Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 243, f. 179^{r}; Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 6596, f. 172^{v}
ما بين العلامتين ليس في نسخة المصنّف .	ما بين العلامتين ليس في نسخة الدستور .
What is between the two marks [i.e. the clause at stake] is not in **the manuscript of the author**.	What is between the two marks [i.e. the clause at stake] is not in **the manuscript of the [author's] holograph**.

According to the scribal note preserved in these manuscripts, the clause that is absent in the short version was also absent in the manuscript of the author (*muṣannif*)[64], or in his own holograph (*dustūr*)[65]. This latter term is the same one

[58] A thirteenth-century manuscript of which neither the precise date of copy nor the copyist are known; it is one of the ten manuscripts employed in the Cairo edition.

[59] An Ottoman copy preserving the section of Logic of the *Šifāʾ* only. The copy dates to the 29 Ǧumādà al-āḫira 1134H/ 16th April 1722, and its copyist, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī, realized it under the request of his master Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī in the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople.

[60] A complete copy of the *Šifāʾ*, dated to the year 693H/1293-4; its copyist, Abū Bakr ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī, realized it for the library of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī.

[61] On the relation of this manuscript to the three witnesses of version A, see again Di Vincenzo, *Early Exegetical Practice on Avicenna's* Šifāʾ *: Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's* Marginalia *to Logic* (forthcoming).

[62] The manuscript is a complete copy of the *Šifāʾ*; it was copied in Šīrāz in 1075H/1664-5 by Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Urdistānī according to Anawati, *Essai de bibliographie avicennienne* cit., p. 432. It is reported as undated by R. Wisnovsky, *Indirect Evidence for Establishing the Text of the* Shifāʾ, « Oriens », 40, 2012, p. 263.

[63] The manuscript is a complete copy of the *Šifāʾ* realized in 1076H/1665-6 by Sulṭān Muḥammad Ibn Rafīʿ al-Dīn Muḥammad Iṣfahānī.

[64] On the Arabic term *muṣannif*, meaning 'author, compositor, compiler', see A. Gacek, *The Arabic Manuscript Tradition: A Glossary of Technical Terms and Bibliography*, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 2001, p. 86.

[65] The term *dustūr* usually designates the author's original, or the archetype of the entire tradition; see Gacek, *The Arabic Manuscript Tradition* cit., p. 46.

employed by al-Ǧūzǧānī as a synonym of *sawād* (designating the author's draft) to refer to Avicenna's own holographs in his prologue to the *Šifā'* (see T3 above). If we trust the scribal note, the clause only preserved in the long version should be considered as an addition made after the first composition of the passage.

From a syntactical point of view, as previously argued, the text seems to work better without the allegedly-added clause. From a doctrinal point of view, the clause at stake is unnecessary: Avicenna's argument against the traditional (i.e. Porphyry's and his followers'[66]) definitions of the differentia specifica claims that, provided that the traditional definitions considered the differentia as predicated of several species as well as the genus[67], and provided that Aristotle allows, to some extent, in the *Posterior Analytics* an essential predication of the differentia (a predication ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν) as well as the genus, then the genus and the differentia end up sharing the same definition (i.e. they are both defined as *predicated of several items differing in species in answer to 'what is it?'*), which is an undesired conclusion. The structure of Avicenna's critical argument is seemingly perfectly fine without the additional clause.

What is, then, the purpose of the addition of that clause in the long version? First, it specifies the element in virtue of which the differentia and the genus are distinguished in the traditional definitions, namely by the fact that genus is predicated in the 'what is it?' (ar. *min ṭarīqi mā huwa*). Second, it introduces a hypothetical clause that changes quite radically the structure of the phrase: in fact, instead of directly stating, as in the short version, that Aristotle allows a predication of the differentia in answer to 'what is it?' (ar. *fī ǧawābi mā huwa*), the long version suggests it in a more hypothetical way (« if it were in differentia's nature [...] to be apt to be [given] in answer to 'what is it?'... »). My suggestion is that the clause might have been added not only with an explicative purpose, but likely with the aim of 'rectifying' the doctrine of the passage too. In fact, the modification could be understood in the light of Avicenna's distinction between a predication in the 'what is it?' (ar. *min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) — describing the way in which the constituents of a quiddity (hence, both genus and differentia) are essentially predicated — and a predication in answer to 'what is it?' (ar. *fī ǧawābi mā huwa*) — more specifically describing the way in which predicables signifying the thing's quiddity, like the genus and the species, are essentially predicated of it, to the exclusion of the differentia[68]. Reading in the short version of T4 that the differentia is

[66] For a tentative identification of the indistinct plurality of thinkers to which Avicenna refers in this passage, see S. Di Vincenzo, *Avicenna against Porphyry's Definition of* Differentia Specifica « Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale », 26, 2015, pp. 129-183.

[67] For Avicenna's refutation of this point, see Di Vincenzo, *Avicenna against Porphyry's Definition of* Differentia Specifica cit., pp. 132-151.

[68] This distinction is extensively dealt with by Avicenna in *Madḫal*, II.1, p. 94.4-96.18 Cairo ed.; for an English translation and a discussion of this passage, cf. Di Vincenzo, *Avicenna against Porphyry's Definition of* Differentia Specifica cit., pp. 152-183. For this distinction in Avicenna's *Burhān*, see B. Ibrahim, *Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Philosophical Approach to the Study of Natural Phenomena*, PhD Thesis submitted to McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal 2013, especially pp. 47-59.

predicated in answer to 'what is it?' (ar. *fī ǧawābi mā huwa*) might have, then, impelled someone to modify the passage, in order to smooth a statement that was in apparent contradiction with Avicenna's own thought. However, the contradiction in the short version is only apparent: Avicenna is just reporting the claim that the differentia is predicated in answer to 'what is it?' (*fī ǧawābi mā huwa*) ascribing it to Aristotle, and is still not exposing his own distinction of two levels of essential predication. In sum, the addition of the clause could be the result of a revision of the text aiming at making it clearer and more 'consistent' with Avicenna's doctrine.

To sum up, the textual case in *Ǧadal*, I.6 presents several elements of analogy with the cases taken from *Madḫal*: most part of the manuscript tradition attests, in this case as well, a longer version of the text, and the longer version presents some syntactical difficulties, whereas the shorter version is perfectly fine. In this case, however, we get some additional information allowing us to exclude the hypothesis that the shorter version is the result of an intentional abridgement of the text (I.2), for we are told that it is rather the version preserved in the author's manuscript and, therefore, supposedly the original version. In this case as well, the hypothesis that the long version might be the result of a copyist's interpolation (hypothesis II.b.2) seems quite unlikely, because of the nature of the text interpolated.

IV.3. *Who's the 'author' of the long version (*versio vulgata*)?*

Ideally, the textual additions showed so far for Avicenna's *Madḫal* and *Ǧadal*, implying a doctrinal expansion and modification of the text, should be expected from the author's part. However, although it cannot be definitely excluded, both the style and content of some of the passages analysed (cf. cases 3-5 in section III) represent a difficulty face to the hypothesis that the additions are all Avicenna's (hypothesis II.1). The traditional notion of 'author' — strictly referring to one single authorial figure that is the only one who detains the control of all of his work — is probably not entirely suitable to account for the composition of the *Šifāʾ*. Perhaps, the possibility that the work underwent a revision that is, to some extent, the result of a collective work should be taken into account. A scenario of this sort seems to be suggested by a series of testimonies concerning the composition of the work. In fact, the text of the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* was an object of the scholastic debate when Avicenna was still alive; this can be inferred from the introduction of a letter of Avicenna's to his colleague Ibn Zayla (d. 440H/1048)[69], in which Ibn Zayla declares having urged Avicenna to provide further clarifications concerning what he states in the beginning of the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* (T6).

[69] On Ibn Zayla, see Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition* cit., pp. 195-199 and Al-Rahim, *Avicenna's Immediate Disciples: their Lives and Works* cit., pp. 14-16. For more information about the text of this introduction and for his English translation, see Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition* cit., pp. 199-200.

T6. Introduction to Ibn Sīnā's letter to Ibn Zayla [ed. REISMAN, *The making of the Avicennan tradition*, p. 284][70]

« [Ibn Zayla] said: In our Master's statement at the beginning of *The Cure* (*fī ftitāḥ Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*), I came upon some contradictory and conflicting points that fall outside the consensus [of scholars] (*al-iǧmāʿ*). So it would behove him to provide a correction of that and to disclose the picture of it [that he has in mind], if he can ».

Discussions concerning several doctrinal points of the *Šifāʾ* might have arisen from the reading-sessions of the work to which, according to al-Ǧūzǧānī's account, Avicenna took part together with his disciples, apparently also before the end of the composition of the whole work (T7):

T7. ABŪ ʿUBAYD AL-ǦŪZǦĀNĪ, *Biography of Ibn Sīnā*, pp. 54-56 ed. Gohlman[71]

« [...] And so he began with the 'Physics' (*al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*) of a work which he called the *Šifāʾ* (*Healing*). He had already written the first book of the *Qānūn*, and every night pupils (*ṭalabat al-ʿilm*) would gather at his house, while by turns I would read from the *Šifāʾ* and someone else would read from the *Qānūn*. [...] The instruction took place at night, because of the lack of free time during the day on account of his service to the Amīr »[72].

An objection could possibly be raised against the hypothesis of a second recension resulting from the scholarly activity of Avicenna's disciples on their master's work, namely that we have little clue about their attitude towards Avicenna's authority and, consequently, it cannot be stated to what extent they could feel entitled to introduce modifications in his own work. As a partial answer to such an objection, however, it could be observed that some of Avicenna's works were the object of non-authorial editorial interventions within Avicenna's school. For instance, al-Ǧūzǧānī's editorial activity on Avicenna's works, and more specifically on the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*, is well documented[73]. Just to mention a couple of instances of the interventions specifically concerning the

[70] Transl. in REISMAN, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition* cit., p. 199, slightly modified.

[71] Transl. in W. E. GOHLMAN, *The Life of Ibn Sina: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*, SUNY Press, Albany, New York 1974, pp. 55-57.

[72] The amīr Abū Ṭāhir Šams al-Dawla (r. 387-419/997-1021 ca.).

[73] As reported by al-Bayhaqī (*Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, p. 94 ed. Šafīʿ), al-Ǧūzǧānī is responsible for the addition of a section on Mathematics to both the *Kitāb al-Naǧāt* and the *Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī*; see also A. BERTOLACCI, *The Reception of Aristotle's* Metaphysics *in Avicenna's* Kitāb al-Šifāʾ *– A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2006, pp. 37, 587-588 and AL-RAHIM, *Avicenna's Immediate Disciples: Their Lives and Works* cit., p. 7.

Šifāʾ, one can think of the addition of his own prologue to the whole *summa* and to the quotation of an excerpt of Avicenna's *Al-Adwiya al-Qalbiyya* added between the fourth and the fifth treatise of the *Kitāb al-Nafs*[74]. It is also worth recalling that T3 attested that al-Ǧūzǧānī assumed at a certain point a crucial role within the transmission of Avicenna's work, like the creation of a clean copy that was probably meant to be the archetype of the rest of the tradition[75]. Seemingly, the editing of a clean copy of Avicenna's works after their first composition was more a task undertook by Avicenna's circle of disciples rather than Avicenna's own occupation[76]. It is, therefore, possible that Avicenna's direct disciples played, at least to some extent, a non-marginal role in the revision and improvement of their master's work, contributing to creating a second, enlarged and 'improved' version of the text.

Conclusion

The present survey conducted on the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḫal* revealed several textual cases that might point to the existence of two different recensions of the work. Some additional evidence, provided by the analysis of the manuscript tradition of another section of the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*, namely the *Kitāb al-Ǧadal*, together with the information about the composition of the *Šifāʾ* that we get from the testimonies of Avicenna's direct disciples, might suggest that a first authorial recension of the work might have been revised and enlarged by means of textual additions. The long version resulting from this revision would be a second recension of the work, a '*versio vulgata*' that is much more widespread in the manuscript tradition and in whose genesis the scholarly activity of Avicenna's disciples might perhaps have played a relevant role. In such a scenario, the twelfth-century Latin translation of *Kitāb al-Madḫal* would

[74] On this addition and its diffusion within the manuscript tradition, see the article by T. Alpina in the present volume.

[75] Al-Ǧūzǧānī also personally undertook, in certain cases, the copy of his master's works; for instance, he wrote under dictation the *Muḫtaṣar al-Awṣaṭ fī l-Manṭiq*; cf. Abū ʿUbayd al-Ǧūzǧānī, *Biography of Ibn Sīnā*, p. 44 ed. Gohlman: « I used to attend him [Ibn Sīnā] every day and study the *Almagest* and ask for dictation in logic, so he dictated *The Middle Summary on Logic* (*al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awṣaṭ fī l-Manṭiq*) to me » (transl. in Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sina* cit., p. 45).

[76] In the case of Avicenna's *Lisān al-ʿArab*, apparently, Avicenna's circle failed in this task, due to the poor conditions of Avicenna's first draft; the author evidently didn't take care of drawing a clean copy of the work, according to his habits (cf. T3). See Abū ʿUbayd al-Ǧūzǧānī, *Biography of Ibn Sīnā*, p. 72 ed. Gohlman: « The Master then wrote a book on philology which he called *The Arabic Language* (*Lisān al-ʿArab*), to which he had composed nothing analogous on philology, and which he did not transcribe it into clean copy (*al-bayāḍ*). The writing was still in its rough state (*ʿalà musawwadatihi*) when he died, and no one could discover how to put it in order (*tartīb*) » (transl. in Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sina* cit., p. 73, slightly modified).

play a key role in the reconstruction of an earlier stage of composition of the work, being based on an Arabic exemplar that would be the so far known most ancient witness of the first recension of Avicenna's work.

The hypothetical reconstruction provided in this paper, as a merely provisional result of a still ongoing research, demands a further inquiry into the other half of the estimated manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḫal* and an exhaustive survey of the manuscript tradition of the other sections of the *summa*. Such an inquiry is expected to be able to verify if, on the one hand, this hypothesis of explanation holds for the section of *Madḫal* and, on the other, if it can be extended to the other sections of the *Šifāʾ*. By way of conclusion, I'd suggest that the hypothesis concerning the existence of two recensions of Avicenna's first work of the *Šifāʾ* — and, possibly, of the whole *summa* — is at least a possibility that should not be overlooked when undertaking the task of editing the text of the different sections of Avicenna's *Šifāʾ*.

APPENDIX A

List of the manuscripts employed for the present work and of the manuscripts employed for the Cairo edition[77]

Manuscripts employed	Mss. of Cairo ed.
XIIc.	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276 (first decade of Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 536H/4th-13th July **1142**)	
XIIIc.	
* İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 772 (Šaʿbān 628H / June-July **1231**)	x
İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 (25 Rabīʿ al-Awwal-25 Šawwāl 666H/21st December **1267**-15th July **1268**)	
Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt Collection 44988, 331 *falsafa* (VII/**XIII** c.)	x
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 (671-674H/**1272-1276**)	
* İstanbul, Millet Kütüphanesi (now: Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi), Ali Emiri 1504 (674H/**1275-6**)	x
* İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 (10 Rabīʿ l-awwal 677H/8th August **1278**)	
* İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Āşir Efendi 207 (680H/**1281-2**)	x
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (693H/**1293-4**)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damat İbrahim Paşa 823 (697H/**1297-8**)	
XIVc.	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damat İbrahim Paşa 822 (**XIII-XIV** c.)	
XVc.	
İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262 (IX/**XV** c.)	

[77] An asterisk marks the manuscripts bearing traces of the short version of Avicenna's text.

*Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 1057 (IX/**XV** c.)	
İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3445 (XI/XVII c. Anawati; probably before XV/**XVI** c.)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damat İbrahim Paşa 824 (824H/**1421-2**)	x
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Mağlis-i Šūrā-yi Millī (now: Mağlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī Library) 135 (871H/**1466-7**)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748 (27 Rağab 879H/16th December **1474**)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 771 (885H/**1480-1**)	
* İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 770 (888H/**1483-4**)	
İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 (886H/1481-897H/**1492**)	
Benares, Ğāmiʿa Ğawādiyya, Bonaras 95 (20 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 902H/5th December **1496**)	
XVIc.	
* Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Golius Or. 4 (before Xc. H/**XVIc.**)	
* Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1326 [former 580] (Xc. H ?/**XVI** c.?)	
İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708 (X/**XVI** c.)	x
Khvoy, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247 (Ramaḍān 986H/November-December **1578**)	
Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 3983 (vols. i-ii) (1002H/**1593-4**)	
XVIIc.	
Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya (now: Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya), 894 *falsafa* (X-XI/**XVI-XVII** c.)	x
* Mašhad, Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 1119 (XI/**XVII** c.)	
London, British Museum (now: BLOIOC) Or. 7500 (XI/**XVII** c.)	x
Kashan, Fahrang va Irshad 15 (XI/**XVII** c.)	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Mağlis-i Šūrā-yi Millī 1907 (XI/**XVII** c.)	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Dāniškāda-i Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 236/1 (XI/**XVII** c.)	

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550 (1023H/**1614-5**)	
* İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 773 (26 Šaʿbān 1041H/18th March **1632**)	
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Ar. 6829 (Ḏū l-ḥiǧǧa 1054-Ḏū l-Qaʿda 1055H /January-February **1645** – December 1645 -January **1646**)	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār (now: Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Šahīd Muṭahharī) 8331 (1055H/**1645-6**)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 795 (1066H/**1655-6**)	
Aligarh, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 110/30 (1071H/**1660-1**)	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 243 (Šīrāz, 1075H/**1664-5**)	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 6596 (1076H/**1665-6**)	
London, Royal Asiatic Society, Arabic 58 (Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1082H/ July-August **1671**)	
İstanbul, Millet Kütüphanesi (now: Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi), Feyzullah Efendi 1206 (1093H/**1682**)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa 857 (1102H/**1690-1**)	
XVIIIc.	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1425 (1125H/**1713-4**)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565 (before 29 Ṣafar 1135H / 9th December **1722**)	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 (İstanbul, 29 Ǧumādà al-āḫira 1134H/ 16th April **1722**)	
London, British Museum (now: BLOIOC), India Office Ar. 1420 (1148H/**1735-6**, from an exemplar completed in 891H/1486-7)	x
Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 3477 (XII/**XVIII** c.)	
XIXc.	
Beirut, Maktaba Šarqiyya, Université Saint-Joseph 372 (XIII/**XIX** c.)	
Hyderabad, Osmaniya University Library, acq. 582 (XIII/**XIX** c.)	

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Mağlis-i Šūrā-yi Millī 1908 (XIII/**XIX** c.)	
Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 3478 (1267H/**1850-1**)	
XXc.	
	Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 262 *ḥikma wa-falsafa* (1337H/**1918-9**)
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī 1801 (final colophon, different hand: date 1343H = **1924-5**)	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Dāniškāda-i Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 593/1 (XIV/**XX** c.)	
Unknown date	
İstanbul, Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ʿUmūmī) 4288	
İstanbul, Köprülü Halk Kütüphanesi, Fazil Ahmet Paşa 894	
İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 910	
* İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi, Hatice Sultan 208	
Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 7590	

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF AVICENNA'S *KITĀB AL-MADḪAL*

Fig. 1. *Percentage of the manuscript tradition taken into account for the present inquiry*



Fig. 2. *Chronological distribution of the manuscripts taken into account*



Fig. 3. *Manuscripts taken into exam preserving the short version*



ABSTRACT

Is There a versio vulgata *of Avicenna's* Kitāb al-Šifāʾ *? On the Hypothesis of a Double Recension of* Kitāb al-Madḫal

The present paper concerns the textual tradition of Avicenna's reworking of Porphyry's *Isagoge* (*Kitāb al-Madḫal*) opening the Logic section of Avicenna's *Book of the Cure* (*Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*). The present inquiry, conducted on 59 Arabic manuscripts and on the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work, has as its starting point the observation that the Latin translation, together with 11 Arabic manuscripts and the early indirect tradition of the work, witnesses the existence of a different, shorter, version of some passages of the text than that attested by most of the manuscripts. I shall suggest that one of the possibilities that should at least be considered in the attempt to explain this phenomenon is that of considering the short version of the text as an earlier recension of the text. In the frame of this hypothetical suggestion, the majority of the manuscript tradition would preserve an interpolated text, a *versio vulgata* that might not correspond to Avicenna's first version of the text. The existence and diffusion of two different recensions of the work might provide a clue of the compositional and editorial process that Avicenna's *Book of the Cure* underwent.

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The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement n° 339621.